KANCHAN KUMAR vs. THE STATE OF BIHAR

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1562 OF 2022 ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 9601 OF 2016 KANCHAN KUMAR                 ...APPELLANT VERSUS THE STATE OF BIHAR      ...RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA J.  1.  Leave granted. 2. This   appeal   is   against   the   concurrent   dismissals   by   the 1 2 Trial  and the High Court  of the application for discharge filed by the   Appellant   under   Section   227   of   the   Code   of   Criminal 3 Procedure, 1973 .

Page 1 of 16 3.   Facts leading to the filing of this Appeal:   The Appellant 4 joined the Bihar State Financial Corporation   in the capacity of an Assistant General Manager on 19.07.1974. After a period of thirteen years, in 1987, a complaint came to be filed against the Appellant for having allegedly purchased three houses and two pieces of land in Bihar, which according to the complainant, was disproportionate to Appellant’s known sources of income. This complaint was inquired into, and after a detailed investigation, the allegations were found to be false. Except for a residential house   in   Patna,   which   the   Appellant   had   purchased   on 29.08.1988 for Rs. 2,26,500 with the help of a loan from the BSFC, no other assets could be traced to the ownership of the Appellant. However, despite finding no merit in the allegation, the investigation was kept pending.  4. In the meanwhile, life moved on and in 1996, the Appellant 5 joined the Oil and Natural Gas Commission  as Deputy General Manager on deputation, keeping his lien with the BSFC.   Four years after joining ONGC, an FIR came to be registered against him   on   21.02.2000,  under   Sections   13(l)(d)   and   13(2)   of   the 4  hereinafter referred to as ‘the BSFC’. 5  hereinafter referred to as ‘the ONGC’. Page 2 of 16 6 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 , on the same allegation that he possessed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. These alleged assets were purportedly acquired during his tenure with the BSFC, and consequently, the check period in the   FIR   was   considered   from   the   date   he   joined   BSFC,   i.e., 19.07.1974 to the date of registration of the residential house purchased by him, i.e., 29.08.1988. The Appellant wrote a letter to   the   Director   General   of   Police   (Vigilance),   Patna,   on 18.04.2002, raising a grievance that the calculations in the FIR undervalued   his   income   and   overvalued   his   assets,   thus depicting a false and inflated account of his expenditure. 5. Eventually a charge sheet came to be filed on 11.09.2007, i.e., about seven years after the registration of the FIR, and in fact, twenty years after the complaint on this very allegation was found   to   be   false   by   the   authorities.   Be   that   as   it   may,   the charge­sheet filed against the Appellant indicated that he earned a total income of Rs. 3,01,561 and incurred an expenditure of Rs. 5,24,386 during the check period. In view of this, the charge against   the   Appellant   was   of   having   amassed  Rs.   2,22,825, disproportionate to his known sources of income.  The charge­ 6  hereinafter referred to as the ‘PC Act’. Page 3 of 16 sheet indicated two components of his income, being ­ i) savings rd of Rs. 1,13,081 (1/3   of his salary), and ii) home and car loan from BSFC worth Rs. 1,88,480. On the other hand, the charge sheet   included   six   components   of   his   expenditure,   being   –   i) payment of Rs. 2,26,500 towards the construction of his house, ii) general expenditure during the check period of Rs. 24,800, iii) amount in bank deposit worth Rs. 55,000, iv) loan repayment of Rs. 53,467, v) LIC deposit worth Rs. 6,057, and vi) estimated value of articles found during a search conducted on 21.02.2000, as being Rs. 1,58,562. At the relevant stage, the Appellant applied for discharge 6. under “Section 239” of the Cr.P.C (which should have been under 7 Section 227 ) before the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna, alleging   that   there   were   glaring   errors   in   the   calculation. However, the Court summarily dismissed the application by  its order   dated   28.03.2016,   without   analysing   or   examining   the documents produced and the arguments advanced. The Court held that: 7  Though the Appellant stated that the application is under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C., as Special   Judges   appointed   under   the   PC   Act   are   deemed   to   be   Court   of   Session,   the discharge application should have been filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., and not under Section 239 therein. The Ld counsel for the Appellant Shri Sunil Kumar, Senior Advocate clarified this position of law while making his submissions. Page 4 of 16 “ Perused the record and I find that there is sufficient materials against accused in this case at   least   prima   facie   at   this   stage   to   frame charge against the accused against whom there is allegation that he during the check period amassed. Although certain explanations have been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner but the same appears to be looked into and appreciated during the course of trial when the accused petitioner wife have a chance to   prevents   innocence   producing   his   oral   or documentary evidences. For the present I am not satisfied with the explanation so produced by the accused in his favour in support of his discharge application. Considering   the   aforesaid   facts   and circumstances   the   charge   petition   of   the accused petitioner namely Kanchan Kumar is hereby   rejected.   Put   up   on   22.04.2016   for framing of charge. The accused is directed to remaining   physically   present   on   the   date   so fixed by this court for framing of charge.” Aggrieved by the dismissal of his application for discharge, 7. the   Appellant   moved   the   High   Court.   