Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SRI SINNA RAMANUJA JEER AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SRI RANGA RAMANUJA JEER AND ANOTHER.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
27/04/1961
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION:
1961 AIR 1720 1962 SCR (2) 509
CITATOR INFO :
R 1976 SC2547 (25)
F 1977 SC 27 (7)
ACT:
Temple Honour-Suit by aradanaikar and trustee of temple for
declaration of right to first theertham-Maintainability-
Test Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), s. 9.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent as the aradanaikar and trustee of the
Emberumanar temple, dedicated to Sri Ramanujacharya, which
was one of the group of temples built around the main temple
of Athinathalwar in the Tirunelveli District, brought the
two suits, out of which present appeals arose, for
declaration of his right to the first theertham and other
honours and perquisites in precedence over all other
worshippers in the temple of Athinathalwar and his case was
that he was entitled to them by virtue of his office in the
Emberumanar temple. The matters came up to the High Court.
There was a remand order and the Subordinate Judge who tried
the suits thereafter held that the Emberumanar temple was a
sub-shrine attached to the main temple and as such the
plaintiff was virtually an office-holder in the main temple
and the precedence claimed by him was attached to that
office as part of the remuneration and decreed the suits.
On appeal the District judge, on a review of the entire
evidence, set aside the findings arrived at by the trial
court and dismissed the suits as not maintainable. The
appeals to the High Court were heard by a single judge who,
on a reconsideration of the evidence, reversed the findings
of the District judge and affirmed those of the Subordinate
judge and decreed the suits. It was, further, held by the
High Court that, as one of the theerthakars, the appellant
could be considered to be the holder of the office of
arulipad in the main temple.
Held, that although it was not permissible under s. 9 of the
Code of Civil Procedure for a civil Court to entertain a
suit for a declaration of religious honours and privileges
simpliciter, it could entertain a suit to establish one’s
right to an office in a temple and to the honours and
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privileges attached to such office as its remuneration or
perquisites. But the essential condition for the existence
of an office was that its holder must be under a legal
obligation to discharge the duties attached to it and be
liable to penalty on failure to do so.
So judged, there could neither be an independent office of
theerthakar, for he had no obligatory duties to perform, nor
that of an arulipad, since that word only connoted that the
names of theerthakays were called out by the archaka in a
particular order.
65
510
The question whether first theertham or any other honours
shown to a person were merely as a mark of respect on the
occasion of his visit to the temple, or were part of the
remunera tion attached to his office, must in every case be
decided on evidence and in the latter case such honours must
be shown to have formed an integral part of the ritual to be
performed by the recipient as the holder of the office.
Athan Sadagopachariar Swamigal v. Elayavalli Srinivasa-
chariar, (1913) M.W.N. 289, approved.
Striman Sadagopa v. Krishna Tatachariyar, (1863) 1 M.H.C.R.
301, Sri Rungachariar v. Rungasami Buttachar, (1909) I.L.R.
32 Mad. 291 and Vathiar Venkatachariar v. P. Ponappa
Ayyangar, (1918) 45 I.C. 959, referred to.
Sri Emberumanar jeer Swamigal v. The Board of Commissioners
for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, (1936) 71 M.L.J.
588, considered.
Held, further, that it was well settled that the High Court
bad no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the
ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error
might seem to be. In the instant case, the High Court was
clearly in error in reversing the finding of the District
judge, which was one of fact, that the Emberumanar temple
was neither subordinate to, nore part of the Athinathalwar
temple and no office-holder of the former could, therefore,
become an office-holder of the latter.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLANTE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 244 and
245 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
February 19, 1953, of the Madras High Court in Second
Appeals Nos. 2120 and 2121 of 1947.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. S. K. Iyengar, for the
appellants.
K. N. Rajagopala Sastri and M. S. K. Sastri, for
respondent No. 1A.
S. V. Venugopalachari and R. Gopalakrishnan, for
respondent No. 8A in Appeal No. 244 and respondent No. 7A in
Appeal No. 245.
1961. April 27. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SUBBA RAO, J.-These two appeals are directed against the
judgment of the High Court of Madras dated February 19,
1953, setting aside that of the District Judge, Tirunelveli,
and restoring that of the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, in
O. S. Nos. 45 and 46
511
of 1945 on his file, and they raise the question of
maintainability of a suit in regard to honors and
perquisites in the temple of Athinathalwar in Alwar
Tirunagari.
At Alwar Tirunagari in Tirunelveli District there is a
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famous temple called Athinathalwar temple. The presiding
deity in the temple is Lord Vishnu. Its origin is lost in
antiquity. In ’the 10th and 11th centuries Vaishnavite
saints, called Alwars and Acharyas, who were ardent devotees
of Lord Vishnu, worshiped at the temple and sang in praise
of the Lord. As time passed by, 20 smaller temples were
erected to commemorate the lives of Alwar8 and Acharya8.
Within the compound of the main shrine, there are three
minor shrines of Nachiar, Nammalwar, and Garuda; the rest of
the smaller shrines are outside the premises of the main
temple. Each of the said temples has its own manager,
archakas and separate endowments; but, presumably because of
the fact that the Alwar8 and Acharyas, whose idols are
installed in the smaller temples, were originally devotees
of Sri Athinathalwar, an interesting and novel practice of
mutual and regular exchange of visits between the idols in
the smaller shrines and the idol of Athinathalwar has grown
over the years. During certain specified occasions in the
year, the idols in the minor temples are brought to the main
temple for worship; so too, on specific occasions the idol
of Athinathalwar is also taken to the minor shrines; such
visits being reminiscent of the days when the Alwars and
Acharya8 worshiped in the temple of Athinathalwar.
