Full Judgment Text
2010:BHC-OS:5555-DB
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICUATURE AT MUMBAI
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO. 45 OF 2009
Sudarshan Kumar S/o Basuki )
Singh, Aged about 34 years, )
Indian Hindu Inhabitant at )
Mumbai, Occupation : Service )
as Assistant Provident Fund )
Commissioner, having his )
office at Regional Office, )
Mumbai – 1, Bhavishya Nidhi )
Bhavan, 341, Bandra (East), )
Mumbai – 400 051. ... ).. ... ... Petitioner.
Versus
1) The Union of India, )
Through the office of the )
Government Pleader, High )
Court, Mumbai400 023. )
2) The Employees' Provident )
Fund Organization, )
Bhavishya Nidhi Bhava, )
14Bhikaiji Cama Place, )
New Delhi – 110 066. )
3) The Central Provident Fund)
Commissioner, Employees' )
Provident Fund )
Organization, Bhavishya )
Nidhi Bhavan, 14 – Bhikaiji)
Cama Place, New Delhi )
110 066. )
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2
4) The Regional Provident )
Fund CommissionerI, )
Regional Office – Mumbai )
I, Bhavishya Nidhi Bhavan)
341, Bandra (East), )
Mumbai – 400 051. )... ... Respondents.
Ms. Meena Doshi, Amicus Curae.
Mr. M. I. Sethna, Sr. Counsel with Mr. J. B. Mishra
for the Respondents.
CORAM : F. I. REBELLO &
A. A. SAYED, JJ.
DATED : 30TH APRIL, 2010
JUDGMENT (Per F. I. Rebello, J.) :
Rule. Heard forthwith.
2. The petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition to impugn the
th
circular dated 19 June, 2008. At the relevant time the petitioner
was working as Assistant Commissioner of Provident Fund,
Employees' Provident Fund Organization (EPFO). The petitioner was
also exercising power as an Authority under Section 7A of the
Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
for the purpose of deciding the disputes arising under the provisions
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3
of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 (which shall hereinafter be referred to as “the Act”).
th
3. On 30 January, 2009 this Court had directed that no
departmental action should be taken against the petitioner in
relation to the issuance of arrest warrants on the parties in respect of
th
the subject proceedings pending before him. On 28 April, 2009 a
statement was made by the petitioner that the petition is a public
interest litigation and the office was accordingly allowed to process
th
it. On 5 November, 2009 Amicus Curiae was appointed to espouse
the cause of the petitioner. The office thereafter has reregistered the
th
petition as Public Interest Litigation No. 45 of 2009. By order of 10
th
March, 2010 the guideline No.3 of the Circular dated 19 June, 2008
was directed not to be given effect to until further orders.
4. On behalf of the petitioner, the learned Amicus Curiae submits
that paragraph 3 of the Circular affects the administration of justice
and interferes with the functioning of a quasijudicial authority. It is
further submitted that such a circular is in contravention to Article
50 of the Constitution of India which enjoins on the State to separate
the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State.
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4
Any administrative instruction or direction which interferes with the
administration of justice is arbitrary and therefore liable to be
quashed and set aside.
5. We may gainfully refer to paragraph 3 of the Circular dated
th
19 June, 2008, which reads as under :
“3. The officers of the rank of APFC should not invoke
powers to issue arrest warrant in the matter of 7A in a routine
manner unless all other methods including the repeated
utilization of the Enforcement Officer's services are exhausted
and the prior permission of RPFCII (InCharge SRO)/RPFCI
as the case may be is obtained for invoking the power u/s
7A(2)(a).”
6. Reply has been filed on behalf of respondents opposing the
relief sought for in the petition. It is set out that the Circulars are
merely instructions issued to bring awareness amongst the Officers to
act reasonably and fairly and they should not act under duress and
or arbitrarily and to avoid rash use of powers which may be
detrimental to the image of the organization. It is, therefore,
contended that the said paragraph nowhere interferes with the
functioning of the quasijudicial authorities.
Written submissions have also been filed on behalf of the
respondents. According to respondents two main questions arise for
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5
consideration which are (A) Locus standi of the petitioner to move
the public interest litigation; and (B) Assuming that he has locus,
whether the present petition can be entertained on the ground of
public interest.
