Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 646
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No…..…. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No.1866 of 2024)
MAHNOOR FATIMA IMRAN & ORS.
APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S VISWESWARA INFRASTRUCTURE
PVT. LTD & ORS.
RESPONDENT(S)
With
Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No.3660 of 2024)
Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No.3661 of 2024)
Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No……….of 2024)
(@Dy. No.19071 of 2024)
J U D G E M E N T
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
1.
Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
2. These appeals arise from the order of the Division
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.05.08
14:00:05 IST
Reason:
Bench of the High Court of Telangana in a writ appeal filed
Page 1 of 34
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from the judgment in a batch of writ petitions dismissed by a
common order. The appeal was only against the judgment in
W.P No.30855 of 2016; which writ petition essentially prayed
for restraining the Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure
1
Corporation Limited , the first respondent therein from
attempting to enter into the land of the writ petitioners having
an extent of 53 acres, situated in Survey No.83/2 of Raidurg
Panmaktha, Village Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy
District, with prayers also against demolition of the fencing
and structures without any notice or without any right or
authority. The connected writ petitions also claimed similar
reliefs as against the first respondent, but with respect to
smaller extents of property, said to have been purchased
from the original owners. The appellants before the Division
Bench claimed that they are in possession of the subject
property on the strength of registered title deeds in which
the vendor is one M/s Bhavana Co-operative Housing Society
2
Ltd. who obtained possession of the land under an
1
For brevity ‘the TSIICL’
2
Bhavana Society hereinafter
Page 2 of 34
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agreement of sale on 19.03.1982. We are not concerned with
the other writ petitions since the impugned judgment in the
SLPs are concerned with only an appellate order reversing
the judgment in WP No.30855 of 2016 and allowing the said
writ petition.
3. The learned Single Judge after dealing with the various
proceedings taken against the total extent of 525 acres 31
guntas in Survey No.83 of Raidurg Panmaktha Village,
Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, originally
belonging to 11 individuals, under the Andhra Pradesh Land
3
Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and
4
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 confined
the consideration to the 53 acres. It was noticed that the
agreement of sale dated 19.03.1982 was validated by
proceedings of the Assistant Registrar, Ranga Reddy District
on 11.09.2006 which validation was held to be fraudulent by
the District Registrar, Karimnagar by order dated 12.08.2015.
The No Objection Certificates issued by the Urban Land
3
(hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Land Reforms Act’)
4
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Land Ceiling Act’)
Page 3 of 34
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Ceiling authorities against the writ petitioners also stood
cancelled, against which no proceedings were taken. There
was nothing to show a valid title having been conferred on
the writ petitioners and the vendor of the writ petitioners had
filed a suit for specific performance; O.S.No.248 of 1991
before the jurisdictional civil court which had been
dismissed for default on 06.04.2001 and the application for
restoration was also dismissed on 23.02.2004. Finding no
valid explanation as to how another agreement of sale of the
same date i.e., 19.03.1982 surfaced, relying on S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu (D) by LRs v. Jagannath (D) by LRs
5
and Ors. emphasised the fraud perpetrated by the
petitioners. The subject land was comprised in a total of 99
acres 17 guntas, covered by the agreement of sale dated
19.03.1982; stated to be in the possession of the Government
as on the date of the agreement, having vested in the
Government under the Land Reforms Act. The possession
was said to have been redelivered to the General Power of
5
(1994) 1 SCC 1
Page 4 of 34
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Attorney (GPA) of the original declarants, thus, negativing
the claim of possession with M/s. Bhavna Cooperative
Housing Society from 1982. The writ petition filed on the
ground of possession stood dismissed.
4. In the appeal, the Division Bench found that the State
was concerned with only 470 acres of land out of the total
525.31 acres, as per the learned Advocate General and
hence the 53 acres stood distinct and separate. The learned
Single Judge, according to the Division Bench, erred in so far
as looking into the title of the writ petitioners since the prayer
was against illegal dispossession, based merely on the
possession of the subject land. As far as the possession,
interim orders by co-ordinate benches were relied on. One
in WP No.29547 of 2011, wherein a Division Bench by interim
order dated 01.03.2011 restrained the Lok Ayukta from
proceeding further in an application filed by the Andhra
6
Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. , the
predecessor of TSIIC. The other order was passed on
6
The APIIC
Page 5 of 34
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17.02.2012 in WP No.4466 of 2012 filed by the appellants
wherein there was a stay of demolition of the structures
raised by the writ petitioners (the appellants herein) in
Survey No.83/2 in Raidurg Panmaktha, Village
Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Relying on
the settled legal position that a person in possession cannot
be dispossessed, except in accordance with law and finding
the actions of the TSIIC, to be in violation of the interim orders
issued, restrained the respondents from dispossessing the
appellants from 53 acres situated in Survey No.83/2 as also
from demolishing the fencing sheets and construction raised
by the appellants without taking recourse to law.
5. The appeals before us have been filed by the party
respondents in the writ petition who are the legal heirs of the
original owners and one, by individuals claiming smaller
extents of property. Before us, for the appellants Shri
Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appeared, Shri
Hiren P.Raval, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the
respondents who are the writ petitioners and Shri S. Niranjan
Page 6 of 34
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Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the State of
Telangana and the petitioners in SLP (C) Diary No.19071 of
2024 are represented by Shri P. Mohith Rao, Advocate on
Record, who adopted the arguments raised by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing in the other appeals.
6. At the outset, we notice that the writ petition is only one
filed seeking an order against dispossession, unless in
accordance with law, as noticed by the Division Bench.
However, we cannot but say that the learned Single Judge has
not decided the question of title and has only raised an
apprehension on the asserted title and possession by the writ
petitioners. The title was asserted to be validly obtained by
instruments of conveyance, but the title of the vendor was
suspect. Likewise, possession, on the ground, in reality, had
not been proved was the essence of the findings of the
learned Single Judge. Before we look at the sustainability of
the impugned judgment, we have to notice that the subject
land, rather the total larger extent; the original owners being
the 11 individuals, predecessors in interest of the appellants
Page 7 of 34
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herein, had a chequered career as is seen from the decisions
produced in the records; State of A.P and Ors. v. N.
7
Audikesava Reddy and Ors. and Omprakash Verma v.
8
State of A.P.
8
7. We notice the facts from Omprakash Verma which, at
the outset, found that one Mohd. Ruknuddin Ahmed and 10
others were the original owners of a land admeasuring
526.07 acres in Survey No.83 situated at Village Raidurg
(Panmaktha) of Ranga Reddy District in the State of Andhra
Pradesh; comprised in which is the subject land of this
litigation having an extent of 53 acres. On 07.07.1974, the
owners executed registered GPA in favour of a partnership
firm known as Sri Venkateswara Enterprises, represented by
its Managing Partners A. Ramaswamy and A. Satyanarayana.
On 01.01.1975, when the Land Reforms Act came into force,
the said land being an agricultural land, the owners filed 11
declarations under the Land Reforms Act. About 99.07 acres
was found surplus in the hands of 4 declarants and possession
7
(2002) 1 SCC 227
8
(2010) 13 SCC 158
Page 8 of 34
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was taken on 11.04.1975, which vested in the State
Government. Later, the Land Ceiling Act came into force and
the owners through their GPA, filed declarations under
Section 6 (1) of the that Act, allegedly on a mistaken
impression, since the land in question was agricultural land
and it was not included in the Master Plan under that Act.
