Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR, BANARES
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MAHARAJ KISHORE KHANNA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
16/03/1959
BENCH:
ACT:
Execution of Decrees-Decree passed by Special judge in U.P.
-If can be executed outside U. P.-Extra-territoriality-
Transfer of such decree-Collector and Additional Collector,
if exercise same powers-Limitation-U. P. Encumbered Estates
Act, 1934 (U. P.XXV of 1934), ss. 14(7) and 24(3)-Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), s. 39-Indian Limitation
Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), Art. 182.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent, who owned landed properties at Banaras in
Uttar Pradesh and at Purnea in Bihar, was heavily indebted
and applied to the Collector, Banaras under s. 4 of the U.
P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, for, liquidation of his
debts. The Collector, acting under s. 6, forwarded the
application to the Special judge, appointed under the Act
who on March 21, 1940, passed after the enquiry directed by
the Act three money decrees in favour of three creditors of
the respondent and forwarded them to the Collector for
execution. Section 14(7) of the Act provided that such
decrees were to be deemed to be decrees of a civil Court
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of competent jurisdiction. Section 24(3) of the Act
provided that for purposes of execution against property
outside U. P. such decrees were to be deemed to be in favour
of the Collector. The execution of the decrees was
commenced by the Additional’ Collector, Banaras against the
respondent’s properties in U. P. Thereafter, the Additional
Collector applied to the Additional Civil judge, Banaras,
and on January 4, 1947, got the said decrees transferred to
the Subordinate judge, Purnea and on March 17, 1947, he
applied to the Subordinate Judge for execution of the
decrees by attachment and sale of the respondents properties
at Purnea. The Subordinate judge made an order directing
execution to issue, but, on appeal, the High Court set aside
the order on the ground that the Subordinate Judge had no
jurisdiction to entertain the execution application.
Held, that the Subordinate judge Purnea had jurisdiction to
execute the decrees. By virtue of s. 14(7) of the Act a
decree of the Special judge was, within U. P., a decree for
all purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure and could
properly be transferred under S. 39 Of the Code for
execution to a Court outside U. P. No question of extra-
territorial operation of the Act arose in the application of
s. 14(7) to the decrees as the Purnea Court was merely
applying the U. P. Act to decrees passed in U. P.
For the purposes of execution and sale the Additional
Collector was to be deemed to be the Collector as he
exercised the Collector’s powers in this regard. As such
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the applications for transfer and execution of the decree
were properly made by the Additional Collector.
It was the same Court which exercised the powers of the
Additional Civil Judge as also those of the Special judge.
The order of transfer of the decree made by the Additional
Civil judge could be treated as having been made by the
Special judge. As such it was made by the same Court which
passed the decrees and was a good order under S. 39 of the
Code.
The application for execution before the Subordinate judge,
Purnea was made while execution proceedings in respect of
the same decrees were pending before the Additional
Collector, Banaras and was a continuation of the same. No
question of limitation could arise in respect of such an
application.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL Appeal No. 298 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 28, 1953, of
the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 90 of
1949, arising out of the judgment and order dated January
25, 1949, of the Sub-Judge, Purnea, in Misc. Case No. 54 of
1947.
Sir lqbal Ahmad, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and
Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.
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M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and R. C. Prasad,
for the respondent.
1959. March 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKAR, J.-This appeal arises out of a proceeding in
execution of an adjudication made under the provisions of
the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act, 1934 (U. P.
XXV of 1934), an Act passed by the legislature of the United
Provinces, now called the Uttar Pradesh. The questions that
arise in this appeal largely turn on the provisions of that
Act and they have therefore to be referred to.