Sri Ramanujacharya was one of the greatest of the devotees
of Lord Vishnu and is well known throughout this vast
country as the progenitor of an important school of Indian
philosophy. He died in the year 1127 A. D. In the 13th
century a shrine was built in his honour and his idol was
installed therein. Sri Ramanujacharya is also known as
Udayavar or Emberumanar and the shrine built in his
dedication is known as Emberumanar temple. The manager and
archaka of the said temple is known as Emberumanar
512
Jeer. Emberumanar temple also is outside -the precincts of
the temple of Athinathalwar. There are also mutual visits
between the idol of Emberumanar and the idol of
Athinathalwar to each other’s temple. The present
Emberumanar Jeer is the plaintiff in the suits out of which
the appeals have arisen.
There is a mutt called the Vanamamalai Mutt in the said
District and the head of the mutt is known as Vanamamalai
Jeer. He is a 8anyasi held in reverence by Vaishnavites of
South India. He is the first defendant.
The heads of the Ahobilam Mutt and the Tirukkurungudi Mutt
are the second and third defendants respectively. The
fourth defendant is the Executive Officer of the temple of
Sri Athinathalwar and he was appointed by the Hindu
Religious Endowments Board, Madras.
The records disclose that, at any rate from the middle of
the last century, there have been disputes between the
various Jeers and others as regards the order of priority in
which certain honours have to be distributed among the said
Jeers when they attend the temple of Sri Athinathalwar for
worship. In the ghoshties (group of worshipers in front of
the deity) both on ordinary and special days the said Jeers
are shown honours befitting their rank. The honours consist
of distribution of theertham, thulasi, satari and viniyogam,
and a few more similar items. Each of the said Jeers is
allotted a particular place in the ghoshti and a certain
order of precedence is observed inter se between them. This
order of precedence in the matter of receiving honours has
become an unending source of bickering between the religious
heads; with the result, the Madras Hindu Religious Endow-
ments Board, constituted under Act 1 of 1923, with
jurisdiction to administer the endowments in the Madras
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State, had to interfere and settle the disputes inter se
between the various Jeers. On May 12, 1927, the said Board
fixed the order of precedence for honours between the
various Jeers to be observed both on ordinary and special
days. By the said order the Board recognized the
Emberumanar Jeer’s right
513
to the honours and perquisites in precedence over the other
Jeers on all the days other than Vaikasi festival days,
except the 7th day, and as regards the other days of the
festival, namely, 1st to 6th and 8th to 10th days, the Board
directed that the other Jeers should be shown on the
respective days both the ordinary and special honours in
precedence over the rest of the Jeers, including the
Emberumanar Jeer. Not satisfied with the said order, the
Emberumanar Jeer filed O. S. No. 320 of 1933 in the Court of
the District Munsif, Tirunelveli, which was later
transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge,
Tuticorin, as O. S. No. 45 of 1945, against the other Jeers
and the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, for the declara-
tion of his right to the first theertham and other per-
quisites in precedence over all the others in the ghoshties
of Sri Athinathalwar temple on the ground that he was
entitled to them as the office-holder of the, temple of
Emberumanar. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, the
Board, by its order dated May 15, 1935, altered the order of
precedence giving the Vanamamalai Jeer precedence over the
Emberumanar Jeer; and this led to the Emberumanar Jeer
filing another suit O. S. No. 201 of 1941 in the Court of
the District Munsif, Srivaikuntam, for a declaration of his
right to the first theertham, etc., in precedence over all
the others. This suit was later transferred to the Court of
the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin as O. S. No. 46 of 1945, to
be tried along with O. S. No. 45 of 1945. To the suits the
Emberumanar Jeer, the Vanamamalai Jeer, the Ahobilam Jeer
and the Tirukkurungudi Jeer, and the Executive Officer of
the Hindu Religious Endowments Board were made parties.
These suits have had a chequered career. But we shall
briefly refer only to those stages of the long drawn
litigation which have some bearing on the questions raised
in the present appeals. O. S. No. 320 of 1933 was finally
numbered as O. S. No. 66 of 1936 and was disposed of on
March 25, 1941, by the District Munsif, Tirunelveli. The
learned District Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground
that it was not maintainable as the plaintiff had no legal
right in respect
514
of which he could seek relief in a civil court. On appeal,
the learned Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, came to the
conclusion that, as the plaintiff had come to court to
establish his right of precedence to receive the theertham,
etc., as forming part of the emoluments of his office of
aradanaikar in the suit temple, the suit could not be
dismissed on the preliminary ground that it was barked under
s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; on that basis, he set
aside the decree of the District Munsif and remanded the
case for trial on other issues arising in the case. Both
the parties preferred appeals to the High Court of Madras
and they were numbered as C. M. As. Nos. 1 and 155 of 1943;
on January 31,1945, Chandrasekara Aiyar, J., dismissed both
the appeals. The learned Judge propounded alternative
theories, and he expressed himself thus:
"Of course, before he (plaintiff) can succeed
in the suit, the plaintiff has to make out
that he being the Aradanaikar and trustee of
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the Emberumanar temple amounts to his holding
an office in the suit temple."
The learned Judge agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the
suit could not be dismissed in limine without deciding the
said question of fact. On remand, the learned Subordinate
Judge, Tuticorin, to whom the said suit and the connected
suit, being renumbered O. S. Nos. 45 and 46 of 1945, were
remanded came to the conclusion that the Emberumanar temple
was a sub-shrine attached to the main temple of Sri Athina-
thalwar, and that the plaintiff, who was the aradanaikar of
the sub-shrine, would be virtually an office-holder in the
main temple. He further hold that the privilege of first
theertham was attached to the said office as part of its
remuneration and, therefore, the suit was one of civil
nature falling under s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in
that view, having held on the merits that the plaintiff had
established his right of precedence, he decreed both the
suits. As many as six appeals were preferred against the
decrees in the two suits by the aggrieved parties to the
District Court; and the learned District Judge in a common
judgment disposed of them on January 23, 1947.