8. Draft statements were issued on 06.12.1979 and
25.01.1980 under the Land Ceiling Act. The final statements
under Section 9 were issued declaring the surplus area for
each of the declarants on 16.09.1980 and 30.01.1980. A
notification was issued by the competent authority under
Section 10 (1) by GOMS No.5013 dated 19.12.1980 vesting
the surplus land determined. The State Government under
Section 23 of the Land Ceiling Act allotted 470.33 acres to the
Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA), the
possession of which was not surrendered. Later, in exercise
of the powers conferred under Section 20(1) of the Land
Ceiling Act, certain exemptions were granted, entitling each
holder of excess land to hold 5 acres instead of 1000 sq.
Page 9 of 34
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meters. A number of persons, including the appellants
purchased different extents of land which sale deeds were
directed to be cancelled by the Inspector General of
Registrations. The cancellation order passed by the Registrar
was challenged in a writ petition which was allowed. A
Division Bench rejected the appeal against which a SLP was
7
filed in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors. , in which the
decision of the High Court was reversed. The State
Government then took a decision to allot the excess land to
third parties who were in occupation of such excess land on
payment of prescribed regular charges, upon which the
original declarants sought for a consideration providing
them to retain the excess land on payment of requisite
compensation.
9. The State Government without taking any action on the
representations allotted 424.13 acres of land in the name of
APIIC against which four writ petitions were filed in the High
Court by individual owners as well as one M/s. Chanakyapuri
Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Secunderabad which
Page 10 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Society claimed that the proceedings of the competent
authority under the Land Ceiling Act stood restored by the
7
judgment in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors. The Division
Bench rejected the writ petitions against which SLPs were
8
filed which were decided in Omprakash Verma’s case. The
8
learned judges in Omprakash Verma’s case rejected the
contention that the original owners had filed the declaration
on a misconception and confusion. We extract paragraph 86
to 88 of the cited decision: -
“ 86. It is not in dispute that the panchnama has not
been questioned in any proceedings by any of the
appellants. Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri
Cooperative Society was in possession at one
stage and Shri Venkateshawar Enterprises was
given possession by the owners and possession
was also given to Golden Hill Construction
Corporation and thereafter it was given to the
purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are
not in possession. In view of the same, the finding
of the High Court that the possession was taken by
the State legally and validly through a panchnama
is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld.
Page 11 of 34
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87. It is relevant to point out the conduct of the
appellants in the previous proceedings which
were highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel
for the State as well as APIIC. They are:
(a) the appellants themselves described the
land in Survey No. 83 as “grazing land” in
their declarations filed under Section 6(1);
(b) the appellants filed declarations under the
Land Reforms Act subjecting the land to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
(c) filing declarations under the ULC Act
treating the land in Survey No. 83 as vacant
land;
(d) the transaction of agreement of sale
entered into between GPA and Chanakyapuri
Cooperative Housing Society;
(e) owners and Society filed applications for
exemptions which were rejected;
(f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its
remedies against such rejection of exemption
up to this Court in which the owners through
their power of attorney were sailing with the
Society.
In fact these instances were projected in
their counter-affidavit before the High Court
Page 12 of 34
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by the State and APIIC to non-suit the
appellants. Though the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants pointed out that
these aspects were not highlighted before the
High Court, the conduct of the appellants as
regards the above aspects cannot be ignored.
88. It is pointed out that the owners
themselves have described the land in Survey
No. 83 as “grazing lands” and “vacant land”
in the relevant columns of their declaration
under Section 6(1) and, therefore, the
proceedings of the competent authority under
Sections 8, 9 and 10 are valid. Though the said
aspect had not been disputed by the
appellants, however, it is pointed out that the
mentioning of “grazing lands” in the said
declaration is not conclusive. However, as
observed earlier, their statements in the form
of declarations before the authorities
concerned cannot be denied. In fact, we were
taken through those entries which are
available in the paper book in the form of
annexures.”
Page 13 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
10. Hence, in so far as the land allotted to APIIC, now in the
possession of TSIIC, which is 424.13 acres, the vesting and
allotment has attained finality. There can be no dispute either
of title or possession raised on that land.
11. Now, we come to the 99.07 acres, vested under the
Land Reforms Act. While proceedings were continuing under
the Land Ceiling Act, which were also challenged on the
ground that the entire lands were agricultural lands, not
included under the Land Ceiling Act, the GPA of the original
declarants filed a petition before the Land Tribunal pointing
out the proceedings taken under the Land Ceiling Act,
asserting that the provisions of the Land Reforms Act are not
applicable since the entire land in Survey No.83 was treated
as vacant land under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.
The GPA sought release of the extent of 99.07 acres which
was rejected. Four appeals were filed before the Land
Reforms Appellate Authority-cum-District Judge, Ranga
Reddy in which there was a remand. The Land Tribunal on
remand accepted the plea of the declarants and directed the
Page 14 of 34
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extent of 99.07 acres to be released to the declarants; which
according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
State was not permissible.
12. Subject of the present appeals; 53 acres, is said to be
comprised in the 99.07 acres of land allegedly reverted to the
declarants on 25.04.1990, the possession allegedly having
been handed over to the GPA of the declarants. In so far as
the remaining 46.20 acres, there is said to be a writ petition
pending before the High Court in which the High Court has
permitted the State to protect the total 470.33 acres, including
the 424.32 acres earlier allotted to APIIC, now with the TSIIC.
While the appellants herein, the legal representatives of the
original owners/declarants asserted their possession and
ownership, the respondents who are the writ petitioners
equally assert their possession on the strength of title deeds
which have not been challenged at all.
13. All the parties have filed their detailed written
submissions. On the arguments, suffice it to notice that Shri
Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Page 15 of 34
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appellants submitted that there could be no conveyance
effected by the sale agreement of 19.03.1982 and the title
deeds executed cannot confer any title on the vendees since
the vendor did not have a valid title. The vendor in the said
title deeds had sought for specific performance which suit
stood dismissed for default and the application for
restoration was also rejected. Based on the sale deeds, the
writ petitioners had taken loans from banks, offering the said
lands as collateral security, which had led to a CBI
investigation where the sale deeds were found to be
fraudulent. Proceedings were initiated under the criminal
law against the writ petitioners and their Directors. In so far
as the 46.20 acres, the appellants would agitate their cause in
the writ petition pending before the High Court. The
remaining 53 acres was admittedly taken possession by the
GPA of the original declarants, which possession is with the
appellants, the ownership having devolved upon them.
14. Shri Hiren P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondents on the other hand submits that there is no
Page 16 of 34
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challenge to the sale deeds and the entire exercise is
experimental, especially considering the development
agreement entered into with a builder as is produced by the
Respondent No.1 to 7 through I.A. No.83765 of 2025. Behind
the scenes, the developer is funding the litigation in the hope
that the appellants who are all living abroad would obtain
possession of the disputed land on which the developer
could carry out their activities. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy,
learned Senior Counsel on the other hand submits that the
State is concerned with 99.07 acres of land which had vested
in the State under the Land Reforms Act. The land having
vested with the State, there is no reason for reverting it back
to the original declarants who had claimed the said lands to
be agricultural lands when the Land Reforms Act came into
force. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy also points out Section 9-A of
the Land Reforms Act which provides for reopening of cases.
