ANURADHA BHASIN vs. UNION OF INDIA

REPORTABLE I N   THE  S UPREME  C OURT   OF  I NDIA IVIL RIGINAL URISDICTION C  O  J   W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1031  OF  2019   NURADHA HASIN ETITIONER A  B               …P ERSUS V U NION   OF  I NDIA   AND  O RS .      …R ESPONDENT ( S ) And   W RIT  P ETITION  (C IVIL ) N O . 1164  OF  2019   G HULAM  N ABI  A ZAD                …P ETITIONER ERSUS V NION OF NDIA AND NR ESPONDENT S U    I    A .                   …R ( )   J UDGMENT     T ABLE   OF  C ONTENTS  

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  N. V. R AMANA , J.   A. INTRODUCTION      “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,  it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness,  it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity,  it   was   the   season   of   Light,   it   was   the season of Darkness,  it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair,  we   had   everything   before   us,   we   had nothing before us, we   were   all   going   direct   to   Heaven,   we were all going direct the other way­  in   short,   the   period   was   so   far   like   the present   period,   that   some   of   its   noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for   good   or   for   evil,   in   the   superlative degree of comparison only.” ­Charles Dickens in A Tale of Two Cities 2 Although cherished in our heart as a “Paradise on Earth”, the 1. history   of   this   beautiful   land   is   etched   with   violence   and militancy. While the mountains of Himalayas spell tranquillity, yet   blood   is   shed   every   day.   In   this   land   of   inherent contradictions, these petitions add to the list, wherein two sides have   shown   two   different   pictures   which   are   diametrically opposite and factually irreconcilable. In this context, this Court’s job is compounded by the magnitude of the task before it. It goes without saying that this Court will not delve into the political propriety   of   the   decision   taken   herein,   which   is   best   left   for democratic   forces   to  act  on.   Our   limited   scope   is   to   strike   a balance between the liberty and security concerns so that the right to life is secured and enjoyed in the best possible manner. 2. Liberty   and   security   have   always   been   at   loggerheads.   The question before us, simply put, is what do we need more, liberty or security? Although the choice is seemingly challenging, we need to clear ourselves from the platitude of rhetoric and provide a meaningful answer so that every citizen has adequate security and sufficient liberty. The pendulum of preference should not swing   in   either   extreme   direction   so   that   one   preference 3 compromises the other. It is not our forte to answer whether it is better   to   be   free   than   secure   or   be   secure   rather   than   free. However, we are here only to ensure that citizens are provided all the rights and liberty to the highest extent in a given situation while ensuring security at the same time.  3. The genesis of the issue starts with the Security Advisory issued by   the   Civil   Secretariat,   Home   Department,   Government   of Jammu and Kashmir, advising the tourists and the Amarnath Yatris   to   curtail   their   stay   and   make   arrangements   for   their return   in   the   interest   of   safety   and   security.   Subsequently, educational institutions and offices were ordered to remain shut until   further   orders.   On   04.08.2019,   mobile   phone   networks, internet services, landline connectivity were all discontinued in the valley, with restrictions on movement also being imposed in some areas. On   05.08.2019,   Constitutional   Order   272   was   issued   by   the 4. President, applying all provisions of the Constitution of India to the State   of   Jammu  and  Kashmir,  and   modifying  Article  367 (Interpretation)   in   its   application   to   the   State   of   Jammu   and Kashmir. In light of the prevailing circumstances, on the same day, the District Magistrates, apprehending breach of peace and 4 tranquillity,   imposed   restrictions   on   movement   and   public gatherings by virtue of powers vested under Section 144, Cr.P.C. Due to the aforesaid restrictions, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1031   of   2019   claims   that   the   movement   of   journalists   was severely   restricted   and   on   05.08.2019,   the   Kashmir   Times Srinagar   Edition   could   not   be   distributed.   The   Petitioner   has submitted that since 06.08.2019, she has been unable to publish the Srinagar edition of Kashmir Times pursuant to the aforesaid restrictions. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the Petitioners (Ms. Anuradha Bhasin and Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad) approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking issuance of an appropriate writ for setting   aside   or   quashing   any   and   all   order(s),   notification(s), direction(s) and/or circular(s) issued by the Respondents under which   any/all   modes   of   communication   including   internet, mobile and fixed line telecommunication services have been shut down   or   suspended   or   in   any   way   made   inaccessible   or unavailable in any locality. Further, the Petitioners sought the issuance   of   an   appropriate   writ   or   direction   directing Respondents to immediately restore all modes of communication including   mobile,   internet   and   landline   services   throughout 5 Jammu   and   Kashmir   in   order   to   provide   an   enabling environment for the media to practice its profession. Moreover, the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019 also pleaded to pass any appropriate writ or direction directing the Respondents to take necessary   steps   for   ensuring   free  and   safe   movement   of reporters and journalists and other media personnel. Lastly, she also pleaded for the framing of guidelines ensuring that the rights and means of media personnel to report and publish news is not unreasonably curtailed. 6. Moreover, Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad (Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1164 of   2019),   alleges   that   he   was   stopped   from   travelling   to   his constituency in Jammu and Kashmir. In this context, he alleges that   due   to   the   aforesaid   restrictions,   he   is   not   able   to communicate with the people of his constituency.  7. When W.P. (C) No. 1164 of 2019 (by Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad), was listed before a Co­ordinate Bench of this Court on 16.09.2019, the following order was passed: “Issue notice. We permit the petitioner to go to Srinagar and visit   the   following   districts,   subject   to restrictions, if any:­ (i) Srinagar, (ii) Anantnag, (iii) Baramulla and (iv) Jammu.  6 The petitioner has undertaken before the Court on his own volition that he will not indulge in any political rally or political activity during his visit.   The   visit   will  solely   be   concerned   with making   an   assessment   of   the   impact   of   the present situation on the life of the daily wage earners, if any.  So far as prayers (2) and (3) of the writ petition are concerned, the State as well as, the Union of India will respond within two weeks hence.”  8. When W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019, was listed on 16.08.2019, the matter was ordered to be tagged along with W.P. (C) No. 1013 of 2019 (five­Judge Bench) and was later de­tagged. On 16.09.2019, a Co­ordinate Bench of this Court ordered the following: “The State of Jammu & Kashmir, keeping in mind   the   national   interest   and   internal security, shall make all endeavours to ensure that normal life is restored in Kashmir; people have   access   to   healthcare   facilities   and schools,   colleges   and   other   educational institutions and public transport functions and operates normally. All forms of communication, subject to overriding consideration of national security, shall be normalized, if required on a selective   basis,   particularly   for   healthcare facilities .” When   the   said   writ   petition   was   listed   before   this   Bench   on 01.10.2019, in light of expediency, this Bench directed that no further intervention applications shall be entertained. However, liberty was granted to file additional documents in support of applications   for   intervention.   When   the   matter   came   up   for 7 hearing on the next date on 16.10.2019, the following order was passed: “When   these   matters   came   up   for   hearing today, learned Solicitor General appearing for the   Union   of   India   made   a  submission   that after   filing   the   counter   affidavit   in   these matters,   certain   further   developments   have taken   place   and   some   of   the   restrictions imposed have been relaxed, particularly with reference to mobile connectivity as well as the landlines services etc. and, therefore, he wants to   file   another   additional   affidavit   indicating the   steps   taken   by   the   Government   about relaxation of some restrictions. He also made a request to accommodate him for a  week only. During the course of hearing, we are informed by the learned  Senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   petitioners that   the   orders   which   are   issued   by   the authorities relating to the restrictions imposed have not been provided to them so far.  When we asked the learned Solicitor General about the non­ supply of orders issued by the authorities relating to the restrictions imposed, particularly   with   respect   to   the   cell   phone services as well as Section 144 proceedings, he claims privilege over those orders. He, however, states   that   those   orders   can   be   produced before this Court.  However,   if   for   any   reason,   learned   Solicitor General does not want to give a copy of those orders to the petitioners, we request him to file an affidavit indicating the reasons for claiming such privilege.”  8 On 24.10.2019, after the aforesaid orders were placed on record and   pleadings   were   complete,   the   matter   was   listed   for   final disposal   on   05.11.2019.   Taking   into   account   the   concerns expressed by the parties, we extensively heard the counsel for both   sides,   as   well   as   all   the   Intervenors   on   05.11.2019, 06.11.2019,   07.11.2019,   14.11.2019,   19.11.2019,   21.11.2019, 26.11.2019 and 27.11.2019, and considered all the submissions made and documents placed before us. B.     CONTENTIONS   Ms. Vrinda Grover, Counsel for the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019  It was contended that the petitioner, being executive editor of one of the major newspapers, was not able to function post 05.08.2019, due to various restrictions imposed on the press.  Print media came to a grinding halt due to non­availability of   internet   services,   which   in   her   view,   is   absolutely essential for the modern press.  Curtailment of the internet, is a restriction on the right to free speech, should be tested on the basis of reasonableness and proportionality.  The procedure that is to be followed for restricting Internet services   is   provided   under   the   Temporary   Suspension   of Telecom   Services   (Public   Emergency   or   Public   Service) Rules, 2017 [hereinafter “ ”], which were Suspension  Rules notified   under   the   Telegraph   Act.   The   Suspension   Rules 9 indicate that the restriction imposed was contemplated to be of a temporary nature.  The orders passed under the Suspension Rules placed on record by the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regarding the restrictions pertaining to the Internet and phones (either mobile or telephone were  ex facie  perverse and suffered from non­application of mind.   Learned   counsel   submitted   that   the   orders   were   not   in compliance   with   the   procedure   prescribed   under   the Suspension Rules. Further, the orders did not provide any reasoning   as   to   the   necessity   of   the   restrictions,   as   is required under the Suspension Rules.   Lastly, the learned counsel contended that the orders are based on an apprehension of likelihood that there would be danger to a law and order situation. Public order is not the same as law and order, and the situation at the time when the orders were passed did not warrant the passing of the orders resulting in restrictions. Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1164 of 2019  Learned  senior  counsel submitted  that the  orders  of  the authorities had to be produced before the Court, and cannot be the subject of privilege, as claimed by the State.  It was submitted that the conduct of the State, in producing documents and status reports during argumentation, was improper, as it did not allow the Petitioners with sufficient opportunity to rebut the same.  Learned senior counsel submitted that the Union of India can declare an emergency only in certain limited situations. Neither   any   ‘internal   disturbance’   nor   any   ‘external aggression’   has   been   shown   in   the   present   case   for   the imposition of restrictions which are akin to the declaration of Emergency.  With   respect   to   the   orders   restricting   movement   passed under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.,   the   learned   senior   counsel contended that such an order is made to deal with a ‘law 10 and   order’ situation, but the  orders  do  not  indicate  any existing law and order issue, or apprehension thereof.  Learned senior counsel pointed out that the order of the Magistrate under Section 144, Cr.P.C. cannot be passed to the public generally, and must be specifically against the people or the group which is apprehended to disturb the peace. It is necessary for the State to identify the persons causing the problem, and an entire State cannot be brought to a halt. Moreover, he has contended that there was no application of mind before passing those orders.   While submitting that it could be assumed that there was some   material   available   for   the   purpose   of   passing   the orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C., the question which then arises is how the State balances the rights of individuals.  The   learned   senior   counsel,   with   respect   to   the communications’ restrictions, submitted that the State had not indicated as to the necessity to block landline services. He   further   submitted   that   the   communications/Internet restrictions which were imposed under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 [hereinafter “ Telegraph Act ”] needs to follow the provisions of Section 5 of the Telegraph Act, in line with Article   19   of   the   Constitution.   While   there   can   be   some restrictions, there can be no blanket orders, as it would amount to a complete ban. Instead, a distinction should be drawn   while   imposing   restrictions   on   social   media/mass communication   and   the   general   internet.   The   least restrictive option must be put in place, and the State should have taken preventive or protective measures. Ultimately, the State needs to balance the safety of the people with their lawful exercise of their fundamental rights.  On   internet   restrictions,   the   learned   senior   counsel submitted that such restrictions not only impact the right to free speech of individuals but also impinges on their right to trade.   Therefore,   a   less   restrictive   measure,   such   as restricting   only   social   media   websites   like   Facebook   and Whatsapp, should and could have been passed, as has been done in India while prohibiting human trafficking and child pornography websites. The learned senior counsel pointed to orders passed in Bihar, and in Jammu and Kashmir in 2017, restricting only social media websites, and submitted that the same could have been followed in this case as well. 11  Indicating   that   the   State   can   impose   restrictions,   the learned   senior   counsel   focussed   on   the   question   of   the “least restrictive measure” that can be passed. The learned senior counsel submitted that while imposing restrictions, the rights of individuals need to be balanced against the duty of the State to ensure security. The State must ensure that measures are in place that allows people to continue with their life, such as public transportation for work and schools, to facilitate business, etc. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, Senior Counsel for Intervenor in I.A. No. 139141 of 2019 in W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019  The   learned   senior   counsel   emphasized   on   the   term “reasonable”, as used in Article 19(2) of the Constitution, and   submitted   that   the   restrictions   on   the   freedom   of speech should be reasonable as mandated under Article 19 of the Constitution. These restrictions need to be tested on the anvil of the test of proportionality.  Learned senior counsel submitted that Section 144, Cr.P.C. orders should be based on some objective material and not merely on conjectures. Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Counsel for the Intervenor in I.A. No. 139555 in W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019  Learned senior counsel attempted to highlight that the issue of balancing the measures necessary for ensuring national security or curbing terrorism, with the rights of the citizens, is   an   endeavour   that   is   not   unique,   and   has   been undertaken   by   Courts   in   various   jurisdictions.   Learned senior counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court of   Israel   concerning   the   Legality   of   the   General   Security Service's   Interrogation   Methods   in   Public   Committee Against   Torture   in   Israel   v.   Israel ,   38   I.L.M.   1471 (1999)   relating to the question of whether torture during interrogation of an alleged terrorist was permissible. In that 12 case, the Israeli Supreme Court held that such acts were unconstitutional, and could not be justified in light of the freedoms and liberties afforded to the citizens of Israel.  Learned senior counsel drew parallels between the situation faced by the Israeli Supreme Court in the abovementioned case, and that before this Court, wherein, according to the learned senior counsel, the State is attempting to justify the restrictions due to the circumstances prevailing in the State of   Jammu   and   Kashmir.   The   learned   senior   counsel submitted that such a justification merits rejection as it would amount to granting too much power to the State to impose broad restrictions on fundamental rights in varied situations.   It   would   amount   to   individual   liberty   being subsumed by social control.  The learned senior counsel emphasized on the seriousness of the present matter, stating that such restrictions on the fundamental rights is the reason for the placement of Article 32 of the Constitution in Part III, as a fundamental right which allows for the enforcement of the other fundamental rights. He referred to the Constituent Assembly debates to highlight the import of Article 32, as contemplated by the Members of the Constituent Assembly.  The learned senior counsel also placed before this Court the Government  of   India  National   Telecom   Policy,   2012,   and submitted that the wide restrictions imposed by the State are   in   contravention   of   the   aforementioned   policy.   He submitted   that   the   freedom   of   speech   and   expression   is meant to allow people to discuss the burning topic of the day,   including   the   abrogation   of   Article   370   of   the Constitution.  Lastly,   the   learned   senior   counsel   emphasized   that   the restrictions that were imposed are meant to be temporary in nature,   have   lasted  for   more   than   100   days,   which   fact should be taken into account by this Court while deciding the matter. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Senior Counsel for the Intervenor in   I.A. No. 140276 in   W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019 13  Learned senior counsel submitted that Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution require that any action of the State must demonstrate five essential features: (a) backing of a ‘law’, (b) legitimacy of purpose, (c) rational connection of the act and object, (d) necessity of the action, and (e) when the above four are established, then the test of proportionality.  At the outset, learned senior counsel submitted that it is necessary to test the validity of the orders by reference to the   facts   and   circumstances   prevailing   on   the   date   of passing of the said orders,  i.e. , 04.08.2019.  Learned senior counsel submitted that the orders that have not been published cannot be accorded the force of law. The necessity of publication of law is a part of the rule of natural justice. Not only must the orders be published, it is also necessary   that   these   orders   be   made   available   and accessible to the public. The State cannot refuse to produce the orders before the Court or claim any privilege.  The   learned   senior   counsel   further   submitted   that, notwithstanding   the   expediency   of   the   situation,   the necessity of a measure must be shown by the State. The people have a right to speak their view, whether good, bad or ugly, and the State must prove that it was necessary to restrict the same.  On the point of proportionality, the learned senior counsel submitted that the test of proportionality was upheld by this Court in the case of  K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India , (2017) 10 SCC 1 (hereinafter “ K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy­ 9J.) ”)  and therefore the proportionality of a measure must be   determined   while   looking   at   the   restrictions   being imposed by the State on the fundamental rights of citizens. The learned senior counsel pointed out that it is not just the legal and physical restrictions that must be looked at, but also the fear that these sorts of restrictions engender in the minds of the populace, while looking at the proportionality of measures. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in W.P. (Crl.) No. 225 of 2019 14  Although   this   Writ   Petition   was   withdrawn   during arguments,   the   learned   senior   counsel   wished   to   make certain   submissions   regarding   the   issue   at   hand.   The learned senior counsel submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that although he and his family were law abiding citizens, yet they are suffering the effects of the restrictions. Citing the House of Lords judgment of   Liversidge v. Anderson , (1941) 3 All ER 338  the learned senior counsel submitted that   it   was   the   dissent   by   Lord   Atkin,   upholding   the fundamental rights of the citizens of the United Kingdom, which is now the law of the land. Mr. K. K. Venugopal, Learned Attorney General for the Union of India  The learned Attorney General supported the submissions made   by   the   Solicitor   General.   He   submitted   that   the background   of   terrorism   in   the   State   of   Jammu   and Kashmir   needs   to   be   taken   into   account.   Relying   on National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah ,   the   learned   Attorney   General Watali,   2019   (5)   SCC   1 submitted that this Court while deciding the aforementioned case, has taken cognizance of the problem of terrorism in the State before.  According to the learned Attorney General, keeping in mind the   facts   regarding   cross   border   terrorism   and   internal militancy, it would have been foolish to have not taken any preventive measures in the circumstances. The necessity of the orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C. are apparent from the background facts and circumstances, when there can be huge violence if the Government did not take these kinds of measures. In fact, similar steps were taken earlier by the Government   in   2016   when   a   terrorist   was   killed   in   the State. Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General for the State of Jammu and Kashmir 15  The learned Solicitor General submitted that the first and foremost duty of the State is to ensure security and protect the   citizens­   their   lives,   limbs   and   property.   He   further submitted that the facts relied on by the Petitioners and the Intervenors were incorrect, as they did not have the correct information about the factual position on the ground in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.  The learned Solicitor General submitted that the historical background   of   the   State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir   is necessary to be looked at to understand the measures taken by the State. The State has been a victim of both physical and digital cross border terrorism.  The   abrogation   of   Article   370   of   the   Constitution   on 05.08.2019 was a historic step, which resulted not in the taking   away   of   the   rights   of   the   citizens  of  Jammu  and Kashmir, but conferment of rights upon them which they never had. Now, with the abrogation, 106 people friendly laws have become applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.  The learned Solicitor General submitted that the Petitioners were incorrect to state that public movement was restricted. In   fact,   individual   movement   had   never   been   restricted. Additionally, while schools were closed initially, they have now been reopened. Depending on the facts, circumstances and requirements of an area, restrictions were put in place which are now being relaxed gradually.  On the orders passed by the Magistrates under Section 144, Cr.P.C., in their respective jurisdictional areas, the learned Solicitor General submitted that they were best placed to know   the   situation   on   the   ground,   and   then   took   their respective decisions accordingly. Currently, there is nearly hundred percent relaxation of restrictions. Restrictions were being   relaxed   on   the   basis   of   the   threat   perception. Restrictions were never imposed in the Ladakh region. This fact shows that there was application of mind while passing the orders by the officers on the ground, and that there was no   general   clampdown,   as   is   being   suggested   by   the Petitioners.  Further,   the   learned   Solicitor   General  pointed   to  various figures to indicate that people were leading their ordinary lives   in   the   State.   He   submitted   that   all   newspapers, 16 television   and   radio   channels   are   functioning,   including from Srinagar, where the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019   is   situated.   The   learned   Solicitor   General   further indicated that the Government had taken certain measures to ensure that essential facilities would be available to the populace.  The learned Solicitor General submitted that orders passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C. can be preventive in nature, in order to prevent danger to public safety. The Magistrate can pass the order even on the basis of personal knowledge, and the   same   is   supposed   to   be   a   speedy   mechanism.   The orders   passed   must   be   considered   keeping   in   mind   the history and the background of the State.  Relying on  Babulal Parate v. State of  Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 51,  and  , Madhu Limaye v. Sub­Divisional Magistrate , the learned Solicitor General Monghgyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746 submitted that the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was such that the orders could be justified in view of maintenance of the “security of the State”. Regarding the Petitioners’   submission   that   the   restrictions   could   have been imposed on specific individuals, the learned Solicitor General submitted that it was impossible to segregate, and control, the troublemakers from the ordinary citizens.  The   learned   Solicitor   General   submitted   that   there   were enough facts in the knowledge of the Magistrate to pass the orders   under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   There   was   sufficient speculation on the ground to suggest that there might be a move to abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution, and they were   aware   of   the   situation   on   the   ground.   Provocative speeches   and   messages   were   being   transmitted. This information is all available in the public domain.  It  was   further   submitted   that   the   Court   does   not   sit   in appeal of the decision to impose restrictions under Section 144,   Cr.P.C.   and   has   limited   jurisdiction   to   interfere, particularly when there are no allegations of  mala fide  made against the officers and when the question involved is of national security. The level of restriction required is best left to the officers who are on the ground with the requisite information   and   knowledge,   and   the   same   is   not   to   be replaced by the opinion of the Courts. 17  With respect to the communications and internet shutdown, the learned Solicitor General submitted that internet was never restricted in the Jammu and Ladakh regions. Further, he submitted that social media, which allowed people to send messages and communicate with a number of people at   the   same   time,   could   be   used   as   a   means   to   incite violence. The purpose of the limited and restricted use of internet is to ensure that the situation on the ground would not be aggravated by targeted messages from outside the country. Further, the internet allows for the transmission of false news or fake images, which are then used to spread violence.   The   dark   web   allows   individuals   to   purchase weapons and illegal substances easily.  The   learned   Solicitor   General   submitted   that   the jurisprudence on free speech relating to newspapers cannot be applied to the internet, as both the media are different. While   newspapers   only   allowed   one­way   communication, the   internet   makes   two­way   communication   by   which spreading of messages are very easy. The different context should be kept in mind by the Court while dealing with the restrictions with respect to the two media.  While   referring   to   various   photographs,   tweets   and messages   of   political   leaders   of   Kashmir,   he   stated   that these   statements   are   highly   misleading,   abrasive   and detrimental to the integrity and sovereignty of India.  Further, it is not possible to ban only certain websites/parts of the Internet while allowing access to other parts. Such a measure   was   earlier   attempted   in   2017,   but   it   was   not successful.  Lastly,   the   learned   Solicitor   General   submitted   that   the orders passed under the Suspension Rules were passed in compliance with the procedure in the Suspension Rules, and are being reviewed strictly in terms of the same. 9. Some of the intervenors have supported the submissions made by the learned Attorney General and the Solicitor General, and indicated that the restrictions were necessary and in compliance with   the   law.   They   have   also   submitted   that   normalcy   is 18 returning  in  the   State   of  Jammu and   Kashmir,   and  that  the present petitions are not maintainable. C.   ISSUES 10. In   line   with   aforesaid   facts   and   arguments,   the   following questions of law arise for our consideration: I. Whether   the   Government   can   claim   exemption   from producing all the orders passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C. and other orders under the Suspension Rules? II. Whether   the   freedom   of   speech   and   expression   and freedom   to   practise   any   profession,   or   to   carry   on   any occupation, trade or business over the Internet is a part of the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution? Whether the Government’s action of prohibiting internet III. access is valid? Whether the imposition of restrictions under Section 144, IV. Cr.P.C. were valid? Whether the freedom of press of the Petitioner in W.P. (C) V. No. 1031 of 2019 was violated due to the restrictions? D.  PRODUCTION OF ORDERS 11. The present petitions, their context and conduct of the parties, have placed this Court in a peculiar situation. We have been 19 asked to go into the question of the validity of orders, restricting movement and communication, passed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir by various authorities, however, the orders are not before us. The Petitioners and Intervenors claim that the orders were not available, which is why they could not place them on record.  12. At the same time, while the non­availability of orders was not denied by the Respondent­State, they did not produce the said orders. In fact, when this Court by order dated 16.10.2019 asked them   to   produce   the   orders,   the   Respondent­State   placed   on record   only   sample   orders,   citing   difficulty   in   producing   the numerous orders which were being withdrawn and modified on a day­to­day   basis.   The   Respondent­State   also  claimed  that  the plea to produce orders by the Petitioners was an expansion of the scope of the present petitions. At the outset, a perusal of the prayers in the Writ Petitions before 13. us should be sufficient to reject the aforementioned contention of the Respondent­State. In W.P. (C) No. 1164 of 2019 and I.A no. 157139 in I.A. no. 139555 of 2019 in W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019, a prayer has been made to issue a writ of mandamus or any other   writ   directing   Respondent   Nos.   1   and   2   to   produce   all 20 orders by which movement of all persons has been restricted since 04.08.2019. Further, production of all orders by way of which communication has been blocked in State of Jammu and Kashmir has also been sought. On the obligation of the State to disclose information, particularly 14. in a writ proceeding, this Court in  Ram Jethmalani v. Union of (2011) 8 SCC 1, observed as follows: India , 