515
The learned District Judge, on a review of the evidence in
the case, held that the institutions were not interdependent
or intimately connected in such a way that an office-holder
of the Emberumanar temple was necessarily an office-holder
of the Athiiiathalwar temple. On that finding, he held that
the plaintiff was not an office-holder of the Athinathalwar
temple and, therefore, he was not entitled to file a suit
with regard to his rights of precedence in being given the
theertham, etc. In the result he allowed the appeals and
dismissed both the suits with costs throughout. Against the
said judgment, the plaintiff preferred second appeals to the
High Court of Judicature at Madras, being Second Appeals
Nos. 2120 and 2121 of 1947. They were heard by-
Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., who on a reconsideration of the
evidence disagreed with the finding arrived at by the
learned District Judge and accepted the finding given by the
learned Subordinate Judge. Not only the learned Judge
accepted the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that
the plaintiff as the aradanaikar or the archaka of the sub-
shrine was virtually an office-holder in the main temple, he
also went further and held that, as one of the theerthakars,
the plaintiff could be considered to be the holder of the
office of arulipad in the main temple. In the result the
learned Judge set aside the decree of the District Judge and
restored the decrees of the learned Subordinate Judge. As
leave to appeal to a division bench was not given by the
learned Judge, the first defendant, i.e., the Vanamamalai
Jeer, in the suits, by special leave, has preferred these
appeals against the judgment of the High Court.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the
appellant, raised before us the following points: (1) A suit
for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to honours
in a temple would not lie unless he establishes that he
holds an office in the said temple and that the said honours
form part of the perquisites attached to the said office,
and that, as in the present case the plaintiff claimed that
he was an aradanaikar and trustee of only the Emberumanar
temple and as such entitled to honours in Athinathalwar
temple,
516
the suits should have been dismissed in limine on the ground
that the plaints did not disclose any claim of civil nature
falling under s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (2) The
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Courts were not justified in allowing the plaintiff to make
out a now case not disclosed in the plaints, namely that the
Emberumanar temple was a subordinate shrine of the Athi
nathalwar temple and, therefore, the plaintiff was the
office-holder of the latter temple; assuming that there was
justification for the courts in allowing the plaintiff to
develop a new case at a very late stage of the proceedings,
there was a clear finding of the District Court based on the
evidence adduced in the case that the Emberumanar temple was
not a sub-shrine of the Athinathalwar temple, and the High
Court had no jurisdiction to set aside that finding in
second appeals.
Mr. Rajagopala Sastri, learned counsel for the respondents,
contended that the plaintiff’s alternative case was not
really a new one, but all the relevant facts in support of
that case were disclosed in the plaints, and that the
finding of the District Judge was not a finding of fact but
was either a legal inference from proved facts or a mixed
question of fact and law. He argued that the contention of
learned counsel for the appellant ignores the religious
background and ideas of the class of persons with which we
are now concerned, and that, if the matter is approached
from a correct perspective, as the High Court did, it would
be realized that there was such an association between the
two temples as it could be said that one is subordinate to
the other leading to the only irresistible inference that
the plaintiff, the office-holder of the sub-shrine, could
claim honours in the main temple of which the sub-shrine is
only a part in the larger sense.
At the outset it would be convenient and necessary to notice
briefly the law pertaining to the maintainability of suits
in civil courts in respect of honours in temples. Section 9
of the Code of Civil Procedure describes the nature of suits
which a court has jurisdiction to entertain. It can
entertain every suit of a civil nature excepting suits of
which its cognizance is
517
either expressly or impliedly barred. As a corollary to
this, it follows that a court cannot entertain a suit which
is not of a civil nature. Prima facie suits raising
questions of religious rites and ceremonies only are not
maintainable in a civil court, for they do not deal with
legal rights of parties. But the explanation to the section
accepting the said undoubted position says that a suit in
which the right to property or to an office is contested is
a suit of civil nature notwithstanding that such right may
depend entirely on the decision of a question as to
religious rites or ceremonies. It implies two things,
namely, (i) a suit for an office is a suit of a civil
nature; and (ii) it does not cease to be one even if the
said right depends entirely upon a decision of a question as
to the religious rites or ceremonies. It implies further
that questions as to religious rites or ceremonies cannot
independently of such a right form the subject-matter of a
civil suit. Honours shown or precedence given to religious
dignitaries when they attend religious ceremonies in a tem-
ple cannot be placed on a higher footing than the religious
rights or ceremonies, for they are integral part of the said
rites or ceremonies in the sense that the said honours are
shown to persons partaking in the ceremonies. Prima facie
honours, such as who is to stand in the ghoshti, in what
place, who is to get the tulasi, etc., in which order, and
similar others, cannot be considered to be part of the
remuneration or perquisites attached to an office, for they
are only tokens of welcome of an honoured guest within the
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precincts of a temple. One would have thought that it would
even be a sacrilege to claim a right of -precedence in the
presence of the Almighty God, for all go before him as
humble devotees to earn his blessings and not to assert
their self importance or claim their right to preferential
treatment. But a century of case law in that part of the
country has recognized certain rights of different grades of
devotees and they and their innumerable followers began to
cherish them or even to fight for them in criminal and civil
courts. This Court, therefore, does not propose to
reconsider the
66
518
question of honours on first principles but only will
resurvey the law on the subject with a view to ascertain,
and if possible to clarify, the legal position.
The earliest decision is that in Striman Sadagopa v. Kristna
Tatachariyar (1). There, the plaintiff was the gurukkal of
Sri Ahobilam Mutt and he sued the trustees of Sri
Devarajaswami temple at Conjeevaram for damages for injuries
done to him by withholding from him certain honours and
emoluments and also sought to have his right to such honours
and emoluments established for the future. Two Schedules
were attached to that plaint and they showed inter alia that
what was claimed as honours were such as garlands,
cocoanuts, prasadams and other paraphernalia attending the
ceremonial recitation when the gurukkal visited the temple.
Scotland, C.J., formulated the legal position thus:
"........... these clearly show that every one
of the matters in respect of which the suit is
brought is purely a matter of religious and
sacred observance in connection with the
worship and ceremonials at the pagoda, and is
claimed by the plaintiff as a matter of
devotional respect and display due to his
priestly rank or as a votive offering made to
him whilst passing in procession through the
temples, and when brought to the presence of
the principal idol."
Then the learned Chief Justice proceeded to state:
"He (the plaintiff) is not officially
connected in any way with the management or
control of the pagoda, or its property or
funds; and the alleged dues of his office have
no doubt been owing to the great reverence at
one time entertained for his sacredotal rank
in the Hindu religion, and the importance from
a religious point of view of his mere presence
at the pagoda."
He concluded thus:
"Such honours and -emoluments cannot in any
respect be considered as remuneration for
duties or ministrations performed by the
plaintiff in the secular affairs or religious
services of the pagoda."
(1) (1863) 1 M.H.C.R. 301,3o6.
519
This decision, which has stood the test of time, clearly
lays down that a suit to enforce the rights of persons
holding offices connected with the management and regulation
of temples and for honours and emoluments connected
therewith would lie in a civil court; but a suit by a
plaintiff, who does not hold an office in the temple,
claiming honours customarily shown to him as a matter of
devotional respect and display due to his rank is not of a
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civil nature. The principle laid down in this case and
restated in subsequent cases has been applied by a division
bench of the Madras High Court to a claim for first
theertham, etc., in Sri Rungachariar v. Rungasami Buttachar
(1). That decision was given in an appeal arising out of a
suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs had a hereditary
miras right to the offices of Sthalathar, Kutumba First
Theertham, Muntrapushpam, Vedaparayanam and Adyapakam from
times immemorial in the temple of Sri Parimala Ranga-
nathaswami at Tiruvilandur, and, by virtue of such right,
were entitled to a fourth share of the honours and
emoluments due to their offices as detailed in schedule A of
the plaint. The learned Judges, on the evidence, came to
the following conclusion:
"......... the plaintiffs as hereditary
Sthalathars are bound to perform, besides the
duties of superintendence attached to their
office of Sthalathar, the ceremonial duties of
vedaparayanam, etc., and are entitled to
receive remuneration for the performance of
those duties. Included in this remuneration
is the privilege of first theertham’ from
which the plaintiffs are called
’theerthakars".
Then the learned Judges proceeded to observe:
"Taking the findings to be, as we do, that the
privilege of the first theertham is attached
to the hereditary office of the plaintiffs as
a part of the remuneration of the office, the
Court must, to protect the plaintiffs in the
enjoyment of the office, declare what is the
honour to which they are entitled."
This decision recognizes that a suit for a declaration of a
plaintiff’s right to an office and for the honours,
(1) (1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 291, 208.
520
such as first theertham, etc., as part of the remuneration
will lie in a civil court.
Athan Sadagopachariar Swamigal v. Elayavalli Sri-
nivasachariar (1) is a decision relating to honours in
Athinathalwar temple itself. The plaintiff in that case was
a trustee of a temple called Pillalokacharyar’s temple. The
principal object of the suit was to prevent the first
defendant from claiming to be one of the Adhyapaka
Mirasidars in the temple of Nammalwar and Adinathar in Alwar
Tirunagari. It was contended that the first defendant was
one of the seven Adhyapaka Mirasidars in the temple and his
rank in the ghoshti was just above the plaintiffs. Sadasiva
Aiyar, J., posed the question raised and gave his answer
thereto thus:
"The legal question I wish to say something
about is whether a suit for the honours
mentioned in the second item of the 2nd
Schedule to the plaint is maintainable in a
Civil Court. It is clear that if those
honours are not attached to any office in the
temple, no such suit could lie. The first
branch of the question, therefore, is a
question of fact, viz., whether these honours
are attached to the Adhyapaka Miras office in
the temple."
After considering the evidence and other relevant decisions,
the learned Judge came to the following conclusion:
"I see no difficulty whatever in holding on
the evidence in this case that the plaintiffs
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and the 1st defendant and the 5 other
Adhyapaka Mirasidars get their rank in the
Goshti and their rank in the distributions of
prasadams not because those honours are part
of the Adhyapaka Miras office to which they
are entitled but because of their being
Acharya Purushas or of their families having
been very respectable religious families for
long or be. cause the mere respect due to
their offices has been considered as making
them fit in a social, and religious point of
view to obtain such honours."
That would be enough to dispose of that appeal, but the
learned Judge proceeded to make certain observations even on
the assumption that the said honours
(1) (1913) M.W.N. 289, 299, 300, 301.
521
had been attached to emoluments so far as the 7 Adhyapaka
Mirasidars were concerned. The observations of the learned
Judge, though obiter, deserve to be quoted not only because
of his vast experience in matters of Hindu religion but also
because of his well known reformative zeal to remove the
cobwebs that shroded the Hindu religion by superstitious
ignorance and perverted imposition. The learned Judge says:
".......... the next question of law is
whether such honours to be shown in the
presence of God can be legally attached to the
office as emoluments, in other words, can
honours be legally claimed by anybody as
receivable by him in a temple? When a trustee
chooses to parade the temple elephants and
dancing girls before a high official or any
other person and gives him prasadams, etc., he
does it in order to show ’honours’ to that
person and when he does it without prejudice
to the conduct of the rituals and ceremonies
in the temple, he always says that the God of
the temple Himself condescends to treat the
official or other persons as God’s guest and
shows him these ’honours’. Such persons to
whom respect is shown cannot in my opinion
claim such ’honours’ as a legal right, but as
a favour shown by the temple Deity. Such
honours in the strict eye of the Shastras
cannot be called honours at all but as doles
condescendingly given by the temple Deity as a
’favour’. One of the honours, as is well
known, shown to a, Hindu in a Vaishnava temple
is to place the impression of the feet of the
Deity upon the head or shoulders of the
devotee. Another is the distribution of the
’leavings’ of the food offered to the Deity to
the distinguished devotee. The sandal paste
of the feet of the Deity and the leaving of
his food and the garland worn by the God are
given as marks of pure grace and not as rights
and hoilours claimable by the
devotee............ This clearly shows that
while we ought to humbly accept the Deity’s
leavings given through the trustee or an
archaka, a claim for ’honour’ to be shown in
the presence of God is a sinful claim and is
illegal and unshastraic.
