GANDHI SEWA SADAN RAJSMAND vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1724  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27881 OF 2019) INDIAN SCHOOL, JODHPUR & ANR. …PETITIONER(S) VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.  …RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1713­1722  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.27907­27916 OF 2019) CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1723  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27987 OF 2019) CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1725  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2942 OF 2020) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1729   OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5470 OF 2020) CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1730  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5589 OF 2020) Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NEETU KHAJURIA Date: 2021.05.03 14:38:08 IST Reason: CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1726  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5902 OF 2020) 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1727­1728  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6743­6744 OF 2021) (@ DIARY NO(S). 6803 OF 2020) AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1732  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6745 OF 2021) (@ DIARY NO(S). 44 OF 2021) CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1731  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 431 OF 2021) CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  1733­1735  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 577­579 OF 2021) CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1736  OF 2021 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2494 OF 2021) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. These   two   sets   of   appeals   are   being   disposed   of   by   this 1. common judgment. 1 2. In the  first set  of appeals, six appeals  emanate from common judgment and order dated 14.08.2019 passed by the High Court of 1  arising out of SLP (C) No. 27881 of 2019; SLP (C) Nos.27907­27916 of 2019; SLP (C) No. 27987 of 2019; SLP (C) No. 2942 of 2020; SLP (C) No. 5902 of 2020; and SLP (C) No …………. of 2021 @ Diary No(s). 6803 of 2020; 3 2 Judicature   for   Rajasthan   at   Jodhpur   and   two   other   appeals against the judgment and order dated 11.02.2020 of the Jaipur Bench of the same High Court, which followed the earlier decision of   the   Jodhpur   seat   referred   to   above.     In   these   matters,   the appellants (Management(s) of private unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan) had assailed the validity of the Rajasthan Schools 3 (Regulation of Fee) Act, 2016 , in particular Sections 3, 4, 6 to 11, 15   and   16   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder   titled   Rajasthan 4 Schools (Regulation of Fee) Rules, 2017 , in particular Rules 3, 4, 6 to 8 and 11 thereof being  ultra vires  the Constitution and abridge the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution of India. 5 In the   of appeals, four appeals , also filed by the 3. second set Management(s) of private unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan, emanate from the common judgment and order dated 18.12.2020 of the same High Court.   In these appeals, the challenge is to the orders passed by the State Authorities on 09.04.2020, 07.07.2020 2  arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 5470 and 5589 of 2020 3  for short, “the Act of 2016” 4  for short, “the Rules of 2017” 5  arising out of SLP (C) No …………. of 2021 @ Diary No(s). 44 of 2021; SLP (C) No.  431 of 2021; SLP (C) Nos. 577­579 of 2021; and SLP (C) No. 2494 of 2021 4 and   28.10.2020   regarding   deferment   of   collection   of   school   fees including reduction of fees limited to 70 per cent of tuition fees by schools affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education and 60 per cent from the schools affiliated with Rajasthan Board of Secondary   Education,   in   view   of   reduction   of   syllabus   by   the respective­Boards due to aftermath of pandemic (lockdown) from March 2020. 4. The   issues   involved   in   all   these   appeals   concern   around 36,000   private   unaided   schools   including   220   minority   private unaided   schools   in   the   State   of   Rajasthan   governed   by   the provisions of the Act of 2016 referred to above.   Accordingly, all these appeals were clubbed and heard analogously.   However, as aforesaid, two broad issues would arise for our consideration. Re: First Set: 5. Reverting to the first set of appeals, the challenge is to the provisions of the Act of 2016 and Rules of 2017 being violative of rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on occupation of imparting education which includes autonomy to 5 determine the school fees by the Managements of private unaided schools.   It is urged that any restriction imposed in that regard would   be   arbitrary   and   unreasonable.     Further,   the   impugned provisions inevitably limit the autonomy of the school Management of   private   unaided   schools   to   the   level   of   merely   proposing   the 6 school   fees   to   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee ,   in   which   the Management has only one representative as against eight others i.e., five parents, three teachers and one principal.  This imbalance in the constitution of the SLFC negates the effective control of the Management   in   the   affairs   of   the   school   and   in   particular   the autonomy to determine its own school fees.  Notably, five parents, who are appointed as members of the SLFC are chosen by draw of lots   from   amongst   the   willing   parents   of   the   wards   pursuing education in the  schools  concerned and  could  include even the wards who are availing free education under the Right of Children 7 to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 .   In fact, the latter have no stakes in the matter of determination of school fees.  As the willing parents are selected by lottery system, in the process even the person who has no modicum of knowledge of development of a 6  for short, “the SLFC” 7  for short, “the RTE Act” 6 school, management of finances and dynamics of quality education, would become part of the process of determination of school fees. The members of the SLFC would inevitably have conflicting interest. They would be interested in ensuring that minimum school fee is finalised.   The nominated teachers may constantly seek favour of the   Management   by   exploiting   their   position   as   member   of   the SLFC.   In the process, an environment of constant difference of opinion would prevail between the school Management on one side and the parents of the wards and teachers, who would form part of the SLFC.  Pertinently, the provisions of the impugned Act of 2016 give authority to the SLFC to override the proposal of the school Management in the matter of school fees to be collected from the wards during the relevant period.  Effectively, the parents who are members of the SLFC, would control the decision­making process impacting the autonomy of the school Management in regard to determination of school fees, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.   The parents­teachers duo who are part of the SLFC would have no intention or motivation to create new facilities or commitment to develop the school towards excellence.  Moreover, they would not be accountable for anything that finally impacts the 7 quality of education in the school concerned.  It is only the school Management who would be held accountable in that regard, whilst school Management is denuded of its autonomy to determine school fees.     The   school   fees   so   determined   by   the   SLFC   as   per   the provisions of the impugned Act of 2016, would remain unchanged and binding for next three years with no provision for increase in case of contingency of funds needed for new development or general inflation or hike in salary and wages of staff or any other legitimate purpose. The   impugned   Act   of   2016   also   gives   wide   powers   to   the 6. 8 Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   and   Revision   Committee including power to issue summons, search, seizure and penalties as if   the   occupation   of   imparting   education   is   akin   to   res   extra commercium.    The school Management­appellants apprehend that dispute   with   regard   to   determination   of   school   fees   would   be endless and get embroiled in the process of appeal, revision and judicial proceedings.  Resultantly, schools would suffer uncertainty in financial matters.  Furthermore, there is no mechanism provided to guarantee the recovery of school fees after it is finally determined 8  for short, “the DFRC” 8 under the Act of 2016.  The working of the impugned Act of 2016 would eventually stifle the growth and development of the private unaided schools and that all schools — small and big, would be treated equally with same measure, which would be arbitrary and discriminatory and against the principle expounded by this Court that the school fees of private unaided schools should be school­ based and not a rigid or uniform arrangement.   According to the appellants, the factors enumerated for determination of school fees are vague, subjective and irrelevant.  The crucial factors such as for making a good school are not even adverted to in Section 8 of the impugned Act of 2016.  The process of determination of school fees is a dynamic exercise and could be effectively done by the school Management on its own while keeping in mind that establishing a school is essentially a charity.   According to the appellants, the provisions of the impugned Act of 2016 are unworkable and violate the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution.   The State can only regulate the fees determined by the private unaided schools only if it shows that the same entails in profiteering or capitation, which is prohibited by law. 9 7. It is urged that by now it is well­established that the private unaided schools ought to have maximum autonomy with regard to administration   including   the   right   of   appointment,   disciplinary powers,   admission   of   students   and   the   “fees   to   be   charged”  as expounded by this Court in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. vs. 9 .    The Court noted that it is in the State of Karnataka & Ors. interests of the general public that more good quality schools are established.   Autonomy   and   non­regulation   of   the   school administration in matters referred to above will ensure that more such institutions are established.   This view has been restated in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of 10 India & Anr. .  According   to   the   appellants,   the   activities   of   school   level 8. education are qualitatively different from that of professional level education.  The determination of school fees, therefore, stands on a totally different footing than determination of fees for professional colleges for medicine etc.   The impugned Act of 2016 falls foul of doctrine of proportionality — as restrictions imposed on the school 9   (2002) 8 SCC 481 (paras 60 and 61) 10  (2012) 6 SCC 1 (paras 50 to 53) 10 Management in respect of  determination of   school fees have no cogent nexus/object sought to be achieved. It is lastly urged that the legislative field regarding regulation 9. of   school   fees   is   already   occupied   by   the   law   made   by   the 11 12 Parliament being the RTE Act  and the Rules framed thereunder.   Hence, it was not open to the State legislature to enact a law on the same subject.   These points were urged even before the High Court at the 10. instance of the appellants.   The respondent­State countered the same on the argument that the impugned Act of 2016 was in the nature of a regulatory law, with complete autonomy to the school Management to decide about its fee structure which, however, could be given effect to upon approval given by the SLFC.   The SLFC consists   of   not   only   parents   of   wards,   but   also   the   school Management and their representatives in the form of teachers.  It ensures participation of all the stakeholders and democratisation of the   decision­making   process.     The   proposal   of   the   school Management, if found to be in order, is generally approved and it is 11  Sections 13 and 16 of the RTE Act 12  The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2010 (Rules 12, 15 and 16) 11 open to the SLFC to give counter suggestion which if   acceptable to the school Management can be acted upon by it.  In case there is a difference of opinion, only then the matter goes for adjudication of the rival claims before the DFRC and the decision of that Authority becomes binding on the parties.  Further, the school Management, the SLFC as well as the Adjudicatory­cum­Regulatory Authority, each one of them is guided by the principles and factors delineated in Section 8 of the Act of 2016 and Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017 in the matter of determination of school fees.  Such external regulation for fee fixation has been recognised and approved by this Court in successive decisions  viz.,   Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. 13 vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. ,  P.A. Inamdar & Ors. vs. State 14 ,  of Maharashtra & Ors. Modern School vs. Union of India & 15 Ors. ,   Action Committee, Unaided Private Schools & Ors. vs. 16 and   Director   of   Education,   Delhi   &   Ors.   Modern   Dental College   and   Research   Centre   &   Ors.   vs.   State   of   Madhya 17 .    According to the respondent­State, the setting Pradesh & Ors. 13  (2003) 6 SCC 697 (5­Judge Bench) 14  (2005) 6 SCC 537 (7­Judge Bench) 15  (2004) 5 SCC 583 (3­Judge Bench) 16  (2009) 10 SCC 1 (3­Judge Bench) 17  (2016) 7 SCC 353 (5­Judge Bench) 12 up   of   External   Fee   Regulatory   Authority   is   consistent   with   the jurisprudential exposition of this Court and held not to be violative of   Article   19(1)(g)   or   Article   30   of   the   Constitution   of   India. According to the State, there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the Act of 2016.   In that, the principles enunciated in the statutory provisions under consideration are not irrelevant or irrational as suggested by the appellants. 11. The respondent­State has also refuted the challenge to the impugned Act of 2016 merely on the basis of its nomenclature. According to the State, non­mentioning of the words prevention of profiteering and charging of capitation fee in the impugned Act of 2016, does not  ipso facto  make the same constitutionally suspect. It is urged  that  a  Constitution  Bench  of   this  Court  in   Modern Dental   College   and   Research   Centre   (supra)   has   upheld   the validity   of   identical   provisions   enacted   by   the   State   of   Madhya Pradesh in relation to fixation of fee by external committees and, therefore,   the   challenge   set   up   by   the   appellants   cannot   be countenanced. 13 12. The respondent­State would urge that the High Court in the impugned judgment after adverting to the exposition of different Constitution   Benches   of   this   Court,   justly   concluded   that   the impugned   Act   of   2016   did   not   violate   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution as the right flowing therefrom was not an absolute fundamental right.  Further, there is no substance in the grounds set forth to assail the validity of the impugned Act of 2016. The High Court did advert to these arguments canvassed by 13. both sides and eventually dismissed the challenge to the validity of the impugned Act of 2016 vide common judgment and order dated 14.08.2019.   The High Court after adverting to the exposition in (supra),  T.M.A. Pai Foundation  Islamic Academy of Education (supra),  Modern School  (supra) and  Modern Dental College and (supra), proceeded to dismiss the writ petitions by Research Centre  observing as follows: “19.   Therefore,   in   the   backdrop   of   law   laid   down   by Constitution Bench in Modern Dental College & Research Centre   (supra),   if   the   impugned   Act   and   the   provisions sought to be assailed by the petitioners and the regulatory measures provided under the Rules are examined objectively with pragmatic approach, then, it would   ipso facto   reveal that   State   has   not   made   any   endeavour   to   trench   into autonomy   of   petitioner­institutions.   The   provisions   are 14 regulatory in nature with the solemn object of preventing profiteering and commercialization in school education. The constitution of the Committee for regulating fee structure, by no  stretch  of imagination be construed  as  an attempt  to completely bye­pass the school management. The Committee as   such   is   chaired   by   representative   of   the   management besides   principal   as   a   Secretary   with   three   teachers nominated by the management and five parents nominated from parent teachers association. Thus, the contention of the petitioners that State has completely chipped the wings of management or invaded their autonomy is an euphonious plea bereft of any merit. The   criteria   for   determining   fee   are   also   based   on legitimate considerations provided under  Section 8  of the Act. Thus, even while considering fee structure of the school, the Committee cannot be allowed to act at its whims and fancy   but   for   adhering   to   the   criteria   laid   down   under Section 8 of the Act. That apart, the remedy against the fee determined by the Committee is also provided in the Statute by   way   of   appeal/reference   and   second   appeal,   which sufficiently repudiate the contention of the petitioners about unreasonable   restrictions   on   their   autonomy   within   the mischief of unacceptable constraints envisaged under clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. 20.   Switching   on   to   the   coercive   measures   and   penal provisions   provided   under   the   Statute   and   enforcement methodology prescribed under the Rules, it would be just and   appropriate   to   observe   that   all   these   provisions   are essential   and   necessary   concomitant   of   regulatory mechanism for achieving desired objectives, and therefore cannot be categorized as unreasonable restrictions. In the overall scenario, we are also convinced that Sections 13 to 18 of the impugned Act and Rule 11 of the Rules are not intended to be invoked on sundry occasions for interfering with   day   to   day   functioning   of   the   unaided   recognized schools. Thus, complaint of the petitioners about fanciful and   capricious   supplication   of   these   provisions   per   se appears to be a far cry without any substance. Indisputably,   the   Rules   are   in   the   nature   of subordinate legislation and framed by the Government in 15 exercise of power under Section 19 of the Act for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act. Thus, the Rules as such are neither assailable on the ground of lack of legislative competence, nor for failure to conform to the parent statute under which Rules are made. Moreover, these rules are also not offending any right conferred on the petitioners under Part III of the Constitution or in violation of any provision of the Constitution, therefore, challenge to the Rules is wholly unsustainable. 21. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that   the   impugned   Act   is   unconstitutional   as   being   in derogation to Article 13(2) of the Constitution, appears to be quite alluring but of no substance. Analyzing this argument meticulously in the backdrop of lis involved in these matters, we   have   already   repudiated   the   same.   At   the   cost   of repetition, we may reiterate here that the impugned Act and its other provisions are not taking away or abridges rights of the petitioners conferred by Part III of the Constitution. We may hasten to add that entire edifice of challenge in these petitions   is   alleged   infraction   of   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution,   which   indisputably   is   not   an   absolute fundamental   right.   As   observed   hereinabove,   the   said fundamental right is subject to reasonable restrictions and such   restrictions   are   permissible   as   they   are   aimed   at seeking   laudable   objectives   in   the   larger   public   interest. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the impugned provisions of the Act as well as Rules are  intra­vires  of the Constitution not   being   in  violation  of  Article  13(2)  and  19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution. The   upshot   of   above   discussion   is   that   all   these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. The stay petitions th are also dismissed and interim order passed on 9  of April, 2018 is vacated.” We have heard Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel 14. for the appellants, Dr. Manish Singhvi and Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned senior counsel for the State of Rajasthan. 16 15. After cogitating over the rival arguments and considering the impugned   judgment,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   observing   that although the High Court was right in its conclusion, it has disposed of   the   challenge   to   the   validity   of   different   provisions   of   the impugned   Act   of   2016   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder   in   a summary manner.  We agree that merely adverting to the decisions of this Court was not enough.   The High Court should have then analysed the challenge to the respective provisions and also the overall   scheme   of   the   Act   of   2016.     Ordinarily,   we   would   have relegated the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of the entire matter afresh.  However, considering the nature of issues raised and the concerns expressed by the parties, we proceed to address the challenge to the relevant provisions of the Act of 2016 in this judgment itself.  Indeed,   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   16. T.M.A.   Pai Foundation  (supra) has expounded that the private unaided school management must have absolute autonomy to determine the school fees.   But at the same time the consistent view of this Court has been restated and enunciated by the Constitution Bench in  Modern 17 Dental College and Research Centre  (supra) in paragraph 75 of the reported decision.  In that, though the fee can be fixed by the educational   institutions   and   it   may   vary   from   institution   to institution depending upon the quality of education provided by each of such institutions, commercialisation is not permissible; and in   order   to   ensure   that   the   educational   institutions   are   not indulging in commercialisation and exploitation, the Government is equipped with necessary powers to take regulatory measures and to ensure   that   the   private   unaided   schools   keep   playing   vital   and pivotal role to spread education and not to make money.     The Court   further   noted   that   when   it   comes   to   the   notice   of   the Government that the institution was charging fee or other charges which are excessive, it has complete authority coupled with its duty to issue directions to such an institution to reduce the same so as to avoid profiteering and commercialisation. In   paragraph   76   of   the   same   decision,   the   Court   then 17. proceeded to consider the next question as to how a regulatory framework for ensuring that no excessive fee is charged by the educational institutions, can be put in place.  For that, the Court 18 adverted   to   the   decision   in   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation   (supra), (supra),   (supra) Islamic Academy of Education   Modern School   and   P.A. Inamdar   (supra)   and noted that primary education is a fundamental   right,   but   it   was   not   an   absolute   right   as   private schools cannot be allowed to receive capitation fee or indulge in profiteering in the guise of autonomy to determine the school fees itself.   The Court plainly noted that every school management of private unaided school is free to devise its own fee structure, but the same can be regulated by the Government in the interests of general   public   for   preventing   profiteering   and/or   charging   of capitation fee.  Further, fixation of fees needs to be regulated and controlled at the initial stage itself.  The Constitution Bench noted with approval the exposition in  Association of Private Dental and 18 which reads thus: Medical Colleges vs. State of M.P. , 