The Act was intended to give relief to the proprietors of
certain landed properties in the United Provinces. Section
4 of the Act enabled a proprietor of such landed properties
to make an application in writing to the Collector of the
District in which any of his lands is situate, stating the
amount of his debts and asking for the application of the
Act to him. Upon such an application being made, the
Collector is to make an order under s. 6 forwarding it to a
Special Judge appointed under the Act who, under s. 3 is any
civil judicial officer appointed for a local area, to
exercise the powers conferred and to perform the duties
imposed, by the Act. Section 7 of the Act provides that
upon the making of an order by the Collector under s. 6,
subject to certain exceptions which it is not necessary to
enumerate, all proceedings pending in the courts in the
United Provinces in respect of a debt due by the applicant
shall be stayed and all execution processes issued against
him by such courts shall become null and void and no fresh
process in execution shall be issued against him, nor any
fresh suit or other proceeding instituted. The Special
Judge after he has received the application sent to him by
the Collector is required by s. 8 to call upon the applicant
to submit a written statement verified in the manner of a
plaint, setting out full particulars of his debts, the names
and addresses of his creditors and the nature and extent of
his proprietary rights in land as also of all his properties
which are liable to attachment under s. 60 of
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the Code of Civil Procedure. Under s. 9 the Special Judge
has then to publish a notice calling upon persons having
claims against the applicant to submit the same within a
time specified. Section 10 states that the claimant shall
give full particulars of his claim and of the applicant’s
properties. Section 11 provides that the Special Judge will
publish a further notice specifying the properties mentioned
by the applicant as belonging to him and any person wishing
to make a claim to any such property has to do so within a
certain period. The same section gives power to the Special
Judge to decide the claims made to the properties and
provides that the decision made by him is to be deemed to be
a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 14 lays down that the Special Judge will inquire
into the claims submitted by the creditors against the
applicant and decide the questions in issue on the same
principles as those on which a court of law would have
decided them, but he has the power to reduce the interest
due and to give relief to the applicant in respect of such
claims under certain specified United Provinces Acts. Sub-
section (7) of s. 14 provides that if upon enquiry the
Special Judge finds that any amount is due to any claimant
he shall pass a simple money decree for such amount together
with costs and interest and " such decree shall be deemed to
be a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction " but
it shall not be executable within the United Provinces
except under the provisions of the Act. The next section to
be referred to is s. 19 which requires the Special Judge to
send the decrees granted under s. 14(7) to the Collector for
execution in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of
the Act and to inform him of the nature and extent of the
property which he has found to be liable to satisfy the
debts of the applicant. Then come the provisions as to
execution contained in Chapter V. The sections in this
Chapter provide that the Collector will himself and without
being required to be moved for the purpose by any person,
proceed to execute the decree against the properties of the
applicant within the United Provinces by the various methods
indicated, and for
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realising the value of the applicant’s properties the Col-
lector shall have all the powers of a civil court for the
execution of a decree. With regard to the properties of the
applicant outside the United Provinces, the Act could not
provide for execution. To cover such cases it was enacted
by s. 24(3) that for the purpose of execution against
property outside the United Provinces the decrees passed by
the Special Judge would be deemed to be decrees in favour of
the Collector. These are all the provisions of the Act that
need be referred to for the purposes of this case.
The facts may now be stated. The respondent was the
proprietor of landed properties in the United Provinces and
was entitled to claim relief under the Act. He became
heavily encumbered in debts. It is not necessary to go into
his financial embarrassment in great detail and it will be
enough to say that in 1926 and 1927 he had created several
mortgages on his properties in favour of the Allahabad Bank,
the Banaras Bank and a person called Kalia, for very large
sums. In 1929, the Banaras Bank filed a suit against the
respondent in the Court of the Additional Sub-Judge,
Banaras, in the United Provinces for enforcement of its
mortgage making the other creditors of the respondent named
above parties to the suit. A decree was passed in that suit
giving the creditors priority in a certain order. The
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Allahabad Bank not being satisfied with that order of
priority, filed an appeal in the High Court at Allahabad
which was decided in its favour. While the appeal was
pending, the respondent applied to the Collector of Banares
for relief under the Act. The procedure laid down in the
Act as earlier summarised was duly followed and on March 21,
1940, the Special fudge of Banares to whom the application
had been forwarded by the Collector, passed three money
decrees in favour of the three creditors of the respondent
mentioned above in a certain order of priority with which we
shall not be concerned in this case. The total amount of
such decrees came nearly to rupees nine lacs. He then sent
the decrees to the Collector of Banaras for execution as
required by the Act. The execution of the decrees
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was thereafter commenced by the Additional Collector,
Banaras under the provisions of the Act against the
properties in the United Provinces.
