Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE GWALIOR SUGAR CO., LTD.,AND OTHERS(AND CONNECTED APPEAL)
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/11/1960
BENCH:
ACT:
Cess-Levy on sugar cane ordered by erstwhile Ruler-Consti-
tutional validity-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 265, 373.
HEADNOTE:
In order to put the sugar industry on a stable footing, for
which it was necessary to develop the cane area, the Ruler
of the erstwhile Gwalior State by an order dated 27-7-1946
sanctioned the levy of cess of one anna per maund on all
sugar cane purchased by the respondent company. When the
Government of Madhya Bharat, which was the successor state
of the former Gwalior State, made a demand for payment of
the cess, the respondent filed a petition before the High
Court of Madhya ,Bharat challenging the legality of the levy
on the grounds (1) that the order dated 27-7-1946 was only
an executive order and not a law under Art. 265 of the
Constitution of India and that, therefore, there was no
authority for the imposition of the cess after January 26,
1950, and (2) that the levy was discriminatory and violated
Art. 14 inasmuch as while the respondent was made liable to
pay the cess the other sugar factories in the State were
exempt. It was found that at the time when cess was first
levied there was no sugar factory in existence in the
Gwalior State other than that of the respondent.
Held, that (i) the Ruler of an Indian State was an absolute
monarch in which there was no constitutional limitation to
act in any manner he liked, he being the supreme
legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of
the executive. I Consequently, the order dated 27-7-1946
issued by the Ruler of Gwalior State amounted to a law
enacted by him and became an existing law under Art. 372 of
the Constitution of India. The levy of cess was therefore
by authority of law within the meaning of Art. 265;
Madhaorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] 1
S.C.R. 957, followed.
(2) the levy of cess did not contravene Art. 14 because (a)
the object was cane development in the particular area and a
geographical classification based upon historical factors
was a permissible mode of classification, and (b) a tax
could not be struck down as discriminatory unless it was
found that it was imposed with a deliberate intention of
differentiating between
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(ii) where the order is passed by the Sub-divisional Animal
Husbandry Officer, under sub-rule (5), to the District
Animal Husbandry Officer and
(iii) where the order is passed by the authority prescribed
under sub-rule (1) to the Sub-divisional Animal Husbandry
Officer, if there is one; if not, to the District Animal
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Husbandry Officer;
(b) The appeal shall not be decided against the appellant
unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being
heard."
The argument on behalf of the petitioners is that they are
"Kassais" by profession and they earn their living by
slaughtering cattle only (not goats or sheep which are
slaughtered by "Chiks"); that they have the fundamental
right to carry on their profession and trade; and that s. 3
of the Act read with r. 3 imposes unreasonable
restrictions--restrictions not in the interests of the
general public-on their fundamental right and therefore they
are not saved by cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.
Some of these arguments were considered by this Court in Md.
Hanif Quareshi v. The State of Bihar (1) and it was pointed
out that the test of reasonableness should be applied to
each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard,
or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as
applicable to all cases. It referred to the decision in
State of Madras v. V. G. Row (2) and repeated what was said
therein that "the nature of the right alleged to have been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be
remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the
prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict." ’Another consideration which has to be
kept in mind is that "the legislature is the best judge of
what is good for the community,. by whose suffrage it comes
into existence...................... (See The State of Bihar
v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (3)).
But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity
of the law must rest with the
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 629. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 597.
(3) [1952] S.C.R. 889.
621
Court and the Court must not shirk that solemn duty cast on
it by the Constitution. We must, therefore, approach the
problem before us in the light of the principles laid down
by this Court.