After   recounting   the chronology   of   events,   the   High   Court   proceeded   to   quote judgment   after   judgment,   and   finally   dismissed   the   revision application by merely holding that:  “   In   the   aforesaid   circumstances,   even   if 15. considering the submissions made on behalf of petitioner,   for   argument’s   sake   needs   proper verification   attracting   roving   enquiry   which could be permissible only during course of trial. Page 5 of 16  Much emphasis has been laid at the end of 16. the petitioner relating to valuation. With the cost of repetition, the contention of the petitioner is that as the raid was conducted on 21.02.2000, on account thereof, the valuation having been shown against the article so seized at the end of the Vigilance must be considered to be in consonance   with   the   date   of   recovery.   That argument   happens   to   be   fallacious   in   the background of the fact that from the case diary, it is evident that valuation has been estimated only. There happens to be complete absence of prima facie material whereupon one could infer that the value so affixed at that very moment was   prevailing   rate   on   the   alleged   date   of seizure. Furthermore, to ascertain genuineness on this score will again attract roving enquiry which for the present stage is found forbidden.  17.  Consequent thereupon, the instant petition is  found  devoid  of  merit  and  is, accordingly, rejected. ” 8. It   is   against   the   aforesaid   order   that   the   Appellant   has approached this Court.   9. Submissions of parties : The Ld. Senior Counsel Shri Sunil Kumar has submitted that the basic objection relating to the calculation and wrongful inclusion of certain items was sufficient for the Trial Court to discharge the Appellant. In a simple and straight forward submission, he took us through certain glaring errors that were evident from the record of the case before the Page 6 of 16 Special Judge (Vigilance). In support of his submissions, he also referred to the decisions of this Court in  Union of India  v.  Prafulla 8 Kumar Samal and Anr.  and  Ghulam Hassan Beigh  v.  Mohammad 9 Maqbool Magrey . 10. The counsel for the Respondent  Shri Abhinav Mukerji AOR, has contended that the Trial Court was right in dismissing the discharge application. He submitted that the Courts could not have   conducted   a   roving   inquiry   while   adjudicating   an application under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. 11. The   short   question   arising   for   consideration   is Issue:   whether   the   Appellant   is   entitled   to   be   discharged   of   the proceedings initiated against him under the PC Act.  12. Legal provision and precedents:  Section 227 of the Cr.P.C relating to discharge is as under:  “ If, upon consideration of 227. Discharge —   the   record   of   the   case   and   the   documents submitted   therewith,   and   after   hearing   the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and ” record his reasons for so doing. 8  (1979) 3 SCC 4. 9  2022 SCC OnLine SC 913. Page 7 of 16 13. The   threshold   of   scrutiny   required   to   adjudicate   an application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., is to consider the broad probabilities of the case and the total effect of the material on record, including examination of any infirmities appearing in the case.  In  Prafulla Kumar Samal  (supra), it was noted that:

(1)   That   the   Judge   while   considering   the question   of   framing   the   charges   under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2)   Where   the   materials   placed   before   the Court   disclose   grave   suspicion   against   the accused   which   has   not   been   properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would   naturally   depend   upon   the   facts   of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views  are  equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced   before   him   while   giving   rise   to some   suspicion   but   not   grave   suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. Page 8 of 16 (4)  That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section   227   of   the   Code   the   Judge   which under   the   present   Code   is   a   senior   and experienced   court   cannot   act   merely   as   a Post   Office   or   a   mouthpiece   of   the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and   weigh   the   evidence   as   if   he   was conducting a trial.”                                                (emphasis supplied) 10 14.   In   Sajjan  Kumar   v.   Central  Bureau  of  Investigation ,   the Court cautioned against accepting every document produced by the prosecution on face value, and noted that it was important to sift the evidence produced before the Court. It observed that: “ On consideration of the authorities about 21.   the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: ... (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court   must   apply   its   judicial   mind   on   the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and 10  (2010) 9 SCC 368. Page 9 of 16 documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value   disclose   the   existence   of   all   the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this   limited   purpose,   sift   the   evidence   as   it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case...” (emphasis supplied) 15.   Summarising the principles on discharge under Section 227 of   the   Cr.P.C,   in   Dipakbhai   Jagdishchandra   Patel   v.   State   of 11 Gujarat ,  this Court recapitulated: “   At   the   stage   of   framing   the   charge   in 23. accordance with the principles which have been laid   down   by   this   Court,   what   the   court   is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the   prosecution.   The   sifting   is   not   to   be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle   of   the   trial   Judge   hearing   arguments after   the   entire   evidence   has   been   adduced after a full­fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for   the   conviction   of   the   accused.  All   that   is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at 11  (2019) 16 SCC 547. Page 10 of 16 the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where   it   is   possible   that   the   accused   has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the   suspicion   which   is   premised   on   some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the   accused   has   committed   the   offence.” (emphasis supplied) Without getting into too many details, we 16.1 Analysis:   consider it to be appropriate and in fact sufficient to confine our inquiry to three heads of expenditure indicated in the charge­ sheet itself. This limited inquiry will also satisfy the requirements of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.    