Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1261 OF 2008
Mahadevappa ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Karnataka Rep.
By Public Prosecutor ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 03.01.2007 passed by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal
No.1040 of 2000 whereby the High Court allowed
the appeal filed by the respondent/State herein.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2019.01.10
17:31:23 IST
Reason:
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2. It is necessary to set out the facts hereinbelow in
detail to appreciate the issues arising in this appeal.
3. The appellant (accused) was married to
Rukmini Bai (deceased) on 04.06.1994. On the
same day, the younger sister of Rukmani Bai,
namely, Sonabai was also married to the appellant's
younger brotherBhimanand. Both the marriages
were performed in Lokeshwar Temple at a place
called Lokapur.
4. After marriage, the appellant, who was serving
as a Constable in the Police Station, Kaladagi in the
District Bagalkot went to Kaladagi with Rukmini
Bai. So far as the appellant's younger brother was
concerned, he was working as a Constable in CRPF
at Nagaland. He also proceeded to Nagaland with
his wife.
5. On 02.10.1995, father of Rukmini Bai
Eknath (PW1) received a wireless message that
Rukmini Bai was admitted to Government Hospital
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at Bagalkot for burn injuries. On receipt of the
message, Eknath and some elder persons of the
village immediately left for Bagalkot. On reaching
the hospital, Eknath found the condition of
Rukmini Bai her daughter to be very critical.
6. When Eknath asked from Rukmini Bai the
cause of sustaining injuries by her, she first started
crying on seeing him and then said that her
husband (appellant) had poured kerosene oil on her
body and set her on fire. Later eventually around
6.15 p.m. on the same day, Rukmini Bai
succumbed to her injuries while in the hospital.
7. Eknath (PW1) then lodged the FIR in PS
Kaladagi on the same day against the appellant (FIR
No.99/95) for commission of offences under
Sections 498(A) read with Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”). The
Investigating Officer registered the FIR and started
investigation. He recorded the statements of several
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persons, got the post mortem of the dead body,
obtained F.S.L. Report and after completion of the
investigation and collecting necessary evidence, filed
the chargesheet against the appellant. The case
was then committed to the Sessions Court for trial.
8. The Sessions Judge by judgment/order dated
31.05.2000 acquitted the appellant of all the
charges. It was held that the prosecution was not
able to prove the charge of demand of dowry against
the appellant. It was also held that the prosecution
was also not able to prove that Rukmini Bai
suffered homicidal death. In other words, the
Sessions Judge held that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution was not sufficient to hold the
appellant guilty of the offence punishable under
Section 498A IPC and the murder punishable
under Section 302 IPC.
9. The State felt aggrieved by the appellant's
acquittal and filed appeal in the High Court of
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Karnataka seeking leave to appeal questioning the
legality and correctness of the order of the acquittal
passed by the Sessions Judge.
10. By impugned order, the High Court granted
leave to file appeal and later allowed the State's
appeal. The High Court by impugned order reversed
the order of the acquittal passed by the Sessions
Judge and convicted the appellant for commission
of offences punishable under Sections 498A and
302 IPC. The High Court held that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, in clear terms, proved
both the charges, namely, the demand of dowry and
murder beyond reasonable doubt against the
appellant and, therefore, the appellant was liable to
be convicted under Section 302 read with Section
498A of IPC. The High Court, accordingly,
sentenced the appellant to undergo life
imprisonment. It is against this judgment/order of
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the High Court, the appellant (accused) has filed
this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
11. Heard Mr. Mallikarjun S. Mylar, learned
counsel for the appellant and Mr. Joseph Aristotle
S., learned counsel for the respondent.
12. Mr. Mallikarjun S. Mylar, learned counsel for
the appellant (accused), while assailing the legality
and correctness of the impugned order, contended
that no case was made out by the State before the
High Court for reversing the judgment of the
Sessions Judge. It was his submission that the High
Court should have upheld the order of the Sessions
Judge, which rightly acquitted the appellant holding
that the charges leveled against the appellant were
not proved.
