Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4268 of 2003
PETITIONER:
L.S. Synthetics Ltd.
RESPONDENT:
Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. & Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2004
BENCH:
N. Santosh Hegde,S.B. Sinha & A.K. Mathur
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
with C.A. No. 4269 of 2003 and
C.A. No. 4270 of 2003
S.B. SINHA, J:
These appeals arising out of the judgments and orders dated 21st
March 2003 passed by the Special Court at Bombay in Miscellaneous
Petition Nos. 71, 72 and 99 of 1999 involving similar questions of law and
fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this
common judgment.
FACTS:
The fact of the matter, however, is being noticed from Civil Appeal
No. 4268 of 2003.
A notification was issued on 2.7.1992 by the Custodian notifying the
Respondent No. 1 as a notified party in terms of the provisions of the Special
Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992
(for short "the said Act").
The Appellant herein obtained short term loans amounting to Rs.
14.25 lakhs from the notified party during the period 1.4.1991 to 6.6.1992 as
specified in the said Act. The Custodian called upon the Appellant herein to
furnish particulars of the said loans pursuant to or in furtherance whereof the
Appellant herein accepted the same to be outstanding as on 30.6.1992 in the
books of Respondent No. 1 payable to him. On the said amount of loan,
interest at the rate of 21% per annum was payable.
The Appellant herein was directed to deposit the principal amount by
the Custodian which was not complied with. The concerned Chartered
Accountant, however, gave a certificate to the effect that a sum of Rs. 14.25
lakhs was advanced as loan to the Appellant by the Respondent No. 1 with
interest at 21% per annum and that the total sum outstanding was Rs.
34,98,967.04/-. The Respondent No. 1 thereafter initiated a proceeding
before the Special Court praying for a direction upon the Appellant herein to
pay to the Custodian a sum of Rs. 34, 99,900.68/- on behalf of his behalf.
The contentions of the Appellant before the Special Court were that it
having furnished full details of the amount in question to the Custodian in
1993, the claim was barred by limitation and the said Act did not enable the
Respondent herein to recover any time barred debts from it. It was further
urged that the transaction in question having not arisen out of transactions in
securities, the Special Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It
was also contended that in that view of the matter Section 9A of the said Act
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must be read down.
JUDGMENT:
By reason of the impugned judgment, the Special Court, however,
rejected the said contentions holding that once a property is found to be
owned by a notified party, all claims relating thereto must be adjudicated
upon by the Special Court.
Following its earlier decision of the Tribunal in A.K. Menon,
Custodian Vs. Modern Chemical Corporation & ors. [2002 (1) All M.R.
180], the Special Court held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would
have no application to the proceedings under the said Act. It was
consequently ordered:
"(a) I hereby direct Respondent No. 1 to pay to the
Custodian on behalf of FFSL Rs. 14.25 lacs with
interst at 15% per annum from the date on which
the loan(s) have been advanced upto payment."
SUBMISSIONS:
Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellant would contend that the advances made by the Respondent being
not transactions of the nature specified in the Act, an application filed by the
notified party was not maintainable. It was submitted that the provisions of
the said Act and in particular those contained in Section 9A must be read
down so as to uphold the constitutionality of the said Act. Strong reliance in
this connection has been placed on Harshad Shantilal Mehta Vs. Custodian
and Others [(1998) 5 SCC 1] and Canara Bank Vs. Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Ltd. and Others [1995 Supp (3) SCC 81].
The learned counsel would further submit that by reason of the
provisions of the said Act, the plea of limitation which could have been
taken by the Appellant, had a suit been filed by the Respondent No. 1
against it, would still be available as the transaction is of civil nature. It was
argued that only because a statutory attachment comes into force by reason
of Section 3(3) of the Act, the property of the notified party does not vest in
the Custodian. In any event, Mr. Sanghi would argue that the notified party
had no locus to initiate the proceedings before the Special Court.
The learned counsel would, in the alternative, submit with reference to
Civil Appeal Nos. 4269 and 4270 of 2003 that there being no agreement to
pay interest, the Special Court erred in directing such payment of interest
without arriving at a finding that any demand in relation thereto was made in
terms of the provisions of the Interest Act.
Mr. Subramonium Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, on the other hand, would argue that as all properties stood
attached in terms of the said notification on 22.7.1991 and all amount
recovered are required to be utilized towards the dues of the notified person;
an application at the instance of the notified person was maintainable.