It is also pointed out that though the Land Ceiling Act, 1976
has been repealed in 1999, the vesting cannot be disturbed
and the decisions of this Court on the earlier two occasions
Page 17 of 34
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has brought about a finality to the vesting under the repealed
Act.
15. The respondents herein who were the writ petitioners
have emphasised their claims on the basis of the decision in
Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana &
9
Anr. . The said decision has been cited to argue that the title
deeds; registered instruments of conveyance, are to be
deemed valid unless set aside or declared void by a Civil
Court of competent jurisdiction. There is no such dictum in
the said decision wherein a Division Bench of this Court was
concerned with conveyances made on the strength of
agreements of sale, General Power of Attorney and Wills.
The issue addressed was avoidance of execution and
registration of deed of conveyances as a mode of transfer of
a free hold immovable property, especially in the teeth of
Section 17 and Section 49 of the Registration Act. The
tendency to adopt Power of Attorney sales along with
execution of sale agreements and a bequeath by way of will,
9
(2012) 1 SCC 656
Page 18 of 34
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instead of execution and registration of proper deeds of
conveyance on receipt of full consideration was deprecated.
We extract paragraphs 15 to 17 of an earlier order dated
15.05.2009 in the said case, extracted as such in para 15 of
the aforesaid decision:
“15. The Registration Act, 1908 was enacted with
the intention of providing orderliness, discipline
and public notice in regard to transactions relating
to immovable property and protection from fraud
and forgery of documents of transfer. This is
achieved by requiring compulsory registration of
certain types of documents and providing for
consequences of non-registration.
16. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly
provides that any document (other than
testamentary instruments) which purports or
operates to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish whether in present or in future ‘any
right, title or interest’ whether vested or contingent
of the value of Rs.100 and upward to or in
immovable property.
17. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no
document required by Section 17 to be registered
shall, affect any immovable property comprised
Page 19 of 34
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therein or received as evidence of any transaction
affecting such property, unless it has been
registered. Registration of a document gives
notice to the world that such a document has been
executed.”
16 . The observation that registration of a document gives
notice to the world that such a document has been executed
is not to confer an unimpeachable validity on all such
registered documents. Even the respondents/writ
petitioners accept that the presumption coming forth from a
registered deed of conveyance is rebuttable. While
reserving the right of persons who had obtained sale
agreement/general power of attorney/will executed, to
complete confirmation of title on them by getting registered
deeds of conveyance, the conclusion of the cited decision,
which acts as a binding precedent, is available in para 24,
which we extract hereunder: -
“24. We therefore reiterate that immovable
property can be legally and lawfully
transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of
conveyance. Transactions of the nature of “GPA
Page 20 of 34
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sales” or “SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey
title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be
recognised or valid mode of transfer of immovable
property. The courts will not treat such
transactions as completed or concluded transfers
or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor
create any interest in an immovable property.
They cannot be recognised as deeds of title,
except to the limited extent of Section 53-A of the
TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or
made the basis for mutations in municipal or
revenue records. What is stated above will apply
not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to
freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold
property. A lease can be validly transferred only
under a registered assignment of lease. It is time
that an end is put to the pernicious practice of
SA/GPA/will transactions known as GPA sales.”
17 . It is in this context that we must examine the document
of 19.03.1982, an agreement which is said to have been
validated in the year 2006. We immediately notice that the
very contention of the writ petitioners is only that they have
obtained proper conveyances by registered sale deeds from
Page 21 of 34
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Bhavana society, whose claim is under the agreement of
1982, which has not till date been registered and hence
cannot be recognized as a valid mode or instrument of
transfer of immovable property, going by the above
decision.
18. We refer to the documents from the memorandum of
appeal in SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024. The agreement of sale
executed by the GPA holder of the original declarants, in
favour of M/s. Bhavana Society is produced as Annexure P-
33. The agreement is dated 19.03.1982 and the extent of the
property agreed to be sold is 125-35 acres. Clause (2) of the
agreement clearly indicates only a payment of Rs.50,000/- by
cheque towards part of sale consideration, the balance sale
consideration to be paid within six months from the date of
obtaining permission under the provisions of the Land
Ceiling Act. The original declarants represented through the
GPA, termed as the vendors in the agreement, also spoke of
the delivery of vacant possession of the land to the intending
purchaser. The plaint in the suit filed by the Bhavana Society
Page 22 of 34
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is produced as Annexure P-32 which, while asserting actual
physical possession having been handed over to the plaintiff
sought only for a direction to the defendants 1 to 9 through
the defendants 10 and 11 to execute a sale deed in favour of
the plaintiff society in respect of the scheduled land
admeasuring 125-35 acres. Hence Bhavana Society was
aware that they obtained no valid title from the agreement of
sale. The suit filed in 1991 after possession of 99.07 acres was
taken under the Land Reforms Act, was stood dismissed for
default on 06.04.2001. The petition filed under Order IX Rule
10
9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was rejected on
23.02.2004 as seen from Annexure P-36. After this, the
revalidation was done on the agreement of sale, as is
produced at Annexure P-37, a copy of which also has been
produced by respondents Nos.1 to 7 as Annexure 2 in IA No.
83765 of 2025; but without registration, which in any event is
not possible at this distance of time.
10
(for brevity, ‘the CPC’)
Page 23 of 34
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19. Moreover, though the agreement of sale dated
19.03.1982 is said to be one based on which the suit for
specific performance was filed and later revalidated, both
differ considerably. The agreement produced as Annexure
P-37, though of the same date and the very same vendors and
vendees, as is seen from Annexure P-34, the extent differs in
so far as it refers to 99.17 acres out of the total extent of 525.35
acres. Here, we must specifically notice that there was a
demarcation of 99.17 acres of land out of the total extent when
the land had been declared vested in the State under the
Land Reforms Act and possession taken by the State in 1975.
In 1982 when the agreement of sale validated subsequently
was executed, that extent had vested in the State and was in
the State’s possession. The alleged reversion of such land to
the original declarants occurred only in the year 1990 and
hence there was no reason for the sale of the specified extent
as seen from Annexure P-37 at that point of time. These are
not two separate transactions since the consideration paid is
Rs.50,000/- by cheque issued on Andhra Bank,
Page 24 of 34
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Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad. However, the cheque
numbers differ in so far as Annexure P-33 showing the
number of 738569 while Annexure P-37 indicates it to be
238569; obviously a printer’s devil.
20. Further clause (2) in the said agreements also differ
which stands extracted hereunder:
Annexure P-33: -
“2) That in pursuance of the above said offer and
acceptance, the Second party purchaser has this
day paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty
thousands only) by cheque no. 738569 on Andhra
Bank, Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad towards
part of sale consideration and agreed to pay the
balance of sale consideration within six months
from the date of obtaining permission under the
provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation
Act, 1976.”