The respondent owns an estate in the district of Purnea in
Bihar, called the Semapur estate. Under s. 24(3) of the Act
earlier mentioned, the decrees passed by the Special Judge
are to be deemed to be decrees in favour of the Collector
for the purpose of execution against the Semapur estate.
The Additional Collector, Banaras, applied to the Additional
Civil Judge, Banaras, for transmission of the said decrees
to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Purnea for execution
and an order for transmission of the decrees to the Court at
Purnea was accordingly made by that Judge on January 4,
1947. Thereafter on March 17, 1947, the Additional
Collector, Banaras, applied to the Subordinate Judge,
Purnea, as the transferee Court to execute the decrees by
attachment and sale of the Semapur estate. The Subordinate
Judge thereupon made an order directing execution to issue
as sought. The respondent preferred an appeal to the High
Court at Patna from this order of the Subordinate Judge,
Purnea and his appeal was allowed with the result that the
execution of the decrees against the Semapur estate failed.
The present appeal is by the Additional Collector, Banaras
against the order of the High Court.
The first question that arises in this appeal is whether the
Subordinate Judge, Purnea, bad jurisdiction to order
execution of the decree transferred to him. The High Court
held that he did not have that jurisdiction. The matter was
put in this way. The decree was not a decree under the Code
of Civil Procedure. It was only to be deemed as such
because of s. 14(7) of the Act. The Act -was an Act of the
United Provinces legislature which could not pass a
legislation having effect outside the United Provinces. The
operation of s. 14(7) of the Act had therefore to be
confined within the borders of the United Provinces. The
Subordinate Judge, Purnea could not apply that section in
Bihar and treat the decree as a decree
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under the Code. If he could not do so he could not order
execution of the decree. If he were permitted so to apply
the Act, then an Act of the legislature of the United
Provinces would be indirectly affecting property outside the
United Provinces which it could not directly do. The Act
could be applied in Bihar only by giving it an extra-
territorial operation. This the law did not allow. So the
decree could not be executed in Purnea.
We think that this argument is fallacious. No question of
any extra-territorial application of the United Provinces
Act either directly or indirectly, arises in this case. It
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is clear that by virtue of s. 14(7) of the Act, a decree of
the Special Judge under the Act is within the United
Provinces, a decree for all purposes of the Code. It could
therefore be transferred decree under s. 39 of the Code of
Civil Procedure to a court outside the United Provinces, for
execution. Now when a decree is transferred, it is the duty
of the transferee court to execute it by all methods
provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. But it is said
that the transferee court must be satisfied that it is a
decree under the Code of Civil Procedure before it can order
execution under that Code. How then is the transferee court
to decide that ? It has before it a decree passed not by
itself but by another ,court. It has therefore to satisfy
itself that the decree was one which, for that court, was a
decree passed under the Code. In order to do that it is
asked to apply the United Provinces Act to the decree passed
within the United Provinces. How can it be said that if it
so applies the United Provinces Act it is giving it an
extra-territorial operation ? It is doing nothing of the
kind. It is applying an Act of the United Provinces to
something which happened within the territories of those
Provinces; it is applying an United Provinces Act to a
matter within the competence of the legislature of the
United Provinces to legislate upon. No doubt a court
outside the United Provinces is applying a statute of those
Provinces, but that does not amount to giving extra-
territorial operation to that statute. If the statute is
being so applied
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to one of its legitimate objects, it is not being given any
extra-territorial operation at all.