(emphasis supplied) 15. We may note that there are two separate types of reasoning that mandates us to order production of the orders passed by the authorities in this case.  First , Article 19 of the Constitution has been interpreted to mandate right to information as an important facet   of   the   right   to   freedom   of   speech   and   expression.   A 21 democracy, which is sworn to transparency and accountability, necessarily mandates the production of orders as it is the right of an   individual   to   know.   Moreover,   fundamental   rights   itself connote a qualitative requirement wherein the State has to act in a responsible manner to uphold Part III of the Constitution and not to take away these rights in an implied fashion or in casual and cavalier manner.  16. Second , there is no dispute that democracy entails free flow of information. There is not only a normative expectation under the Constitution, but also a requirement under natural law, that no law should be passed in a clandestine manner. As Lon L. Fuller suggests in his celebrated article “ there can be no greater legal 1 monstrosity   than   a   secret   statute ”.   In   this   regard,   Jeremy Bentham   spoke   about   open   justice   as   the   “ keenest   spur   to exertion ”. In the same context, James Madison stated “ a   popular government,   without   popular   information,   or   the   means   of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern the ignorance and a people 1 Lon L. Fuller,  Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart , The Harvard Law Review, 71(4), 630, 651 [February, 1958]. 22 who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives ”. As a general principle, on a challenge being made regarding the 17. curtailment of fundamental rights as a result of any order passed or action taken by the State which is not easily available, the State should take a proactive approach in ensuring that all the relevant orders are placed before the Court, unless there is some specific ground of privilege or countervailing public interest to be balanced, which must be specifically claimed by the State on affidavit. In such cases, the Court could determine whether, in the facts and circumstances, the privilege or public interest claim of the State overrides the interests of the Petitioner. Such portion of the order can be redacted or such material can be claimed as privileged, if the State justifies such redaction on the grounds, as allowed under the law. 18. In the present case, while the State initially claimed privilege, it subsequently dropped the claim and produced certain sample orders, citing difficulty in producing all the orders before this Court.   In   our   opinion,   this   is   not   a   valid   ground   to   refuse production of orders before the Court.  23 E. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER PART III AND RESTRICTIONS       THEREOF   The petitioners have contended that the impugned restrictions 19. have affected the freedom of movement, freedom of speech and expression and right to free trade and avocation. In this context, we have to first examine the nature of the fundamental rights provided under the Constitution. The   nature   of   fundamental   rights   under   Part   III   of   the 20. Constitution   is   well   settled.   The   fundamental   rights   are prescribed as a negative list, so that “no person could be denied such   right   until   the   Constitution   itself   prescribes   such limitations”. The only exception to the aforesaid formulation is Article 21A of the Constitution, which is a positive right that requires an active effort by the concerned government to ensure that the right to education is provided to all children up to the age of 16 years.  21. The positive prescription of freedom of expression will result in different   consequences   which   our   own   Constitution   has   not entered into. Having different social and economic backgrounds and   existing   on   a   different   scale   of   development,   the   human 24 rights enshrined therein have taken a different role and purpose. The   framers   of   the   Indian   Constitution   were   aware   of   the situation of India, including the socio­economic costs of such proactive   duty,   and   thereafter   took   an   informed   decision   to restrict   the   application   of   fundamental   rights   in   a   negative manner. This crucial formulation is required to be respected by this   Court,   which   has   to   uphold   the   constitutional   morality behind utilization of such negative prescriptions. 22. Now,   we   need   to   concern   ourselves   about   the   freedom   of expression over the medium of internet. There is no gainsaying that in today’s world the internet stands as the most utilized and accessible medium for exchange of information. The revolution within the cyberspace has been phenomenal in the past decade, wherein the limitation of storage space and accessibility of print medium has been remedied by the usage of internet.  At this point it is important to note the argument of Mr. Vinton 23. G. Cerf, one of the ‘fathers of the internet’. He argued that while the internet is very important, however, it cannot be elevated to 2 the  status   of   a  human   right.   Technology,   in  his   view,   is   an enabler of rights and not a right in and of itself. He distinguishes 2  Vinton G. Cerf,  Internet Access is not a Human Right , The New York Times (January 04,  2012). 25 between placing technology among the exalted category of other human rights, such as the freedom of conscience, equality etc. With great respect to his opinion, the prevalence and extent of internet proliferation cannot be undermined in one’s life.   24. Law and technology seldom mix like oil and water. There is a consistent criticism that the development of technology is not met by equivalent movement in the law. In this context, we need to note that the law should imbibe the technological development and accordingly mould its rules so as to cater to the needs of society. Non recognition of technology within the sphere of law is only a disservice to the inevitable. In this light, the importance of internet cannot be underestimated, as from morning to night we are   encapsulated   within   the   cyberspace   and   our   most   basic activities are enabled by the use of internet.   We need to distinguish between the internet as a tool and the 25. freedom of expression through the internet. There is no dispute that   freedom   of   speech   and   expression   includes   the   right   to disseminate information to as wide a section of the population as is possible. The wider range of circulation of information or its greater impact cannot restrict the content of the right nor can it 26 justify its denial. [ refer to  Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal ,  (1995) 2 SCC 161 ;  Shreya Singhal v. Union of India , (2015) 5 SCC 1].    26. The development of the jurisprudence in protecting the medium for expression can be traced to the case of   Indian Express v. Union   of   India ,   (1985)   1   SCC   641,   wherein   this   Court   had declared that the freedom of print medium is covered under the freedom of speech and expression. In  Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana,  (1988) 3 SCC 410, it was held that the right of citizens to exhibit films on Doordarshan, subject   to   the   terms   and   conditions   to   be   imposed   by   the Doordarshan, is a part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(a),   which   can   be curtailed only under circumstances set out under Article 19(2). Further,   this   Court   expanded   this   protection   to   the   use   of airwaves in the case of  Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India  ( supra ). In this context, we may   note   that   this   Court,   in   a   catena   of   judgments,   has 27 recognized   free   speech   as   a   fundamental   right,   and,   as technology has evolved, has recognized the freedom of speech and expression over different media of expression. Expression through the internet has gained contemporary relevance and is one of the major means of information diffusion. Therefore, the freedom   of   speech   and   expression   through   the   medium   of internet is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) and accordingly, any restriction on the same must be in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 27. In this context, we need to note that the internet is also a very important tool for trade and commerce. The globalization of the Indian   economy   and   the   rapid   advances   in   information   and technology   have   opened   up   vast   business   avenues   and transformed India as a global IT hub. There is no doubt that there are certain trades which are completely dependent on the internet.   Such   a   right   of   trade   through   internet   also   fosters consumerism and availability of choice. Therefore, the freedom of trade and commerce through the medium of the internet is also constitutionally protected under Article 19(1)(g), subject to the restrictions provided under Article 19(6). 28 28. None of the counsels have argued for declaring the right to access the internet as a fundamental right and therefore we are not expressing any view on the same. We are confining ourselves to declaring   that   the   right   to   freedom   of   speech   and   expression under Article 19(1)(a), and the right to carry on any trade or business   under   19(1)(g),   using   the   medium   of   internet   is constitutionally protected.  29. Having explained the nature of fundamental rights and the utility of   internet   under   Article   19   of   the   Constitution,   we   need   to concern ourselves with respect to limitations provided under the Constitution   on   these   rights.   With   respect   to   the   freedom   of speech and expression, restrictions are provided under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which reads as under:

29 30. The right provided under Article 19(1) has certain exceptions, which empowers the State to impose reasonable restrictions in appropriate   cases.   The   ingredients   of   Article   19(2)   of   the Constitution are that: a. The action must be sanctioned by law; b. The proposed action must be a reasonable restriction; c. Such restriction must be in furtherance of interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. At the outset, the imposition of restriction is qualified by the term 31. ‘reasonable’ and is limited to situations such as interests of the sovereignty, integrity, security, friendly relations with the foreign States, public order, decency or morality or contempt of Court, defamation   or   incitement   to   an   offence.   Reasonability   of   a restriction   is   used   in   a   qualitative,   quantitative   and   relative sense. 32. It has been argued by the counsel for the Petitioners that the restrictions under Article 19 of the Constitution cannot mean 30 complete   prohibition.   In   this   context   we   may   note   that   the aforesaid contention cannot be sustained in light of a number of judgments of this Court wherein the restriction has also been held   to   include   complete   prohibition   in   appropriate cases. [ Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. v. Union of India , AIR 1954 SC 634,  Narendra Kumar v. Union of India , (1960)   2   SCR   375,   State   of   Maharashtra   v.   Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao , (1969) 2 SCR 392,  Sushila Saw Mill v. State , (1995) 5 SCC 615,   of Orissa Pratap Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India , (1997) 5 SCC 87 and  Dharam Dutt v. Union of , (2004) 1 SCC 712] India 33. The   study   of   aforesaid   case   law   points   to   three   propositions which emerge with respect to Article 19(2) of the Constitution. (i) Restriction on free speech and expression may include cases of prohibition. (ii) There should not be excessive burden on free speech   even   if   a   complete   prohibition   is   imposed,   and   the government   has   to   justify   imposition   of   such   prohibition   and explain as to why lesser alternatives would be inadequate. (iii) Whether a  restriction amounts  to a complete prohibition  is a question of fact, which is required to be determined by the Court 31 with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. [ refer to State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534]. The second prong of the test, wherein this Court is required to 34. find   whether   the   imposed   restriction/prohibition   was   least intrusive,   brings   us   to   the   question   of   balancing   and proportionality. These concepts are not a new formulation under the Constitution. In various parts of the Constitution, this Court has taken  a  balancing  approach  to  harmonize  two  competing rights. In the case of   Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India , (1980) 2 SCC 591 and  Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company (1983) 1 SCC 147 ,  this Court v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.,  has   already   applied   the   balancing   approach   with   respect   to fundamental rights and the directive principles of State Policy. 35. Before, we delve into the nuances of ‘restriction’ as occurring under   Article   19(2)   of   the   Constitution,   we   need   to   observe certain facts and circumstances in this case. There is no doubt that   Jammu   and   Kashmir   has   been   a   hot   bed   of   terrorist insurgencies   for   many   years.   In   this   light,   we   may   note   the State’s   submission   that   since   1990   to   2019   there   have   been 32 71,038 recorded incidents of terrorist violence, 14,038 civilians have   died,   5292   security   personnel   were   martyred,   22,536 terrorists were killed. The geopolitical struggle cannot be played down or ignored. In line with the aforesaid requirement, we may note that even the broadest guarantee of free speech would not protect the entire gamut of speech. The question which begs to be answered is whether there exists a clear and present danger in restricting such expression. 36. Modern terrorism heavily relies on the internet. Operations on the internet do not require substantial expenditure and are not traceable easily. The internet is being used to support fallacious proxy   wars   by   raising   money,   recruiting   and   spreading propaganda/ideologies. The prevalence of the internet provides an easy inroad to young impressionable minds. In this regard, 3 Gregory   S.   McNeal ,   Professor   of   Law   and   Public   Policy, Pepperdine University, states in his article about propaganda and the use of internet in the following manner: “Terrorist   organisations   have   also   begun   to employ   websites   as   a   form   of   information warfare.   Their   websites   can   disperse inaccurate   information   that   has   far­reaching 3  Gregory S. McNeal,  Cyber Embargo: Countering the Internet Jihad , 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l  L. 789 (2007). 33 consequences.  Because  internet   postings   are not regulated sources of news, they can reflect any viewpoint, truthful or not. Thus, readers tend to consider internet items to be fact, and stories   can   go   unchecked   for   some   time. Furthermore, streaming video and pictures of frightening   scenes   can   support   and   magnify these news stories. As a result, the internet is a   powerful   and   effective   tool   for   spreading propaganda.”  4 37. Susan   W.   Brenner ,   NCR   Distinguished   Professor   of   Law   and Technology, University of Dayton School of Law, also notes that the   traditional   approach   has   not   worked   satisfactorily   on terrorism   due   to   the   proliferation   of   the   internet.   It   is   the contention of the respondents that the restriction on the freedom of speech was imposed due to the fact that there were national security issues over and above a law and order situation, wherein there were problems of infiltration and support from the other side of the border to instigate violence and terrorism. The learned Solicitor General pointed out that the ‘war on terrorism’ requires imposition   of   such   restriction   so   as   to   nip   the   problem   of terrorism   in   the   bud.   He   submitted   that   in   earlier   times, sovereignty   and   integrity   of   a   State   was   challenged   only   on occurrence  of   war.   In  some  cases,   there   have  been  instances 4  Susan W. Brenner,  Why the Law Enforcement Model is a Problematic Strategy for Dealing  with Terrorist Activity Online , 99 Am. Soc’y Int’l. L. Proc. 108 (2005). 34 where   the   integrity   of   the   State   has   been   challenged   by secessionists.   However,   the   traditional   conceptions   of   warfare have   undergone   an   immense   change   and   now   it   has   been replaced by a new term called ‘war on terror’. This war, unlike the earlier   ones,   is   not   limited   to   territorial   fights,   rather,   it transgresses   into   other   forms   affecting   normal   life.   The   fight against terror cannot be equated to a law and order situation as well.   In   this   light,   we   observe   that   this   confusion   of characterising terrorism as a war   stricto sensu   or a normal law and   order   situation   has   plagued   the   submission   of   the respondent Government and we need to carefully consider such submissions. 38. Before   analysing   the   restrictions   imposed   on   the   freedom   of speech and expression in the Indian context, we need to have a broad  analysis   of   the   state   of   affairs   in   the   United   States   of America (hereinafter ‘ US ’) where freedom of expression under the First Amendment is treated to be very significant with the US being   perceived   to   be   one   of   the   liberal   constituencies   with respect to free speech jurisprudence. However, we need to refer to the context and state of law in the US, before we can understand such an assertion. 35 During   the   US   civil   war,   a   dramatic   confrontation   over   free 39. speech   arose   with   respect   to   the   speech   of   Clement   L. Vallandigham, who gave a speech calling the civil war ‘wicked, cruel and unnecessary’. He urged the citizens to use ballot boxes to hurl ‘President Lincoln’ from his throne. As a reaction, Union soldiers arrested Mr. Vallandigham and he had to face a five­ member military commission which charged him with ‘ declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion’ . [ , 28 F. Cas. 874 Ex parte Vallandigham (1863) ]   The   commission   found   Mr.   Vallandigham   guilty   and imposed   imprisonment   during   the   war.   The   aforesaid imprisonment   was   met   with   demonstrations   and   publications calling   such   imprisonment   as   a   crime   against   the   US Constitution.   President   Lincoln,   having   regard   to   the   US Constitution,   commuted   the   imprisonment   and   converted   the same to banishment. He justified the aforesaid act by stating that banishment was more humane and a less disagreeable means of securing least restrictive measures. 36 40. During World War I, many within the US had strong feelings against the war and the draft imposed by the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. During this period, the US enacted the Espionage Act, 1917 which penalised any person who wilfully caused or attempted to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny by refusal from duty or naval services. In any case, in  Abraham , 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justice Holmes even in v. United States his dissent observed as under:

 The Second World War was also riddled with instances of tussle 41. between the First Amendment and national security issues. An instance of the same was the conviction of William Dudley Pelley, 37 under the Espionage Act,  1917, which the Supreme  Court of United States refused to review. 42. During the Cold War, the attention of the American Congress was on the increase of communism. In 1954, Congress even enacted the Communist Control Act, which stripped the Communist party of all rights, privileges and immunities. During this time,  Dennis , 341 US 494 (1951), is an important precedent. v. United States Sections 2(a)(1), 2(a)(3) and 3 of the Alien Registration Act, 1940 made it unlawful for any person to knowingly or wilfully advocate with the intent of the overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States by force or violence, to organize or help to organize any group which does so, or to conspire to do so. The Petitioner in the aforementioned case challenged the aforesaid provision on the ground that these provisions violated the First Amendment. The US Supreme Court held: “An analysis of the leading cases in this Court which   have   involved   direct   limitations   on speech,   however,   will   demonstrate   that   both the majority of the Court and the dissenters in particular cases have recognized that this is not an unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be   subordinated   to   other   values   and considerations.” 38 43. During the Vietnam war, the US Supreme Court had to deal with the case of  , 395 US 444 (1969), wherein Brandenburg v. Ohio the   Court   over­ruled   Dennis   ( supra )   and   held   that   the   State cannot   punish   advocacy   of   unlawful   conduct,   unless   it   is intended to incite and is likely to incite ‘imminent lawless action’. 44. There is no doubt that the events of September 2001 brought new challenges to the US in the name of ‘war on terror’. In this context, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that “ To those… who scare peace­loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to 5 6 America’s enemies… ’.  However, Bruce Ackerman, in his article, states that: “The   “war   on   terrorism”   has   paid   enormous political dividends .... but that does not make it   a   compelling   legal   concept.   War   is traditionally defined as a state of belligerency between sovereigns .... The selective adaptation of doctrines dealing with war predictably leads to   sweeping   incursions   on   fundamental liberties.” 5  Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Anti­Terrorism Policy, 106th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft) 6  Ackerman, Bruce, "The Emergency Constitution", Faculty Scholarship Series, 113 (2004). 39 45. From the aforesaid study of the precedents and facts, we may note   that   the   law   in   the   US   has   undergone   lot   of   changes concerning dissent during war. The position that emerges is that any   speech   which   incites   imminent   violence   does   not   enjoy constitutional protection.  46. It goes without saying that the Government is entitled to restrict the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) if the need be so, in compliance with the requirements under Article 19(2). It is in this context, while the nation is facing such adversity, an abrasive statement with imminent threat may be restricted, if the same impinges upon sovereignty and integrity of India. The question is one of extent rather than the existence of the power to restrict. The requirement of balancing various considerations brings us to 47. the principle of proportionality. In the case of  K. S. Puttaswamy ( supra ) ,  this Court observed: (Privacy­9J.)  “ Proportionality  is an  essential facet of 310… the   guarantee   against   arbitrary   State   action because it ensures that the nature and quality of   the   encroachment   on   the   right   is   not disproportionate to the purpose of the law...” 40 48. Further, in the case of   CPIO v Subhash Chandra Aggarwal , (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1459,   the meaning of proportionality was explained as: “ It   is   also   crucial   for   the   standard   of 225… proportionality   to   be   applied   to   ensure   that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question…” 49. At   the   same   time,   we   need   to   note   that   when   it   comes   to balancing national security with liberty, we need to be cautious. 7 In the words of Lucia Zedner :

The proportionality principle, can be easily summarized by Lord 50. Diplock’s aphorism ‘ you must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do? ’ [ refer to  R v. Goldsmith ,  [1983] 1

41 WLR 151, 155 (Diplock J)] .  In other words, proportionality is all about means and ends.  51. The suitability of proportionality analysis under Part III, needs to be observed herein. The nature of fundamental rights has been extensively commented upon. One view is that the fundamental rights apply as ‘rules’, wherein they apply in an ‘all­or­nothing fashion’. This view is furthered by Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his theory that concept of a right implies its ability to trump 8 over a public good.   Dworkin’s view necessarily means that the rights themselves are the end, which cannot be derogated as they represent the highest norm under the Constitution. This would imply   that   if   the   legislature   or   executive   act   in   a   particular manner, in derogation of the right, with an object of achieving public   good,   they   shall   be   prohibited   from   doing   so   if   the aforesaid action requires restriction of a right. However, while such an approach is often taken by American Courts, the same may not be completely  suitable in  the  Indian context,  having regard   to   the   structure   of   Part   III   which   comes   with   inbuilt restrictions.  8 Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.),   Theories of Rights  (1984) 153 (hereinafter Dworkin, “Rights as is trumps”).  42 52. However,   there   is   an   alternative   view,   held   by   Robert   Alexy, 9 wherein   the   ‘fundamental   rights’   are   viewed   as   ‘principles’, wherein the rights are portrayed in a normative manner. Rules are   norms   that   are   always   either   fulfilled   or   not;   whereas principles are norms which require that something be realized to the   greatest   extent   possible   given   the   legal   and   factual

for how to deal with conflicts between them: it means that where they conflict, one principle has to be weighed against the other and a determination has to be made as to which has greater 11 weight   in   this   context.   Therefore,   he   argues   that   nature   of 12 principles implies the principle of proportionality. 53. The   doctrine   of   proportionality   is   not   foreign   to   the   Indian Constitution, considering the use of the word ‘reasonable’ under Article 19 of the Constitution. In a catena of judgments, this Court has held “reasonable restrictions” are indispensable for the realisation of freedoms enshrined under Article 19, as they are what   ensure   that   enjoyment   of   rights   is   not   arbitrary   or excessive, so as to affect public interest. This Court, while sitting 9 R. Alexy,  A Theory of Constitutional Rights  (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).  10 Ibid at page 47. 11 Ibid, page 50. 12 Ibid, page 66. 43 in   a   Constitution   Bench   in   one   of   its   earliest   judgments   in