(para-2, page 872)
Annexure P-37 :
“That in pursuance of the above said offer and
acceptance, the Second party purchaser has paid
the total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,350/- this
Page 25 of 34
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day and out of which a sum of Rs. 50,000/-
(Rupees Fifty thousands only) by cheque no.
238569 on Andhra Bank, Mukharamjahi Road,
Hyderabad.”
(para-2, page-906)
The very recital in Annexure P-37 is anomalous and
does not with certainty declare that the entire consideration
was paid or only Rs. 50,000/ as part payment by cheque.
21. Annexure P-33 speaks only of a consideration of Rs.
50,000/- and the balance consideration to be paid within six
months from the date of obtaining permission under the
provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. Annexure P-37 speaks of
payment of total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,350/- out of
which Rs.50,000/- has been paid by cheque; the recital not
really lending any assurance of the payment. Though the
extents differ, the schedule of the property in both the
agreements shows the very same boundaries, another
anomaly which raises a suspicion on the actual demarcation
and reversion to the original declarants.
Page 26 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
22. Further, an instrument of conveyance is compulsorily
registrable as required under the Registration Act. Section 23
prescribes four-months’ time for presenting a document for
registration from the date of its execution. Section 24
provides that if there are several persons executing a
document at different times, such document may be
presented for registration or re-registration within four
months from the date of such execution. In the instant case,
all the executants, parties to the agreement, have signed on
the day shown in the agreement. The proviso to Section 34
also enables the Registrar to condone the delay, if the
document is presented within a further period of four months,
on payment of a fine. The validation of the sale agreement,
which clearly is shown to be not one executed by the
declarants, by reason of it materially differing from that
produced as Annexure P-33, on the strength of which a suit
for specific performance was filed by the vendor, the
Bhavana Society, which is also the intended purchaser in the
sale agreement of 1982, it smacks of fraud. The agreement of
Page 27 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
1982, the original one and the revalidated one, cannot result
in a valid title, merely for reason that the subsequent
instrument had been registered. As we noticed at the outset,
the learned Single Judge did not decide the title but only
raised valid suspicion insofar as the title of the vendor in the
deed of conveyance. Even according to the writ petitioners,
their claim stems from a sale agreement, which is not a
proper deed of conveyance, especially since it is not a
registered document.
23. The Division Bench has found possession on the
appellants and the writ petitioners by virtue of two interim
orders passed by Co-ordinate Benches of the High Court.
The first one is in W.P. No. 29547 of 2011, wherein the Lok
Ayukta was directed not to pass any further orders but the
State Government and the APIIC Ltd. were not restrained
from taking any action in accordance with law. The interim
order in W.P. No. 4466 of 2012 also does not establish
possession on the writ petitioners. Undoubtedly, the 53 acres
would be comprised in the 99.07 acres alleged to have been
Page 28 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
resumed to the possession of the original declarants through
their GPA, but there is nothing on record indicating the
possession, either of the respondents/writ petitioners or the
appellants/respondents in the writ petition.
24. We also take serious notice of the submission made by
the State insofar as the invocation of Section 9-A of the Land
Reforms Act, as of now against the 99.07 acres vested in the
State, which would ideally remain in the possession of the
State. As far as 46.20 acres is concerned, it would depend
upon writ petitions pending before the Telangana High Court
and the proceedings sought to be initiated by the State under
the Land Reforms Act. But we cannot ignore the submission
of the State that the Land Ceiling Act permits retention of only
1000 Sq. m. with each declarant. At the same time, we must
8
notice that Omprakash Verma speaks of an exemption
granted to the original declarants to hold 5 acres each
instead of 1000 Sq.m. We notice this not as an entitlement
which exemption will have to be proved in accordance with
the Act when a claim is raised or an action against the land is
Page 29 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
resisted. Even then the declarants cannot have possession of
99.07 acres; the reversion of which, physically is not clearly
established. The fate of 53 acres comprised in 99.07 acres
also would be subject to a proposed action by the State under
the Land Reforms Act.
25. We make it clear that we have not said anything about
the possession of 99.07 acres which will have to be agitated
in appropriate proceedings. As far as the writ petition
praying for a direction not to dispossess, we find that the writ
petitioners to have not established a valid title. We prima
facie find the title to be suspect, which would disentitle them
from claiming a rightful possession, which also has not been
proved.
26. In this context, we refer to the judgment of this Court in
Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande v. Balkrishna Rambharose
11
Gupta . The dispute was with respect to a tenant and
landlord and the bone of contention was possession. In the
suit for permanent injunction filed by the tenant, the Trial
11
(2020) 19 SCC 119
Page 30 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence
found that the plaintiff failed to prove his actual and physical
possession over the suit property. The finding of the Trial
Court based on the oral and documentary evidence was
overturned by the First Appellate Court and the High Court
drawing inference of possession from applications filed in an
earlier suit. This Court restored the order of the Trial Court,
finding that actual and physical possession must be proved,
which principle would apply even in a writ petition under
Article 226, more strictly since there is no evidence led and
the consideration is only based on documents produced on
affidavit.
27. When dispossession by the State is alleged on the
strength of possession, mere reliance on interim orders
passed in writ petitions earlier filed cannot establish such
actual and physical possession. We have also noticed that the
validated agreement of 19.03.1982, based on which
conveyance is claimed by the writ petitioners, cannot be
sustained on the clear terms in the two agreements. We
Page 31 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
noticed on a comparison of the actual agreement on which a
suit for specific performance was filed and the latter
agreement, which stood validated but not registered even
now that the original declarants and the writ petitioners have
been approbating and reprobating. The power of absolute
right over lands is on the State and the person in occupation,
is only there, by virtue of the grants, which can be brought to
an end by the State which has the power of eminent domain .
Here there is a statutory vesting of property and prima facie,
guile employed in making conflicting claims before the
authorities under the Land Reforms Act and the Land Ceiling
Act as also entering into multiple transactions to defeat the
statutory vesting with successive litigations, all in vain, which
travelled up to this Court twice earlier.
28. The cloud on title and the doubts raised on possession
by the learned Single Judge, as affirmed by us are merely
prima facie observations to deny discretion to invoke the
extra ordinary power under Article 226. So are the
misgivings expressed on the claim of repossession by the
Page 32 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
original declarants through their GPA and the skepticism
regarding their very right to obtain repossession of property
already vested in the State, under a Statute, which Statute also
does not provide for any review of the notification issued
under the Act; the notification having merely affirmed the
statutory vesting. The reservation in favour of the State also
arises only from our anxiety to preserve the property,
without creation of any third-party interest, to avoid any
hindrance of the State’s power to invoke the provisions under
the Land Reforms Act, if done within a reasonable period,
which would also be subject to legitimate legal scrutiny. It
goes without saying; then, the parties would be entitled to
agitate their respective causes, in the appropriate civil forum
or if statutorily prohibited, avail of the remedies made
available under the statute which proceedings will not be
governed by the findings in our judgment, we having only
prima facie declined invocation of the discretionary,
extraordinary jurisdiction.
Page 33 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
29. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is restored,
and the appeals stand disposed of, with the above
observations and reservations.
30. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
….……….……………………. J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
………….……………………. J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 07, 2025.
Page 34 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No…..…. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No.1866 of 2024)
MAHNOOR FATIMA IMRAN & ORS.
APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S VISWESWARA INFRASTRUCTURE
PVT. LTD & ORS.
RESPONDENT(S)
With
Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No.3660 of 2024)
Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No.3661 of 2024)
Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (C) No……….of 2024)
(@Dy. No.19071 of 2024)
J U D G E M E N T
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
1.
Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
2. These appeals arise from the order of the Division
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.05.08
14:00:05 IST
Reason:
Bench of the High Court of Telangana in a writ appeal filed
Page 1 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
from the judgment in a batch of writ petitions dismissed by a
common order. The appeal was only against the judgment in
W.P No.30855 of 2016; which writ petition essentially prayed
for restraining the Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure
1
Corporation Limited , the first respondent therein from
attempting to enter into the land of the writ petitioners having
an extent of 53 acres, situated in Survey No.83/2 of Raidurg
Panmaktha, Village Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy
District, with prayers also against demolition of the fencing
and structures without any notice or without any right or
authority. The connected writ petitions also claimed similar
reliefs as against the first respondent, but with respect to
smaller extents of property, said to have been purchased
from the original owners. The appellants before the Division
Bench claimed that they are in possession of the subject
property on the strength of registered title deeds in which
the vendor is one M/s Bhavana Co-operative Housing Society
2
Ltd. who obtained possession of the land under an
1
For brevity ‘the TSIICL’
2
Bhavana Society hereinafter
Page 2 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
agreement of sale on 19.03.1982. We are not concerned with
the other writ petitions since the impugned judgment in the
SLPs are concerned with only an appellate order reversing
the judgment in WP No.30855 of 2016 and allowing the said
writ petition.
3. The learned Single Judge after dealing with the various
proceedings taken against the total extent of 525 acres 31
guntas in Survey No.83 of Raidurg Panmaktha Village,
Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, originally
belonging to 11 individuals, under the Andhra Pradesh Land
3
Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and
4
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 confined
the consideration to the 53 acres. It was noticed that the
agreement of sale dated 19.03.1982 was validated by
proceedings of the Assistant Registrar, Ranga Reddy District
on 11.09.2006 which validation was held to be fraudulent by
the District Registrar, Karimnagar by order dated 12.08.2015.
The No Objection Certificates issued by the Urban Land
3
(hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Land Reforms Act’)
4
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Land Ceiling Act’)
Page 3 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Ceiling authorities against the writ petitioners also stood
cancelled, against which no proceedings were taken. There
was nothing to show a valid title having been conferred on
the writ petitioners and the vendor of the writ petitioners had
filed a suit for specific performance; O.S.No.248 of 1991
before the jurisdictional civil court which had been
dismissed for default on 06.04.2001 and the application for
restoration was also dismissed on 23.02.2004. Finding no
valid explanation as to how another agreement of sale of the
same date i.e., 19.03.1982 surfaced, relying on S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu (D) by LRs v. Jagannath (D) by LRs
5
and Ors. emphasised the fraud perpetrated by the
petitioners. The subject land was comprised in a total of 99
acres 17 guntas, covered by the agreement of sale dated
19.03.1982; stated to be in the possession of the Government
as on the date of the agreement, having vested in the
Government under the Land Reforms Act. The possession
was said to have been redelivered to the General Power of
5
(1994) 1 SCC 1
Page 4 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Attorney (GPA) of the original declarants, thus, negativing
the claim of possession with M/s. Bhavna Cooperative
Housing Society from 1982. The writ petition filed on the
ground of possession stood dismissed.
4. In the appeal, the Division Bench found that the State
was concerned with only 470 acres of land out of the total
525.31 acres, as per the learned Advocate General and
hence the 53 acres stood distinct and separate. The learned
Single Judge, according to the Division Bench, erred in so far
as looking into the title of the writ petitioners since the prayer
was against illegal dispossession, based merely on the
possession of the subject land. As far as the possession,
interim orders by co-ordinate benches were relied on. One
in WP No.29547 of 2011, wherein a Division Bench by interim
order dated 01.03.2011 restrained the Lok Ayukta from
proceeding further in an application filed by the Andhra
6
Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. , the
predecessor of TSIIC. The other order was passed on
6
The APIIC
Page 5 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
17.02.2012 in WP No.4466 of 2012 filed by the appellants
wherein there was a stay of demolition of the structures
raised by the writ petitioners (the appellants herein) in
Survey No.83/2 in Raidurg Panmaktha, Village
Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Relying on
the settled legal position that a person in possession cannot
be dispossessed, except in accordance with law and finding
the actions of the TSIIC, to be in violation of the interim orders
issued, restrained the respondents from dispossessing the
appellants from 53 acres situated in Survey No.83/2 as also
from demolishing the fencing sheets and construction raised
by the appellants without taking recourse to law.
5. The appeals before us have been filed by the party
respondents in the writ petition who are the legal heirs of the
original owners and one, by individuals claiming smaller
extents of property. Before us, for the appellants Shri
Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appeared, Shri
Hiren P.Raval, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the
respondents who are the writ petitioners and Shri S. Niranjan
Page 6 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the State of
Telangana and the petitioners in SLP (C) Diary No.19071 of
2024 are represented by Shri P. Mohith Rao, Advocate on
Record, who adopted the arguments raised by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing in the other appeals.
6. At the outset, we notice that the writ petition is only one
filed seeking an order against dispossession, unless in
accordance with law, as noticed by the Division Bench.
However, we cannot but say that the learned Single Judge has
not decided the question of title and has only raised an
apprehension on the asserted title and possession by the writ
petitioners. The title was asserted to be validly obtained by
instruments of conveyance, but the title of the vendor was
suspect. Likewise, possession, on the ground, in reality, had
not been proved was the essence of the findings of the
learned Single Judge. Before we look at the sustainability of
the impugned judgment, we have to notice that the subject
land, rather the total larger extent; the original owners being
the 11 individuals, predecessors in interest of the appellants
Page 7 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
herein, had a chequered career as is seen from the decisions
produced in the records; State of A.P and Ors. v. N.
7
Audikesava Reddy and Ors. and Omprakash Verma v.
8
State of A.P.
8
7. We notice the facts from Omprakash Verma which, at
the outset, found that one Mohd. Ruknuddin Ahmed and 10
others were the original owners of a land admeasuring
526.07 acres in Survey No.83 situated at Village Raidurg
(Panmaktha) of Ranga Reddy District in the State of Andhra
Pradesh; comprised in which is the subject land of this
litigation having an extent of 53 acres. On 07.07.1974, the
owners executed registered GPA in favour of a partnership
firm known as Sri Venkateswara Enterprises, represented by
its Managing Partners A. Ramaswamy and A. Satyanarayana.
