SARASWATHY vs. BABU

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1999 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.2190 of 2012)  SARASWATHY        …. APPELLANT VERSUS BABU      ….RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted.  This appeal has been preferred  by   the   appellant­wife   against   the   judgment   and  th order dated 13   December, 2011 passed by the High  JUDGMENT Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras.     By   the   impugned  judgment,   the   High   Court   dismissed   the   criminal  revision   case   filed   by   the   appellant   and   thus  affirmed the order of First Appellate Court.   2. The pertinent facts of the case are as follows: The parties to the present dispute are married  to each other and the said marriage was solemnized  th on 17  February, 2000.  According to the appellant,  1 Page 1 she brought 50 sovereign gold ornaments and 1 kg  silver   articles   as   stridhan   also   Rs.10,000/­   was  given   to   the   respondent.     After   marriage   the  appellant lived in her matrimonial house at Padi,  Chennai.   After four months of the marriage, the  respondent­husband   and   his   family   demanded   more  dowry in the form of cash and jewels. The appellant  was   not   able   to   satisfy   the   said   demand.  Therefore,   she  was   thrown   out  of   her   matrimonial  house by the respondent and her in­laws.   Another  allegation of the appellant is that after sending  out the appellant from her matrimonial house, the  respondent­husband   intended   to   marry   again.   On  hearing such rumour, the appellant filed petition  JUDGMENT under   Section   9   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955  (hereinafter   referred   to  as,   “the   HM   Act,   1955”)  bearing   no.   H.M.O.P.   No.   216   of   2001   before   the  Principal   Subordinate   Judge,   Chengalpattu,   Tamil  Nadu for restitution of conjugal rights.  The respondent­husband on the other hand filed  H.M.O.P. No. 123 of 2002 under Section 13(1) (ia)  and (iv) of the HMA Act, 1955 before the Principal  2 Page 2 Subordinate   Judge,   Chengalpattu,   Tamil   Nadu   for  dissolution of marriage between the appellant and  the respondent . th On   5   April,   2006,   the   learned   Principal  Subordinate   Judge,   Chengalpattu,   Tamil   Nadu  dismissed the petition for dissolution of marriage  filed   by   the   respondent­husband   and   allowed   the  petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed  by the appellant­wife with the condition that the  appellant   should   not   insist   for   setting   up   of   a  separate residence by leaving the matrimonial home  of the respondent.  In the year 2008, the appellant filed Crl. M.P.  No. 2421 of 2008 before learned XIII Metropolitan  JUDGMENT Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai against the respondent  seeking relief under Section 19, 20 and 22 of the  Protection   of   Women   from   Domestic   Violence   Act,  2005   (hereinafter   referred   to   as,   “the   PWD   Act,  2005”).   The learned XIII Metropolitan Magistrate,  Egmore,   Chennai   partly   allowed   the   same   and  directed   the   respondent   to   give   maintenance   of  Rs.2,000/­ per month to the appellant to meet out  3 Page 3 her   medical   expenses,   food,   shelter   and   clothing  expenses.     The Magistrate Court’s held that the  appellant   is   in   domestic   relationship   with   the  respondent and the appellant being the wife of the  respondent   has   a   right   to   reside   in   the   shared  household.   The officer in charge of the nearest  Police Station was directed to give protection to  the appellant for implementation of the residence  orders   and   was   also   directed   to   assist   in   the  implementation of the protection order.   The   respondent­husband   being   aggrieved  preferred  Criminal   Appeal   No.  339   of   2008   before  the   Sessions   Court     (Vth   Additional   Judge)   at  Chennai.   JUDGMENT In the meantime, as per the order passed by the  XIII   Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Egmore,   Chennai   the  appellant­wife   went   to   her   matrimonial   house   for  staying   with   the   respondent­husband   house   along  with Protection Officer.   However, the respondent  did not obey the order of the Court and refused to  allow   the   appellant­wife   to   enter   the   house   and  locked the door from outside and went out.   4 Page 4 nd On 22   December, 2008, the appellant filed a  complaint   against   the   respondent   for   not   obeying  the   order   of   the   learned   XIII   Metropolitan  Magistrate,   Egmore,   Chennai   and   the   same   was  registered in Ambatur T3 Korattur Police Station as  FIR No. 947 of 2008 under Section 31,32 and 74 of  the  PWD Act, 2005.  The case was committed to the  learned   XIII   Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Egmore,  Chennai   and   registered   as   Criminal   Miscellaneous  Petition No. 636 of 2011. In the meantime, the Criminal Appeal No. 339 of  2008   filed   by   the   respondent­husband   was   partly  allowed by the Sessions Court (Vth Addl. Judge) at  st Chennai on 21   October, 2010. Sessions Courts by  JUDGMENT the said order set aside the order prohibiting the  respondent­husband from committing acts of domestic  violence   as   against   the   appellant­wife   by   not  allowing her to live in the shared household and  the order directing the respondent to reside in the  house owned by respondent’s mother and upheld the  order granting maintenance of Rs.2,000/­ per month  5 Page 5 in favour of the appellant­wife by the respondent­ husband.  3. Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   order,   the  appellant­wife   filed   Crl.   R.C.   No.   1321   of   2010  before   the   High   Court.     A  criminal  miscellaneous  petition no.1 of 2010 was also filed in the said  rd revision application.   On 23   December, 2010, the  High   Court   granted   an   interim   stay   to   the   above  order   passed   by   the   learned   Sessions   Court   (Vth  Addl. Judge) at Chennai.    4. In the meantime, while the matter was pending  before   the   High   Court,   the   learned     XIII  Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai passed an  th order on 24  February, 2011 in Crl. Misc. Petition  JUDGMENT No.   636   of   2011   (arising   out   of   FIR   No.   947   of  2008)   and   directed   the   SHO,   Ambatur   T3   Korattur  Police   Station   to   break   the   door   of   the  respondent’s house in the presence of the Revenue  Inspector and make accommodation for the appellant  with further direction to the SHO to inquire about  the   belongings   in   the   respondent’s   house   in  presence   of   the   family   members   of   the   respondent  6 Page 6 with further direction to submit the report to the  respondent as well as the Protection Officer.  The  respondent­husband thereafter filed a petition for  rd vacating the order of stay dated 23  December, 2010  th and vide order dated 9  March, 2011 the High Court  vacated the order of stay and made it clear that  appellant­wife can go and reside with her husband  in his rental residence at Guduvancherry .    As the  order   aforesaid   was   not   complied   with   by   the  respondent­husband   the   appellant­wife   filed  Contempt   Petition   No.   958   of   2011   against   the  respondent­husband     for   wantonly   disobeying   the  th order   dated   9   March,   2011   passed   by   the   High  Court.   JUDGMENT 5. The   High   Court   closed   the   contempt   petition  st vide   order   dated   21   July,   2011   with   following  observation: “In view of the categorical submission made by  the Ld. Counsel for the respondent as well as  the statement made by the respondent herein by  appearing before this court and stating that  the respondent undertakes not to prevent the  contempt petitioner from entering inside the  premises   at   Door   No.   80,   Karpagambal   Nagar,  Nadivaram,   Guduvancherry,   Chennai   and   the  contempt petitioner also agreed to occupy and  stay   in   the   above   said   premises   from  7 Page 7 01.08.2011,   the   contempt   petition   is   hereby  closed.” 6. Thereafter   the   appellant   made   representation  before Sub Inspector of Police, Guduvancherry  and  stated that the respondent­husband has given false  address   and   in   order   to   comply   with   the   court’s  order,   the   appellant   went   to   the   address   and   on  enquiry came to know that the address was a bogus  one.   The appellant thereby submitted a complaint  and   requested   the   police   to   enquire   from   the  respondent   to   ascertain   the   real   facts   so   as   to  ensure that the court’s order is executed in its  letter and spirit.   7. When the matter was pending before the Police,  the High Court decided the criminal miscellaneous  JUDGMENT case filed by the appellant and held that although  the   offending   acts   of   the   respondent   could   be  construed   as   offences   under   other   enactments   it  could not be construed as acts of domestic violence  under   the  PWD  Act,   2005  until  the  Act  came  into  force.     The   High   Court   dismissed   the   revisional  application.  8 Page 8 8. From the bare perusal of the impugned judgment  passed   by  the  High   Court,   we   find  that   the  High  Court framed the following question: “ 4.   The   primary   question   that   arises   for  consideration is whether acts committed prior  to the coming  into force of the Protection of  Women   from   Domestic   Violence   Act,   2005   and  which fall within the definition of the term  ‘Domestic   Violence’   as   informed   in   the   Act  could form the basis of an action.” 9. The High Court after taking into consideration  the stand taken by the parties held as follows: “ 5.  