YASHODA (ALIAS SODHAN) vs. SUKHWINDER SINGH.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8247 OF 2009 YASHODA (ALIAS SODHAN)           ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS SUKHWINDER SINGH AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. th 1. The   appeal   challenges   the   judgment   dated   28 January 2009 passed  by the  learned Single  Judge of  the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal No. 3205 of 2007 (O&M), thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the present appellant. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are as under: 1 As   per   Kartar   Singh,   the   original   plaintiff   (since deceased), the grandfather of respondent Nos.1 and 2, he had entered into an agreement to sell the agricultural lands th on 10  January 1993.  As per the said agreement, the sale th deed was to be executed before 15  March 1994. According to the plaintiff, a family settlement also took place between him and the appellant­defendant in the month of November 1993. It is to be noted that the plaintiff initially filed a suit for declaration against the appellant­defendant being Civil Suit th No. 141 of 1994 on 10  February 1994.  The said suit was filed on the basis of the said family settlement that took place in   the   month   of   November   1993.     On   the   basis   of   the application filed by the plaintiff, the said suit was dismissed th as withdrawn on 7  May 1994. nd 3. The plaintiff filed the present suit on 2  June 1994 being Suit No. 536 of 1994 seeking specific performance on th the  basis  of alleged  agreement to sell dated 10   January 1993.    The appellant­defendant resisted the  suit  by filing th written   statement   on   29   October   1994.     In   the   written statement, the appellant­defendant categorically denied the 2 existence and/or the execution of any agreement to sell.  It was specifically contended by the appellant­defendant that the second suit was not maintainable in view of withdrawal th of the first suit. The plaintiff filed his Replication on 14 November 1994 contending that the first suit for declaration was   filed   only   to   avoid   payment   of   stamp   duty   and registration charges. 4. The learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sunam   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “trial   court”)   vide th judgment and decree dated 6   August 1997 dismissed the suit for specific performance. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondents,   i.e.,   the   legal   representatives   of   the   plaintiff filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Sangrur   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “Appellate   Court”). th The Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 26 July 2007 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of agreement to sell dated th 10   January 1993. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant­ defendant preferred an appeal before the High Court.   The th High   Court   vide   impugned   judgment   dated   28   January 3 2009 dismissed the appeal.  Hence, the appellant­defendant has approached this Court. 5. We have heard Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant­defendant and Shri   Narender   Hooda,   learned   Senior   Counsel   and   Shri Gagan Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­plaintiffs. 6. Shri Luthra, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the trial court, finding that the plaintiff had suppressed the fact with regard to filing of the earlier suit and further that the plaintiff had resiled from the stand taken by him in the earlier litigation and taken a contrary stand, had dismissed the suit.  He submitted that however, the learned Appellate Court   erroneously   accepted   the   stand   of   the   plaintiff   in Replication that the earlier suit was filed only in order to save the   stamp   duty   and  registration   charges   and   allowed   the appeal.   7. Shri   Luthra   submitted   that   the   perusal   of   the evidence of the plaintiff would show that he had not stated anything   regarding   the   earlier   suit   in   his   evidence.     He 4 submitted that, the learned Appellate Court has failed to take into   consideration   that   all   the   witnesses   were   closely associated with the plaintiff and therefore, their evidence was not trustworthy.   He further submitted that the appellant­ defendant  had   specifically   put  up   a  case   that   she   was   a parda­nasheen lady and that the plaintiff was her cousin and she   had   blind   faith   on   him.     He   submitted   that,   taking disadvantage of such a blind faith, the plaintiff had taken her thumb impression on some paper and used it to create an agreement to sell.  He further submitted that, as a matter of fact,   an   application   for   partition   was   also   filed   by   the th appellant­defendant   on   4   July   1994.     He   therefore submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the suit deserves to be dismissed. 8. Shri   Luthra   relied   on   various   judgments   of   this Court in support of the submission that, since the act of the respondents­plaintiffs   of   suppression   of   material   facts amounted to fraud, he was not entitled to a discretionary relief. 5 9. Shri Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­plaintiffs submitted that all the three courts have concurrently found that the execution of the agreement th to sell dated 10   January 1993 was duly established.   He submitted that the trial court as well as the Appellate Court and   the   High   Court   have   also   found   that   the   appellant­ defendant has failed to establish the fact that the agreement to  sell  is   a  result  of   fraud   or   misrepresentation.     Having decided these issues in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs, the   trial  court  had   erred   in  non­suiting   the   respondents­ plaintiffs on a technical ground.  Shri Gupta, relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of   Arunima Baruah v. 1 , submitted that,  unless  the Union of India and Others   suppression of filing of an earlier suit is a material fact, such non­disclosure would not be fatal to the case of the plaintiff. Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Harjas Rai   Makhija   (Dead)   Through   Legal   Representatives   v. 2 Pushparani Jain and Another , he submitted that a mere concealment   or   non­disclosure   of   relevant   facts   without 1 (2007) 6 SCC 120 2 (2017) 2 SCC 797 6 intent to deceive or a bald allegation of fraud without proof and intent to deceive, would not render a decree obtained by a party as fraudulent.   Shri Gupta submitted that in the present case, the trial court itself has found that the plaintiff had   failed   to   establish   fraud   and   as   such,   the   Appellate Court has rightly allowed the appeal.  He also relies on the judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Svenska Handelsbanken   v.   M/s   Indian   Charge   Chrome   and 3 Others .  Shri Gupta further relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Union of India v. M/s Chaturbhai M. 4 Patel and Co.   in support of his submission that fraud has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 10. Shri Gupta further submitted that the earlier suit for declaration   was   filed   on   the   claim   that   the   respondents­ plaintiffs were owner in possession of the suit property on the basis of settlement deed, whereas the second suit was th filed on the basis of agreement to sell dated 10   January 1993.  He submitted that there is nothing on record to show 3 (1994) 1 SCC 502 4 (1976) 1 SCC 747 7 that the respondents­plaintiffs had any intention to defraud the appellant­defendant. 11. Shri Hooda, learned Senior Counsel submitted that after the Replication was allowed by the trial court, it became a part of the plaint. As such, the respondents­plaintiffs had sufficiently   proved   as   to   the   circumstances   in   which   the earlier suit was filed.   He therefore submitted that the trial court   had   erred   in   non­suiting   the   plaintiff   on   a   trivial ground. Shri Hooda further submitted that after holding that the respondents­plaintiffs had proved the agreement to sell, that the  appellant­defendant had  failed  to  prove that  any fraud was played on her and that the issue under Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’) was   also   in   favour   of   the   respondents­plaintiffs,   the   trial court had grossly erred in dismissing the suit.  He submitted that   the   said   error   has   been   rightly   corrected   by   the Appellate Court. 12. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration being Civil Suit No. 141 of 1994.   It will be relevant to refer to some of the averments in the said plaint: 8 1. “That previously the defendant was owner to the rd extent   of   1/3   share   in   land   measuring   205 Kanal   4   Marla   mustatil   &   killa   numbers   as detailed   in   the   heading   of   the   plaint.   Copy   of Jamabandi is attached herewith.  2. That previously the defendant was also owner to the extent of 1/6 share in land measuring 139 Kanal   2   Marla   and   land   gair   mumkin   plot measuring   9   Kanal   2   Marla   mustatil   &   kiolla numbers as detailed in the heading of the plaint. Copy of Jamabandi is attached herewith.  3. ……… 4. That   about   three   months   ago   and   a   family settlement took place between the plaintiff and defendant and the land in dispute fallen into the share   of   the   plaintiff   and   the   defendant   had delivered the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff after visiting the spot. In this now the plaintiff   is   continuous   in   possession   over disputed   property   as   owner   since   last   three month. The defendant has remained no concern.  5. That the defendant was requested to admit the claim   of   the   plaintiff   and   to   get   corrected   the name of the plaintiff in revenue record as owner but the defendant after dilly­dallying the matter had refused yesterday to do so from which cause of   action   accrued   to   the   plaintiff   against   the defendant.” th 13. The   said   suit   for   declaration   was   filed   on   10 February   1994.     