The learned counsel would submit that the Special Court could
initiate a suo motu proceeding and as it has a duty to issue direction(s) as
regards the attached property and in that view of the matter, the provisions
of the Limitation Act will have no application. Strong reliance in this
connection has been placed on Mt. Laxmibai Vs. Tukaram [AIR 1930
Nagpur 206].
ATTACHMENT:
It is not in dispute that the Respondent No. 1 herein has advanced loan
to the Appellant by different cheques amounting to Rs. 14.25 lakhs which
were to be repaid at the interest rate of 21% per annum, the details whereof
are as under:
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"Cheque No. Date Amount
234285 28.01.92 1,50,000
244746 27.04.92 3,50,000
244825 06.05.92 1,00,000
246029 25.05.92 1,00,000
246038 25.05.92 75,000
246159 09.06.92 6,50,000"
The said Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of a Special
Court for the trial of offences relating to transactions in securities and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. A Special Court is
established under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of the said Act. Not only all
prosecutions relating to offences committed under the said Act are to be
initiated before the Special Court in terms of Section 7 of the Act, by reason
of Section 9A thereof which was inserted by Act 24 of 1994 with effect from
25th January, 1994, the Special Court is empowered to exercise all such
jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before
such commencement by any Civil Court in relation to any matter or claim
inter alia relating to any property standing attached under Sub-section (3) of
Section 3 thereof.
In terms of the provisions of the said Act, the Custodian has three
functions to perform:
(i) to notify a person in the Official Gazette, on being satisfied on
information received that he has been involved in any offence
relating to transactions in securities during the period specified
therefor;
(ii) He has the authority to cancel any contract or agreement relating to
the properties of the notified persons which, in his opinion, has
been entered into fraudulently or for the purpose of defeating the
provisions of the Act as specified in Section 4.
(iii) He is required to deal with the properties in the manner as directed
by the Special Court.
By reason of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, the Custodian
who may be appointed under Sub-section (1) thereof is entitled to notify a
person on satisfying himself that he is involved in any offence relating to
transactions in securities, wherefor he may rely upon the information
received from any of the sources specified in Rule 2 of 1992 Rules. Sub-
section (3) of Section 3 provides for a non-obstante clause in terms whereof
any property movable or immovable belonging to the notified person shall
stand attached simultaneously with the issue of the notification.
JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIAL COURT:
The jurisdiction of the Special Court is of wide amplitude. Subject to
a decision in appeal therefrom, its decision is final.
In this case, the notified person himself had disclosed that a sum of
Rs. 14.25 lakhs is owing and due to it from the Appellant. The debt at the
hands of the Appellant payable to the Respondent being admitted, we have
no hesitation to hold that the same would be subject matter of attachment.
The debt in question is capable of being attached being a property
belonging to the notified party and upon such attachment the consequences
provided therefrom would ensue and in that view of the matter the Special
Court will have jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order in relation thereto
by issuing appropriate directions in terms of the provisions of the said Act.
As the Special Court had the requisite jurisdiction to deal with the attached
property, it is immaterial whether the factum of the statutory provisions is
brought to its notice by the notified party himself or by the Custodian. The
Court has the requisite jurisdiction; nay a duty to apply itself to the said
question once the matter is brought to its notice.
The jurisdiction of the Special Court, it is not correct to contend, is
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confined only to the illegal transactions in securities and properties acquired
by the notified person out of the same. Once the properties are attached
under Sub-section (3) of Section 3, the Custodian has no other option but to
apply the same in such a manner as the Special Court may direct.
LOCUS OF THE RESPONDENT :
The said Act does not specify as to who can initiate a proceeding
before the Special Court. The Special Court, as would appear from the plain
wordings of the said Act, is entitled to direct the Custodian as regard
application of any property which stands attached. It may, therefore, do so
at the instance of the notified person apart from the Custodian. It can also
initiate a proceeding suo motu once attachment of any property belonging to
a notified person is brought to his notice.
READING DOWN OF SECTION 9A OF THE ACT :
The primal question which, however, arises for consideration is
whether a statutory attachment in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of
the said Act would apply only in relation to a property which was the
subject-matter of the transactions in securities.
Application of all properties belonging to the notified person who,
according to the Custodian, might have committed an offence within the
meaning of the provisions thereof evidently for the purpose of discharge of
such liabilities is obviated by reason of Section 11 of the said Act which
reads as under:
"11. Discharge of liabilities. - (1)
Nothwithstanding anything contained in the Code
and any other law for the time being in force, the
Special Court may make such order as it may
deem fit directing the Custodian for the disposal of
the property under attachment.