On 01.01.1975, when the Land Reforms Act came into force,
the said land being an agricultural land, the owners filed 11
declarations under the Land Reforms Act. About 99.07 acres
was found surplus in the hands of 4 declarants and possession
7
(2002) 1 SCC 227
8
(2010) 13 SCC 158
Page 8 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
was taken on 11.04.1975, which vested in the State
Government. Later, the Land Ceiling Act came into force and
the owners through their GPA, filed declarations under
Section 6 (1) of the that Act, allegedly on a mistaken
impression, since the land in question was agricultural land
and it was not included in the Master Plan under that Act.
8. Draft statements were issued on 06.12.1979 and
25.01.1980 under the Land Ceiling Act. The final statements
under Section 9 were issued declaring the surplus area for
each of the declarants on 16.09.1980 and 30.01.1980. A
notification was issued by the competent authority under
Section 10 (1) by GOMS No.5013 dated 19.12.1980 vesting
the surplus land determined. The State Government under
Section 23 of the Land Ceiling Act allotted 470.33 acres to the
Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA), the
possession of which was not surrendered. Later, in exercise
of the powers conferred under Section 20(1) of the Land
Ceiling Act, certain exemptions were granted, entitling each
holder of excess land to hold 5 acres instead of 1000 sq.
Page 9 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
meters. A number of persons, including the appellants
purchased different extents of land which sale deeds were
directed to be cancelled by the Inspector General of
Registrations. The cancellation order passed by the Registrar
was challenged in a writ petition which was allowed. A
Division Bench rejected the appeal against which a SLP was
7
filed in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors. , in which the
decision of the High Court was reversed. The State
Government then took a decision to allot the excess land to
third parties who were in occupation of such excess land on
payment of prescribed regular charges, upon which the
original declarants sought for a consideration providing
them to retain the excess land on payment of requisite
compensation.
9. The State Government without taking any action on the
representations allotted 424.13 acres of land in the name of
APIIC against which four writ petitions were filed in the High
Court by individual owners as well as one M/s. Chanakyapuri
Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Secunderabad which
Page 10 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Society claimed that the proceedings of the competent
authority under the Land Ceiling Act stood restored by the
7
judgment in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors. The Division
Bench rejected the writ petitions against which SLPs were
8
filed which were decided in Omprakash Verma’s case. The
8
learned judges in Omprakash Verma’s case rejected the
contention that the original owners had filed the declaration
on a misconception and confusion. We extract paragraph 86
to 88 of the cited decision: -
“ 86. It is not in dispute that the panchnama has not
been questioned in any proceedings by any of the
appellants. Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri
Cooperative Society was in possession at one
stage and Shri Venkateshawar Enterprises was
given possession by the owners and possession
was also given to Golden Hill Construction
Corporation and thereafter it was given to the
purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are
not in possession. In view of the same, the finding
of the High Court that the possession was taken by
the State legally and validly through a panchnama
is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld.
Page 11 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
87. It is relevant to point out the conduct of the
appellants in the previous proceedings which
were highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel
for the State as well as APIIC. They are:
(a) the appellants themselves described the
land in Survey No. 83 as “grazing land” in
their declarations filed under Section 6(1);
(b) the appellants filed declarations under the
Land Reforms Act subjecting the land to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
(c) filing declarations under the ULC Act
treating the land in Survey No. 83 as vacant
land;
(d) the transaction of agreement of sale
entered into between GPA and Chanakyapuri
Cooperative Housing Society;
(e) owners and Society filed applications for
exemptions which were rejected;
(f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its
remedies against such rejection of exemption
up to this Court in which the owners through
their power of attorney were sailing with the
Society.
In fact these instances were projected in
their counter-affidavit before the High Court
Page 12 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
by the State and APIIC to non-suit the
appellants. Though the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants pointed out that
these aspects were not highlighted before the
High Court, the conduct of the appellants as
regards the above aspects cannot be ignored.
88. It is pointed out that the owners
themselves have described the land in Survey
No. 83 as “grazing lands” and “vacant land”
in the relevant columns of their declaration
under Section 6(1) and, therefore, the
proceedings of the competent authority under
Sections 8, 9 and 10 are valid. Though the said
aspect had not been disputed by the
appellants, however, it is pointed out that the
mentioning of “grazing lands” in the said
declaration is not conclusive. However, as
observed earlier, their statements in the form
of declarations before the authorities
concerned cannot be denied. In fact, we were
taken through those entries which are
available in the paper book in the form of
annexures.”
Page 13 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
10. Hence, in so far as the land allotted to APIIC, now in the
possession of TSIIC, which is 424.13 acres, the vesting and
allotment has attained finality. There can be no dispute either
of title or possession raised on that land.
11. Now, we come to the 99.07 acres, vested under the
Land Reforms Act. While proceedings were continuing under
the Land Ceiling Act, which were also challenged on the
ground that the entire lands were agricultural lands, not
included under the Land Ceiling Act, the GPA of the original
declarants filed a petition before the Land Tribunal pointing
out the proceedings taken under the Land Ceiling Act,
asserting that the provisions of the Land Reforms Act are not
applicable since the entire land in Survey No.83 was treated
as vacant land under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.
The GPA sought release of the extent of 99.07 acres which
was rejected. Four appeals were filed before the Land
Reforms Appellate Authority-cum-District Judge, Ranga
Reddy in which there was a remand. The Land Tribunal on
remand accepted the plea of the declarants and directed the
Page 14 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
extent of 99.07 acres to be released to the declarants; which
according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
State was not permissible.
12. Subject of the present appeals; 53 acres, is said to be
comprised in the 99.07 acres of land allegedly reverted to the
declarants on 25.04.1990, the possession allegedly having
been handed over to the GPA of the declarants. In so far as
the remaining 46.20 acres, there is said to be a writ petition
pending before the High Court in which the High Court has
permitted the State to protect the total 470.33 acres, including
the 424.32 acres earlier allotted to APIIC, now with the TSIIC.
While the appellants herein, the legal representatives of the
original owners/declarants asserted their possession and
ownership, the respondents who are the writ petitioners
equally assert their possession on the strength of title deeds
which have not been challenged at all.
13. All the parties have filed their detailed written
submissions. On the arguments, suffice it to notice that Shri
Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Page 15 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
appellants submitted that there could be no conveyance
effected by the sale agreement of 19.03.1982 and the title
deeds executed cannot confer any title on the vendees since
the vendor did not have a valid title. The vendor in the said
title deeds had sought for specific performance which suit
stood dismissed for default and the application for
restoration was also rejected. Based on the sale deeds, the
writ petitioners had taken loans from banks, offering the said
lands as collateral security, which had led to a CBI
investigation where the sale deeds were found to be
fraudulent. Proceedings were initiated under the criminal
law against the writ petitioners and their Directors. In so far
as the 46.20 acres, the appellants would agitate their cause in
the writ petition pending before the High Court. The
remaining 53 acres was admittedly taken possession by the
GPA of the original declarants, which possession is with the
appellants, the ownership having devolved upon them.