522
I would therefore respectfully confine the
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decision in Sri Bungachariar v. Bungaswami
Buttachar(1) to cases in which the receiving
of the first theertham by an office-holder has
become indissoluble part of the ritual to b
e
performed by the recipient as an office-holder
and the extension of the principle should be
carefully guarded against."
These are weighty observations and if they were appropriate
in the year 1913 they should be much more so in the year
1961. We respectfully accept these observations as laying
down the correct proposition, namely, that a party claiming
an honour like-first theertham, etc., has to prove not only
that he is an office-holder of the temple and that he has
been receiving the first theertham in the Ghoshti but also
that the receipt of the first theertham, has become an
integral part of the ritual to be performed by him as an
officeholder; for, the receipt of the first theertham would
be consistent with its being shown as a grace from the Lord
and also as its being a part of the remuneration to the
office. Another division bench of the Madras High Court in
Vathiar Venkatachariar v. P. Ponappa Ayyengar (2) had to
consider the question of a claim to a religious honour which
consisted of receiving theerthams and prasadams in the
temple in certain order of -precedence. This case also
relates to Athinathalwar temple and to the question of
precedence among the theerthakars. The first question
raised was whether there was such an office as theertham
office in the temple. Krishnan, J., delivering the leading
judgment, in rejecting that there was such an office
observed:
"It may be mentioned that among the Theer-
thakars there are some 5 or 7 in number, who
are called Adhyapakamdars, whose special duty
it is to recite these Prabandams and they are
remunerated by Inam lands given to them. They
are what may be called the official reciters
in this temple."
Adverting to the question raised, the learned Judge
proceeded to observe:
"It is clear that, to constitute an office
one, if not
(1) (1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad, 291, 298.
(2) (1918) 45 I.C. 959. 961, 962.
523
the essential, thing is the existence of a
duty or duties attached to the office which
the office-holder is under a legal obligation
to perform and the nonperformance of which may
be visited by penalties ,such as a suspension,
dismissal, etc."
Applying the test in the case of Theerthakars and other
Adhyapakamdars, the learned Judge said:
"The only difference between the outsiders and
the Theerthakars, as shown by the evidence, is
that the Theerthakars have special places
allotted to them in the temple to stand and
recite and they are given the honour of
Theertham and Prasadam, before the outsiders
get them; and they have what is called an
’Arulapad’, that is, their names are called
out by the Archaka in -a certain order, when,
if present, they have to respond by saying
’Nayinde’, meaning ’I am here’. This does not
seem to show that they are anything more than
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a recognized and privileged class of
worshipers who are shown special consideration
by having places allotted to them in the
temple and by being given the honours before
the ordinary worshipers in an order of
precedence fixed by the usage of the temple."
On a consideration of the evidence in that case, the learned
Judge stated:
"On the evidence as set out it must be held
that the plaintiffs have not made out the
existence of any obligatory duty on the part
of the Theerthakars or Of any office called
the Theertham office."
This judgment, therefore, establishes that there is no
office called the theertham office in the temple, as there
is no obligatory duty on the part of the said theerthakars
in the temple. As the claim to the said honour was not
established to have been attached as emoluments to the
religious office the suit was dismissed. Sri Emberumanar
Jeer Swamigal v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras (1) is a decision of a single
Judge of the Madras High Court in a writ petition filed by
Emberumanar Jeer questioning the order of the Religious
Endowments Board which is the subject-matter of
(1) (1936) 71 M.L.J. 588, 591.
524
the present appeals. That writ petition was dismissed on
the ground that the Board’s order related to administrative
matter and, therefore, a writ of certiorari would not lie to
quash the same; but in the course, of the judgment,
Pandurang Row, J., made certain relevant observations and
they are:
"What was determined by the Board was the
order of distribution of theertham and honours
connected with theertham. This matter cannot
in my opinion be regarded as a determination
of any rights of subjects. The rights of
subjects referred to in the rule are rights
which can be legally enforced and not mere
honours or precedence claimed or recognized as
a matter of courtesy or usage. It is not
seriously disputed that the right to obtain
the theertham or honours in a particular order
of precedence is not a civil right which can
be enforced or declared in a Civil Court."
After citing the observations in Sriman Sadagopa v. Kristna
Tatachariyar (1), the learned Judge observed:
"Indeed the rule that Civil Courts cannot take
cognizance of claims to mere honours or
privileges of the nature referred to above has
been unquestioned for many years and every
attempt to evade that rule has met with
failure."
The observations of the learned Judge are rather wide, for,
as the earlier decisions show, though a suit for privileges
or honours per se may not lie in a Civil Court, if they are
annexed to an office, they can be agitated therein. This
judgment was taken in appeal to a division bench of the High
Court, consisting of Leach, C. J., and Somayya, J., who
confirmed the same. They observed:
"It is acknowledged that a question relating
to the distribution of theertham or other
temple honours cannot be made the subject-
matter of a suit as it is not a question which
affects a legal right."
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The remarks we made in regard to the observations of
Pandurang Row, J., would equally apply to these
observations. They do not represent the entire law on the
subject, but only a part of it.
(1) (1863) 1 M.H.C.R. 301.