13. Learned counsel further contended that this
being a case of reversal, this Court is entitled to
reappreciate the entire evidence for coming to its
own conclusion with a view to find out as to
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whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution is
sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for
commission of offences punishable under Sections
498A and 302 IPC.
14. Learned counsel then took us to the entire
ocular evidence and made sincere attempt by
pointing out the circumstances occurring prior to
the date of incidence and the manner in which
those incidents occurred with a view to show that
on such evidence adduced by the prosecution, no
case of demand of dowry could be made out against
the appellant within the meaning of Section 498A
IPC nor a charge of commission of murder of
Rukmini Bai punishable under Section 302 IPC was
made out.
15. In other words, his submission was that the
view taken by the Sessions Judge acquitting the
appellant from both the charges deserves to be
restored as against the view taken by the High
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Court, which wrongly held the appellant guilty for
commission of the offences.
16. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent
(State) supported the impugned order and argued
that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. It was his
submission that the Sessions Judge failed to
properly appreciate the evidence adduced by the
prosecution as a result of which wrong conclusion
of acquittal was arrived at by the Sessions Judge
whereas, according to learned counsel, the High
Court was right in its approach in appreciating the
evidence and coming to a conclusion that both the
charges, i.e., demand of dowry and murder were
made out against the appellant.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on appreciating the entire evidence, we
are inclined to agree with the reasoning and the
conclusion of the High Court.
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18. In our view, the High Court was right in
holding that a case of the appellant's conviction
under Section 498A and Section 302 IPC was made
out by the prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt
and, therefore, the appellant has to be convicted
and accordingly sentenced for commission of twin
offences punishable under Sections 498A and 302
IPC.
19. On appreciating the evidence and on perusal of
the record of the case, we find that it is not in
dispute that Rukmini Bai died within 17 months of
her marriage with the appellant (date of marriage is
4.6.1994 and the date of her death is 2.10.1995). It
is also not in dispute that Rukmini Bai was not
suffering from any kind of ailment and was a
healthy woman. It is also not in dispute that the
death occurred due to severe burn injuries suffered
by her on 02.10.1995.
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20. The question which, therefore, arises for
consideration is, first whether the appellant at any
point of time made any demand of dowry to
Rukmini Bai or/and to her parents; and secondly,
whether Rukmini Bai's death was “homicidal” or
“accidental” in nature.
21. In other words, the question arises for
consideration is whether Rukmini Bai's death can
be regarded as “dowry death” attracting Section
498A IPC or/ and secondly, whether her death was
“homicidal” attracting Section 302 IPC or it was
“accidental death”.
22. PW1 is the father of the deceased Rukmini
Bai. He deposed in his evidence that the appellant
was working as a Constable in the State Police
Department. He was addicted to consuming alcohol
daily. He often visited to the house of PW1 in fully
drunken condition. He deposed that Rukmini Bai
had told him and his wife (mother of Rukmini Bai)
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that under the influence of alcohol, the appellant
used to insist Rukmini Bai that she should also
consume liquor and dance before him undressed.
He also deposed that Rukmini Bai had told him
many a times that the appellant used to harass and
illtreat her off and on in the house. He also
deposed that Rukmini Bai also used to tell him that
the appellant also used to beat her while he was
under the influence of liquor and used to insist her
to go to her parental house to bring Rs.4000/ to
Rs.5000/ from her parents for him. He further
deposed that on two occasions, he managed to send
Rs.2000/ for the appellant through Rukmini Bai
but third time, he declined due to his poor financial
capacity to send more money. He deposed that
Rukmini Bai once told him that she apprehends
danger to her life when she is alone with the
appellant and, therefore, she would like to come
back and stay with her parents in their house. He
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deposed that with the intervention of elder members
of the village, Rukmini Bai was persuaded to go
back and stay with the appellant for which she
agreed.
