Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
K.M. SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SECRETARY, ASSOCIATION OF INDIAN UNIVERSITIESAND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/04/1992
BENCH:
YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)
BENCH:
YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 1356 1992 SCR (2) 630
1992 SCC (3) 129 JT 1992 (4) 12
1992 SCALE (1)839
ACT:
Indian Evidence Act, 1872:
Section 20- Statement made on special oath by person -
Evidentiary value of -Held an admission of the person.
Code of civil procedure, 1908:
Suit-Disposal of -By special oath-Validity of:
Oaths Act, 1969:
Section 9-Oaths Act, 1873- Repeal of -Whether debars parties
from entering into any contract.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner in the special Leave petition filed a
suit for declaring that the resignation tendered by him was
involuntary and a result of fraud,coercion and threat as
well as the inducement as alleged in the plaint. During the
pendency of this suit, he filed an application under Order
10 Rule 2 Read with Section 151 of the code of Civil Proce-
dure for a direction that if the respondent officers No.1
and 2 took a special oath in Gurudwara and Mandir respec-
tively to the effect that the resignation of the plaintiff
was not extracted from him under duress, fear, inducement,
fraud, coercion then that part of the claim might be dis-
missed as withdrawn.
The respondent Officers having accepted the challenge
the Additional District Judge appointed a local commissioner
to administer the oath to the said two persons as desired by
the petitioner, and the same having been taken and the court
duly informed, the additional District Judge ordered dis-
missal of that part of the claim covered by the suit.
On the following day of the dismissal of the
application, the
631
petitioner filed another application with a prayer to decide
the aforesaid issue on merits and evidence and that the
respondents might not be allowed to take advantage of the
blunder committed by the petitioner in his application, and
for cancellation of the court’s order dismissing the claim.
This application was dismissed by the Trial Judge. The Trial
Court took the view that Section 20 of the Evidence Act was
applicable and that the repeal of the Oath Act, 1873 by
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Section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1969 no where debarred the
parties from entering into any contract.
The petitioner filed revision petition against the two
orders of the Trial Court but the same was dismissed.
In the special leave petition of this Court, the
petitioner contended in person that in view of the repeal of
the Oaths Act, 1873 by the Oaths Act, 1969 the suit could
not be decided on the basis of special oath.
Dismissing the special leave petition, this Court,
HELD: 1. The oath was administered as per the petition-
er’s statement and there is thus no manner of doubt that
the oath taken by the two persons in pursuance of the offer
of the petitioner amounted to an admission of the respond-
ent’s claim on his part within the meaning of Section 20 of
the Evidence Act.[639 D]
2. The two persons were the nominees of the plaintiff
and the statement of the nominees by virtue of Section 20 of
the Evidence Act would be treated as an admission of the
parties.[639 D-E]
3. The Trial Court was right in its view that Section
20 of the Evidence Act was applicable in the instant case,
and that the repeal of the Oaths Act, 1873 by Section 9 of
the Oaths Act, 1969 nowhere debarred the plaintiff parties
from entering into any contract. The orders of the Trial
Court are therefore unassailable and the High Court has
rightly dismissed the revision petition.[635 G-H;639 E]
Hirachand Kothari (dead) by Lrs. v. State of Rajasthan
and another, [1985] Supp. SCC 17, referred to.
J. A. Munnuswami Naidu v. K.S.P. Thyagaraya Chettiar
and another, AIR 1977 Madras 273, Vasudeva Shanbog v.
Naraina Rai, 1880 ILR 2 Madras 356, Rustam etc. v. The
Financial Commissioner, etc. 1981-83 PLR
632
759, Mrs.Florabel Skinner and Others v.Jai Bajrang Kala
Mandir Ram Lila Mandal, Hissar, AIR 1980 P & H 284 and
Thakur Singh & Others v. lnder singh, AIR 1976 P & H 287,
approved.
Pacharanda Nanjappa v. Pacharanda Belliappa deceased by
Seethavva & Others, 1979-29 ILR (Karnataka) 2018 and Ananda
Chandra Sahu (deceased by L.R.) & Others. v. Ananta Khuntia
and other, AIR 1983 Orissa 250, over-ruled.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Special Leave Petition
(civil) No.10436 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.91 of the Delhi
High Court in C.R. No. 359 of 1989.
Petitioner-in-person.
P.P. Rao Rajindra Dhawan and Jitendra Sharma for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. This Special Leave Petition filed
by Sh. K.M. Singh, who was a Finance Officer of the
Association of Indian Universities, AIU House, 16 Kotla
Marg, New Delhi, is against the Judgment dated 26th April,
1991 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Delhi in Civil Revision No. 359 of 1989.