118 interpreted limitations on personal liberty, and the balancing thereof, as follows:

while laying down the test of reasonableness, held that:  15.  … It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed,   should   be   applied   to   each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,   the   underlying   purpose   of   the 44 restrictions   imposed,   the   extent   and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby,   the   disproportion   of   the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time,   should   all   enter   into   the   judicial verdict…. (emphasis supplied) A   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Mohammed  v.  ,   (1969) 1 SCC  853 while Faruk State of  Madhya  Pradesh determining   rights   under   Article   19(1)( g )   of   the   Constitution, discussed the doctrine of proportionality in the aforesaid terms:

(emphasis supplied)

the principle of proportionality, in light of administrative orders, was explained as follows: 45 28.   By   “proportionality”,   we   mean   the question whether, while regulating exercise of   fundamental   rights,   the   appropriate   or least­restrictive   choice   of   measures   has been   made   by   the   legislature   or   the administrator so as to achieve the object of the   legislation   or   the   purpose   of   the administrative   order,   as   the   case   maybe . Under   the   principle,   the   court   will   see   that the  legislature  and   the  administrative authority  “ maintain   a  proper   balance between   the   adverse   effects   which   the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve ”. The legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given   an   area   of   discretion   or   a   range   of choices   but   as   to   whether   the   choice   made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the court.   That   is   what   is   meant   by proportionality. (emphasis supplied) [See also   State of Bihar  v.  Kamla Kant Misra , (1969) 3 SCC

that no constitutional right can be claimed to be absolute in a realm where rights are interconnected to each other, and limiting 46 some rights in public interest might therefore be justified. The Court held as follows:

47

how to treat competing rights. The Court attempted to resolve the conflict by holding that rights and limitations must be interpreted harmoniously so as to facilitate coexistence. This Court observed therein:

48 in mind the relative social values of each competitive   aspects   when   considered   in proper context.” (emphasis supplied)

requisite balance, the solution for which was derived from the

tool which guides Judges through the process of resolving these

upon by most theorists is the version developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The aforesaid doctrine lays down a four  pronged   test   wherein,   first,   it   has   to   be   analysed   as   to whether the measure restricting the rights serves a legitimate goal   (also   called   as   legitimate   goal   test),   then   it   has   to   be analysed whether the measure is a suitable means of furthering this   goal   (the   rational   connection   stage),   next   it   has   to   be assessed whether there existed an equally effective but lesser restrictive alternative remedy (the necessity test) and at last, it should be analysed if such a measure had a disproportionate impact   on   the   right­holder   (balancing   stage).   One   important 13 Kai Mö l ler,   The Global Model of Constitutional Rights   (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).  49 feature   of   German   test   is   the   last   stage   of   balancing,   which determines   the   outcome   as   most   of   the   important   issues   are pushed to the balancing stage and the same thereby dominates the   legal   analysis.   Under   this   approach,   goal   which   is any   legitimate will be accepted; as usually a lesser restrictive measure might   have   the   disadvantage   of   being   less   effective   and   even marginal   contribution   to   the   goal   will   suffice   the   rational 14 connection test. 57. The   aforesaid   test   needs   to   be   contrasted   with   its   Canadian

doctrine, the object of the measure must be compelling enough to warrant overriding of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom; a rational nexus must exist between such a measure and the object sought to be achieved; the means must be least restrictive; and lastly, there must be proportionality between the effects of such measure and the object sought to be achieved. This doctrine of proportionality is elaborately propounded by Dickson, C.J., of the

(Can) SC, in the following words (at p. 138): l 14 Kai   Mö ler,   Constructing   the   Proportionality   Test:   An   Emerging   Global   Conversation, Reasoning Rights Comparative Judicial Engagement  (Hart Publishing, 2014). 50 “To   establish   that   a   limit  is   reasonable   and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First,   the   objective,   which   the   measures, responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom   are   designed   to   serve,   must   be   “of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom” … Second … the party invoking Section 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and   demonstrably   justified.   This   involves   “a form   of   proportionality   test”…   Although   the nature   of   the   proportionality   test   will   vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. There   are,   in   my   view,   three   important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be … rationally connected   to   the   objective.   Second,   the means   …   should   impair   “as   little   as possible” the right or freedom in question …   Third,   there   must   be  a   proportionality between the effects of the measures which are   responsible   for   limiting   the   Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has   been   identified   as   of   “sufficient   The   more   severe   the importance”... deleterious   effects   of   a   measure,   the   more important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” (emphasis supplied)

51 legitimate goal, demands the same to be compelling enough to warrant the limitation of constitutional rights. Additionally, while the German necessity test calls for a lesser restrictive measure which is equivalently effective, the need for effectiveness has been

least infringing measure has been stipulated.

15 seminal book   on proportionality upon which Dr A.K. Sikri, J. placed reliance while expounding the doctrine of proportionality

“ 60 . … a limitation of a constitutional right will be constitutionally permissible if:

52

to   analyse   that   the   principle   of   proportionality   is   inherently embedded in Indian Constitution under the realm of the doctrine of reasonable restrictions and that the same can be traced under Article 19. The relevant extracts are placed below: “65.   We   may   unhesitatingly   remark   that this doctrine of proportionality, explained hereinabove in brief, is enshrined in Article 19 itself when we read clause (1) along with clause (6) thereof.   While defining as to what constitutes a reasonable restriction, this Court in a plethora of judgments has held that the expression   “ reasonable   restriction ”   seeks   to strike   a   balance   between   the   freedom guaranteed by any of the sub­clauses of clause (1)   of   Article   19   and   the   social   control permitted by any of the clauses (2) to (6).  It is held   that   the   expression   “ reasonable ” connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of public.  Further, in order to be reasonable, the restriction must have a reasonable relation to the   object   which   the   legislation   seeks   to achieve,   and   must   not   go   in   excess   of   that object   (see  P.P.   Enterprises  v.  Union   of   India , (1982)   2   SCC   33).   At   the   same   time, reasonableness   of   a   restriction   has   to   be determined   in   an   objective   manner   and from the standpoint of the interests of the general   public   and   not   from   the   point   of view   of   the   persons   upon   whom   the 53 restrictions  are  imposed   or  upon  abstract considerations   (see  Mohd.   Hanif Quareshi  v.  State of Bihar , AIR 1958 SC 731).”

with the German approach was propounded by this Court in the

that: In this direction, the next question that “63. arises is as to what criteria is to be adopted for a proper balance between the two facets viz. the rights and limitations imposed upon it by a statute.   Here   comes   the   concept   of “ proportionality ”,   which   is   a   proper criterion.   To   put   it   pithily,   when   a   law limits   a   constitutional   right,   such   a limitation   is   constitutional   if   it   is proportional .   The   law   imposing   restrictions will be treated as proportional if it is meant to achieve a proper purpose, and if the measures taken to achieve such a purpose are rationally connected to the purpose, and such measures are necessary...

(emphasis supplied) 54

interpretation of the necessity stage as it has direct impact upon the   realisation   and   optimisation   of   constitutional   rights   while 17 others such as David Bilchitz   found significant problems with this approach. 

policies   to   be   necessary   by   justifying   that   the   available alternatives may not be equally effective, while the latter applies the   “minimal   impairment   test”   narrowing   the   constitutionally permissible   policies   and   places   a   strong   burden   on   the Government to justify its policies. Therefore, Bilchitz argues that if   the   necessity   stage   is   interpreted   strictly,   legislations   and policies   no   matter   how   well   intended   will   fail   to   pass   the proportionality inquiry if any other slightly less drastic measure exists. Bilchitz, therefore, indicates that Alexy’s conclusion may be too quick.  16 Robert Alexy,   A Theory of Constitutional Rights   (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 47.  17 David   Bilchitz,   Necessity   and   Proportionality:   Towards   A   Balanced   Approach?   in   L. Lazarus, C. McCrudden and N. Bowles (eds.), Reasoning Rights, 41 (2014).  55

separation of power, as Courts would often substitute the views of   the   legislature   in   deciding   what   is   the   “least   restrictive measure”. Taking the aforesaid issues into consideration, Bilchitz proposed a moderate interpretation of the necessity test wherein Courts   may   no   longer   be   required   to   assess   policies   and measures against impractical and unreasonable standards. He

ensure   that   only   measures   with   a   strong   relationship   to   the objective   they   seek   to   achieve   can   justify   an   invasion   of fundamental rights. That process thus requires courts to reason through   the   various   stages   of   the   moderate   interpretation   of

19 is listed below: (MN1)   All   feasible   alternatives   need   to   be identified,   with   courts   being   explicit   as   to criteria of feasibility;  (MN2)   The   relationship   between   the government measure under consideration, the alternatives identified in MN1 and the objective sought to be achieved must be determined. An attempt   must   be   made   to   retain   only   those alternatives   to   the   measure   that   realise   the objective in a real and substantial manner;  18  Ibid, page 61. 19 Ibid, page 61. 56 (MN3) The differing impact of the measure and the   alternatives   (identified   in   MN2)   upon fundamental rights must be determined, with it being   recognised   that   this   requires   a recognition of approximate impact; and  (MN4) Given the findings in MN2 and MN3, an overall   comparison   (and   balancing   exercise) must be undertaken between the measure and the alternatives. A judgement must be made whether the government measure is the best of all feasible alternatives, considering both the degree   to   which   it   realises   the   government objective   and   the   degree   of   impact   upon fundamental   rights   (‘the   comparative component’). 

they   require   strong   protection,   thereby   mandating   a   sensible necessity test as the same will prevent the fundamental right from   becoming   either   absolute   or   to   be   diminished.   Bilchitz, describes the aforesaid test to be neither factual nor mechanical,

purpose   of   the   necessity   enquiry   is   to   offer   an   explicit consideration of the relationship between means, objectives and rights… Failure to conduct the necessity enquiry with diligence, however,  means   that   a   government   measure   can   escape   close 57 scrutiny in relation to both the realisation of the objective and its

based on the German Test and modulated the same as against the tests laid down by Bilchitz. Therein this Court held that:  In  “157. Modern   Dental   College   &   Research Centre  [ Modern   Dental   College   &   Research Centre  v.  State of M.P. , (2016) 7 SCC 353], four sub­components of proportionality which need to be satisfied were taken note of. These are: ( a ) A measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage). ( b ) It must be a suitable means of furthering this   goal   (suitability   or   rational   connection stage). ( c ) There must not be any less restrictive but equally effective alternative (necessity stage). ( d ) The   measure   must   not   have   a disproportionate   impact   on   the   right­holder (balancing stage).

20 Ibid, 62 58

(emphasis supplied)

needs to be satisfied under our Constitution for a violation of the right to privacy to be justified, in the following words:  “1288.  In  K.S.   Puttaswamy  v.  Union   of India  [ K.S.   Puttaswamy  v.  Union   of   India , (2017) 10 SCC 1], one of us (Chandrachud, J.), speaking for four Judges, laid down the tests that   would   need   to   be   satisfied   under   our Constitution   for   violations   of   privacy   to   be justified.   This   included   the   test   of proportionality: (SCC p. 509, para 325) 59

60

(emphasis supplied)