14. Shri Hiren P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondents on the other hand submits that there is no
Page 16 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
challenge to the sale deeds and the entire exercise is
experimental, especially considering the development
agreement entered into with a builder as is produced by the
Respondent No.1 to 7 through I.A. No.83765 of 2025. Behind
the scenes, the developer is funding the litigation in the hope
that the appellants who are all living abroad would obtain
possession of the disputed land on which the developer
could carry out their activities. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy,
learned Senior Counsel on the other hand submits that the
State is concerned with 99.07 acres of land which had vested
in the State under the Land Reforms Act. The land having
vested with the State, there is no reason for reverting it back
to the original declarants who had claimed the said lands to
be agricultural lands when the Land Reforms Act came into
force. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy also points out Section 9-A of
the Land Reforms Act which provides for reopening of cases.
It is also pointed out that though the Land Ceiling Act, 1976
has been repealed in 1999, the vesting cannot be disturbed
and the decisions of this Court on the earlier two occasions
Page 17 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
has brought about a finality to the vesting under the repealed
Act.
15. The respondents herein who were the writ petitioners
have emphasised their claims on the basis of the decision in
Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana &
9
Anr. . The said decision has been cited to argue that the title
deeds; registered instruments of conveyance, are to be
deemed valid unless set aside or declared void by a Civil
Court of competent jurisdiction. There is no such dictum in
the said decision wherein a Division Bench of this Court was
concerned with conveyances made on the strength of
agreements of sale, General Power of Attorney and Wills.
The issue addressed was avoidance of execution and
registration of deed of conveyances as a mode of transfer of
a free hold immovable property, especially in the teeth of
Section 17 and Section 49 of the Registration Act. The
tendency to adopt Power of Attorney sales along with
execution of sale agreements and a bequeath by way of will,
9
(2012) 1 SCC 656
Page 18 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
instead of execution and registration of proper deeds of
conveyance on receipt of full consideration was deprecated.
We extract paragraphs 15 to 17 of an earlier order dated
15.05.2009 in the said case, extracted as such in para 15 of
the aforesaid decision:
“15. The Registration Act, 1908 was enacted with
the intention of providing orderliness, discipline
and public notice in regard to transactions relating
to immovable property and protection from fraud
and forgery of documents of transfer. This is
achieved by requiring compulsory registration of
certain types of documents and providing for
consequences of non-registration.
16. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly
provides that any document (other than
testamentary instruments) which purports or
operates to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish whether in present or in future ‘any
right, title or interest’ whether vested or contingent
of the value of Rs.100 and upward to or in
immovable property.
17. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no
document required by Section 17 to be registered
shall, affect any immovable property comprised
Page 19 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
therein or received as evidence of any transaction
affecting such property, unless it has been
registered. Registration of a document gives
notice to the world that such a document has been
executed.”
16 . The observation that registration of a document gives
notice to the world that such a document has been executed
is not to confer an unimpeachable validity on all such
registered documents. Even the respondents/writ
petitioners accept that the presumption coming forth from a
registered deed of conveyance is rebuttable. While
reserving the right of persons who had obtained sale
agreement/general power of attorney/will executed, to
complete confirmation of title on them by getting registered
deeds of conveyance, the conclusion of the cited decision,
which acts as a binding precedent, is available in para 24,
which we extract hereunder: -
“24. We therefore reiterate that immovable
property can be legally and lawfully
transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of
conveyance. Transactions of the nature of “GPA
Page 20 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
sales” or “SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey
title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be
recognised or valid mode of transfer of immovable
property. The courts will not treat such
transactions as completed or concluded transfers
or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor
create any interest in an immovable property.
They cannot be recognised as deeds of title,
except to the limited extent of Section 53-A of the
TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or
made the basis for mutations in municipal or
revenue records. What is stated above will apply
not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to
freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold
property. A lease can be validly transferred only
under a registered assignment of lease. It is time
that an end is put to the pernicious practice of
SA/GPA/will transactions known as GPA sales.”
17 . It is in this context that we must examine the document
of 19.03.1982, an agreement which is said to have been
validated in the year 2006. We immediately notice that the
very contention of the writ petitioners is only that they have
obtained proper conveyances by registered sale deeds from
Page 21 of 34
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Bhavana society, whose claim is under the agreement of
1982, which has not till date been registered and hence
cannot be recognized as a valid mode or instrument of
transfer of immovable property, going by the above
decision.
18. We refer to the documents from the memorandum of
appeal in SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024. The agreement of sale
executed by the GPA holder of the original declarants, in
favour of M/s. Bhavana Society is produced as Annexure P-
33. The agreement is dated 19.03.1982 and the extent of the
property agreed to be sold is 125-35 acres. Clause (2) of the
agreement clearly indicates only a payment of Rs.50,000/- by
cheque towards part of sale consideration, the balance sale
consideration to be paid within six months from the date of
obtaining permission under the provisions of the Land
Ceiling Act. The original declarants represented through the
GPA, termed as the vendors in the agreement, also spoke of
the delivery of vacant possession of the land to the intending
purchaser. The plaint in the suit filed by the Bhavana Society
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is produced as Annexure P-32 which, while asserting actual
physical possession having been handed over to the plaintiff
sought only for a direction to the defendants 1 to 9 through
the defendants 10 and 11 to execute a sale deed in favour of
the plaintiff society in respect of the scheduled land
admeasuring 125-35 acres. Hence Bhavana Society was
aware that they obtained no valid title from the agreement of
sale. The suit filed in 1991 after possession of 99.07 acres was
taken under the Land Reforms Act, was stood dismissed for
default on 06.04.2001. The petition filed under Order IX Rule
10
9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was rejected on
23.02.2004 as seen from Annexure P-36. After this, the
revalidation was done on the agreement of sale, as is
produced at Annexure P-37, a copy of which also has been
produced by respondents Nos.1 to 7 as Annexure 2 in IA No.
83765 of 2025; but without registration, which in any event is
not possible at this distance of time.
10
(for brevity, ‘the CPC’)
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19. Moreover, though the agreement of sale dated
19.03.1982 is said to be one based on which the suit for
specific performance was filed and later revalidated, both
differ considerably. The agreement produced as Annexure
P-37, though of the same date and the very same vendors and
vendees, as is seen from Annexure P-34, the extent differs in
so far as it refers to 99.17 acres out of the total extent of 525.35
acres. Here, we must specifically notice that there was a
demarcation of 99.17 acres of land out of the total extent when
the land had been declared vested in the State under the
Land Reforms Act and possession taken by the State in 1975.
In 1982 when the agreement of sale validated subsequently
was executed, that extent had vested in the State and was in
the State’s possession. The alleged reversion of such land to
the original declarants occurred only in the year 1990 and
hence there was no reason for the sale of the specified extent
as seen from Annexure P-37 at that point of time. These are
not two separate transactions since the consideration paid is
Rs.50,000/- by cheque issued on Andhra Bank,
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Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad. However, the cheque
numbers differ in so far as Annexure P-33 showing the
number of 738569 while Annexure P-37 indicates it to be
238569; obviously a printer’s devil.
20. Further clause (2) in the said agreements also differ
which stands extracted hereunder:
Annexure P-33: -
“2) That in pursuance of the above said offer and
acceptance, the Second party purchaser has this
day paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty
thousands only) by cheque no. 738569 on Andhra
Bank, Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad towards
part of sale consideration and agreed to pay the
balance of sale consideration within six months
from the date of obtaining permission under the
provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation
Act, 1976.”