In the revision petition the petitioner had sought to
set aside an order dated 30th January, 1989 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, dismissing the
application filed on his behalf wherein he had prayed for
cancelling an order dated 14th October, 1988 vide which a
part of the claim of the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff
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covered by issue No.1 was ordered to be dismissed as with-
drawn.
The facts giving rise to the filing of the revision
petition were that the petitioner had filed a suit inter
alia for declaring that the resignation tendered by the
petitioner/plaintiff was involuntary and a result of
fraud,coercion and threat as well as the inducement as
alleged in the plaint. This plea of the petitioner was
subject matter of issue No.1.
During the course of the proceedings the petitioner had
filed an application dated 14th October, 1988 purporting to
be under Order 10
633
Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
In this application it was prayed that if Sh. Amrik Singh
and Sh.R.P. Mahendroo, officers of defendant No.1.took
special oath in Gurudwara and Mandir respectively to the
effect that the resignation of the plaintiff was not ex-
tracted from him on 5th April, 1976 under duress, fear,
inducement,fraud, coercion then that part of the claim might
be dismissed as withdrawn. The plaintiff/petitioner in fact
made this statement before the Additional District Judge and
Sh. Amrik Singh and Sh. Mahendroo accepted the said chal-
lenge. They were ready to take special oath in Gurudwara and
Mandir in terms of the plaintiff’s statement. Consequently a
local commissioner was appointed by the Additional District
Judge who administered the oath to the said two person the
Gurudwara and Mandir respectively, as desired by the plain-
tiff/petitioner and accordingly the learned Additional
District Judge ordered on 14.10.1988 dismissal of that part
of the claim covered by issue No.1 as withdrawn. The revi-
sion petition was directed against this order as well.
That on the next date i.e. 15th October, 1988 the
plaintiff/petitioner filed another application with the
prayer to decide the aforesaid issue No.1 on merits and
evidence and the defendants may not be allowed to take
advantage of the blunder committed by the plaintiff/peti-
tioner and for cancelling the order dated 14th October,
1988. This application dated 15th October. 1988 was dis-
missed by the trial court by order dated 30th January,1989.
In the reply filed to the Special Leave Petition it is
pointed out that the suit was fixed on 14th October, 1988
for further evidence of the defendants and in fact on the
said date Dr. Amrik Singh was to be cross-examined by the
petitioner. Dr. Amrik Singh as well as Sh. R.P. Mahendroo,
Under Secretary of the Association of Indian Universities
were present in the Court and when the suit was called the
petitioner filed the application dated 14th October, 1988
wherein he had offered to abide by the statement made by Dr.
Amrik Singh and Sh. R.P. Mahendroo. Whereupon both Dr.Amrik
Singh and Sh. R.P. Mahendroo expressed their willingness and
agreed to take oath and accepted the offer. The petitioner
affirmed the same and made a further statement before the
court as under:-
"Dr. Amrik Singh D.W. present in the Court and
R.P.
634
Mohindru, officials of the respondents take spe-
cial oath in Gurudwara and Mandir respectively to the
effect that the resignation of the plaintiff K.M. Singh was
not extracted from him on 5.4.76 under duress, fear, induce-
ment, fraud or coercion then that portion of the plaint
shall be dismissed as withdrawn."
The said offer made by the petitioner was put to both
Dr. Amrik Singh and Sh. Mahendroo and both of them accepted
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the same and also made the following statement in Court as
under:-
"We are ready to take special oath in the Mandir
and Gurudwara as stated by the plaintiff in his statement
above."
In view of the offer made by the petitioner and accept-
ed by both of them the Court thereafter passed the order
reading as under:-
"Present - Plaintiff in person. Counsel for the
defendant.
One witness of the deft. Dr. Amrik Singh is
present for further cross-examination by the plaintiff.
However, the plaintiff has filed an application under rule 2
read with Section 151 C.P.C.and has stated that if the said
witness of the defendant and Shri R.P. Mahendroo Under
Secretary of the defendant No.1 takes special oath in the
Gurudwara and Mandir respectively to the effect that the
resignation of the plaintiff was not extracted from him on
5.4.76 under duress, fear, inducement, fraud or coercion,
then that part of the claim of the plaintiff may be deemed
to be dismissed as withdrawn. The witness and official of
the defendant stated that they are ready to take the said
special oath in the Gurudwara and Mandir respectively. Let
statements be recorded. Statements have been recorded sepa-
rately. The Application filed by the plaintiff stands dis-
posed of. The counsel for the defendant states that the
defendant is ready and willing to pay the admitted part
claim, if any, of the plaintiff.The plaintiff submits direc-
tion to go alongwith the parties and the witness to the
Gurudwara and Mandir respectively for taking special oath.
The plaintiff states that he is ready to bear the expenses
of the local commissioner. Accordingly, I hereby appoint Sh.
A.P.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate, as Local Commissioner present in
Court with the direction to visit alongwith the
635
parties to Gurudwara Sisganj Sahib and Gauri Shanker Mandir
today at 1 p.m. to take special oath by the said persons.
His fee is fixed at Rs.500 to be paid by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff has paid the fee of the Local Commissioner in the
Court."
Thereafter the petitioner paid the fee fixed by the
trial Court to the Local Commissioner. The time and date for
visit to Gurudwara and Mandir were fixed by the Court at the
instance of the petitioner as well as Dr. Amrik Singh and
Sh. Mahendroo. As per the directions of the Court the Local
Commissioner in the company of the petitioner, Dr. Amrik
Singh and Sh. Mahendroo went to Gurudwara Sisganj as well as
Gauri Shanker Mandir both situated in Chandni Chowk, Delhi
where the Local Commissioner administered the oath to both
of them and their statements were recorded. Both of them
denied that the plaintiffs resignation was obtained by
fraud, coercion, threat and or that he was induced to tender
the resignation. After the said oath was taken the matter
was taken up in the afternoon session by the trial court
when the Local Commissioner submitted his report to the
Court whereupon the trial court passed the following order:-
"Present-As before.
The Local Commissioner has filed his report to the
effect that he has got the special oath adminis-
tered to the witness and official of the defend-
ant. In view of the statement of the plaintiff
recorded earlier the suit of the plaintiff
with regard to his resignation and consequential
reinstatement which is covered by Issue No.1 stands
dismissed as withdrawn.
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Now to come up for making payment by the
defendant of the other claim of the plaintiff, if
any, on 4.11.1988’’
As stated earlier, thereafter, on 15th October, 1988
the application was filed for recalling this order
dismissing a part of the suit as withdrawn. The trial court,
however, took the view that Section 20 of the Evidence Act
was applicable and it also took the view that the repeal of
the Oaths Act, 1873 by Section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1969 no
where debar the parties form entering into any contract.
High Court, as stated earlier, dismissed the revision
petition and
636
agree with the view of trial court. Before the High Court
reliance was placed on the decision of the Karnataka High
Court in Pacharanda Nanjappa v. Pacharanda Belliappa de-
ceased by Seethavva and others, 1979-29 ITR (Karnataka)
2018. The High Court, however, did not follow the aforesaid
decision and preferred to decide the matter in view of the
decisions of the Madras High Court in J.A. Munnuswami Naidu
v. K.S.P. Thyagaraya Chettair and another, A.I.R. 1977
Madras 273; Vasudeva Ghanbog v. Naraina Pai, 1880 ILR 2
Madras 356 decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Rustam etc. v. The Financial Commissioner, etc. 1981-83 PLR
759 and Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court
in Mrs. Florabel Skinner and others v. Jai Bajrang Kala
Mandir Ram Lila Mandal, Hissar AIR 1980 p & 284.
Before us also the petitioner, who appeared in person,
submitted that in view of the repeal of the Oaths Act, 1873
by the Oaths Act, 1969 the suit could not be decided on the
basis of special oath. The petitioner also relied on the
decision of the Orissa High Court in Ananda Chandra Sahu
(deceased by L.R.) and others v. Ananta Khuntia and others
AIR 1983 Orissa 250.
It may be noticed that both the learned Single Judge of
the Karnataka High Court as well as the learned Division
Bench of the Orissa High Court were correct in noticing the
effect of repeal of the Oaths Act, 1873 by Section 9 of the
Oaths Act, 1969, but it appears the provisions of Section 20
of the Evidence Act were not brought to their notice. The
learned Judges of the Karnataka High Court and Orissa High
Court were right in observing in what cases the provisions
of the Oaths Act, 1873 was to continue to govern and in
which cases they would cease to apply. But as stated earli-
er, the provisions of Section 20 of the Evidence Act were
not brought to their notice. Section 20 of the Evidence Act
reads as follows :-
" 20 Admissions by persons expressly referred to by
party to suit.-Statements mode by persons to whom a
party to the suit has expressly referred for infor-
mation in reference to a matter in dispute are
admissions.
Illustration
The question is, whether a horse sold by A to B is
sound.
A says to B "Go and ask C ,C knows all about itC’s
statement is an admission
In Hirachand Kothari (dead) by lrs v. State of Rajasthan and
another (1985)(SUPP) SCC 17, this Court held thus
"Section 20 is the second exception to the general
rule laid down in section 18. It deals with one
class of vicarious admissions. Where a party refers
to a third person for some information or an opin-
ion are matter in dispute the statements made by
the third person are receivable as admission
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against the person referring. The word ‘informa-
tion’ occurring in section 20 is not to be under-
stood in the sense that the parties desired to know
something which none of them had any knowledge of.