It   is   to   be   noted   that   according   to   the respondents­plaintiffs,   the   alleged   agreement   to   sell   was th executed on 10  January 1993.  As such it is prior in point 9 th of time to the date of filing of the suit for declaration i.e. 10 February   1994.     There   is   no   mention   with   regard   to   the alleged agreement to sell in the said plaint. th The plaintiff filed an application on 7  May 1994 for 14. withdrawal of the said suit for declaration.  Vide order of the same date, the trial court, after recording the statement of the plaintiff that he did not want to proceed with the case, dismissed the same as withdrawn.  Within a period of one month, the plaintiff filed the 15. present suit for specific performance.   It will be relevant to refer to some of the averments in the plaint: “2. That the defendant agreed to sell the above said suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 6,50,000/­   and   the   defendant   executed   an agreement on dated 10.1.1994 at Patran in favour of the plaintiff and received a sum of Rs. 50,000/­ from the plaintiff as earnest money and remaining amount   was   to   be   paid   by   the   plaintiff   to   the defendant at the time of sale deed before the Sub­ Registrar.   The   agreement   was   read   over   to   the defendant   who   after   admitting   the   same   to   be correct put her thumb impressions in the presence of Lal Singh Lamberdar, Amolak Singh s/o Jagroop Singh   and   Bhagwant   Singh   S/o   Krishan   Singh resident of Shadihari and witnesses also attested the said agreement in the presence of defendant. The plaintiff put his thumb impression in token of correctness of the above said agreement. 10 ………. 15. That there is no litigation pending or decided between the parties with regard to the agreement in question.” 16. It could thus clearly be seen that, the present suit th bases   its   claim   only   on   the   agreement   to   sell   dated   10 January 1993.  Leave aside there being any reference to the earlier   suit,   the   plaintiff   baldly   stated   that   there   was   no litigation pending or decided between the parties with regard to the agreement in question.  No doubt that it is sought to be   argued   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents­ plaintiffs that the statement in paragraph (15) of the plaint is only   with   regard   to   the   litigation   with   respect   to   the agreement in question.  It is stated that the said paragraph does   not   mention   litigation   with   regard   to   the   land   in question and as such, there is no suppression of material fact. 17. After the suit for specific performance was filed, the written statement was filed by the appellant­defendant on th 29  October 1994.  In the written statement, the appellant­ defendant has stated thus: 11 “3. That the plaintiff file the said suit no.141 dt. 10.2.1994 in the Court of P.C.S. Sub Judge First Class Sunam on 10.2.1994 which was dismiss on 7.5.1994,   but   the   plaintiff   ending   between   the parties, on this ground only the suit of the plaintiff is  liable   to   be   dismissed.   In  case   any   agreement executed  earlier  between  the   parties,  the   plaintiff must mention about this in the suit, hence on this alone ground the suit is liable to be dismissed.  4) That the plaintiff on 10.2.1994 in regard to the land   filed   Suit   for   pre­emption   Right   against   the defendant   in   which   the   plaintiff   shown   himself owner in possession of the land in question, the said suit was consigned to record on 7.5.1994. In the   said   suit   the   defendant   did   not   mention anything in regard to the agreement DT 10.1.1994. 5) That the plaintiff did not come before the Hon'ble Court   in   clean   hand   and   he   has   concealed   the matter before the Hon'ble Court, hence the suit is liable to be dismissed.  6) That the plaintiff and Defendant are having close relations with each other. The plaintiff is uncle's son of Defendant. Defendant has no brother, hence he treated plaintiff as her real brother and believe upon him. Defendant is aged lady her eye sight is very week and villager lady, she has no legal knowledge. The plaintiff getting the wrongful gain of her believe with the intention to grab her share has taken the thumb   impression   on   the   writing   by   committing cheating and fraudulent means.” After   the   appellant­defendant   took   objection   with 18. regard to the earlier suit being withdrawn, the plaintiff came with the Replication application wherein, for the first time, he 12 came up with a story that the earlier suit was filed only to save   the   stamp   duty   and   registration   fee   and   since   the appellant­defendant became dishonest later on, the plaintiff withdrew the suit.  It is thus clear that the Replication was filed as an after­thought only to cure the lacuna as pointed out in the written statement.   The trial court found that a person cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the court of law to play fast and loose and to blow hot and cold.  