(para-2, page 872)
Annexure P-37 :
“That in pursuance of the above said offer and
acceptance, the Second party purchaser has paid
the total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,350/- this
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day and out of which a sum of Rs. 50,000/-
(Rupees Fifty thousands only) by cheque no.
238569 on Andhra Bank, Mukharamjahi Road,
Hyderabad.”
(para-2, page-906)
The very recital in Annexure P-37 is anomalous and
does not with certainty declare that the entire consideration
was paid or only Rs. 50,000/ as part payment by cheque.
21. Annexure P-33 speaks only of a consideration of Rs.
50,000/- and the balance consideration to be paid within six
months from the date of obtaining permission under the
provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. Annexure P-37 speaks of
payment of total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,350/- out of
which Rs.50,000/- has been paid by cheque; the recital not
really lending any assurance of the payment. Though the
extents differ, the schedule of the property in both the
agreements shows the very same boundaries, another
anomaly which raises a suspicion on the actual demarcation
and reversion to the original declarants.
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22. Further, an instrument of conveyance is compulsorily
registrable as required under the Registration Act. Section 23
prescribes four-months’ time for presenting a document for
registration from the date of its execution. Section 24
provides that if there are several persons executing a
document at different times, such document may be
presented for registration or re-registration within four
months from the date of such execution. In the instant case,
all the executants, parties to the agreement, have signed on
the day shown in the agreement. The proviso to Section 34
also enables the Registrar to condone the delay, if the
document is presented within a further period of four months,
on payment of a fine. The validation of the sale agreement,
which clearly is shown to be not one executed by the
declarants, by reason of it materially differing from that
produced as Annexure P-33, on the strength of which a suit
for specific performance was filed by the vendor, the
Bhavana Society, which is also the intended purchaser in the
sale agreement of 1982, it smacks of fraud. The agreement of
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CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
1982, the original one and the revalidated one, cannot result
in a valid title, merely for reason that the subsequent
instrument had been registered. As we noticed at the outset,
the learned Single Judge did not decide the title but only
raised valid suspicion insofar as the title of the vendor in the
deed of conveyance. Even according to the writ petitioners,
their claim stems from a sale agreement, which is not a
proper deed of conveyance, especially since it is not a
registered document.
23. The Division Bench has found possession on the
appellants and the writ petitioners by virtue of two interim
orders passed by Co-ordinate Benches of the High Court.
The first one is in W.P. No. 29547 of 2011, wherein the Lok
Ayukta was directed not to pass any further orders but the
State Government and the APIIC Ltd. were not restrained
from taking any action in accordance with law. The interim
order in W.P. No. 4466 of 2012 also does not establish
possession on the writ petitioners. Undoubtedly, the 53 acres
would be comprised in the 99.07 acres alleged to have been
Page 28 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
resumed to the possession of the original declarants through
their GPA, but there is nothing on record indicating the
possession, either of the respondents/writ petitioners or the
appellants/respondents in the writ petition.
24. We also take serious notice of the submission made by
the State insofar as the invocation of Section 9-A of the Land
Reforms Act, as of now against the 99.07 acres vested in the
State, which would ideally remain in the possession of the
State. As far as 46.20 acres is concerned, it would depend
upon writ petitions pending before the Telangana High Court
and the proceedings sought to be initiated by the State under
the Land Reforms Act. But we cannot ignore the submission
of the State that the Land Ceiling Act permits retention of only
1000 Sq. m. with each declarant. At the same time, we must
8
notice that Omprakash Verma speaks of an exemption
granted to the original declarants to hold 5 acres each
instead of 1000 Sq.m. We notice this not as an entitlement
which exemption will have to be proved in accordance with
the Act when a claim is raised or an action against the land is
Page 29 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
resisted. Even then the declarants cannot have possession of
99.07 acres; the reversion of which, physically is not clearly
established. The fate of 53 acres comprised in 99.07 acres
also would be subject to a proposed action by the State under
the Land Reforms Act.
25. We make it clear that we have not said anything about
the possession of 99.07 acres which will have to be agitated
in appropriate proceedings. As far as the writ petition
praying for a direction not to dispossess, we find that the writ
petitioners to have not established a valid title. We prima
facie find the title to be suspect, which would disentitle them
from claiming a rightful possession, which also has not been
proved.
26. In this context, we refer to the judgment of this Court in
Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande v. Balkrishna Rambharose
11
Gupta . The dispute was with respect to a tenant and
landlord and the bone of contention was possession. In the
suit for permanent injunction filed by the tenant, the Trial
11
(2020) 19 SCC 119
Page 30 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence
found that the plaintiff failed to prove his actual and physical
possession over the suit property. The finding of the Trial
Court based on the oral and documentary evidence was
overturned by the First Appellate Court and the High Court
drawing inference of possession from applications filed in an
earlier suit. This Court restored the order of the Trial Court,
finding that actual and physical possession must be proved,
which principle would apply even in a writ petition under
Article 226, more strictly since there is no evidence led and
the consideration is only based on documents produced on
affidavit.
27. When dispossession by the State is alleged on the
strength of possession, mere reliance on interim orders
passed in writ petitions earlier filed cannot establish such
actual and physical possession. We have also noticed that the
validated agreement of 19.03.1982, based on which
conveyance is claimed by the writ petitioners, cannot be
sustained on the clear terms in the two agreements. We
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CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
noticed on a comparison of the actual agreement on which a
suit for specific performance was filed and the latter
agreement, which stood validated but not registered even
now that the original declarants and the writ petitioners have
been approbating and reprobating. The power of absolute
right over lands is on the State and the person in occupation,
is only there, by virtue of the grants, which can be brought to
an end by the State which has the power of eminent domain .
Here there is a statutory vesting of property and prima facie,
guile employed in making conflicting claims before the
authorities under the Land Reforms Act and the Land Ceiling
Act as also entering into multiple transactions to defeat the
statutory vesting with successive litigations, all in vain, which
travelled up to this Court twice earlier.
28. The cloud on title and the doubts raised on possession
by the learned Single Judge, as affirmed by us are merely
prima facie observations to deny discretion to invoke the
extra ordinary power under Article 226. So are the
misgivings expressed on the claim of repossession by the
Page 32 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
original declarants through their GPA and the skepticism
regarding their very right to obtain repossession of property
already vested in the State, under a Statute, which Statute also
does not provide for any review of the notification issued
under the Act; the notification having merely affirmed the
statutory vesting. The reservation in favour of the State also
arises only from our anxiety to preserve the property,
without creation of any third-party interest, to avoid any
hindrance of the State’s power to invoke the provisions under
the Land Reforms Act, if done within a reasonable period,
which would also be subject to legitimate legal scrutiny. It
goes without saying; then, the parties would be entitled to
agitate their respective causes, in the appropriate civil forum
or if statutorily prohibited, avail of the remedies made
available under the statute which proceedings will not be
governed by the findings in our judgment, we having only
prima facie declined invocation of the discretionary,
extraordinary jurisdiction.
Page 33 of 34
CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.
29. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is restored,
and the appeals stand disposed of, with the above
observations and reservations.
30. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
….……….……………………. J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
………….……………………. J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 07, 2025.
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