525
It is not necessary to refer to further citations, for the
decisions already cited lay down the relevant principles of
law clearly. For convenience of reference we may summarize
the law on the subject thus: (1) A suit for a declaration of
religious honours and privileges simpliciter will not lie in
a civil court. (2) But a suit to establish one’s right to an
office in a temple, and to honours and privileges attached
to the said office as its remuneration or perquisites, is
maintainable in a civil court. (3) The essential condition
for the existence of an office is that the holder of the
alleged office shall be under a legal obligation to
discharge the duties attached to the said office and for the
non-observance of which he may be visited with penalties.
(4) So judged, there cannot be an independent office of
theerthakar, for a theerthakar has no obligatory duties to
perform; nor can there be an office of arulipad; the said
word only connotes that the names of the theerthakars are
called out by the archaka in a certain order. (5) Even if
theertham is given or other honours are shown in a
particular order to a person holding an office, it does not
necessarily follow that the said honours are part of the
remuneration attached to the office; but it is a question of
fact to be ascertained on the evidence whether the said
honours are attached to the office as part of its per-
quisites in the sense that they have become an integral part
of the ritual to be performed by the recipient as the
office-holder or are only shown to him as a mark of respect
on the occasion of his visit to the temple.
Having regard to the said principles, lot us now look at the
contentions raised in this case. The first submission of
learned counsel for the appellant is that, in view of the
said principles, the suit should have been dismissed in
limine on the basis of the allegations in the plaint. In
paragraph 4 of the plaint in O. S. No. 45 of 1945, the claim
of the plaintiff to the office is stated thus:
"The plaintiff is the present Emberumanar Jeer
and as such the aradhanaikar and trustee of
the said
67
526
Emberuraanar temple having been appointed and
nominated by his predecessor Sri Sadagopa
Ramanuja Jeer who died in 1930."
In paragraph 7 of the plaint, his claim to the honours is
stated thus:
"In his capacity as holder of the office of
aradhanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar
temple and as emoluments attached to the said
office, the Emberumanar Jeer is by immemorial
usage and custom entitled to receive, in the
ghoshties that are formed before all the
sannidhies in the Adhinathalwar temple on all
occasions of each day on all the days of the
year without exception, the first theertham
and other honours described in Schedule 1
below and the perquisites described in
Schedule 11 below."
In paragraph 9 it is further stated:
"In his capacity as holder of the office of
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Aradhanalkar and trustee of Emberumanar temple
and as emoluments attached to the said office
the Emberumanar Jeer is entitled to receive on
the 7th day of Vaikasi festival in the
Athinathalwar temple, in addition to and along
with the honours and perquisites described in
Schedules 1 and 11, certain other honours such
as the tying of the silk gear, etc., more
particularly described in Schedule III hereto.
These are known as special honours while the
honours described in Schedules I and II are
known as ordinary honours."
It is clear from the said allegations that the claim of the
plaintiff to the ordinary and special honours in the
Athinathalwar temple is based upon his capacity as office-
holder as Aradhanaikar and trustee of Emberu-manar temple.
There is no allegation that he is an officeholder in
Athinathalwar temple., In the written. statements filed by
the defendants the claim of the plaintiff to the said
honours is denied.
In O.S. No. 46 of 1945 also the claim of the plaintiff to
the honours is based upon the same allegations that are made
in the plaint in O. S. No. 45 of 1945. In the written-
statement filed by the defendants the said claim is denied.
Indeed, the original issues reflected
527
only the allegations found in the pleadings. If the courts
had directed their minds to the pleadings, as they should
have done, instead of traveling beyond them in search of
some plausible basis to sustain the plaintiff’s claim the
suits would have been dismissed for the simple reason that
on the allegations in the plaint the plaintiff was not an
office-holder in the temple of Athinathalwar and, therefore,
he’ could not claim the honours shown to him in the said
temple as perquisites attached to his office; but
unfortunately this was not done, and we think that it is too
late to dismiss the suit on that ground when all the parties
adduced voluminous evidence on the alternative ground and
took the decision of the courts. We shall, therefore, pro-
ceed to consider the case on the alternative basis on which
the claim has been put forward on behalf of the plaintiff in
the courts below.
To appreciate the said basis, it is necessary to re-
capitulate the relevant facts. Originally, the District
Munsif dismissed the suit O. S. No. 320 of 1933 (0. S. No.
45 of 1945 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate
Judge, Tuticorin) on the ground that the plaintiff has no
legal right in respect of which he could seek relief in a
civil court. But on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge
set aside the decree and remanded the suit for trial. In
paragraph 18 of his judgment, the learned Subordinate Judge
stated:
"In view of the above authorities I am of
opinion that when the present plaintiff has
come to Court with a specific case set out in
paragraphs 7 and 9 of his plaint that his
right of precedence to receive theertham,
thulasi, satari, prasadam and other per-
quisites forms part of the emoluments of his
office of aradanaikar in the suit temple, the
suit cannot be dismissed on the preliminary
ground that it is barred under Section 9,
Civil Procedure Code."
There is an obvious mistake in this statement, for in the
paragraphs mentioned therein it is not alleged that the
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plaintiff has an office in the Athinathalwar temple.
Presumably this mistake lead the learned Judge to come to
the conclusion which he did. On appeal, in the High Court
it was pointed out to the court that
528
temple. But Chandrasekara Aiyar, J., for the first time,
allowed the plaintiff to make out a new case. The learned
Judge stated the said case in the following words:
"One view to take up in this case is what was
adopted by the District Munsif, namely, that
as the plaintiff admittedly holds no office in
the Athinathalwar temple he cannot claim these
honours. The other view which found favour
with the Subordinate Judge is that owing to
the alleged associations of the two temples,
their interlinking and their interdependence,
the Aradanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar
temple might claim to be regarded as an
office-holder in the Athinathalwar temple."
The learned Judge did not decide the point,
but he observed:
"But the idea of two temples or Mutts, of
equal rank and co-ordinate and independent
authority or where one is the primary
institution and the other its subsidiary or
adjunct being linked together for certain
purposes of worship and observance of rituals
cannot be said to be entirely foreign to Hindu
notions."