(2) The following liabilities shall be paid or
discharged in full, as far as may be, in the order as
under :
(a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from
the persons notified by the Custodian under sub-
section (2) of Section 3 to the Central Government
or any State Government or any local authority;
(b) all amounts due from the person so notified by
the Custodian to any bank or financial institution
or mutual fund; and
(c) any other liability as may be specified by the
Special Court from time to time."
It is not a case where a third party right is involved as was the case in
Kudremukh Iron Ore Co. Ltd. Vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and
Another [(1994) 4 SCC 246]. The purpose of the said Act is to discharge the
liabilities of the Government Banks, financial institutions, mutual funds, etc.
and for the said purpose, the statute itself provides that all properties
belonging to the notified person shall stand attached. Once a statutory
attachment comes into force, although the properties in question unlike the
provisions of some other Acts do not vest in the Custodian but the same
evidently remain under the control of the Special Court. There is, in our
considered opinion, no basis to hold, as has been urged by Mr. Sanghi, that
only those properties belonging to the notified person which are subject
matter of the transactions in securities would stand attached and for that
purpose Section 9A of the said Act is not required to be read down.
HARSHAD SHANTILAL MEHTA:
Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Sanghi to paragraph 14 of
Harshad Shantilal Mehta (supra) which reads as follows:
"14. It has also been submitted before us by one of
the notified parties (Dhanraj Mills v. Custodian)
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that properties belonging to notified persons which
have no nexus with the transactions in securities of
the notified person during the "statutory period",
also cannot be attached under Section 3. Reliance
is placed on the decision of the Bombay High
Court in the case of Hitesh Shantilal Mehta v.
Union of India ((1992) 3 Bom CR 716) (to which
one of us was a party) in this connection. Our
attention is drawn to the following passage in the
High Court’s judgment : (at p. 719)
"If the person ... approaches the Special Court and
makes out, for example, a case that the property
which is attached has no nexus of any sort with the
illegal dealings in securities belonging to banks
and financial institutions during the relevant period
and/or that there are no claims or liabilities which
have to be satisfied by attachment and sale of such
property, in our view, the Special Court would
have the power to direct the Custodian to release
such property from attachment."
Hence a property not having any nexus with the
illegal dealings in securities can be released from
attachment by the Special Court in an appropriate
case."
This Court in paragraph 14 was merely recording the submissions of
one of the notified parties. Even a question as to whether all properties of
notified persons would be subject to the statutory attachment under Sub-
section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act or not did not arise for consideration
therein.
Therein indisputably this Court was referring to a judgment of the
Bombay High Court but did not pronounce finally on the correctness or
otherwise thereof.
In Hitesh Shantilal Mehta (supra) the Bombay High Court appears
to have merely held that in appropriate cases the Special Court would have
the power to direct the Custodian to release such property from attachment,
in the event, it is found that the property which is attached has no nexus with
the illegal dealings in securities belonging to banks and financial institutions
during the relevant period and/ or there are no claims or liabilities which
have to be satisfied by attachment and sale of such property. Once it is held
that a debt can be subject matter of attachment, the provisions of Sub-section
(3) of Section 3 of the said Act would squarely be applicable in view of the
fact that the same was the property belonging to a notified person. This
position in law is not disputed. Such attached property, thus, if necessary,
for the purpose of discharging the claims and liabilities of the notified
person indisputably would stand attached and can be applied for discharge of
his liabilities in terms of Section 11 of the said Act.
In Harshad Shantilal Mehta (supra), it was , inter alia, opined :
28\005 It was, therefore, expected that the available
funds from attached assets would be speedily
restored to the banks and financial institutions. It
was also expected that even after the discharge of
tax liabilities for the relevant period, substantial
funds would be left over for being paid to the
banks and financial institutions concerned."
CANARA BANK:
In Canara Bank (supra) this Court was concerned with transfer of an
application pending before the Company Law Board in terms of Sub-Section
(2) of Section 9-A of the Act and only in that context, it was observed:
"10. Sub-section (1) of Section 9-A is divisible
into two parts. By the first part, the Special Court
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is empowered to exercise, on and from the
commencement of the Amendment Ordinance, all
such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were
exercisable before such commencement by any
civil court. By the second part, the Special Court is
empowered to exercise such jurisdiction, powers
or authority in regard to the matters or claims
therein specified, which include matters or claims
arising out of transactions in securities entered into
between the stated dates in which a notified person
is involved. So read, the Special Court has the
jurisdiction, powers and authority of a civil court
to exercise the same in regard to matters or claims
arising out of transaction in securities entered into
between the stated dates in which a notified person
is involved. Sub-section (1) of Section 9-A,
therefore, invests the Special court with the
jurisdiction, powers and authority necessary for the
purposes of entertaining matters or claims of the
nature specified therein. Sub- section (2) provides
for the transfer of such matters or claims pending
in any court to the Special Court on the
commencement of the Amendment Ordinance.
And sub-section (3) expressly debars any court
other than the Special Court from exercising any
jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such
matters or claims."
LIMITATION:
The contention as regards the applicability of the Limitation Act must
be considered having regard to the foregoing findings .
The Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable only in relation to certain
applications and not all applications despite the fact that the words "other
proceedings" were added in the long title of the Act in 1963. The provisions
of the said Act are not applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than
courts, such as quasi-judicial tribunal or even an executive authority. The
Act primarily applies to the civil proceedings or some special criminal
proceedings. Even in a Tribunal, where the Code of Civil Procedure or
Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable; the Limitation Act, 1963 per se
may not be applied to the proceedings before it. Even in relation to certain
civil proceedings, the Limitation Act may not have any application. As for
example, there is no bar of limitation for initiation of a final decree
proceedings or to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure or for correction of accidental slip or omission
in judgments, orders or decrees; the reason being that these powers can be
exercised even suo motu by the Court and, thus, no question of any
limitation arises. [See Nityananda, M. Joshi and another Vs. the Life
Insurance Corporation of India and others, AIR 1970 SC 209, Hindustan
Times Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, (1998) 2 SCC 242 and Mt.
Laxmibai (supra)]
Even no period of limitation is prescribed in relation to a writ
proceeding.
S.N. Variava, J. in A.K. Menon, Custodian (supra), whereupon the
learned Special Court has placed reliance, observed:
"19. It is thus that the said Act lays down a
responsibility on the Court to recover the
properties. So far as monies are concerned,
undoubtedly the particular coin or particular
currency note given to a debtor would no longer be
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available. That however does not mean that the
lender does not have any right to monies. What is
payable is the loan i.e. the amount which has been
lent. The right which the creditor has is not a
"right to recover" the money. The creditor has the
title/ right in the money itself. An equivalent
amount is recoverable by him and the title in any
equivalent amount remain is the lender. Thus the
property which a Notified Party would have is not
the right to recover but the "title in the money
itself." Thus under Section 3(3) what would stand
attached would be the title/ right in the money
itself. Of course what would be recoverable would
be an equivalent of that money. Once the money
stands attached then no application is required to
be made by any parties for recovery of that money.
It is then the duty of the Court to recover the
money. No period of limitation can apply to any
Act to be done by a Court. Therefore in all such
Applications the only question which remains is
whether on the date of the Notification the right in
the property existed. If the right, in the property
existed then irrespective of the fact that the right to
recover may be barred by limitation there would be
a statutory attachment of that property. Once there
is a statutory attachment of that property the Court
is duty bound to recover it for the purposes of
distribution. There can be no period of limitation
for acts which a Court is bound to perform. In this
case since the Court is compulsorily bound to
recover the money there can be no limitation to
recover the money there can be no limitation to
such recovery proceedings. To be remembered
that Section 3(3) as well as Section 13 provide that
provisions of the said Act would prevail over any
other law. This would include the limitation Act."
We respectfully agree with the said view.
We may, however, add that the attachment of the properties of the
notified party being for specific purposes, i.e., for the purpose of discharging
his liabilities, the Special Court is bound to pass appropriate orders in
relation thereto. A property once attached shall remain under attachment till
an appropriate order is passed. It is, therefore, idle to contend that even in
respect thereof the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply. The Court
while issuing directions to the Custodian in relation to the attached property
for the purpose of discharge of the liability of the notified person must pass
an appropriate order. So long the claims or other proceedings initiated
before the Special Court as regard discharge of liability of the notified
person continue, the attachment remains in force. A proceeding before the
Special Court is not a suit for recovery of an amount. The proceedings
before the Special Court are extraordinary in nature. Distribution of the
assets of a notified person may take a long time but it would bear repetition
to state because all the claims filed before the Special Court are disposed of,
the property of the notified person stands attached. In other words, the
provisions of the Limitation Act would inter alia apply only when a suit is
filed or a proceeding is initiated for recovery of an amount and not where a
property is required to be applied towards the claims pending before the
tribunal for the purpose of discharge of the liabilities of the notified person
in terms of Section 11 of the said Act.
