Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
K.BRAHMA SURAIAH & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
LAKSHMINARAYANA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/11/1968
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
SHAH, J.C.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 816 1970 SCR (3) 933
1969 SCC (1) 138
ACT:
Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959-
Mysore Panchayat Secretaries’ Powers and Duties Rules, 1961,
r. 16-Rule providing that complaints and suits on behalf of
Panchayat to be filed by Secretary-Private complaint
whether can be filed for offence under s. 220 of Act.
HEADNOTE:
A private complaint was lodged against the appellants for an
offence under s. 220 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and
Local Boards Act, 1959. Rule 16 of the Mysore Panchayat
Secretaries’ Powers and Duties Rules, 1961 provided that
the Secretary shall have power to file complaints and suits
on behalf of the Panchayat, and to conduct the proceedings
on its behalf and on the orders of the Panchayat. On their
conviction the appellants went to the High Court and
contended that in view of Rule 16 they could not be
prosecuted on a private complaint. The High Court decided
against them on the view that the said Rule did not preclude
persons other than the Secretary from filing a complaint but
it only debarred complaints being made by others on behalf
of the Panchayat. Against the High Court’s judgment appeal
by special leave was filed in this Court.
HELD: (i) In the presence of r. 16 and for the reasons
given by this Court in R. M. Kanavi’s case which dealt with
similar provisions. under the Bombay Municipal Borough Act,
1925, it must be held that it was the Secretary of the
Panchayat who alone was competent to file the, complaint.
Section 213(3) of the Mysore Act is analogous to s.
23A(3) of the’ Bombay Act under which the offence fell in
Kanavi’s case. On a parity of reasoning it could not be
suggested that if there had been any contravention of s.
213 ( 3 ) any voter or member of the public could have
filed a complaint in the matter. The other provisions. also
of the Act which follow, namely, as. 214 to’ 219 indicate
that it was never contemplated that a complaint for an
infringement or contravention of the prohibition contained
therein could be lodged before a Magistrate having
jurisdiction under s. 233 by any private individual in the
presence of specific rule that the Secretary shall have the
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power to file a complaint on behalf of the Panchayat. Most
of these sections i.e. sq. 217 and 218 postulate infraction
of orders of the Panchayat for which the Panchayat alone
would be interested in filing a complaint. Thus the scheme
of the Act also supports the view that a complaint could be
filed only under r. 16 of the Mysore Panchayat Secretaries’
Powers and Duties Rules, 1961 and could not have been filed
by a private complaint. [936 H--937 C]
K.M. Kanavi v. State of Mysore, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 821,
followed and’
(ii) The High Court was not fight in saying that all
offences committed under the various provisions contained in
the Act would be cognizable owing to the general powers
conferred on police officer by s. 236 of the Act. The
section gives Only a limited power to the police
934
officer to effect arrest if an offence is committed In his
presence. The present case moreover did not relate to the
powers which a police officer could exercise in respect of
an offence under s. 220 of the Act but to the question
whether a private complaint could be filed. [937 G---938 C]
Public Prosecutor v. A. V. Ramiah, A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 392
referred to.
(iii) The difficulty felt by the High Court that a
Secretary who is subordinate to the Chairman may find it
embarrassing to file a complaint against him can hardly be
accepted as serious. The Secretary has to act on behalf of
the Panchayat and it is the panchayat that would be vitally
interested in preventing and stopping any contravention of
the provisions of s. 220 of the Act. ’The’ Secretary acts on
behalf of the Panchayat and the question of his
subordination to any one of its office bearers is of no
consequence. [938 D]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 183 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated March 30, 1966 of the Mysore High Court in Criminal
Revision Petition No. 384 of 1965.
R.B. Datar, for the appellants.
The respondent did not appear.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J, This is an appeal by special leave from a
judgment of the Mysore High Court in which the only point
involved is whether a private complaint could be entertained
for the commission of an offence under s. 220 of the Mysore
Village Panchayats & Local Boards Act, 1959, hereinafter
called the "Act". The appellants who were the Vice-Chairman
and the Chairman of the Keladi village panchayat were
convicted under the aforesaid section and sentenced to pay a
fine of Pa. 50 and Pa. 40 and in default to undergo 7 days
and 5 days’ simple imprisonment respectively.
A private complaint was filed against the appellants
alleging that they gave bids at an auction held at the
village panchayat and appellant No. 1 purchased a radio
belonging to the panchayat for Pa. 35/-. Appellant No. 2
also bid at the same auction for the radio. According to s.