The trial court, relying on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of   Jaspal Singh v. 5 Sardul Singh , held that a party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate and resile from that position.  The trial court has also found that the explanation submitted by the plaintiff with regard to the circumstances under which the earlier suit was filed, speaks volumes of the dishonest intention of the plaintiff.  The trial court also found that the plaintiff has made an attempt to defraud the State of its revenue.  The trial court found that the past litigation has a direct bearing on the merits of the present controversy.   It observed that the plaintiff was duty bound to plead the same 5 1994 (3) Recent Revenue Reports 106 (Punjab and Haryana) 13 in the plaint.  The trial court found that under Order VII Rule 1 (j) of the CPC (as applicable in Punjab), the statement with regard to earlier litigation has to be made in the plaint.   It will be relevant to refer to the said provision: “ORDER VII PLAINT 1. Particulars to be contained in plaint. …………. (j)  a statement to the effect that no suit between the same parties, or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating on the same grounds has been previously instituted or finally   decided   by   a   Court   of   competent jurisdiction or limited jurisdiction, and if so, with what results.”  19. The trial court therefore, relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of  S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) 6 , By   LRs.   v.   Jagannath   (Dead)   By   LRs.   and   Others dismissed the suit, though it had answered the other issues in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs. 20. This well­reasoned judgment of the trial court came to   be   reversed   by   the   Appellate   Court.     Accepting   the 6 (1994) 1 SCC 1 14 explanation of the respondents­plaintiffs in Replication that the earlier suit was filed in order to save the registration fee and the stamp duty, the Appellate Court held that the non­ disclosure of the plaintiff about earlier litigation in the plaint but   clarifying   it   later   in   the   Replication,   was   not   such   a crucial point on the basis of which he could be non­suited in toto. 21. Though the suit was dismissed by the trial court and decreed   by   the   Appellate   Court,   the   High   Court   observed thus: “The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the agreement to sell and the default on the part   of   the   appellant   has   been   established   and therefore directed the agreement to be enforced by way of execution of the sale deed.  In appeal, the findings of the learned trial Court were affirmed.” 22. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   there   is   total   non­ application of mind by the High Court.  The High Court did not even care to refer to the grounds raised in the appeal with   regard   to   the   effect   of   non­disclosure   of   filing   and withdrawal of the earlier suit.  The High Court dismissed the 15 suit on the basis that it arises out of the concurrent findings of fact and no question of law is involved. 23. What would be the effect of suppression of earlier proceedings has been considered by this Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya  Naidu   (supra).    The Court observed thus: “  The   High   Court,   in   our   view,   fell   into   patent 5. error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath   obtained   the   preliminary   decree   by playing   fraud   on   the   court.   The   High   Court, however,   went   haywire   and   made   observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than   not,   process   of   the   court   is   being   abused. Property­grabbers,   tax­evaders,   bank­loan­dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life   find   the   court­process   a   convenient   lever   to retain   the   illegal   gains   indefinitely.   We   have   no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 16 6.  The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt   that   Jagannath   obtained   the   preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act   of   deliberate   deception   with   the   design   of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another.   It   is   a   deception   in   order   to   gain   by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed   (Ex.   B­15)   in   favour   of   Chunilal   Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master   Chunilal   Sowcar.   Without   disclosing   all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal   Sowcar.   Non­production   and   even   non­ mentioning   of   the   release   deed   at   the   trial   is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that   the   appellants­defendants   could   have   easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B­15 and   non­suited   the   plaintiff.   A   litigant,   who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.” 24. Again   in   the   case   of   A.V.   Papayya   Sastry   and 7 , this Court observed Others v. Govt. of A.P. and Others   thus: 7 (2007) 4 SCC 221 17

