KAUSHAL KISHOR vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH GOVT. OF U.P. HOME SECRETARY

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 113 OF 2016 KAUSHAL KISHOR                                             … PETITIONER(S) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S) WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION @ (DIARY) NO. 34629 OF 2017 J U D G M E N T V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J. PRELUDE தயயனனறசடறடபணறஉளறளனறமறஆறனதத நனவயனனறசடறடவட Said the Tamil Poet­Philosopher Tiruvalluvar of the Tamil Sangam age   (31,   BCE)   in   his   classic   “ Tirukkural ”.   Emphasizing   the importance of sweet speech, he said that the scar left behind by a Signature Not Verified burn injury may heal, but not the one left behind by an offensive Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2023.01.03 16:58:23 IST Reason: 1 speech. The translation of this verse by G.U. Pope in English reads thus: “In flesh by fire inflamed, nature may thoroughly heal the sore;  In soul by tongue inflamed, the ulcer healeth never more.” A Sanskrit Text contains a piece of advice on what to speak and how to speak.

2 free speech ), history shows that humanity has consistently defied those diktats. The present reference to the Constitution Bench is the   outcome   of   such   behaviour   by   two   honourable   men,   who occupied the position of Ministers in two different States. I.   Questions formulated for consideration By an order dated 05.10.2017, a Three Member Bench of this 1. Court directed Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 to be placed before the Constitution Bench, after two learned senior counsel, appointed as  amicus curiae,  submitted that the questions arising for consideration in the writ petition were of great importance. Though the Bench recorded, in its order dated 05.10.2017, the questions that   were   submitted   by   the   learned   amicus   curiae ,   the   Three Member Bench did not frame any particular question, but directed the matter to be placed before the Constitution Bench. 2. At this juncture, a Special Leave Petition (Diary) No.34629 of 2017 arising out a judgment of the Kerala High Court came up before the same Three Member Bench. Finding that the questions raised in the said SLP were also similar, this Court passed an order 3 on 10.11.2017, directing the said SLP also to be tagged with Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016. 3. Thereafter,   the   Constitution   Bench,   by   an   order   dated 24.10.2019, formulated the following five questions to be decided by this Court:­ “…1)   Are   the   grounds   specified   in   Article   19(2)   in relation to which reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed by law, exhaustive, or can restrictions on the right to free speech be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights?  2) Can a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 of the Constitution of India be claimed other than against the ‘State’ or its instrumentalities?  3) Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution   of   India   even   against   a   threat   to   the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another citizen or private agency?  4) Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to any affairs of State or for protecting the Government, be   attributed   vicariously   to   the   Government   itself, especially   in   view   of   the   principle   of   Collective Responsibility?  5)   Whether   a   statement   by  a  Minister,   inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part Three of the Constitution,   constitutes   a   violation   of   such constitutional   rights   and   is   actionable   as ‘Constitutional Tort”? …” 4 II. A brief backdrop 4. Without a brief reference to the factual matrix, the questions to be answered by us may look abstract. Therefore, we shall now refer to the background facts in both these cases.    Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 was filed under Article 5. 32   of   the   Constitution   praying   for   several   reliefs   including monitoring   the   investigation   of   a   criminal   complaint   in   FIR No.0838/2016 under Section 154 Cr.P.C., for the offences under Sections 395, 397 and 376­D read with the relevant provisions of the   Protection   of   Children   from   Sexual   Offences   Act,   2012   (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) and for the trial of the case outside the State and also for registering a complaint against the then Minister for Urban   Development   of   the   Government   of   U.P.   for   making statements outrageous to the modesty of the victims. The case of the petitioner in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 in brief was that on 29.7.2016 when he and the members of his family were travelling from Noida to Shahjahanpur on National Highway 91 to attend the death ceremony of a relative, they were waylaid by a 5 gang. According to the writ petitioner, the gang snatched away cash and   jewelry   in   the   possession   of   the   petitioner   and   his   family members and they also gang raped the wife and minor daughter of the   petitioner.   Though   an   FIR   was   registered   on   30.7.2016   for various   offences   and   newspapers   and   the   television   channels reported   this   ghastly   incident,   the   then   Minister   for   Urban Development   of   the   Government   of   U.P.   called   for   a   press conference   and   termed   the   incident   as   a   political   conspiracy. Therefore, the petitioner apprehended that there may not be a fair investigation. The petitioner claims that he was also offended by the irresponsible statement made by the Minister and hence he was compelled to file the said writ petition for the reliefs stated supra. 6. Insofar as Special Leave Petition (Diary) No.34629 of 2017 is concerned, the same arose out of a judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissing two writ petitions. The writ petitions were filed in public interest on the ground that the then Minister   for   Electricity   in   the   State   of   Kerala   issued   certain statements   in   February   2016,   7.4.2017   and   22.4.2017.   These statements were highly derogatory of women. Though according to 6 the petitioners in the public interest litigation, the political party to which the Minister belonged, issued a public censure, no action was taken officially against the Minister. Therefore, the petitioner in one writ petition prayed among other things for a direction to the Chief Minister to frame a Code of Conduct for the Ministers who have   subscribed   to   the   oath   of   office   as   prescribed   by   the Constitution with a further direction to the Chief Minister to take suitable action if any of the Ministers failed to live upto the oath. The prayer in the second writ petition was for a direction to the concerned Authorities to take action against the Minister for his utterances. 7. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, on the ground that the prayer of the public interest writ petitioners were in the realm of moral values and that the question whether the Chief Minister should frame a code of conduct for the Ministers of his cabinet or not, is not within the domain   of   the   Court   to   decide.   Therefore,   challenging   the   said common order, the petitioner in one of those public interest writ petitions has come up with Special Leave Petition (Diary) No.34629 7 of 2017.  Since the questions raised by the petitioner in the Special Leave   Petition   overlapped   with   the   questions   raised   in   the   Writ Petition, they have been tagged together.  III. Contentions We   have   heard   Shri   R.   Venkataramani,   learned   Attorney 8. General for India, Ms. Aparajita Singh, learned senior counsel who assisted   us   as   amicus   curiae,   Shri   Kaleeswaram   Raj,   learned counsel for  the  petitioner  in the   special leave petition and  Shri Ranjith B. Marar, learned counsel appearing for the person who sought to intervene/implead. III.A. Preliminary note submitted by learned Attorney General for India 9. The   learned   Attorney   General   for   India   submitted   a preliminary note containing his submissions question­wise, which can be summed up as follows:­ Question No.1 (i) On question No.1 it is his submission that as a matter of constitutional principle, any addition, alteration or change in the   norms   or   criteria   for   imposition   of   restrictions   on   any fundamental   right   has   to   come   up   through   a   legislative 8 process. The restrictions already enumerated in clauses (2) and   (6)   of   Article   19   have   to   be   taken   to   be   exhaustive. Therefore, the Court cannot, under the guise of invoking any other fundamental right such as the one in Article 21, impose restrictions   not   found   in   Article   19(2).   Under   the Constitutional scheme, there can be no conflict between two different fundamental rights or freedoms. Question No. 2 (ii) The   Constitution   itself   sets   out   the   scheme   of   claims   of fundamental rights against the State or its instrumentalities and it has also enacted in respect of breaches or violations of fundamental   rights   by   persons   other   than   State   or   its instrumentalities. Any proposition, to add or insert subjects or matters   in   respect   of   which   claims   can   be   made   against persons other than the State, would amount to Constitutional change. The concept of State action propounded and applied in US Constitutional Law and the enactment of 42 US Code § 1983 have to be seen in the context of peculiar state of affairs dealing with governmental and official immunities from legal proceedings. In view of specific provisions in Articles 15(2), 17, 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution, there may not be a strict need to take recourse to the law obtaining in the USA. Claims against persons other than the State, either through enacted law or otherwise must be confined to constitutionally enacted subjects or matters.  9 Question No. 3 (iii) There are sufficient Constitutional and legal remedies available for a citizen whose liberty is threatened by any person. Beyond the Constitutional and legal remedy and protection available, there may not be any other additional duty to affirmatively protect   the   right   of   a   citizen   under   Article   21.   Cases   of infringement of fundamental rights are taken care of under Articles 32 and 226.  Question No. 4 (iv) Conduct of public servants like a Minister, if it is traceable to the  discharge  of  public  duty  or  the  duties  of  the  office, is subject to scrutiny of the law. Sanction for prosecution can be granted   if   misconduct   is   committed   under   colour   of   office. Such misconduct including statements that may be made by a Minister   cannot   be   linked   to   the   principles   of   collective responsibility. The concept of vicarious liability is incapable of being applied to situations and no government can ever be vicariously liable for malfeasance or misconduct of Minister not traceable to statutory duty or statutory violations for the purpose of legal remedies. Ministerial misdemeanors, which have nothing to do with the discharge of public duty and not traceable to the affairs of the State, will have to be treated as acts of individual violation and individual wrong. To extend in the abstract, the liability of the State to such situations or instances without necessary limitations can be problematic. 10 Post   M/s.  Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain   vs.   The State of 1 2 Uttar Pradesh   and following  Rudul Sah  vs.  State of Bihar , this   Court   has   treated   misconduct   of   public   servants   or officers and consequent infringement of Constitutional rights as ground for grant of compensation. However, there is need for   clarity   and   certainty   as   far   as   the   conceptual   basis   is concerned. This may be better resorted through enacted law. Question No. 5 (v) While the principle of Constitutional tort has been conceived in  Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias Lalita Behera (Through the 3 Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee)  vs.  State of Orissa , and   subsequently   applied   to   provide   in   regard   to   the constitutional remedies, the matter pre­eminently deserves a proper   legal   framework   in   order   that   the   principles   and procedures are coherently set out without leaving the matter open­ended or vague. III.B. Notes of submissions by Amicus 10. Ms. Aparajita Singh, learned senior counsel and  amicus curiae submitted a written note question­wise, which can be summed up as follows:­ Question No. 1 1  AIR 1965 SC 1039 2  (1983) 4 SCC 141 3  (1993) 2 SCC 746 11 (i) The right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) is subject to clearly defined restrictions under Article 19(2). Therefore, any law seeking to limit the  right under Article 19(1)(a) has to necessarily fall within the limitations provided under Article 19(2). Whenever two fundamental rights compete, the Court will balance the two to allow the meaningful exercise of both. This conundrum is not new, as the rights under Article 21 and under Article 19(1)(a) have been interpreted and balanced on numerous   occasions.   Take   for   instance   the   Right   to Information Act, 2005. The Act balances the citizen’s right to know under Article 19(1)(a) with the right to fair investigation and right to privacy under Article 21. This careful balancing was   explained   by   this   Court   in   Thalappalam   Service 4 Cooperative Bank Ltd.  vs .  State of Kerala .   The decision of this Court in   R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal   vs.   State of 5 is another example of reading down the restrictions (in T.N.   the   form   of   defamation)   on   the   right   to   free   speech   under Article 19(2), in its application to public officials and public figures in larger public interest. Again, in  People’s Union for 6 Civil   Liberties   (PUCL)   vs .   Union   of   India ,   the   right   to privacy of the spouse of the candidate contesting the election was   declared   as  subordinate  to  the   citizens’   right   to  know under   Article   19(1)(a).   In   Jumuna   Prasad   Mukhariya   vs. 4  (2013) 16 SCC 82 5  (1994) 6 SCC 632 6  (2003) 4 SCC 399 12 7 Lachhi Ram , a challenge to Sections 123(5) and 124(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ( as they prevailed at that   time )   was   rejected,   on   the   ground   that   false   personal attacks against the contesting candidate was not violative of the right to free speech. But when it comes to private citizens who are not public functionaries, the right to privacy under Article 21 was held to trump the right to know under Article 19(1)(a). This was in the case of  vs. Ram Jethmalani   Union 8 ,  which concerned the right to privacy of account of India holders. In  Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited 9 vs.   Securities and Exchange Board of India ,  this Court struck a balance between the right of the media under Article 19(1)(a)   with   the   right   to   fair   trial   under   Article   21.   The argument that free speech under Article 19(1)(a) was a higher right than the right to reputation under Article 21 was rejected by this Court in  vs. Subramanian Swamy    Union of India, 10 in   which   Section   499   IPC   was   under Ministry   of   Law challenge. The right to free speech was balanced with the right 11 to pollution free life in   Noise Pollution (V.), in Re   and the right to fair trial of the accused was balanced with the right to 12 fair trial of the victim in  vs. .  Asha Ranjan   State of Bihar 7 (1955) 1 SCR 608 8 (2011) 8 SCC 1 9 (2012) 10 SCC 603 10 (2016) 7 SCC 221 11 (2005) 5 SCC 733 12 (2017) 4 SCC 397 13 Question No. 2 (ii) There   are   some   fundamental   rights   which   are   specifically granted against non­State actors. Article 15(2)(a) – access to shops,   public   restaurants,   hotels   and   places   of   public entertainment, Article 17 – untouchability, Article 23 – forced labour and Article 24­ prohibition of employment of children in factories, mines etc., are rights which are enforceable against private citizens also. Some aspects of Article 21 such as the right to clean environment have been enforced against private parties as well. The State is also under a Constitutional duty to ensure that the rights of its citizens are not violated even by non­State actors and ensure an environment where each right can   be   exercised   without   fear   of   undue   encroachment.   In 13 vs.  , People’s Union for Democratic Rights  Union of India while   rejecting   the   contention   of   the   State   that   it   was  the obligation of the private party i.e., the contractor to follow the mandate of Article 24 of the Constitution and the relevant laws, it was clarified that the primary obligation to protect fundamental rights was that of the State even in the absence of   an   effective   legislation.   In   vs. Bodhisattwa   Gautam   14 ,  interim   compensation   was Subhra   Chakraborty   (Ms.) awarded holding that fundamental rights under Article 21 can be enforced even against private bodies and individuals. Public law remedy has been repeatedly resorted to even against non­ 13 (1982) 3 SCC 235 14 (1996) 1 SC 490 14 State actors when their acts have violated the fundamental rights of other citizens. Award of damages against non­State actors for violation of the right to clean environment under 15 Article 21 was laid down in   vs.   . M.C. Mehta   Kamal Nath Similarly, the majority and concurring opinion in  Justice K.S. 16 Puttaswamy   vs.   Union of India ,  while elaborating on the duty of the State and non­State actors to protect the rights of citizens,   pointed   out   that   recognition   and   enforcement   of claims   qua   non­State   actors   may   require   legislative intervention.   However,   when   it   comes   to   Article   19,   a Constitution Bench in  vs. P.D. Shamdasani   Central Bank of 17 ,  has held it to be inapplicable against private India Ltd. persons. Question No. 3 (iii) Fundamental rights of citizens enshrined in the Constitution are   not   only   negative   rights   against   the   State   but   also constitute a positive obligation on the State to protect those rights. The Constitution Bench in   vs. State of West Bengal  Committee   for   Protection   of   Democratic   Rights,   West 18 ,  while   upholding   the   power   of   the   Constitutional Bengal Court   to   transfer   an   investigation   to   the   CBI   without   the consent of the concerned State, emphasized the duty of the 15 (2000) 6 SCC 213 16 (2017) 10 SCC 1 17 1952 SCR 391 18 (2010) 3 SCC 571 15 State to conduct a fair investigation which is a fundamental right of the victim under Article 21.  The majority judgment in Justice  K.S.   Puttaswamy   (supra),   defines   the   positive obligation of the State to ensure the meaningful exercise of the 19 right of privacy. In  S. Rangarajan  vs.  P. Jagjivan Ram , this Court has categorically laid down that the State cannot plead its inability to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. In 20 vs. , Section 6(1) of the Union of India   K.M. Shankarappa Cinematograph   Act,   1952   which   granted   the   Central Government, the power to review the decision of the quasi­ judicial Tribunal under the Act, was sought to be defended on the   ground   of   law   and   order.   