The most pertinent question is-having regard to all the
relevant circumstances, is the age of 25 years laid down in
s. 3 a reasonable restriction on the right of the
petitioners in the interests of the general public ? We are
unable to say that it is. Apart from the affidavits made on
behalf of the petitioners and the respondent State, a large
volume of authoritative and expert opinion has been placed
before us which shows beyond any doubt that a bull, bullock
or she-buffalo does not remain useful after 14 or 15 years
and only a few of them live up to the age of 25. In the
Report of the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee,
published by the Ministry of Agriculture, it is recommended
by the Committee that the slaughter of animals over 14 years
of age and unfit for work as also animals of any age
permanently unable to work owing to injury or deformity,
should be allowed. In the Report on the Marketing of Meat
in India (published by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture)
there is a reference to a draft Bill circulated by the
Ministry of Agriculture (page 112 of the Report) which
contains a clause that animals over 14 years of age and
unfit for work may be slaughtered on a certificate from a
Veterinary Officer. In the Report on the Marketing of
Cattle in India, again published by the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, occurs the following passage as to the price of
animals with reference to their age:
"Young draught animals up to the age of 4 years-being raw
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and untrained-fetch comparatively low prices. Between 4 and
8 years of age, the animals are in the prime of their youth
and tender best service, and fetch maximum prices. From the
8th year onwards old age sets in, and a graded decline is
observed in their capacity to work and consequently prices
depreciate considerably." .
In a Food and Agricultural Organisation study of cattle in
India and Pakistan (Zebu Cattle of India and
79
622
Pakistan, page 94) it is stated that the active breeding
life of a bull is estimated to be about 10 years. In
Black’s Veterinary Dictionary (edited by W. C. Miller and G.
P. West, fifth edition) it is stated that pedigree ,bulls
may reach 12 or 14 years of age before being discarded; and
cattle seldom live longer than 15 or 16 years, and when they
do, their age is usually of no immediate importance. In
another publication of the Ministry of Agriculture called
’Problems of Cattle Insurance’ under Indian conditions, it
is stated that the life of cattle is comparatively much
shorter, the maximum age being only about 15 years. There
is an interesting chart relating to the determination of age
in cattle in a publication called ’Cattle Development in
Uttar Pradesh’ by R. L. Kaura, Director of Animal Husbandry;
that chart shows that at II years incisors appear smaller
due to wearing out; at 12 years space appears between the
teeth, and after 12 teeth wear out constantly and roots
remain far apart from one another. As against all this
expert opinion the respondent State has relied on the chart
embodying some useful data about domestic animals, prepared
by Major A. C. Aggarwala, Director of Veterinary Services,
Punjab, and R. R. Gulati, Superintendent, Veterinary
Department, Jullandur, which shows the sterility age of a
buffalo at 15 and average age at 25, and of a cow sterility
at 15 and 16 years and average life 22 years.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
We are clearly of the view that the almost unanimous opinion
of experts is that after the age of 15, bulls. bullocks and
buffaloes are no longer useful for breeding, draught and
other purposes and whatever little use they may have then is
greatly offset by the economic disadvantages of feeding and
maintaining unserviceable cattle-disadvantages to which we
had referred in much greater detail in Md. Hanif Quareshi’s
case (1). Section 3 of the Bihar Act in so far as it has
increased the age limit to 25 in respect of bulls, bullocks
and she-buffaloes, imposes an unreasonable restriction on
the fundamental right of the petitioners, a restriction
moreover which cannot be said to be in
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 629.
623
the interests of the general public, and to that extent it
is void. We may here repeat what we said in Chintaman Rao
v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1):
"The phrase ’reasonable restriction’ connotes that the
limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right
should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond
what is required in the interests of the public. The word
’reasonable’ implies intelligent care and deliberation, that
is, the choice of a course which reason dictates.
Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the
right cannot be said to contain the quality of
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reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance
between the freedom guaranteed in Art. 19(1)(g) and the
social control permitted by clause (6) of Art. 19, it must
be held to be wanting in that quality."
As to r. 3 the grievances of the petitioners are these.
Under the rule the prescribed authority for the purpose of
s. 3 of the Act consists of the Veterinary Officer and the
Chairman or Chief Officer of a District Board, Municipality
etc. Unless both of them concur, no certificate for
slaughter can be granted. It is pointed out that the
Chairman or Chief Officer would be a layman not in a
position to judge the age or usefulness of cattle. The
result would be that the animal in respect of which a
certificate is required may have to be shown to the
Veterinary Officer as also the Chairman or Chief Officer,
who may not be staying at the same place as the Veterinary
Officer. If the two differ, the matter has to be referred
to the Sub-divisional Animal Husbandry Officer. This
procedure, it is contended, will involve the expenditure of
so much money and time that it will not be worthwhile for
the petitioners to ask for a certificate, or having got a
certificate, to slaughter the animal. An animal which is
above 15 or which has become useless generally costs much
less than a young, serviceable animal. If the petitioners
have to incur all the expenditure which the procedure laid
down by r. 3 must necessarily cost them, then they must
close down their trade. As to the right of appeal from an
order refusing to grant a
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 759,763.