Where there is a dispute as regards a certain
question and the Court is in need of information
regarding the truth on that point any statement
which the referee may make is nevertheless informa-
tion within the purview of section 20 and is admis-
sible. The reason behind admissibility of the
statement is that when a party refers to another
person for a statement of his views the party
approves of the utterance in anticipation and
adopts that as his own. The principle is the same
as that of reference to arbitration
The reference under section 20 may be by express
words or by conduct but in any case there must be a
clear admission to refer and such admission are
generally conclusive. Admissions may operate as
estoppel and they do so where parties had agreed to
abide by them "
A similar question arose in J.A. Munnuswami Naidu
(supra) before the division bench of the Madras High Court.
There a suit had been filed on 16th June 1971 for recovery
of money against the appellant on the foot of a security
bond. The second respondent in the suit was a puisne mort-
gagee. The appellant filed the written statement that the
respondent, the first mortgagee had fraudulently suppressed
the payment of interest in the security bond and if the
proper account was taken the money will be due to the first
respondent. When the suit was taken up for trail the plain-
tiff agreed to take a special oath on his family deity that
for the suit security bond no money except those shown by
way of endorsement was
638
received by him it was also agreed that the plaintiff mort-
gagee taking such an oath the suit may be decreed. The
plaintiff took a special oath and the suit was decreed. The
judgment debtor filed an un-numbered execution application
praying that the decree be declared as a nullity having been
passed by the civil Court having no jurisdiction. The exe-
cuting court dismissed the objections to the execution and
the matter came up in appeal before the High Court. The
learned single judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal.
Whereupon the matter was taken up before the Division bench
Kailasam C.J(as his lordship then was) and Balasubrahmanyam,
J. dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal. It was submitted
before the division Bench that because the Oaths Act, 1873
has been repealed what the plaintiff had stated on special
oath is not an evidence. The learned single judge who had
heard the appeal was confronted with the arguments that the
date on which the special oath was taken the Oaths Act,
1873,which provided that when a special oath was taken under
section 10, it would be conclusive against the person who
offered was no longer in force as the said Act had been re-
pealed in 1969 and the new act of 1969 dispensed with the
procedure as to the taking of the special oath and its
consequences it was common ground that the special oath was
taken in ignorance of the fact that the Oaths Act,1873,under
which the procedure as to the taking of special oath was
admitted had been repealed and that the new Oaths Act had no
provision for such a procedure. The division bench observed
that they could not accept the contention that because
Oaths Act,1873 has been repealed what the plaintiff has
stated on special oath is not an evidence Earlier the single
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judge had taken the same view.
The question directly in issue came up before a divi-
sion bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Thakur
singh and others v.Inder Singh,AIR 1976 P & H 287.The divi-
sion bench took the view that :
"The only effect of exclusion of section 9 to 12
of the oaths Act,1873 by Oaths Act,1969 is that if
any party to any judicial proceeding offers to be
bound by any special oath and the court thinks it
fit to administer such an oath to the other party
consenting thereto and such oath is taken by the
other party the evidence given on such oath as
against persons who offered to be bound as afore-
said would no more be conclusive proof of the
matter stated in such deposition where an agreement
was arrived at between the counsel for parties that
if the
639
Defendant were to take oath in a particular Gurud-
wara stating that the suit land was not of plain-
tiff and that defendant had not executed any agree-
ment in favour of plaintiff, the suit of plaintiff
be dismissed and in pursuance of the order of the
Court on the basis of agreement, the defendant did
take oath there being no special oath either pre-
scribed or taken and the suit having been dismissed
on the basis of such oath
Held that the compromise arrived at between the
counsel for the plaintiff of behalf of his client
and the defendant appellant would be covered by
section 20 the Evidence Act and the plaintiff would
be bound by the statement made by the defendant if
the same is found to have been made strictly in
accordance with the terms offered by him"
It will be noticed that in the present case the oath was
administered as per plaintiffs/petitioners statement
and,therefore there is thus no manner of doubt that the oath
taken by two persons is pursuance of the offer of the peti-
tioner amounted to admission of respondent’s claim on his
part within the meaning of section 20 of the Evidence Act.
The two persons were the nominees of the plaintiff and the
statement of the nominees by virtue of section 20 of the
Evidence Act would be treated as an admission of the parties
thus the orders of the Trial court dated 14th October,1988
and 30th January ,1989 were unassailable and the High court
has rightly dismissed the revision petition .
The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed with-
out any order as to costs
N.V.K
Petition dismissed.