constitutional validity of the Aadhaar scheme, Dr. Chandrachud,

reiterated the fundamental precepts of doctrine of proportionality in relation to protection of privacy interests while dealing with personal data: “1324. The   fundamental   precepts   of proportionality, as they emerge from decided cases can be formulated thus: 1324.1. A   law   interfering   with   fundamental rights   must   be   in   pursuance   of   a legitimate State aim ; 1324.2. The   justification   for   rights­infringing measures that interfere with or limit the exercise   of   fundamental   rights   and 61 liberties   must   be   based   on   the existence   of   a   rational   connection between those measures, the situation in   fact   and   the   object   sought   to   be achieved; 1324.3. The   measures   must   be   necessary   to achieve   the   object   and   must   not infringe   rights   to   an   extent   greater than is necessary to fulfil the aim ; 1324.4. Restrictions   must   not   only   serve legitimate purposes; they must also be necessary to protect them ; and 1324.5. The   State   must   provide   sufficient safeguards relating to the storing and protection of centrally stored data . In order   to   prevent   arbitrary   or   abusive interference   with   privacy,   the   State must guarantee that the collection and use of personal information is based on the consent of the individual; that it is authorised   by   law   and   that   sufficient safeguards exist to ensure that the data is only used for the purpose specified at the time of collection. Ownership of the data   must   at   all   times   vest   in   the individual whose data is collected. The individual must have a right of access to the data collected and the discretion to opt out.” (emphasis supplied) 69. This is the current state of the doctrine of proportionality as it exists in India, wherein proportionality is the key tool to achieve 62 judicial   balance.   But   many   scholars   are   not   agreeable   to 21 recognize proportionality equivalent to that of balancing. 70. In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   may   summarize   the requirements of the doctrine of proportionality which must be followed by the authorities before passing any order intending on restricting fundamental rights of individuals. In the first stage itself, the possible goal of such a measure intended at imposing restrictions must be determined. It ought to be noted that such goal must be legitimate. However, before settling on the aforesaid measure,   the   authorities   must   assess   the   existence   of   any alternative mechanism in furtherance of the aforesaid goal. The appropriateness of such a measure depends on its implication upon the fundamental rights and the necessity of such measure. It is undeniable from the aforesaid holding that only the least restrictive measure can be resorted to by the State, taking into consideration   the   facts   and   circumstances.   Lastly,   since   the order has serious implications on the fundamental rights of the 21 Julian  Rivers,   Proportionality  and Variable  Intensity of  Review ,  (2006) 65   C.L.J.   174 (hereinafter   Rivers,   “Proportionality”);   Martin   Luteran,   Towards   Proportionality   as   a Proportion Between Means and Ends  in Cian C. Murphy and Penny Green (eds.),  Law and Outsiders: Norms, Processes and “Othering” in the 21st Century  (2011) (hereinafter Luteran, “Towards Proportionality”); see also the contribution of Alison L. Young in Chapter 3 of this volume.  63 affected   parties,   the   same   should   be   supported   by   sufficient material and should be amenable to judicial review. 71. The   degree   of   restriction   and   the   scope   of   the   same,   both territorially and temporally, must stand in relation to what is actually necessary to combat an emergent situation.  72. To   consider   the   immediate   impact   of   restrictions   upon   the realization of the fundamental rights, the decision maker must prioritize the various factors at stake. Such attribution of relative importance is  what constitutes proportionality.  It ought to be noted that a decision which curtails fundamental rights without appropriate   justification   will   be   classified   as   disproportionate. The concept of proportionality requires a restriction to be tailored in accordance with the territorial extent of the restriction, the stage   of   emergency,   nature   of   urgency,   duration   of   such restrictive   measure   and   nature   of   such   restriction.   The triangulation   of   a   restriction   requires   the   consideration   of appropriateness,   necessity   and   the   least   restrictive   measure before being imposed.  73. In this context, we need to note that the Petitioners have relied on a recent judgment of the High Court of Hong Kong, in  Kwok 64 Wing Hang and Ors. v.   Chief Executive in Council ,   [2019] HKCFI 2820 to state that the Hong Kong High Court has utilised the principle to declare the “anti­mask” law as unconstitutional. In any case, we need not comment on the law laid down therein, as   this   Court   has   independently   propounded   the   test   of proportionality as applicable in the Indian context. However, we may   just   point   out   that   the   proportionality   test   needs   to   be applied in the context of facts and circumstances, which are very different in the case at hand. Having   observed   the   law   on   proportionality   and   reasonable 74. restrictions,   we   need   to   come   back   to   the   application   of restrictions on the freedom of speech over the internet. 75. The respondent­State has vehemently opposed selective access to internet services based on lack of technology to do the same. If such a contention is accepted, then the Government would have a free pass to put a complete internet blockage every time. Such complete blocking/prohibition perpetually cannot be accepted by this Court. 76. However,   there   is   ample   merit   in   the   contention   of   the Government   that   the   internet   could   be   used   to   propagate terrorism   thereby   challenging   the   sovereignty   and   integrity   of 65 India. This Court would only observe that achievement of peace and   tranquillity   within   the   erstwhile   State   of   Jammu   and Kashmir   requires   a   multifaceted   approach   without   excessively burdening the freedom of speech. In this regard the Government is required to consider various options under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, so that the brunt of exigencies is decimated in a manner   which   burdens   freedom   of   speech   in   a   minimalist manner.  77. Having   discussed   the   general   constitutional   ambit   of   the fundamental rights, proportionality and reasonable restrictions, and a specific discussion on freedom of expression through the internet and its restriction under Article 19(2), we now need to analyse the application of the same in the present case.  F. INTERNET SHUTDOWN     78. Having   observed   the   substantive   law   concerning   the   right   to internet and the restrictions that can be imposed on the same, we need to turn our attention to the procedural aspect. 79. It must be noted that although substantive justice under the fundamental   rights   analysis   is   important,   procedural   justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of substantive justice. There is a 66 need for procedural justice in cases relating to restrictions which impact individuals’ fundamental rights as was recognized by this Court in the case of  , (1978) 1 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India SCC 248 and the  K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy­9J.)  case ( supra ).   The procedural mechanism contemplated for restrictions on the 80. Internet, is twofold: first is contractual, relating to the contract signed between Internet Service Providers and the Government, and the second is statutory, under the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the Telegraph Act. In the present case, we are concerned only with the statutory scheme available, particularly under the Telegraph Act, and we will   therefore   confine   our   discussion   mostly   to   the   same. However,   as   it   would   be   apposite   to   distinguish   between   the different   statutory   mechanisms,   we   would   touch   upon   these cursorily. Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 read with 81. the   Information   Technology   (Procedures   and   Safeguards   for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 allows blocking  of access  to  information.  This Court, in the   Shreya Singhal   case ( supra ), upheld the constitutional validity of this 67 Section   and   the   Rules   made   thereunder.   It   is   to   be   noted however, that the field of operation of this section is limited in scope. The aim of the section is not to restrict/block the internet as a whole, but only to block access to particular websites on the internet. Recourse cannot, therefore, be made by the Government to restrict the internet generally under this section. 82. Prior to 2017, any measure restricting the internet generally or even shutting down the internet was passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C.,   a   general   provision   granting   wide   powers   to   the Magistrates   specified   therein   to   pass   orders   in   cases   of apprehended danger. In 2015, the High Court of Gujarat, in the case of  Gaurav Sureshbhai Vyas v. State of Gujarat ,  in   Writ Petition (PIL) No. 191 of 2015, considered a challenge to an order under Section 144, Cr.P.C. blocking access to mobile internet services in the State of Gujarat. The High Court of Gujarat,  vide order dated 15.09.2015, upheld the restriction imposed by the Magistrate under Section 144, Cr.P.C. While the Court did not undertake a full­fledged discussion of the power of the Magistrate to issue such restrictions under Section 144, Cr.P.C., the Court observed as follows: 68 “ 9. …[ U]nder   Section   144   of   the   Code, directions may be issued to certain persons who may be the source for extending the .   Under   the facility   of   internet   access circumstances,   we   do   not   find   that   the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that   the   resort   to   only   Section   69A   was available and exercise of power under Section 144   of   the   Code   was   unavailable,   can   be accepted.” (emphasis supplied) A Special Leave Petition was filed against the above judgment of the Gujarat High Court, being SLP (C) No. 601 of 2016, which was dismissed by this Court  in limine  on 11.02.2016.    83. The position has changed since 2017, with the passage of the Suspension Rules under Section 7 of the Telegraph Act. With the promulgation of the Suspension Rules, the States are using the aforesaid Rules to restrict telecom services including access to the internet.  84. The Suspension Rules lay down certain safeguards, keeping in mind the fact that an action under the same has a large effect on the fundamental rights of citizens. It may be mentioned here that we are not concerned with the constitutionality of the Suspension Rules, and arguments on the same were not canvassed by either 69 side.  As such, we are limiting our discussion to the procedure laid down therein. Rule 2 lays down the procedure to be followed for the suspension of telecom services, and merits reproduction in its entirety: “ (1)   Directions   to   suspend   the   telecom 2. services shall not be issued except by an order made by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs in the case   of   Government   of   India   or   by   the Secretary to the State Government in­charge of the Home Department in the case of a State Government   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the competent   authority),   and   in   unavoidable circumstances,   where   obtaining   of   prior direction  is not feasible,  such order may  be issued by an officer, not below the rank of a Joint   Secretary   to   the   Government   of   India, who has been duly authorised by the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary, as the case may be:        Provided that the order for suspension of telecom   services,   issued   by   the   officer authorised by the Union Home Secretary or the State Home Secretary, shall be subject to the confirmation   from   the   competent   authority within 24 hours of issuing such order:        Provided   further   that   the   order   of suspension of telecom services shall cease to exist   in   case   of   failure   of   receipt   of confirmation   from   the   competent   authority within the said period of 24 hours. (2)   Any   order   issued   by   the   competent authority   under   sub­rule   (1)   shall   contain 70

71

85. Rule 2(1) specifies   the  competent  authority   to  issue   an  order under   the   Suspension   Rules,   who   in   ordinary   circumstances would   be   the   Secretary   to   the   Ministry   of   Home   Affairs, Government of India, or in the case of the State Government, the Secretary to the Home Department of the State Government. The sub­rule   also   provides   that   in   certain   “unavoidable” circumstances an officer, who is duly authorised, not below the rank   of   a   Joint   Secretary,   may   pass   an   order   suspending services. The two provisos to Rule 2(1) are extremely relevant herein, creating an internal check as to orders which are passed by   an   authorised   officer   in   “unavoidable”   circumstances,   as opposed   to   the   ordinary   mechanism   envisaged,   which   is   the 72 issuing of the order by the competent authority. The provisos together   provide   that   the   orders   passed   by   duly   authorised officers in “unavoidable” circumstances need to be confirmed by the competent authority within twenty­four hours, failing which, as  per  the second proviso, the order of suspension will cease to exist. The confirmation of the order by the competent authority is therefore   essential,   failing   which   the   order   passed   by   a   duly authorised officer will automatically lapse by operation of law.  86. Rule   2(2)   is   also   extremely   important,   as   it   lays   down   twin requirements for orders passed under Rule 2(1).  First , it requires that every order passed by a competent authority under Rule 2(1) must be a reasoned order. This requirement must be read to extend not only to orders passed by a competent authority, but also to those orders passed by an authorised officer which is to be sent for subsequent confirmation to the competent authority. The reasoning of the authorised officer should not only indicate the necessity of the measure but also what the “unavoidable” circumstance was which necessitated his passing the order. The purpose of the aforesaid rule is to integrate the proportionality analysis within the framework of the Rules. 73 87. Only in such an event would the requirement of confirmation by the competent authority have any meaning, as it would allow the competent authority to properly consider the action taken by the authorised officer. Further, the confirmation must not be a mere formality, but must indicate independent application of mind by the competent authority to the order passed by the authorised officer, who must also take into account changed circumstances if any, etc. After all, it is the competent authority who has been given the power under the Suspension Rules to suspend telecom services, with the authorised officer acting under the Suspension Rules only due to some exigent circumstances.    88. The second requirement under Rule 2(2) is the forwarding of the reasoned order of the competent authority to a Review Committee which has been set up under the Suspension Rules, within one working   day.   The   composition   of   the   Review   Committee   is provided under Rule 2(5), with two distinct review committees contemplated   for   the   Union   and   the   State,   depending   on   the competent   authority   which   issued   the   order   under   Rule   2(1). Rule 2(6) is the final internal check under the Suspension Rules with respect to the orders issued thereunder. Rule 2(6) requires the   concerned   Review   Committee   to   meet   within   five   working 74 days of issuance of the order suspending telecom services, and record its findings about whether the order issued under the Suspension Rules is in accordance with the provisions of the main statute,  , Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act. viz. 89. This last requirement, of the orders issued under the Rules being in accordance with Section 5(2), Telegraph Act, is very relevant to understand the circumstances in which the suspension orders may be passed. Section 5(2), Telegraph Act is as follows: “5.   Power   for   Government   to   take possession   of   licensed   telegraphs   and   to   order interception of messages xxx (2) On the occurrence of any public emergency, or   in   the   interest   of   the   public   safety,   the Central Government or a State Government or any officer specially authorised in this behalf by   the   Central   Government   or   a   State Government   may,   if   satisfied   that   it   is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security   of   the   State,   friendly   relations   with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence, for reasons  to  be  recorded  in writing,  by  order, direct that any message or class of messages to or from any person or class of persons, or relating to any particular subject, brought for transmission by or transmitted or received by any   telegraph,   shall   not   be   transmitted,   or shall be intercepted or detained, or shall be disclosed to the Government making the order or an officer thereof mentioned in the order: 75        Provided   that   the   press   messages intended   to   be   published   in   India   of correspondents   accredited   to   the   Central Government or a State Government shall not be   intercepted   or   detained,   unless   their transmission has been prohibited under this sub­section.” This Court has had prior occasion to interpret Section 5 of the 90. Telegraph   Act.   In   the   case   of   Hukam   Chand   Shyam   Lal  v. (1976) 2 SCC 128, a Four­Judge Bench of this Union of India,  Court interpreted Section 5 of the Telegraph Act and observed as follows:

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(emphasis supplied) 91. The aforementioned  case  was  followed  in   People’s  Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India,  (1997) 1 SCC 301, in the context of phone­tapping orders passed under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, wherein this Court observed as follows:

77

92. Keeping in mind the wordings of the section, and the above two pronouncements of this Court, what emerges is that the pre­ requisite for an order to be passed under this sub­section, and therefore the Suspension Rules, is the occurrence of a “public emergency”   or   for   it   to   be   “in   the   interest   of   public   safety”. Although the phrase “public emergency” has not been defined under the Telegraph Act, it has been clarified that the meaning of the phrase can be inferred from its usage in conjunction with the phrase “in the interest of public safety” following it. The  Hukam Chand Shyam Lal  case ( supra ) further clarifies that the scope of “public emergency” relates to the situations contemplated under the sub­section pertaining to “ sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or 78 public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence ”.   The   word   ‘emergency’   has   various   connotations.   Everyday 93. emergency, needs to be distinguished from the type of emergency wherein   events   which   involve,   or   might   involve,   serious   and sometimes widespread risk of injury or harm to members of the public   or   the   destruction   of,   or   serious   damage   to,   property. Article   4   of   the   International   Covenant   on   Civil   and   Political Rights, notes that ‘[I] n time of public emergency which threatens the   life   of   the   nation   and   the   existence   of   which   is   officially proclaimed... ’. Comparable language has also been used in Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights which says­ " In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation ".  We may only point out that the ‘public emergency’ is required to be of serious nature, and needs to be determined on a case to case basis.  The second requirement of Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act is for 94. the authority to be satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to pass the orders in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign 79 states   or   public   order   or   for   preventing   incitement   to   the commission of an offence, and must record reasons thereupon. The term ‘necessity’ and ‘expediency’ brings along the stages an emergency is going to pass through usually. A public emergency usually  would involve different  stages  and the  authorities are required to have regards to the stage, before the power can be utilized under the aforesaid rules. The appropriate balancing of the factors differs, when considering the stages of emergency and accordingly,   the   authorities   are   required   to   triangulate   the necessity   of   imposition  of   such  restriction   after   satisfying   the proportionality requirement. 95. A point canvassed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Ms. Vrinda Grover, with regard to the interpretation of the proviso to Section   5(2)   of   the   Telegraph   Act.   The   proviso   to   the   section specifies that a class of messages,  i.e. , press messages intended to   be   published   in   India   of   correspondents   accredited   to   the Central   Government   or   a   State   Government,   will   be   treated differently from other classes of messages. The learned counsel contended that this separate classification necessitates that an order  interfering  with  the   press   would  be   in  compliance   with Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act only if it specifically states that 80 the   press   is   also   to   be   restricted.   However,   the   aforesaid interpretation could not be supported by the petitioner with any judgments of this Court.  It must be noted that although the Suspension Rules does not 96. provide  for   publication   or   notification  of   the   orders,   a   settled principle   of   law,   and   of   natural   justice,   is   that   an   order, particularly one that affects lives, liberty and property of people, must be made available. Any law which demands compliance of the people requires to be notified directly and reliably. This is the case regardless of whether the parent statute or rule prescribes the   same   or   not.   We   are   therefore   required   to   read   in   the requirement of ensuring that all the orders passed under the Suspension   Rules   are   made   freely   available,   through   some suitable   mechanism.   [ See   B.K.   Srinivasan   v.   State   of ,  (1987) 1 SCC 658] Karnataka 97. The above requirement would further the rights of an affected party to challenge the orders, if aggrieved. Judicial review of the orders issued under the Suspension Rules is always available, although no appellate mechanism has been provided, and the same cannot be taken away or made ineffective. An aggrieved 81 person has the constitutional right to challenge the orders made under the Suspension Rules, before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or other appropriate forum. We   also   direct   that   all   the   above   procedural   safeguards,   as 98. elucidated   by   us,   need   to   be   mandatorily   followed.   In   this context,   this   Court   in   the   Hukam   Chand   Shyam   Lal   case ( ), observed as follows: supra