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certificate, it is contended that that right is also
illusory for all practical purposes. To take the animal to
the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry or the District
Animal Husbandry Officer or the Sub-divi sional Animal
Husbandry Officer, as the case may be, and to keep and feed
the animal for the period of the appeal and its hearing will
cost more than the price of the animal itself.
We consider that these grievances of the petitioners have
substance, and judged from the practical point of view, the
provisions of r. 3 impose disproportionate restrictions on
their right. It is difficult to understand why the
Veterinary Officer, who has the necessary technical
knowledge, cannot be trusted to give the certificate and why
it should be necessary to resort to a complicated procedure
to resolve a possible difference of opinion between two
officers, later followed by a still more expensive appeal.
We, therefore, hold r. 3 also to be bad in so far as it
imposes disproportionate restrictions indicated above, on
the right of the petitioners.
(2) We now proceed to consider the Uttar Pradesh Prevention
of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Act, 1958. After the decision
of this Court in Md. Hanif Quareshi v. The State of Bihar
(1) an Ordinance was passed called the Uttar Pradesh
Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958.
This Ordinance was later repealed and replaced by the Act.
The petitioners say that in the Bill as originally drafted
the age limit below which slaughter was not permissible was
put at 15 years; but the Select Committee increased it to 20
years. It will probably be best, for clearness sake, to set
forth not the whole provisions of the Act, for that would be
too lengthy, but those which form most directly the subject
matter on which the controversy turns. Section 3 of the Act
reads (omitting portions not relevant for our purpose)-
"S. 3(1) Except as hereinafter provided, no person shall
slaughter or cause to be slaughtered or offer or cause to be
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offered for slaughter-
(a)..........................................
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 629.
625
(b) a bull or bullock, unless he has obtained in respect
thereof a certificate in writing, from the competent
authority of the area in which the bull or bullock is to be
slaughtered, certifying that it is fit for slaughter...
(2) No bull or bullock, in respect of which a certificate
has been issued under sub-section (1)(b) shall be’
slaughtered at any place other than the place indicated in
the certificate or within twenty days of the date of issue
of the certificate.
(3) A certificate under sub-section (1)(b) shall be issued
by the competent authority, only after it has, for reasons
to be recorded in writing, certified that(a) the bull or
bullock is over the age of twenty years; and
(b) in the case of a bull, it has become permanently unfit
and unserviceable for the purpose of breeding and, in the
case of a bullock, it has become permanently unfit and
unserviceable for the purposes of draught and any kind of
agricultural operation:
Provided that the permanent unfitness or unserviceability
has not been caused deliberately.
(4) The competent authority shall, before issuing the
certificate under sub-section (3) or refusing to issue the
same, record its order in writing. Any person aggrieved by
the order of the competent authority, under this section,
may, within twenty days of the date of the order, appeal
against it to the State Government, which may pass such
orders thereon as it may deem fit.
(5) The State Government may, at any time, for the purposes
of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the
action taken under this section, call for and examine the
record of any case and may pass such orders thereon as it
may deem fit.
(6) Subject to the provisions herein contained any action
taken under this section, shall be final and conclusive and
shall not be called in question."
On behalf of the petitioners it has been argued that s. 3
imposes a number of unreasonable restrictions. Firstly, it
is urged that the age-limit with regard to bulls or bullocks
is put too high, viz. at 20 years. This is an
626
aspect which we have already considered in relation to the
Bihar Act. What we have said about the age s limit in that
connexion applies equally to the Uttar Pradesh Act. The 8th
Live-stock Census, 1956 shows that in Uttar Pradesh bulls
and bullocks over 3 years of age, not in use for breeding or
work, numbered as many as 126,201 in 1956 as compared to
162,746 in 1951. The Municipal Manual, Uttar Pradesh, Vol.
1, contains a direction that for slaughter of animals,
bullocks and male buffaloes in good state of health below
ten years of age should be included. Secondly, it is
pointed out that not being content with fixing an
unreasonably high age-limit, the impugned provision imposes
a double restriction. It says that the animal must be over
twenty years in age and must also be permanently unfit and
unserviceable; and in the case of a bullock, the unfitness
must be for "any kind of agricultural operation" and not
merely for draught purposes. The result of this double
restriction, it is stated, is that even if the animal is
permanently unserviceable and unfit at an earlier age, it
cannot be slaughtered unless it is over twenty years in age.
Before a certificate can be given, the animal must fulfil
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two conditions as to (1) age and (2) permanent unfitness.
We consider this to be a demonstrably unreasonable
restriction. In Md. Hanif Quareshi’s case (1) this Court
had said that a total ban on the slaughter of bulls and
bullocks after they had ceased to be capable of breeding or
working as draught animals was not in the interests of the
general public. Yet this is exactly what the impugned
provision does by imposing a double restriction. It lays
down that even if the animal is permanently unserviceable,
no certificate can be given unless it is more than 20 years
in age. The restriction will in effect put an end to the
trade of the petitioners.
Thirdly, the impugned provision provides (1) that the animal
shall not be slaughtered within 20 days of the date of the
issue of the certificate and (2) that any person aggrieved
by the order of the competent authority may appeal to the
State Government within 20 days. It is to be noted that the
right of appeal is not
(1) [1939] S.C R. 629.
627
confined to a refusal to grant a certificate as in the Bihar
Act, but the right is given to any person aggrieved by the
order of the competent authority. In other words, even when
a certificate is given, any person, even a member of the
public, who feels aggrieved by it may prefer an appeal and
hold up the slaughter of the animal for a long time. From
the practical point of view these restrictions really put a
total ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks even after
they have ceased to be useful, and we must hold, following
our decision in Md. Hanif Quareshi’s case (1) that s. 3 of
the Uttar Pradesh Act in so far as it imposes unreasonable
restrictions on the right of the petitioners as to slaughter
of bulls and bullocks infringes the fundamental right of the
petitioners and is to that extent void.
(3) Now, we come to the Madhya Pradesh Act. Several
provisions of this Act have been challenged before us as
imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right
of the petitioners. Section 4 deals with prohibition of
slaughter of agricultural cattle. The expression
’agricultural cattle’ means an animal specified in the
schedule: it means cows of all ages; calves of cows and of
she-buffaloes; bulls; bullocks; and male and female
buffaloes. As we have stated earlier, we are concerned in
these cases with the validity of the restrictions placed on
the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes. Now, s. 4
is in these terms:
"S. 4(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force or in any usage or custom to the
contrary, no person shall slaughter or cause to be
slaughtered or offer or cause to be offered, for slaughter-
(a) cows, calves of cows, or calves of she-buffaloes, or
(b) any other agricultural cattle unless he has obtained in
respect of such cattle a certificate in writing issued by
the Competent Authority for the area in which the cattle is
to be slaughtered that the cattle is fit for slaughter.
(1) [1959] S.C.R.29.
628
(2) No certificate under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall
be issued by the Competent Authority .unless the Veterinary
Officer after examining the cattle certifies that-
(a) the cattle is over twenty years of age and is unfit for
work or breeding or has become permanently incapacitated
from work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or an
incurable disease; and
(b) the cattle is not suffering from any disease which makes
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its meat unwholesome for human consumption.
(3) The Competent Authority shall, before issuing or
refusing to issue a certificate under this section, record
its order in writing. Any person aggrieved by the order of
the Competent Authority under this section, may, within ten
days of the date of the order, prefer an appeal against such
order to the Collector of the district or such other officer
as may, by notification, be authorised in this behalf by the
State Government, and the Collector or such other officer
may pass such orders thereon as he thinks fit.
(4) Subject to the orders passed in appeal, if any, under
sub-section (3), the order of the Competent Authority shall
be final and shall not be called in question in any Court."
Section 5 places a restriction as to the place and time for
slaughter and the objection taken before us relates to the
time rather than to the place of slaughter. It says in
effect that no cattle in respect of which a certificate has
been issued under s. 4 shall be slaughtered within ten days
of the date of issue of the certificate and where an appeal
is preferred against the grant of such certificate, till the
time such appeal is disposed of. The provision of appeal is
contained in sub-s. (3) of s. 4 of the Act which we have
quoted earlier. That sub-section lays down that any person
aggrieved by the order of the Competent Authority, may,
within ten days of the date of the order, prefer an appeal
against the order to the Collector of the district or such
other officer as may, by notification, be authorised in this
behalf by the State Government.