220 of the Act no member or an employee of a panchayat shah
directly or indirectly bid for or acquire interest in any
movable or immovable property sold at such sale in
connection therewith. if any person contravenes this
provision he is to be punished, on conviction, with a fine
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which may extend to Rs. 500/-. Under Rule 16 of the Mysore
Panchayat Secretaries’ Powers and Duties Rules, 1961
promulgated under the provisions of the Act, only the
Secretary of the Panchayat has the power to file a complaint
on behalf of the Panchayat. The High Court was of the view
that this Rule did not’ preclude persons
935
other than the Secretary from filing a complaint but it only
debarred complaints being, made by others on behalf of the
Panchayat. Now Rule 16 may be reproduced. :--
"The Secretary shall have power to file
complaints and suits on behalf of the
Panchayat and to conduct the proceedings on
its behalf under the orders of the
Panchayat."
In K.M. Kanavi v. The State of Mysore(1) the appellant
Kanavi, who was the president of Municipal Borough of Gadag
Betgeri had been removed from Presidentship. He refused to
hand over the charge of all the papers and property which
were in his possession relating to the Borough to the new
President in spite of an order made by the Government under
s. 23A of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925,
hereinafter called the "Bombay Act" to that effect.
Pursuant to orders made by the Divisional Commissioner and
the Deputy Commissioner the new President filed a complaint
against Kanavi for an offence punishable under s. 23A(3) of
the Bombay Act. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to
pay a fine of Rs. 50/-. A question arose whether the
complaint filed by the new President was competent as it was
not filed in accordance with the procedure laid down in that
Act. Section 200 of the Bombay Act provided that the
Standing Committee and subject to the provisions of sub-s.
(3) the Chief Officer may order proceedings to be taken for
the recovery of any penalties and for the punishment of any
persons offending against the provisions of the aforesaid
Act. This Court was of the opinion that the complaint which
had been filed by the new President was for initiating the
proceedings for the punishment of Kanavi who had offended
against the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 23A and as the
new President was not the Chief Officer and he had not filed
the complaint under any direction made by the Standing
Committee the complaint could not be entertained. In that
case also the High Court had taken the view that s. 200(1)
was only an enabling section which gave the power to the
Standing Committee and the Chief Officer to make a direction
for taking of proceedings and it could not be held to be
exhaustive of the authorities who could make directions for
initiation of proceedings. The High Court had taken notice
of the fact that there was no provision in that Act
forbidding cognizance of offences being taken except on a
complaint made under a direction of the Standing Committee
or the Chief Officer. , This is what was observed by this
Court :-
"We are unable to accept the
interpretation put by the High Court on s.
200(1) of the Act. It is true that there is
no specific provision in the Act laying down
that
[1968] 3 S.C.R. 821.
936
cognizance of an offence under the Act is not
to be taken except on a Complaint filed in
accordance with a direction made under s.
200(1), but the scheme of the Act and the
purpose of this provision in s. 200(1) makes
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it clear that the legislature intended that
such proceedings. should only be instituted in
the manner laid down m that sub-section. The
word "may" was used only because the
legislature could not have enacted a mandatory
provision requiring the Standing Committee or
the Chief Officer to make a direction for
institution of proceedings in all cases. This
word was intended to give a discretion to the
Standing COmmittee or the Chief Officer to
make directions for taking proceedings only
when they considered it appropriate that such
a direction should be made and to avoid
compelling the Standing Committee or the Chief
Officer to make such direction in all cases.
The use of this word "may" cannot be
interpreted as laying down that, if a
proceeding for punishment of any person for
contravention of any of the provisions of the
Act is to be instituted, it can be instituted
in any manner without complying with the
requirements of s. 200(1) of the Act. If the
interpretation put by the High Court on this
provision is accepted, it would mean that this
provision was totally unnecessary, because
there would be no need to confer power on the
Standing Committee or the Chief Off
icer to
make such directions if such directions could
be made or proceedings instituted at the
instance of any private individual. We cannot
accept the submission that this provision was
made in the Act simply by way of abundant
caution. In fact, if the provision had been
made with such an object in view, there is no
reason why the power should have been
expressed to be conferred on the Standing
Committee and the Chief Officer only and not
on the President of the Municipality. We,
consequently, hold that, if any proceeding for
punishment of any person for contravention of
any of the provisions of the Act is to be
instituted, it must be instituted in the
manner laid down in s. 200(1) of the Act and
in that manner only."