18  2009 SCC Online MP 760 19

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18. After   having   quoted   the   above   exposition   with   approval   in paragraph 81, the Court then proceeded to examine the need for a regulatory mechanism.   It noted that the regulatory measures are felt necessary to promote basic well­being for individuals in need. In paragraphs 90 to 92 in  Modern Dental College and Research (supra), this Court noted as follows: Centre 

21

20  supra at footnote No.9 22

19. After this jurisprudential exposition, it is not open to argue that   the   Government   cannot   provide   for   external   regulatory mechanism for determination of school fees or so to say fixation of “just” and “permissible” school fees at the initial stage itself. 20. The question is: whether the impugned enactment stands the test of reasonableness and rationality and balances the right of the educational   institutions   (private   unaided   schools)   guaranteed   to them under Article 19(1)(g) of the  Constitution in the  matter of determination of school fees?  The Act of 2016 has been enacted by the State legislature.   It was enacted as it was noticed that the 23 earlier enactment on the self­same subject did not include provision of   appeal   against   the   orders   of   fee   determination   by   the   Fee Determination Committee.  It was also noticed that there are large number of private schools (approximately 34,000) and a single fee determination committee cannot determine the fee of such schools in a proper manner in time.  For that reason, the Act of 2016 came into being to provide for regulation of collection of fees by schools in the   State   of   Rajasthan   and   matters   connected   therewith   and incidental thereto.  It extends to the whole of the State of Rajasthan and applies to both aided and unaided schools.  The Act provides for   a   regulatory   mechanism.     The   expression   “aided   school”   is defined   in   Section   2(b)   to   mean   a   school   receiving   any   sum   of money as aid from the State Government.  The expression “unaided school” has not been defined.  It must, however, follow that all other private   schools,   other   than   aided   schools   would   qualify   that category (i.e., unaided private schools).  The expression “school” has been defined in Section 2(t), which reads thus:

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The expression “private school” has been defined in Section 21. 2(p), which reads thus:

It is, thus, clear that the Act of 2016 applies to all the schools within the State of Rajasthan referred to in Section 2(t) including private schools as defined in Section 2(p). 22. Section 3 of the Act of 2016 predicates that no school itself or on  its  behalf   shall   collect   any   fee   in   excess   of   the   fee   fixed  or approved under the Act of 2016.   The expression “fee” has been defined in Section 2(h), which reads thus: 25

Besides the definition of expression “fee”, it would be apposite 23. to advert to the factors for determination of fee under the Act of 2016 as delineated in Section 8 of the Act of 2016.  The same reads thus:

26 24. In addition to Section 8, it is essential to take note of Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017 which provides for additional factors to be reckoned for determination of school fees.  Rule 10 reads thus:

25. After adverting to Section 8 and Rule 10, it is amply clear that the   relevant   factors   for   determination   of   reasonable   school   fees under the Act of 2016 and Rules framed thereunder have been duly articulated and are based on objective parameters.   It was urged that clause (a) of Section 8 is vague.  We find force in the argument of the respondent­State that the factors referred to in Section 8 and Rule 10 for determination of fee are founded on the dictum of this Court in successive reported precedents, as relevant factors.   The factor   of   location   of   the   school   is   certainly   relevant   for 27 determination of fee as are the other factors referred to in Section 8 and Rule 10.  The totality of the effect of all the specified factors is to be reckoned for determining the school fees of the concerned school for the relevant period.  The location of the school is not the only factor that is to be taken into account.  26. At the end, what is relevant is that the institution is entitled to fix its own fee structure, which may include reasonable revenue surplus for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution, as long as it does not entail in profiteering and commercialisation.  Whether fee structure evolved by the concerned school   results   in   profiteering   or   otherwise   is   a   matter   which eventually would become final with the determination/adjudication by the Statutory Regulatory Committees constituted under Sections 7 and 10 of the Act of 2016, namely, Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee (DFRC) and Revision Committee respectively, as the case may be.  That adjudication, however, becomes necessary only if the SLFC were to disapprove the proposal of the school Management regarding fee structure determined by the school.  Whereas, if the SLFC   were   to   accept   the   proposal   of   the   school   Management regarding fee structure as it is, that would be the fees under the Act 28 of 2016 for the relevant period and then there would be no need for the DFRC to adjudicate upon the fixation of fee in the concerned school. 27. The SLFC is constituted institution or school wise, whereas the   DFRC   is   an   independent   statutory   regulatory   authority empowered to enquire into the factum of whether fee structure of the   given   school   determined   by   its   Management   entails   in profiteering.  In the event, the SLFC disapproves the proposal of the school Management, the dispensation provided for adjudication of the contentious position between the stakeholders in no manner violate   the   fundamental   right   of   establishment   of   educational institution guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 28. Section   4   of   the   Act   of   2016   provides   for   Parent­Teachers Association, which reads thus:

29 (c) On formation of the Parent­Teachers Association, a lottery shall be conducted by drawing a lot of the willing parents to constitute the School Level Fee Committee and a notice of one week before such lottery shall be given to the member of the Parent­Teachers Association. (2)(a) The School Level Fee Committee shall consist of, ­

Section 4 predicates that every private school shall constitute the Parent­Teachers Association, which is to be formed by the head of 30 the school within thirty days from the beginning of each academic year.  Section 4(1)(b) envisages that every teacher of the school and parent of every student in the school shall be a member of the Parent­Teachers   Association.     Section   4(1)(c)   provides   that   on formation   of   the   Parent­Teachers   Association,   a   lottery   shall   be conducted by drawing a lot of the willing parents to constitute the SLFC.     In   the   context   of   this   provision,   it   was   urged   that   for choosing the willing parent to become member of the SLFC by draw of lots, no eligibility criteria has been prescribed in the Act of 2016 or the Rules of 2017.  Besides, willing parent of the ward, who is admitted   in   the   school   against   the   25   per   cent   quota   of   free education under the RTE Act, may also fit into this category even though he would have no stakes in the fee structure proposed by the school Management.  The argument seems to be attractive, but for that reason the provision need not be struck down or declared as violative of any constitutional right of management of the school. This provision can be read down to mean that the draw of lots would   be   in   respect   of   willing   parents   whose   wards   have   been admitted against the seats other than the seats reserved for free education under the RTE Act.  Further, for ensuring that the willing 31 parent   must   be   well­informed   and   capable   of   (meaningful) interacting   in   the   discourse   on   the   proposal   of   fee   structure presented   by   the   school   Management,   he/she   must   have   some minimum   educational   qualification   and   also   familiar   with   the development of school, management of finances and dynamics of quality education.  The desirability of such eligibility of the willing parent ought to be specified. 29. Absence of such provisions in the Act or Rules, however, can be no basis to suspect the validity of the provision in question.  We say so because draw of lots can be one of the ways of identifying the willing parent who could become member of the SLFC.  Whether the member should be chosen by election from amongst the willing parents or draw of lots or by nomination including his/her eligibility conditions, is a legislative policy.  They may serve the same purpose for constituting the SLFC to give representation to the parents of the wards who are already admitted in the school and are pursuing education thereat.  In any case, this argument of the appellants will not take the matter any further much less to declare the relevant provision   ultra vires   as being violative of fundamental right of the appellants as such. 32 30. The composition of the SLFC has been specified in Section 4(2) (a)   of   the   Act   of   2016.     It   consists   of   a   Chairperson   being representative of management of the private school nominated by such management; Secretary — Principal of the private school ( Ex officio ); three teachers nominated by the management of private school as to be the members of the SLFC; and five parents from Parent­Teachers   Association   chosen   by   a   lottery   conducted   by drawing a lot of willing parents.  The SLFC consists of ten members —   five   are,   in   a   way,   representatives   or   nominees   of   the Management   and   five   parents   from   the   Parent­Teachers Association.   The SLFC so constituted would continue to function for   one   academic   year   and   the   member   chosen   from   Parent­ Teachers Association is not eligible to participate again for a period of three years thereafter from the date of expiry of his/her term as the member of the SLFC.  By this process, the parents representing different wards get opportunity to be part of the SLFC.  Suffice it to observe that the constitution of the SLFC and for the nature of its function, no fault can be found with Section 4 of the Act of 2016 much less on the ground that it violates the fundamental right to establish an educational institution. 33 31. Section   5   of   the   Act   of   2016   deals   with   fixation   of   fee   in “Government schools” and “aided schools”.   However, we are not concerned with the said provision in the cases before us. 32. Section 6 deals with regulation of fees in private schools and the procedure to be followed for finalisation of the fee structure. The same reads thus:

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33. On   bare   perusal   of   this   provision,   it   is   noticed   that   the Management has the prerogative to submit its proposal regarding the fee structure in the given school.  That proposal is submitted to the   SLFC   set   up   under   Section   4   of   the   Act   of   2016.     The mechanism provided in Section 6 onwards would primarily apply to private unaided schools.  Indeed, the expression “propose” used in Section   6(1)   would   mean   that   the   proposal   of   the   school Management is its in­principle decision regarding the fee structure for the relevant period.   The usage of expression “propose” in no way   undermines   the   autonomy   of   the   school   Management,   in particular to determine its own fee structure for the relevant period. The consequence of proposal not being accepted by the SLFC is a different issue.  Notably, the SLFC’s decision under Section 6(2) is not binding on the school Management.  For, it is open to the school 35 Management to then refer the matter for adjudication to the DFRC constituted under Section 7 of the Act of 2016, who in turn is obliged to decide the reference one way or the other.  Indeed, that decision would be binding on both — the school Management as well   as   the   parents,   unless   it   is   interdicted   by   the   Revision Committee constituted under Section 10 of the Act of 2016 at the instance of the other party. 34. The stipulation such as in Section 6(3) of the Act of 2016 that the decision of fee structure proposed by the school Management, if approved by the SLFC, would be binding for three academic years, had   been   recognised   and   approved   in   Islamic   Academy   of (supra) in paragraphs 7 and 161 and also noted in Education      P.A. Inamdar  (supra). To put it differently, the dispensation envisaged under Section 35. 6 of the impugned Act of 2016 is not intended to undermine the autonomy of the school Management in the matter of determination of   fee   structure   itself.     What   it   envisages   is   that   the   school Management may determine its own fee structure, but may finalise or give effect to the same after interacting with the SLFC.   It is a 36 broad­based committee, consisting of representatives of the school Management   as   well   as   five   parents   from   Parent­Teachers Association.     This   is   merely   a   consultative   process   and democratisation of the decision­making process by taking all the stakeholders on board.   The SLFC does not sit over the proposal submitted by the school Management as a court of appeal, but only reassures itself as to whether the proposed fee structure entails in profiteering by the school on applying the parameters specified in Section 8 and Rule 10.  In other words, it is open to the SLFC to take a different  view  regarding  the   school  fees   proposed  by the school Management and arrive at a different fee structure.  If that counter proposal is acceptable to the school Management, nothing further is required to be done and the decision so taken by the school Management would become binding for three academic years on   all   concerned.     However,   in   case   the   school   Management disagrees with the recommendations of the SLFC, it is open to both sides, namely, the school Management as well as the parents of wards to take the matter to the DFRC for adjudication on that aspect. 37 36. While deciding the school fees, the school Management/SLFC including the Statutory Regulatory Authorities, all concerned are guided by the factors delineated in Section 8 of the Act of 2016 and Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017.   Suffice it to note that the process envisaged in Section 6 is democratic and consensual resolution of the issue of fee structure for the relevant period between the school Management   and   the   parents’   representative   being   part   of   the SLFC.  It is not to give final authority to the SLFC to determine the fee structure itself which, as aforesaid, is the prerogative of the school Management as per Section 6(1) of the Act of 2016.  In that sense, the autonomy of the school Management to determine the fee structure   itself   in   the   first   place   is   untrammelled   and   not undermined in any way.  Section 7 of the Act of 2016 is about the constitution of the 37. DFRC.  The same reads thus:

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39 From the bare perusal of Section 7(1), it is noticed that first five members are official members.   It is a broad­based independent Committee which includes two representatives of private schools in the divisional area “nominated by the Divisional Commissioner” and similarly   two   representatives   of   parents   “nominated   by   the Divisional   Commissioner”.     The   representation   is   given   to   the concerned   stakeholders   in   the   matter   of   determination   of   fee structure and in particular in the matter of enquiry into the factum whether   fee   structure   proposed   by   the   concerned   school Management entails in profiteering or otherwise.   In reference to Section   7(2)(a),   we   must   observe   that   the   term   of   office   of representatives of the private schools and, in particular parents has been earmarked as two years from the date of their nomination. This would mean, necessarily, that the concerned parent would be eligible   until   his/her   ward   continues   in   the   school   during   the tenure and is not a member of the SLFC of any school within the divisional area.   Any member not fulfilling this criterion would be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith and, in his place, a new member   can   be   nominated   by   the   competent   authority   from amongst the parents of the wards pursuing studies in the school in 40 the   concerned   divisional   area.     Moreover,   while   nominating representative of parents, the Divisional Commissioner must keep in   mind   that   the   person   so   nominated   must   possess   basic qualification of accounting, development of a school and dynamics of quality education; and whose ward has not secured admission against 25 per cent quota of free education under the RTE Act. Thus understood, even Section 7 of the Act of 2016 does not violate the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution in respect of establishment of educational institution.

is empowered to nominate two representatives of private schools would keep in mind that his/her nominees are from the schools within the divisional area and at least one amongst them should be chosen from a minority school so that representation is given to all stakeholders, including minority and non­minority private unaided schools.  At the same time, it must be borne in mind that such a person is already not a member of the SLFC of any school in the divisional area.  The dispensation provided in Section 7, is, thus, to create an independent machinery for adjudication of the question as to whether the fee structure proposed/determined by the school 41 Management   of   the   concerned   school   entails   in   profiteering, commercialisation or otherwise.

of expression “determination”, in our opinion, does not take away the autonomy of the school Management in determining its own fee structure.   This provision is only an indicator as to what factors should be reckoned for determination of fee and on that scale the SLFC as well as the Statutory Regulatory Committees will be in a position   to   analyse   the   claim   of   the   school   Management.     This provision, in fact, sets forth objective parameters as to what would be the reasonable fee structure — not resulting in profiteering and commercialisation by the school Management.   As aforesaid, this provision will have to be read along with Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017 which provides for additional factors to be borne in mind while examining the question regarding reasonableness of the fee structure proposed by the school Management.

42

43

adjudicate the dispute between the Management and the Parent­ Teachers   Association   regarding   fee   to   be   charged   by   the   school Management from the students.  The DFRC has been empowered to undertake   search,   inspect   and   seize   any   records,   accounts, registers or other documents belonging to the concerned school or the management in so far as such records, accounts, registers or other documents are necessary and relevant to decide the issues before the said Committee.   It can regulate its own procedure for the discharge of its functions and exercise all powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

adjudicate the dispute between the school Management and Parent­ 44 Teachers Association regarding difference of opinion in respect of fee structure for the concerned school.  What is significant to note is that Section 9(5) makes it amply clear that the DFRC has no power   to   grant   any   interim   stay   to   the   fee   determined   by   the Management.  However, in light of Section 6(5) during the pendency of the appeal or reference before the DFRC, school Management is at liberty to collect fee of the previous academic year plus ten per cent increase in such fee till the final decision of the DFRC, as predicated in Section 6(5) of the Act of 2016.  The decision of the DFRC   is   amenable   to   appeal   before   the   Revision   Committee constituted under Section 10 of the Act of 2016.   None of these violate the fundamental right of the school Management guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to determine its own fee structure in any manner. 

This Committee discharges the function of an appellate authority where   the   aggrieved   party,   namely,   school   Management   or   the Parent­Teachers Association can assail the decision of the DFRC. This   is   a   final   adjudicatory   body   created   under   Section   10 consisting   of   official   members   including   two   representatives   of 45 private   schools   nominated   by   the   State   Government   and   two representatives   of   parents   nominated   by   the   State   Government. This is again a broad­based independent Committee to consider the revision preferred against the decision of the DFRC, constituted on similar lines.  The latter Committee is constituted under Section 7 of the Act of 2016.   The observations made in reference to the constitution of the DFRC under Section 7 hitherto would, therefore, apply with full force to this provision as well.

specified in Section 11 of the Act of 2016, which provision makes it amply clear that the decision of the Revision Committee shall be final and conclusive and shall be binding on the parties for three academic years.   Setting up of an independent final adjudicatory authority   especially   created   for   considering   the   question   as   to whether   the   fee   structure   proposed   by   the   school   Management results in profiteering or otherwise, it does not impinge upon the fundamental   right   of   the   school   Management   guaranteed   under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 46

Act of 2016 is devoid of merit.  Section 15 deals with consequences of contravention of the provisions of the Act of 2016 or the Rules made thereunder by an individual. Whereas, Section 16 deals with consequences   of   violation   by   a   management   and   persons responsible therefor.  It is unfathomable as to how these provisions can have the propensity to violate the fundamental right of the school   Management   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution especially  when  violation of  the  mandate of  certain compliances under the Act of 2016 and Rules framed thereunder has been made an offence and persons responsible for committing such violation can be proceeded with on that count.

the validity of the relevant provisions of the Act of 2016, must also fail with regard to the challenge to Rules 3, 4, 6 to 8 and 11 of the Rules of 2017.

Parent­Teachers Association.  The school Management can have no grievance regarding the procedure for conducting meeting of Parent­ 47 Teachers Association of the school concerned much less violating its fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution regarding establishment of educational institution and administration thereof, including determination of fee structure on its own.

Association, which reads thus:

The   above   Rule   enables   the   Parent­Teachers   Association   to   get information about tuition fees, term fees and fees for co­curricular activities as decided by the SLFC; to also observe completion of syllabus as per the planning; to assist school for planning of other co­curricular activities; and to assess the needs of co­curricular activities.   This is an enabling provision bestowing power coupled with duty in the Parent­Teachers Association.  This in no way affect 48 the right of the school Management in the matter of determination of   school   fees   by   itself.     The   purpose   of   above   provision   is   to empower the Parent­Teachers Association to get information about tuition   fees,   term   fees   and   fees   for   co­curricular   activities,   to facilitate it to analyse the claim of the school Management regarding the fee structure being reasonable or otherwise.  It is on the basis of that   information,   the   representatives   of   the   Parent­Teachers Association,   forming   part   of   the   SLFC,   will   be   in   a   position   to meaningfully interact either to give counter offer or agree with the proposal submitted by the school Management.  Even though, the Act of 2016 is largely for regulation of fee, the information regarding the incidental aspect thereof as to whether co­curricular activities proposed   by   the   school   Management   are   necessary   or   not   is significant.  For, if Parent­Teachers Association is of the view that it is unnecessary, it can project its perception in that regard during the interaction to persuade the school Management to avoid such co­curricular activities and to reduce the burden of expenses to be incurred therefor.  That would resultantly reduce the liability of the parents commensurately due to reduced fee liability. 49

specifies the additional duties to be performed by the SLFC besides the powers and functions specified in the Act of 2016.  Rule 6 reads thus:

We fail to understand as to how Rule 6 would come in the way or infringe   the   fundamental   right   of   the   school   Management guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.   This Rule gives additional powers to the SLFC for ensuring compliances of the provisions   of   the   Act   of   2016   and   the   Rules   made   thereunder including regarding determination of school fees. 49. Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules of 2017 deal with meeting of the SLFC and procedure to refer proposal to DFRC and to file appeal 50 and   revision   before   the   Statutory   Regulatory   Committees respectively.  The same reads thus:

51

These Rules deal with purely procedural matters and are in line with the powers and functions of the concerned Committees.  The Rules   provide   for   the   manner   in   which   the   proposal   is   to   be submitted  by  the   school Management  and   to  be   taken  forward. These provisions in no way affect the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution much less autonomy of the school Management to determine the fee structure itself in the first place including the administration of the school as such. 50. The next challenge is to Rule 11 which obligates the private schools   to   maintain   accounts   and   other   records   in   the   manner prescribed thereunder.  The same reads thus: 52