The   contention   was   rejected holding that it was the duty of the Government to ensure law and   order.   In   vs. Indibly   Creative   Private   Limited   21 ,  the   negative   restraint   and Government   of   West   Bengal positive obligation under Article 19(1) (a) has been explained. 22 In  Pt. Parmanand Katara  vs.  Union of India , it was held that even the doctors in Government hospitals are duty bound to fulfil the constitutional obligation of the State under Article 21.  Question No. 4 19 (1989) 2 SCC 574 20 (2001) 1 SCC 582 21 (2020) 12 SCC 436 22 (1989) 4 SCC 286 16 (iv)  The Minister being a functionary of the State, represents the State   when   acting   in   his   official   capacity.   Therefore,   any violation   of   the   fundamental   rights   of   the   citizens   by   the Minister in his official capacity, would be attributable to the State. The State also has a positive obligation to protect the rights of citizens under Article 21, whether the violation is by its   own   functionaries   or   a   private   person.   It   would   be preposterous   to   suggest   that   while   the   State   is   under   an obligation   to   restrict   a   private   citizen   from   violating   the fundamental rights of other citizens, its own Minister can do so with impunity. However, the factum of violation would need to be established on the facts of a given case. It would involve a   detailed   inquiry   into   questions   such   as     whether   the (a) statement by the Minister was made in his personal or official capacity;   whether the statement was made on a public or (b) private issue;  (c)  whether the statement was made on a public 23 or private platform. In   Amish Devgan   vs.   Union of India , while dealing with hate speech, the impact of the speech of “ a person of influence ” such as a Government functionary, was explained.   vs .   State   of   Maharashtra   Sarangdharsingh 24 ,  provides a clear instance of direct Shivdassingh Chavan interference with the investigation by a Chief Minister. The Court   held   the   action   of   the   Chief   Minister   to   be   " wholly unconstitutional " and contrary to the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and imposed costs on the State. The concurring opinion emphasizes the responsibility that the oath of office casts on the Minister under the Constitution. In   Secretary, Jaipur   Development   Authority,   Jaipur   vs.   Daulat   Mal 23 (2021) 1 SCC 1 24 (2011) 1 SCC 577 17 25 Jain ,   while  dealing   with   a   case   involving   the   misuse   of public   office   by   a   Minister,   this   Court   elaborated   on   the responsibility and liability of the Ministerial office under the Constitution. The importance of the Oath of Office under the Constitution was also emphasized by the Constitution Bench 26 in   Manoj   Narula   vs.   Union   of   India .  However,   the Ministerial code of conduct was held to be not enforceable in a 27 court of law in   R .   Sai Bharathi   vs.   J. Jayalalitha ,  as it does not have any statutory force. An argument can be made that the Minister is personally bound by the oath of his office to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India under   Articles   75(4)   and   164(3)   of   the   Constitution.   The Constitution imposes a solemn obligation on the Minister as a Constitutional functionary to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. The code of conduct for Ministers (Both for Union and States) specifically lays down that the Code is in addition to the “. . .  observance of the provisions of the Constitution, the Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1951 ”.   Therefore,   a Constitutional functionary is duty bound to act in a manner which is in consonance with this constitutional obligation of the State. Question No. 5 (v) The   State   acts   through   its   functionaries.   Therefore,   the official act of a Minister which violates the fundamental rights of   the   citizens,   would   make   the   State   liable   under constitutional tort. The principle of sovereign immunity of the 25 (1997) 1 SCC 35 26 (2014) 9 SCC 1 27 (2004) 2 SCC 9 18 State for the tortious acts of its servant, has been held to be inapplicable in the case of violation of fundamental rights. The principle of State liability under Constitutional tort was expounded in  (supra). In  Nilabati Behera  Common Cause, 28 A Registered Society  vs.  Union of India. ,  the position in the case of a public functionary was explained. III.C.  Written submissions of Shri Kaleeswaram Raj, Advocate for the SLP petitioner Shri   Kaleeswaram   Raj,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the 11. petitioner in the special leave petition submitted an elaborate note. This note is divided into several chapters dealing with the nature and extent of the freedom of speech, the restrictions on the same, the horizontality of fundamental rights, constitutional rights and constitutional values, statements made by Ministers and collective responsibility, self­regulation as the best mode of regulation, hate speech not being  a  protected  speech and   the  way  forward.  The contents of this note are summarized as follows:­ (i) The Constitutional mandate of freedom of expression and free   speech   is   to   be   preserved   without   imposing unconstitutional   restrictions.   It   is   a   right   available   to everyone including political personalities. 28 (1999) 6 SCC 667 19 (ii) But even while upholding such a right, efforts should be taken to frame a voluntary code of conduct for Ministers etc., to ensure better accountability and transparency; (iii) There   is   an   imperative   need   to   evolve   a   device   such   as Ombudsman to act as a Constitutional check on the misuse of the freedom of expression by public functionaries using the apparatus of the State; (iv) The right under Article 19(1)(a) is limited by restrictions expressly   indicated   in   Article   19(2),   under   which   the restrictions should be reasonable and must be provided for by law, by the State.  Therefore this Court cannot provide for any additional restriction by an interpretative exercise or otherwise; (v) It is too remote to suggest that the right of a victim under Article 21 stands violated if there is a statement by someone that   the   case   was   born   out   of   political   conspiracy. Therefore, there is actually no conflict of any other right with Article 21; (vi) Unlike Article 25 which makes the right thereunder subject to public order, morality and health, Article 19(1)(a) does not   contain   such   restrictions.   As   held   by   this   Court   in 29  vs.  , freedom of Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. The Union of India speech can be restricted only in the interest of security of 29 (1962) 3 SCR 842 20 the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency   or   morality   or   in  relation  to  contempt   of   court, defamation   or   incitement   to   an   offence.   It   cannot   be curtailed, in the interest of the general public, as in the case of freedom to carry on business; (vii) Restricting speech by public figures, such as politicians, on serious crimes will have great impact on the  freedom of speech.   Such criticism which calls out true conspiracies and true miscarriage of justice, plays an important role in a democracy; (viii) In so far as the enforcement of fundamental rights against non­State   actors   is   concerned,   the   vertical   approach   is giving   way   to   the   concept   of   horizontal   application.   The vertical   approach   connotes   a   situation   where   the enforceability   is   only   against   the   Government   and   not against   private   actors.   But   with   Nation   States   gradually moving from  laissez faire  governance to welfare governance, the role of the State is ever expanding, which justifies the shift. (ix) While   the   South   African   Constitution   has   adopted   a horizontal application by providing in Section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights of Final Constitution of 1996 that no person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of sub­Section (3) which 21 sets out the grounds that bind the State, the judiciary itself has adopted a direct horizontal effect, in Ireland as could be seen   from   the   decisions   in   John   Meskell   vs .   Córas 30 and   vs. Iompair   Éireann Murtagh   Properties   Limited   31 In  (supra), the Irish Supreme Court Cleary .  John Meskell  granted damages against the employer who dismissed the employee for not joining a particular union after serving a due   notice   to   persuade   him.   In   Murtagh   Properties (supra), the High Court recognized and enforced Limited   the   right   to   earn   livelihood   without   any   discrimination based   on   sex   against   a   private   employer.   Countries   like Canada  and   Germany   have   developed  indirect  horizontal application, meaning thereby that the rights regulate the laws and statutes, which in turn regulate the conduct of citizens; (x) In the Indian context, direct horizontal effect has limited application as can be seen from Articles 15(2), 17 and 24; (xi) Paradigm   cases   of   horizontality   should   be   distinguished from ordinary cases. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court 32 held in   Shelly   vs.   Kraemer   a covenant contained in a contract prohibiting the sale of houses in a neighbourhood to African­Americans, as unenforceable, for they have the effect   of   denying   equal   protection   under   the   laws.   The 30 1973 IR 121 31 1972 IR 330 32 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 22 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took a similar view 33 in   L th ϋ   case  (1958)  where a call for  boycott of  a film directed by a person who had worked on anti­semitic Nazi propaganda was challenged. The German Court held that there was an objective order of values that must affect all spheres of law; (xii) It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the power under   Article   226   is   available   not   only   against   the Government and its instrumentalities but also against “ any person or authority ”. A reference may be made in this regard to two decisions  namely  Praga Tools Corporation  vs.  Shri 34 C.A.   Imanual   and   Andi   Mukta   Sadguru   Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotasav 35 vs. ; Smarak Trust  V.R. Rudani (xiii) There are several instances where this Court has issued writs under Article 32 against non­State actors. Broadly those cases fall under two categories,   namely,   (i)   private players performing public duties/functions; and   (ii)   non­ State actors performing statutory activities that impact the rights   of   citizens.   Cases   which   fall   under   these   two categories have been held by this Court to be amenable to writ jurisdiction as seen from several decisions including 33 Luth (1958) BVerfGE 7, 198  34 (1969) 1 SCC 585 35 (1989) 2 SCC 691 23 36 M.C.  Mehta   vs.   Union of India .  Absent any  of  these parameters,   the   Court   has   refused   to   exercise   writ 37 jurisdiction as seen from  vs.  . ; Binny Ltd.  V. Sadasivan (xiv) Even   in   jurisdictions   where   socio   economic   rights   have been elevated in status to that of constitutional rights, the enforcement   of   those   rights   were   made   available   only against the State and not against private actors, as held by this Court in   Society for Unaided Private Schools of 38 Rajasthan  vs.  Union of India ; (xv) On the issue of potential conflict of rights, it is important to   bear   in   mind   the   distinction   between   constitutional rights and constitutional values. On a formal level, values are understood teleologically as things to be promoted or maximized.   Rights,   on   the   other   hand,   are   not   to   be promoted but rather to be respected. It would not show proper concern for a right to allow the violation of one right in order to prevent the violation of other rights. This would promote   the   non­violation   of   rights,   but   it   would   not 39 respect rights ; (xvi) Instead of values whose satisfaction is to be maximized, rights act as constraints on the actions of the state. They confer individuals with a sphere of liberty that is inviolable. 36  AIR 1987 SC 1086 37  (2005) 6 SCC 657 38  (2012) 6 SCC 1 39  Frances Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol.2, Oxford University Press, 1996 24 Rights thereby act as restrictions on the government on how to pursue values, including constitutional values. It is, therefore, crucially important that we draw a distinction between   the   constitutional   rights   and   constitutional values. Not every increase in liberty or every improvement in  leading  a dignified life is a  constitutional right.  This position has been accepted by this Court; (xvii) As held by this Court in   Justice  K.S. Puttaswamy , the Court will strike a balance, wherever a conflict between two sets of fundamental rights is projected. Strictly speaking, what is actually conceived by some and noted in several decisions including  , is not the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy conflict of rights in abstractum, at a doctrinal level, but the conflict in the notion/invocation/practice of rights; (xviii) On   the   issue   of   statements   made   by   Ministers   and collective   responsibility,   a   reference   has   to   be   made   to Articles 75(3) and 164(2).   Both these Articles speak of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers. Though the language employed in these Articles indicate that such a collective responsibility is to the House of the People/ Legislative Assembly, it is actually a responsibility to the people at large. Since every utterance by a Minister will have a direct bearing on the policy of the Government, there   is   an   imperative   need   for   a   voluntary   code   of conduct. As pointed out by this Court in  Common Cause 25 (supra), collective responsibility has two meanings, namely, (i)   that   all   members   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   are unanimous   in   support   of   its   policies   and   exhibit   such unanimity in public; and   that they are personally and (ii) morally responsible for its success and failure; (xix) Individual aberrations on the part of Ministers are serious threats to constitutional governance and as such the head of the Council of Ministers has a duty to ensure that such breaches do not happen; (xx) A code of conduct to self­regulate the speeches and actions of Ministers is constitutionally justifiable and this Court can definitely examine its requirement. Ideally, a Minister is   not   supposed   to   breach   his   collective   responsibility towards the Cabinet and the Legislature and hence, it is advisable to have a cogent code of conduct as occurring in advanced democracies; (xxi) While it is not possible to impose additional restrictions on the freedom of speech, it is certainly desirable to have a code  of  conduct for  public  functionaries,  as followed in other jurisdictions.  The Court may keep in mind the fact that   this   Court   in   Sahara   India   Real   Estate (supra)  cautioned  against  framing Corporation Limited   guidelines across the board to restrict the freedom of Press; 26 (xxii) Coming to hate speeches, there has been a steep increase in the number of hate speeches since 2014. From May­ 2014 to date, there have been 124 reported instances of derogatory   speeches   by   45   politicians.   Social   media platforms have connived the proliferation of targeted hate speech.   Such   speeches   provide   fertile   ground   for incitement to violence; (xxiii)  On the role of the Court in dealing with the question of hate speech, the decisions in  Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan 40 vs. ;   vs   Union   of   India Kodungallur   Film   Society   . 41 and   (supra)   lay   down Union   of   India Amish   Devgan   broad parameters; (xxiv)   At the international level, the definition of hate speech was formulated in the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, to mean “… any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior,   that   attacks   or   uses   pejorative   or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words,   based   on   their   religion,   ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor.” The   Role   and   Responsibilities   of   Political   Leaders   in Combating   Hate   Speech   and   Intolerance   (Provisional version)   dated   12   March   2019,   was   submitted   by   the 40  (2014) 11 SCC 477 41  (2018) 10 SCC 713 27 Committee   on   Equality   and   Non­Discrimination   to   the Parliamentary   Assembly   of   the   Council   of   Europe.   The Assembly passed the resolution adopting the text proposed by rapporteur Ms. Elvira Kovacs, Serbia; (xxv)   Finally, the way forward is,  (i)  for the legislature to adopt a voluntary model code of conduct for persons holding public offices,   which   would   reflect   Constitutional   morality   and values   of   good   governance;   and   (ii)   the   creation   of   an appropriate   mechanism   such   as   Ombudsman,   in accordance with the Venice principles and Paris principles. Till such an Ombudsman is constituted, the National and State Human Rights Commissions have to take pro­active measures,   in   terms   of   the   provisions   of   Protection   of Human Rights Act, 1993. IV. Discussion and Analysis Question No. 1 12. Question No.1 referred to us, is as to whether the grounds specified in Article 19(2) in relation to which reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed by law are exhaustive, or can restrictions on the right to free speech be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights? 28 History of evolution of clause (2) of Article 19 13. For finding an answer to this question, it may be necessary and   even   relevant   to   take   a   peep   into   history.   Since   Dr.   B.R. Ambedkar’s original draft in this regard followed Article 40(6) of the Irish   Constitution,   the   original   draft   of   the   Advisory   Committee included   restrictions   such   as   public   order,   morality,   sedition, obscenity,   blasphemy   and   defamation.   Sardar   Vallabhbhai   Patel suggested the inclusion of libel also.  These restrictions were sought 42 to be justified by citing the decision in  Gitlow  vs.  New York . Since the country had witnessed large scale communal riots at 14. that time, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer forcefully argued for the inclusion of security and defence of the State or national security as one of the restrictions.  Discussion also took place about restricting speech that is intended to spoil communal harmony and speech which is seditious in nature. With suggestions, counter suggestions and   objections   so   articulated,   the   initial   report   of   the   Sub­ Committee on Fundamental Rights underwent a lot of changes. The evolution of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 19 stage by stage, from the 42  286 US 652 (1925) 29 time when the draft report was submitted in April 1947, upto the time when the Constitution was adopted, can be presented in a 43 tabular form  as follows:

43   Sourced from the article “Arguments from Colonial Continuity­ the Constitution (First Amendment)   Act,   1951”   (2008)   of   Burra,   Arudra,   Assistant   Professor,   Department   of Humanities and Social Sciences , IIT (Delhi),  30

31

Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, this Court 15. had an occasion to deal with a challenge to an order passed by the Government   of   Madras   in   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by Section   9(1­A)   of   the   Madras   Maintenance   of   Public   Order   Act, 44 1949 , banning the entry and circulation of a weekly journal called ‘ Cross Roads ’ printed and published in Bombay. The ban order was challenged on the ground that it was violative of Article 19(1)(a). The validity of the statutory provision under which the ban order was issued, was also attacked on the basis of Article 13(1) of the Constitution. A Seven Member Constitution Bench of this Court, while upholding the challenge in   Romesh Thappar   vs.   State of 45 held as follows: ­ Madras   44  1949 Act 45  AIR 1950 SC 124 32 “[12]   We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting   freedom   of   speech   and   expression   is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within   the   reservation   under   clause   (2)   of Art.   19, although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. …”  16. An argument was advanced in  Romesh Thappar  (supra) that Section 9(1­A) of the 1949 Act could not be considered wholly void, as the securing of public safety or maintenance of public order would include the security of the State and that therefore the said provision, as applied to the latter purpose was covered by Article 19(2).  However, the said argument was rejected on the ground that where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right, in language wide enough to cover restrictions, both within or without the limits of Constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the Constitutional limits, as it is not severable. 17. On the same date on which the decision in  Romesh Thappar was delivered, the Constitution Bench of this Court also delivered 46 another judgment in  vs.  . It also Brij Bhushan  The State of Delhi 46  AIR 1950 SC 129 33 arose out of a writ petition under Article 32 challenging an order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, requiring the Printer and the Publisher  as well as the Editor of an English weekly by name ‘ Organizer ’, to submit for scrutiny, before   publication,   all   communal   matters   and   news   and   views about  Pakistan   including   photographs   and   cartoons,   other   than those derived from the official sources. Following the decision in Romesh Thappar , the Constitution Bench held that the imposition of pre­censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the Press, which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression. The Bench went on to hold that Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 does not fall within the reservation of clause (2) of Article 19. 18. After aforesaid two decisions, the Parliament sought to amend the Constitution through the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, 1951.   In   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   to   the   First Amendment, it was indicated that the citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) has been held 34 by some Courts to be so comprehensive as not to render a person culpable, even if he advocates murder and other crimes of violence. Incidentally,   the   First   Amendment   also   dealt   with   other   issues, about which we are not concerned in this discussion.  Clause (2) of Article 19 was substituted by a new clause under the Constitution (First   Amendment)   Act,   1951.   For   easy   appreciation   of   the metamorphosis that clause (2) of Article 19 underwent after the first amendment, we present in a tabular column, Article 19(2) pre­first amendment and post­first amendment as under: ­

19. It is significant to note that Section 3(1)(a) of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, declared that the  newly substituted 35 clause (2) of Article 19 shall be deemed always to have been enacted   in   the   amended   form,   meaning   thereby   that   the amended clause (2) was given retrospective effect. 20. Another important feature to be noted in the amended clause (2)   of   Article   19   is   the   inclusion   of   the   words   ‘ reasonable restrictions ’. Thus, the test of reasonableness was introduced by the first amendment and the same fell for jural exploration within no 47 time, in  State of Madras  vs.  V.G. Row .  The said case arose out of a judgment of the Madras High Court quashing a Government Order declaring a society known as ‘ People’s Education Society ’ as an   unlawful   association   and   also   declaring   as   unconstitutional, Section 15(2)(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950. While upholding the judgment of the Madras High Court, this Court indicated as to how the test of reasonableness has to be expounded.  The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: ­ “23. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the   test   of   reasonableness,   wherever   prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and   no   abstract   standard,   or   general   pattern   of 47 (1952) 1 SCC 410 36 reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.  The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,   the   underlying   purpose   of   the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil   sought   to   be   remedied   thereby,   the disproportion   of   the   imposition,   the   prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and   forming   their   own   conception   of   what   is reasonable,   in   all   the   circumstances   of   a   given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit   to   their   interference   with   legislative judgment in  such  cases can  only  be  dictated  by their sense of responsibility and self­restraint and the   sobering   reflection   that   the   Constitution   is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable .” 21. After the First Amendment to the Constitution, the country witnessed cries for secession, with parochial tendencies showing their   ugly   head,   especially   from   a   southern   State.   Therefore,   a National   Integration   Conference   was   convened   in   September­ October,   1961   to   find   ways   and   means   to   combat   the   evils   of communalism,   casteism,   regionalism,   linguism   and   narrow mindedness.   This   Conference   decided   to   set   up   the   National Integration Council. Accordingly, it was constituted in 1962. The constitution of the Council assumed significance in the wake of the 37 Sino­India war in 1962. This National Integration Council had a Committee on national integration and regionalism. This Committee recommended two amendments to the Constitution,  namely ,  (i)  the amendment of clause (2) of Article 19 so as to include the words “ ” as one of the restrictions; and the sovereignty and integrity of India (ii)  the amendment of 8 F orms of oath or affirmation contained in the Third Schedule .  Until 1963, no one taking a constitutional oath was required to swear that they would “ uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India ”. But, the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 expanded the forms of oath to ensure that “ every candidate for the membership of a State Legislature or Parliament, and every aspirant to, and incumbent of, public office ” – to quote its Statement of  Objects   and   Reasons   –  “ pledges  himself  .  .  .  to  preserve  the integrity   and   sovereignty   of   the   Union   of   India .”   Thus,   by   the Constitution   (Sixteenth   Amendment)   Act,   1963,   “ the   sovereignty and integrity of India ”, was included as an additional ground of restriction on the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Having seen the history of evolution of clause (2) of Article 19, 22. let us now turn to the first question.  38 Two parts of Question No.1 23. Question No.1 is actually in two parts.  The first part raises a poser as to whether reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech enumerated in Article 19(2) could be said to be exhaustive. The second part of the Question raises a debate as to whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2), by invoking other fundamental rights. First part of Question No.1 24. The judicial history of the evolution of clause (2) of Article 19 which we have captured above shows that lot of deliberations went into the articulation of the restrictions now enumerated. The draft Report   of   the   Sub­Committee   on   Fundamental   Rights   itself underwent several changes until the Constitution was adopted in November, 1949. In the form in which the Constitution was adopted in   1949,   the   restrictions   related   to   (i)   libel;   (ii)   slander;   (iii) defamation;     contempt of court;     any matter which offends (iv) (v) 39 against decency or morality; and  (vi)  any matter which undermines the security of the State or tends to overthrow the State. st   th   After   the   1 and   16 Amendments,   the   emphasis   is   on 25. reasonable restrictions relating to,   (i)   interests of sovereignty and integrity of India;   the security of the State;   friendly relations (ii) (iii) with foreign states;   (iv)   public order;   (v)   decency or morality;   (vi) contempt   of   court;   defamation;   and     incitement   to   an (vii)   (viii) offence.  26. A careful look at these eight heads of restrictions would show that they save the existing laws and enable the State to make   laws,   restricting   free   speech   with   a   view   to   afford protection to (i) individuals (ii) groups of persons (iii) sections of society (iv) classes of citizens (v) the Court (vi) the State and (vii) the country . This can be demonstrated by providing in a table, the provisions of the Indian Penal Code that make some speech or expression a punishable offence, thereby impeding the right to free speech,   the   heads   of   restriction   under   which   they   fall   and   the 40 category/class  of   person/persons   sought  to  be  protected   by  the restriction: Table of Provisions under IPC restricting freedom of speech and expression

48  Subject matter of challenge pending before this Court. 41

42

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We have taken note of, in the above Table, only the provisions 27. of the Indian Penal Code that curtail free speech. There are also other special enactments such as The Scheduled Castes and The 44 Scheduled   Tribes   (Prevention   of   Atrocities)   Act,   1989,   The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 etc., which also impose certain restrictions on free speech. From these it will be clear that the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 are so exhaustive that the laws made for the purpose of protection of the individual, sections of society, classes of citizens, court, the country and the State have been saved.  28. The   restrictions   under   clause   (2)   of   Article   19   are comprehensive   enough   to   cover   all   possible   attacks   on   the individual,   groups/classes   of   people,   the   society,   the   court,   the country and the State. This is why this Court repeatedly held that any restriction which does not fall within the four corners of Article 19(2) will  be   unconstitutional.   For  instance,   it  was   held   by  the Constitution Bench in  vs.  Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd.  The 49 Union of India , that a law enacted by the legislature, which does not come squarely within Article 19(2) would be struck down as unconstitutional. Again, in  (supra), this Court held Sakal Papers  that   the   State   cannot   make   a   law   which   directly   restricts   one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. 49 1959 SCR 12 45 29. That the Executive cannot transgress its limits by imposing an additional   restriction   in   the   form   of   Executive   or   Departmental instruction was emphasised by this Court in  vs. Bijoe Emmanuel  50 State of Kerala .  The Court made it clear that the reasonable restrictions sought to be imposed must be through “ ” having a law statutory   force   and   not   a   mere   Executive   or   Departmental instruction.   The restraint upon the Executive not to have a   While   Courts back­door   intrusion   applies   equally   to   Courts. may be entitled to interpret the law in such a manner that the rights existing in blue print have expansive connotations, the Court cannot   impose   additional   restrictions   by   using   tools   of interpretation. What this Court can do and how far it can afford to go,   was   articulated   by   B.   Sudharshan   Reddy,   J.,   in   Ram Jethmalani  (supra) as follows: “ 85 . An argument can be  made  that  this  Court  can make exceptions under the peculiar circumstances of this case, wherein the State has acknowledged that it has not acted with the requisite speed and vigour in the case   of   large   volumes   of   suspected   unaccounted   for monies   of   certain   individuals.   There   is   an   inherent danger in making exceptions to fundamental principles and rights on the fly. Those exceptions, bit by bit, would then   eviscerate   the   content   of   the   main   right   itself. 50 (1986) 3 SCC 615 46 Undesirable lapses in upholding of fundamental rights by the legislature, or the executive, can be rectified by assertion   of   constitutional   principles   by   this   Court. However, a decision by this Court that an exception could be carved out remains permanently as a part of judicial canon, and becomes a part of the constitutional interpretation itself. It can be used in the future in a manner and form that may far exceed what this Court intended or what the constitutional text and values can bear. We are not proposing that Constitutions cannot be interpreted in a manner that allows the nation­State to tackle   the   problems   it   faces.   The   principle   is   that exceptions cannot be carved out willy­nilly, and without forethought as to the damage they may cause. .One of the chief dangers of making exceptions to 86 principles that have become a part of constitutional law, through aeons of human experience, is that the logic, and   ease   of   seeing   exceptions,   would   become entrenched as a part of the constitutional order. Such logic   would   then   lead   to   seeking   exceptions,   from protective walls of all fundamental rights, on grounds of expediency and claims that there are no solutions to problems   that   the   society   is   confronting   without   the evisceration   of   fundamental   rights.   That   same   logic could   then   be   used   by   the   State   in   demanding exceptions   to   a   slew   of   other   fundamental   rights, leading to violation of human rights of citizens  on a massive scale.” 30. Again,   in   Secretary,   Ministry   of   Information   & vs. Broadcasting,   Govt.   of   India     Cricket   Association   of 51 Bengal , this Court cautioned that the restrictions on free speech can   be   imposed   only   on   the   basis   of   Article   19(2).   In   Ramlila 52 ,  this Court developed a three­pronged Maidan Incident, in re. 51 (1995) 2 SCC 161 52  (2012) 5 SCC 1 47 test namely,  (i)  that the restriction can be imposed only by or under the authority of law and not by exercise of the executive power;  (ii) that   such   restriction   must   be   reasonable;   and   (iii)   that   the restriction must be related to the purposes mentioned in clause (2) of Article 19.  31. That the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article   19   are   exhaustive   can   be   established   from   another perspective   also.   The   nature   of   the   restrictions   on   free   speech imposed by law/judicial pronouncements even in countries where a higher threshold is maintained, are almost similar. To drive home this point, we are presenting in the following table, a comparative note relating to different jurisdictions:

48

49

50

51

32. Since the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 seek to protect:    the   individual   –   against   the   infringement   of   his   dignity, (i) reputation, bodily autonomy and property;   different sections of society professing and practicing, different (ii) religious   beliefs/sentiments   ­   against   offending   their   beliefs   and sentiments;   classes/groups of citizens belonging to different races, linguistic (iii) identities etc.­ against an attack on their identities;    women   and   children   –   against   the   violation   of   their   special (iv) rights;   the State ­ against the breach of its security;  (v) (vi)  the country ­ against an attack on its sovereignty and integrity;  the Court – against an attempt to undermine its authority,  (vii) we think that the restrictions contained in clause (2) of Article 19 are exhaustive and no further restriction need to be incorporated. 33. In any event,  the  law imposing any restriction in terms of clause (2) of Article 19 can only be made by the State and not by 52 the Court.  The role envisaged in the Constitutional scheme for the Court, is to be a gate­keeper (and a conscience keeper) to check   strictly   the   entry   of   restrictions,   into   the   temple   of fundamental   rights.   The   role   of   the   Court   is   to   protect fundamental rights limited by lawful restrictions and not to protect restrictions and make the rights residual privileges . Clause (2) of Article 19 saves   the operation of any existing law; (i) and  (ii)  the making of any law by the State. Therefore, it is not for us to add one or more restrictions than what is already found. Second part of Question No.1 34. The second part of Question No.1 is as to whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights. 35. This part of Question No.1 already stands partly answered while dealing with the first part of Question No.1.  The decisions of this   Court   in   (supra),   the Express   Newspapers   (Private)   Ltd.   Cricket   Association   of   Bengal   (supra)   and   Ramlila   Maidan 53 Incident, in re.  (supra), provide a complete answer to the question whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2). The   question   whether   additional   restrictions   can   peep   into 36. Article  19(2),   by   invoking   other   fundamental  rights,   also   stands answered by this Court in   Sakal Papers .  In   Sakal Papers ,  the Central Government issued an order called Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 in exercise of the power conferred under the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, fixing the maximum number of pages that might be published by a newspaper according to the price  charged.   Therefore,   the   publisher   of   a   Marathi   Newspaper challenged the constitutionality of both the Act and the Order.  One of the arguments raised on behalf of the State in the said case was that there are two aspects of the activities of newspapers namely, (i)   the dissemination of news and views; and   (ii)   the commercial aspect.  While the former would fall under Article 19(1)(a), the latter would fall under Article 19(1)(g).   Since   these   two   rights   are   independent   and   since   the 37. restrictions on the right under Article 19(1)(g) can be placed in the 54 interest of the general public under Article 19(6), it was contended by the State in  Sakal Papers  that the Act and the Order are saved by clause (6) of Article 19. But the said argument of the State was rejected   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in   Sakal   Papers ,   in   the following words:

55

38. We are conscious of the fact that   Sakal Papers   was a case where the petitioner before the Court had two different fundamental rights and  the  law  made   by  the   State  fell  within  the  permitted restrictions   upon   the   exercise   of   one   of   those   two   fundamental rights.  However, the restriction traceable to clause (6) of Article 19 was   not   available   in   clause   (2)   of   Article   19.   It   is   in   such circumstances   that   this   Court   held   that   the   restriction   validly imposed   upon   the   exercise   of   one   fundamental   right   cannot automatically become valid while dealing with another fundamental right   of   the   same   person,   the   restriction   of   which   stands Constitutionally on different parameters. 39. In   the   conflict   was   neither   between   one Sakal   Papers   individual’s   fundamental   right   qua   another   individual’s fundamental   right   nor   one   fundamental   right   qua   another fundamental right of the same individual. It was a case where a restriction validly made upon a fundamental right was held invalid  another fundamental right of the same individual.  In the cases qua 56 on hand, what is sought to be projected is a possible conflict arising out of the exercise of a fundamental right by one individual, in a manner infringing upon the free exercise of the fundamental right of another person. But this conflict is age old. The exercise of all fundamental rights by all citizens is possible 40. only when each individual respects the other person’s rights. As acknowledged by the learned Attorney General and Ms. Aparjita Singh, learned   Amicus ,  this   Court  has   always  struck   a  balance whenever it was found that the exercise of fundamental rights by an individual, caused inroads into the space available for the exercise of fundamental rights by another individual. The emphasis even in the Preamble on “ ” is an indication that the survival of all fraternity fundamental rights and the survival of democracy itself depends upon mutual respect, accommodation and willingness to co­exist in peace and tranquility on the part of the citizens. Let us now see a few examples. The Fundamental Duty enjoined upon every citizen of the country under Article 51­A (e) to   “promote harmony and the spirit   of   common   brotherhood   amongst   all   the   people   of   India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities 57 and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women” , is also an indicator that no one can exercise his fundamental right in a manner that infringes upon the fundamental right of another.  41. As articulated by Jeevan Reddy, J. in  Cricket Association of no one can exercise his right of speech in such a manner Bengal,  as to violate another man’s right. In paragraph 152 of the decision in  Cricket Association of Bengal , Jeevan Reddy, J. said :  “Indeed it may be the duty of the State to ensure that this right is available to all in equal measure and that  it is not hijacked by a few to the detriment of the rest. This obligation flows from the Preamble to our Constitution, which seeks to secure all   its   citizens   liberty   of   thought,   expression,   belief   and worship………...Under our Constitutional scheme, the State is not merely under an obligation to respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part­III but under an equal obligation to ensure conditions in which those rights can be meaningfully and effectively enjoyed by one and all.” 58

43. There are several instances where this Court either struck a balance or placed on a slightly higher pedestal, the fundamental right of one over that  of the  other.  Interestingly,  the  competing claims arose in many of those cases, in the context of Article 19(1) (a) right of one person  qua  Article 21 right of another. Let us now take a look at some of them.  (i)  In  (supra), the rights pitted against one another R. Rajagopal  were the freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to privacy of the Officers of the Government under Article 21. This Court propounded:  “ .   We   may   now   summarise   the   broad   principles 26 flowing from the above discussion: (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child­bearing and education   among   other   matters.   None   can   publish anything   concerning   the   above   matters   without   his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory   or   critical.   If   he   does   so,   he   would   be 59 violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may,   however,   be   different,   if   a   person   voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. (2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any   publication   concerning   the   aforesaid   aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be   subjected   to   the   indignity   of   her   name   and   the incident being publicised in press/media. (3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) above   —   indeed,   this   is   not   an   exception   but   an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious,   right   to   privacy,   or   for   that   matter,   the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the   publication   was   made   (by   the   defendant)   with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media)   to   prove   that   he   acted   after   a   reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove   that   what   he   has   written   is   true.   Of   course, where   the   publication   is   proved   to   be   false   and actuated   by   malice   or   personal   animosity,   the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant   to   the   discharge   of   his   duties,   the   public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as   explained   in   (1)   and   (2)   above.   It   needs   no reiteration  that   judiciary,  which  is   protected   by   the power to punish for contempt of court and Parliament 60 and  legislatures   protected  as  their   privileges   are  by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule. (4) So far as the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are   concerned,   they   cannot   maintain   a   suit   for damages for defaming them. (5) Rules 3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets   Act,   1923,   or   any   similar   enactment   or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media. (6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit, or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media.” (ii)  In   (supra) the People’s   Union   for   Civil   Liberties   (PUCL)   ,   rights that were perceived as competing with each other were the right to privacy of the spouse of a candidate contesting election   qua   the  voter’s right to information.  In his separate but   near   concurring   opinion,   P.   Venkatarama   Reddi,   J. articulated the position thus : “121. … …W hen there is a competition between the right to privacy   of   an   individual   and   the   right   to information of the citizen, the former right has to be subordinated to the latter right as it serves the larger public interest. …” (iii)  In   (supra) ,   the   rights   that Noise   Pollution   (V.),   in   Re   competed   with   one   another,   were   the   rights   enshrined   in Article   19(1)(a)   and   Article   21.   The   clash   was  between 61 individuals and the persons in the neighborhood. This Court held:

(iv) In   the right to know, inhering in Article Ram Jethmalani   19(1)(a) and the right to privacy under Article 21, were seen to be in conflict. Right to privacy was asserted by individuals holding bank accounts in other countries. The court had to balance the same with the citizens’ right to know. This Court propounded as follows:

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(v) In  freedom Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited  of press and the right to fair trial were the competing rights. In this case, the Constitution Bench was dealing with a question whether   an   order   for   postponement   of   publication   of   the proceedings   pending   before   a   Court,   would   constitute   a restriction   under   Article   19(1)(a)   and   as   to   whether   such restriction is saved under Article 19(2).   This question was answered by the Constitution Bench in para 42 as follows:

63

64

right to know held as part of Article 19(1)(a) and the right to privacy being part of Article 21 were perceived as competing with each other, in a matter between holders of accounts in cooperative  banks  and  members   of  the   public  who  wanted details. This Court in paragraph 64 held: “64.  Recognising the fact that the right to privacy is a sacrosanct facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, the legislation has put a lot of safeguards to protect the rights under Section 8(j), as already indicated.  If the information   sought   for   is   personal   and   has   no relationship with any public activity or interest or it will   not   subserve   larger   public   interest,   the   public authority or the officer concerned is not legally obliged to provide those information.  Reference may be made to   a   recent   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Girish Ramchandra   Deshpande   v.     Central   Information Commr.,  (2013) 1 SCC 212, wherein this Court held that   since   there   is   no   bona   fide   public   interest   in seeking information, the disclosure of said information would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act.  Further, if the authority finds that information sought for can be made available in the larger public interest, then the officer   should   record   his   reasons   in   writing   before providing   the  information,  because  the   person   from whom information is sought for, has also a right to privacy   guaranteed   under   Article   21   of   the Constitution.” (vii)  In   (supra),  the   right   to   freedom   of Subramanian   Swamy   speech of an individual guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a)  qua the   right   to   dignity   and   reputation   of   another   individual guaranteed under Article 21 were the competing rights. In this case, the Court held as follows:  65

(viii)  In  (supra), the right to free trial, of an accused Asha Ranjan  vis­à­vis   the   victim,   came   up   for   consideration.   The   Court propounded in paragraph 61:

66

67 (ix)  In   Railway   Board   representing   the   Union   of   India   vs . 53 Niranjan Singh ,  a trade union worker was charged of the misconduct   of   addressing   meetings   within   the   railway premises,   in   contravention   of   the   directions   issued   by   the employer. When he sought protection under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 19(1), this Court rejected the same by holding “ that the exercise of those freedoms will come to an end as soon as the right of someone else to hold his property intervenes . ” This Court went on to state that “ the validity of that limitation is not to be judged by the test prescribed in sub­Articles (2) and (3) of Article 19 ”. (x) In  Life Insurance Corporation of India  vs.  Prof. Manubhai 54 D. Shah , two fundamental rights were not competing or in conflict with each other. But the right to free speech and the right to propagate one’s ideas, in the context of censorship under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and in the context of a State institution refusing to publish an Article in an in­house magazine were in question. In Paragraph 23 of the Report, this Court said: “ every right has a corresponding duty or obligation and so is the fundamental right of speech and expression.  The freedom conferred by Article 19(1((a) is therefore not absolute as perhaps in the case of the US First Amendment: it carries with it certain responsibilities towards fellow citizens and society at 53 (1969) 1 SCC 502 54  (1992) 3 SCC 637 68 large.   A   citizen   who   exercises   this   right   must   remain conscious that his fellow citizen too has a similar right. Therefore, the right must be so exercised as not to come in direct conflict with the right of another citizen .” The series of decisions discussed above shows that whenever 44. two or more fundamental rights appeared either to be on a collision course or to be seeking preference over one another, this Court has dealt   with   the   same   by   applying   well­established   legal   tools. Therefore, we are of the view that under the guise of invoking other fundamental rights, additional restrictions, over and above those prescribed in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed upon the exercise of one’s fundamental rights. 45. In fine, we answer Question No.1 in the following manner:  “The grounds lined up in Article 19(2) for restricting the right to free speech are exhaustive. Under the guise of invoking other fundamental rights or under the guise of two fundamental rights staking a competing claim against each   other,   additional   restrictions   not   found   in   Article 19(2),   cannot   be   imposed   on   the   exercise   of   the   right conferred by Article 19(1)(a) upon any individual.” 69 Question No.2 46. The   second   question   referred   to   us   is   as   to   whether   a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 can be claimed against anyone other than the State or its instrumentalities. Actually, the question is not about “ claim ” but about “ enforceability ”. 47. To use the phraseology adopted by the philosophers of Law, the   question   on   hand   is   as   to   whether   Part   III   of   the   Wherever Constitution has a “vertical” or “horizontal” effect. Constitutional rights regulate and impact only the conduct of the Government and Governmental actors, in their dealings with private individuals, they are said to have “ a vertical effect ”. But wherever Constitutional   rights   impact   even   the   relations   between   private individuals, they are said to have “ a horizontal effect ”. 48. In   his   scholarly   article,   “The   ‘ Horizontal   Effect ’   of Constitutional Rights”, published in Michigan Law Review (Volume 2. Issue 3, 2003) Stephen Gardbaum, states that the horizontal position has been adopted to varying degrees in Ireland, Canada, Germany,   South   Africa   and   European   Union.   According   to   the 70 learned  author, this  issue  has also been the  topic  of sustained debate   in   the   United   Kingdom   following   the   enactment   of   the 55 Human Rights Act of 1998 . No jurisdiction in the world appears to be adopting, at least as 49. on date, a purely vertical approach or a wholly horizontal approach. A   vertical   approach   provides   weightage   to   individual   autonomy, choice and privacy, while the horizontal approach seeks to imbibe Constitutional values in all individuals. These approaches which appear   to   be   bipolar   opposites,   raise   the   age­old   question   of ‘ individual vs. society ’. 50. Even in countries where the individual reigns supreme, as in the United States, the Thirteenth Amendment making slavery and involuntary   servitude   a   punishable   offence,   has   actually   made inroads into individual autonomy. Therefore, some scholars think that the Thirteenth Amendment provided a shift from the ‘purely vertical’ approach in a direct way. Subsequently, an indirect effect of   the   horizontality   was   found   in   certain   decisions   of   the   U.S. Supreme Court, two of which are of interest. 55 Interestingly The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was enacted in India five years  before a similar Act came in United Kingdom. 71 51. After the American Civil War (1861­1865), the Reconstruction Era began in the United States. During this period, the Fourteenth Amendment   came   (1866­1868)   followed   by   the   Civil   Rights   Act, 1875 (also called Enforcement Act or Force Act). This Civil Rights Act,   1875   entitled   everyone,   to   access   accommodation,   public transport  and   theaters   regardless   of   race   or   color.   Finding   that despite the Act, they were excluded from “ whites only ” facilities in hotels,   theaters   etc.,   the   victims   of   discrimination   (African­ Americans) filed cases. All those five cases were tagged together and the U.S. Supreme Court held in (year 1883) what came to be known 56 as   ”   that   the   Thirteenth   and   Fourteenth “Civil   Rights   Cases Amendments   did   not   empower   Congress   to   outlaw   racial discrimination by private individuals. But after nearly 85 years, this 57 decision   was   overturned   in   Jones   vs.   Alfred   H.   Mayer   Co wherein it was held that Congress could regulate sale of private property to prevent racial discrimination. This was done in terms of 42 U.S. Code  § 1 982  which entitled a ll citizens of the United States to have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by 56 109 US 3 (1883) 57 392  US  409 (1968) 72 white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 52. But a good 20 years before the decision in  Jones  (supra) was delivered, the U.S. Supreme Court had an occasion to consider a clash between contractual rights and Constitutional rights. It was in   Shelly   (supra) where an African­American family ( Shellys ) who purchased a property in a neighbourhood in St. Louis, Missouri was sought   to   be   restrained   from   taking   possession,   because   of   a racially restrictive covenant contained in an Agreement of the year 1911 to which a majority of property owners in the neighbourhood were parties. The covenant restricted the sale of any property or part thereof for a term of 50 years to African­Americans and Asian­ Americans.   The   Missouri   Supreme   Court   upheld   the   racially restricted covenant. But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed it holding that   the   enforcement   of   such   covenants   violated   the   Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   In other words the   contractual   rights   were   trumped   by   the   Constitutional obligations. 73 58 53. Then came the decision in  New York Times  vs.  Sullivan .  It was a case where the City Commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama filed an action for libel against the New York Times for publishing an allegedly defamatory statement in a paid advertisement. The jury awarded damages and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the First Amendment which prohibited a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to the public official’s official conduct except in the case of actual malice, bound the plaintiff from exercising his private right. The above decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court were seen by 54. scholars as indicating a shift from a ‘purely vertical approach’ to a ‘horizontal approach’. 55. While   the   U.S.   Constitution   represented   (to   begin   with)   a purely vertical approach, the Irish Constitution was found to be on the opposite side of the spectrum, with the rights provided therein having horizontal effect. Article 40 of the Irish Constitution deals with Personal Rights under the Chapter “ Fundamental Rights ”. Sub­ 58 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 74 Article (3) of Article 40 states that “ The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable,  by its laws to defend and ”.  In other words, two vindicate the personal rights of the citizen rights are guaranteed namely   (i)   respect for the personal rights of the citizen; and  to defend and vindicate the personal rights of its (ii)  citizen. 56. The second clause of sub­Article (3) of Article 40 of the Irish Constitution states that “ The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen ”. 57. The   above   provisions   have   been   interpreted   by   the   Irish Supreme Court as imposing a positive obligation on all State actors, including the Courts to protect and enforce the rights of individuals. It appears that full horizontal effect was given by the Irish Supreme Court   to   Constitutional   rights   such   as   freedom   of   association, freedom from sex discrimination and the right to earn a livelihood. For instance, the Irish Supreme Court had an occasion to consider 75 in   John   Meskell ,  the   Constitutional   rights   of   citizens   to   form associations and unions guaranteed by Article 40.6.1. This case arose out of an agreement reached between certain trade unions and the employer to terminate the services of all workers and to reemploy them on condition that they agree to be members of the specified trade unions at all times. One employee whose services were terminated was not reemployed, as he refused to accept the special condition.  Therefore, he sued the company for damages and claimed   a   declaration   that   his   dismissal   was   a   violation   of   the Constitutional   rights.   Holding   that   the  Constitutional  right  of citizens   to   form   associations   and   unions   necessarily recognized   a   correlative   right   to   abstain   from   joining associations   and   unions ,   the   Irish   Supreme   Court   awarded damages on the ground that the non­State actors actually violated the   Constitutional   right   of   the   plaintiff.   In   other   words,   the Constitutional rights were considered to have horizontal effect. 58. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 also provides horizontal effect to certain rights.  Section 8.2 of the said Constitution states: “ A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a 76 natural   or   a   juristic   person   if,   and   to   the   extent   that,   it   is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.” 59. The manner in which Section 8.2 has to be applied is spelt out in Section 8.3.  The same reads thus: “8.  Application ….. 3. When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court  a. in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and b. may develop rules of the common law to limit the   right,   provided   that   the   limitation   is   in accordance with section 36(1).” 60. Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees equality before law and equal protection and the benefit of the law to everyone.   Section 9.3 mandates the State not to unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone, on one or more grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 77 marital   status,   ethnic   or   social   origin,   colour,   sexual orientation,   age,   disability,   religion,   conscience,   belief, culture, language, and birth.   If Section 9.3 is a mandate against the State, what follows in Section 9.4 is a mandate against every person.  Section 9.4 reads as follows: “9. Equality ….. 4.  No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in   terms   of   sub­section   (3).   National   legislation must   be   enacted   to   prevent   or   prohibit   unfair discrimination.” 61. Again,   Section   10   recognises   the   right   to   human   dignity. While doing so, it employs a language, which applies to non­ State actors also .  Section 10 states that “ Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected ”. During the period from April 1994 to February 1997, when the 62. Republic   of   South   Africa   had   an   Interim   Constitution,   the Constitutional Court of South Africa had an occasion to deal with a defamation action in   vs Du Plessis and Others   . De Klerk and 78 59 Another .  The   defamation   action   was   instituted   by   an   Airline company, against a newspaper for publishing an article implicating the Airline in the unlawful supply of arms to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). After the Interim Constitution came into  force,   the  defendant­newspaper  raised  a  defence  that they were insulated against the defamation action, under Section 15 of the Constitution which protected the freedom of the press. The Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court referred two issues   to   the   Constitutional   Court.   One   of   the   issues   was whether Chapter 3 (fundamental rights) of the Constitution was applicable to legal relationships between private parties. The majority (11:2) of the Court held that Chapter 3 could not be applied   directly   to   the   common   law   in   actions   between   private parties.   But   they   left   open   the   question   whether   there   were particular   provisions   of   the   Chapter   that   could   be   so   applied. However,   the   Court   held   that   in   terms   of   Section   35(3)   of   the Interim Constitution, Courts were obliged in the application and development   of   common   law,   to   have   due   regard   to   the   spirit, purport and objects of Chapter 3. The majority held that it was the 59  1996 ZACC 10 79 task of the Supreme Court to apply and develop the common law as required by Section 35(3). 63.     Interestingly,   the   dissenting   opinion   given   by   Kriegler,   J. became the subject matter of lot of academic debate. To begin with, Kriegler, J. rejected the idea that the debate was one of “ verticality ”.  He said that Chapter 3 rights do not operate versus horizontality only   as   against   the   State   but   also   horizontally   as   between individuals   where   Statutes   are   involved.   Calling   “ direct horizontality”  as a bogeyman, Kriegler, J. said as follows:

80

64. After the Final Constitution was adopted and it came into force on February 4, 1997, the first case to come up on this issue was 60 vs.  .  In this case, Bantu Holomisa, the leader Khumalo  Holomisa of the South African opposition political party sued a newspaper for publishing   an   article   alleging   as   though  he   was   under   a  police investigation   for   his   involvement   with   a   gang   of   bank   robbers. Heavy reliance was placed in this case on the majority decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in  (supra) .  But Du Plessis  as pointed out earlier,  Du Plessis  was a case which was decided at a   time   when   South   Africa   had   only   an   Interim   Constitution. 60  (2002) ZACC 12 81 Therefore, while dealing with  Khumalo  (supra), the Constitutional Court of South Africa applied the Final Constitution, as it had come into force by then. What is relevant for our purpose is the opinion of the   Constitutional   Court   in   paragraph   33   which   dealt   with   the enforcement of the rights against non­State actors. Paragraph 33 reads thus: “[33] In this case, the applicants are members of the media   who   are   expressly   identified   as   bearers   of constitutional rights to freedom of expression.   There can be no doubt that the law of defamation does affect the right to freedom of expression.   Given the intensity of   the   constitutional   right   in   question,   coupled with  the potential  invasion  of that right which could   be   occasioned   by   persons   other   than   the state or organs of state, it is clear that the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal application   in   this   case   as   contemplated   by section 8(2) of the Constitution .   The first question we need then to determine is whether the common law of defamation unjustifiably limits that right.  If it does, it will be necessary to develop the common law in the manner   contemplated   by   section   8(3)   of   the Constitution.” 65.    The horizontal effect was taken to another extreme by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in   Governing Body of the Juma   Musjid   Primary   School   &   Others   vs.   Essay   N.O.   and 61 wherein it was held that an eviction order obtained by the Others   61 (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) 82 owner of a private land on which a public school was located, could not be enforced as it would impact the students’ right to basic education   and   the   best   interests   of   the   child   under   the   South African Constitution (Sections 28 and 29). The Court held that a private   landowner   and   non­State   actor   has   a   Constitutional obligation not to impair the right to basic education under Section 29 of the Constitution.  The relevant portion reads thus: “[57] In order to determine whether the right to a basic education in terms of section 29(1)(a) binds the Trust, section 8(2) requires that the nature of the right of the learners to a basic education and the duty imposed by that right be taken into account.  From the discussion in the previous paragraphs of the general nature of the right and the MEC’s obligation in relation to it, the form of the duty that the right to a basic education imposed   on   the   Trustees   emerges.     It   is   clear   that there is no primary positive obligation on the Trust to provide basic education to the learners.  That primary positive obligation rests on the MEC.  There was also no   obligation   on   the   Trust   to   make   its   property available to the MEC for use as a public school.   A private landowner may do so, however, in accordance with section 14(1) of the Act which provides that a public school may be provided on private property only in terms of an agreement between the MEC and the owner of the property. [58]   This   Court,   in   Ex   Parte   Chairperson   of   the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, made it clear that socio­economic rights (like the right to a   basic   education)   may   be   negatively   protected from improper invasion. Breach of this obligation occurs directly when there is a failure to respect the right, or indirectly, when there is a failure to 83 prevent   the   direct   infringement   of   the   right   by another   or   a   failure   to   respect   the   existing protection   of   the   right   by   taking   measures   that diminish that protection. It needs to be stressed however   that   the   purpose   of   section   8(2)   of   the Constitution is not to obstruct private autonomy or to impose on a private party the duties of the state in protecting the Bill of Rights.   It is rather to require private parties not to interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of a right.  Its application also depends on the intensity of the constitutional right   in   question,   coupled   with   the   potential invasion of that right which could be occasioned by   persons other than the State or organs of State.   ” Coming to the United Kingdom, they ratified the European 66. Convention on Human Rights in 1951.  But the rights conferred by the Convention had to be enforced by British citizens only in the European Court of Human Rights, for a long time. Finding that it took an average of five years to get an action in the European Court of Human Rights after all domestic remedies are exhausted and also finding that on an average, the same costed £30,000, a white paper was submitted in 1997 under the title “ Rights Brought Home” .  This led   to   the   enactment   of   the   Human   Rights   Act,   1998   by   the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It came into force on 2.10.2000 (coincidentally  Gandhi Jayanti  Day).  This Act sought to incorporate into   the   domestic   law,   the   rights   conferred   by   the   European 84 Convention, so that the citizens need not go to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.  After the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the horizontal effect of Convention Rights became the subject matter of debate in several cases. 62 For instance,  vs. was a case where the 67. Douglas   Hello! Ltd.   right to privacy of an individual was pitted against the right of free speech and expression. In that case, a magazine called   OK! was given the exclusive right to publish the photographs of the wedding reception of a celebrity couple that took place at New York. On the day of the wedding, certain paparazzo had infiltrated the venue and took   few   unauthorized   photographs   which   were   shared   with potential   competitor   viz.   Hello!   Ltd.   (another   magazine).   Hello! published the photographs in the next issue of their magazine even before Ok! could publish it. The question before the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) was whether there was violation of right to privacy, among others   and whether it could be enforced against a private person.  The Court said: “49.   It follows that the ECtHR has recognised an obligation   on   member   states   to   protect   one 62 [2001] QB 967 85 individual from an unjustified invasion of private   and an obligation on the life by another individual courts of a member state to interpret legislation in a way which will achieve that result.  50. Some, such as the late Professor Sir William Wade, th in Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law (8  Ed.) p 983, and   Jonathan   Morgan,   in Privacy,   Confidence   and Horizontal   Effect:"   Hello"   Trouble (2003)   CLJ   443, contend  that the Human Rights Act should be given 'full, direct, horizontal effect'. The courts have not … been prepared to go this far. … 102.   To summarise our conclusion at this stage: disregarding the effect of the OK! contract, we are satisfied that the Douglases' claim for invasion of their privacy falls to be determined according to the   English   law   of   confidence.   That   law,   as extended   to   cover   private   and   personal information,   protected   information   about   the Douglases' wedding.” 63 68. In   X vs. Y , the Court of Appeals dealt with the case of an employee X, who was cautioned by the Police for committing a sex offence   with   another   man   in   a   public   bathroom.   The   offence occurred when X was off duty. On finding about the incident, the employer Y suspended X and dismissed him after a disciplinary hearing. The dismissal was challenged as violative of Convention Rights.   An   argument   was   raised   that   these   rights   are   not enforceable against private parties. Though on facts, the claim of 63 [2004] EWCA Civ 662 86 the   dismissed   employee   was   dismissed,   the   legal   issue   was articulated by the Court thus: “55. The applicant invoked articles 8 and 14 of the Convention in relation to his cause of action in private law. (1) As appears from the authorities cited in section C above, article 8 is not confined in its effect to relations between   individuals   and   the   state   and   public authorities .   It   has   been   interpreted   by   the Strasbourg court as imposing a positive obligation on   the   state   to   secure   the   observance   and enjoyment of the right between private individuals. (2)  If the  facts  of  the  case  fall within  the ambit  of article 8, the state is also under a positive obligation under article 14 to secure to private individuals the enjoyment   of   the   right   without   discrimination, including   discrimination   on   the   ground   of   sexual orientation. (3) A person's sexual orientation and private sex life fall within the scope of the Convention right to respect for private life (see ADT v. UK [2000] 2 FLR 697) and the right to non­discrimination in respect that right. Interference with the right within article 8.1 has to be justified under article 8.2.”

arose as to the enforceability of the right to freedom of assembly against non­State actors, who obstructed the assembly. The case

religious service and a march to the clinic of a doctor who carried 64 [1988] ECHR 15 87 out abortions in Stadl­Paura. A number of counter­demonstrators disrupted the march to the hillside by mingling with the marchers and shouting down their recitation. At the end of the ceremony, special riot­control units – which had until then been standing by –

in the act of throwing eggs was fined. The association lodged a disciplinary   complaint   against   police   for   failing   to   protect   the demonstration, which was refused. When the matter was taken to the Constitutional Court, it held that it had no jurisdiction over the case.   Therefore,   the   association   applied   to   the   European Commission   on   13   September   1982,   alleging   violation   of

“32.  A demonstration may  annoy  or  give offence to persons   opposed to   the   ideas   or   claims   that   it   is seeking   to   promote. The participants   must,   however, be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their   opponents;   such   a   fear   would   be   liable   to deter associations or other groups supporting common ideas   or   interests   from   openly expressing   their opinions   on   highly   controversial   issues   affecting the community. In a democracy the right to counter­ demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate. 88 Genuine,   effective   freedom   of   peaceful   assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the   part   of   the   State   not   to   interfere:   a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 (art. 11). Like Article   8   (art.   8),   Article   11 (art.   11)   sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, if need be (see, mutatis mutandis, the X and Y v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, p. 11, § 23)” 65 70. In  X and Y  vs.  The Netherlands , a privately­run home for children with mental disabilities was sued on the ground that a 16­ year­old inmate was subjected to sexual assault. When the case was dismissed by the domestic court on a technical plea, the father of the victim approached the European Court of Human Rights. ECHR outlined the extent of State obligation on the protection of the right to life even against private persons as follows: “23.   The   Court   recalls   that   although   the   object   of Article 8 (art. 8) is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities,   it   does   not   merely   compel   the   State   to abstain   from   such   interference:   in   addition   to   this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or   family   life   (see   the   Airey   judgment   of   9   October 1979,   Series   A   no.   32,   p.   17,   para.   32).   These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between ” themselves. 65 [1985] ECHR 4 89 71. Having   taken   an   overview   of   the   theoretical   aspect   of “ ”   and   the   approach   of   Constitutional verticality   vs   horizontality Courts in other jurisdictions, let us now come back to the Indian context.  72. Part­III of the Indian Constitution begins with Article 12 which defines the expression “ the State ” to include the Government and the Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of  the   States   and   all  local  or   other   authorities   within  the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. 73. After defining the expression “ the State ” in Article 12 and after declaring   all   laws   inconsistent   with   or   in   derogation   of   the fundamental   rights   to   be   void   under   Article   13,   Part­III   of   the Constitution proceeds to deal with rights.  There are some Articles in  Part­III  where  the  mandate  is   directly  to the  State  and there are other Articles where without injuncting the State, certain   rights   are   recognized   to   be   inherent,   either   in   the citizens of the country or in persons . In fact, there are two sets of dichotomies that are apparent in the Articles contained in Part 90 III. One set of dichotomy is between  (i)  what is directed against the State; and   what is spelt out as inhering in every individual (ii)   without  reference   to  the  State.   The   other   dichotomy   is   between citizens; and   persons. This can be illustrated easily in the (i)   (ii)   form of a table as follows:

91

92

93

94

74. The above table would show that some of the Articles of Part­ III are in the form of a directive to the State, while others are not. This is an indication that some of the rights conferred by Part­III are to be honored by and also enforceable against, non­State actors. 95 75. For instance, the rights conferred by Articles 15(2)(a) and (b), 17, 20(2), 21, 23, 24, 29(2) etc., are obviously enforceable against non­State actors also. The owner of a shop, public restaurant, hotel or place of entertainment, though a non­State actor cannot deny access to a citizen of India on grounds only of religion, race etc., in view of Article 15(2)(a). So is the case with wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public, in view of Article 15(2)(b). The right not to be enforced with any disability arising out of untouchability is available against non­State actors under Article 17. The right against double jeopardy, and the right against self­incrimination available under sub­Articles (2) and (3) of Article 20 may also be available even against non­State actors in the   case   of   prosecution   on   private   complaints.   We   need   not elaborate   more,   as   the   table   given   above   places   all   rights   in perspective. 76. That takes us to the question as to how the Courts in India have dealt with cases where there were complaints of infringement by   non­State   actors,   of   fundamental   rights,   other   than   those 96 covered in column 2 of the Table in para 73 above. To begin with, this Court was weary of extending the enforcement of fundamental rights against private individuals. But this reluctance changed over a period of time. Let us now see how the law evolved: (i) In   (supra), a Five Member Bench of this P.D. Shamdasani   Court was dealing with a writ petition under Article 32, filed by a person who lost a series of proceedings both civil and otherwise, against the Central Bank of India Limited, which was at that time a company incorporated under Companies Act. The grievance of the petitioner in that case was that the shares held by him in the company were sold by the bank in exercise of its right of lien for recovery of a debt. Therefore, the petitioner pitched his claim under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(1)( which was available at that time ). But while making a comparison between Article 31(1) ( as it stood at that time ) and Article 21, both of which contained a declaration in the same negative form, this Court observed in   P.D. Shamdasani   as follows:   “ T here   is   no   express   reference   to   the   State   in Article 21 .  But could it be suggested on that account that that Article was intended to afford protection to life and personal liberty against violation by private individuals? The   words   “except   by   procedure   established   by   law” . plainly exclude such a suggestion ” 97 (ii) The aforesaid principle in  P.D. Shamdasani  was reiterated by another   Five   Member   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Smt.   Vidya 66 Varma   vs.   Dr.   Shiv   Narain   Varma holding   that   the language of Article 31(1) and Article 21 are similar and that they do not apply to invasions of a right by a private individual and that consequently no writ will lie in such cases. (iii) In   Sukhdev   Singh   vs.   Bhagatram   Sardar   Singh 67 Raghuvanshi   two   questions   arose   before   a   Constitution Bench of this Court. One of the questions was whether an employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to protection of Articles 14 and 16 against the corporation on the premise that these   statutory   corporations   are   authorities   within   the meaning of Article 12. In his separate but concurring opinion, Mathew,   J.   pointed   out   that   the   concept   of   State   has undergone   drastic   changes   in   recent   years   and   that   today State cannot be conceived of simply as a coercive machinery wielding   the   thunderbolt   of   authority.   The   learned   Judge quoted the decision of the US Supreme Court in   vs. Marsh   68 ,  where a person who was a Jehovah’s witness was Alabama arrested   for   trespassing   and   distributing   pamphlets,   in   a company town owned by a corporation. Though the property in question was private, the Court said that the operation of a town was a public function and that therefore, the private 66 AIR 1956 SC 108 67 (1975) 1 SCC 421 68 326 US 501 (1946) 98 rights   of   the   corporation   must   be   exercised   within constitutional limitations. After quoting the decision in  Marsh, K.K. Mathew, J. went on to hold as follows:

(iv) In  (supra) this Court People’s Union for Democratic Rights  pointed   out   that   the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under Article   24   is   enforceable   against   everyone,   including   the contractors.  The Court went a step further by holding that the Union   of   India,   the   Delhi   Administration   and   the   Delhi Development   Authority   have   a   duty   to   ensure   that   this Constitutional obligation is obeyed by the contractors. Going further, this Court held that certain fundamental rights such as   those   found   in   Articles   17,   23   and   24   are   enforceable against the whole world. 99 (v) S. Rangarajan  (supra) was a case where a division Bench of the Madras High Court revoked the ‘U’ certificate issued to a Tamil   feature   film,   on   the   ground   that   it   offended   the reservation policy. The Government of Tamil Nadu supported the decision of the  High Court on the ground that several organizations   in   Tamil   Nadu   were   agitating   that   the   film should   be   banned   as   it   hurt   the   sentiments   of   people belonging to the reserved categories.  After pointing out that this Court was amused and troubled by the stand taken by the State Government, this Court indicated that it is the duty of the State to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty granted against the State and that the State cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience problem.   Holding that the State cannot negate the rule of law and surrender to blackmail and intimidation, this Court said that it the obligatory duty of the Court to prevent it and protect the freedom. (vi) In   , this Court made   Smt. Nilabati a distinction between, (i) the decision in Kasturi Lal upholding the State’s plea of sovereign immunity for tortious acts of its servants, which was confined to the sphere of liability in tort; and (ii) the State’s liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application in the constitutional scheme . In paragraph 100 34,   which  contains  the   separate   but concurring   opinion of Dr. A.S. Anand, J., the law was summarised as follows:­

Court pointed out that the administrative law of accountability 69 (1994) 1 SCC 243 101

actions has taken many strides and that it is now accepted by both by this Court and English Courts that the State is liable to compensate for the loss or injury suffered by a citizen due to arbitrary actions of its employees. (viii) The decision in   (supra), arose under Bodhisattwa Gautam   special  circumstances.   A  girl  student  of   a  college   lodged a complaint   against   a   Lecturer   for   alleged   offences   under Sections 312, 420, 493, 496 and 498­A IPC.   The Lecturer moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint. The High Court dismissed the quash petition. When the Lecturer filed a special leave petition, this Court not only dismissed the SLP but also issued notice   on the suo motu question as to why he should not be asked to pay reasonable monthly maintenance during the pendency of the prosecution. Finally,   this   Court   ordered   payment   of   a   monthly   interim compensation after   holding that what was violated was the fundamental right of the women under Article 21 and that therefore a remedy can be provided by this Court under Article 32 even against the non­state actor  ( namely the   accused ).     This   decision   was   cited   with   approval   in vs.   Chairman,   Railway   Board  &   Ors.   Chandrima   Das 70 (Mrs.) &Ors. . 70 (2000) 2 SCC 465 102 (ix) As rightly highlighted by the learned   amicus,   this Court has awarded   damages   against   non­State   actors   under   the environmental law regime, whenever they were found to have violated the right under Article 21. For instance this Court was 71 concerned   with   a   case   in   M.C.   Mehta   vs.   Kamal   Nath   where a company built a club on the banks of River Beas, partly   taken   on   lease   from   the   Government   and   partly   by encroaching into forest land and virtually turning the course of   the   River.   Invoking   the   “ polluter   pays   principle ”   and “ precautionary   principle ”   landscaped   in   Vellore   Citizens’ 72 Welfare   Forum   vs.   Union   of   India and   also   applied   in Indian   Council   for   Enviro­Legal   Action   vs.   Union   of 73 India , this Court held the owner of the private motel to be liable to pay compensation towards the cost of restoration of the ecology of the area. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the motel as to why they should not be asked to pay compensation to reverse the degraded environment and as to why a pollution fine should not be imposed. In response, the motel contended before this Court that though in proceedings under   Article   32   it   was   open   to   this   Court   to   grant compensation to the victims whose fundamental rights were violated or who are victims of arbitrary Executive action or victims of atrocious behavior of public authorities, the Court cannot impose any fine on those who are guilty of that action. 71 (1997) 1 SCC 388 72 (1996) 5 SCC 647 73 (1996) 3 SCC 212 103 The motel also contended that fine is a component of criminal jurisprudence   and   hence   the   imposition   of   fine   would   be violative   of   Articles   20   and   21.   This   Court,   even   while accepting the said argument in so far as the component of fine is concerned, directed the issue of fresh notice to the motel to show   cause   why   exemplary   damages   be   not   awarded,   in addition   to   the   damages   already   awarded.   Thereafter,   this Court held in  M.C. Mehta  vs.  Kamal Nath  (supra at footnote no.15) as follows:­ “ 10.  In   the   matter   of   enforcement   of   fundamental rights under Article 21, under public law domain, the Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 32 of the Constitution, has awarded damages against those who have   been   responsible   for   disturbing   the   ecological balance either by running the industries or any other activity which has the effect of causing pollution in the environment. The Court while awarding damages also POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE enforces the “ ­   ” which is widely accepted as a means of paying for the cost of pollution and control. To put in other words, the wrongdoer, the polluter,   is   under   an   obligation   to   make   good   the damage caused to the environment . ” (x) In   Consumer   Education   &   Research   Centre  &   Ors.   vs. 74 Union of India  &Ors. , this Court held that in appropriate cases   the   Court   could   give   appropriate   directions   to   the employer,   be   it   the   State   or   its   undertaking   or   private employer , to make the right to life meaningful, to prevent pollution of work place, protection of environment, protection of   the   health   of   the   workmen   and   to   preserve   free   and 74 (1995) 3 SCC 42 104 unpolluted water for the safety and health of the people. The Court was dealing in that case with the occupational health hazards   and   diseases   afflicting   the   workmen   employed   in asbestos industries. In paragraph 29 of the Report, this Court said, “… It is therefore settled law that in public law claim for compensation is a remedy available under Article 32 or Article 226   for the   enforcement   and   protection  of  fundamental and human   rights.   …   It   is   a   practical   and   inexpensive   mode   of redress available for the contravention made by the State, its servants, its instrumentalities ,  a company or a person in the purported exercise of their powers and enforcement of the rights claimed either under the statutes or licence issued under the statute or for the enforcement of any right or duty under the Constitution or the law .” 75 (xi) In  vs. ,  this Court laid down Vishaka     State of Rajasthan . guidelines, in the absence of a legislation, for the enforcement of the right to gender equality of working women, in a class action petition that was filed to enforce fundamental rights of working women and to prevent sexual harassment of women in workplace. The guidelines imposed an obligation upon both public and private employers not to violate the fundamental rights   guaranteed   to   working   women   under   Article   14,   15, 19(1)(g) and 21. In  vs. Medha Kotwal Lele  & Ors.   Union of

105 76 India ,this   Court   noted   that   even   after   15   years   of   the judgment in  Vishaka  (supra) , many States had not made the necessary amendments or failed to effectively implement the guidelines. This Court issued a direction in Paragraph 44.4 : “ 44.4     The   State   functionaries   and   private   and public   sector   undertakings/organisations/bodies/ institutions,   etc.   shall   put   in   place   sufficient mechanism to ensure full  implementation of  Vishaka [Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 : 1997  SCC   (Cri)  932]   guidelines  and  further   provide that   if   the   alleged   harasser   is   found   guilty,   the complainant victim is not forced to work with/under such harasser and where appropriate and possible the alleged   harasser   should   be   transferred.   Further provision   should   be   made   that   harassment   and intimidation of witnesses and the complainants shall be met with severe disciplinary action.” (xii) In  Githa Hariharan (Ms.)  & Anr .  vs .  Reserve Bank of India 77 & Anr. , this Court was dealing with a challenge to Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and Section 19(b) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 which declared the father to be the natural guardian of the person and property of a minor son and unmarried daughter. The mother was recognised as the natural guardian under these provisions   “ after   the   father”.   These   provisions   resulted   in hardship to spouses separated from each other while dealing with the wards. Reading the obligations of the State under certain International Conventions like CEDAW into the right to 76 (2013) 1 SCC 297 77 (1999) 2 SCC 228 106 dignity of women and gender equality, traceable to Article 21 and 14, this Court read down the word “ after ” to mean “ in the absence   of ”.   By   such   interpretation,   this   Court   invoked fundamental rights to interpret a word in the sphere of family law. 78 (xiii) In   Indian Medical Association   vs.   Union of India . , the policy of an Army College of Medical Sciences to admit only those   who   are   wards   of   army   personnel,   based   on   scores obtained   in   an   entrance   test,   was   under   challenge.   The question   that   came   up   for   consideration   was   whether   this discriminatory   practice   by   a   private   entity   would   be   in violation   of   Article   15   of   the   Constitution.   This   Court   in Paragraph 187 stated:

78  ( 2011) 7 SCC 179 107 (xiv) In   Society   for   Unaided   Private   Schools   of   Rajasthan (supra) ,  the   constitutionality   of   Section   12   of   the   Right   of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 was challenged on the ground that it violated Articles 19(1)(g) and 30 of those who had established schools in the private sector. While upholding the Constitutionality of the provision, which required all schools, private and State­funded, to reserve 25% of its intake for students from disadvantaged background, this Court held: 