7. It is set out that the said Circular came to be issued pursuant
to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vignan
Education Development Society, Ongole v/s Assistant Provident
Fund Commissioner and Authority, Guntur and Others., 2005 II
LLJ 728, where the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court on the facts was pleased to observe that the arrest warrant
issued against the petitioner disclosed gross misuse of powers. That
order was upheld in appeal. It is further contended that at the time
th
the petition was filed on 25 July, 2008 the petitioner's charge was
th
transferred with effect from 19 June, 2008. It is, therefore, set out
that in these circumstances the petitioner would have no locus standi
to maintain the petition. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of J. R. Raghupathy v/s State of A.P. &
others , AIR 1988 SC 1681, to contend that in respect of the
administrative instructions this Court will not interfere with the
exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
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6
Constitution of India.
8. To understand the controversy, we may gainfully reproduce Sections
7A(1), (2), (3) and (3-A) of the Act, which reads as under:
“7A. Determination of moneys due from employers.-
(1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Additional
Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Fund
Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or any
Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may by order,-
(a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of
this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute; and
(b) determine the amount due from any employer under any
provision of this Act, the Scheme or the Pension Scheme or the
Insurance Scheme, as the case may be,
and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he
may deem necessary.
(2) The Officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall,
for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested
in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for
trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on
oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;
(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;
and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of
Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
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7
(3) No order shall be made under sub-section (1), unless the
employer concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of representing
his case.
(3-A) Where the employer, employee or any other person required to
attend the inquiry under sub-section (1) fails to attend such inquiry
without assigning any valid reason or fails to produce any document
or to file any report or return when called upon to do so, the officer
conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or
determine the amount due from any employer, as the case may be, on
the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and other
documents available on record.
(4) . . . . . .
(5) . . . . . .”
The bare perusal of the afore mentioned provisions would show that
the authorities under Section 7A conducting an inquiry have been
conferred powers as are vested in a Civil Court including enforcing
attendance of any person or examining him on oath. It is in that
context that we must examine the paragraph to the circular.
9. On consideration of paragraph 3 of the said Circular, the first
part is setting out that the power to issue arrest warrant should not
be exercised in a routine manner, perhaps that could be said to be
merely advisory in character. However, the following sentence, “........
and the prior permission of RPFCII (InCharge SRO)/RPFCI as the
case may be is obtained for invoking the power u/s 7A(2)(a)”, can be
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8
said to directly interfere with the power of quasi judicial authority
exercising its powers under Section 7A of the Act. The contention in
the affidavit of respondents that even if a power has been conferred,
it should be used sparingly and with utmost care cannot be faulted.
The question is who will decide. Is it the quasiJudicial Authority or
by the administrative circular such as the one we have reproduced
earlier. The law on exercise of discretion even by an administrative
authority is well settled. We may only quote the relevant portion of
para 20 from the judgment in J. R. Raghupathy (supra), which reads
thus:
“At one time, the traditional view in England was that
the executive was not answerable where its action was
attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor De
Smith in his classical work `Judicial Review of Administrative
th
Action' 4 Edn., at pp. 285287 states the law in his own terse
language. The relevant principles formulated by the courts
may be broadly summarized as follows. The authority in which
a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that
discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In
general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to
which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address
itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation
of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in
each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion
it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do
what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good
faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must
not be wayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to
promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the
legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act
arbitrarily or capriciously.”
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9
Therefore, it is for the authorities in whom the power is vested
to exercise the power. The exercise of power cannot be interfered
with by any administrative authority. If such a power is allowed to be
exercised by an administrative authority which has the effect of
controlling the exercise of power of quasijudicial or judicial body
that would directly impinge on the administration of justice and the
rule of law. It is not possible for this Court to accept such a
contention that the judicial power can be fettered by administrative
instructions. The rule of law would contemplate that the judicial
authority exercises its powers in terms of the act and the rules
framed thereunder. If the Authority is a creature of a statute it is
bound by the provisions of that statute. A body even if be a part of
the machinery of the same act cannot be permitted to issue direction
controlling the discretion of the authority exercising quasijudicial
powers. In our opinion, therefore, para 3 of the impugned Circular is
arbitrary and violative of the powers conferred on the authority
under Section 7A of the Act and consequently will have to be set
aside.
10. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondents by their
counsel relying on the judgment in J. R. Raghupathy (Supra) that the
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10
Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in respect of the administrative Circulars, would really not arise
in this case. In J. R. Raghupathy's case (supra) on the facts there it
would be clear that what was being considered was the setting up of
Mandal Headquarter and for that purpose the State Government had
issued a Circular which had to be considered while proposing the
setting up of the Mandal Headquarter. It is in that context that the
Court observed that there must be legal right and then only can a
Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The law is well settled that mandamus does not lie to enforce
administrative instructions not having any statutory force and which
do not give any legal right in favour of the petitioner. The reason
being they confer no legal right upon anybody.
11. The other challenge was to the maintenance of the petition as
a public interest litigation. It is true that the petitioner, when he filed
a petition, did it as a person aggrieved. The Court, however,
thereafter allowed the petition to be treated as a public interest
litigation and has been so processing. We have no difficulty in
holding that the petition would be maintainable as a public interest
litigation as paragraph 3 of the impugned Circular is arbitrary and
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11
apart from that directly impinges or interferes with the
administration of justice. In these circumstances, we have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioner would have locus to
maintain this petition as a public interest litigation.
12. We had earlier noted that this Court had directed the
respondents not to proceed to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioner herein. Once the petitioner exercises his quasi
judicial powers conferred by statute, it is really not for the executive
to proceed to hold that the action amounts to misconduct warranting
disciplinary proceeding. The law would require that any exercise of
judicial powers can only be corrected by taking recourse to remedies
available under the Act. Administrative Authority cannot sit in
judgment over a judicial or quasijudicial order under the order be
malafide. In the circumstances, if the respondents are proceeding to
initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for
exercise of quasijudicial powers, in our opinion, prima facie, such an
exercise cannot be done. However, we do not propose to enter into
that controversy considering that the issue is not directly before us.
In the light of that the following order:
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12
13. Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), to the extent
th
that paragraph 3 of the impugned Circular dated 19 June, 2008
issued by the Central Provident Fund Commissioner is quashed and
set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as
to costs.
Sd/
(F.I. REBELLO,J.)
Sd/
(A. A. SAYED, J.)
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1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICUATURE AT MUMBAI
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO. 45 OF 2009
Sudarshan Kumar S/o Basuki )
Singh, Aged about 34 years, )
Indian Hindu Inhabitant at )
Mumbai, Occupation : Service )
as Assistant Provident Fund )
Commissioner, having his )
office at Regional Office, )
Mumbai – 1, Bhavishya Nidhi )
Bhavan, 341, Bandra (East), )
Mumbai – 400 051. ... ).. ... ... Petitioner.
Versus
1) The Union of India, )
Through the office of the )
Government Pleader, High )
Court, Mumbai400 023. )
2) The Employees' Provident )
Fund Organization, )
Bhavishya Nidhi Bhava, )
14Bhikaiji Cama Place, )
New Delhi – 110 066. )
3) The Central Provident Fund)
Commissioner, Employees' )
Provident Fund )
Organization, Bhavishya )
Nidhi Bhavan, 14 – Bhikaiji)
Cama Place, New Delhi )
110 066. )
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2
4) The Regional Provident )
Fund CommissionerI, )
Regional Office – Mumbai )
I, Bhavishya Nidhi Bhavan)
341, Bandra (East), )
Mumbai – 400 051. )... ... Respondents.
Ms. Meena Doshi, Amicus Curae.
Mr. M. I. Sethna, Sr. Counsel with Mr. J. B. Mishra
for the Respondents.
CORAM : F. I. REBELLO &
A. A. SAYED, JJ.
DATED : 30TH APRIL, 2010
JUDGMENT (Per F. I. Rebello, J.) :
Rule. Heard forthwith.
2. The petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition to impugn the
th
circular dated 19 June, 2008. At the relevant time the petitioner
was working as Assistant Commissioner of Provident Fund,
Employees' Provident Fund Organization (EPFO). The petitioner was
also exercising power as an Authority under Section 7A of the
Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
for the purpose of deciding the disputes arising under the provisions
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
3
of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 (which shall hereinafter be referred to as “the Act”).
th
3. On 30 January, 2009 this Court had directed that no
departmental action should be taken against the petitioner in
relation to the issuance of arrest warrants on the parties in respect of
th
the subject proceedings pending before him. On 28 April, 2009 a
statement was made by the petitioner that the petition is a public
interest litigation and the office was accordingly allowed to process
th
it. On 5 November, 2009 Amicus Curiae was appointed to espouse
the cause of the petitioner. The office thereafter has reregistered the
th
petition as Public Interest Litigation No. 45 of 2009. By order of 10
th
March, 2010 the guideline No.3 of the Circular dated 19 June, 2008
was directed not to be given effect to until further orders.
4. On behalf of the petitioner, the learned Amicus Curiae submits
that paragraph 3 of the Circular affects the administration of justice
and interferes with the functioning of a quasijudicial authority. It is
further submitted that such a circular is in contravention to Article
50 of the Constitution of India which enjoins on the State to separate
the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State.
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
4
Any administrative instruction or direction which interferes with the
administration of justice is arbitrary and therefore liable to be
quashed and set aside.
5. We may gainfully refer to paragraph 3 of the Circular dated
th
19 June, 2008, which reads as under :
“3. The officers of the rank of APFC should not invoke
powers to issue arrest warrant in the matter of 7A in a routine
manner unless all other methods including the repeated
utilization of the Enforcement Officer's services are exhausted
and the prior permission of RPFCII (InCharge SRO)/RPFCI
as the case may be is obtained for invoking the power u/s
7A(2)(a).”
6. Reply has been filed on behalf of respondents opposing the
relief sought for in the petition. It is set out that the Circulars are
merely instructions issued to bring awareness amongst the Officers to
act reasonably and fairly and they should not act under duress and
or arbitrarily and to avoid rash use of powers which may be
detrimental to the image of the organization. It is, therefore,
contended that the said paragraph nowhere interferes with the
functioning of the quasijudicial authorities.
Written submissions have also been filed on behalf of the
respondents. According to respondents two main questions arise for
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
5
consideration which are (A) Locus standi of the petitioner to move
the public interest litigation; and (B) Assuming that he has locus,
whether the present petition can be entertained on the ground of
public interest.
7. It is set out that the said Circular came to be issued pursuant
to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vignan
Education Development Society, Ongole v/s Assistant Provident
Fund Commissioner and Authority, Guntur and Others., 2005 II
LLJ 728, where the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court on the facts was pleased to observe that the arrest warrant
issued against the petitioner disclosed gross misuse of powers. That
order was upheld in appeal. It is further contended that at the time
th
the petition was filed on 25 July, 2008 the petitioner's charge was
th
transferred with effect from 19 June, 2008. It is, therefore, set out
that in these circumstances the petitioner would have no locus standi
to maintain the petition. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of J. R. Raghupathy v/s State of A.P. &
others , AIR 1988 SC 1681, to contend that in respect of the
administrative instructions this Court will not interfere with the
exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
6
Constitution of India.
8. To understand the controversy, we may gainfully reproduce Sections
7A(1), (2), (3) and (3-A) of the Act, which reads as under:
“7A. Determination of moneys due from employers.-
(1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Additional
Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Fund
Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or any
Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may by order,-
(a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of
this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute; and
(b) determine the amount due from any employer under any
provision of this Act, the Scheme or the Pension Scheme or the
Insurance Scheme, as the case may be,
and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he
may deem necessary.
(2) The Officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall,
for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested
in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for
trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on
oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;
(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;
and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of
Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
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7
(3) No order shall be made under sub-section (1), unless the
employer concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of representing
his case.
(3-A) Where the employer, employee or any other person required to
attend the inquiry under sub-section (1) fails to attend such inquiry
without assigning any valid reason or fails to produce any document
or to file any report or return when called upon to do so, the officer
conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or
determine the amount due from any employer, as the case may be, on
the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and other
documents available on record.
(4) . . . . . .
(5) . . . . . .”
The bare perusal of the afore mentioned provisions would show that
the authorities under Section 7A conducting an inquiry have been
conferred powers as are vested in a Civil Court including enforcing
attendance of any person or examining him on oath. It is in that
context that we must examine the paragraph to the circular.
