Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
JETHAMAL PITHAJI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE ASSISTANT COLLECTOR 0F CUSTOMS BOMBAY AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/09/1973
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
CITATION:
1974 AIR 699 1974 SCR (1) 645
1974 SCC (3) 393
ACT:
Sea Customs Act (8 of 1878), s. 167(81)-Statement to customs
officer containing inculpatory and exculpatory statements-If
inculpatory portion can be relied on for conviction.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, a goldsmith, was convicted under s. 167(81)
of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, in that he was in possession
of gold bars with foreign markings. The evidence against
him consisted of his statement recorded by the customs
officer and the evidence of the sub-inspector of police who
seized the gold bars from him. In his statement to the
customs officer the appellant stated that he was duped by
another who left the bag with him and that it was only when
he took the bag to his room that he discovered that it
contained bars of gold, and that the bag was found in his
room.
The Magistrate framed the charge against the accused after
examining the customs officer and the sub-inspector. The
sub-inspector was also crossexamined after the charge was
framed; but when he was called for further customs officer
and the sub-inspector. The sub-inspector was also crossgold
bars were found in the room but that the accused was not
present when they were seized.
The trial court found that the statement of the police
officer made in further cross examination after framing the
charge was untrue and relying on the evidence given by him
earlier convicted the appellant. The High Court, in
maintaining the conviction, also relied upon the statement
of the appellant to the customs officer.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court.
HELD : ( 1 ) If the Court finds the exculpatory part of the
statement of the accused to be inherently improbable, there
is no reason why the other part of the statement which
implicates the accused and which the court sees no reason to
disbelieve should not be accepted. In the present case the
inculpatory part of statement of the accused to the customs
officer is distinct and severable from the exculpatory part.
It is very difficult to believe the version of the accused
that he was duped and the remaining part of the statement
clearly implicates him. [1647H; 648G-H; 649A-B]
Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1033,
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followed.
(2)As regards the evidence of the sub-inspector there is
no cogent reason for disbelieving his earlier version. He
changed his version to spite the prosecution because, after
his earlier version and before he was called for further
cross-examination, he was compulsorily retired as a measure
of punishment. [647 D-E]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 48 of
1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
16th January, 1970 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 694 of 1968.
S. V. Gupte and R. B. Dattar, for the appellant.
Gobind Das and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No.1.
646
B. N. Lokur and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHANNA, J.-This appeal by special leave is against the
judgment of the Bombay High Court affirming on appeal the
conviction of the appellant under section 167(81) of the Sea
Customs Act and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for
two years.
The prosecution case is that on August 17, 1961 Sub
Inspector Sahani of the Railway Preventive Section, on
receipt of some information, went to room No. 2 on the
second floor of Bori Chawl in the 13th lane, Kamathipura,
Bombay. The accused was found present there, holding a bag.
The said bag was taken into possession by the Sub Inspector
add was found to contain 25 bars of gold, weighing ten tolas
each, of the value of Rs. 78,400/. The bars had foreign
markings. The Sub Inspector arrested the accused for an
offence under section 124 of the Bombay Police Act. As the
articles recovered from. the accused consisted of gold bars
with foreign markings, the matter was entrusted to the
Customs Officer H. C. Advani (PW 2). The gold bars too were
handed over to Advani. Advani recorded statement Ex. A of
the accused. A complaint was thereafter filed against the
accused by the Assistant Collector of Customs on the
allegation that the accused had committed an offence under
section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act.
The accused in his statement under section 342 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure stated that the gold bars in question
had not been recovered from him. According to him, the bag
containing gold bars was recovered by the police officer
from the second floor of the building whereas the accused
resided on the ground floor. The accused denied having
anything to do with the gold bars which were taken into
possession by Sub Inspector Sahani. No evidence was
produced in defence.
The Chief Presidency Magistrate before whom the accused was
sent up for trial accepted the prosecution allegations and
rejected the version of the accused. The judgment of the
trial court, as mentioned earlier, was confirmed on appeal-
by the High Court.
In appeal before us, Mr. Gupte on behalf of the accused
appellant has argued that the conviction of the accused is
based upon the sole testimony of Sub Inspector Sahani. ’It
is pointed out that Sahani made contradictory statements
during the course of the trial and as such, his evidence
cannot provide a solid foundation for basing the conviction
of the accused. In this respect we find that the statements
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of Sahani and Advani were recorded by Mr. Nasrullah, Chief
Presidency Magistrate on February 6, 1964. Charge under
section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act was thereafter framed
against the accused. There was further cross-examination of
these two witnesses on February 12, 1964 after the framing
of the charge. On February 25, 1964 the trial court stayed
further proceedings in the case to await the decision of a
case pending in this Court, wherein it was stated a question
of law having bearing upon the present case was involved.