In our opinion, even this provision by no stretch of imagination would affect the fundamental right of the school Management under Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution   much   less   to   administer  the 53 school.   This provision, however, is to ensure that a meaningful inquiry   can   be   undertaken   by   the   SLFC   or   the   Statutory Regulatory­cum­Adjudicatory   Authorities   in   determination   of   the fact   whether   the   fee   structure   propounded   by   the   school Management results in profiteering or otherwise.  If information is furnished in any other manner (other than the manner specified in Rule   11),   it   would   become   difficult   for   the   concerned Committees/Authorities to answer the contentious issue regarding profiteering.     The   fee   structure   determined   by   the   school Management can be altered by the Adjudicatory Authorities only upon recording a negative finding on the factum of amount claimed towards school fees relating to particular activities is an essential expenditure or otherwise; and that the fee would be in excess of reasonable profit being ploughed back for the development of the institution or otherwise.   The recovery of excess amount beyond permissible   limit   would   result   in   profiteering   and commercialisation.   In our opinion, therefore, even Rule 11 is a relevant and reasonable provision and does not impact or abridge the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  54 51. The last assail was on the argument that the field regarding (school) fee, in particular capitation fee is already covered by the law enacted by the Parliament being RTE Act and for that reason, it was not open to the State to enact law on the same subject such as the impugned Act of 2016.  This argument is completely misplaced and tenuous.   For, the purpose for which the RTE Act has been enacted by the Parliament is qualitatively different.  It is to provide for free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 6 to 14 years, which is markedly different from the purpose for which the Act of 2016 has been enacted by the State legislature.  Merely because the Central Act refers to the expression “capitation fee” as defined in Section 2(b) and also in Section 13 of the RTE Act — mandating that no school or person shall, while admitting a child, collect any capitation fee, does not mean that the Central Act deals with the mechanism needed for regulating fee structure to ensure that the schools do not collect fees resulting in profiteering and commercialisation.  By its very definition, the capitation fee under the  Central  Act  means   any   kind   of   donation  or   contribution  or payment other than the fee notified by the school.   On the other hand, fee to be notified by the school is to be done  under the 55 impugned   Act   of   2016   after   it   is   so   determined   by   the   school Management   and   approved   by   the   SLFC   or   by   the   Statutory Regulatory Authorities, as the case may be.   Suffice it to observe that the field occupied by the Central Act is entirely different than the field occupied by the State legislation under the impugned Act of 2016.   The impugned Act of 2016 deals specifically with the subject   of   regulating   fee   structure   propounded   by   the   private unaided school management.  Hence, there is no substance in this challenge. Taking overall view of the matter, therefore, we uphold the 52. conclusion   of   the   High   Court   in   rejecting   the   challenge   to   the validity of the impugned Act of 2016 and Rules framed thereunder. However, we do so by reading down Sections 4, 7 and 10 of the Act in   the   manner   indicated   in   paragraphs   28;   37/38   and   42 respectively of this judgment.   These provisions as interpreted be given effect to, henceforth, in conformity with the law declared in this judgment.   For the reasons mentioned hitherto, we hold that the High Court rightly concluded that the provisions of the Act of 2016 as well as the Rules of 2017 are  intra vires  the Constitution of 56 India   and   not   violative   of   Articles   13(2)   and   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution. Re: Second Set: 53. These appeals assail the common judgment and order dated 18.12.2020 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur whereby all the connected cases involving challenge   to   the   orders   dated   09.04.2020,   07.07.2020   and 28.10.2020 issued by the State Authorities were disposed of. 54. The   order   dated   09.04.2020   was   issued   by   the   Director, Secondary Education, in the wake of COVID­19 pandemic, directing the   private   schools   recognised   by   the   Primary   and   Secondary Education Departments to defer collection of school fees for a period of three months.  The said order reads thus:

ORDER

57

(Saurabh Swami) I.A.S.,  Director, Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner. 

Before expiry of the period noted in the aforementioned order, 55. the   Director,   Secondary   Education   issued   another   order   on 07.07.2020.  The same reads thus:

ORDER

58

56. The private unaided schools then filed writ petition(s) before the High Court challenging the aforesaid orders dated 09.04.2020 and 07.07.2020.  The learned Single Judge of the High Court Bench at Jaipur considered the prayer for interim relief and vide order dated   07.09.2020   directed   the   school   Authorities   to   allow   the students to continue their studies online and also to deposit only 70 per cent of the tuition fees element from the total fees chargeable for the period from March 2020 in three instalments.  The relevant extract of the order of the learned Single Judge dealing with the prayer for interim relief at the instance of the appellants­Schools reads thus: “13. I have considered the submissions as above and perusal the material available on record. 14. While there are myriad issues involved in the present batch   of   the   writ   petitions,   which   are   required   to   be examined finally; at this interim stage, this Court finds that 59 a balance is required to be struck between financial difficulty of the school management relating to release of the salary of the staff and minimum upkeep of school on one side and the financial pressure, which has come on the parents due to the pandemic and lock­down as noticed above. 15. After noticing the judgments passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in the case of  Nareshbhai Kanubhai Shah Versus State of Gujarat & 2 Others : R/Writ Petition (PIL) No.   and other connected matters decided on 64/2020 31.7.2020,   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at Chandigarh in the case of   Independent Schools Association Versus State of Punjab & Others : CWP No. 7409/2020   and other connected matters decided on 30.6.2020 and the High Court of Delhi in the case of  Rajat Vats Versus Govt. of Nct of Delhi   &   Another :   WP   (C)   No.2977/2020   decided   on 20.4.2020,   this   Court   is   of   the   view   that   prima   facie , members of the petitioner association cannot be deprived of receiving the tuition fees for the students, who continued to remain on their rolls. 16.   However,   this   Court   notices   that   total   infrastructure cost, which the school may  incur  for  the regular  studies during normal days, has been definitely reduced day to day schools are not opening. It is noticed that the tuition fees is assessed   on   the   basis   of   the   infrastructure   expenditure including  staff  salary   and operation  cost  incurred  by   the schools in terms of the provisions of the Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Act, 2016, after following the procedures laid down therein. 17.   This   Court   agrees     with   the   counsel   for prima   facie intervenors  that while  the  institutes had to incur  certain additional expenditure for developing online classes process, the same would be less than individual expenditure being incurred by the parents for providing infrastructure to their each ward, who is undergoing online classes at home. There may be also cases where the parents may have two or three children. To each one separate laptop or computer will be required   to   provide   as   all   of   them   would   be   undergoing online classes at the same time. Thus, comparative balance is required to be maintained.  60 18.  Prima facie , this Court is also of the view that under the Act of 2005, the authorities would have jurisdiction to lay down policy, guideline and direction, which may be found to be  suitable  for   the purpose  of  providing   the  relief  to the persons affected by the disaster as mentioned in Section 22 of   the  Act   of   2005.   The   guidelines  can  be   laid   down  for mitigation   of   such   loss   to   the   citizens.   The   powers   and functions of the State Executive Committee under Section 22(j)   provide   that   the   State   Executive   Committee   shall ensure that non­governmental organizations carry out their activities in an equitable and non­discriminatory manner. The petitioners are all non­governmental organizations and are   expected   therefore   to   play   their   necessary   role   in mitigating the sufferance caused to the public at large, while at the same time also protect their own staff from facing financial difficulties. This Court is also conscious of the fact that   the   State­respondents,   while   passing   the   impugned orders,   have   not   taken   into   consideration   the   difficulties, which   the   staff   of   the   concerned   school   would   face   on account of non­payment of the fees. However, burdening the parents with complete tuition fees would not be appropriate and justified.  19. In view of the above, this Court by an interim measure and   till   the   situation   gets   normalized,   directs   the   school authorities to allow the students to continue their studies online and allow them to deposit 70% of the tuition fees element from the total fees being charged for the year. The said 70% of the tuition fees shall be paid for the period from March, 2020 in three installments to the respective schools. However, it is made clear that on non­payment of the said fees, the student(s) may not be allowed to join online classes, but   shall   not   be   expelled   from   the   school.   The   three installments shall be fixed by depositing the first installment on or before 30.9.2020 while the second installment shall be paid by 30.11.2020 and third installment shall be paid by 31.1.2021.   However,   it   is   further   made   clear   that   the question regarding remaining fees shall be examined at the stage of final disposal of these writ petitions. The orders are being   passed   as   interim   arrangement   subject   to   final adjudication of the case. 20. The stay applications are accordingly disposed of.” 61 57. Against this decision, intra­court cross appeals came to be filed.     In   those   appeals,   the   Division   Bench   vide   order   dated 01.10.2020 stayed the operation of the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge.  The appeals were then heard on 12.10.2020 and reserved for orders.  However, as representations were received from several counsel that they were unable to interact with the   court   through   video   conferencing,   the   matters   were   notified   for further hearing on 14.10.2020.  The Court then directed listing of appeals on 20.10.2020.  However, before next date of hearing, the State Government vide order dated 16.10.2020 constituted a four­ member Committee to give suggestions to the State Government in relation to recovery of fees from parents/students by Private/Non­ Government Educational Institutions during the academic session 2020­21.   The High Court was apprised about this development when the matters were taken up on 23.10.2020 as is noticed from the said order, which reads thus: “ Order 23/10/2020 Mr. Rajesh Maharshi, AAG, submits that a committee has been constituted for determination of fees to be charged by the private schools for the period of lockdown imposed due to Covid­19 Pandemic.  The Committee is in process to finalize its recommendations  and  accordingly  the affidavit 62 nd shall be filed on behalf of the State Government on 2   of November 2020 positively. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma learned Senior advocate raised serious objection and prayed for interim measure in view of the great hardship being faced by the private schools to run their institutions. Considering the hardship of the private schools, it is directed that  the State Government shall issue necessary directions   by   28.10.2020   positively   regarding   interim   fees which the private schools shall be allowed to charge subject to final decision in this regard. In the meanwhile, necessary affidavit in compliance of earlier directions shall be filed by the State Government by 02.11.2020 without fail after providing a copy of the same to all the parties. List on 03.11.2020” The appeals were, thus, directed to be notified on 3.11.2020. 58. Before   that   date,   however,   the   Director,   Secondary   Education issued order dated 28.10.2020, which reads thus:

ORDER

63

64

3.   Every   guardian   will   be   provided   of   receipt   of   tuition fees/capacity building fees. The said receipt will contain the 65

59. This order was assailed by some of the private schools before the High Court by way of substantive writ petition(s), which, as per the High Court Rules was required to proceed before the Single 66 Judge in the first place.  In addition, applications were filed in the pending   intra­court   appeals   before   the   Division   Bench   seeking liberty   to   challenge   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   issued   by   the Director, Secondary Education.   As a result, the Division Bench with the consent of parties thought it appropriate to hear all the matters including involving challenge to the order dated 28.10.2020 of the Director, Secondary Education. 60. Accordingly, the appeals and writ petitions were heard and decided together by the common judgment and order pronounced on 18.12.2020, which is impugned in the present appeals.   The Division   Bench   vide   impugned   judgment   opined   that   the   State Government was competent and had jurisdiction to issue directions as given vide order dated 28.10.2020 of the Director, Secondary Education, being a policy decision necessitated due to aftermath of pandemic situation.   The Court held that in absence of any legal provision  to  address   the   unprecedented   difficulties   faced   by  the parents and their wards across the State, it was open to issue administrative directions in exercise of power under Article 162 of the Constitution and especially when there was no legal provision prohibiting issuance of such directions.   The Division Bench also 67 opined that such order could be issued even in exercise of power 21 under Section 22 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 .   The Division Bench rejected the argument of the appellants that the stated   order   dated   28.10.2020   does   not   mention   the   source   of power  under   which   the   same   has   been  issued   by   the   Director, Secondary   Education   or   that   it   was   vitiated   due   to   lack   of opportunity of hearing to the school Management(s).   Instead, the Court held that even if there is no formal authentication of the order, it would be of no consequence.  For, the direction was given by the Chief Minister being the administrative and political head of the   State   Government.     It   was   the   bounden   duty   of   the   State Government to reckon the ground realities and strike a balance between the interests of private schools as well as of the parents and   students   and   to   mitigate   the   plight   of   the   citizens   due   to unprecedented   crisis   post   COVID­19   pandemic.     The   Court   did advert   to   the   fact   that   the   school   Management   was   obliged   to honour its commitment, rather obligation to pay salary to its staff on account of governing statutory provisions despite the pandemic situation.  Further, the State of Rajasthan had adopted a different 21  for short, “the Act of 2005” 68 pattern of substantially reducing the school fees in comparison to other States.   Nevertheless, it noted that it is always open to the school   Management   as   well   as   the   parents   to   approach   the statutory forum for determination of just fee under the Act of 2016. The Division Bench finally proceeded to conclude as follows: “In view of the above discussion, the rest of the petitions are disposed of as under:­ I. All the private schools recognized by the Primary and Secondary Education Department shall be entitled to collect school fees from the parents of their students including the students of pre­primary classes in terms of the order dated 28.10.2020   issued   by   the   State   Government   subject   to special determination of fees as being directed hereunder. II. All the private schools are directed to form necessary bodies required for special determination of fees within 15 days,  if such  bodies have not  been constituted so  far  in terms of Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Act 2016, and Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Rules 2017. III.   In   order   to   safeguard   the   interests   of   the   schools’ management and the parents, it is further directed that all the private schools recognized by the Primary and Secondary School Education Department shall specially determine the school fees for the period in which schools remained closed due to COVID­19 pandemic and after opening of the schools in   the  Session   2020­   2021   in  terms   of   the  provisions   of Section 8 of Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Act, 2016 and for this purpose all the schools shall publish necessary details including the strength and salary paid to the staff during the period in which the schools remained closed for such special determination on their notice boards as well as on their websites. This special determination of school fees shall be completed within two months from the date of order positively. 69 IV.   With   the   object   to   prevent   any   unfair   practice   of collection of fees in the process of this special determination of fees the component of tuition fees shall be specifically determined and for that purpose, all heads of the school fees shall be bifurcated as mandated under Section 6(4) of the Act of 2016. V. Besides this, the schools’ management or the parents may take recourse of the provision of appeal/reference before Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee/Revision   Committee, as the case may be in case any of them are aggrieved of such special determination. Needless   to   say,   that   in   the   process   of   above   special determination of school fees, it will be open for the schools’ management   and   the   parents   to   determine   the   fees   in consonance   with   the   directions   contained   in   order   dated 28.10.2020 or they may increase or decrease the fees to be collected for the current session. VI. The interim order dated 07.09.2020 passed by learned Single Judge stands vacated.” 61. In this backdrop, the management of private unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan have approached this Court to assail the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and also the order dated 28.10.2020 issued by the Director, Secondary Education.  As a matter of fact, challenge to the orders issued by the Director, Secondary Education on 09.04.2020 and 07.07.2020 had worked out   due to efflux of time.   For, by these orders the school Management was merely directed to defer collection of school fees   for   specified   period   as   noted   therein;   and   that   period   had already expired.  Thus, our focus in this judgment will be and ought 70 to be only on the legality and rationality of the order issued by the Director,   Secondary   Education   on   28.10.2020   and   applicable  to academic year 2020­21 only, including the basis on which the same has been upheld by the High Court vide impugned judgment. 62. According   to   the   appellants   (private   unaided   schools),   the school fee charged from their students was fixed by the SLFC in its meeting   held   on   28.10.2017,   by   following   procedure   prescribed under the Act of 2016 and the Rules framed thereunder.  The same was to remain in force for the academic years 2018­19, 2019­20 and 2020­21.   In the present appeals, as aforementioned, we are concerned only with the school fees pertaining to the academic year 2020­21, in light of the impugned order dated 28.10.2020 issued by the Director, Secondary Education. The   appellants   would   urge   that   being   a   responsive   school 63. administration   and   also   being   deeply   concerned   with   the development of wards pursuing education in the concerned schools, the   school   Management   “on   their   own”   had   decided   to   offer scholarship of 25 per cent of the annual fee to their students.  That was to mitigate the difficulties faced by the parents and keeping in 71 mind that certain recurring expenses were not being incurred by the school Management during the lockdown period.  Be that as it may, in law, it is not open to the State Authorities to modify the school fees once fixed by the SLFC for the relevant academic year that too in the manner done by the Director, Secondary Education vide order dated 28.10.2020.  The fact that the parties are at liberty to challenge the modification/reduction of school fees before the statutory   forum   does   not   justify   the   issue   of   such   an   order   — unless the State Authorities have clear mandate to do so under the governing law.   The departure made by the Director, Secondary Education vide order dated 28.10.2020 was not acceptable to the school Management, being  ex facie  illegal.  It does not disclose the source of power under which it has been issued.  At best, it can rely on   the   interim   observations   made   by   the   High   Court   in   the proceedings   pending   at   the   relevant   time.     Those   observations cannot confer power on the State Authorities when no such power exists in the State Government in relation to modification/reduction of   fee   structure   determined   by   the   school   Management   and approved by the SLFC.  Moreover, it is well­established that there can be no rigid uniform fee structure for all the private unaided 72 schools in the State.  The High Court had erroneously assumed that the   power   exercised   by   the   Director,   Secondary   Education   was ascribable to Article 162 of the Constitution.   For, the subject of school fees is fully covered and governed by the provisions of the Act of 2016 and the Rules framed thereunder.   Therefore, in the name   of   policy   decision,   the   impugned   order   dated   28.10.2020 cannot be sustained, which on the face of it is not in conformity with   the   express   statutory   provisions   governing   the   subject   of school fees. It is urged that there was no express provision in the Act of 64. 2016   permitting   such   intervention   by   the   State   Authorities   in respect of school fees already fixed under the Act of 2016.  Reliance placed on Section 18 of the Act of 2016 was completely inapposite as that merely confers power upon the State Government to issue directions consistent with the provisions of the Act of 2016 and for carrying out the purposes of that Act or for giving effect to any of the provisions of that Act.  Thus, recourse cannot be taken by the State Authorities to the provisions of the Act of 2016 much less Section 18 to justify the impugned order dated 28.10.2020.  In any case that order, on the face of it, is unreasonable, arbitrary and 73 irrational.     For,   Section   8   provides   for   the   parameters   for determination   of   school   fee   and   admittedly   the   school   fee   had already been fixed by the SLFC on 28.10.2017 which was still in force   and   applicable   for   the   academic   year   2020­21   as   well. Therefore, it was not open to reduce the same much less limit it to only one parameter of tuition fee amongst other parameters referred to in Section 8. 65. It is urged that reliance placed on Section 18 of the Act of 2016 is completely ill­advised.  There is no mechanism in the Act of 2016 to review or reduce the school fees once approved by the SLFC or  determined   by   the  Statutory   Regulatory  Authorities.   On the other hand, as per Section 6(3) such school fee is binding on all concerned for three academic years, which in the present case was to remain in force until the academic year 2020­21.     Further, the reduction   of   school   fees   has   been   erroneously   linked   to   the instructions issued by the concerned Board.  In fact, the Board had issued directives to complete the course including through online training/teaching.     Moreover,   there   is   no   concept   of   “capacity building   fee”   under   the   Act   of   2016.     The   expression   “capacity building” obviously has been borrowed from the legislation such as 74 the  Act  of   2005.    In  any   case,   it  is   necessary   to  make   factual enquiry   school   wise   as   to   whether   the   concerned   school   had completed the entire syllabus for the relevant academic year; and also, whether the liability of the school towards teaching and non­ teaching   staff   and   their   administrative   and   infrastructure (recurring)   expenses,   had   been   discharged   by   the   school Management. 66. It is then urged that the High Court committed manifest error in   upholding   the   impugned   order   dated   28.10.2020   as   being ascribable to exercise of power under the Act of 2005.   For, the stated Act provides express mechanism as to when and by whom the   power   to   issue   directions   can   be   exercised.     The   Director, Secondary Education has no such power under the Act of 2005 nor the State Government could do so thereunder much less to reduce the school fees fixed after approval of the SLFC in terms of the mechanism stipulated under the Act of 2016.  The provisions of the Act   of   2005   are   limited   to   providing   effective   management   of disasters and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 75 67. The manner and method of addressing such disaster and in particular “disaster management” as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act of 2005 is by preparation of a plan for disaster management by the authority concerned under that Act.  A National Plan, State Plan or District Plan is required to be prepared under the Act of 2005. That is in respect of prevention of disasters or mitigation of their effects.   It is the direct effect of disaster that is required to be mitigated and not indirect hardship caused to individuals much less in respect of contractual matters.  The plan must advert to the measures to be taken for the integration of mitigation measures in the   development   plans   and   the   measures   to   be   taken   for preparedness and capacity building to effectively respond to any threatening disaster situations or disaster including the roles and responsibilities   of   different   Ministries   or   Departments   of   the Government of India.  In any case, the action is to be initiated by the State Authorities, established under the Act of 2005, namely, the Disaster Management Authority at the concerned level.  In the scheme of the Act of 2005, there is nothing to indicate that the Authorities   can   interfere   with   contractual   matters   or   indirect hardships — such as inability of parents to pay school fees due to 76 pandemic situation.  The Director, Secondary Education, in no way, is   concerned   with   the   preparation   of   a   disaster   plan   or   its enforcement   and   implementation   under   the   Act   of   2005.     As   a result,   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   cannot   be   sustained   with reference to the provisions of the Act of 2005.  The provision in the form of Section 72 of the Act of 2005 is also of no avail because the same   is   in   reference   to   the   provisions   of   the   Act,   which,   as aforesaid, in no way apply to the subject of fixation and collection of school fees.  That subject is exclusively governed under the Act of 2016. 68. Even the invocation of provisions of the Rajasthan Epidemic 22 Diseases Act, 2020   by the State to justify the stated order has been stoutly refuted by the appellants.  The powers required to be exercised   by   the   State   Government   under   the   Act   of   2020   are delineated in Section 4 of the Act of 2020.  None of these measures (referred to in Section 4) concern the subject of determination of school fees much less reduction of school fees once it is approved by the SLFC and is in force for the concerned academic year.  The general provision in Section 4(2)(g) permitting the Government to 22  for short, “the Act of 2020” 77 regulate   or   restrict   the   functioning   of   offices,   Government   and private and educational institutions in the State, would not give authority to the State Government to decide about the fee structure of the concerned unaided private school.  The regulation can be in regard to the timings when the school should be opened and closed and the protocol to be followed by the school during the working hours, as the case may be.  That provision does not empower the State Government to reduce the school fees which is approved by the SLFC and is in force for the concerned academic year. According   to   the   appellants   neither   the   order   dated 69. 28.10.2020 issued by the Director, Secondary Education can be sustained in law nor the reasons weighed with the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment to uphold the same can stand the test of judicial scrutiny. Learned   counsel   for   the   minority   private   unaided   school 70. additionally   contended   that   the   order   issued   by   the   Director, Secondary Education violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) as well as Article 30(1) of the Constitution. That the right to fix the school fees is a fundamental right under 78 Articles   19(1)(g)   and   30   of   the   Constitution   which   cannot   be regulated   by   the   State   except   for   preventing   profiteering   and capitation fee.  To buttress his submission, reliance was placed on 23 24 the dictum in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation   (supra),   P.A. Inamdar 25 (supra) and  Modern School   (supra).  He would submit that in the case of minorities, the State regulation on minority right has to satisfy a dual test — the test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to make the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community and for other persons to resort to it. Learned counsel has also relied upon the decision dated 20.05.2020 of   the   Delhi   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Ramjas   School   vs. 26 Directorate of Education  wherein the High Court noted that in the case of unaided educational institutions, availability of surplus is no ground to disapprove the fee hike.   Absent any charging of capitation fee/profiteering, the State Authorities cannot reject the fee proposal of the school Management and that the quantum of fee to be charged is an element of administrative functioning of the 23  paras 29­38, 45, 53­57, 61 and 122 24  paras 91­94, 104, 107 and 139­141 25  paras 16 and 17 26  Writ Petition (C) No.9688 of 2018 (paras 66, 78, 88 and 91) 79 school,   over   which   the   autonomy   of   the   unaided   educational institution cannot be compromised.  He has also placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in  Naresh Kumar vs. Director 27 of Education, Delhi  decided on 24.04.2020.  He then invited our attention to the decision of this Court in   Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (Registered) & Ors. vs. Union of India & 28   wherein the Constitution Bench opined that the RTE Act will Ors. not   apply   to   minority   educational   institutions.     Whereas,   non­ minority institutions are bound by the RTE Act to provide 25 per cent admission to economically weaker sections of the society and to get reimbursement from the Government towards unit cost.  In substance,   he   has   iterated   the   argument   that   the   school Management(s) of private unaided schools has a right to fix their fee structure and to collect school fees as approved by the SLFC or the Statutory Regulatory Authority. 71. Per   contra,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State   and representing   the   parents   submit   that   due   to   extraordinary   and unprecedented situation arisen due to complete lockdown for such 27  Writ Petition (C) No.2993 of 2020 (paras 18 to 21) 28  (2014) 8 SCC 1 (paras 53 to 55) 80 a long period, the parents are not in a position to pay the fixed school fees. It is only because of large number of representations made by them, the State Government responded by issuing orders on 09.04.2020 and later on 07.07.2020 to defer the payment of school fees and finally to reduce the school fees in terms of order dated   28.10.2020   issued   by   the   Director,   Secondary   Education. The dispensation provided in the order dated 28.10.2020 is merely to take mitigating measures and to assuage the concerns of the parents who were in dire need of such assistance.  The measures taken by the State Government in terms of Sections 38 and 39 of the Act of 2005, cast onerous responsibility upon the Government to take all measures for mitigation and capacity building in the wake   of   a   pandemic.     These   provisions   must   be   given   widest meaning   as   narrow   construction   would   result   in   curtailing   the powers of a welfare State to undertake measures for dealing with the unprecedented situation.  The spirit of the provisions must be kept   in   mind   and   the   court   must   uphold   the   validity   of   the impugned order which has been issued in larger public interest. Reliance has been placed on the dictum of this Court in the  State 81 29 of   M.P.   &   Ors.   vs.   Nandlal   Jaiswal   &   Ors. and   Pathan Mohammed   Suleman   Rehmatkhan   vs.   State   of   Gujarat   & 30 Ors. , to buttress this submission. According to the respondents, Section 72 of the Act of 2005 72. gives an overriding effect over all other laws and, therefore, the power of the State Government exercised in terms of Sections 38 and 39 in respect of measures articulated therein,  need not be constricted keeping in mind the language of the said provisions.  In other words, all that is required to be done by the State to assuage the concerns of the society and citizenry related to the situation arisen from the lockdown due to pandemic, is permissible within the meaning of the said provisions. 73. It is urged that mere omission to mention the source of power will not invalidate the exercise of power itself as long as there is a valid source to that exercise of power as noted by this Court in High   Court   of   Gujarat   &   Anr.   vs.   Gujarat   Kishan   Mazdoor 29  (1986) 4 SCC 566 (para 34) 30  (2014) 4 SCC 156 (para 10) 82 31 32 Panchayat & Ors. ,  M.T. Khan & Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors . 33 and  N. Mani vs. Sangeetha Theatre & Ors. . 74. It   is   then   urged   that   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   was necessitated and was in furtherance of the observations made by the   Division   Bench   vide   order   dated   23.10.2020.     That   was, obviously, to fulfil the   obligations of the court as well parens patriae as of the State.  It is urged that the State has a legitimate interest under its  parens patriae  powers in providing care   to its citizens and since   the   direction   issued   is   to   fulfil   that   obligation   which   was necessitated because of the unprecedented situation coupled with the fact that even the High Court had expressed a benign hope that the   State   Government   ought   to   find   out   some   arrangement,   it became necessary to issue direction vide order dated 28.10.2020. Such power could be exercised even as a policy matter and the State Government is competent to do so under Article 162 of the Constitution. 75. It   is   also   urged   that   the   direction   given   by   the   Director, Secondary Education vide order dated 28.10.2020 could be issued 31  (2003) 4 SCC 712 (para 53) 32  (2004) 2 SCC 267 (para 16) 33  (2004) 12 SCC 278 (para 9) 83 by the State in exercise of power under Section 18 of the Act of 2016 and hence, no fault can be found with the State Government having exercised that power. 76. It is urged on behalf of State that the issue in the present appeals is limited to the justness of the order dated 28.10.2020 and, therefore,   the direction given to the State in the interim order passed by this Court on 08.02.2021 to ensure that all government outstanding dues towards unit cost payable to respective unaided school are settled within one month from the date of the order, was inapposite and needs to be recalled.  It is urged that computation of the   unit   cost   is   complex   and   assessment   thereof   is   a   time­ consuming process. 77. Learned counsel for the State in his written submission has finally suggested to modulate the relief to be given in these appeals in the following words: “ 5. Re: Modulation of the relief in the present matter  The initial notification issued by the State Government on 09.04.2020 and 07.07.2020 have outlived its utility and worked itself out.  The Constitutional Courts do not pronounce upon any academic matter.   The validity of the   Circular   dated   09.04.2020   and   07.07.2020   have become academic in wake of subsequent events. 84  The order dated 28.10.2020 can also become passed if following relief, with utmost humility, is granted: (a)  The management of each school shall propose the fee   structure   in   terms   of   Section   6(1)   and   place   it before the school­level committee within a period of 15 days from the date of judgment of this Hon’ble Court. This shall be exclusively for Covid Year (2020­2021) irrespective of earlier determination of fees. (b)     The   management   shall   take   into   account   the special circumstances of the COVID and curtailment of expenses   during   COVID   along   with   the   factors mentioned   in   Section   8   of   the   Act   of   2016.     The management   shall   be   reasonable   and   explain expenditure   under   each   head   as   enjoined   by   the statute.  Section 6(4) read in conjunction with Section 8 of the Act. (c)  The school­level fee committee will approve the fee within a period of 30 days. (d)  There shall be compulsory fixation of fee for COVID year   2020­21   separately   (alone)   for   each   school   in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2016. (e)  The fixation of fee for 2021­22 can, thereafter, take place normally in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2016.  Thus, the final school fee shall come into existence for the COVID year 2020­21 within a period of 45 days from the date of judgment of this Hon’ble Court and the order of   28.10.2020   interim   order   passed   by   this   Hon’ble Court shall subsume in the same.” 78. According to Ms. Pragya Baghel, learned counsel representing the   parents,   the   State   Government   had   not   followed   proper procedure for determination of 70 per cent of the tuition fees and that decision is not backed by any tangible material on record. Moreover,   the   impugned   decision   was   taken   without   giving opportunity   to   the   stakeholders,   in   particular   the   parents’ association.     For   which   reason,   such   a   decision   should   not   be 85 allowed to be taken forward by the State Government.   It is then urged that the action taken under the Act of 2005 was obviously in larger  public   interest  and   being   a  policy   decision   would   not  be amenable to judicial review.   In any case, the appropriate course would   be   to   relegate   the   parties   before   a   special   Committee comprising of a retired Judge of the High Court, one Chartered Accountant   and   retired   Teachers/Officers   nominated   by   the Director of Public Education Board, who can take an appropriate decision after hearing all the stakeholders. A written submission has also been filed on behalf of parents 79. (by Mr. Sushil Sharma and others) contending that online classes   are not a recognised form of education and that is being done by the private schools on their own without any defined syllabus by the   Board.     No   planning   or   infrastructure   required   for   online education is in place.   No permission has been obtained by the private   schools   to   conduct   online   classes   from   the   concerned Boards   nor   any   feedback   is   taken   from   the   parents   about   the efficacy   of   the   online   teaching.     It   is   urged   that   there   is   no uniformity in the teaching methodology or any standard operating procedure or protocol prescribed by the concerned Boards to be 86 followed by the private schools.   The focus is essentially on the disadvantage of online classes conducted by the private schools.  It is also urged in the written submission that the recommendation made by the State Government and recognition of online classes as capacity building classes are inappropriate.  At the end, it is urged that   this   Court   ought   to   direct   waiver   of   complete   fees   for   the duration schools were closed and direct the State to prescribe a fixed fee for online classes to a standard uniform charge on par with NOIS across schools   and to declare exams taken by the schools so far as invalid in law and to issue such other direction as may be necessary. 80. Another   written   submission   filed   for   the   intervener   ­ Mr.   Charanpal   Singh   Bagri,   claiming   to   be   parent   in   a   private school   in   the   State   of   Punjab.     He   has   raised   several   issues including the questions pertaining to the matters concerning the schools in the State of Punjab which are  sub judice.   In our opinion, it   is   not   necessary   to   dilate   on   this   written   submission   as   the present   appeals   pertain   to   the   issues   concerning   the   private unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan governed by the Act of 87 2016 and the Rules framed thereunder.   It will be open to the intervener to pursue all the points raised in the written submission in   the   proceedings   pending   in   the   High   Court   or   this   Court concerning the private schools in the State of Punjab.  We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion in that regard. 81. We also have the benefit of written submission filed by Mr. Sunil   Samdaria,   appearing   in­person   who   has   essentially commended us to uphold the impugned judgment and order dated 18.12.2020 of the High Court of Rajasthan and seeking directions to further reduce the school fees below the percentage specified in the order dated 28.10.2020 and as upheld by the High Court.  In fact, he has gone to the extent of suggesting that no fee should be charged for the period the schools have remained closed in the academic session 2020­21 as that would result in profiteering by the school Management.  According to this respondent, the schools have saved colossal amount of money towards electricity charges, water charges, stationary charges and other miscellaneous charges which are required for physical running of the school and which may not be collected by the school for the relevant period. 88 82. When the hearing of these appeals was in progress considering the urgency involved, we thought it appropriate to pass interim directions   which   were   intended   to   address   the   concerns   of   all parties in some measure.   That order was passed on 08.02.2021, which reads thus: “SLP (C) No(s). 619/2021 De­linked. List the matter on 15th February, 2021. SLP (C) Nos.27907­27916/2019, SLP (C) No. 27987/2019 SLP (C) No. 27881/2019, SLP (C) No. 2942/2020, SLP (C) No.   5902/2020,   Diary   No.   6803/2020,   SLP   (C)   No. 5470/2020, SLP (C) No. 5589/2020, SLP (C) No. 431/2021 Diary No(s). 44/2021 (XV), SLP (C) No. 577­579/2021 and SLP (C) No(s). 619/2021 Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 3533 of 2021 is taken up along with these matters, at the request of the petitioners therein. The hearing of these cases has been commenced and is part heard. But, since the hearing is likely to take some more time, we deem it appropriate to pass interim directions which   will   address   the   concerns   of   all   parties   in   some measure. We propose to stay the impugned order on the following conditions: (a)   The   management/school   may   collect   fees   for   the academic year 2019­2020 as well as 2020­2021 from the students,   equivalent   to   fees   amount   notified   for   the academic  year  2019­2020,  in six  monthly  installments commencing from 5th March, 2021 and ending on 5th August, 2021. (b) The Management shall not debar any student from attending   either   online   classes   or   physical   classes   on account of non­payment of fees, arrears/outstanding fees including the installments, referred to above, and shall not   withhold   the   results   of   the   examinations   of   any student on that account. 89 (c) Where the parents have difficulty in remitting the fee in terms of this interim order, it will be open to those parents   to   approach   the   school   concerned   by   an individual   representation   and   the   management   of   the school will consider such representation on a case­to­case basis sympathetically. (d) The above arrangement will not affect collection of fees for   the   academic   year   2021­2022,   which   would   be payable by the students as and when it becomes due and payable, and as notified by the management/school. (e)   In   respect   of   the   ensuing   Board   examinations   for classes X and XII (to be conducted in 2021) the school management   shall   not   withhold   the   name   of   any student/candidate on the ground of non­payment of the fee/arrears,   if   any,   on   obtaining   undertaking   of   the concerned parent/student. (f)   The   above   arrangements   would   be   subject   to   the outcome of these matters including the final directions to be given to the parties and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in these proceedings. (g) We also direct the State of Rajasthan to ensure that all government outstanding dues towards unit cost payable to   respective   unaided   schools   are   settled   within   one month   from   the   today   and,   in   any   case,   before   31st March, 2021. Ordered accordingly. Heard in part. Hearing of the aforesaid cases, shall continue on 15th February, 2021.” 83. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants had stated that if the Court were to make this interim arrangement absolute, the appellants would be satisfied with such a direction.   However, as aforesaid, the respondents, namely, the State Government and the 90 parents have a different perception and have addressed us fully to oppose grant of any relief to the appellants. We   have   heard   Mr.   Pallav   Shishodia,   Mr.   Shyam   Divan, 84. learned senior counsel, Mr. Puneet Jain and Mr. Romy Chacko, learned counsel for the appellants, Dr. Manish Singhvi and Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned senior counsel for the State of Rajasthan and Mr. Sunil Samdaria, in­person. At the outset, in this judgment we consciously opt to limit our 85. analysis   to   the   challenge/grounds   concerning   the   legality   and justness   of   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   issued   by   the   Director, Secondary   Education   concerning   private   unaided   schools   in   the State of Rajasthan and as applicable to the academic year 2020­21 only.  We do not wish to advert to or analyse any other issue raised by the parties and we may not be understood to have expressed any opinion either way in that regard. 86. Undeniably, an unprecedented situation has had evolved on account of complete lockdown due to pandemic.   It had serious effect on the individuals, entrepreneurs, industries and the nation as a whole including in the matter of economy and purchasing 91 capacity of one and all.   A large number of people have lost their jobs and livelihood as aftermath of such economic upheaval.  The parents who were under severe stress and even unable to manage their day­to­day affairs and the basic need of their family made fervent   representation   to   the   school   Management(s)   across   the State.   A public discourse in that regard surfaced in the media which impelled the political dispensation to intervene.  Thus, on the directions   of   the   Chief   Minister   of   the   State   of   Rajasthan,   the Department initially issued order dated 09.04.2020 merely to defer the   collection   of   school   fees   which   restriction   was   extended   by subsequent order dated 07.07.2020. 87. The matter had reached the High Court and by way of interim arrangement, learned Single Judge of the High Court issued certain directions against which the parties approached the Division Bench of   the   High   Court   by   way   of   intra­court   appeals.     During   the pendency of intra­court appeals in deference to the observations of the court, the State Authority proceeded to issue further order on 28.10.2020, which, essentially is the subject matter of assail in these appeals. 92 88. The State cannot be heard to rest its argument to defend the impugned order dated 28.10.2020 as having been issued in light of benign hope expressed by the High Court.  It could do so only if the law permitted the State Government to intervene on the subject of school fees of private unaided schools (minority or non­minority, as the case may be).  Resultantly, what we need to examine in these appeals is whether order dated 28.10.2020 issued by the Director, Secondary Education can be sustained in law. 89. Although the stated order makes no reference to the source of power under which it had been issued, four different perspectives have been invoked by the State to justify the exercise of that power. First, it is competent to do so under Section 18 of the Act of 2016 itself.  Second, being a policy decision, it could issue an executive direction   to   mitigate   the   concerns   of   the   parents   in   exercise   of power under Article 162 of the Constitution.  Third, such power can be exercised by the State Government for mitigating the concerns of the parents and for capacity building of the stakeholders as one of the measures under the Act of 2005.  Lastly, such direction could 93 be issued also in exercise of power under the Act of 2020 by the State Authorities. We now proceed to test the correctness of the pleas taken by 90. the State Government  in seriatim . 91. The source of power derived from Section 18 of the Act of 2016 is a flimsy argument.  Section 18 of the Act of 2016 reads thus: “ 18.   Power  to  issue   directions.  ­  The   State  Government may issue to any school such general or special directions consistent with the provision of this Act and the rules made thereunder as in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of this Act or for giving effect to any of the provisions contained therein or in any rules or orders made thereunder and the management of the school shall comply with every such direction.” This provision does bestow power on the State Government to issue general   or   special   directions   to   any   school   within   the   State. However, such direction must be consistent with the provisions of the Act of 2016 and the Rules framed thereunder.  It cannot be in conflict with the mandate of the Act and the Rules.   Additionally, such directions must be necessitated due to expediency for carrying out the purposes of the Act and the Rules or to give effect to the applicable   provisions.     If   the   direction   issued   by   the   State Government does not qualify these parameters, it must follow that 94 the   same   has   been   issued   in   excess   of   power   bestowed   under Section 18 of the Act of 2016. After analysing the scheme of the Act of 2016, at least two 92. aspects are amply clear.   The first is that a firm mechanism has been specified under the Act of 2016 regarding determination of fee structure in the form of approval by the SLFC and, if required, adjudication by the DFRC and the Revision Committee.  There is no express   provision   in   the   Act   or   Rules   authorising   the   stated functionaries/authorities to modify the school fees once finalised in the manner provided by the Act of 2016.   Whereas, the explicit mandate   in   the   Act   of   2016   is   that,   the   fees   so   fixed   by   the concerned   functionaries/authorities   shall   be   binding   on   all concerned for three academic years.  This is a clear indication of not altering the school fees unilaterally after it is fixed under the Act of 2016  in any manner for the  specified period.  If we may say so, it is in the nature of prohibition or a mandate to continue the same fee structure for at least three academic years, after it is fixed by the concerned authority under the Act.   By its very nature, the direction   given   by   the   State   Government   is   in   conflict   with   the scheme of finalisation of fee structure under the Act of 2016 and 95 also   the   binding   effect   thereof   for   the   specified   period   of   three academic years on all concerned.   Thus understood, the direction issued   by   the   State   Government   in   the   form   of   order   dated 28.10.2020 does not satisfy the twin tests of being consistent with the provisions of the Act; and also being necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act, as the case may be.   93. Suffice it to observe that the order dated 28.10.2020 being in the   nature   of   direction,   has   been   issued   in   breach   of   the   pre­ conditions specified in Section 18 of the Act of 2016.  As a matter of law, the State Government had no power, whatsoever, to interdict the fee structure much less which has been finalised and fixed by the concerned functionaries/authorities under the Act of 2016 itself before expiry   of   the   statutory   period   as   specified.     As   a   result, Section 18 of the Act of 2016 will be of no avail to the respondents, in   particular   the   State   Government   to   justify   the   order   dated 28.10.2020. 94. A  fortiori,  even the argument of the respondents relying upon the   existence   of   executive   power   under   Article   162   of   the Constitution, ought to fail.  It is well­established position that the 96 executive power of a State under Article 162 of the Constitution extends to the matters upon which the legislature of the State has competency to legislate and is not confined to matters over which legislation has already been passed.  It is also well­settled that the State   Government   cannot   go   against   the   provisions   of   the Constitution   or   any   law.     The   subject   of   determination   of   fee structure and whether it entails in profiteering, is already covered by the legislation in the form of the Act of 2016 and the Rules framed thereunder.  It is not as if there is no enactment covering that subject or any incidental aspects thereof.   The Act of 2016, which in itself is a self­contained code on the said subject, not only provides for the manner in which the concerned school ought to finalise its fee structure, but also declares that the fee so finalised either by consensus or through adjudication mode shall be binding on all concerned for a period of three academic years.  In any case, determination of fees including reduction thereof is the exclusive prerogative of the management of the private unaided school.  The State can provide  independent  mechanism  only to regulate  that decision of the school Management to the extent that it does not result in profiteering and commercialisation. 97 95. Viewed   thus,   reliance   placed   on   Union   of   India   vs. 34 will be of no avail.  In that case, Moolchand Kharaiti Ram Trust   the   hospitals   were   obligated   to   render   free   treatment   in   lieu   of allotment of government land to them for earning no profit and held in   trust  for   public   good.     The   Court   opined   that   there   was  no necessity of enacting a law and the policy formulated by the State Government in that regard cannot be disregarded. 96. In the present case, we need not dilate on the factum as to whether the Director, Secondary Education could have issued such a policy document in exercise of executive power under Article 162 of   the   Constitution,   which   power   exclusively   vests   in   the   State Government alone.   The fact remains that the direction issued in terms of impugned order dated 28.10.2020, on the face of it, collide with the dispensation specified in the Act of 2016 in the matter of determination of school fees and its binding effect on all concerned for a period of three academic years, without any exception.   The fact   that   in   the   proceedings   before   the   High   Court   the   State Government had ratified the impugned order, does not take the matter   any   further.     In   that,   there   can   be   no   ex   post   facto 34  (2018) 8 SCC 321 (paras 90 and 91) 98 ratification   by   the   State   Government   in   respect   of   subject,   on which, it itself could not issue such direction in law. Even the exposition in   97. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & 35 Ors. vs. State of Punjab   and   Secretary, A.P.D. Jain Pathshala 36 will not come to the & Ors. vs. Shivaji Bhagwat More & Ors.     aid of the respondents for the same reasons.  Notably, not only the subject of finalisation of fee structure and the matters incidental thereto have been codified in the form of the Act of 2016, but also a law has been enacted to deal with the matters during the pandemic situation   in   the   form   of   Central   Act,   namely,   the   Act   of   2005 including the State legislation i.e., the Act of 2020.   In fact, the State legislation deals with the subject of epidemic diseases and its management.  Even those enactments do not vest any power in the State Government to issue direction with regard to commercial or economic aspects of matters between private parties with which the State has no direct causal connection, which we shall examine later at the appropriate place.   In other words, the power of the State Government to deal with matters during the pandemic situation 35  AIR 1955 SC 549 36  (2011) 13 SCC 99 99 have already been delineated by the Parliament as well as the State legislature. As   such,   it   is   not   open   to   the   State   Government   to   issue 98. directions   in   respect   of   commercial   or   economic   aspects   of legitimate   subsisting   contracts/transactions   between   two   private parties with which the State has no direct causal connection, in the guise   of   management   of   pandemic   situation   or   to   provide “mitigation to one” of the two private parties “at the cost of the other”.   This is akin to – rob Peter to pay Paul.   It is a different matter, if as a policy, the State Government takes the responsibility to subsidise the school fees of students of private unaided schools, but cannot arrogate power to itself much less under Article 162 of the   Constitution   to   issue   impugned   directions   (to   school Management   to   collect   reduced   school   fee   for   the   concerned academic   year).     We   have   no   hesitation   in   observing   that   the asservation of the State Government of existence of power to issue directions   even   in   respect   of   economic   aspects   of   legitimate subsisting   contracts/transactions   between  two  private   parties, if accepted in respect of fee structure of private unaided schools, is fraught with undefined infinite risk and uncertainty for the State. 100 For, applying the same logic the State Government may have to assuage similar concerns in respect of other contractual matters or transactions between two private individuals in every aspect of life which   may   have   bearing   on   right   to   life   guaranteed   under   the Constitution.   That would not only open pandora’s box, but also push the State Government to entertain demands including to grant subsidy, from different quarters and sections of the society in the name of mitigating measures making it financially impossible and unwieldy for the State and eventually burden the honest tax payers ­ who also deserve similar indulgence.  Selective intervention of the State in response to such demands may also suffer from the vice of discrimination and also likely to impinge upon the rights of private individual(s) — the supplier of goods or service provider, as the case may be.   The State cannot exercise executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution to denude the person offering service(s) or goods   of   his   just   claim   to   get   fair   compensation/cost   from   the recipient of such service(s) or goods, whence the State has no direct causal relationship therewith. 99. It is   one   thing  to  say   that  the   State   may   regulate   the  fee structure   of   private   unaided   schools   to   ensure   that   the   school 101 Management   does   not   indulge   in   profiteering   and commercialisation, but in the guise of exercise of that power, it cannot   transcend   the   line   of   regulation   and   impinge   upon   the autonomy of the school to fix and collect “just” and “permissible” school   fees   from   its   students.     It   is   certainly   not   an   essential commodity   governed   by   the   legislation   such   as   Essential Commodities Act, 1955 empowering the State to fix tariff or price thereof.  In light of consistent enunciation by this Court including the Constitution Bench, that determination of school fee structure (which includes reduction of fixed school fee for the relevant period) is the exclusive prerogative of the school Management running a private unaided school, it is not open to the Legislature to make a law   touching   upon   that   aspect   except   to   provide   statutory mechanism to regulate fees for ensuring that it does not result in profiteering and commercialisation by the school Management.   Ex­ consequenti ,   the   State   Government   also   cannot   exercise   power under Article 162 of the Constitution in that regard. 100. Notably,   the   direction   given   in   the   impugned   order   to   the school Management is to collect only specified percentage of annual 102 tuition fees on the assumption that the schools will not be required to   complete   the   course   for   the   academic   year   2020­21.     This assumption has been rebutted by the appellants by relying on the instructions   issued   by   the   concerned   Board   indicating   to   the contrary.     In   any   case,   that   does   not   extricate   the   school Management   from   incurring   recurring   capital   and   revenue expenditure including to pay their academic and non­academic staff their full salary and emoluments for the relevant period.   For, no corresponding   authority   is   given   to   the   school   Management   to deduct suitable amount from their salaries.  Thus, the effect of the impugned order is to reduce school fees determined under the Act in absence of authority to do so including under the Act of 2016. Further, on the face of it, the direction given is inconsistent with the provisions of the stated Act. To put it tersely, the impugned order issued   is   in   respect   of   matters   beyond   the   power   of   the   State Government ­ to regulate the fee structure for ensuring that the school   Management   does   not   indulge   in   profiteering   and commercialisation.     Accordingly,   the   impugned   order   dated 28.10.2020   cannot   be   sustained   even   in   reference   to   executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution. 103 101. Reverting   to   the   provisions   of   the   Act   of   2005,   no   doubt Section 72 thereof predicates that the provisions of the Act will have overriding   effect   on   other   laws   for   the   time   being   in   force   or anything inconsistent in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act of 2005.  This provision, however, would come into effect only if it is to be held that the Statutory Authorities under the Act of 2005 have power to deal with the subject of school fee structure of private unaided schools.   102. For that, we may usefully refer to Section 23 of the Act of 2005 which provides for the contents of the plan for disaster management to be prepared for every State called the State Disaster Management Plan.  Section 23 reads thus:

(4) The State Plan shall include,—

104

(5) The State Plan shall be reviewed and updated annually.

103. Going by the scheme of the Act of 2005, the State Authority established under Section 14 known as State Disaster Management Authority is expected to formulate policies and plans for disaster management in the State.   Indeed, such policies and plans may 37 include   mitigation   measures   in   respect   of   persons   affected   by disaster.  The mitigation measures, however, are aimed merely for reducing   the   risk/impact   or   effects   of   a   disaster   or   threatening disaster situation.  Considering the sphere of functions of the State 37   Section 2(i) “mitigation” means measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation; 105 Authority   including   the   State   Executive   Committee   or   different Authorities established at concerned level within the State, there is not   even   a   tittle   of   indication   that   in   the   name   of   mitigating measures, the disaster management plan may comprehend issue of direction in respect of economic aspects of legitimate subsisting contracts   or   transactions   between   two   private   individuals   with which the State has no direct causal relationship, and especially when   the   determination   of   compensation/cost/fees   is   the prerogative of the supplier or manufacturer of the goods or service provider of the services.   The scheme of the Act of 2005 obligates the State Authority to assuage the concerns of the persons arising from “direct impact” of the disaster and to take mitigation measures to minimise the impact of such disaster and for that purpose, resort 38 39 of   capacity­building including   of   its   own   resources to   wit,     manpower, services, materials and provisions as noted in Section 40 2(p), and preparedness measures referred to in Section 2(m).  It is   38  Section 2(b) “capacity­building” includes—        (i)     identification of existing resources and resources to be acquired or created;     (ii)  acquiring or creating resources identified under sub­clause (i);     (iii) organisation and training of personnel and coordination of such training for effective management of disasters; 39  Section 2(p) “resources” includes manpower, services, materials and provisions; 40  Section 2(m) “preparedness” means the state of readiness to deal with a threatening disaster situation or disaster and the effects thereof; 106 not   possible   to   countenance   the   persuasive   argument   of   the respondents that expansive meaning be assigned to the provisions of the Act of 2005 so as to include power to reduce school fees of private unaided school albeit fixed under the Act of 2016 and which by law is to remain in force until academic year 2020­21.  104. As is noticed from the preamble of the Act of 2005, it is to provide for the effective management of disasters and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.  It extends to the whole of India.  The Act is to establish Statutory Committees at different level for  carrying  out the  purposes  for  which  the   Act has  been enacted.  It is essentially for effective management of disasters and for   matters   connected   therewith   or   incidental   thereto.     The expression “disaster” has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Act of 2005, which reads thus:

107 105. The Authorities created under the Act of 2005 are expected to deal   with   matters   concerning   the   disaster   management.     The expression “disaster management” has been defined as follows:

(e)   “disaster   management”   means   a   continuous   and integrated process of planning, organising, coordinating and implementing measures which are necessary or expedient for — (i) prevention of danger or threat of any disaster;

(iii) capacity­building; (iv) preparedness to deal with any disaster;

(vii) evacuation, rescue and relief; (viii) rehabilitation and reconstruction;” 106. It is also useful to advert to Section 18 of the Act of 2005 which   provides   for   powers   and   functions   of   State   Authority established under Section 14 consisting of Chief Minister of the State, who acts as Chairperson ( Ex officio)  and other Chairpersons of the respective Authorities.  Section 18 reads thus: 108

(a) lay down the State disaster management policy;

(e) coordinate the implementation of the State Plan;

The   obligation  of   the  State  Government  for  the   purpose of 107. disaster management can be culled out from Section 38, which reads thus: 109

110

108. The corresponding responsibilities of departments of the State Government have been delineated in Section 39, which reads thus:

(e) review the enactments administered by it, its policies, rules and regulations with a view to incorporate therein 111

(ii) assessing the damage from any disaster; (iii) carrying out rehabilitation and reconstruction;

112 109. The State Executive Committee constituted under the Act of 2005   vide   Section   20   is   obligated   to   discharge   the   functions delineated in Section 22 of the Act.  The same reads thus:

113

Having   regard   to   the   purport   of   the   Act   of   2005,   it   is 110. unfathomable as to how the State Authorities established under the stated Act can arrogate unto themselves power to issue directions to 114 private   parties   on   economic   aspects   of   legitimate   subsisting contractual matters or transactions between them inter se.  In any case,   the   impugned   order   has   not   been   issued   by   the   State Authority referred to in the Act of 2005.  It is not enough to say that the same was issued under the directions of the Chief Minister of the State.  For, the Chief Minister is only the Chairperson ( Ex officio ) of   the   State   Disaster   Management   Authority   established   under Section 14 of the Act of 2005.  Suffice it to observe that there is no provision in the Act of 2005 which concerns or governs the subject of interdicting the school fee structure fixed under the Act of 2016. 111. Section   72   of   the   Act   of   2005   was   pressed   into   service. However, that cannot be the basis to justify the impugned order dated 28.10.2020.  Section 72 reads thus:

The Act of 2005 is not a panacea for all difficulties much less not concerning disaster management [Section 2(e)] as such.  As noted earlier,  there   is   no   express   provision   in   the   Act  of   2005   which empowers   the   Director,   Secondary   Education   (or   the   State 115 Government) to issue order and directions in respect of school fee structure because of the pandemic situation. For the same reasons, reliance placed on the provisions of the 112. State legislation, namely, the Act of 2020 dealing with epidemic diseases will be of no avail to justify the impugned order dated 28.10.2020   issued   by   the   Director,   Secondary   Education.     The power   to   take   special   measures   and   specify   regulation   as   to epidemic disease can be exercised by the State Government under Section 4 of the Act of 2020.  Section 4 reads thus: “ 4.   Power   to   take   special   measures   and   specify regulations as to epidemic disease.—  (1) When at any time the Government is satisfied that the State or any part thereof is visited by or threatened with an outbreak of any epidemic disease,   the   Government   may   take   such   measures,   as   it deems   necessary   for   the   purpose,   by   notification   in   the Official Gazette, specify such temporary regulations or orders to be observed by the public or by any person or class of persons   so   as   to   prevent   the   outbreak   of   such   epidemic disease   or   the   spread   thereof   and   require   or   empower District Collectors to exercise such powers and duties as may be specified in the said regulations or orders. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the   foregoing   provisions,   the   Government   may   take measures and specify regulations,­  (a) to prohibit any usage or act which the Government considers   sufficient   to   spread   or   transmit   epidemic diseases   from   person   to   person   in   any   gathering, celebration, worship or other such activities within the State;  116 (b) to inspect the persons arriving in the State by air, rail, road or any other means or in quarantine or in isolation, as the case may be, in hospital, temporary accommodation,   home   or   otherwise   of   persons suspected of being infected with any such disease by the officer authorized in the regulation or orders; (c)   to   seal  State  Borders   for   such   period   as  may   be deemed necessary; (d) to impose restrictions on the operation of public and private transport;  (e) to prescribe social distancing norms or any other instructions   for   the   public   to   observe   that   are considered necessary for  public health and safety on account of the epidemic; (f)   to   restrict   or   prohibit   congregation   of   persons   in public   places   and   religious   institutions   or   places   of worship; (g)   to   regulate   or   restrict   the   functioning   of   offices, Government and private and educational institutions in the State; (h)   to   impose   prohibition   or   restrictions   on   the functioning of shops and commercial and other offices, establishments, factories, workshops and godowns; (i)   to   restrict   duration   of   services   in   essential   or emergency services such as banks, media, health care, food supply, electricity, water, fuel etc.; and  (j) such other measures as may be necessary for the regulation   and   prevention   of   epidemic   diseases   as decided by the Government.” The measures enunciated in Section 4 of the Act of 2020 in no way deal   with   the   “tariffs”   of   air,   rail,   road,   hospital,   temporary accommodation.  It only enables the Authority to prohibit any usage or activities which the Government considers sufficient to spread or transmit epidemic diseases and for that purpose to inspect various places suspected of being infected with such diseases.   Indeed, it 117 can regulate or restrict the functioning of offices, Government and private and educational institutions in the State.   That, however, would   be   only   in   respect   of   manner   of   its   use   and   its   timings including to observe standard operating procedures to ensure that epidemic diseases do not transmit or spread on account of activities carried out therein.   That power to regulate cannot be invoked to control   the   tariffs,   fees   or   cost   of   goods   and   services   and   in particular   economic   aspects   of   contractual   matters   between  two private parties or so to say school fees of private unaided schools. Accordingly, even the last point urged by the State to justify the impugned order dated 28.10.2020 falls to the ground. 113. A  priori,  it must follow that the Director, Secondary Education had no authority whatsoever to issue direction in respect of fee structure determined under the Act of 2016 including to reduce the same for the academic year 2020­21 in respect of private unaided schools.  Having failed to trace the legitimate source of power under which   the   directions   have   been   issued,   as   aforesaid,   the respondents ­ State Authorities cannot fall back upon the benign hope expressed by the High Court to do the needful in the backdrop of the representations made by several parents about the difficulties 118 encountered by them due to pandemic situation.   It would have been a different matter if the Director, Secondary Education had used his good offices to impress upon the school management(s) of the concerned school(s) to explore the mitigating measures/options on their own for the academic year 2020­21 and to give concession to   their   students   to   the   extent   possible   at   least   in   respect   of unutilised   facilities   and   savings   on   overheads   by   the   school Management in that behalf or to give concession in the form of scholarship to deserving students.   It is stated by the appellants that the school Management on their own had offered scholarship of 25 per cent of the annual fee to their students.  In other words, the Director, Secondary Education could have mediated between the Association of the school Management and representatives of the Parent­Teachers Association for arriving at an amicable solution due   to   pandemic   situation   for   the   academic   year   2020­21,   on humanitarian grounds, but could not issue the impugned order when even the State had no power to issue the same. 114. Accordingly, the appellants are justified in assailing the order dated 28.10.2020 issued by the Director, Secondary Education and must succeed.  However, that does not give licence to the appellants 119 to be rigid and not be sensitive about aftermath of pandemic.  The school Management supposedly engaged in doing charitable activity of imparting education, is expected to be responsive and alive to that situation and take necessary remedial measures to mitigate the hardship suffered by the students and their parents.  It is for the school Management to reschedule payment of school fee in such a way that not even a single student is left out or denied opportunity of pursuing his/her education, so as to effectuate the adage “live and let live”. In law, the school Management cannot be heard to collect fees 115. in respect of activities and facilities which are, in fact, not provided to or availed by its students due to circumstances beyond their control.   Demanding fees even in respect of overheads on such activities would be nothing short of indulging in profiteering and commercialisation.  It is a well­known fact and judicial notice can also be taken that, due to complete lockdown the schools were not allowed to open for substantially long period during the academic year   2020­21.     Resultantly,   the   school   Management   must   have saved   overheads   and   recurring   cost   on   various   items   such   as petrol/diesel,   electricity,   maintenance   cost,   water   charges, 120 stationery charges, etc.  Indeed, overheads and operational cost so saved would be nothing, but an amount undeservedly earned by the school without offering such facilities to the students during the relevant period .   Being fee, the principle of  quid pro quo  must come into play.  However, no accurate (factual) empirical data has been furnished by either side about the extent to which such saving has been or could have been made or benefit derived by the school Management.     Without   insisting   for   mathematical   exactitude approach, we would assume that the school Management(s) must have saved around 15 per cent of the annual school fees fixed by the school/adjudicated by the Statutory Regulatory Authorities for the relevant period.   At   this   stage,   we   must   advert   to   the   stand   taken   by   the 116. learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants would be content with the interim order passed by this Court on 08.02.2021, being   confirmed   as   a   final   order.     This   suggestion   is   indeed attractive, but that arrangement does not provision for the amounts saved   by   the   school   Management   towards   unspent overheads/expenses in respect of facilities not utilised or could not 121 be   offered   by   the   school   Management   to   the   students   due   to lockdown situation.  As aforesaid, we would assume that at least 15 per   cent   of   the   annual   school   fees   would   be   towards overheads/expenses saved by the school Management.    Arguendo , this assumption is on the higher side than the actual savings by the school Management of private unaided schools, yet we are inclined to   fix   that   percentage   because   the   educational   institutions   are engaged   in   doing   charitable   activity   of   imparting   and   spreading education  and   not  make   money.     That  they   must  willingly  and proactively do.  Hence, collection of commensurate amount (15 per cent of the annual school fees for academic year 2020­2021), would be   a   case   of   profiteering   and   commercialisation   by   the   school Management.   Ordinarily, we would have thought it appropriate to relegate 117. the parties before the Regulatory Authority to refix the school fees for the academic year 2020­21 after taking into account all aspects of   the   matter   including   the   advantage   gained   by   the   school Management   due   to   unspent   overheads/expenses   in   respect   of facilities not availed by the students.  However, that course can be 122 obviated by the arrangement that we propose to direct in terms of this judgment.   To avoid multiplicity of proceedings (as school fee structure is linked to school — school wise) including uncertainty of legal processes by over 36,000 schools in determination of annual fee structure for the academic year 2020­21, as a one­time measure to do complete justice between the parties, we propose to issue following directions: (i) The   appellants   (school   Management   of   the concerned private unaided school) shall collect annual school fees from their students as fixed under the Act of   2016   for   the   academic   year   2019­20,   but   by providing deduction of 15 per cent on that amount in lieu of unutilised facilities by the students during the relevant period of academic year 2020­21. (ii) The   amount   so   payable   by   the   concerned students   be   paid   in   six   equal   monthly   instalments before   05.08.2021   as   noted   in   our   order   dated 08.02.2021. 123 (iii) Regardless of the above, it will be open to the appellants   (concerned   schools)   to   give   further concession to their students or to evolve a different pattern   for   giving   concession   over   and   above   those noted in clauses (i) and (ii) above. (iv) The   school   Management   shall   not   debar   any student   from  attending   either   online   classes   or physical classes on account of non­payment of fees, arrears/outstanding   fees   including   the   installments, referred to above, and shall not withhold the results of the examinations of any student on that account. (v) If   any   individual   request   is   made   by   the parent/ward finding it difficult to remit annual fees for the academic year 2020­21 in the above terms, the school Management to consider such representation on case­to­case basis sympathetically. (vi) The above arrangement will not affect collection of fees for the academic year 2021­22, as is payable by 124 the students of the concerned school as and when it becomes due and payable. (vii) The school Management shall not withhold the name of any student/candidate for the ensuing Board examinations for Classes X and XII on the ground of non­payment   of   fee/arrears   for   the   academic   year 2020­21,   if   any,   on   obtaining   undertaking   of   the concerned parents/students. We   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that   we   are   issuing   general 118. uniform direction of deduction of 15 per cent of the annual school fees in lieu of unutilised facilities/activities and not on the basis of actual data school­wise.  As aforesaid, we have chosen to do so with a view to obviate avoidable litigation and to give finality to the issue of determination and collection of school fees for the academic year 2020­21, as a one­time measure which is the subject matter of these   appeals.     We   have   consciously   limited   the   quantum   of deduction from annual school fees to 15 per cent although the school Management had mentioned about its willingness to provide 25   per   cent   scholarship   to   deserving   students,   as   we   have 125 compelled the school Management to collect annual school fees for the  academic   year   2020­21   as   was   fixed   for   the   academic   year 2019­20 on which some of the school Management(s) could have legitimately asked for increase of at least 10 per cent in terms of Section 6(5) of the Act of 2016.  119. As we are disposing of the appeals in terms of this judgment, the contempt petition(s) filed before the High Court on the basis of impugned judgment also need to be disposed of.   Accordingly, we deem   it   appropriate   to   dispose   of   all   the   contempt   petition(s) initiated in reference to the impugned judgment, as the same is being overturned by this decision. 120. While   parting,   we   must   note   that   the   respondent­State   of Rajasthan has moved a formal application for recall/modification of direction   given   in   clause   (g)   of   the   order   of   this   Court   dated 08.02.2021 — to ensure payment of outstanding dues towards unit cost payable to respective unaided schools within specified time.  It is urged that due to complexity of facts, it was not possible to complete the process of computation before 31.03.2021.  In the first place, there is no question of recall or modification of that direction. 126 We were conscious of the fact that that is not the subject matter of the appeals before this Court.   Nevertheless, such direction was issued taking into account totality of the situation and to give relief to the private unaided schools by directing the State of Rajasthan to discharge its statutory obligation within specified time, of paying the   outstanding   dues   of   the   concerned   private   unaided   schools towards unit cost.  Accordingly, we reiterate that direction but give further time to the State Government to complete the process of calculation   and   disbursal   of   the   outstanding   amount   payable towards unit cost to the concerned unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan before the end of July 2021.  The outstanding dues to be paid in terms of this direction would be obviously in respect of academic year upto 2020­21. 121. We must also note that we have not dilated on each of the reported decisions relied upon by the parties, as it is not necessary to do so for the view taken by us.  For, there is nothing inconsistent in those decisions. 127 ORDER In view of the above,  (a) we dispose of the  first set  of appeals challenging the validity of   the   Act  of   2016   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder   with observations   and   the   conclusion   recorded   in   paragraph   52 above by reading down Sections 4, 7 and 10 of the Act and direct that henceforth the same be applied in conformity with the law declared in this judgment.   (b) The  second set  of appeals, however, are allowed in the above terms including mentioned in paragraph 117.  The impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 18.12.2020 is quashed   and   set   aside.     Instead,   the   intra­court   appeals preferred  by  the  appellants  questioning  the   decision  of the learned Single Judge and the writ petitions filed before the High Court to assail the impugned order dated 28.10.2020, shall stand disposed of in terms of this judgment.   128 (c) The   contempt   petition(s)   pending   before   the   High   Court   in connection with the subject matter of these appeals also stand disposed of.  No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. ………………………………J.        (A.M. Khanwilkar) ………………………………J. (Dinesh Maheshwari) New Delhi; May 3, 2021.