Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 150-151 of 2001
PETITIONER:
M/s Bhagwati Prasad Pawan Kumar
RESPONDENT:
Union of India
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/05/2006
BENCH:
B.P. SINGH & R.V. RAVEENDRAN
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
B.P. SINGH, J.
These two appeals by special leave have been preferred by the
appellant against the judgment and order of the Gauhati High Court in
MA (F). No.180 of 1996 dated May 19, 2000 and the order passed in
Review Petition No.85 of 2000 dated July 28, 2000. The High Court
by its judgment and order impugned dismissed the appeal preferred by
the appellant against the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal,
Guwahati Bench dated August 30, 1996 in Application No.915 of
1993. The review petition preferred against the judgment and order of
the High Court was also rejected by order dated July 28, 2000.
The factual background in which the dispute arose is as
follows:-
Two consignments of iodised salt were booked in favour of the
appellant. The first consignment consisted of 767 bags and the second
744 bags. These consignments were not delivered. The appellant,
therefore, lodged two claims dated April 26, 1991 claiming the value
of the said goods, namely Rs.53,264/- and Rs.51,686/- in respect of
the two consignments. By letters dated April 7, 1993 (despatched in
August, 1993) the Railways admitted the claims only to an extent of
Rs.9,111/- and Rs.9,032/- and enclosed two cheques in favour of the
appellant for the sum of Rs.9,111/- and Rs.9,032/- in respect of the
two claims. Both the cheques were dated July 27, 1993. The letters
contained the following condition :-
"In case the above offer is not acceptable to you, the
Cheque should be returned forthwith to this office:
failing which it will be deemed that you have accepted
the offer in full and final satisfaction of your claim.
The retention of this cheque and/or encashment thereof
will automatically amount to acceptance in full and final
satisfaction of your above claim without reason and you
will be estopped from claiming any further relief on the
subject".
On receipt of two letters alongwith the two cheques, the
appellant wrote to the Railways two identical letters of August 20,
1993 stating that the claims were placed under PROTEST and could
not be accepted and that the balance amount should be remitted within
15 days. We extract below one of the letters dated August 20, 1993:-
"We regret to inform you that our above noted claim has
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been settled for Rs.9111/- instead of Rs.53284/- the
claimed amount. The same is therefore placed under :
PROTEST : and cannot be accepted. Please therefore
remit the balance amount to us within a period of 15 days
from the date of receipt of this letter, failing which, we
shall be compelled to lodge a Civil suit against the Rly
for recovery of the balance amount. Please treat this as
most urgent".
It is not in dispute that the cheques were encashed, though the
exact date of encashment is not apparent from the record. It is also
not disputed that the balance amount claimed by the appellant was not
paid by the Railways. In these circumstances the appellant filed a
claim application before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati
Bench for Rs.21,151/- and Rs.20,258/- (after adjusting the freight
payable namely Rs.23,022/- and Rs.22,396/-) in all Rs.41,409/- as
balance compensation in regard to the two invoices.
Before the Railway Claims Tribunal the Railways pleaded full
and final settlement since the cheques were not returned and were in
fact encashed. The Tribunal took the view that there was no scope for
the applicant to treat the amount as part payment by making a protest
and if the applicant found the amount to be insufficient he should have
returned the cheques because the offer made by the Railways was in
very clear terms, namely \026 that the amount could be accepted only in
full and final satisfaction of the claim or else the cheques had to be
returned. In this view of the matter the claim application was
dismissed by the Railway Claims Tribunal.
The appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court which
came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of the High Court
who referred the matter for consideration by a Division Bench, since it
appeared to the learned Judge that there was a conflict of opinion
between two judgments of Single Judges of the Court in case reported
in AIR 1973 Gauhati 111 : Union of India vs. M/s. Rameshwarlal
Bhagchand and an unreported decision in Second Appeal No. 77 of
1982 of March 11, 1991 (M/s. Assam Bengal Cereals Ltd. vs. Union
of India). The matter was heard by a Division Bench of the High
Court and by judgment and order of May 5, 2000 the appeal preferred
by the appellant was dismissed.
