Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 317
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2536 of 2026]
JAY PRAKASH YADAV …APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J
1 2
1. Dismissal of the appellant’s criminal appeal by the High Court of
3
Jharkhand is under assail in the present appeal, by special leave.
4 5
Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court under Section 302 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959
led to imposition of sentences of life imprisonment and 7 years,
respectively. As a consequence of dismissal of the criminal appeal,
such conviction and sentence stood affirmed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2026.04.06
16:11:06 IST
Reason:
1 rd
vide judgment and order dated 23 September, 2024
2
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1351 of 2016
3
High Court
4 th
vide judgment and order dated 27 September, 2016 in S.T. No .235 of 2014
5
II ASJ, Chatra
1
2. According to the prosecution, the appellant (a constable in the Indian
Reserve Battalion) had allegedly gunned down his superior, one S.I.
6 th
Sunil Soren . The incident happened at around 7:30 PM on 18 May,
2014. The motive for the crime was that the deceased had not
approved the appellant’s request for grant of leave.
3. The informant (a hawaldar), examined as PW-3, testified that he was
on duty with four other constables at the time of the incident.
Appellant was on sentry duty from 6:00 PM to 8:00 PM. At about 7:30
PM, upon hearing gunfire, PW-3 came out of the guard room, went
to the spot, and found the appellant coming from the side of the room
of the deceased and holding an INSAS rifle (later confirmed to be the
weapon of offence). Appellant then confessed to killing the deceased.
Relevant excerpts from the chief examination of PW-3 are reproduced
below:
1. I am the informant in the case. The incident is of 18.5.14 at
16.00 hrs to 19.5.14 at 16.00 hrs. I was present on duty along
with four other Constables 549 Kundan Chaudhary, 499
Jaiprakash Yadav, 365 Suryanand Prakash. 323 Vikas Kumar, at
the IRBP PiparwarCamp premises, Post No. 3 on the backside
of the armoury. Duty of the CT 499 Jaiprakash Yadav was from
6.00 to 8.00 hrs. Large number of police men came. I was in
the guard room. Then at 7.30 hrs. I heard the firing sound.
Hearing the sound of firing, we came out of the guard room and
went to the spot. The CT 499 Jay Prakash Yadav was not found
present on the post nor was found nearby. Then I had gone
towards the canteen and look towards the barrack and saw the
police guard Jay Prakash Yadav was coming from the side of
the S.I. Sunil Soren's room. He was holding Insas weapon. On
my question, he said, as his leave was not granted, he has killed
Sunil Soren. Telling this much, he went towards the barrack.
Then I went towards the canteen and looked into Sunil Soren's
6
deceased
2
room and saw he was laying on the floor in a pool of blood.
Some empties were scattered on the floor. One magazine was
kept on Saurav Ji's table. From there, I went to the police
station and gave the information. …..
(emphasis ours)
4. From the above, it is clear that PW-3, at best, is a post occurrence
witness. Despite having testified about seeing the appellant clearly,
we have found the following version of PW-3 in his cross examination:
7. After hearing the indiscriminate bullet sound, when I came
out, by that time it was already darkness. It was not clearly
visible on account of the darkness.
8. There was the sound of some people coming from the
canteen side but due to the darkness, their faces were not
clearly visible. From the voice of Jay Prakash, it seems that it
was Jay Prakash. I could not see where Jay Prakash had gone.
(emphasis ours)
5. Thus, PW-3 admitted that he identified the appellant only from his
voice and not by clear visual recognition due to the prevailing
darkness at the time. This admission materially undermines the
reliability of his testimony, particularly in light of his earlier assertion
that he had seen the appellant holding the weapon. We, thus, find it
difficult to rely upon his testimony.
6. There is no eyewitness in the present case; the prosecution case rests
entirely on circumstantial evidence. The other witnesses (PW-4 to
PW-9) are either hearsay witnesses or have been declared hostile.
Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court, as affirmed by the High
Court, apart from the testimony of PW-3, is based on the testimonies
3
of PW-2, CW-2, the evidence of the ballistic expert (CW-1), and the
th th
duty registers dated 13 and 14 May 2014.
a. PW-2 (Constable) testified that, upon hearing gunshots, he came
out of his barrack and saw people running in different directions.
PW-3 then informed him (PW-2) that the appellant had shot the
deceased. Both the Trial Court and the High Court have treated
the testimony of PW-2 as corroborative of the testimony of PW-
3.
b. It is an admitted position that the appellant had been issued a
rifle bearing butt no. 329. CW-3, a jawan, testified that the seized
rifle (the alleged weapon of offence) bearing butt no. 351
belonged to him. He further stated that, about ten days prior to
the incident, while performing guard duty, his rifle had been
inadvertently exchanged with another rifle bearing butt no. 329.
By the time he realized this, he had already left for training.
Although he informed his superior, he was directed to continue
with the rifle in his possession, as it was not feasible to return.
On this basis, the courts below have also treated this
circumstance as established.
c. CW-1, the ballistic expert, testified that the bullets recovered
from the body of the deceased had been fired from the seized
rifle bearing butt no. 351.
th th
d. Exhibit X/5, being the duty register for 12 and 13 May 2014,
shows that the appellant was using the rifle bearing butt no. 351.
4
7. Now, let us examine how far the testimony of the witnesses is reliable
to support the conviction.
8. Appellant allegedly did not confess before PW-2. PW-2 came to know
of the same through PW-3. PW2, thus, is only a hearsay witness.
9. The testimony of CW-3 read with Exhibit X/5 may raise a possibility
of the appellant using the rifle on the date of offence. However, the
version of CW-3 that his rifle had been inadvertently exchanged with
another rifle bearing butt no. 329 about ten days prior to the incident,
while performing guard duty, has to be accepted with a pinch of salt.
It is difficult to accept that in a disciplined force, exchange of rifles
allotted to two jawans would remain unnoticed for long ten days.
th
Significantly, the duty register for 18 May, 2014 was not led in
evidence. In the absence of other cogent evidence to support this
circumstance, in our opinion, it would not be safe to sustain the
conviction on mere suspicion.
10. It is trite law that every link in the chain of circumstantial evidence
must be conclusively established. Even a single missing or weak link
may prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The chain must be so
complete as to point unerringly to the guilt of the accused, and to no
one else. Where, on the same set of evidence, two views are
reasonably possible, the benefit of doubt must necessarily be
extended to the accused (see: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State
7
of Maharashtra ).
7
(1984) 4 SCC 116
5
11. In the present case, the evidence on record falls short of the standard
of proof required in criminal law and does not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellant.
Consequently, in our considered opinion, it (the evidence) is wholly
insufficient to warrant his conviction.
12. We have noted from the judgment under challenge that according to
the High Court, the version of PW-3 in chief could not be demolished
by the appellant in course of cross-examination. The testimony of
PW-3 in course of his cross-examination has been noted in paragraph
5 (supra). We wonder, what more was required of the appellant;
indeed, we regret to note that the High Court missed the woods for
the tree.
13. The aforesaid analysis leads us to the irresistible conclusion of there
being no convincing evidence on record to suggest that it is the
appellant, and none else, who gunned down the deceased. As a
sequitur, the order of conviction rendered by the High Court has to
be set aside and the appellant acquitted. It is ordered accordingly.
14. Appellant has been in custody for nearly 12 years. He shall be
released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
15. Based on the conviction recorded by the Trial Court, the appellant
must have been dismissed from service. He is granted liberty to seek
reinstatement before his appointing authority with such other
consequential benefits, as he may be advised, provided he is still
mentally and physically capable of discharging his duties. If any
6
prayer in this behalf is received, the appellant’s appointing authority
shall take an expeditious decision thereon in accordance with law.
Should the appellant be not found so capable, he may be financially
compensated adequately.
16. The appeal is, thus, allowed on the above terms.
17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………….............................J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
……………..............................J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
New Delhi;
April 06, 2026.