The first objection pertains to the inclusion an amount 16.2 of Rs. 55,000, recorded as the balance amount in the Appellant’s bank account during the check period, and accordingly counted as   an   expenditure   in   the   charge   sheet.   However,   the   Bank Passbook   filed   by   the   Appellant,   which   was   available   to   the Investigation Officer and the Special Judge (Vigilance), evidently records a balance amount of only Rs. 11,998 during the check­ period. The difference in the figures was not explained by the Prosecution. Accordingly, the Special Judge (Vigilance) and the Page 11 of 16 High Court failed to reconcile such a simple and straightforward inconsistency in the Prosecution’s evidence. We are of the opinion that only an amount of Rs. 11,998, recorded in the Appellant’s Bank Passbook during the check­period as the balance amount, is validly admissible as expenditure under this head. 16.3 The   second   objection   relates   to   the   inclusion   of   an amount of Rs. 53,467 as expenditure towards repayment of the loan from the BSFC. However, the amount repaid towards loan instalments was already deducted from Appellant’s gross salary, and the deducted figure was recorded as the total disposable income with the Appellant during the check period. Hence, the loan repayment cannot be separately counted as an expenditure yet again. This is a glaring mistake. The Special Judge (Vigilance) as well as the High Court did not consider this objection on the ground   that   a   roving   inquiry   is   not   permissible   the   stage   of discharge.  16.4 The   third   objection   relates   to   the   inclusion   of   Rs. 1,58,562   as   the   value   of   the   articles   found   during   a   search conducted in Appellant’s house on 21.02.2000, twelve years after the check period of 1974 to 1988. There is nothing to indicate, Page 12 of 16 even  prima facie , that these articles found during the search in the year 2000 were acquired during the check period. In the absence of any material to link these articles as having been acquired during the check period, it is impermissible to include their value in the expenditure. We are therefore of the opinion that the Appellant’s objection about inclusion of this amount in the list of expenditure is fully justified. Unfortunately, even this objection, which did not require much scrutiny of the material on record, was not considered by the Special Judge (Vigilance) or the High Court. 17.  The three heads of expenditure discussed hereinabove must be excluded from Appellant’s total alleged expenditure during the check   period.   First,   the   Appellant’s   actual   balance   amount reflected in the Bank Passbook, i.e., Rs. 11,998, as against the purported account balance of Rs. 55,000, must be taken into account. Further, the second and third amounts, as indicated above,   must   be   excluded   from   Appellant’s   total   expenditure mentioned in the charge­sheet. Accordingly, the total expenditure comes only to Rs. 2,69,355, and not Rs. 5,24,386, which is based on certain mistakes that we have indicated hereinabove. It is this Page 13 of 16 expenditure of Rs. 2,69,355 which is to be contrasted with the income   of   Rs.   3,01,561   during   the   check­period.   These   facts clearly demonstrate that there is no  prima facie  case made out by the prosecution and therefore the Appellant was entitled to be discharged.  18. The conclusions that we have drawn are based on materials placed before us, which are part of the  case record. This is the same record that was available with the Special Judge (Vigilance) when the application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. was taken up.   Despite   that,   the   Special   Judge   (Vigilance)   dismissed   the discharge application on the simple ground that a roving inquiry is   not   permitted   at   the   stage   of   discharge.   What   we   have undertaken is not a roving inquiry, but a simple and necessary inquiry for a proper adjudication of an application for discharge. The Special Judge (Vigilance) was bound to conduct a similar inquiry for coming to a conclusion that a  prima facie  case is made out for the Appellant to stand trial. Unfortunately, the High Court committed   the   same   mistake   as   that   of   the   Special   Judge (Vigilance). Page 14 of 16 19. Apart from the above analysis, we would note with great distress   that   the   allegation   relating   to   Appellant’s disproportionate income in the period between 1974 and 1988 was levelled in an FIR filed twelve years after the said period concluded. The charge­sheet came to be filed seven years after the registration of the FIR. The application for discharge came to be dismissed on 28.03.2016, almost after a decade of filing of the charge   sheet.   The   dismissal   was   affirmed   by   the   High   Court seven months thereafter, i.e., on 05.10.2016. Finally, and most unfortunately,   the   present   SLP   has   been   pending   before   this Court for  the last six  years.  In the  meanwhile, the  Appellant superannuated from service in 2010, but had no option except to contest   the   case.   He   is   now   72   years.   Continuation   of   the prosecution, apart from the illegality as indicated hereinabove, would also be unjust.  For the reasons stated above, we allow the Criminal Appeal 20. arising out of  SLP  (Crl) No. 9601 of  2016, and  set aside the judgment and order of the High Court of Patna in CRLM No. 23031 of 2016 dated 05.10.2016, and that of the Court of Special Page 15 of 16 Judge (Vigilance), Patna in  Special Case No. 09 of 2000, dated 28.03.2016, and discharge the Appellant.   21. No order as to costs. ……………………………….J.                                                             [B.R. GAVAI] ……………………………….J. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA] NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 14, 2022               Page 16 of 16