18 rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment. 25.  It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell together ( fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant ); or fraud and   deceit   ought   to   benefit   none   ( fraus   et   dolus nemini patrocinari debent ). 26.  Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.” 25. As   observed,   there   is   an   essential   distinction between  mistake  and   trickery.    In  the   present  case,  it  is sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents­plaintiffs that the averment in paragraph (15) of the plaint was with regard to a lis on the basis of the agreement.  It is submitted that the earlier suit was not based on the agreement and as such, there was no suppression.  We find the argument to be unsustainable.  We are of the view that such a statement was 19 made   as   a   trickery   so   as   to   obtain   the   judgment   by misleading the court.   26. In the case of  H.N. Jagannath and Others v. State 8 , the land owners filed civil suits of Karnataka and Others one after other in respect of acquired lands.  The said suits were withdrawn without liberty to approach the court again. Simultaneously,   land   owners   also   filed   writ   petitions challenging the acquisition on different grounds.  The same were dismissed.   Thereafter, the land owners submitted an application to the State Government for denotification of the land.   Since it was not considered, one more writ petition came   to   be   filed   in   which   a   direction   was   issued   for consideration of the representation.  The said representation was rejected in the year 1992.  The land owners filed another writ petition questioning the rejection of its representation. The   same   was   also   dismissed.     Thereafter,   six   more   writ petitions   were   filed   again   questioning   the   validity   of acquisition proceedings and yet again, they were dismissed. In an intra­court appeal, the Division Bench relegated the parties   to   the   civil   court   to   work   out   their   remedies. 8 (2018) 11 SCC 104 20 Criticizing the approach of the Division Bench, this Court observed thus: “ 14.  It is not in dispute that the property in question along with other properties was acquired by the BDA in accordance   with   law   by   issuing   notifications   under Sections 17(1) and 19(1) of the BDA Act as far back as in the year 1977 and in the year 1979. BDA has formed and   allotted   the   sites.   Most   of   the   allottees   have constructed   houses   and   are   residing   peacefully. However, Respondent 4 still contends that possession has   remained   with   it   and   therefore   the   acquisition needs   to   be   set   aside   and   that   the   land   should   be denotified. As detailed supra, Respondent 4 has already approached the civil court thrice and High Court on six occasions.   Whenever   the   suits   are   withdrawn, Respondent 4 has not sought any liberty to approach the civil court once again. Thus, it was not open for Respondent 4 to approach the civil court repeatedly for the very same reliefs. Consistently, the civil court on three   occasions   has   negatived   the   contention   of   the appellant. 15.  Even   when   Respondent   4   approached   the   High Court of Karnataka by filing the writ petitions and writ appeals, it has failed. Futile attempts have been made by   Respondent   4   only   to   see   that   the   allottees   are harassed and to keep the litigation pending. After the final   notification,   an   award   was   passed   and compensation was deposited. Possession was taken and the same was evidenced by the panchnama prepared as far   back   as   on   23­9­1986.   The   notification   under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 20­1­1987 disclosing the factum of taking possession of the land in question. Attempt made by Respondent 4 for getting the disputed land denotified has also failed as far back as on 15­1­1993, when the State Government had rejected the representation of Respondent 4 seeking 21 denotification. The writ petition filed by Respondent 4 challenging   such   order   of   dismissal   of   the representation was also dismissed. Despite the same, Respondent   4   is   pursuing   the   matter   by   filing   writ petition after writ petition. It is a clear case of abuse of process of law as well as the court. 16.  We do not find any reason to interfere in the finding of   fact   rendered   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   that possession was taken by BDA on 23­9­1986. There is nothing to be adjudicated further in respect of the title or possession of the property. The title as well as the possession   of   the   property   has   vested   with   BDA   for about more than 30 years prior to this day and sites were formed and allotted to various persons including the appellant herein. In the light of such voluminous records and having regard to the fact that Respondent 4 has   been   repeatedly   making   futile   attempts   by approaching   the   courts   of   law   by   raising   frivolous contentions,   the   Division   Bench   ought   not   to   have granted liberty to Respondent 4 to approach the civil court once again for the very same relief, for which it has failed earlier. In view of this, the learned counsel for the appellant is justified in contending that the Division Bench   has   completely   erred   in   reviving   the   dispute which had long been given a legal quietus after a series of litigations. The judgment of the Division Bench, if allowed to stand, will unsettle the settled state of affairs involving   hundreds   of   allottees   of   sites   who   have constructed the houses and are residing therein. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench virtually sets at naught a number of judgments rendered by the civil court as well as the High Court in the very matter (and was given without any reason much less a valid reason). 17.  …….. 18.  ……..  Having regard to the discussion made supra, in our 19. considered   opinion,   it   is   a   clear   case   of   contempt 22 committed by Respondent 4 by repeatedly approaching the courts of law for almost the same relief which was negatived by the courts for three decades. However, we decline to initiate contempt proceedings and to impose heavy costs, under the peculiar facts and circumstance of this case.” 27. We find that the Appellate Court has grossly erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court which had dismissed the suit taking into consideration the conduct of the respondents­plaintiffs.   28. Insofar as the reliance placed by Shri Gupta on the judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Arunima   Baruah (supra) is concerned, the Court observed thus:

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29. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that w hat would be a ‘material fact’ would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It has also been held that ‘material   fact’   would   mean   material   for   the   purpose   of determination of the lis. It has also been held that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands.   In the present case, filing of the earlier suit and withdrawal thereof without   liberty   to   file   another   suit   was   a   material   fact. Undisputedly,   the   respondents­plaintiffs   had   failed   to approach the court with clean hands.  As such, we find that the said judgment would be of no assistance to the case of the respondents­plaintiffs.  Insofar as the judgment in the case of   30. Harjas Rai Makhija  (supra) is concerned, in the facts of the said case, the Court held that though the appellant Makhija had an opportunity to prove the allegation of fraud when he filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC, he missed 24 that opportunity right up to this Court.   He took a second shot at alleging fraud and filed another suit.   However, he failed in the trial court as well as the High Court as he could not produce any evidence to prove that fraud was committed th by the respondent when she obtained the decree dated 4 October 1999.   As such, the said judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 31. Insofar   as   the   judgment   in   the   case   of   M/s (supra) is concerned, it was Chaturbhai M. Patel and Co.   the case of defendant that some amount of fraud had been played on the defendant by the collusion of the plaintiff with his father.   This Court, concurring with the findings of the High Court, found that the circumstances relied on by the appellant   were   not   at  all   conclusive   to   prove   the   case   of fraud.     The   present   case   is   a   case   of   suppression   of   a material fact with regard to filing and withdrawal of earlier proceedings.     As   such,   the   said   judgment   would   not   be applicable to the facts of the present case. 32. Similarly,   the   facts   in   the   case   of   Svenska (supra) were also totally different and as Handelsbanken   25 such, reliance on the said judgment is also of no assistance to the case of the respondents­plaintiffs in the present case. 33. In that view of the matter, we find that the Appellate Court   has   grossly   erred   in   reversing   the   well­reasoned judgment and decree of the trial court.  As already observed hereinabove,   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   passed without application of mind.  The High Court has gone on a premise that the trial court had decreed the suit and the Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal.  This is factually erroneous. 34. In the result, we pass the following order: (i) The appeal is allowed; th (ii) The   judgment   and   decree   dated  26   July   2007 passed by the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 191 of 2006 and the judgment passed by the High Court th dated 28  January 2009 in R.S.A. No. 3205 of 2007 (O&M) are quashed and set aside; and th (iii) The   judgment   and   decree   dated   6   August   1997 passed by the trial court in Suit No. 536 of 1994 26 thereby   dismissing   the   suit   of   the   respondents­ plaintiffs is upheld.  35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs. …..….......................J. [B.R. GAVAI]  …….......................J.        [C.T. RAVIKUMAR] NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 12, 2022. 27