The moot question that arose for consideration of the High
Court was whether the acceptance of the two cheques by the appellant
and their encashment by it did not amount to acceptance of the offer
contained in the two letters of April 7, 1993. The aforesaid letters of
April 7, 1993, as noticed earlier, offered the amounts contained in the
two cheques in full and final settlement of appellant’s claim and
further provided that in case the offer was not acceptable, the cheques
should be returned forthwith. It is the case of the Railways that by
retaining the cheques and encashing them, the appellant signified its
acceptance of the amounts comprised in the two cheques in full and
final settlement of its claims. Such acceptance by conduct is
recognized by Section 8 of the Contract Act.
On the other hand the appellant contended that it had written a
letter rejecting the offer and placing the claims "under protest" and
called upon the respondent to pay the balance amount claimed by it.
The appellant, therefore, submitted that there was no acceptance by
conduct as envisaged by Section 8 of the Contract Act, and that its
retention of the cheques must be viewed in the light of the protest
made by it under its letters of August 20, 1993. The sole question
which, therefore, arises for consideration by us is whether by its
conduct, the appellant accepted the offer contained in the letters of the
Railways dated April 7, 1993.
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Section 8 of the Contract Act reads as under :-
"8.Acceptance by performing conditions, or
receiving consideration - Performance of the conditions
of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for
a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a
proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal".
The High Court considered the case of Rameshwarlal
Bhagchand (supra) on which reliance was placed by the Raiwlays. In
that case the plaintiff-respondent, M/s. Rameshwarlal Bhagchand had
transported 210 bags of groundnut through Railways, but when it took
delivery, the consignments were found to be so damaged as not fit for
human consumption. It was so certified by the Railway Officer
concerned. The consignee served a notice on the Railway
Administration claiming compensation in the sum of Rs.2,368.25 ps..
The General Manager sent a cheque in the sum of Rs.1173.19 ps. to
the consignee on May 5, 1964 alongwith a letter stating that the
cheque was being sent in full and final settlement of the claim. The
consignee encashed the cheque but subsequently communicated to the
General Manager by its letter dated July 29, 1964 that the cheque
received satisfied only a part of the claim and that the balance amount
should be remitted. Since the General Manager failed to make
payment of the balance amount claimed by the consignee a suit for
recovery of the balance amount was filed. In these facts the High
Court took the view that the plaintiff having encashed the cheque
without first communicating to the General Manager that it did not
agree to the proposal made by him, it must be assumed in terms
Section 8 of the Contract Act to have accepted the proposal by mere
acceptance of the cheque. It was held that the fact that it wrote a letter
on July 29, 1964 after encashing the cheque, and denying that the
amount had fully settled its claim, did not alter the position. If the
consignee did not agree to the offer made by the General Manager in
his communication dated May 5, 1964, it should have communicated
its refusal to accept the offer, before encashing the cheque. Otherwise
it would be assumed that the cheque was encashed on the terms
offered by the General Manager, and only later the consignee changed
its mind after realizing the proceeds of the cheque.
The judgment of the Gauhati High Court in Assam Bengal
Cereals Limited (supra) proceeded on a different set of facts. In that
case the consignee/claimant had received an offer from the Railways
to accept the cheque in full and final settlement of its claim. In
response thereto, by letter addressed to the Railways, it informed the
Railways that the cheque had been retained and the Railways should
give reasons for withholding the balance amount. It was stated in the
letter that if no reply was received within 15 days, the acceptance of
the cheque would not amount to full and final settlement. In fact, the
cheque was not encashed for 15 days after issuance of the letter by the
claimant/consignee. In these facts it was held that that principle laid
down in Rameshwarlal Bhagchand case (supra) was not applicable to
the case since the claimant had responded to the offer of the Railways
demanding from them the reasons as to why the entire claim was not
admitted, and further provided that unless reasons are assigned within
15 days from the receipt of the letter, the retention of the cheque
would not be treated as acceptance of the payment in full and final
settlement. In the peculiar facts of the case, therefore, it was held that
the encashment of the cheque did not amount to acceptance of the
offer made by the Railways.
In the impugned judgment and order, the Division Bench of the
High Court has agreed with the view in Rameshwarlal Bhagchand
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case (supra).
We may refer to the other decisions cited at the Bar.
In AIR 1972 All 176 : Amar Nath Chand Prakash vs. Bhearat
Heavy Electricals Limited the facts were that the respondent gave a
contract to the appellant for doing certain construction work which
was completed by the first week of March 1965. The appellant
company prepared a final bill of the work done on March 29, 1965.
The appellant signed a no claim declaration and also gave a receipt in
token of accepting the amount found due to the appellant. The
appellant thereafter raised a dispute alleging short payment etc. It
invoked the arbitration clause and called upon the respondent to
appoint an arbitrator. When the respondent did not respond to the
notice issued by the appellant, an application under Section 20 of the
Arbitration Act was filed by the appellant. The respondent contested
the application contending that the appellant having given a no claim
certificate in final settlement of its claim and having accepted the
payment by means of a cheque in full and final settlement of its dues,
it amounted to discharge of the contract alongwith which the
arbitration agreement also stood extinguished and, therefore, there
was no dispute capable of being referred to arbitration. The High
Court considered the material on record and found that though the
declaration was signed by the appellant, as also the memorandum of
payment, in the final bill there was an endorsement to the effect that
the appellant had accepted the payment under protest. This was done
on March 29, 1965 whereas the cheque was actually prepared and
delivered much later on December 14, 1965. In the absence of any
oral evidence, the High Court was required to construe the document
in order to ascertain the intention of the contractor in making such an
endorsement and of the company in permitting such an endorsement
to be made. In the facts of the case the High Court observed that the
endorsement dispelled any intention to remit the performance in
regard to the balance of the claim. On the contrary it clearly evinced
that the receipt of the amount was not unconditional so as to effect the
discharge of the contract. On the contrary it safeguarded the position
of the contractor and indicated that he was not accepting the payment
without any reservation. The appellant specifically stated that he was
receiving the money ’under protest’ which clearly amounted to
making a reservation. The reservation could only be that the
acceptance of payment was not in discharge of the contract.
Consequently it could not be said that the appellant dispensed with, or
remitted the performance of the contract, for the rest of his dues.
Reliance was placed on the principle enunciated in (1889) 22 QBD
610 : Day vs. Mciea in which it was observed :-
"If a person sends a sum of money on the terms that it is
to be taken, if at all, in satisfaction of a larger claim: and
if the money is kept it is a question of fact as to the terms
upon which it is so kept. Accord and satisfaction imply
an agreement to take the money in satisfaction of the
claim in respect of which it is sent. If the accord is a
question of agreement, there must be either two minds
agreeing or one of the two persons acting in such a way
as to induce the other to think that the money is taken in
satisfaction of the claim, and to cause him to act upon
that view. In either case it is a question of fact."
Applying this principle it was held that there was no accord and
satisfaction in the sense of bilateral consensus of intention. The
appellant made it clear that it was accepting the money ’under
protest’, that is, conditionally. Under the circumstances it cannot be
said that signing the no claim certificate and the grant of the receipt
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amounted to discharge of the contract.
In AIR 1977 Madhya Pradesh 215 : Union of India and
another vs. M/s. Gangaram Bhagwandas, the respondent had filed a
suit on January 6, 1970 claiming by way of damages a sum of
Rs.504.58 ps. on account of goods being damaged due to negligence
and misconduct on the part of the Railways and its employees. While
the suit was pending a cheque for Rs.283.05 was sent under cover of a
letter dated March 6, 1970 which stated that the amount was being
sent in full and final settlement of the claim. The respondent
encashed the chque. The High Court on facts found that there was no
denying the fact that the plaintiff did not accept the cheque in full
satisfaction. It had not passed a receipt in full satisfaction, nor did it
send a receipt to the Railways acknowledging receipt of the amount.
On the contrary, even after receiving the cheque the respondent
prosecuted the suit for the balance of the amount. The Railway had
led no evidence to show that the intention of the plaintiff was to
accept the cheque in full and final settlement of its claim. On this
finding, relying upon the principle laid down in Day vs. Mciea it was
held that :
"The question was thus primarily one of fact and since
the defendant did not choose to lead any evidence on the
point nor are there such circumstances brought on the
record to lead to the conclusion that the cheque was
accepted in discharge of the whole debt, I am unable to
come to the conclusion that the acceptance of the cheque
amounted to satisfaction of the whole claim."
The decision of this Court in AIR 1963 SC 250 : Lala
Kapurchand Godha and others vs. Nawab Himayatalikhan Azamjah,
may not be of much assistance as in that case apart from the fact that
the appeal was decided with reference to Section 63 of the Contract
Act, there was clear evidence on record that the plaintiffs therein had
received the sum of Rs. 20 lakhs in full satisfaction of their claim and
duly discharged the promissory notes by endorsement of "full
satisfaction" and received payment in full.
Section 8 of the Contract Act provides for acceptance by
performing conditions of a proposal. In the instant case, the Railways
made an offer to the appellant laying down the condition that if the
offer was not acceptable the cheque should be returned forthwith,
failing which it would be deemed that the appellant accepted the offer
in full and final satisfaction of its claim. This was further clarified by
providing that the retention of the cheque and/ or encashment thereof
will automatically amount to satisfaction in full and final settlement of
the claim. Thus, if the appellant accepted the cheques and encashed
them without anything more, it would amount to an acceptance of the
offer made in the letters of the Railways dated April 7,. 1993. The
offer prescribed the mode of acceptance, and by conduct the appellant
must be held to have accepted the offer and therefore, could not make
a claim later. However, if the appellant had not encashed the cheques
and protested to the Railways calling upon them to pay the balance
amount, and expressed its inability to accept the cheques remitted to
it, the controversy would have acquired a different complexion. In
that event, in view of the express non acceptance of the offer, the
appellant could not be presumed to have accepted the offer. What,
however, is significant is that the protest and non acceptance must be
conveyed before the cheques are encashed. If the cheques are
encashed without protest, then it must be held that the offer stood
unequivocally accepted. An ’offeree’ cannot be permitted to change
his mind after the unequivocal acceptance of the offer.
It is well settled that an offer may be accepted by conduct. But
conduct would only amount to acceptance if it is clear that the offeree
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did the act with the intention (actual or apparent) of accepting the
offer. The decisions which we have noticed above also proceed on
this principle. Each case must rest on its own facts. The courts must
examine the evidence to find out whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case the conduct of the "offeree" was such as
amounted to an unequivocal acceptance of the offer made. If the facts
of the case disclose that there was no reservation in signifying
acceptance by conduct, it must follow that the offer has been accepted
by conduct. On the other hand if the evidence disclose that the
"offeree" had reservation in accepting the offer, his conduct may not
amount to acceptance of the offer in terms of Section 8 of the Contract
Act.
Coming to the facts of this case if the appellant, before
encashing the cheques, had sent the communication dated August 20,
1993, it could perhaps be argued that by retaining but not encashing
the cheques, it did not intend to accept the offer made in the letter of
the Railways dated April 7, 1993. At the same time if the evidence
disclosed that it encashed the cheques and later sent a protest, it must
be held that it had accepted the offer unconditionally by conveying its
acceptance by the mode prescribed, namely \026 by retaining and
encashing the cheques, without reservation. Its subsequent change of
mind and consequent protest did not matter.
In the instant case there is neither pleadings nor evidence on
record as to the date on which the cheques were received and the date
on which the same were sent for encashment. It is, therefore, not
possible to record a categoric finding as to whether the letters of
protest were written after encashing the cheques or before encashing
the cheques. It was for the appellant to plead and prove that it had not
accepted the offer and had called upon the Railways to pay the
balance amount. This it must have done before encashing the
cheques. If the appellant encashed the cheques and then wrote letters
of protest to the Railways, it cannot be held that it had not accepted
the offer by conduct, because at the time when it sent the cheques for
encashment, it had not conveyed its protest to the offerer. In the
absence of any pleading or evidence to establish that the encashment
of the cheques was subsequent to the protest letters by the appellant, it
is not possible to hold that by encashing the cheques the appellant had
not adopted the mode of acceptance prescribed in the letters of the
Railways dated April 7, 1993. In the absence of such evidence it must
be held that by encashing the cheques received from the Railways, the
appellant accepted the offer by adopting the mode of acceptance
prescribed in the offer of the Railways.
In this view of the matter these appeals must fail. Accordingly
these appeals are dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
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