(emphasis supplied) This applies with even more force considering the large public impact on the right to freedom of speech and expression that such a broad­based restriction would have. Lastly, we think it necessary to reiterate that complete broad 99. suspension of telecom services, be it the Internet or otherwise, being a drastic measure, must be considered by the State only if ‘necessary’ and ‘unavoidable’. In furtherance of the same, the 82 State must assess the existence of an alternate less intrusive remedy.   Having   said   so,   we   may   note   that   the   aforesaid Suspension Rules have certain gaps, which are required to be considered by the legislature.  One of the gaps which must be highlighted relates to the usage of 100. the   word   “temporary”   in   the   title   of   the   Suspension   Rules. Despite   the   above,   there   is   no   indication   of   the   maximum duration   for   which   a   suspension   order   can   be   in   operation. Keeping in mind the requirements of proportionality expounded in the earlier section of the judgment, we are of the opinion that an   order   suspending   the   aforesaid   services   indefinitely   is impermissible. In this context,  it is necessary to lay down some procedural safeguard till the aforesaid deficiency is cured by the legislature   to   ensure   that   the   exercise   of   power   under   the Suspension  Rules   is   not   disproportionate.   We   therefore   direct that   the Review Committee constituted under Rule 2(5) of the Suspension Rules must conduct a periodic review within seven working days of the previous review, in terms of the requirements under Rule 2(6). The Review Committee must therefore not only look  into   the   question   of   whether   the   restrictions   are   still   in compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of the Telegraph 83 Act, but must also look into the question of whether the orders are   still   proportionate,   keeping   in   mind   the   constitutional consequences of the same. We clarify that looking to the fact that the restrictions contemplated under the Suspension Rules are temporary in nature, the same must not be allowed to extend beyond that time period which is necessary. 101. Coming to the orders placed before us regarding restrictions on communication   and   Internet,   there   are   eight   orders   that   are placed before us. Four orders have been passed by the Inspector General of Police, of the respective zone, while the other four orders are confirmation orders passed by the Principal Secretary to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department, confirming the four orders passed by the Inspector General of Police.  102. The learned Solicitor General has apprised the Bench that the authorities are considering relaxation of the restrictions and in some places the restrictions have already been removed. He also pointed that the authorities are constantly reviewing the same. In this case, the submission of the Solicitor General that there is still possibility of danger to public safety cannot be ignored, as this Court has not been completely apprised about the ground 84 situation by the State. We believe that the authorities have to pass their orders based on the guidelines provided in this case afresh. The learned Solicitor General had submitted, on a query being put to him regarding the feasibility of a measure blocking only social media services, that the same could not be done. However,   the   State   should   have   attempted   to   determine   the feasibility of such a measure. As all the orders have not been placed before this Court and there is no clarity as to which orders are in operation and which have already been withdrawn, as well as the apprehension raised in relation to the possibility of public order situations, we have accordingly moulded the relief in the operative portion. G. RESTRICTIONS UNDER SECTION 144 OF CRPC.     “ As  emergency does not shield the actions of Government completely; disagreement does not justify destabilisation; .” the beacon of rule of law shines always 103. The Petitioners have asserted that there were no disturbing facts which   warranted   the   imposition   of   restrictions   under   Section 144, Cr.P.C. on 04.08.2019. They strenuously argued that there 85 had   to   be   a   circumstance   on   04.08.2019   showing   that   there would   be   an   action   which   will   likely   create   obstruction, annoyance   or   injury   to   any   person   or   will   likely   cause disturbance of the public tranquillity, and the Government could not have passed such orders in anticipation or on the basis of a mere apprehension.  104. In   response,   the   learned   Solicitor   General,   on   behalf   of   the Respondent,   argued   that   the   volatile   history,   overwhelming material   available   even   in   the   public   domain   about   external aggressions, nefarious secessionist activities and the provocative statements   given   by   political   leaders,   created   a   compelling situation which mandated passing of orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C. 105. These contentions require us to examine the scope of Section 144, Cr.P.C, which reads as follows: “144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger .—(1) In cases   where,   in   the   opinion   of   a   District Magistrate, a Sub­divisional Magistrate or any other   Executive   Magistrate   specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there  is sufficient ground for proceeding 86 under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable , such Magistrate may,   by   a   written  order stating the  material facts  of  the  case   and   served   in   the   manner provided by Section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate   considers   that   such   direction   is likely   to   prevent,   or   tends   to   prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully   employed,   or   danger   to   human   life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray. (2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency   or   in   cases   where   the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed  ex parte . (3) An order under this section may be directed to   a   particular   individual,   or   to   persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area. (4) No order under this section shall remain in force   for   more   than   two   months   from   the making thereof: 87 Provided   that,   if   the   State   Government considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing   a   riot   or   any   affray,   it   may,   by notification,  direct  that  an  order   made  by  a Magistrate under this section shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date on which the order made by   the   Magistrate   would   have,   but  for   such order, expired, as it may specify in the said notification. (5)   Any   Magistrate   may,   either   on   his   own motion   or   on   the   application   of   any   person aggrieved,   rescind   or   alter   any   order   made under   this   section,   by   himself   or   any Magistrate   subordinate   to   him   or   by   his predecessor­in­office. (6) The State Government may, either on its own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made by it under the proviso to sub­section (4). (7) Where an application under sub­section (5) or sub­section (6) is received, the Magistrate, or the State Government, as the case may be, shall   afford   to   the   applicant   an   early opportunity of appearing before him or it , either in   person   or   by   pleader   and   showing   cause 88 against the order; and if the Magistrate or the State Government, as the case may be, rejects the application wholly or in part, he or it  shall record in writing the reasons  for so doing. 106. Section 144, Cr.P.C. is one of the mechanisms that enable the State to maintain public peace. It forms part of the Chapter in the Criminal Procedure Code dealing with “ Maintenance of   Public Order and Tranquillity ” and is contained in the sub­chapter on “ urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger ”. The structure of the provision shows that this power can only be invoked in “ urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger ”. 107. Section  144,   Cr.P.C.   enables   the   State   to   take   preventive measures   to   deal   with   imminent   threats   to   public   peace.   It enables   the   Magistrate   to   issue   a   mandatory   order   requiring certain   actions   to   be   undertaken,   or   a   prohibitory   order restraining citizens from doing certain things. But it also provides for several safeguards to ensure that the power is not abused, viz .­   prior   inquiry   before   exercising   this   power,   setting   out material facts for exercising this power and modifying/rescinding the order when the situation so warrants. 89 108. The aforesaid safeguards in Section 144, Cr.P.C. are discussed below and deserve close scrutiny.   (a) Prior Inquiry before issuing Order : Before issuing an order under Section 144, Cr.P.C., the District Magistrate (or any authorised Magistrate) must be of the   that: opinion i. There   is   a   sufficient   ground   for   proceeding   under   this provision   i.e.   the   order   is   likely   to   prevent   obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed or danger to human life, health or safety or disturbance to the public tranquillity; and  ii. Immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. The phrase “opinion” suggests that it must be arrived at after a careful inquiry by the Magistrate about the need to exercise the extraordinary power conferred under this provision.  (b) :   Once   a   Magistrate   arrives   at   an Content   of   the   Order opinion,   he   may  issue  a  written order  either  prohibiting  a person from doing something or a mandatory order requiring a   person   to   take   action   with   respect   to   property   in   his possession or under his management. But the order cannot be a blanket order. It must set out the “material facts” of the case. The “material facts” must indicate the reasons which 90 weighed with the Magistrate to issue an order under Section 144, Cr.P.C.  (c) Communication of the Order :  The Order must be served in the manner provided under Section 134, Cr.P.C., i.e., served on the person against whom it is made. If such a course of action is not practicable, it must be notified by proclamation and publication so as to convey the information to persons affected by the order. Only in case of an emergency or where the circumstances are such that notice cannot be served on such a person, can the order be passed  .  ex parte (d) Duration of the Order:  As this power can only be exercised in   urgent   cases,   the   statute   has   incorporated   temporal restrictions—the order cannot be in force for more than two months. However, the State Government can extend an order issued   under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   by   a   Magistrate   for   a further   period   up   to   six   months   if   the   State   Government considers it necessary for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or preventing a riot.  Although, a two­month period outer limit for the Magistrate, and a six­month limit for the State Government, has been provided   under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   but   the   concerned 91 Magistrate and the State Government must take all steps to ensure   that   the   restrictions   are   imposed   for   a   limited duration.  (e) Act Judicially while Rescinding or Modification of the :  The Magistrate can rescind or alter any order made by Order him on his own or on an application by any aggrieved person. Similarly, the State Government may also on its own motion rescind or alter any order passed by it, extending an order passed   under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   While   considering   any application for modification or alteration, the Magistrate or the State   Government   is   required   to   act   judicially,   i.e.,   give   a personal hearing and give reasons if it rejects the application. Care   should   be   taken   to   dispose   of   such   applications expeditiously.  Section  144,   Cr.P.C.   has   been   the   subject   matter   of   several 109. Constitution Bench rulings and we will briefly examine them. The constitutional  validity   of   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   under   the predecessor of the 1898 Act came up for the first time before the Constitution Bench of this Court in  case ( ). Babulal Parate  supra 92 Repelling   the   contention   that   it   is   an   infringement   of   the fundamental right of assembly, this Court upheld the provision due to the various safeguards inbuilt under Section 144, Cr.P.C. This Court opined that: a. Section 144, Cr.P.C does not confer arbitrary power on the Magistrate, since it must be preceded by an inquiry.  b. Although Section 144, Cr.P.C confers wide powers, it can   only   be   exercised   in   an   emergency,   and   for   the purpose   of   preventing   obstruction   and   annoyance   or injury to any person lawfully employed. Section 144, Cr.P.C is not an unlimited power. c. The Magistrate, while issuing an order, has to state the material facts upon which it is based. Since the order states   the   relevant   facts,   the   High   Court   will   have relevant material to consider whether such material is adequate   to   issue   Section   144,   Cr.P.C   order.   While considering such reasons, due weight must be given to the opinion of the District Magistrate who is responsible for the maintenance of public peace in the district.   d. This power can be exercised even when the Magistrate apprehends danger. It is not just mere “likelihood” or a “tendency”, but immediate prevention of particular acts to counteract danger.  e. Even   if   certain   sections   of   people   residing   in   the particular   area   are   disturbing   public   order,   the Magistrate can pass an order for the entire area as it is difficult   for   the   Magistrate   to   distinguish   between members   of   the   public   and   the   people   engaging   in 93 unlawful   activity.   However,   any   affected   person   can always apply to the Magistrate under Section 144(4), Cr.P.C. seeking exemption or modification of the order to permit them to carry out any lawful activity. f. If any person makes an application for modification or alteration of the order, the Magistrate has to conduct a judicial proceeding  by giving  a  hearing,  and   give  the reasons for the decision arrived at. g. The order of the Magistrate under Section 144, Cr.P.C is subject to challenge before the High Court. The High Court’s revisionary powers are wide enough to quash an order which cannot be supported by the materials upon which the order is supposed to be based.  h. If any prosecution is launched for non­compliance of an order issued under Section 144, Cr.P.C., the validity of such   an   order   under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   can   be challenged even at that stage. 110. The validity of the Section 144(6) under the 1898 Act again came up for consideration before a Bench of five Judges in   State of

judgment declared the latter part of Section 144(6), Cr.P.C as it then existed, which enabled the State Government to extend an order   passed   under   Section   144,  Cr.P.C.  indefinitely,   as unconstitutional,   since   it   did   not   provide   limitations   on   the duration of the order and no mechanism was provided therein to 94 make a representation against the duration of the order. Under the 1973 Act, a time limit has been prescribed on the maximum duration of the order. 

This Court, while affirming the constitutional validity of Section 144, Cr.P.C. reiterated the safeguards while exercising the power under Section 144, Cr.P.C. The Court highlighted that the power under Section 144, Cr.P.C. must be:  (a)exercised   in   urgent   situations   to   prevent   harmful occurrences.   Since   this   power   can   be   exercised absolutely and even  ex parte , “the emergency must be sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave”  (b)exercised in a judicial manner which can withstand  judicial scrutiny.  This Court observed that: “ 24 . The gist of action under Section 144 is the urgency   of   the   situation,   its   efficacy   in   the likelihood   of   being   able   to   prevent   some harmful occurrences. As it is possible to act absolutely   and  even   ex  parte.   it   is   obvious that the emergency must be sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave.   Without it the   exercise   of   power   would   have   no 95 justification.   It   is   not   an   ordinary   power flowing   from   administration   but   a   power used  in  a judicial  manner  and  which  can stand further judicial scrutiny in the need for the exercise of the power, in its efficacy and in the extent of its application.  There is no   general   proposition   that   an   order   under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be passed without taking evidence: … These fundamental facts emerge from the way the occasions for the exercise of the power are mentioned. Disturbances of public tranquillity, riots and affray lead to subversion of public order   unless   they   are   prevented   in   time. Nuisances dangerous to human life, health or safety   have   no   doubt   to   be   abated   and prevented. …..In so far as the other parts of the section are concerned the key­note of the power is to free society from menace of serious disturbances of a grave character. The section is   directed   against   those   who   attempt   to prevent the exercise of legal rights by others or imperil the public safety and health. If that be so the matter must fall within the restrictions which   the   Constitution   itself   visualizes   as permissible in the interest of public order, or in the interest of the general public.   We may say, however, that annoyance must assume sufficiently grave proportions to bring the matter within interests of public order. ” (emphasis supplied) 112. Again, in  Mohd. Gulam Abbas v. Mohd. Ibrahim,  (1978) 1 SCC 226 this Court, in deciding a review petition, elaborated on the ,  circumstances in which the power under Section 144, Cr.P.C. can be exercised. This Court held as under: 96 “ 3.  ... It is only where it is not practicable to allow them to do something which is quite legal, having regard to the state of excited feelings   of   persons   living   in   an   area   or frequenting a locality, that any action may be taken under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure  Code  which  may  interfere  with what  are,   otherwise,  completely   legal  and permissible conduct and speech . 4. ….It   may   however   be   noted   that   the Magistrate   is   not   concerned   with   individual rights   in   performing   his   duty   under   Section 144   but   he   has   to   determine   what   may   be reasonably   necessary   or   expedient   in   a situation of which he is the best judge. 5. … If public peace and tranquillity or other objects mentioned there are not in danger the Magistrate concerned cannot act under Section 144. He could only direct parties to go to the proper forum. On the other hand, if the public safety, peace, or tranquillity are in danger, it is left to the Magistrate concerned to take proper action under Section 144, Cr.P.C.” (emphasis supplied) 113. In  Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh ,  (1982) 1 SCC 71, this Court held that an order passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C. is an executive order which can be questioned in exercise of writ jurisdiction   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution.   The   Court reiterated   the   circumstances   in   which   the   power   can   be exercised. The Court observed as under: “   The entire basis of action under Section 27. 144   is   provided   by   the   urgency   of   the 97 situation   and   the   power   thereunder   is intended   to   be   availed   of   for   preventing disorders,   obstructions   and   annoyances with a view to  secure the public weal  by . maintaining  public peace  and  tranquillity Preservation   of   the   public   peace   and tranquillity is the primary function of the Government   and   the   aforesaid   power   is conferred   on   the   executive   magistracy enabling   it   to   perform   that   function effectively during emergent situations and as such it may become necessary for the Executive   Magistrate   to   override temporarily   private   rights   and   in   a   given situation   the   power   must   extend   to restraining   individuals   from   doing   acts ,   for,   it   is perfectly   lawful   in   themselves obvious that when there is a conflict between the   public   interest   and   private   rights   the former must prevail.   …. In other words, the Magistrate’s   action   should   be   directed against   the   wrong­doer   rather   than   the wronged.   Furthermore,   it   would   not   be   a proper exercise of discretion on the part of the Executive Magistrate to interfere with the lawful exercise of the right by a party on a consideration that those who threaten to interfere constitute a large majority and it   would   be   more   convenient   for   the administration to impose restrictions which would   affect   only   a   minor   section   of   the community   rather   than   prevent   a   larger section more vociferous and militant.   ... 33. It   is   only   in   an   extremely extraordinary   situation,   when   other measures   are   bound   to   fail,   that   a   total prohibition   or   suspension   of   their   rights may be resorted to as a last measure. ” 98 (emphasis supplied) 114. Again, in  Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commr. of Police ,   Calcutta ,   (1983) 4 SCC 522 ,   a Bench of three Judges expressed   doubts   about   the   dicta   in   the   case Gulam   Abbas   ( supra )   on the   nature of the order under Section 144, Cr.P.C. but reiterated that repetitive orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C. would be an abuse of power. This Court observed as follows: “ 16 ….  The scheme of that section does not contemplate repetitive orders and in case the  situation   so  warrants   steps   have   to  be taken under other provisions of the law such as   Section   107   or   Section   145   of   the   Code when   individual   disputes   are   raised   and   to meet   a   situation   such   as   here,   there   are provisions   to   be   found   in   the   Police   Act.   If repetitive orders are made it would clearly amount to abuse of the power conferred by Section 144 of the Code. ” (emphasis supplied) 115. In  Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re , (2012) 5 SCC 1, this Court emphasised the safeguards under Section 144, Cr.P.C. and the circumstances under which such an order can be issued.  The   learned   counsel   on   behalf   of   the   Petitioners   vehemently 116. contested   the   power   of   the   Magistrate   to   pass   the   aforesaid orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C. as there existed no incumbent 99 situation of emergency. It was argued that such orders passed in mere anticipation or apprehension cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. As explained above, the power under Section 144, Cr.P.C. is a preventive power to preserve public order. In  Babulal Parate  case ( supra ), this Court expressly clarified that this power can be exercised  even  where   there  exists  an  apprehension  of danger. This Court observed as under: “25.  The language of Section 144 is somewhat different. The test laid down in the section is not   merely   “likelihood”   or   “tendency”.   The section   says   that   the   Magistrate   must   be satisfied   that   immediate   prevention   of particular   acts   is   necessary   to   counteract danger   to   public   safety   etc.   The   power conferred by the section is exercisable not only   where   present   danger   exists   but   is exercisable   also   when   there   is   an apprehension of danger.” (emphasis supplied) 117. In view of the language of the provision and settled law, we are unable to accept the aforesaid contention.  118. Further, learned senior counsel Mr. Kapil Sibal expressed his concern that in the future any State could pass such type of blanket restrictions, for example, to prevent opposition parties 100 from contesting or participating in elections. In this context, it is sufficient   to   note   that   the   power   under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C. cannot be used as a tool to prevent the legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any democratic rights. Our Constitution protects the expression of divergent views, legitimate expressions and disapproval, and this cannot be the basis for invocation   of   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   unless   there   is   sufficient material   to   show   that   there   is   likely   to   be   an   incitement   to violence or threat to public safety or danger. It ought to be noted that provisions of Section 144, Cr.P.C. will only be applicable in a situation   of   emergency  and   for   the   purpose   of   preventing obstruction   and   annoyance   or   injury   to   any   person   lawfully employed [ refer to  Babulal Parate   case   ( supra )]. It is enough to note   that   sufficient   safeguards   exist   in   Section   144,   Cr.P.C., including the presence of judicial review challenging any abuse of power   under   the   Section,   to   allay   the   apprehensions   of   the petitioner.    119. The Petitioners have also contended that ‘law and order’ is of a narrower ambit than ‘public order’ and the invocation of ‘law and order’ would justify a narrower set of restrictions under Section 144, Cr.P.C. 101 In this context, it is pertinent for us to emphasize the holding 120. rendered by a five­Judge Bench of this court in  Ram Manohar AIR 1966 SC 740, wherein this Court Lohia v. State of Bihar ,  emphasised the difference between “public order” and “law and order” situation. This Court observed as under: “ 55.   It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was   said   to   comprehend   disorders   of   less gravity than those affecting “security of State”, “law and order” also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting “public order”. One   has   to   imagine   three   concentric circles.   Law   and   order   represents   the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State.  It is then easy  to  see   that  an  act may  affect  law  and order but not public order just as an act may affect   public   order   but   not   security   of   the State. By using the expression “maintenance of law   and   order”   the   District   Magistrate   was widening   his   own   field   of   action   and   was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules.” (emphasis supplied) 121. This Court therein held that a mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder may not necessarily lead to a breach of public

