Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1100 of 2000
PETITIONER:
Ram Bachan Rai & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
Ram Udar Rai & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a learned
Single Judge of the Patna High Court summarily rejecting
the Civil Revision filed by the appellants under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the
’Code’).
The Civil Revision was filed against the order of the
Executing Court allowing the application for execution of
a decree which was passed more than 14 years ago.
A brief reference to the factual aspect would suffice.
The respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit for
declaration of title and recovery of possession in which
the appellants had appeared and filed a written
statement. The suit was decreed ex parte as the
defendants did not appear on the date fixed. The ex parte
decree in the concerned suit was passed on 3.5.1976. No
appeal was, however, filed against the aforesaid judgment
and decree. The present appellants who are the judgment
debtors filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC
for setting aside the ex parte decree which was dismissed
for default on 14.7.1978. The said application was not
restored by the trial Court and a Miscellaneous Appeal
filed also stood dismissed on 10.1.1987. The Civil
revision filed against the order of dismissal was also
dismissed on 6.4.1987. At no stage any stay was granted
by any Court and the respondents as decree holders filed
an application for execution on 5.4.1991. According to
the appellants, only a symbolic possession was taken as
no notice as mandatorily required to be served in terms
of Order XXI Rule 22 or Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was ever served on the judgment debtors.
When the judgment debtors came to know of the
symbolic possession taken by the decree holders, they
filed objection under Section 47 CPC saying that the
decree was not legally enforceable as it was barred by
time.
The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the
objection holding that the period of twelve years had to
be counted from the date of dismissal of the Civil
Revision by the High Court i.e. from 6.4.1987 as the ex-
parte decree had merged in it. As already noted, the Civil
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Revision was summarily dismissed.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the High Court was not
justified in summarily rejecting the Civil Revision.
According to him, the Executing Court had erroneously
held that the period of limitation had to be reckoned
with effect from the date of dismissal of the Civil
Revision. On the contrary, in view of what has been
stated in W.B. Essential Commodities Supply
Corporation v. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd.
and Anr. (1999 (8) SCC 315) the application was clearly
filed beyond the period of limitation. Article 136 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the ’Limitation Act’)
provides for a period of 12 years for filing an application
for execution of a decree for recovery of immovable
property. Since the application was filed on 5.4.1991 it
was beyond the period of limitation.
In response, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the judgment and decree dated 3.5.1976
was passed in the suit admittedly under Order XX Rule 7
of the CPC. As the cost for enforcement of the decree was
not quantified, the period of limitation could not have
commenced from the date of judgment and the decree.
The basic issue, therefore, is when would the period
of limitation for execution of a decree passed in a suit
commence. Article 136 of the Limitation Act reads as
follows:
Description of
application
Period of limitation
Time from which period
begins to run
For the
execution of
any decree
(other than a
decree
granting a
mandatory
injunction)
or order of
any civil
Court.
Twelve years
When the decree or
order becomes
enforceable or where
the decree or any
subsequent order
directs any payment of
money or the delivery
of any property to be
made tat a certain date
or at recurring periods,
when default in
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making the payment or
delivery in respect of
which execution is
sought, takes place;
Provided that an
application for the
enforcement or
execution of a decree
granting a perpetual
injunction shall not be
subject to any period of
imitation.
Noticing some conflicts in views expressed by two
Judge Benches judgment of this Court, reference was
made to a three Judge Bench in Chiranjilal (dead) by Lrs.
V. Hari Das (dead) by Lrs. (2005(2) SCC 261). A three
Judge Bench by its judgment dated May 13, 2005 in Dr.
Chiranji Lal (D) by Lrs. V. Hari Das (d) by Lrs. (2005 (10)
SCC 746) has decided the matter observing inter-alia as
follows:
"24. A decree in a suit for partition declares
the right of the parties in the immovable
properties and divides the shares by metes and
bounds. Since a decree in suit for partition
creates rights and liabilities of the parties with
respect to the immovable properties, it is
considered as an instrument liable for the
payment of stamp duty under the Indian
Stamp Act. The object of the Stamp Act being
securing the revenue for the State, the scheme
of the Stamp Act provides that a decree of
partition not duly stamped can be impounded
and once the requisite stamp duty along with
penalty, if any, is paid the decree can be acted
upon."
In paragraph 25 of the same decision, this Court
also observed as follows:
25. The engrossment of the final decree in a
suit for partition would relate back to the date
of the decree. The beginning of the period of
limitation for executing such a decree cannot
be made to depend upon date of the
engrossment of such a decree on the stamp
paper. The date of furnishing of stamp paper is
an uncertain act, within the domain, purview
and control of a party. No date or period is
fixed for furnishing stamp papers. No rule has
been shown to us requiring the Court to call
upon or give any time for furnishing of stamp
paper. A party by his own act of not furnishing
stamp paper cannot stop the running of period
of limitation. None can take advantage of his
own wrong. The proposition that period of
thereupon an only thereafter the period
limitation would remain suspended till stamp
paper is furnished and decree engrossed of
twelve years will begin to run would lead to
absurdity. In Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v.
Walchand Ramchand Kothari, it was said that
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the payment of court fee on the amount found
due was entirely in the power of the decree-
holder and there was nothing to prevent him
from paying it then and there; it was a decree
capable of execution from the very date it was
passed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the said decision, the inevitable
conclusion is that the Executing Court was not correct in
its view. It is to be noted that learned counsel for the
respondents conceded to the position that the period of
limitation is not to be reckoned from the date of dismissal
of the Civil Revision which was filed relating to rejection
of the application under Order IX Rule 13, CPC. The
entire focus was on the date from which the period of
limitation is to be reckoned. Reliance was placed on a
decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ram Nath Das and
Ors. v. Saha Chowdhury and Co. Ltd. and Ors. (AIR 1974
Cal 246) where it was held that the decree was
enforceable and when cost is assessed. The ratio in the
said judgment clearly runs counter to what has been
stated in Dr. Chiranji Lal’s case (supra).
For the reasons aforesaid, the application for
execution filed on 5.4.1991 was clearly time barred
having been filed beyond the period of twelve years
prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act.
Accordingly the High Court as well as the Executing
Court committed illegality in coming to a conclusion that
it was not barred by limitation. Therefore, the inevitable
result is that the order passed by the High Court and the
Executing Court cannot be maintained and are set aside.
The appeal is allowed. The application for execution
stands rejected. No costs.