This court would first concern itself with  whether   acts   which   now   constitute   domestic  violence but committed prior to the coming into  force   of   the   Act   would   form   a   basis   of   an  action   thereunder.     With   due   respect   to   the  authorities   above   cited,   this   court   would  inform   that   the   fundamental   issue   stands  unaddressed.   The Act cam into force on 2005.  It   cannot   be   disputed   that   several   wrongful  actions which might have amounted to offences  such   as   cruelty   and   demand   for   dowry   cannot  have   taken   the   description   of   “Domestic  violence”   till   such   time   the   act   came   into  force.  In other words the offending acts could  have   been   construed   as   offences   under   other  enactments but could not have been construed as  acts of ‘Domestic Violence’ until the act came  into force.  Therefore, what was not ‘Domestic  violence’ as defined in the Act till the Act  came into force could not have formed the basis  of an action.   Ignorance of law is no excuse  but the application of this maxim on any date  prior to the coming into force of the Act could  only   have   imputed   knowledge   of   offence   as  subsisted   prior   to   coming   into   force   of   the  Act.  It is true that it is only violation of  orders   passed   under   the   Act   which   are   made  punishable.     But   those   very   orders   could   be  JUDGMENT 9 Page 9 passed   only  in   the  face   of  acts  of   domestic  violence.   What constituted domestic violence  was not known until the passage of the act and  could not have formed the basis of a complaint  of commission of ‘Domestic violence’.” 10.   From the judgment passed by the Trial Court  (XIII   Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Egmore,   Chennai  th dated 5  December, 2008) we find that the appellant  filed   petition   against   her   husband   Babu   seeking  relief under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 under the  PWD Act, 2005.  Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 read as  follows: “18.   Protection   orders.­ The   Magistrate   may,  after   giving   the   aggrieved   person   and   the  respondent an opportunity of being heard and on  being   prima   facie   satisfied   that   domestic  violence has taken place or is likely to take  place, pass a protection order in favour of the  aggrieved   person   and   prohibit   the   respondent  from­  (a) committing any act of domestic violence;  (b)   aiding   or   abetting   in   the   commission   of  acts of domestic violence;  (c)   entering   the   place   of   employment   of   the  aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is  a   child,   its   school   or   any   other   place  frequented by the aggrieved person;  (d)   attempting   to   communicate   in   any   form,  whatsoever,   with   the   aggrieved   person,  including   personal,   oral   or   written   or  electronic or telephonic contact;  (e)   alienating   any   assets,   operating   bank  lockers   or   bank   accounts   used   or   held   or  enjoyed   by   both   the   parties,   jointly   by   the  aggrieved person and the respondent or singly  by   the   respondent,   including   her   stridhan   or  any other property held either jointly by the  JUDGMENT 10 Page 10 parties or separately by them without the leave  of the Magistrate;  (f) causing violence to the dependants, other  relatives or any person who give the aggrieved  person assistance from domestic violence;  (g) committing any other act as specified in  the protection order.    19. Residence orders.­( 1) While disposing of an  application   under   sub­section   (1)   of   section  12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that  domestic   violence   has   taken   place,   pass   a  residence order –  (a) restraining   the   respondent   from  dispossessing   or   in   any   other   manner  disturbing   the   possession   of   the   aggrieved  person from the shared household, whether or  not the respondent has a legal or equitable  interest in the shared household;  (b) directing   the   respondent   to   remove  himself from the shared household;  (c) restraining the respondent or any of his  relatives from entering any portion of the  shared   household   in   which   the   aggrieved  person resides;  (d) restraining   the   respondent   from  alienating   or   disposing   off   the   shared  household or encumbering the same;  JUDGMENT (e) restraining   the   respondent   from  renouncing   his   rights   in   the   shared  household   except   with   the   leave   of   the  Magistrate; or  (f) directing  the  respondent  to  secure  same  level   of   alternate   accommodation   for   the  aggrieved   person   as   enjoyed   by   her   in   the  shared   household   or   to   pay   rent   for   the  same, if the circumstances so require:  Provided that no order under clause (b) shall  be passed against any person who is a woman. 11 Page 11 (2) The Magistrate may impose any additional  conditions or pass any other direction which he  may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to  provide for the safety of the aggrieved person  or any child of such aggrieved person.  (3) The Magistrate may require from the  respondent to execute a bond, with or without  sureties, for preventing the commission of  domestic violence.  (4)   An   order   under   sub­section   (3)   shall   be  deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)  and shall be dealt with accordingly.  (5)   While   passing   an   order   under   sub­section  (1),   sub­section   (2)   or   sub­section   (3),   the  court   may   also   pass   an   order   directing   the  officer in charge of the nearest police station  to give protection to the aggrieved person or  to   assist   her   or   the   person   making   an  application on her behalf in the implementation  of the order.  (6)   While   making   an   order   under   sub­section  (1),   the   Magistrate   may   impose   on   the  respondent   obligations   relating   to   the  discharge   of   rent   and   other   payments,   having  regard to the financial needs and resources of  the parties.  JUDGMENT (7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in­ charge   of   the   police   station   in   whose  jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached  to   assist   in   the   implementation   of   the  protection order.  (8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to  return   to   the   possession   of   the   aggrieved  person her stridhan or any other property or  valuable security to which she is entitled to.    20. Monetary reliefs. ­(1) While disposing of an  application   under   sub­section   (1)   of   section  12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to  pay   monetary   relief   to   meet   the   expenses  incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved  12 Page 12 person and any child of the aggrieved person as  a   result   of   the   domestic   violence   and   such  relief may include, but not limited to,­ (a) the loss of earnings; (b) the medical expenses; (c)   the   loss   caused   due   to   the   destruction,  damage   or   removal   of   any   property   from   the  control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as  well   as   her   children,   if   any,   including   an  order   under   or   in   addition   to   an   order   of  maintenance under section 125 of the Code of  Criminal   Procedure,   1973(2   of   1974)   or   any  other law for the time being in force. (2)   The   monetary   relief   granted   under   this  section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable  and consistent with the standard of living to  which the aggrieved person is accustomed. (3)   The   Magistrate   shall   have   the   power   to  order   an   appropriate   lump   sum   payment   or  monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature  and circumstances of the case may require. (4)   The  Magistrate   shall  send   a   copy  of   the  order   for   monetary   relief   made   under   sub­ section (1) to the parties to the application  and   to   the   in­charge   of   the   police   station  within the local limits of whose jurisdiction  the respondent resides. JUDGMENT (5)   The   respondent   shall   pay   the   monetary  relief granted to the aggrieved person within  the period specified in the order under sub­ section (1). (6)   Upon   the   failure   on   the   part   of   the  respondent   to   make   payment   in   terms   of   the  order under sub­section (1), the Magistrate may  direct   the   employer   or   a   debtor   of   the  respondent,   to   directly   pay   to   the   aggrieved  person or to deposit with the court a portion  of   the   wages   or   salaries   or   debt   due   to   or  accrued to the credit of the respondent, which  amount   may   be   adjusted   towards   the   monetary  relief payable by the respondent.  13 Page 13 ­In addition to other  22. Compensation orders. reliefs as may be granted under this Act, the  Magistrate may on an application being made by  the aggrieved person, pass an order directing  the respondent to pay compensation and damages  for the injuries, including mental torture and  emotional   distress,   caused   by   the   acts   of  domestic   violence   committed   by   that  respondent.”  11. The Trial Court having noticed the provisions  of PWD Act, 2005 and the fact that the appellant­ wife   was   prevented   by   the   respondent­husband   to  enter   the  matrimonial   house   even   after   the   order  passed by the Subordinate Judge, granted protection  under   Section   18   with   further   direction   to   the  respondent­husband   under   Section   19   to   allow   the  appellant­wife to enter in the shared household and  not to disturb the possession of the appellant­wife  JUDGMENT and to pay maintenance of Rs.2,000/­ per month to  meet her medical expenses, food and other expenses.  However, no compensation or damages was granted in  favour of the appellant­wife.   Notices   were   issued   on   the   respondent   but  inspite of service, no affidavit has been filed by  the   respondent  denying   the   averments   made   in  the  petition.  14 Page 14 12. Section   2   (g)   of   PWD   Act,   2005   states   that  “domestic   violence”   has   the   same   meaning   as  assigned   to   it   in   Section   3   of   PWD   Act,   2005.  Section 3 is the definition of domestic violence.  Clause   (iv)   of   Section   3   relates   to   “economic  abuse” which includes prohibition or restriction to  continued access to resources or facilities which  the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by  virtue   of   the   domestic   relationship   including  access   to   the   shared   household   as   evident   from  clause (c) of Section 3(iv). 13. In the present case, in view of the fact that  even   after   the   order   passed   by   the   Subordinate  Judge   the   respondent­husband   has   not   allowed   the  JUDGMENT appellant­wife   to   reside   in   the   shared   household  matrimonial   house,   we   hold   that   there   is   a  continuance of domestic violence committed by the  respondent­husband against the appellant­wife.   In  view of the such continued domestic violence, it is  not   necessary   for   the   courts   below   to   decide  whether the domestic violence is committed prior to  the coming into force of the Protection of Women  15 Page 15 from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and whether such  act   falls   within   the   definition   of   the   term  ‘Domestic Violence’ as defined under Section 3 of  the PWD Act, 2005.  14. The other issue that whether the conduct of the  parties even prior to the commencement of the PWD  Act, 2005 could be taken into consideration while  passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 fell  for consideration before this Court in  V.D. Bhanot  v. Savita Bhanot (2012) 3 SCC 183.    In the said  case, this Court held as follows: “ 12.   We agree with the view expressed by the  High Court that in looking into a complaint  under   Section   12   of   the   PWD   Act,   2005,   the  conduct   of   the   parties   even   prior   to   the  coming   into   force   of   the   PWD   Act,   could   be  taken   into   consideration   while   passing   an  order under Section 18, 19 and 20 thereof.  In  our   view,   the   Delhi   High   Court   has   also  rightly   held   that   even   if   a   wife,   who   had  shared   a   household   in   the   past,   but   was   no  longer doing so when the Act came into force,  would still be entitled to the protection of  the PWD Act, 2005,” JUDGMENT 15. We   are   of   the   view   that   the   act   of   the  respondent­husband squarely comes within the ambit  of Section 3 of the PWD Act, 2005, which defines  “domestic violence” in wide term.   The High Court  16 Page 16 made an apparent error in   holding that the conduct  of the parties prior to the coming into force PWD  Act, 2005 cannot be taken into consideration while  passing   an   order.     This   is   a   case   where   the  respondent­husband has not complied with the order  and   direction   passed   by   the   Trial   Court   and   the  Appellate   Court.   He   also   misleads   the   Court   by  giving wrong statement before the High Court in the  contempt petition filed by the appellant­wife. The  appellant­wife having being harassed since 2000 is  entitled for protection orders and residence orders  under Section 18 and 19 of the PWD, Act, 2005 along  with the maintenance as allowed by the Trial Court  under Section 20 (d) of the PWD, Act, 2005.  Apart  JUDGMENT from   these   reliefs,   she   is   also   entitled   for  compensation   and   damages   for   the   injuries,  including   mental   torture   and   emotional   distress,  caused by the acts of domestic violence committed  by the respondent­husband.   Therefore, in addition  to the reliefs granted by the courts below, we are  of   the   view   that   the   appellant­wife   should   be  compensated   by   the   respondent­husband.   Hence,   the  17 Page 17 respondent is hereby directed to pay compensation  and   damages   to   the   extent   of   Rs.5,00,000/­   in  favour of the appellant­wife.   16. The order passed by the High Court is set aside  with   a   direction   to   the   respondent­husband   to  comply with the orders and directions passed by the  courts   below   with   regard   to   residence   and  maintenance   within   three   months.   The   respondent­ husband   is   further   directed   to   pay   a   sum   of  Rs.5,00,000/­   in   favour   of   the   appellant­wife  within six months from the date of this order.  The  appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations and  directions.     However,   there   shall   be   no  separate  order as to costs.  JUDGMENT ………..………………………………………..J.          (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA) ………………………………………………….J.               (V. GOPALA GOWDA) NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER  25, 2013. 18 Page 18