Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3654-58 of 2002
PETITIONER:
TOPLINE SHOES LTD.
RESPONDENT:
CORPORATION BANK
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/07/2002
BENCH:
D.P. MOHAPATRA & BRIJESH KUMAR
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2002 (3) SCR 1167
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BRIJESH KUMAR, J. Leave granted. Heard appellant in person and the learned
counsel for the Respondent.
This appeal has been preferred against the order dated April 9, 2001 passed
by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissing the
revision filed by the appellant. The short point in controversy is, as to
whether or not the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, could
grant time to the respondent to file his reply, beyond a total period of 45
days, in view of Section 13 (2) (a) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986
(for short the Act).
The appellant filed a complaint before the Gujarat State Consumer Redressal
Commission, claiming compensation against the respondent, on account of
alleged failure on the part of the respondent in advancing the loan to the
appellant despite of furnishing the security for the same. The respondent
received notice, issued by the Commission, on 22.2.2000. According to the
said notice 4.4.2000 was the date fixed before the State Commission. The
respondent appeared on 4.4.2000 and moved an application for adjournment of
the case and grant of time to file reply. The case was adjourned for
4.5.2000. On the said date, namely, 4.5.20CO, the respondent-Bank filed its
reply. The appellant thereafter seems to have filed their rejoinder to the
reply filed by the respondent. On the next date, namely, 24.7.2000 the
appellant moved an application before the State Commission saying that the
reply filed by the respondent was beyond a period of 30 days initially
admissible for filing reply and also beyond a further period of 15 days as
could be extended for the purpose. Hence, it was prayed that the reply of
the respondent may not be accepted on record and the rejoinder filed by the
appellant may also be returned to it. According to the appellant, a total
period of time for filing of reply could not exceed beyond 45 days, as per
Section 13 (2)(a) of the Act. The application was, however, rejected by the
State Commission but a cost of Rs. 500 was imposed upon the respondent for
late filing of the reply.
While refusing the prayer to reject the reply, the Commission observed that
the delay did not appear to be gross or contrary to the order passed
granting adjournment on 4.4.2000. The Commission further observed that the
discretion vested to extend time for 15 days could be exercised from time
to time as the occasion may require and for arriving at this conclusion,
the State Commission has relied upon decisions of this Court reported in
National Sewing Thread Co., Chidambaram v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. AIR
(1953) SC 357 and Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay,
AIR (1961) SC 4 as well as on Section 14 of the General Clauses Act. It has
also been observed that these are matters of procedure which are hand-made
of justice. The revision preferred against the said order before the
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National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was dismissed as it was
considered that no ground was made out to interfere in exercise of its
revisional jurisdictions.
Shri H.M.G. Murthy who appeared in person for the appellant, submitted that
the State Commission had no power to accept a reply filed beyond a total
period of 45 days. Initially the respondent is required to submit the reply
within 30 days which period could be extended not exceeding 15 days as
would be evident from the plain and bare reading of Section 13 (2) (a) of
the Act. It is also submitted that the discretion vested in the
Forum/Commission to extend the time cannot be exercised from time to time
as held by the State Commission since that would frustrate the purpose of
the provision itself. The case of the Respondent is that the provision
fixing a period for submission
TOPLINE SHOES LTD. v. CORPORATION BANK [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 1171
of reply, is only procedural in nature, and it cannot be interpreted in a
manner so as to deprive a party of being heard on merits of his case. It is
also submitted, on facts, that the notice was received on 22.2.2000 and the
appellant was required to be present before the State Commission on
4.4.2000 that is to say after a period of 30 days. On application for
adjournment the time was extended upto 4.5.2000. The respondent had
submitted his reply within the time allowed. Extension was sought only
once. The appellant had also filed their rejoinder to the reply. There was
therefore no occasion to plead that the written statement be rejected and
the rejoinder of the appellant be returned.
We may peruse the relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986. It reads as under:
"Section
13.------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub-section
(2)----------------------------------------------------------------
(a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to
give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such
extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the
District Forum;
(b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the complaint,
referred to him under clause (a) denies or disputes the allegations
contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to
represent his case within the time given by the District Forum, the
District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute,-
(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and
the opposite party, where the opposite party denies or disputes the
allegations contained in the complaint, or
(ii) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant
where the opposite party omits or fails to take any action to represent his
case within the time given by the Forum.
A reading of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 13 no doubt makes it
clear that the District Forum would give time of 30 days to the opposite
party for the purposes of giving his version. An extension of time for
filing reply could be granted but not exceeding 15 days. Thus the total
period during which the reply can be filed is 45 days after extension of
fifteen days is granted. The question which however arises is as to whether
the provision prescribing limit for filing reply is mandatory or directory
in nature. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 indicates that it has been enacted to promote and protect the
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rights and interests of consumers and to provide them speedy and simple
redressal of their grievances. Hence, quasi-judicial machinery has been set
up for the purpose, at different levels. These quasi-judicial bodies have
to observe the principles of natural justice as per clause (4) of the
Statement of Objects and Reasons which reads as under:
"To provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes, a quasi-
judicial machinery is sought to be set up at the district, State and
Central levels. These quasi-judicial bodies will observe the principles of
natural justice and have been empowered to given relief of a specific
nature and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to consumers.
Penalties for non-compliance of the orders given by the quasi-judicial
bodies have also been provided," (emphasis supplied)
Thus the intention to provide a time frame to file reply, is really meant
to expedite the hearing of such matters and to avoid unnecessary
adjournments to linger on the proceedings on the pretext of filing reply.