A Special Court having regard to its nature and functions may be a
court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 but having regard to its scope and
object and in particular the fact that it is a complete code in itself, in our
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opinion, the period of limitation provided in the schedule appended to the
Limitation Act, 1963, will have no application. For the applicability of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the following requirements must be
satisfied by the Court invoking the said provision:
(1) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any
special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or
application.
(2) Such prescription of the period of limitation under such special or
local law should be different from the period of limitation
prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.
In terms of the provisions of the said Act, no period of limitation is
prescribed, evidently because the Parliament thought it to be wholly
unnecessary. Once the statutory operation relating to the attachment of the
property belonging to a notified person comes into being, the duties and
functions of the Special Court start. In relation to the duties and functions
required to be performed by a court of law, no period of limitation need be
prescribed. Furthermore, Section 13 of the said Act provides for a non-
obstante clause which has been used as a devise to modify the ambit of
provisions of law mentioned therein or to override the same in the specified
circumstances. [See T.R. Thandur vs. Union of India and Others \026 (1996) 3
SCC 690 \026 para 8]. The said Act does not provide for any period of
limitation, the reasons wherefor have been noticed hereinbefore and in that
view of the matter, in our considered opinion, Articles 19, 28 and 55
providing for period of limitation prescribed would have no application.
Section 13 of the said Act provides for a non obstante clause which is of
wide amplitude. In a case of conflict between the said Act and any other
Act, the provisions of the former shall prevail.
In Solidaire India Ltd. Vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. & Ors.
[2001 (2) SCALE 1], this Court held :
"10\005The Legislature being aware of the
provisions of Section 22 under the 1985 Act still
empowered only the Special Court under the 1992
Act to give directions to recover and to distribute
the assets of the notified persons in the manner set
down under section 11(2) of the 1992 Act. This
can only mean that the Legislature wanted the
provisions of Section 11(2) of the 1992 Act to
prevail over the provisions of any other law
including those of the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It is a settled rule
of interpretation that if one construction (sic
constructions) leads to a conflict, whereas on
another construction, two Acts can be
harmoniously constructed then the latter must be
adopted. If an interpretation is given that the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,
1985, is to prevail then there would be a clear
conflict if it is held that the 1992 Act is to prevail."
A statute of limitation bars a remedy and not a right. Although a
remedy is bared, a defence can be raised. In construing a special statute
providing for limitation, consideration of plea of hardship is irrelevant. A
special statute providing for special or no period of limitation must receive a
liberal and broader construction and not a rigid or a narrow one. The intent
and purport of the Parliament enacting the said Act furthermore must be
given its full effect. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of
the Limitation Act have no application, so far as directions required to be
issued by the Special Court relating to the disposal of attached property, are
concerned.
Only in the event, all the claims as provided for under Section 11 of
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the said Act are fully satisfied, the amount belonging to the notified person
can be directed to be released in his favour or in favour of any other person.
INTEREST:
It does not appear from the judgment of the Special Court that any
argument was advanced before it that there did not exist any agreement as
regard payment of interest. No such contention has even been raised in the
Memorandum of Appeal or in the Affidavit filed before the Special Court.
In fact, it is admitted that the Custodian and the Appellant exchanged certain
correspondences in this behalf in the year 1992.
We do not find any merit in the contention of Mr. Sanghi that the
Special Court had no jurisdiction to issue any direction for payment of
interest. The said direction, in our opinion, could have been issued having
regard to the fact that the attached amount was being utilized by the
Appellants; assuming that there existed no agreement in relation thereto. As
the attached property remained in the hands of the Appellant and they had
applied the same for their own benefit, the Special Court was entitled to
grant interest by way of restitution.
CONCLUSION:
We, therefore, hold:
(i) A notified party has the requisite locus to bring the fact to the notice
of the Special Court that certain sum is owing and due to him from a
third party whereupon a proceeding can be initiated for recovery
thereof by the Custodian and consequent application thereof in
discharge of the liability of the notified person.
(ii) Sub-section (3) of Section 3 should be literally construed and so
construed all properties belonging to the notified person shall be
subject to attachment which may, consequently, be applied for
discharge of his liabilities in terms of Section 11 of the said Act.
(iii) The provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 have no application in relation
to the proceedings under the said Act.
For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in these
appeals which are dismissed accordingly. No costs.