We further find it difficult to appreciate how the
application by the Subordinate Judge of Purnea of the United
Provinces Act to the decree of the Special Judge, Banaras,
sent to him for execution, results in the United Provinces
Act affecting property outside the United Provinces. The
only result of such application is to remove the objection
that that decree is not a decree of a court in the United
Provinces passed under the Code; the Act is not thereby made
to affect property outside the United Provinces. Of course,
if that decree is a decree under the Code it can be executed
against any property outside the United Provinces. That
however is not the result of the United Provinces Act but of
the Code of Civil Procedure which is a central legislation
and applies to Bihar also. The High Court was therefore
wrong in thinking that the Subordinate Judge, Purnea, had no
jurisdiction to execute the decree passed under the Act
within the United Provinces and sent to him for execution.
It was then contended that the order of transfer of the
decree was invalid because under s. 39 of the Code such an
order could be made only on the application of the decree-
holder and in the present case it had not been made on his
application. His point was this. Under s. 24(3) of the
Act, a decree of the Special Judge is to be deemed to be a
decree in favour of the Collector for the purpose of
execution against property outside the United Provinces.
Therefore, in the present case it was the Collector,
Banaras, who was the decree holder and he alone could apply
for the transfer of the decree. Actually however the order
for the transfer had been made in this case on the
application of the Additional Collector, Banaras. So it was
said the order was invalid. Now this argument depends upon
the Collector and the Additional Collector being different
persons. It is clear however that they are not. That
appears from ss. 14 and 14A of the United Provinces Land
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Revenue Act, 1901, to which our attention was drawn.
Section 14 gives power to the Government to appoint a
Collector for discharging the
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duties mentioned in the Act or any other law for the time
being in force. Section 14A(1) gives power to the
Government to appoint an Additional Collector. Sub-section
(3) of s. 14A provides that the " Additional Collector shall
exercise such powers and perform such duties of a Collector"
as the Government may direct. The Additional Collector
therefore exercises such of the powers and discharges such
of the functions of the Collector, as the Government directs
him to do. We have before us a document containing such an
order by which the work of sale and execution which under
the Encumbered Estates Act had to be done by a Collector,
had been entrusted to the Additional Collector. It follows
that for the purposes of execution and sale under the Act,
the Additional Collector is to be deemed to be the Collector
as he exercises the latter’s powers in this regard. The
Additional Collection was hence quite competent to apply for
the transfer of the decree.
The third point against the validity of the order of the
learned Subordinate Judge was that under s. 39 of the Code
the decree could be transferred only by the Court which
passed it. It was said that in the present case it is only
by virtue of s. 14 of the Act that the decision of the
Special Judge is deemed to be a decree ; that since it was
his decision, he must be deemed to have passed it. It was
then pointed out that the order for the transfer of the
decree had in fact been made by the Additional Civil Judge,
Banaras, and not by the Special Judge, Banaras, and hence
that order was of no effect. This is an argument with which
we are not much impressed. It has been pointed out to us
that the powers of a special Judge under the Act were
conferred on the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge,
Banaras, by the United Provinces Government’s Revenue
Department notification No. 767-Rev. published in the United
Provinces Gazette of the 12th October, 1935. The Additional
Subordinate Judge later came to be called the Additional-
Civil Judge. It is therefore the same court which exercises
the powers of an Additional Civil Judge as also those of a
Special Judge under the Act. We find
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no difficulty in treating the order of transfer as having
been made by the Special Judge. The fact that the order
purported to be made by the Additional Civil Judge was a
matter of mere irregularity and cannot make it invalid. Nor
do we find any lack of power in the Special Judge to order a
transfer of the I decrees. The Act provides that his
adjudication would be treated as a decree of a civil court
of competent jurisdiction. The execution of such a decree
outside the United Provinces is also clearly contemplated by
s. 24(3). We have earlier held that such execution is
permissible in law. That being so, in order to give effect
to the provisions of the Act it has to be held that the
Special Judge must be deemed to be a court which passed the
decree within the meaning of s. 39 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor does there seem to be any objection to think
that the Special Judge is a civil court. From the
provisions of the Act earlier set out there is no doubt that
he adjudicates upon rights of the parties and acts in the
same way as any other civil court would do. Indeed, apart
from the fact that the proceedings before him do not
commence by the filing of a plaint, we find no distinction
between him and a court as ordinarily understood. The order
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of transfer of the decree is hence, in our view, clearly a
good order.