23. He deposed that Rukmini Bai on returning to
her matrimonial house found that the appellant was
not mending his ways, and continued with his bad
habits. She had therefore sent a letter to her father
mentioning the incidents of illtreatment meted out
to her by the appellant. He also deposed that on
receipt of the letter from Rukmini Bai, his wife
Savitribai and his elder brother's wifeDroupadi had
gone to the appellant's house but the appellant
abused both the ladies and did not permit them to
meet Rukmini Bai. He deposed that the appellant
on that day went to the extent of beating the two
ladies with his shoes. The two ladies then went to
the Police Station and requested the incharge of
the police station to advise the appellant to behave
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properly with his wife. On return back to home,
both the ladies told the incident to their elder
brother who then contacted Rukmini Bai when she
told him to send Rs.3000/ for the appellant failing
which allow her to come back to her father's house.
24. PW1 further deposed that after eight days, a
message came to him at his residence that Rukmini
Bai has suffered extensive burns on her body and is
admitted in the hospital for treatment. He,
therefore, immediately left for the hospital along
with his relatives and friends. On reaching there, he
met Rukmini Bai when she told him that it was the
appellant who poured kerosene oil on her body, due
to which she suffered injuries.
25. PW4 (Savitribai) is the mother of deceased. On
perusal of her deposition, we find that she has
corroborated the evidence of PW1 which we have
detailed above on all material issues. In other
words, PW4 also has given the same version of the
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appellant which PW1 has given in his deposition
including about the behavior of the appellant and
the way he had illtreated Rukmini Bai all along till
her death.
26. We, therefore, need not repeat in verbatim the
deposition of PW4 except to state that her
deposition is also on the same lines on which PW1
has given his statement and it fully corroborates
with the version of PW1 on all material issues
about the appellant without any contradiction
between the two versions.
27. Now, we come to the evidence of PW5. He is
another soninlaw of PW1. His name is Bhimappa.
He is brother of the appellant. He was married to
PW1's another daughterSonabai. His marriage was
also performed on the same day on which the
appellant was got married to Rukmini Bai.
28. He also deposed that the appellant used to
illtreat Rukmini Bai and at times beat her also. He
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deposed that one of his relativesKrishnappa when
he visited Rukmini Bai's house, she complained to
him about the bad behavior of the appellant
towards her. This was told to him by Krishnappa.
29. Now, we come to the evidence of PW17
(Kristappa). He is a close relative of Eknath (PW1)
father of the deceased. He deposed that once he
went to Rukmini Bai's residence and when he was
on his way to a Temple at Tulasigeri, Rukmini Bai
met him and complained against the appellant and
told him to convey to her father (PW1) to send
money for the appellant.
30. On a perusal of the evidence of the
aforementioned four prosecution witnesses, it
proves in clear terms that firstly the appellant was
addicted to consuming liquor, Secondly, he used to
demand money from the deceased and her parents
quite often; and thirdly, he also at times used to
illtreat and assault the deceased. The incident of
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illtreatment and demand of money did not occur
once but on many a times and it started soon after
the marriage which continued till Rukmini Bai's
death.
31. In our opinion, there is no reason to discard
the evidence of the father and mother of the
deceased who are the most natural and material
witnesses to speak on such issues. Indeed, in such
circumstances, the daughter a newly married girl
would always like to first disclose her domestic
problems to her mother and father and then to her
close relatives because they have access to her and
are always helpful in solving her problems.
32. We have not been able to notice any kind of
contradiction on any of the material issues in the
evidence of these four witnesses despite they being
subjected to lengthy crossexamination by the
defense. That apart, why should a mother and a
father speak lie unless there are justifiable reasons
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behind it. We do not find any such reason in this
case. Not only that, even their relatives, i.e.,
Bhimappa and Kristappa supported their version.
33. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the acts
and the behavior of the appellant (husband)
towards his wifeRukmini Bai soon after their
marriage which eventually culminated in Rukmini
Bai's death within seven years from the date of their
marriage squarely fell within the meaning of Section
498A Explanations (a) and (b) of IPC.