He concluded thus:
"Of course, before he can succeed in the suit,
the plaintiff has to make out that he being
the Aradanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar
temple amounts to his holding an office in the
suit temple."
The question whether the origin of this new case is found in
the judgment of the Subordinate Judge or that of
Chandrasekara Aiyar, J., need not detain us. This is a new
case not disclosed in the plaint; but after remand both the
parties directed their attention to this question and
adduced all the relevant evidence pertaining thereto.
On remand, the learned Subordinate Judge in an elaborate
judgment considered the said aspect of the case. He
considered the evidence under three heads, namely, (i)
historical, (ii) administrative, and (iii) financial. On
the first head after considering the origin of the two
temples, the learned Judge came to the
529
conclusion that the idea that the Emberumanar temple was
historically connected with Athinathalwar temple could not
be "poopoohed". Under the administrative head, he found
that till 1926 Emberumanar temple was merely a sub-shrine
attached to the bigger Athinathalwar temple, and the
trustees of the latter temple were exercising administrative
control over it as such. Coming then to the financial side,
he found that there was sufficient evidence to justify the
inference that the two were intimately connected even
financially. Passing on to the question of ceremonial and
religious association between these two temples, the learned
Judge found that there was similarity in the mode of routine
and day-to-day worship in the two temples; but there was no
interlinking or interdependence between them in that matter.
Then the learned Subordinate Judge pointed out that
notwithstanding that there was no interlinking and
interdependence in that matter, they were so intimately
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associated with each other in other religious rites and
ceremonies as to lead to the inference that the Emberumanar
temple was after all only a sub-shrine attached to the main
temple of Athinathalwar. Then he pointed out that the
question in the said form was not before Chandrasekara
Aiyar, J., but thought that it was open to him to go into
the said question. After going into the evidence, he
finally came to the conclusion that apart from historical
and secular association, there had been also ceremonial and
religious association between the two temples and,
therefore, the Emberumanar temple was nothing but a sub-
shrine attached to the main temple of Athinathalwar. On
that finding he further held that the plaintiff who was
admittedly the aradhanaikar of the said temple was virtually
an office-holder in the main temple. In the appeals filed
by the various parties against the decrees of the learned
Subordinate Judge, the learned District Judge of Tirunelveli
reviewed the evidence once again under the said three heads
and came to a contrary conclusion. On the administrative
side he found that the Emberumanar temple was not
subordinate to the
530
temple of Athinathalwar, in the sense that the authorities
of the latter temple could give orders to the authorities of
the Emberumanar temple, that is, the former was not
subordinate to the latter temple administratively. On the
financial side, he was equally emphatic that the two
institutions were not interdependent. On the religious or
ritual aspect, the learned District Judge held that, as both
the institutions were constructed in the same place, there
must have been some connection between the two and in that
sense in a general way the Emberumanar temple might be
described as a sub-shrine. On the said facts, the learned
Judge posed the following question for his consideration:
"What is the inference to be derived? On the evidence, he
answered the question thus:
"I hold on the evidence that these
institutions are not interdependent or
intimately connected in such a way that an
office-holder of Emberumanar temple is
necessarily an office-holder of the Athi-
nathalwar temple. I hold therefore that the
plain. tiff is not an office-holder of the
Athinathalwar temple and therefore he is not
entitled to file a suit with regard to his
rights of precedence in being given
theertham."
This finding is certainly a finding of fact based upon the
entire evidence in the case.
In the second appeal, the learned Judge of the High Court,
on a review of the evidence, disagreed with the learned
District Judge and accepted the finding of the learned
Subordinate Judge, and held, for similar reasons, that the
plaintiff was virtually an office-holder in the main temple;
he further held that the plaintiff could also be considered
to be the holder of the office of arulipad and, in that
capacity also he was entitled to the first theertham and
other honours. The first question is one of fact. The
learned District Judge, though he differed from the
Subordinate Judge, held, on a consideration of the entire
evidence that the plaintiff was not an office-holder in the
Athinathalwar temple. It has now been well settled that the
High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal
on the ground of erroneous finding of
531
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fact however gross the error may seem to be. The judgment
of the learned Judge does not disclose that there are any
permissible grounds for interference with the finding of the
District Judge. The second ground of decision of the High
Court is based upon a case that was raised for the first
time before it. Nowhere in the plaints or before the two
subordinate courts the plaintiff attempted to sustain his
claim on his being the holder of the office of arulipad.
The High Court, therefore, was not justified in allowing the
plaintiff to set out any such claim for the first time in
the second appeal. That apart, it does not appear that
there is an office called arulipad. A division bench of the
Madras High Court in Vathiar Venkatachariar v. P. Ponnappa
Ayyengar (1) had an occasion to define the word "arulipad".
There, a claim was made to the office of Theerthakar. On
the evidence it was held that the plaintiffs had not made
out the existence of any obligatory duty on the part of
Theerthakar in the temple. In that context Krishnan, J.,
observed thus:
"............... the Theerthakars have special
places allotted to them in the temple, to
stand and recite and they are given the honour
of Thertham and Prasadam, before the outsiders
get them; and they have what is called an
"Arulipad", that is, their names are called
out by the Archaka in a certain order, when,
if present, they have to respond by saying
’Nayinde’, meaning ’I am here’."
It is, therefore, clear that there is no office designated
as " arulipad", but that word only describes the duty of the
archaka to call their names to ascertain whether the
theerthakars are present in the ghoshti. There is no
evidence in this case that the plaintiff, as a theerthakar,
has any obligatory duty in the Athinathalwar temple to
perform and, therefore, it is not possible to treat him as
an office-holder in that capacity in the said temple.