Lastly, it was said that the decree was barred by
limitation long before the order for its transfer was made.
It was contended that art. 182 of the Limitation Act
governed the case, and the application for its execution had
been made beyond the time limited. The question is, does
the article apply ? The High Court held that that article
had no application to the present case and that no question
of limitation arose " for the execution proceeding in Purnea
Court is merely a continuation of the execution proceeding
pending before the Collector of Banares ". In our opinion,
the High Court was right in the view that it took. It is
quite clear that if the application for execution with which
we are concerned was made in a pending execution proceeding,
notion of the application of art. 182 arises. It = long
been
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recognised by the courts in our country that a right to
continue a proceeding which is pending is a right which
arises from day to day-and no question of any bar of
limitation with regard to the enforcement of such a right
arises: See Kedar Nath Dutt v. Harra Chand Dutt (1) Subba
Chariar v. Muthuveeran Pillai (2).
The question then is, was the application for execution
which has resulted in the order under appeal, one for
continuing a pending execution proceeding ? It is not
disputed that all along since the decree was sent by the
Special Judge to the Collector for execution and before that
date the decree was not executable it has continuously been
in execution under the provisions of the Act by the
Additional Collector, Banaras, and that such execution
proceeding was pending on the date of the present
application for execution. The question thus is, whether
the execution proceeding started in the Court of the
Subordinate Judge, Purnea, was a continuation of the
execution proceeding by the Additional Collector, Banaras.
We think it was. We have to remember that s. 14(7) of the
Act which said that an adjudication of the special Judge was
to be deemed to be a decree also provided that that decree
would not be executable within the United Provinces except
under the provisions of the Act. We have also to remember
that the Act provided that as against the properties within
the United Provinces the decree could only be executed by
the Collector on his own by the various methods provided.
We may also point out that s. 24(4) provides that for the
purpose of such execution the Collector is to have all the
powers of a civil court for the execution of a decree. It
is therefore clear that the only mode of execution of the
decree within the United Provinces contemplated by the Act
is the execution by the Collector. Within the United
Provinces the execution of the decree by the Collector would
be deemed to be an execution under the Civil Procedure Code.
The execution by the Collector is execution of what is a
decree within the Code. When the decree is executed outside
the United Provinces, where, as already stated, it can be
legally
(1) (1882) I.L.R. 8 Cal, 420. (2) (1912) I.L.R. 36 Mad.
553.
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executed, the amount realised by the execution by the
Collector has to be- taken into account. When the
Subordinate Judge, Purnea, has to decide the question ,
whether the application for execution made to him is in
continuance of an existing execution proceeding, he has to
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recognise the proceeding before the Additional Collector,
Banares, as a proceeding in execution under the Code for it
is so under the Act. In doing this, for the reasons earlier
mentioned, he would not be giving any extra-territorial
operation to the Act. It seems to us therefore that the
execution of the decree by the Collector must be deemed to
be execution of a decree for all purposes and therefore an
application made to the Subordinate Judge, Purnea, for
execution of the same decree while an execution proceeding
was pending before the Collector, must be a continuation of
the execution last mentioned. No question of limitation can
arise in regard to such an application.
We think therefore that this appeal must succeed. We set
aside the order of the High Court and restore the order of
the Subordinate Judge, Purnea. The respondent will pay the
costs of the appellant in this Court and in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.