79 (xv) In   vs. ,   the   petitioner,   a Jeeja   Ghosh     Union   of   India disabled   person   suffering   from   cerebral   palsy,   was unceremoniously ordered off a SpiceJet aircraft by the flight crew on account of the disability. The petition was filed for putting in place a system to ensure such a violation of human 79 (2016) 7 SCC 761 108 dignity and  inequality is not meted out to similarly placed persons. This Court observed as follows:  “ 10.  It is submitted by the petitioner that the Union of India (Respondent 1) has an obligation to ensure that its   citizens   are   not   subject   to   such   arbitrary   and humiliating   discrimination.   It   is   a   violation   of   their fundamental rights, including the right to life, right to equality, right to move freely throughout the territory of India, and right to practise their profession.   The State   has   an   obligation   to   ensure   that   these rights are protected  — particularly for those who are disabled. …” This Court awarded compensation to the petitioner against the private Airline on the ground that the airline, though a private enterprise, ought not to have violated her fundamental right. 80 (xvi) In   Zee Telefilms Ltd.   vs.   Union of India , this Court held that  though   BCCI   does  not  fall  within  the  purview  of   the   term “ State ”, it  discharges   public   duties  and   that  therefore   even  if a remedy under Article 32 is not available, the aggrieved party can always seek a remedy before the ordinary courts of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226.  This Court pointed out that the violator   of   a   constitutional   right   could   not   go   scot­free   merely because it is not a State.  The said logic was extended by this Court to   a   “Deemed   to   be   University”   in   Janet   Jeyapaul   vs.   SRM 80 (2005) 4 SCC 649 109 81 University , on the ground that though it is a private university, it was discharging “public functions”, by imparting education. All the above decisions show that on a case­to­case basis, this 77. Court applied horizontal effect, considering the nature of the right violated and the extent of obligation on the part of the violator. But to enable the courts to have certain basic guidelines in place, for dealing with such cases, this Court developed a tool in  Justice K.S. Puttaswamy.  While affirming the right to privacy as a fundamental right, this Court laid down the landscape as follows: “ 397.   Once we have arrived at this understanding of the nature of fundamental rights, we can dismantle a core assumption of the Union's argument:  that a right must   either   be   a   common   law   right   or   a fundamental   right .   The   only   material   distinctions between the two classes of right—of which the nature and content may be the same—lie in the incidence of the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which a  failure  to do  so  can  be  redressed.   Common   law rights are horizontal in their operation when they are violated by one's fellow man, he can be named and   proceeded   against   in   an   ordinary   court   of law.   Constitutional   and   fundamental   rights,   on the   other   hand,   provide   remedy   against   the violation of a valued interest by the “State”, as an abstract   entity,   whether   through   legislation   or otherwise,   as   well   as   by   identifiable   public officials,   being   individuals   clothed   with   the powers of the State. It is perfectly possible for an 81 (2015) 16 SCC 530 110 interest   to   simultaneously   be   recognised   as   a common   law   right   and   a   fundamental   right. Where the interference with a recognised interest is by the State or any other like entity recognised by   Article   12,   a   claim   for   the   violation   of   a fundamental right would lie. Where the author of an identical interference is a non­State actor, an action at common law would lie in an ordinary . court 398.  Privacy has the nature of being both a common law right as well as a fundamental right. Its content, in both forms, is identical. All that differs is the incidence of   burden   and   the   forum   for   enforcement   for   each form.” Thus, the answer to Question No. 2 is partly found in the 9­ 78. Judge Bench decision in  Justice  K.S. Puttaswamy  itself. We have seen from the line of judicial pronouncements listed above that 82 a fter  vs.   lost its hold, this Court A.K. Gopalan  State of Madras has  expanded   the   width   of   Article   21   in   several   areas   such  as health, environment, transportation, Education and Prisoner’s life etc.  As Vivian Bose, J., put it in a poetic language in  S. Krishnan 83 vs   State   of   Madras “ Brush   aside   for   a   moment   the pettifogging   of   the   law   and   forget   for   the   nonce   all   the learned disputations about this and that, and "and" or "or ", or  "may"   and   "must   ".   Look   past   the   mere   verbiage   of   the 82 AIR 1950 SC 27 83  AIR 1951 SC 301 111 words and penetrate deep into the heart and spirit of the The original thinking of this Court that these rights Constitution.”.  can be enforced only against the State, changed over a period of time.   The   transformation   was   from   “State”   to   “Authorities”   to “instrumentalities   of   State”   to   “agency   of   the   Government”   to “impregnation   with   Governmental   character”   to   “enjoyment   of monopoly   status   conferred   by   State”   to   “deep   and   pervasive 84 85 control”   to   the   “nature   of   the   duties/functions   performed” . Therefore, we would answer  Question No. 2 as follows:  “A fundamental right under Article 19/21 can be  enforced  even against  persons  other than ” the State or its instrumentalities Question No. 3 “Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the 79. rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India even against a threat to the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another citizen or private agency?” is the third question referred to us. 84  R.D. Shetty vs International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489  85  Andi Mukta vs V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691  112 80. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to make a small correction. Article 21 right is available not only to citizens but to all persons. Therefore, the word ‘ citizen ’ mentioned in Question No.3 has to be read as ‘ person ’.    As   we   have   pointed   out   in   the   Table   under   paragraph   73 81. above, the expression “ the State ” is not used in Article 21.   This Article 21 guarantees every person that he shall not be deprived of his life and liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Going by the scheme of Part­III which we have outlined both in the preceding paragraphs and in the Table in paragraph 73, it is clear that the State has two obligations,  (i)  not to deprive a person of his life and liberty except according to procedure established by law; and   (ii)   to ensure that the life and liberty of a person is not deprived even otherwise.  Article 21 does not say “the State shall not deprive a person of his life and liberty”, but says that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty” . 82. When the Constitution was adopted, our understanding of the words “ life ” and “ personal liberty ” was not as it has evolved over the 113 past seven decades. Similarly, it was not imagined or conceived at that time that anyone other than the State is capable of depriving the life and personal liberty of a person, except by committing a punishable   offence.   But   with   the   expanding   horizons   of   our philosophical   understanding   of   law,   life   and   liberty   and   the advancement of science and technology, we have come to realize that “ life is not an empty dream ” and “ our hearts are not muffled 86 , nor is “ drums beating funeral marches to the grave” life a tale told 87 by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing ” . Over a period of time, this Court has interpreted ‘ 83. the right to life ’ to include,  (i)  livelihood;  (ii)  all those aspects of life which go to make   a   man’s   life   meaningful,   complete   and   worth   living;   (iii) something more than mere survival or animal existence;  (iv)  right to live (and die) with human dignity;   right to food, water, decent (v)   environment,   medical   care   and   shelter   etc.;   (vi)   all   that   gives meaning to a man’s life, such as his tradition, culture, heritage and protection of that heritage in its full measure; and  the right to (vii)  Privacy. There are certain jurisdictions which have taken this right 86  From H.W. Longfellow in “A Psalm of life” 87  From Shakespeare in Macbeth 114 to   include   “the   r ight   to   be   forgotten ”   or   the   “r ight   not   to   be remembered ”. 84. When the word “ life ” was understood to mean only physical existence, the deprivation of the same was generally conceived to be possible   only   by   the   State,   except   in   cases   where   someone committed an offence punishable under the Penal Code. But the moment the  right to life under Article 21 was developed into a bouquet   of   rights   and   science   and   technology   intruded   into   all spheres to life, the deprivation of the right by non­State actors also became possible. Another development that has taken place in the past   3   to   4   decades   is   that   several   of   the   functions   of   the Government have either been out­sourced to non­State actors or been entrusted to public­private partnerships. This is why, the High Courts and this Court modulated the tests to be applied for finding out the maintainability of an action under Article 226 or Article 32. Once upon a time, the maintainability of a petition under Article 32/226 depended upon “ who the respondent was ”. Later, the focus shifted   to   “ the   nature   of   the   duties/functions   performed ”   by   the 115 respondent, for finding out his amenability to the jurisdiction under Article 226. 85. Life and personal liberty are two different things, even while being   an   integral   part   of   a   whole   and   they   have   different connotations. Question No. 3 is so worded that the focus is not on ‘deprivation of life’ but on  (i)  ‘ deprivation of personal liberty ’ and that too by  the acts or omissions of another person or private agency; and   the duty of the State to affirmatively protect it. Therefore, we (ii) shall,   in   our   discussion,   focus   more   on   two   aspects,   namely,   deprivation of personal liberty by non­State actors; and     the (i) (ii) duty   of   the   State.   An   elaborate   exposition   of   the   expression “ personal liberty ” and its origin in Greek civilization may be found in the judgment of this Court in  Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre 88 vs.  State of Maharashtra . Suffice it to say for our purpose that in   this   judgment,   this   Court   identified   in   paragraph   53   of   the Report that Article 21 guarantees two rights, namely,   right to life; (i) and  (ii)  right to personal liberty. Therefore, because of the manner in which Question No. 3 is framed, we shall try to confine our 88  (2011) 1 SCC 694 116 discussion to personal liberty, though at times both may overlap or get interchanged.   86. The expression “ personal liberty ” appearing in Article 21 was held by this Court in  A.K. Gopalan  (supra) to mean freedom from physical   restraint   of   a   person   by   incarceration   or   otherwise. However, the understanding of the expression “ personal liberty ” got 89 enlarged in  Kharak Singh  vs.  State of U.P.   It was a case where a person who was originally charged for the offence of dacoity and later released for lack of evidence, was put under surveillance by the Police, and his name included in the history­sheet under the U.P.   Police   Regulations.   As   a   result,   he   was   required   to   make frequent visits to the Police Station. Sometimes the Police made domiciliary visits at night to his house. They would knock at the door, disturb his sleep and ask to report to the Police, whenever he went out  of  the  village.  Though by  a majority,  the   Constitution Bench held in  (supra)  that the regulation permitting Kharak Singh  domiciliary visits is unconstitutional, the majority upheld the Police surveillance on the ground that (at that time) right to privacy had 89 AIR 1963 SC 1295 117 not become part of the fundamental rights.  But K. Subba Rao, J. speaking for himself and J.C. Shah, J. held that the concept of personal liberty in Article 21 is comprehensive enough to include privacy.   The   thinking   reflected   in     that   physical A.K.   Gopalan restraint   was   necessary   to   constitute   infringement   of   personal liberty, was completely changed by K. Subba Rao, J. in his minority opinion in   . Giving a completely new dimension to Kharak Singh personal liberty, K. Subba Rao, J. said:

118

minority judgment of Subba Rao and Shah, JJ. eventually became

Nationalisation case), where the 11­Judge Bench finally discarded

90 (2014) 9 SCC 737 91 (1970) 1 SCC 248 119 fundamental rights contained in different articles are not mutually

If U.P. Police Regulations were challenged in  , 87. Kharak Singh identical Regulations issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh were 92 challenged in  Gobind  vs.  State of Madhya Pradesh . Though this Court upheld the impugned Regulations, K.K. Mathew, J. pointed out: “ 25.  Rights and freedoms of citizens are set forth in the   Constitution   in   order   to   guarantee   that   the individual, his personality, and those things stamped with   his   personality   shall   be   free   from   official interference   except   where   a   reasonable   basis   for intrusion   exists.   “Liberty   against   Government”   a phrase coined by Professor Corwin expresses this idea forcefully.   In   this   sense,   many   of   the   fundamental rights of citizens can be described as contributing to the right to privacy. * 27.  There   are   two   possible   theories   for   protecting privacy of home. The first is that activities in the home harm others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere thought that individuals might be engaging in such activities and that such ‘harm’ is not   constitutionally   protectible   by   the   State. The second   is   that   individuals   need   a   place   of sanctuary where they can be free from societal control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from projecting on the world the image they want to be accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers rather than 92 (1975) 2 SCC 148 120 the realities of their natures .[See 26 Stanford Law Rev. 1161, 1187]” 88. Thus, the understanding of this Court in  , that A.K. Gopalan deprivation   of   personal   liberty   required   a   physical   restraint, underwent a change in  Kharak Singh  and  Gobind  (supra) .  From there,   the   law   marched   to   the   next   stage   in   Satwant   Singh Sawhney  vs.  D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New 93 where   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   held   by   a Delhi   majority, that  the right to personal liberty included the right of . It was held in the said locomotion and right to travel abroad decision   that   “ liberty"   in   our   Constitution   bears   the   same comprehensive meaning as is given to the expression "liberty" by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the expression "personal liberty" in Article 21 only excludes

and to travel abroad, but the right to move throughout the 93  AIR 1967 SC 1836 121 territories   of   India   is   not   covered   by   it   inasmuch   as   it   is

was directed to surrender his passport, with a view to prevent him from travelling out of India, on account of an investigation pending against him under the Export and Import Control Act. It must be noted that this case was before the enactment of The Passports Act, 1967. 90. After The Passports Act came into force, the decision of the 94 7­Judge Bench in  vs.  came. It Maneka Gandhi   Union of India was held therein that the right to travel abroad is part of the right to personal liberty and that the same cannot be deprived except according to the procedure established by law. 91. Next came the decision in  Bandhua Mukti Morcha  vs .  Union 95 . It was a case where a letter addressed by an of India   & Ors. NGO to the Court exposing the plight of persons working in stone quarries   under   inhuman   conditions,   was   treated   as   a   public 94  (1978) 1 SCC 248 95 (1984) 3 SCC 161 122 interest   litigation.   Some   of   those   workers   were   actually   bonded labourers.  After this Court issued notice to the State Governments and the lessees of the quarries, a preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of the writ petition. While rejecting the preliminary   objection,   this   Court   broadly   indicated   how   the fundamental rights of those bonded labourers were violated and what were the duties of the State and the Court in cases of that nature. The relevant portion of the decision reads thus:

123

92. Therefore, three major breakthroughs happened, the first in   the   second   in     and   Kharak   Singh, Satwant   Singh Maneka Gandhi  (supra)  and the third in  Bandhua Mukti Morcha  (supra) . The first breakthrough was the opinion, though of a minority, that physical   restraint   was   not   a   necessary   sine   qua   non   for   the deprivation   of   personal   liberty   and   that   even   a   psychological restraint may amount to deprivation of personal liberty. The second breakthrough   was   the   opinion  in     and   Satwant   Singh Maneka Gandhi  that the right of locomotion and to travel abroad are part of the   right   to   personal   liberty.   The   third   breakthrough   was   the opinion   in     that   the   State   owed   an Bandhua   Mukti   Morcha obligation to take corrective measures when there was an infraction of Article 21. 93. In   National   Human   Rights   Commission   vs.   State   of 96 , this Court was confronted with a Arunachal Pradesh  & Anr. situation where private citizens, namely, the All Arunachal Pradesh 96 (1996) 1 SCC 742 124 Students’ Union held out threats to forcibly drive  chakmas,  out of the State. The National Human Rights Commission itself filed a writ petition   under   Article   32.   While   allowing   the   writ   petition   and issuing directions, this Court indicated the role of the State in the following words:

97 94. In  Mr. ‘X’  vs.  Hospital ‘Z’ , the appellant had accompanied a patient to the hospital for treatment and offered to donate blood, for the   purpose   of   surgery.   Before   allowing   him   to   donate   blood, samples were taken  from “X”. It  was detected  that he  was HIV positive. The fact that Mr. “X” tested positive was disclosed by the 97 (1998) 8 SCC 296 125 hospital   to   the   fiancée   of   Mr.   “X”.   Therefore,   the   proposal   for marriage   was   called   off   and   Mr.   “X”   was   ostracised   by   the community. Mr. “X” sued the hospital for damages, pitching his claim on the right to privacy and the duty of confidentiality that the hospital   had   in   their   relationship   with   him.   Though   this   Court partly agreed with Mr. “X” the court found that the disclosure made by the hospital actually saved the life of a lady. But while dealing with   a   right   under   Article   21   vis­à­vis   the   hospital   (a   private hospital), this Court held as follows :­ “ 27.   Right of privacy may, apart from contract, also arise out of a particular specific relationship which may be commercial, matrimonial, or even political.   As already discussed above, doctor­patient relationship,   though   basically   commercial,   is, professionally, a matter of confidence and, therefore, doctors are morally and ethically bound to maintain confidentiality. In such a situation, public disclosure of even true private facts may amount to an invasion of the right of privacy which may sometimes lead to the clash   of   one   person's   “right   to   be   let   alone”   with another person's right to be informed. 28.   Disclosure   of   even   true   private   facts   has   the tendency   to   disturb   a   person's   tranquillity.   It   may generate many complexes in him and may even lead to psychological   problems.   He   may,   thereafter,   have   a disturbed   life   all   through.   In   the   face   of   these potentialities, and as already held by this Court in its various decisions referred to above, the right of privacy is an essential component of the right to life envisaged by Article 21. The right, however, is not absolute and 126 may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others.” 95. In   Pt. Parmanand Katara   (supra) , a human rights activist filed a writ petition under Article 32 seeking a direction to the Union of   India   that   every   injured   person   brought   for   treatment   to   a hospital should instantaneously be given medical aid to preserve life and that the procedural Criminal Law should be allowed to operate thereafter. The basis of the said writ petition was a report about a scooterist who got injured in a road traffic accident, being turned away by the  nearby hospital  on  the  ground  that they were not authorized to handle medico­legal cases.  Before the victim could be taken to an authorized  hospital  located  20  kilometers   away, he died, which prompted the writ petition. While issuing directions, this Court expressed an opinion about the affirmative duty of court in paragraph 8 as follows:­ “ 8.   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   casts   the .   The obligation   on   the   State   to   preserve   life provision   as   explained   by   this   Court   in   scores   of decisions   has   emphasized   and   reiterated   with gradually increasing emphasis that position. A doctor at   the   government   hospital   positioned   to   meet   this State obligation is, therefore, duty bound to extend medical assistance for preserving life.   Every doctor 127 whether   at   a   government   hospital   or   otherwise has   the   professional   obligation   to   extend   his .  No services with due expertise for protecting life law or State action can intervene to avoid/delay the discharge   of   the   paramount   obligation   cast   upon members of the medical profession.   The obligation being   total,   absolute   and   paramount,   laws   of procedure whether in statutes or otherwise which would   interfere   with   the   discharge   of   this obligation   cannot   be   sustained   and   must, therefore, give way . …” That the State has an obligation to help preserve life, guaranteed under Article 21 was spelt out clearly in  . Pt. Parmanand Katara What   applies   to   life   applies   equally   to   personal   liberty.   This   is because there may be cases involving both the right to life as well as liberty.  For   instance,   in   vs. 96. Suchita   Srivastava  &   Anr.     98 Chandigarh   Administration , this   Court   had   an   occasion   to consider the reproductive rights of a mentally­challenged woman. This right was read as part of the right to life and liberty under 99 Article 21. In   vs.   . , this Court Devika Biswas   Union of India considered certain issues concerning the entire range of conduct and   management,   under   the   auspices   of   State   Governments,   of 98 (2009) 9 SCC 1 99 (2016) 10 SCC 726 128 sterilization procedures, either in camps or in accredited centres and held that the right to health and reproductive rights of a person are part of the right under Article 21. While doing so, this Court quoted   with   approval   the   decision   in   Bandhua   Mukti   Morcha where the obligation of the State to ensure that the fundamental rights   of   weaker   sections   of   society   are   not   exploited,   was underlined. 97. Tapping of telephones in exercise of the power conferred by Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 became the subject matter of challenge in   People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) 100 vs.   .   This   Court   held   that   conversation   on Union   of   India telephone is an important facet of a man’s private life and that tapping   of   telephone   would   infringe   Article   21.   Technological eavesdropping except in accordance with the procedure established by law was frowned upon by the Court. This was at a time when mobile phones had not become the order of the day and the State monopoly   was   yet   to   be   replaced   by   private   players   such   as intermediaries/service   providers.   Today,   the   infringement   of   the 100 (1997) 1 SCC 301 129 right to privacy is mostly by private players and if fundamental rights cannot be enforced against non­State actors, this right will go for a toss. In  vs. 98. District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad & Anr.   101 Canara   Bank   &   Ors. ,   what   was   under   challenge   was   an amendment made to The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 by the State of Andhra   Pradesh,   empowering   a   public   officer   to   inspect   the registers,   books,   papers   and   documents   kept   in   any   premises, including a private place where such registers, books etc., are kept. Taking   cue   from   the   decision   in     and   R.   Rajagopal Maneka Gandhi , this Court held in paragraphs 55 and 56 of the decision as follows:­

101 (2005) 1 SCC 496 130

99. In   Indian Woman says Gang­raped on orders of village Court   published   in   Business   and   Financial   News   dated 102 23­1­2014, in Re , this Court was dealing with a  suo motu  writ petition relating to the gang­rape of a women under orders of a community  panchayat  as punishment for having a relationship with a man belonging to a different community. After taking note of two 102 (2014) 4 SCC 786 131 103 earlier decisions, one in   Lata Singh   vs.   State of U.P.   which dealt   with   honour   killings   of   youngsters   involved   in   inter­caste, inter­religious marriages and the other in   vs. Arumugam Servai   104 State of Tamil Nadu , which dealt with   khap panchayats , this Court opined in paragraph 16 as follows:­

In   fact,   this   Court   observed   in   the   aforesaid   decision   that   the obligation of the State does not get extinguished upon payment of compensation and that the rehabilitation of the victims of such nature was a must. 105 100.     In   Shakti   Vahini   vs.   Union   of   India   &   Ors. ,   while dealing   with   a   writ   petition   seeking   a   direction   to   the   State Governments and Central Government to take preventive measures 103 (2006) 5 SCC 475 104 (2011) 6 SCC 405 105 (2018) 7 SCC 192 132 to combat honour crimes and to submit a National/State plan of action, this Court issued a slew of directions directing the State Governments to take both punitive and remedial measures, on the ground that the State has a positive obligation to protect the life and liberty of persons.  In paragraph 49 this Court said, “ We are disposed to think so, as it is the obligation of the State to have an atmosphere   where   the   citizens   are   in   a   position   to   enjoy   their fundamental   rights.”   After   quoting   the   previous   decision   in   S. Rangarajan   (supra) ,   which arose out of the infringement of the freedom of expression in respect of a cinematograph film, this Court said in  (supra)  as follows:­ Shakti Vahini  “ 49. … We   are   absolutely   conscious   that   the   aforesaid passage has been stated in respect of a different fundamental right, but the said principle applies with   more   vigour   when   the   life   and   liberty   of individuals is involved. We say so reminding the States   of   their   constitutional   obligations   to comfort, nurture the sustenance of fundamental rights of the citizens and not to allow any hostile group to create any kind of trench in them .” 101.   At last, while dealing with the right to privacy, in   Justice K.S. Puttaswamy , this Court made it clear that, “ it is a right 133 which   protects   the   inner   sphere   of   the   individuals   from ”. interference by both the State and non­State actors 102.   Before we conclude this chapter, we must point out that some academics feel that the same level of justification for infringement by the State, for all rights recognized by the Court, end up being 106 problematic   and   that   the   idea   of   a   hierarchy   of   rights,   as articulated by Das, J. in  A.K. Gopalan  may have to be examined. In fact,  ,   articulated this idea in  Rohinton Nariman J. Mohd. Arif (supra) where the question was as to whether a petition for review in the Supreme Court should be heard in open Court at least in death penalty cases. The learned Judge said:

106 Anup Surendranath in his Article “ ” in The Oxford Handbook of  Life and Personal Liberty the Indian Constitution (South Asia Edition), 2016 134 Therefore, the importance of the right to personal liberty over and above all the other rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 14 need hardly to be over­emphasized.   103. Therefore, our answer to Question No.3 would be that the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a person under Article 21, whenever there is a threat to personal . liberty, even by a non­State actor Question No.4  104.   Question No.4 referred to us is this: “Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting the Government, be attributed vicariously to the Government itself, especially in view of the principle of Collective Responsibility?” 105.   The   above   question   revolves   around   the   role   and responsibility of a Minister and the vicarious liability/responsibility of a Government to any statement made by him. For answering the said question, we may need to understand the role of a Minister under our Constitutional scheme. 135 106.   Part V of the Constitution providing for matters connected with “ ” contains five chapters, dealing respectively with, The Union (i)   the   Executive;   (ii)   Parliament;   (iii)   Legislative   powers   of   the President;   the Union Judiciary; and  Comptroller and Auditor (iv) (v)  General   of   India.   Part   VI   of   the   Constitution   dealing   with   “ The States ” contains six chapters, dealing respectively with,     general (i) provision containing the definitions;  (ii)  the Executive;  (iii)  the State Legislature;   Legislative   power   of   the   Governor;     the   High (iv)   (v) Courts in the States; and  (vi)  Subordinate Courts. While Articles 74 and 75 provide for,  ‘Council of Ministers 107.   (i)  to aid and advise the President’; and   (ii)   ‘Other provisions as to Ministers’, insofar as the Union is concerned, Articles 163 and 164 provide for,  ‘Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor’; (i)  and  (ii)  ‘Other provisions as to Ministers’, insofar as the States are concerned. Similarly, Article 77 provides for the conduct of business of the Government of India and Article 166 provides for the conduct of business of the Government of a State. The duties of the Prime 136 Minister   are   dealt   with   in   Article   78   and   the   duties   of   Chief Ministers are dealt with in Article 167. 108.   Article 75(3) states that “ the Council of Ministers shall be .”  Similarly, collectively responsible to the House of the People Article 164(2) states “ the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State” . 109.   Generally, all executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President under Article   77(1).   However,   for   more   convenient   transaction   of   the business   of   the   Government   of   India,   the   President   shall   make Rules.   These   Rules   shall   also   provide   for   the   allocation   of   the business   among   Ministers.   This   is   under   Article   77(3).   Similar provisions are found in sub­Articles (1) and (3) of Article 166. 110.  There are special duties assigned to the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers, under Articles 78 and 167 respectively.   While   dealing   with   the   scheme   of   Article   166(3),   the 111.   Constitution Bench of this Court pointed out in  A. Sanjeevi Naidu 137 107 vs .  State of Madras , that under our Constitution, the Governor is essentially a constitutional head and the administration of the State is run by the Council of Ministers.  Since it is impossible for the Council of Ministers to deal with each and every matter that comes before the Government, the Governor is authorized under Article 166(3) to make Rules for the more convenient transaction of the business   of   the   Government  of   the   State   and   for   allocation amongst   its   Ministers   the   business   of   the   Government.   In paragraph  10 of  the said decision, the Constitution Bench spoke   about   “joint   responsibility”   and   not   about   collective responsibility .   The   relevant   portion   of   paragraph   10   reads   as follows:

107  (1970) 1 SCC 443 138

112. The expression “ collective responsibility”  can be traced to some extent, to Article 75(3) insofar as the Union is concerned and to Article 164(2) insofar as the States are concerned. But in both the Articles,   it   is   the   Council   of   Ministers   who   are   stated   to   be collectively   responsible   to   the   House   of   the   People/Legislative Assembly of the State.  Generally collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers either to the House of the People or to the Assembly should be understood to correlate to the decisions and   actions   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   and   not   to   every statement made by every individual Minister. 108 113. In   vs . ,  a   Seven State   of   Karnataka     Union   of   India. Member   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court,   while   dealing   with   a challenge made by the State of Karnataka in the form of a civil suit under Article 131, to the appointment by the Central Government, of a commission of enquiry against the Chief Minister of Karnataka, had an occasion to consider the exposition of the words “c ollective 108  (1977) 4 SCC 608 139 responsibility ”   appearing   in   Article   164(2).   After   indicating   that collective   responsibility   is   basically   political   in   origin   and , Beg, C.J. opined in the said case as follows: mode of operation

140

114. Quoting from Wade and Phillips on Constitutional Law, this Court   pointed   out   in   the   (supra)  that State   of   Karnataka   “ responsibility to Parliament only means that the Minster may ” be compelled by convention to resign. 115. The extent to which the enforcement of collective responsibility can be taken was also indicated in the above decision as follows:

141

116.   In other words, this Court indicated that while a Minister may be   compelled   to   resign   for   his   individual   acts   of   omission   or commission, the  only sanction for the enforcement of collective “ ”. responsibility is the  pressure of public opinion 109 117.   In  R.K. Jain  vs.  Union of India , this Court was concerned with a public interest litigation relating to the functioning of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. At that time the office of the President of the Tribunal was lying vacant for over six months. But after  rule nisi  was issued in the first writ petition, the   Government   appointed   someone   as   the   President   of   the Tribunal. Immediately, a second writ petition was filed challenging the appointment and also some of the recruitment rules relating to 109 (1993) 4 SCC 119 142 the appointment.The file relating to the appointment was produced in a sealed cover and the Government claimed privilege in terms of Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Article 74(2) of the Constitution.  While   dealing   with  the  executive   power   of  the President and the role of the Council of Ministers, K.Ramasamy, J., said “ The principle of ministerial responsibility has a variety of   meanings   precise   and   imprecise,   authentic   and   vague ”. Paragraphs 29 and 30  of the report  in   R.K. Jain   (supra)  may be usefully extracted as follows:

143

118.     In   paragraph   33   of   the   report   in   R.K.   Jain ,   this   Court indicated that the Cabinet as a whole is collectively responsible for the advice tendered to the President and for the conduct of business of each of his/her department. The question as to what happens when   an   individual   Minister   is   in   total   disagreement   with   the collective decision of the Cabinet was also spelt out in   in R.K. Jain the following words:

144

119.     In   Secretary,   Jaipur   Development   Authority,   Jaipur (supra),   the   abuse   of   official   position   by   the   Minister   of   Urban Development and Housing Department and the officers working in the Jaipur   Development  Authority   in the  matter  of   allotment of plots became the subject matter. While dealing with the question of individual   and   collective   accountability   and   responsibility   of Ministers, this Court said in paragraph 10 as follows: “ 10.   ...The Governor runs the Executive Government of a State with the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and   the   Council   of   Ministers   which   exercise   the powers   and   performs   its   duties   by   the   individual Ministers as public officers with the assistance of the bureaucracy   working   in   various   departments   and corporate sectors etc. Though they are expressed in the name of the Governor, each Minister is personally and collectively responsible for the actions, acts and policies. They are accountable and answerable to the people. Their powers and duties are regulated by the law and the rules. The legal and moral responsibility 145 or   liability   for   the   acts   done   or   omissions,   duties performed   and   policy   laid   down   rest   solely   on   the Minister   of   the   Department.   Therefore,   they   are indictable for their conduct or omission, or misconduct or misappropriation.   The Council of Ministers are jointly   and   severally   responsible   to   the Legislature.   He/they   is/are   also   publicly accountable   for   the   acts   or   conducts   in   the ” performance of duties. 120.   Again, in paragraph 11, this Court outlined the responsibility of the Ministers as follows: