Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BALDEO SINGH AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
22/04/1957
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
MENON, P. GOVINDA
SARKAR, A.K.
CITATION:
1957 AIR 612 1957 SCR 995
ACT:
Gram Cutcherry-Criminal jurisdiction--Concurrent jurisdic-
tion of ordinary criminal Courts--Enactment, if
discriminatory in character--Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947
(Bihar Act 7 of 1948), ss. 60, 62, 68, 69, 70, 73-
Constitution of India, Art. 14.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants were convicted of an offence under s. 379 of
the Indian penal Code by a full bench of the Gram Cutcherry
constituted under the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj
Act, 1947. It was contended for the appellants that the
conviction was bad on the grounds, inter alia, that s. 62 of
the Act which provided for the criminal jurisdiction of Gram
Cutcherries gave concurrent jurisdiction to the ordinary
criminal Courts and left it open to a party to go either to
the ordinary criminal Courts or to a bench of the Gram
Cutcherry, and as the procedure followed in the ordinary
criminal Courts was substantially different from that
followed by a Gram Cutcherry, the Act was discriminatory in
nature and as such infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Held, that the impugned provisions of the Act are not
discriminatory in nature.
The scheme of the Act is that a case or suit cognizable
under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried only by it
unless the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned
chooses to take action under s. 70 or S. 73 of the Act. The
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reference to concurrent jurisdiction in s. 62 is explainable
by reason of the provisions in ss. 69, 7o and 73, so that on
the transfer or withdrawal of a case from the Gram Cutcherry
or the cancellation of the jurisdiction of the bench, it may
not be said that the ordinary criminal Courts also have no
jurisdiction to try it.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 145 of
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1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
July 20, 1954, of the Patna High Court in Criminal
Miscellaneous No. 228 of 1954.
S. P. Verma, for the appellants.
R. C. Prasad, for the respondents.
1957. April 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
S.K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an
order of summary dismissal passed by the High Court of
Patna on July 20, 1954, on an application under Arts. 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant facts
are these. One Uma Shankar Prasad instituted a case against
eight persons, including the three appellants before us,
Baldeo Singh, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, on the
allegation that they had forcibly cut and removed ’urad’ and
Kodo crops from his field in village Darwan on October 1,
1953, at about 10 a.m. Uma Shankar said that he objected,
but was threatened with assault. The case was instituted
before the Gram Cutcherry of Bankat in the district of
Champaran, constituted under the provisions of the Bihar
Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), hereinafter
referred to as the Act. Altogether four witnesses were
examined in the case, two on behalf of the prosecution and
two for the accused persons. The defence of some of the
accused persons was that the land on which the crops stood
belonged to one Yogi Sahni, who had sold it to Sunder Singh,
accused, on September, 25, 1953. On December 28, 1953, a
bench of the Gram Cutcherry acquitted all the accused
persons. On January 7, 1954, Uma Shankar Prasad preferred
an appeal under s. 67 of the Act. The appeal was heard on
June 24, 1954,
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and the full bench by a majority, with three dissentient
panches, held the three appellants guilty of the offence
under s. 379, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them to
imprisonment for fifteen days each. The appellants then
moved the High Court of Patna under Arts. 226 and 227 of the
Constitution, with the result stated above. The appellants
then moved this Court and obtained special leave under Art.
136 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the appellants has pressed the
following contentions before us. His first and foremost
contention is that the Act, by reason of certain provisions
contained therein, is discriminatory in nature and offends
against Art. 14 of the Constitution. It I s advisable to
set out first those provisions of the Act which, according
to learned counsel for the appellants, are discriminatory in
character. Section 62 of the Act, which provides for the
criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries, is in these
terms:
" Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subject to the provisions of
this Act, a bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall have
jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Criminal Court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is
situate for the trial of the following offences as well as
abetment of and attempts to commit any such offence, if
committed within the local limits of its jurisdiction,
namely:
(a)offences under the Indian Penal Code, sections 140,
143, 145, 147, 151, 153, 160, 172, 174, 178, 179, 269, 277,
279, 283, 285, 286, 289, 290, 294, 323, 334, 336, 341, 352,
356, 357, 358, 374, 379, 380, 381, 403, 411, 426, 428, 430,
447, 448, 461, 504, 506, 510;
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(b)offences under the Bengal Public Gambling Act, 1867;
(c)offences under sections 24 and 26 of the Cattle
Trespass Act, 1871;
(d) except as otherwise provided, offences under this Act
or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder;
(e)any other offence under any other enactment, if empowered
in this behalf by the Government:
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Provided that the bench shall not take cognizance of any
offence under sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of the Indian
Penal Code in which the value of the property alleged to be
stolen exceeds fifty rupees or in which the accused-
(i)has been previously convicted of an offence punishable
under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code with
imprisonment of either description for a term of three years
or upwards; or
(ii)has been previously fined for theft by any bench of the
Gram Cutcherry; or
(iii) is a registered member of a criminal tribe under
section 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924; or (iv) has been
bound over to be of good behaviour in proceedings instituted
under section 109 or 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898."
It is worthy of note that the section contains two
important qualifications: one is contained in the non-
obstante clause with which the section begins and the other
is contained in the expression ’subject to the provisions of
this Act.’ The importance of this second qualification will
be apparent when some of the other provisions of the Act are
set out. Subject to the two qualifications mentioned above,
s. 62 gives a bench of the Gram Cutcherry Jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the ordinary criminal Court within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate
for the trial of the offences mentioned therein. Section 63
vests the bench with the powers of a Magistrate of the third
class. Section 64 is not relevant for our purpose and need
not be read. Section 65 provides for exclusive civil
jurisdiction of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry in certain
classes of suits, subject to certain provisos. Section 66
says that certain suits shall not be heard by a bench of the
Gram Cutcherry. Section 67 provides for appeals. Then
comes s. 68, which is very important for our purpose and
must be quoted in extenso--
" No court shall take cognizance of any case or suit which
is cognizable under the Act by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
unless an order to the contrary has been passed by the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate or
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the Munsif concerned under the provisions of the Act or any
other law for the time being in force."
Section 69 gives the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif
power to transfer a case or suit pending before a Magistrate
or a Munsif to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry having
jurisdiction to try it. Section 70 gives the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate or the Munsif power to withdraw any case or suit
pending before a bench of the Gram Cutcherry and transfer
the same to the ordinary Courts. Section 71 provides, inter
alia, that no legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act
on behalf of any party in any suit or case before the Gram
Cutcherry. Section 73 gives power to the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate and the Munsif to take necessary action when
there has been a miscarriage of justice or there is an
apprehension of a miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (2)
of s. 73 says that when an order under sub-s. (1) has been
made in respect of any suit or case, the complainant or the
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plaintiff, as the case may be, may institute the case or
suit afresh in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or
a Munsif of competent jurisdiction.
The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that
inasmuch as s. 62 gives only concurrent jurisdiction, it
leaves it open to a party to go either to the ordinary
criminal Courts or to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry.
According to him, this opens the door for discrimination,
because the procedure followed in the ordinary criminal
Courts is substantially different from that followed by a
Gram Cutcherry. The procedure to be followed by the latter
is indicated in s. 60 which states:
" Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any rules or
directions that may be made or issued by the Government in
this behalf, the procedure to be followed by a bench of the
Gram Cutcherry shall be such as it may consider just and
convenient and the bench shall not be bound to follow any
laws of evidence or procedure other than the procedure
prescribed by or under this Act."
This argument as to discrimination fails to take note of the
other provisions of the Act which we have set
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out above. Section 62 is, in express terms, subject to
other provisions of the Act; therefore, it is subject to
s.68 which states that no Court shall take cognizance of any
case or suit which is cognizable under the Act by a bench of
the Gram Cutcherry, unless an order to the contrary has been
passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif
concerned under the provisions of the Actor any other law
for the time being in force. On a proper construction of s.
62 and s. 68, it is clear that there is really no
discrimination and a case cognizable by a bench of the Gram
Cutcherry must be tried there, unless there has been an
order to the contrary in the exercise of his judicial
discretion by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif
concerned as contemplated by the latter part of s. 68. The
provisions of the Act under which such an order can be
passed are contained in the succeeding sections already
referred to by us. The whole scheme of Ch. VII of the Act
is that a case or suit cognizable under the Act by a Gram
Cutcherry should be tried by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
save in those exceptional cases which are provided for in
ss. 70 and 73. The reference to concurrent jurisdiction in
s. 62 is explainable by reason of the provisions in ss. 69,
70 and 73, so that on the transfer or withdrawal of a case
from the Gram Cutcherry or the cancellation of the
jurisdiction of the bench, it may not be said that the
ordinary criminal Courts also have no jurisdiction to try
it.
For these reasons, we are of the view that the impugned
provisions of the Act are not discriminatory in nature, and
there is no merit in the first contention pressed before us.
Secondly, learned counsel for the appellants has referred
us to rr. 60 and 61 of the Bihar Gram Cutcherry Rules, 1949.
Rule 60(2) requires that the decision of the full bench
shall be signed by the members and where a dissentient
judgment has been delivered, the minute of dissent shall
also be recorded under the signatures of the dissenting
members. These requirements were fulfilled in the present
case’ and no materials have been placed before us which may
lead to the conclusion that rr. 60 and 61 have been
violated.
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The third and last contention on behalf of the appellants
is that the conviction of two of the appellants, Ramdeo
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Singh and Sheodhar Singh, is bad, because there was no
evidence at all against them. The two witnesses examined on
behalf of the prosecution definitely said that they saw
Baldeo Singh (appellant) and two other named persons who
have been acquitted, but did not identify the remaining
persons who also forcibly cut and removed the crops. On
this evidence, there was no legal basis for the conviction
of Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh. Our attention has been
drawn to Ramdeo Singh’s own statement in which he said that
he had removed the crops of his own field’. That statement,
standing by itself, is not an admission of guilt. We agree
with learned counsel for the appellants that there was no
evidence whatever to sustain the conviction of Ramdeo Singh
and Sheodhar Singh. Their conviction was manifestly, and on
the face of the record, erroneous.
The High Court was moved for the exercise of its power of
superintendence under Art. 227, and it is open to us in this
appeal to exercise the same power. We would accordingly
allow this appeal so far as Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh
are concerned and set aside their conviction and sentence.
They will now be discharged from bail. So far as Baldeo
Singh is concerned, he was rightly convicted. We do not,
however, think that any useful purpose will be served by
sending him to jail for a short period. We would
accordingly reduce his sentence to a fine of Rs. 30/only or
in default imprisonment as directed by the full bench of the
Gram Cutcherry. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Appeal disposed of accordingly.
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