629
Section 6 imposes a restriction on the transport of
agricultural cattle for slaughter and reads:
"S. 6. No person shall transport or offer for transport or
cause to be transported any agricultural cattle from any
place within the State to any place outside the State, for
the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of the
provisions of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be
or is likely to be, so slaughtered."
Section 7 prohibits the sale, purchase or disposal otherwise
of certain kinds of animals. It reads-.
"S. 7. No person shall purchase, sell or otherwise dispose
of or offer to purchase, sell or otherwise dispose of or
cause to be purchased, sold or otherwise disposed of cows,
calves of cows or calves of shebuffaloes for slaughter or
knowing or having reason to believe that such cattle shall
be slaughtered."
Section 8 relates to possession of flesh of agricultural
cattle and is in these terms: "S. 8. Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, no person shall have in his possession flesh of any
agricultural cattle slaughtered in contravention of the
provisions of this Act."
Section 10 imposes a penalty for a contravention of s.
4(1)(a) and s. 11 imposes penalty for a contravention of any
of the other provisions of the Act.
On behalf of the petitioners it has been pointed out, and
rightly in our opinion, that cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of s. 4
of the Act imposes an unreasonable restriction on the right
of the petitioners. That clause in its first part lays down
that the cattle (other than cows and calves) must be over 20
years of age and must also be unfit for work or breeding;
and in the second part it says, "or has become permanently
incapacitated from work or breeding due to age, injury,
deformity or an incurable disease." It is a little difficult
to understand why the two parts are juxtaposed in the
section. In any view the restriction that the animal must
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be over 20 years of age and also unfit for work or breeding
is an excessive or unreasonable restriction as we have
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630
pointed out with regard to a similar provision in the Uttar
Pradesh Act. The second part of the clause would not be
open to any objection, if it stood by itself. If, however,
it has to be combined with the agelimit mentioned in the
first part of the clause, it will again be open to the same
objection; if the animal is to be over 20 years of age and
also permanently incapacitated from work or breeding
etc.,then the agelimit is really meaningless. Then, the
expression ’due to age’ in the second part of the clause
also loses its meaning. It seems to us that cl. (a) of sub-
s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act as drafted is bad because it
imposes a disproportionate restriction on the slaughter of
bulls, bullocks and buffaloes it is a restriction excessive
in nature and not in the interests of the general public.
The test laid down is not merely permanent incapacity or
unfitness for work or breeding but the test is something
more than that, a combination of age and unfitness’ Learned
Counsel for the petitioners has placed before us an
observation contained in a reply made by the Deputy Minister
in the course of the debate on the Bill in the Madhya
Pradesh Assembly (see Madhya Pradesh Assembly Proceedings,
Vol. 5 Serial no. 34 dated April 14, 1959, page 3201). He
said that the age fixed was very much higher than the one to
which any animal survived. This observation has been placed
before us not with a view to an interpretation of the
section, but to show what opinion was held by the Deputy
Minister as to the proper agelimit. On behalf of the
respondent State our attention has been drawn to a book
called The Miracle of Life (Home Library Club) in which
there is a statement that oxen, given good conditions, live
about 40 years. Our attention has also been drawn to
certain extracts from a Hindi book called Godhan by Girish
Chandra Chakravarti in which there are statements to the
effect that cows and bullocks may live up to 20 or 25 years.
This is an aspect of the case with which we have already
dealt. The question before us is not the maximum age upto
which bulls, bullocks and buffaloes may live in rare cases.
The question before us is what is their average longevity
and at what age
631
they become useless. On this question we think that the
opinion is almost unanimous, and the opinion which the
Deputy Minister expressed was not wrong.
Section 5 in so far as it imposes a restriction as to the
time for slaughter is again open to the same objection as
has been discussed by us with regard to a similar provision
in the Uttar Pradesh Act. A right of appeal is given to any
person aggrieved by the order. In other words, a member of
the public, if he feels aggrieved by the order granting a
certificate for slaughter, may prefer an appeal and hold up
for a long time the slaughter of the animal. We have
pointed out that for all practical purposes such a
restriction will really put an end to the trade of the
petitioners and we are unable to accept a restriction of
this kind as a reasonable restriction within the meaning of
cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.
Section 6 standing by itself, we think, is not open to any
serious objection. It is ancillary in nature and tries to
give effect to the provision of the Act prohibiting
slaughter of cattle in contravention of the Act.
Section 7 relates to the prohibition of sale, purchase etc.,
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of cows and calves and inasmuch as a total ban on the
slaughter of cows and calves is valid, no objection can be
taken to s. 7 of the Act. It merely seeks to effectuate the
total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves (both of cows
and she-buffaloes). Section 8 is also ancillary in
character and if the other provisions are valid no objection
can be taken to the provisions of s. 8. Sections 10 and 11
impose penalties and their validity cannot be seriously
disputed.
However, we must say a few words about s. 12 of the Act
which has also been challenged before us. Section 12 is in
these terms:
"S. 12. In any trial for an offence punishable under
section 11 for contravention of the provision of sections 5,
6 or 7 of this Act the burden of proving that the slaughter,
transport or sale of agricultural cattle was not in
contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be on the
accused."
The argument is that s. 12 infringes the fundamental
632
right of the petitioners inasmuch as it puts the burden of
proof on an accused person not only for his own knowledge or
intention but for the knowledge or intention of other
persons. We do not think that this contention is correct.
The accused person, so far as ss. 5 and 7 are concerned,
must be the person who has slaughtered the animal or who has
purchased, sold or otherwise disposed of the animal etc.
Therefore, the only question will be his knowledge and the
legislature was competent to place the burden of proof on
him. So far as s. 6 is concerned, it specifically refers to
the knowledge of the person who has transported or offered
for transport or caused to be transported any agricultural
cattles from any place within the State to any place outside
the State. Therefore, when the section talks of knowledge,
it talks of the knowledge of that person who has transported
or offered for transport etc. The knowledge of no other
person comes into the purview of s. 6. We are, therefore,’
of the view that s. 12 is not invalid on the ground sug-
gested by the petitioners.
Therefore, the result of our examination of the various
provisions of the Act is that the impugned provisions in cl.
(a) of sub-s. (2) of s. 4, in sub-s. (3) of s. 4 relating to
the right of appeal by any person aggrieved by the order,
and in s. 5 relating to the time of slaughter, impose
unreasonable and disproportionate restrictions which must be
held to be unconstitutional.
As to the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Cattle Preservation
Rules, r. 3 says "that an application for a certificate
under s. 4 shall be made to the competent authority," and r.
4 says that on receipt of the application, the competent
authority shall by an order direct the person keeping the
animal to submit it for examination by the Veterinary
Officer Rule 5 reproduces the provisions of cls. (a) and (b)
of sub-s. (2) of s. 4 and in so far as we have held that the
provision in el. (a) of sub-s. (2) of s. 4 is
unconstitutional, the rule must also fall with it.
There is one other aspect of these cases which has been
emphasized before us, to which a reference must
633
now be made. It is open to the legislature to enact
ancillary provisions to give effect to the main object of
the Act, namely, the prevention of slaughter of animals like
bulls, bullocks or buffaloes which are still useful for the
purposes for which they are generally used. It is pointed
out that acts innocent in themselves may be prohibited and
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the restrictions in that regard would be reasonable, if the
same were necessary to secure efficient enforcement of valid
provisions. For example, it is open to the legislature, if
it feels it necessary, in order to reduce the possibilities
of evasion to a minimum, to enact provisions which would
give effect to the main object of the legislation. We have
not ignored this aspect and have kept in mind the undisputed
right of the legislature to decide what provisions are
necessary to give effect to the main object of the
legislation. In these cases the petitioners have complained
that the main object of the impugned provisions is not the
prohibition of slaughter of animals which are still useful;
the impugned provisions as they are worded really put a
total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes
and for all practical purposes they put a stop to the
profession and trade of the petitioners. We have held that
this complaint is justified in respect of the main
provisions in the three Acts.
We, therefore, allow the three writ petitions and direct, as
we directed in Md. Hanif Quareshi’s case (1) the respondent
States not to enforce the Acts or the rules made thereunder
in so far as they have been declared void by us. The
petitioners will be entitled to their costs of the hearing
in this Court.
Petitions allowed.
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 629.
634