The provision however, as framed, does not indicate that it is mandatory in
nature. In case the extended time exceeds 15 days, no penal consequences
are prescribed therefor. The period of extension of time "not exceeding 15
days," does not prescribe any kind of period of limitation. The provision
appears to be directory in nature, which the consumer forums are ordinarily
supposed to apply, in the proceedings before them. We do not find force in
the submission made by the appellant, in person, that in no event,
whatsoever, the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the
period of 45 days. The provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the
object of speedy disposal of such disputes. It is an expression of
"desirability" in strong terms. But it falls short of creating of any kind
of substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of which the
respondent may be debarred from placing his version in defence in any
circumstances whatsoever. It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider
all facts and circumstances along with the provisions of the Act providing
time frame to file reply, as a guideline, and then to exercise its
discretion as best it may serve the ends of justice and achieve the object
of speedy disposal of such cases keeping in mind principles of natural
justice as well. The Forum may refuse to extend time beyond 15 days, in
view of Section 13(2) (a) of the Act but exceeding the period of 15 days of
extension, would not cause any fatal illegality in the order.
On behalf of the appellant reliance has been placed on a few decisions of
this Court reported in AIR 1980 S.C. 303 Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone.
The case relates to election dispute under the Representation of People
Act, and non-compliance of requirements as provided, such provisions were
held to be mandatory in nature. Specific consequences as a result of non-
compliance, were provided for. It is also observed that normally procedural
rules should not be considered as mandatory in nature. The election law is
a technical law which also provides consequences of non-compliance of
certain provisions but in the present case we find that no consequence is
provided in case the time granted to file reply exceeds total period of 45
days. It may at best can be said to be an irregular way of exercise of
discretion. Normally the Forum or Commission would act in accordance with
the provision relating to procedural matters and while considering the
question whether any further rime may or may not be granted, it would be
relevant to take into account the limit placed for extension of time in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the absence of any penal
consequences to follow, it will not be open for the appellant to contend
that the reply filed by the respondent within the time granted though
beyond 45 days, is liable to be rejected. The appellant therefore cannot
derive any help from the decision referred to above. The other case which
has been relied upon is reported in AIR 1986 S.C. 1370 Life Insurance
Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and Ors. Our attention has been drawn
to the observations made by the Court that the proper way to interpret a
Statute is to give due weight to the use, as well as the omission, to use
the qualifying words in different provisions of the Act. The provision of
the Statute has to be read in the plain and simple manner and in the light
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of the purpose which is sought to be achieved by the enactment. This case
also does not take the case of the appellant any further in view of
discussion earlier. Yet another case referred to is reported in AIR 1959
S.C. 198 Siraj-ul-Haq Khan and Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf,
U.P. and Ors. It has also no application to the present case. Our attention
has particularly been drawn to Paragraph 17 wherein it has been observed as
follows:
".........These decisions illustrate the principle that where the literal
meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat
its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is
legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so
as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of
it effective and operative"
The above observations may perhaps help more to the respondent’s stand.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand, placed
reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1955 S.C. 425 Sangram Singh v.
Election Tribunt Kotah and Anr. The matter relates to an election petition
where ex parte proceedings were ordered. This Court as a general
proposition of interpretation of Statutes observed as follows:
"Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is ’procedure’
something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal
enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people
up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for
reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against
(provided always that justice is done to ’both sides’) lest the very means
designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.
Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of
procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires
that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be
reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and
property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be
precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions
and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken
by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be
construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that
principle"
Another decision relied upon on behalf of the respondent is reported in
[1985] 3 SCC 53 Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and Anr. v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta.
The tenant had failed to deposit the rent within the time permitted under
the provisions of the Act. It was held that period of 15 days as provided
was directory in nature. The Court had discretion to extend the period in
suitable cases.
We have already noticed that the provision as contained under clause (a) of
sub-section (2) of Section 13 is procedural in nature. It is also clear
that with a view to achieve the object of the enactment, that there may be
speedy disposal of such cases, it has been provided that reply is to be
filed within 30 days and the extension of time may not exceed 15 days. This
provision envisages that proceedings may not be prolonged for a very long
time without the opposite party having filed his reply. No penal
consequences have however been provided in case extension of time exceeds
15 days. Therefore, it could not be said that any substantive right accrued
in favour of the appellant or there was any kind of bar of limitation in
filing of the reply within extended time though beyond 45 days in all. The
reply is not necessarily to be rejected. All facts and circumstances of the
case must be taken into account. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the Act also provides that principles of natural justice have also to be
kept in mind.
We would like to observe that the decision of this Court in the cases of
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National Sewing Thread Co. and Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala (supra) would
not be applicable to the case in hand. In those cases it was held that a
power which is vested in the Court can be exercised repeatedly in the
absence of intention to the contrary contained in the Statute. Such a
question is not involved in the present case. The power to extend time
under Clause (a) is with a rider that the extension may not exceed 15 days.
We have, however, already held that the provision saying that extended time
may not exceed 15 days is directory in nature. It does not mean that orders
extending the time to file reply may be passed repeatedly unmindful of and
totally ignoring the provision that the extension may not exceed 15 days.
This provision has always to be kept in mind while passing an order
extending the time to file a reply to the petition. It is another matter,
as we have found that in case time is extended exceeding 15 days, it may
not be kind of an illegality which may deny or deprive the respondent to
file his reply within the time granted by the Forum/Commission.
So far the facts of the present case are concerned, we find that at the
first instance the Commission itself had fixed the date beyond 30 days and
the respondent sought further time which prayer was accepted and 4.5.2000
was fixed. The respondent filed his reply on the date fixed. In such
circumstances there was no occasion to contend that the reply of the
respondent should be rejected.
For the discussion held above, we find no merit in the appeal. The same is
dismissed with costs.