Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Writ Petition (crl.) 284-285 of 2005
PETITIONER:
Epuru Sudhakar & Anr.
RESPONDENT:
Govt. of A.P. & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/10/2006
BENCH:
S. H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
KAPADIA, J.
Although, I respectfully agree with the conclusion containing the
opinion of brother, Arijit Pasayat, the importance and intricacies of the
subject matter, namely, judicial review of the manner of exercise of
prerogative power has impelled me to elucidate and clarify certain crucial
aspects. Hence this separate opinion.
Pardons, reprieves and remissions are manifestation of the exercise of
prerogative power. These are not acts of grace. They are a part of
Constitutional scheme. When a pardon is granted, it is the determination of
the ultimate authority that public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment has fixed.
The power to grant pardons and reprieves was traditionally a Royal
prerogative and was regarded as an absolute power. At the same time, even
in the earlier days, there was a general rule that if the King is deceived, the
pardon is void, therefore, any separation of truth or suggestion of falsehood
vitiated the pardon. Over the years, the manifestation of this power got
diluted.
The power to grant pardons and reprieves in India is vested in the
President and the Governor of a State by virtue of Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution respectively.
Exercise of Executive clemency is a matter of discretion and yet
subject to certain standards. It is not a matter of privilege. It is a matter of
performance of official duty. It is vested in the President or the Governor, as
the case may be, not for the benefit of the convict only, but for the welfare of
the people who may insist on the performance of the duty. This discretion,
therefore, has to be exercised on public consideration alone. The President
and the Governor are the sole judges of the sufficiency of facts and of the
appropriating of granting the pardons and reprieves. However, this power is
an enumerated power in the Constitution and its limitations, if any, must be
found in the Constitution itself. Therefore, the principle of Exclusive
Cognizance would not apply when and if the decision impugned is in
derogation of a Constitutional provision. This is the basic working test to be
applied while granting pardons, reprieves, remissions and commutation.
Granting of pardon is in no sense an overturning of a judgment of
conviction, but rather it is an Executive action that mitigates or set aside the
punishment for a crime. It eliminates the effect of conviction without
addressing the defendants guilt or innocence. The controlling factor in
determining whether the exercise of prerogative power is subject to judicial
review is not its source but its subject matter. It can no longer be said that
prerogative power is ipso facto immune from judicial review. An undue
exercise of this power is to be deplored. Considerations of religion, caste or
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political loyalty are irrelevant and fraught with discrimination. These are
prohibited grounds. Rule of Law is the basis for evaluation of all decisions.
The supreme quality of the Rule of Law is fairness and legal certainty. The
principle of legality occupies a central plan in the Rule of Law. Every
prerogative has to be the subject to the Rule of Law. That rule cannot be
compromised on the grounds of political expediency. To go by such
considerations would be subversive of the fundamental principles of the
Rule of Law and it would amount to setting a dangerous precedent. The Rule
of Law principle comprises a requirement of "Government according to
law". The ethos of "Government according to law" requires the prerogative
to be exercised in a manner which is consistent with the basic principle of
fairness and certainty. Therefore, the power of executive clemency is not
only for the benefit of the convict, but while exercising such a power the
President or the Governor, as the case may be, has to keep in mind the
effect of his decision on the family of the victims, the society as a whole and
the precedent it sets for the future.
The power under Article 72 as also under Article 161 of the
Constitution is of the widest amplitude and envisages myriad kinds and
categories of cases with facts and situations varying from case to case. The
exercise of power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case
and the necessity or justification for exercise of that power has to be judged
from case to case. It is important to bear in mind that every aspect of the
exercise of the power under Article 72 as also under Article 161 does not fall
in the judicial domain. In certain cases, a particular aspect may not be
justiciable. However, even in such cases there has to exist requisite material
on the basis of which the power is exercised under Article 72 or under
Article 161 of the Constitution, as the case may be. In the circumstances,
one cannot draw the guidelines for regulating the exercise of the power.
As stated above, exercise or non-exercise of the power of pardon by
the President or the Governor is not immune from judicial review. Though,
the circumstances and the criteria to guide exercise of this power may be
infinite, one principle is definite and admits of no doubt, namely, that the
impugned decision must indicate exercise of the power by application of
manageable standards and in such cases courts will not interfere in its
supervisory jurisdiction. By manageable standards we mean standards
expected in functioning democracy. A pardon obtained by fraud or granted
by mistake or granted for improper reasons would invite judicial review. The
prerogative power is the flexible power and its exercise can and should be
adapted to meet the circumstances of the particular case. The Constitutional
justification for judicial review, and the vindication of the Rule of Law
remain constant in all areas, but the mechanism for giving effect to that
justification varies.
In conclusion, it may be stated that, there is a clear symmetry between
the Constitutional rationale for review of statutory and prerogative power. In
each case, the courts have to ensure that the authority is used in a manner
which is consistent with the Rule of Law, which is the fundamental principle
of good administration. In each case, the Rule of Law should be the
overarching constitutional justification for judicial review. The exercise of
prerogative power cannot be placed in straight jacket formulae and the
perceptions regarding the extent and amplitude of this power are bound to
vary. However, when the impugned decision does not indicate any data or
manageable standards, the decision amount to derogation of an important
Constitutional principle of Rule of Law.
We appreciate the assistance rendered by Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee as
amicus curiae in this matter.
With these words, I agree with the conclusions in the opinion of
brother, Arijit Pasayat.