7
2026 INSC 317
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2536 of 2026]
JAY PRAKASH YADAV …APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J
1 2
1. Dismissal of the appellant’s criminal appeal by the High Court of
3
Jharkhand is under assail in the present appeal, by special leave.
4 5
Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court under Section 302 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959
led to imposition of sentences of life imprisonment and 7 years,
respectively. As a consequence of dismissal of the criminal appeal,
such conviction and sentence stood affirmed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2026.04.06
16:11:06 IST
Reason:
1 rd
vide judgment and order dated 23 September, 2024
2
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1351 of 2016
3
High Court
4 th
vide judgment and order dated 27 September, 2016 in S.T. No .235 of 2014
5
II ASJ, Chatra
1
2. According to the prosecution, the appellant (a constable in the Indian
Reserve Battalion) had allegedly gunned down his superior, one S.I.
6 th
Sunil Soren . The incident happened at around 7:30 PM on 18 May,
2014. The motive for the crime was that the deceased had not
approved the appellant’s request for grant of leave.
3. The informant (a hawaldar), examined as PW-3, testified that he was
on duty with four other constables at the time of the incident.
Appellant was on sentry duty from 6:00 PM to 8:00 PM. At about 7:30
PM, upon hearing gunfire, PW-3 came out of the guard room, went
to the spot, and found the appellant coming from the side of the room
of the deceased and holding an INSAS rifle (later confirmed to be the
weapon of offence). Appellant then confessed to killing the deceased.
Relevant excerpts from the chief examination of PW-3 are reproduced
below:
1. I am the informant in the case. The incident is of 18.5.14 at
16.00 hrs to 19.5.14 at 16.00 hrs. I was present on duty along
with four other Constables 549 Kundan Chaudhary, 499
Jaiprakash Yadav, 365 Suryanand Prakash. 323 Vikas Kumar, at
the IRBP PiparwarCamp premises, Post No. 3 on the backside
of the armoury. Duty of the CT 499 Jaiprakash Yadav was from
6.00 to 8.00 hrs. Large number of police men came. I was in
the guard room. Then at 7.30 hrs. I heard the firing sound.
Hearing the sound of firing, we came out of the guard room and
went to the spot. The CT 499 Jay Prakash Yadav was not found
present on the post nor was found nearby. Then I had gone
towards the canteen and look towards the barrack and saw the
police guard Jay Prakash Yadav was coming from the side of
the S.I. Sunil Soren's room. He was holding Insas weapon. On
my question, he said, as his leave was not granted, he has killed
Sunil Soren. Telling this much, he went towards the barrack.
Then I went towards the canteen and looked into Sunil Soren's
6
deceased
2
room and saw he was laying on the floor in a pool of blood.
Some empties were scattered on the floor. One magazine was
kept on Saurav Ji's table. From there, I went to the police
station and gave the information. …..
(emphasis ours)
4. From the above, it is clear that PW-3, at best, is a post occurrence
witness. Despite having testified about seeing the appellant clearly,
we have found the following version of PW-3 in his cross examination:
7. After hearing the indiscriminate bullet sound, when I came
out, by that time it was already darkness. It was not clearly
visible on account of the darkness.
8. There was the sound of some people coming from the
canteen side but due to the darkness, their faces were not
clearly visible. From the voice of Jay Prakash, it seems that it
was Jay Prakash. I could not see where Jay Prakash had gone.
(emphasis ours)
5. Thus, PW-3 admitted that he identified the appellant only from his
voice and not by clear visual recognition due to the prevailing
darkness at the time. This admission materially undermines the
reliability of his testimony, particularly in light of his earlier assertion
that he had seen the appellant holding the weapon. We, thus, find it
difficult to rely upon his testimony.
6. There is no eyewitness in the present case; the prosecution case rests
entirely on circumstantial evidence. The other witnesses (PW-4 to
PW-9) are either hearsay witnesses or have been declared hostile.
Conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court, as affirmed by the High
Court, apart from the testimony of PW-3, is based on the testimonies
3
of PW-2, CW-2, the evidence of the ballistic expert (CW-1), and the
th th
duty registers dated 13 and 14 May 2014.
a. PW-2 (Constable) testified that, upon hearing gunshots, he came
out of his barrack and saw people running in different directions.
PW-3 then informed him (PW-2) that the appellant had shot the
deceased. Both the Trial Court and the High Court have treated
the testimony of PW-2 as corroborative of the testimony of PW-
3.
b. It is an admitted position that the appellant had been issued a
rifle bearing butt no. 329. CW-3, a jawan, testified that the seized
rifle (the alleged weapon of offence) bearing butt no. 351
belonged to him. He further stated that, about ten days prior to
the incident, while performing guard duty, his rifle had been
inadvertently exchanged with another rifle bearing butt no. 329.
By the time he realized this, he had already left for training.
Although he informed his superior, he was directed to continue
with the rifle in his possession, as it was not feasible to return.
On this basis, the courts below have also treated this
circumstance as established.
c. CW-1, the ballistic expert, testified that the bullets recovered
from the body of the deceased had been fired from the seized
rifle bearing butt no. 351.
th th
d. Exhibit X/5, being the duty register for 12 and 13 May 2014,
shows that the appellant was using the rifle bearing butt no. 351.
4
7. Now, let us examine how far the testimony of the witnesses is reliable
to support the conviction.
8. Appellant allegedly did not confess before PW-2. PW-2 came to know
of the same through PW-3. PW2, thus, is only a hearsay witness.
9. The testimony of CW-3 read with Exhibit X/5 may raise a possibility
of the appellant using the rifle on the date of offence. However, the
version of CW-3 that his rifle had been inadvertently exchanged with
another rifle bearing butt no. 329 about ten days prior to the incident,
while performing guard duty, has to be accepted with a pinch of salt.
It is difficult to accept that in a disciplined force, exchange of rifles
allotted to two jawans would remain unnoticed for long ten days.
th
Significantly, the duty register for 18 May, 2014 was not led in
evidence. In the absence of other cogent evidence to support this
circumstance, in our opinion, it would not be safe to sustain the
conviction on mere suspicion.
10. It is trite law that every link in the chain of circumstantial evidence
must be conclusively established. Even a single missing or weak link
may prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The chain must be so
complete as to point unerringly to the guilt of the accused, and to no
one else. Where, on the same set of evidence, two views are
reasonably possible, the benefit of doubt must necessarily be
extended to the accused (see: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State
7
of Maharashtra ).
7
(1984) 4 SCC 116
5
11. In the present case, the evidence on record falls short of the standard
of proof required in criminal law and does not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellant.
Consequently, in our considered opinion, it (the evidence) is wholly
insufficient to warrant his conviction.
12. We have noted from the judgment under challenge that according to
the High Court, the version of PW-3 in chief could not be demolished
by the appellant in course of cross-examination. The testimony of
PW-3 in course of his cross-examination has been noted in paragraph
5 (supra). We wonder, what more was required of the appellant;
indeed, we regret to note that the High Court missed the woods for
the tree.
13. The aforesaid analysis leads us to the irresistible conclusion of there
being no convincing evidence on record to suggest that it is the
appellant, and none else, who gunned down the deceased. As a
sequitur, the order of conviction rendered by the High Court has to
be set aside and the appellant acquitted. It is ordered accordingly.
14. Appellant has been in custody for nearly 12 years. He shall be
released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
15. Based on the conviction recorded by the Trial Court, the appellant
must have been dismissed from service. He is granted liberty to seek
reinstatement before his appointing authority with such other
consequential benefits, as he may be advised, provided he is still
mentally and physically capable of discharging his duties. If any
6
prayer in this behalf is received, the appellant’s appointing authority
shall take an expeditious decision thereon in accordance with law.
Should the appellant be not found so capable, he may be financially
compensated adequately.
16. The appeal is, thus, allowed on the above terms.
17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………….............................J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
……………..............................J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
New Delhi;
April 06, 2026.
7