9. On consideration of paragraph 3 of the said Circular, the first
part is setting out that the power to issue arrest warrant should not
be exercised in a routine manner, perhaps that could be said to be
merely advisory in character. However, the following sentence, “........
and the prior permission of RPFCII (InCharge SRO)/RPFCI as the
case may be is obtained for invoking the power u/s 7A(2)(a)”, can be
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
8
said to directly interfere with the power of quasi judicial authority
exercising its powers under Section 7A of the Act. The contention in
the affidavit of respondents that even if a power has been conferred,
it should be used sparingly and with utmost care cannot be faulted.
The question is who will decide. Is it the quasiJudicial Authority or
by the administrative circular such as the one we have reproduced
earlier. The law on exercise of discretion even by an administrative
authority is well settled. We may only quote the relevant portion of
para 20 from the judgment in J. R. Raghupathy (supra), which reads
thus:
“At one time, the traditional view in England was that
the executive was not answerable where its action was
attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor De
Smith in his classical work `Judicial Review of Administrative
th
Action' 4 Edn., at pp. 285287 states the law in his own terse
language. The relevant principles formulated by the courts
may be broadly summarized as follows. The authority in which
a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that
discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In
general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to
which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address
itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation
of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in
each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion
it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do
what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good
faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must
not be wayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to
promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the
legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act
arbitrarily or capriciously.”
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
9
Therefore, it is for the authorities in whom the power is vested
to exercise the power. The exercise of power cannot be interfered
with by any administrative authority. If such a power is allowed to be
exercised by an administrative authority which has the effect of
controlling the exercise of power of quasijudicial or judicial body
that would directly impinge on the administration of justice and the
rule of law. It is not possible for this Court to accept such a
contention that the judicial power can be fettered by administrative
instructions. The rule of law would contemplate that the judicial
authority exercises its powers in terms of the act and the rules
framed thereunder. If the Authority is a creature of a statute it is
bound by the provisions of that statute. A body even if be a part of
the machinery of the same act cannot be permitted to issue direction
controlling the discretion of the authority exercising quasijudicial
powers. In our opinion, therefore, para 3 of the impugned Circular is
arbitrary and violative of the powers conferred on the authority
under Section 7A of the Act and consequently will have to be set
aside.
10. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondents by their
counsel relying on the judgment in J. R. Raghupathy (Supra) that the
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
10
Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in respect of the administrative Circulars, would really not arise
in this case. In J. R. Raghupathy's case (supra) on the facts there it
would be clear that what was being considered was the setting up of
Mandal Headquarter and for that purpose the State Government had
issued a Circular which had to be considered while proposing the
setting up of the Mandal Headquarter. It is in that context that the
Court observed that there must be legal right and then only can a
Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The law is well settled that mandamus does not lie to enforce
administrative instructions not having any statutory force and which
do not give any legal right in favour of the petitioner. The reason
being they confer no legal right upon anybody.
11. The other challenge was to the maintenance of the petition as
a public interest litigation. It is true that the petitioner, when he filed
a petition, did it as a person aggrieved. The Court, however,
thereafter allowed the petition to be treated as a public interest
litigation and has been so processing. We have no difficulty in
holding that the petition would be maintainable as a public interest
litigation as paragraph 3 of the impugned Circular is arbitrary and
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::
11
apart from that directly impinges or interferes with the
administration of justice. In these circumstances, we have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioner would have locus to
maintain this petition as a public interest litigation.
12. We had earlier noted that this Court had directed the
respondents not to proceed to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioner herein. Once the petitioner exercises his quasi
judicial powers conferred by statute, it is really not for the executive
to proceed to hold that the action amounts to misconduct warranting
disciplinary proceeding. The law would require that any exercise of
judicial powers can only be corrected by taking recourse to remedies
available under the Act. Administrative Authority cannot sit in
judgment over a judicial or quasijudicial order under the order be
malafide. In the circumstances, if the respondents are proceeding to
initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for
exercise of quasijudicial powers, in our opinion, prima facie, such an
exercise cannot be done. However, we do not propose to enter into
that controversy considering that the issue is not directly before us.
In the light of that the following order:
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12
13. Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), to the extent
th
that paragraph 3 of the impugned Circular dated 19 June, 2008
issued by the Central Provident Fund Commissioner is quashed and
set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as
to costs.
Sd/
(F.I. REBELLO,J.)
Sd/
(A. A. SAYED, J.)
::: Downloaded on - 26/06/2024 07:32:01 :::