It may be mentioned that the expression of the above opinion
was based on a consideration of the previous decisions of
this Court. Following the ratio of the above decision it
would be legitimate to hold that the complaint, in the
present case, could be filed under Rule 16 only by the
Secretary of the Panchayat and by no one else. It may
be.pointed out that in the Act s. 213(3) is analogous to s.
23A(3) of the Bombay Act. On a parity of reasoning it could
not be suggested that if there had been any
937
contravention of s. 213(3) any voter or member of the public
could have filed a complaint in the matter. The other
provisions also of the Act which follow, namely ss. 214 to
219 indicate that it was never contemplated that a complaint
for _infringe.me.at or contravention of the prohibition
contained therein could be lodged before a magistrate having
jurisdiction under s. 233 by any private individual in the
presence of a specific rule that the Secretary shall have
the power to file a complaint on behalf of the Panchayat.
Most of these sections i.e. ss. 217 and 218 postulate
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infraction of orders of the Panchayat for which the
Panchayat alone would be interested in filing a complaint.
We axe satisfied that the scheme of the Act also supports
the view which we are taking that a complaint could be flied
only under Rule 16 of the Mysore Panchayat Secretaries’
Powers and Duties Rules, 1961 and could not have been filed
by a private complainant.
The High Court seems to have relied on s. 236 of the Act
which deals with powers of police officers. This section
provides that any police officer may arrest any person
committing in his presence any offence against any of the
provisions of the Act or of any rule, regulation or bye-law
made thereunder. The person arrested has to be produced
before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of
arrest. The police officer effecting the arrest must give
immediate information to the Chairman or the Secretary of
the Panchayat of the commission of such offence and give all
assistance in the exercise of his lawful authority. The
High Court was of the view that under the provisions of
this section the police officer could submit a charge sheet
under s. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code after necessary
investigation for offences committed under the Act. Chapter
of the Act relates to establishment and constitution of
Panchayats. There are certain sections in it which by
express words make offences committed under them cognizable
but in the same Chapter there are other sections which do
not contain any such provision; for instance, ss. 15, 17,.
21 and 22 expressly provide that the offences committed
under them would be cognizable but ss. 16, 18, 19 and 20 do
not contain any such provision. In other words the offences
committed under them must be deemed to be not cognizable.
Section 23 in the same Chapter says that no court shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable under s. 16 or s. 17 or
under s. 19(2)(a) unless there is a complaint made by an
order of or under authority from the Deputy Commissioner.
The High Court was, therefore, not right in saying that all
offences committed under the various provisions contained in
the Act would be cognizable owing to the general powers
conferred on police officers by s. 236. Indeed that section
gives only a limited power to the police officer to
effect arrest if an offence is committed in his presence.
There is authority for the view that this will not make an
offence cognizable within the meaning of s. 4(f)
938
of the Criminal Procedure Code; vide Public Prosecutor(1)
v. A.V. Ramiah. In the absence of any express provision in
s. 220 with which we are concerned we doubt whether the
offence committed under it would be cognizable and a police
officer could carry on investigation in respect of it under
Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code and finally
submit a charge sheet under s. 173 of that Code.
It may also be pointed out that in the present case we
are not concerned with the powers which a police officer can
exercise in respect of an offence committed under s. 220 of
the Act. What has to be seen is whether a private person or
an individual could file a complaint. In the presence of
Rule 16 and for the reasons given in K.M. Kanavi v. State of
Mysore(2) we are of the opinion that it was the Secretary of
the Panchayat who alone was competent to file the complaint.
It must be remembered that it would be the panchayat that
would be largely interested in taking action against any of
its members and employees for the contravention of s. 220.
The Secretary would, therefore, be entitled to file a
complaint on behalf of the panchayat. The difficulty felt
by the High Court that a Secretary who is subordinate to the
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Chairman may find it embarrassing to file a complaint
against him can hardly be accepted as a serious hurdle in
the way of coming to the conclusion at which we have
arrived. The Secretary has to act on behalf of the
panchayat and it is the panchayat that would be vitally
interested in preventing and stopping any contravention of
provisions like s. 220 of the Act. The Secretary acts on
behalf of the panchayat and the question of his
subordination to any of its office bearers is of no
consequence.
In the view we have taken the appeal is allowed and the
conviction and sentence imposed on each of the appellants is
set aside.
G.C. Appeal allowed.
(1) A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 392.
(2) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 821.
939