This leads us to the argument of the counsel for the
respondent that, though it cannot be said that the
Emberumanar temple is a part or a subordinate of the
Athinathalwar temple in the sense that all the
(1) (1918) 45 I.C. 959.
532
office-holders of the former are the office-holders of the
latter, there is sufficient ritual connection between the
two which in the consciousness of the religious public is
treated as sufficiently intimate to make the one subordinate
to the other. This intimate religious connection, the
argument proceeds, flows from the historical, administrative
and financial ties, however loose they may be, that have
existed for over a century between the said two temples.
This argument may have some validity in a theological
discussion or an ecclesiastical court, but cannot obviously
be accepted in a civil court. Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., sum-
marizes the facts in his judgment which, in his view,
support the conclusion that the Emberumanar Jeer was
virtually an office-holder in the Athinathalwar temple. As
the correctness of the said facts is not questioned before
us, it will be convenient to extract them in the words of
the learned Judge:
"In all Vaishnavite temples, the Alwars and
the Acharyas take a prominent place in the
religious ceremonies and observances of the
temple. An attempt was made to show that
there has been an interlinking and
interdependence of the ritual and ceremonies
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between these two temples, but, as rightly
found by the learned Subordinate Judge, in the
matter of routine and day-to-day worship and
rituals such interlinking and interdependence
have not been satisfactorily made out. The
rituals or the manner of performing divine
service are uniform in every Vaishnavite
temple. But, as found by the learned
Subordinate Judge, though a ritual in the main
temple is not dependent upon the ritual in the
sub-shrine, the Emberumanar deity being an
Acharya is intimately associated with the
deity in the main temple in all the important
festivals, the most important of which are the
Margali and Vaikasi festivals and other
religious ceremonies. There are several
Mandagapadis for the Athinatha Alwar in the
Emberumanar temple. There is Sethu
Thirumanjam for the Athinatha Alwar and Embe-
rumanar deities on three occasions, two of
them in the Emberumanar temple and one in the
main
533
temple. Then there is what is called Alwar
Sayanam which has to take place on the 10th
day of the Margali festival and which is
performed in the main temple. There are
several other similar religious observances,
where the two deities meet and certain rituals
and religious ceremonies are gone through.
The daily ritual in a Vaishnavite temple is a
routine matter and on occasions, for instance,
in the months of Margali and Vaikasi and on
other festival days, there is necessity for
the Alwars and the Acharyas to meet the main
deity and ceremonies suitable to the occasions
are performed. It is not possible to imagine
a temple where God Vishnu is installed without
the presence of the Alwars and Acharyas.
Alwars and Acharyas are devotees of God Vishnu
who have received divine recognition in their
lives and the festivals in relation to them
depict incidents of such manifestation of
divine grace to his devotees.
It may also be mentioned that the installation
of each Emberumanar Jeer,, who it may be
stated is a Sanyasi, is in the Athinatha Alwar
temple under its Dwajasthamba, the flag staff,
and the declaration of the status of the
succeeding Jeer is made only ill the presence
of the deity of the main temple."
We may also add to the said facts that at one time the share
of tasdik allowance to the Emberumanar temple was paid
through the trustee of Athinathalwar temple and there was
also an occasion when a trustee of the Emberumanar temple
was dismissed by the trustee of the Athinathalwar temple.
On the other hand, both the temples are under different
managements, they have their separate officeholders,
distinct rituals, different budgets, and separate
endowments; and in the year 1926 on an application filed by
the Emberumanar Jeer, the Religious Endowments Board
declared the temple as an excepted temple indicating thereby
that the Emberumanar temple was a separate legal entity and
that the said Jeer was its hereditary trustee. The. only
question, therefore, is whether the said facts enable a
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court to
68
534
hold that one temple is subordinate or part of the other
temple, so that the office-holders of one temple would
become the office-holders of the -other. The facts clearly
establish that in fact and in law the two institutions are
different legal entities. In the past, the trustees of
Athinathalwar temple might have disbursed tasdik allowances
contributed by the Government to the various temples,
including the Emberumanar temple, but it is well known that
for convenience of administration the services of the
trustees of a larger temple were very often utilized by the
Government in that regard; it might have been that sometimes
the amounts payable to the smaller temples were allowed to
lapse, but there is nothing on the record to show that it
was not out of negligence of the trustees of the minor
shrines in not making any pressing demands on the trustees
of Athinathalwar temple; it might also have been that the
trustee of the bigger temple, in his supervisory capacity,
dismissed once in a way the trustee of a smaller shrine in
the locality, but that could be explained by the paramount
position of the trustee of the bigger temple in the locality
compared to that of the minor temples. These and such acts
may show that the trustee of the Athinathalwar temple had
exercised similar supervisory control in the past over the
minor temples; but that in itself does not make the trustee
of the temple of Emberumanar an office-holder in the bigger
temple. It is well known that in the past the temples were
under the supervision of the Revenue Board and later on
under various temple committees. It cannot be suggested
that on that account. the trustees of the minor temples were
officers in the Revenue Board or the temple committees, as
the case may be. We cannot also appreciate how the mutual
visits of the idols to the other’s temple and the honours
shown to the idols on such visits could have any bearing on
the question to be decided, though they reflect the intimate
relationship that exists between the Lord and his ardent
devotee Ramanuja in the public consciousness. But such
cordial relationship existing between two independent
temples cannot in the eye of law make the
535
one a part of the other. Two independent institutions
legally cannot, except in the manner known to law, be
amalgamated into one institution by developing merely
sentimental attachment between them. This argument was
rightly rejected by the learned District Judge, and the High
Court went wrong in accepting it.
Before we close we must make it clear that by this judgment
we have not in any way intended to express our view in the
matter of honours that are customarily shown to one or other
of the parties in these appeals in the temple of
Athinathalwar.
In the result we hold, agreeing with the District Judge,
that the suits were not maintainable in the civil court.
The appeals are, therefore, allowed with costs throughout.
Appeals allowed.