34. This takes us to examine the other question as
to whether the death of Rukmini Bai was homicidal
or accidental.
35. The evidence on record has proved that the
incident in question occurred in the morning
around 8 a.m. in the house of the deceased. It has
also come in evidence that at that time, there were
only two persons in the house, i.e., the deceased
and the appellant.
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36. The case of the prosecution was that it was the
appellant, who poured kerosene oil on his wife
Rukmini Bai when she was in kitchen and set her
on fire, whereas the case of the appellant was that it
was a case of an accidental death. It was suggested
that when Rukmini Bai was boiling the water on the
oven in the kitchen, her nylon sari accidentally
came in contact with the fire, which resulted in her
death.
37. In order to examine this question, the manner
in which the incident occured and the surroundings
prevailing in the room at the time of incident are
important. The nature of burn injuries sustained by
the deceased is also equally important.
38. Having perused the evidence, we are of the
considered opinion that Rukmini Bai died due to
pouring of Kerosene oil and setting her body on fire
and this act could be done only by the appellant
and by no one else. In other words, it was a case of
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homicidal death and not a case of accidental death.
It is proved by the following circumstances.
39. First, it is not in dispute that the incident in
question occurred in the house when only the
deceased and the appellant were present. In other
words, the appellant was the only person present at
the time of incident in the house with the deceased.
40. In these circumstances, it was the appellant
who could give some plausible explanation as to
how and in what manner the incident in question
occurred. As mentioned above, the explanation
given by the appellant was that Rukmini Bai's sari
accidentally caught fire when she was boiling the
water on the oven. In our opinion, this story of the
appellant cannot be believed.
41. Second, the evidence of I.O., PostMortem
Report, FSL report and the evidence of doctor (PW
6) has proved that kerosene oil was found on the
body of deceased and second, one bottle of kerosene
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oil was also lying in the room. The presence of
kerosene oil on the body of deceased would indicate
that the kerosene oil was poured on her body. Since
the appellant was the only person present in the
room (kitchen), it was he who could do it.
42. Third, the presence of broken bangles found in
the room suggest that the deceased must have
struggled with the appellant to save herself which
resulted in breaking of her bangles.
43. Fourth, had it been a case of catching of
simple fire from the oven, then in such event, the
smell of kerosene oil from the body of the deceased
would not have been found on her body.
44. Fifth, it is nobody's case that the deceased
tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosene oil on
her and then put herself on fire.
45. Sixth, the relations between the appellant and
deceased were not cordial. The appellant always
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used to demand money from the deceased which
she was not in a position to give to the appellant.
46. Seventh, had this been a case of accident as
suggested by the defense then burn injuries
sustained by the deceased would have been more on
the lower part of her body rather on the upper part
of the body because according to defense, the
deceased was near to oven when her sari caught
fire. The postmortem report, however, showed that
the burn injuries were more on her upper part and
her blouse was found burnt.
47. In the absence of any plausible explanation
given by the appellant and the one which was
suggested but not having been proved and further
keeping in view the circumstances, the manner in
which the incident occurred and material seized
from the room i.e. kerosene oil bottle, it is proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was
responsible for causing death of Rukmini Bai. In
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other words, Rukmini Bai’s death was homicidal
and not accidental.
48. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that
some of the witnesses of the prosecution did not
support their case, and turned hostile. It is for this
reason, learned counsel submitted that the
prosecution case should be discarded.
49. We do not agree to this submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant. The evidence of
four prosecution witnesses which we have detailed
above fully proves the case of the prosecution. In
this view of the matter, even if, some witnesses
might have turned hostile, yet it would be of no
significance and nor it would adversely affect the
case of the prosecution. It is more so when the
witnesses which we have referred above did not turn
hostile and were, therefore, rightly believed by the
High Court.
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50. In view of the foregoing discussion, we agree
with the reasons and the conclusion of the High
Court. As a result, the appeal fails and is
accordingly dismissed.
.………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[INDU MALHOTRA]
New Delhi;
January 07, 2019
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