102

power   under   Section   144,   Cr.P.C.   can   be   exercised   by   the Magistrate. This Court held therein, as under: “ 24. The gist of action under Section 144 is the urgency of the situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrences.   As it is possible to act absolutely and even ex parte it is obvious that the   emergency   must   be   sudden   and   the consequences sufficiently grave. Without it the exercise of power would have no justification. It   is   not   an   ordinary   power   flowing   from administration   but   a   power   used   in   a judicial   manner   and   which   can   stand further judicial scrutiny in the need for the exercise of the power, in its efficacy and in the extent of its application ….  Disturbances of public tranquillity, riots and affray lead to   subversion   of  public   order   unless   they are prevented in time. Nuisances dangerous to   human   life,   health   or   safety   have   no doubt to be abated and prevented . We are, however, not concerned with this part of the section and the validity of this part need not be decided here. In so far as the other parts of the section   are   concerned   the   key­note   of   the power is to free society from menace of serious disturbances of a grave character.  The section is   directed   against   those   who   attempt   to prevent   the   exercise   of   legal   rights   by others   or   imperil   the   public   safety   and health.  If that be so the matter must fall within   the   restrictions   which   the Constitution itself visualizes as permissible in   the   interest   of   public   order,   or   in   the interest of the general public. We may say, 103 however,   that   annoyance   must   assume sufficiently grave proportions to bring the matter within interests of public order. ” (emphasis supplied) 122. This   Court   in   case  ( supra ) Ramlila   Maidan   Incident,   In   re   further   enunciated   upon   the   aforesaid   distinction   between   a “public order” and “law and order” situation: “ 44. The distinction between “public order” and   “law   and   order”   is   a   fine   one,   but nevertheless   clear.  A   restriction   imposed with “law and order” in mind would be least intruding   into   the   guaranteed   freedom while   “public   order”   may   qualify   for   a greater   degree   of   restriction   since   public order   is   a   matter   of   even   greater   social concern. … 45.   It is keeping this distinction in mind, the legislature,   under   Section   144   CrPC,   has empowered   the   District   Magistrate,   Sub­ Divisional   Magistrate   or   any   other   Executive Magistrate, specially empowered in this behalf, to direct any person to abstain from doing a certain act or to take action as directed, where sufficient   ground   for   proceeding   under   this section   exists   and   immediate   prevention and/or speedy remedy is desirable.  By virtue of   Section   144­A   CrPC,   which   itself   was introduced   by   Act   25   of   2005   [Ed.:   The Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   (Amendment) Act,   2005.]   ,   the   District   Magistrate   has 104 been   empowered   to   pass   an   order prohibiting,   in   any   area   within   the   local limits   of   his   jurisdiction,   the   carrying   of arms in any procession or the organising or holding of any mass drill or mass training with arms in any public place,  where it is necessary   for   him   to   do   so   for   the preservation of public peace, public safety or maintenance of public order.  …” (emphasis supplied) 123. In view of the above, ‘law and order’, ‘public order’ and ‘security of State’ are distinct legal standards and the Magistrate must tailor the restrictions depending on the nature of the situation. If two families quarrel over irrigation water, it might breach law and order, but in a situation where two communities fight over the same, the situation might transcend into a public order situation. However, it has to be noted that a similar approach cannot be taken   to   remedy   the   aforesaid   two   distinct   situations.   The Magistrate cannot apply a straitjacket formula without assessing the gravity of the prevailing circumstances; the restrictions must be proportionate to the situation concerned. 124. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal also contended that an order under Section 144, Cr.P.C. cannot be issued against the 105 public generally  and  must  be specifically intended against the people or the group which is apprehended to disturb the peace

has clarified that such an order can be passed against either a particular individual or the public in general. This Court was aware   that,   at   times,   it   may   not   be   possible   to   distinguish between the subject of protection under these orders and the individuals against whom these prohibitory orders are required to be passed:

The counsel on behalf of the Petitioners have argued that the 125. validity   of   the   aforesaid   restrictions   has   to   be   tested   on   its reasonableness. The restrictions imposed must be proportionate to the proposed/perceived threat. In the context of restrictions 106 imposed by way of orders passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C., this

onerous   duty   is   cast   upon   the   concerned   Magistrate   to   first assess   the   perceived   threat   and   impose   the   least   invasive restriction possible. The concerned Magistrate is duty bound to ensure   that   the   restrictions   should   never   be   allowed   to   be excessive  either   in  nature  or   in   time.   The   relevant  portion  is extracted below:

58. Out   of   the   aforestated   requirements,   the requirements of existence of sufficient ground and need for immediate prevention or speedy remedy   is   of   prime   significance.   In   this context,   the   perception   of   the   officer recording   the   desired/contemplated satisfaction   has   to   be   reasonable,   least invasive and bona fide. The restraint has to be reasonable and further must be minimal. Such   restraint   should   not   be   allowed   to exceed   the   constraints   of   the   particular situation   either   in   nature   or   in   duration. The most onerous duty that is cast upon the 107 empowered officer by the legislature is that the perception   of   threat   to   public   peace   and tranquillity should be real and not quandary, imaginary or a mere likely possibility.” (emphasis supplied)

into the fold, equally apply to an order passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C.  The Petitioners also contended that orders passed under Section 127. 144, Cr.P.C., imposing restrictions, cannot be a subject matter of privilege. Moreover, material facts must be recorded in the order itself. On the other hand, the learned Solicitor General argued that the empowered officers were in the best position to know the situation   on   the   ground   and   accordingly   the   aforesaid   orders were passed. There existed sufficient speculation on the ground to   suggest   abrogation   of   Article   370,   and   the   respective Magistrates,   being   aware   of   the   circumstances,   imposed   the aforesaid   restrictions   in   a   periodic   manner,   indicating   due application of mind. The learned Solicitor General further argued 108 that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the order passed by the magistrate, particularly when there is no imputation of  mala fide. 128. To   put   a   quietus   to   the   aforesaid   issue   it   is   pertinent   to reproduce   and   rely   on   a   relevant   extract   from   the   Ramlila

“ 56.   Moreover,   an order under Section 144 CrPC   being   an   order   which   has   a   direct consequence of placing a restriction on the right to freedom of speech and expression and right to assemble peaceably, should be an order in writing and based upon material facts   of   the   case.   This   would   be   the requirement of law for more than one reason. Firstly, it is an order placing a restriction upon   the   fundamental   rights   of   a   citizen and,   thus,   may   adversely   affect   the interests of the parties, and secondly, under the   provisions   of   CrPC,   such   an   order   is revisable and is subject to judicial review . Therefore,   it   will   be   appropriate   that   it must be an order in writing, referring to the facts and stating the reasons for imposition . In  of such restriction Praveen Bhai Thogadia [(2004) 4 SCC 684: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1387], this Court   took   the   view   that   the   Court,   while dealing with such orders, does not act like an appellate   authority   over   the   decision   of   the official   concerned.   It   would   interfere   only where   the   order   is   patently   illegal   and without jurisdiction or with ulterior motive and on extraneous consideration of political victimisation by those in power .   Normally, 109 interference   should   be   the   exception   and not the rule .” (emphasis supplied) 129. We may note that orders passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C. have direct consequences upon the fundamental rights of the public in general. Such a power, if used in a casual and cavalier manner, would   result   in   severe   illegality.   This   power   should   be   used responsibly, only as a measure to preserve law and order. The order is open to judicial review, so that any person aggrieved by such an action can always approach the appropriate forum and challenge the same. But, the aforesaid means of judicial review will stand crippled if the order itself is unreasoned or un­notified. This Court, in the case of  ( supra ), also stressed Babulal Parate  upon the requirement of having the order in writing, wherein it is clearly   indicated   that   opinion   formed   by   the   Magistrate   was based upon the material facts of the case. This Court held as under:  “  Sub­section (1) confers powers not on the 9. executive   but   on   certain   Magistrates… Under sub­section (1) the Magistrate himself has to form an opinion that there is sufficient ground   for   proceeding   under   this   section 110 and   immediate   prevention   or   speedy remedy is desirable. Again the sub­section requires the Magistrate to make an order in writing and state therein the material facts by reason of which he is making the order thereunde r.   The   sub­section   further enumerates   the   particular   activities   with regard to which the Magistrate is entitled to place restraints.” (emphasis supplied) 130. While passing orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C., it is imperative to   indicate   the   material   facts   necessitating   passing   of   such orders.   Normally,   it   should   be   invoked   and   confined   to   a particular   area   or   some   particular   issues.   However,   in   the present case, it is contended by the Petitioners that the majority of the geographical area of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir  was   placed  under   orders  passed   under   Section  144, Cr.P.C. and the passing of these orders need to be looked at in this perspective. In response, it is the case of the Respondent, although it has not been stated in clear terms, that it is an issue of national security and cross border terrorism. Before we part, we   need   to   caution   against   the   excessive   utility   of   the proportionality   doctrine   in   the   matters   of   national   security, sovereignty and integrity.  111 Although, the Respondents submitted that this Court cannot sit 131. in   appeal   or   review   the   orders   passed   by   the   executive, particularly those pertaining to law and order situation, the scope of judicial review with respect to law and order issues has been settled by this Court. In   State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai   Thogadia,   (2004)   4   SCC   684,   this   Court   observed, specifically in the context of Section 144, Cr.P.C., as follows:  “ 6.   Courts should not normally interfere with matters   relating   to   law   and   order   which   is primarily   the   domain   of   the   administrative authorities concerned. They are by and large the best to assess and to handle the situation depending   upon   the   peculiar   needs   and necessities within their special knowledge. …… Therefore,   whenever   the   authorities concerned in charge of law and order find that   a   person’s   speeches   or   actions   are likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred   resulting   in   fissiparous   tendencies gaining foothold, undermining and affecting communal   harmony,   prohibitory   orders need necessarily to be passed, to effectively avert such untoward happenings . ..   If   they   feel   that   the   presence   or 7. participation of any person in the meeting or congregation would be objectionable, for some patent or latent reasons as well as the past track   record   of   such   happenings   in   other places involving such participants, necessary prohibitory   orders   can   be   passed.   Quick decisions and swift as well as effective action 112 necessitated in such cases may not justify or permit the authorities to give prior opportunity or   consideration   at   length   of   the   pros   and cons.   The   imminent   need   to   intervene instantly, having regard to the sensitivity and perniciously   perilous   consequences   it   may result in if not prevented forthwith, cannot be lost   sight   of.   The   valuable   and   cherished right of freedom of expression and speech may   at   times   have   to   be   subjected   to reasonable   subordination   to   social interests, needs and necessities to preserve the   very   core   of   democratic   life   ­ preservation of public order and rule of law. At   some   such   grave   situation   at   least   the decision as to the need and necessity to take prohibitory   actions   must   be   left   to   the discretion of those entrusted with the duty of maintaining law and order, and interposition of courts   unless a concrete case of abuse or exercise   of   such   sweeping   powers   for extraneous   considerations   by   the   authority concerned or that such authority was shown to act   at   the   behest   of   those   in   power,   and interference   as   a   matter   of   course   and   as though adjudicating an appeal, will defeat the very   purpose   of   legislation   and   legislative intent…”  (emphasis supplied) 132. It is true that we do not sit in appeal, however, the existence of the power of judicial review is undeniable. We are of the opinion that it is for the Magistrate and the State to make an informed judgement about the likely threat to public peace and law and 113 order. The State is best placed to make an assessment of threat to public peace and tranquillity or law and order. However, the law requires them to state the material facts for invoking this power.  This   will  enable   judicial   scrutiny   and   a   verification   of whether there are sufficient facts to justify the invocation of this power. In a situation where fundamental rights of the citizens are being 133. curtailed, the same cannot be done through an arbitrary exercise of   power;   rather   it   should   be   based   on   objective   facts.   The preventive/remedial measures under Section 144, Cr.P.C. should be based on the type of exigency, extent of territoriality, nature of restriction   and   the   duration   of   the   same.   In   a   situation   of urgency, the authority is required to satisfy itself of such material to base its opinion on for the immediate imposition of restrictions or   measures   which   are   preventive/remedial.   However,   if   the authority is to consider imposition of restrictions over a larger territorial   area   or   for   a   longer   duration,   the   threshold requirement is relatively higher.  An order passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C. should be indicative 134. of proper application of mind, which should be based on the 114 material facts and the remedy directed. Proper reasoning links the   application   of   mind   of   the   officer   concerned,   to   the controversy involved and the conclusion reached. Orders passed mechanically or in a cryptic manner cannot be said to be orders passed in accordance with law. 135. During   the   course   of   hearing,   on   26.11.2019,   the   learned Solicitor General sought the permission of this Court to produce certain   confidential   documents   to   be   perused   by   this   Court. However,   he   objected   to   revealing   certain   documents   to   the Petitioners,   claiming   sensitivity   and   confidentiality.   Learned senior   counsel   Mr.   Kapil   Sibal   stated   that   the   Court   could assume the existence of such intelligence inputs and materials. In view of such stand, we have not gone into the adequacy of the material   placed   before   this   Court;   rather,   we   have   presumed existence of the same.  One of the important criteria to test the reasonableness of such a 136. measure is to see if the aggrieved person has the right to make a representation against such a restriction.  It  is  a fundamental principle   of   law   that   no   party   can   be   deprived   of   his   liberty without   being   afforded   a   fair,   adequate   and   reasonable opportunity of hearing. Therefore, in a situation where the order 115 is   silent   on   the   material   facts,   the   person   aggrieved   cannot effectively   challenge   the   same.   Resultantly,   there   exists   no effective mechanism to judicially review the same. [ See  State of

same, it is imperative for the State to make such orders public so as to make the right available under Section 144(5), Cr.P.C. a practical reality.  One thing to remember is that no  mala fide  has been alleged by 137. the Petitioners. It was not denied by the Petitioners that the State has the power to pass such restrictive order. Additionally, the Respondents   contended   that   the   historical   background   of   the State­ cross border terrorism, infiltration of militants, security issues, etc., cannot be forgotten and must be kept in mind while testing   the   legality   of   the   orders.   Further,   the   Respondent submitted that the  orders were passed in  the aforementioned context and in the anticipated threat to law and order, to prevent any loss of life, limb and property. However, these orders do not explain the aforesaid aspects.  Although   the   restrictions   have   been   allegedly   removed   on 138. 27.09.2019,   thereby   rendering   the   present   exercise   into   a 116 virtually academic one, we cannot ignore non­compliance of law by   the   State.   As   learned   senior   counsel   Mr.   Kapil   Sibal submitted,   this   case   is   not   just   about   the   past   or   what   has happened in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir, but also about   the   future,   where   this   Court   has   to   caution   the Government. Hence, we direct that the authorities must follow the principles laid down by this Court and uphold the rule of law. 139. It is contended by the Petitioners that while the Respondents stated that there are no prohibitory orders during the day and there are certain restrictions in certain areas during the night, on the   ground,   the   situation   is   different   as   the   police   is   still restricting the movement of the people even during the day. If that is so, it is not proper and correct for the State to resort to such type of acts. A Government, if it thinks that there is a threat to the law and order situation or any other such requirement, must   follow   the   procedure   laid   down   by   law,   taking   into consideration  the   rights   of   the   citizens,   and   pass   appropriate need­based orders. In view of the same, appropriate directions are provided in the operative part of this judgment. 140. Before parting we summarise the legal position on Section 144, Cr.P.C as follows: 117 i. The power under Section 144, Cr.P.C., being remedial as well as preventive, is exercisable not only where there exists   present   danger,   but   also   when   there   is   an apprehension   of   danger.   However,   the   danger contemplated should be in the nature of an “emergency” and   for   the   purpose   of   preventing   obstruction   and annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed.  ii. The power under Section 144, Cr.P.C cannot be used to suppress legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any democratic rights. iii. An order passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C. should state the material facts to enable judicial review of the same. The   power   should   be   exercised   in   a     and bona   fide reasonable manner, and the same should be passed by relying on the material facts, indicative of application of mind. This will enable judicial scrutiny of the aforesaid order.  iv. While exercising the power under Section 144, Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is duty bound to balance the rights and restrictions based on the principles of proportionality and thereafter apply the least intrusive measure. 118 v. Repetitive orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C. would be an abuse of power. H. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS     The Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1031 of 2019 has filed the petition 141. basing   her   contention   on   the   following   factual   premise,   as averred:  13.  Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1031 of 2019 was filed   on   10­08­2019   under   Article   32   of   the Constitution of India by the Executive Editor of the   newspaper   “Kashmir   Times”,   which publishes two editions daily, one from Jammu and   another   from   Srinagar. The   English newspaper,   Kashmir   Times,   was   founded   in 1954 as a news weekly. It was later converted to a daily newspaper in 1962 and has regularly been   in   print   and   circulation   ever   since. Kashmir   Times   is   a   widely   read   English newspaper in Jammu and Kashmir, and also has significant readership in the neighbouring States of Punjab, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh. 14.  On 04­08­2019, sometime during the day, mobile phone networks, internet services, and landline phones were all discontinued in the Kashmir valley and in some districts of Jammu and   Ladakh.   No   formal   orders   under   which such   action   was   taken   by   the   Respondents were communicated to the affected population, including the residents of the Kashmir Valley. This meant that the people of Kashmir were plunged into a communication blackhole and an   information   blackout.   The   actions   of   the 119 respondents   have   had   a   debilitating   and crippling   effect   on   newsgathering,   reporting, publication,   circulation   and   information dissemination,   and   have   also   resulted   in freezing of web portals and news websites. From the morning of 05­08­2019, with a 15.   heavy   military   presence,   barricades   and severance of all communication links, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was placed under   de facto   curfew.    At   the   same   time,   on   05­08­ 2019, the Constitution (Application to Jammu and   Kashmir)   order,   2019,   C.O.   272   was published in The Gazette of India, vide which under the powers vested by Article 370(1) of the   Constitution of  India,  Article  367(4) was added   to   the   Constitution.   Also   on   05­08­ 2019, the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019, was introduced in the Rajya Sabha, and passed. On 06­08­2019, the said Bill was passed   by   the   Lok   Sabha.   The   President’s assent was given to the Bill on 09­08­2019. The Gazette Notification, dt. 09­08­2019 states that the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation st Act,   2019,   will   come   into   effect   from   31 October, 2019, and that there shall be a new Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. All of this was carried out while the State of Jammu and Kashmir was in a lockdown and silenced through a communication shutdown. In such Circumstances the Kashmir Times’ 16.  Srinagar edition could not be distributed on 05­08­2019   and   it   could   not   be   published thereafter from 06­08­2019 to 11­10­2019, as newspaper   publication   necessarily   requires news   gathering  by   reporters   traveling   across the   Valley   and   unhindered   interaction   with public and officials. Due to the indiscriminate lockdown­including   communication   and internet   blackout­   and   severe   curbs   on 120 movement   enforced   by   the   respondents,   the Petitioner   was   prevented   and   hindered   from carrying   out   her   profession   and   work.   Even after 11­10­2019 only a truncated copy of the newspaper is being published because of the severe restrictions in place even today (internet services and SMS services are completely shut down   even   after   115   days).   The   new portal/website is frozen till date.    142. There   is   no   doubt   that   the   importance   of   the   press   is   well established  under  Indian  Law.  The  freedom of   the  press  is  a requirement   in   any   democratic   society   for   its   effective functioning. The first case which dealt with the freedom of the press can be traced back to  Channing Arnold v. The Emperor , (1914) 16 Bom LR 544, wherein the Privy Council stated that:   “ 36.   The   freedom   of   the   journalist   is   an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject and to whatever length, the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but apart from the statute law his privilege is no other and no higher.   The   range   of   his   assertions,   his criticisms or his comments is as wide as, and no wider than that of any other subject.”    During   the   drafting   of   our   Constitution,   B.   N.   Rau,   while 143. commenting on the amendments by Jaya Prakash Narayan, who had proposed a separate freedom of press, had commented in the following manner: 121 “It is hardly necessary to provide specifically for   the   freedom   of   the   press   as   freedom   of expression provided in sub­clause (a) of clause (1) of article 13 will include freedom of the press...” Thereafter,   many   judgments   of   this   Court   including   144. Bennett v. Union of India,  (1972) 2 SCC 788,  Coleman  Indian Express ( supra ) , Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,  [1962] 3 SCR 842 have expounded on the right of freedom of press and have clearly   enunciated   the   importance   of   the   aforesaid   rights   in modern  society.   In   view   of   the   same,   there   is   no   doubt   that freedom of the press needs to be considered herein while dealing with the issue of the case at hand.     145. From   the   aforesaid   factual   averment,   we   may   note   that   the Petitioner   in   W.P.   (C)   No.   1031   of   2019,   with   respect   to   the present   issue,   does   not   impugn   any   specific   order   of   the government restricting the freedom of the press or restricting the content   of   the   press.   The   allegation   of   the   aforementioned Petitioner   is   that   the   cumulative   effect   of   various   other restrictions, such as the imposition of Section 144, Cr.P.C. and restriction   on   internet   and   communication,   has   indirectly affected the freedom of the press in the valley. 122   There is no doubt that the freedom of the press is a valuable and 146. sacred right enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This right is required in any modern democracy without which there cannot be transfer of information or requisite discussion for a democratic society. Squarely however, the contention of the Petitioner rests on the chilling effects alleged to be produced by the imposition of restrictions as discussed above.    Chilling effect has been utilized in Indian Jurisprudence as a 147. fairly recent concept. Its presence in the United States of America can be traced to the decision in  Weiman v. Updgraff , 344 U.S. 183. We may note that the argument of chilling effect has been utilized   in   various   contexts,   from   being   purely   an   emotive argument   to   a   substantive   component   under   the   free   speech adjudication.   The   usage   of   the   aforesaid   principle   is   chiefly adopted for  impugning  an  action  of  the  State,  which may  be constitutional, but which imposes a great burden on the free speech. We may note that the argument of chilling effect, if not tempered   judicially,   would   result   in   a   “self­proclaiming instrument”.   123 148. The principle of chilling effect was utilized initially in a limited context, that a person could be restricted from exercising his protected right due to the ambiguous nature of an overbroad statute. In this regard, the chilling effect was restricted to the analysis of the First Amendment right. The work of Frederick Schauer provides a detailed analysis in his seminal work on the 22 First Amendment.  This analysis was replicated in the context of privacy and internet usage in a regulatory set up by Daniel J. Solove. These panopticon concerns have been accepted in the case of  ( supra ).  K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy­9J.)  149. We need to concern ourselves herein as to theoretical question of drawing lines as to when a regulation stops short of impinging upon free speech. A regulatory legislation will have a direct or indirect impact on various rights of different degrees. Individual rights cannot be viewed as silos, rather they should be viewed in a cumulative manner which may be affected in different ways. The technical rule of causal link cannot be made applicable in the case of human rights. Human rights are an inherent feature of   every   human   and   there   is   no   question   of   the   State   not 22   Frederick Schauer,   Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect (1978). 124 providing for these rights. In one sense, the restrictions provided under   Article   19(2)   of   the   Constitution   follow   a   utilitarian approach  wherein  individualism   gives   way   for   commonality   of benefit, if such restrictions are required and demanded by law. In this   context,   the   test   of   ‘direct   impact’   as   laid   down   in   A.K Gopalan   v.   State   of   Madras,   AIR   1950   SC   27,   has   been subsequently widened in  Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India ,   1970   (1)   SCC   248,   wherein   the   test   of   ‘direct   and inevitable consequence’ was propounded. As this is not a case wherein a detailed analysis of chilling effect is required for the reasons given below, we leave the question of law open as to the appropriate standard for establishing causal link in a challenge based on chilling effect. 150. The  widening   of   the   ‘chilling   effect  doctrine’   has   always   been viewed with judicial scepticism. At this juncture, we may note the decision in   , 408 U.S. 1 (1972), wherein the Laird v. Tantum respondent brought an action against the authorities to injunct them from conducting surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity, based on the chilling effect doctrine. The United States Supreme Court, in its majority decision, dismissed the 125 plea   of   the   respondent   on   the   ground   of   lack   of   evidence   to establish such a claim. The Court observed that:

Therefore,   to   say   that   the   aforesaid   restrictions   were unconstitutional because it has a chilling effect on the freedom of press   generally   is   to   say   virtually   nothing   at   all   or   is   saying something that is purely speculative, unless evidence is brought before the Court to enable it to give a clear finding, which has not been placed on record in the present case. [ refer to   Clapper v , 568 U.S. 113 (2013)] Amnesty Int’l ,  USA   In this context, one possible test of chilling effect is comparative 151. harm. In this frame­work, the Court is required to see whether the impugned restrictions, due to their broad­based nature, have had a restrictive effect on similarly placed individuals during the period. It is the contention of the Petitioner that she was not able to   publish   her   newspaper   from   06­08­2019   to   11­10­2019. However, no evidence was put forth to establish that such other individuals were also restricted in publishing newspapers in the 126 area. Without such evidence having been placed on record, it would be impossible to distinguish a legitimate claim of chilling effect from a mere emotive argument for a self­serving purpose. On the other hand, the learned Solicitor General has submitted that there were other newspapers which were running during the aforesaid time period. In view of these facts, and considering that the aforesaid Petitioner has now resumed publication, we do not deem   it   fit   to   indulge   more   in   the   issue   than   to   state   that responsible Governments are required to respect the freedom of the press at all times. Journalists are to be accommodated in reporting and there is no justification for allowing a sword of Damocles to hang over the press indefinitely.     I.   C ONCLUSION   152. In this view, we issue the following directions: a. The Respondent State/competent authorities are directed to publish   all  orders   in   force   and   any   future   orders   under Section 144, Cr.P.C and for suspension of telecom services, including   internet,   to   enable   the   affected   persons   to challenge it before the High Court or appropriate forum. b. We declare that the freedom of speech and expression and the   freedom   to   practice   any   profession   or   carry   on   any trade, business or occupation over the medium of internet enjoys constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) and Article   19(1)(g).   The   restriction   upon   such   fundamental 127 rights should be in consonance with the mandate under Article 19 (2) and (6) of the Constitution, inclusive of the test of proportionality.  c. An   order   suspending   internet   services   indefinitely   is impermissible under the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Service) Rules, 2017. Suspension can be utilized for temporary duration only. d. Any order suspending internet issued under the Suspension Rules, must adhere to the principle of proportionality and must not extend beyond necessary duration. e. Any order suspending internet under the Suspension Rules is subject to judicial review based on the parameters set out herein.  f. The existing Suspension Rules neither provide for a periodic review nor a time limitation for an order issued under the Suspension Rules. Till this gap is filled, we  direct that  the Review   Committee   constituted   under   Rule   2(5)   of   the Suspension Rules must conduct a periodic review within seven working days of the previous review, in terms of the requirements under Rule 2(6). g. We   direct   the   respondent   State/competent   authorities   to review all orders suspending internet services forthwith. h. Orders not in accordance with the law laid down above, must be revoked. Further, in future, if there is a necessity to pass   fresh   orders,   the   law   laid   down   herein   must   be followed. i. In any case, the State/concerned authorities are directed to consider   forthwith   allowing   government   websites, localized/limited e­banking facilities, hospitals services and 128 other   essential   services,   in   those   regions,   wherein   the internet services are not likely to be restored immediately. j. The power under Section 144, Cr.P.C., being remedial as well as preventive, is exercisable not only where there exists present danger, but also when there is an apprehension of danger. However, the danger contemplated should be in the nature of an “emergency” and for the purpose of preventing obstruction and annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed.  k. The power under Section 144, Cr.P.C cannot be used to suppress legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any democratic rights. l. An order passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C. should state the material facts to enable judicial review of the same. The power should be exercised in a   bona fide   and reasonable manner, and the same should be passed by relying on the material facts, indicative of application of mind. This will enable judicial scrutiny of the aforesaid order.  m.While exercising the power under Section 144, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate   is   duty   bound   to   balance   the   rights   and restrictions based on the principles of proportionality and thereafter, apply the least intrusive measure. n. Repetitive orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C. would be an abuse of power. o. The Respondent State/competent authorities are directed to review forthwith the need for continuance of any existing orders passed under Section 144, Cr.P.C in accordance with law laid down above.  129 153. The Writ Petitions are disposed of in the afore­stated terms. All pending applications are also accordingly disposed of.       ..............................................J.               (N.V. RAMANA)  ..............................................J. (R. SUBHASH REDDY) ..............................................J.  (B. R. GAVAI)   NEW DELHI; JANUARY 10, 2020 130