The proceedings in the case were revived on November 10,
1967
647
after this Court gave its decision in the other case. In
the meanwhile, Mr. Nasrullah, Chief Magistrate had retired
and had been succeeded by Mr. Gehani. It was then noticed
that the charge framed against the accused by Mr. Nasrullah
had not been signed by him. Fresh charge in identical terms
was thereafter framed by Mr. Gehani against the accused and
was signed by him. Saham was thereafter recalled for
further cross-examination by the accused. Sahani PW had in
the meantime been compulsorily made to retire from police
department as a punishment. Sahani in his further cross-
examination made a volte-face and stated that the bag
containing the gold bars was found lying in room No. 2 on
that building, while the accused was not present there.
Sahani further stated that he had made the accused hold the
ba in his hand at the time the panchas were called by him.
The trial court found that the statement of Sahani made in
further cross-examination after the framing of the charge by
Mr. Gehani was untrue and that the evidence given by him be-
fore Mr. Nasrullah was worthy of credence. The High Court
agreed with the trial court in this respect, and after
hearing Mr. Gupte, we are not inclined to take a different
view. Sahani was confronted with his earlier statement
recorded by himself and the aforesaid statement showed that
the version given by him after the framing of charge, by
Mr., Gehani was absolutely inconsistent with the earlier
statement recorded by Sahani himself. It appears that
Sahani wanted to spite the prosecution because of his
compulsory retirement as a measure of punishment. The
statement made by Sahani before Mr. Nasrullah was in accord
with the panchnama prepared by him and we see no cogent
ground to disbelieve the statement of Sahani before W. Nas-
rullah.
The High Court in maintaining the conviction of the accused
has also relied upon his statement Ex. A. which was
recorded by Customs Officer Advani (PW 2). According to
statement Ex. A, the amused is a goldsmith and has his own
shop. On the day of occurrence at about 2.30 p.m., it is
stated, one Hafizji came to the shop of the accused and told
him to keep the bag in question for about an hour whereafter
Hafizji, undertook to take the bag back. After the de-
parture of Hafizji the accused felt that the bag was heavy.
This fact aroused the suspicion of the accused and he, took
the bag upstairs to the room which had been taken by the
accused on rent. The bag was then found to contain 56 gold
bars of ten tolas each with foreign markings. The accused
added that earlier than that Hafizji had never kept any bag
or gold at his shop.
The trial court and the High Court did not accept that part
of statement Ex. A wherein the accused had stated about
Hafizji having left, the bag containing gold bars with the
accused. We see no cogent ground to take a different view.
If any one had left a bag containing gold bars at the shop
of the accused, it is, in our opinion, very difficult to
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believe that the accused, who is a goldsmith, would not even
touch the bag at the time it was left with him. Ile heavy
weight of the bag in that event would have aroused his
suspicion. The trial court and the High Court, in our view,
rightly rejected the version of the accused that he had been
duped by one Hafizii and
648
that he (the accused) did not know of the contents of the
bag at the time it was left with him. The remaining part of
the statement Ex. A that the bag containing gold bars was
taken by the accused to the room which had been taken on
rent by him and that the bag was found in his aforesaid room
clearly implicates the accused.
It has been. argued by Mr. Gupte that statement Ex. A
should be taken as a whole and in case the court comes to
the conclusion that part of the statement is not worthy of
credence, the court should reject the, whole of the
statement. It is not permissible according to the learned
counsel, to reject the exculpatory statement and act upon
the part of the statement which implicates the accused. In
this respect we find that the question whether it is open to
the court to accept the inculpatory part of the statement
even though the court rejects the exculpatory part was
considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar(1) This Court in
that case quoted with approval the following observations
from page 502 of Taylor’s Law of Evidence 11th Edition :
"In the proof of confessions-as in the case of
admissions in civil causes-the whole of what
the prisoner said on the subject at the time
of making the confession should be taken
together ...
But if, after the entire statement of the
prisoner has been given in evidence, the
prosecutor can contradict any part of it, he
is at liberty to do so; and then the whole
testimony is left to the jury for their
consideration, precisely as in other cases
where one part of the evidence is contradic-
tory to another. Even without such
contradictions it is not to be, supposed that
all the. parts of a confession are, entitled
to equal credit. The jury may believe that
part which charges the prisoner, and reject
that which is in his favour, if they see
sufficient grounds for so doing. If what he
said in his own favour is not contradicted by
evidence offered by the prosecutor, nor is
improbable in itself, it will be naturally
believed by the jury; but they are not bound
to give weight to it on that account, being at
liberty to judge of it, like other evidence-
by all the circumstances of the case."
It was held in that case by this Court that inculpatory part
of the statement could be accepted even though the
exculpatory part of the statement of the accused was
rejected. In the present case, we find that the inculpatory
part of statement Ex. A of the accused is distinct and
severable from the exculpatory- part. The present is not a
case wherein the two parts of the statement are inextricably
linked together and it is not possible to accept one part
without accepting the other part. In case, the court finds
the exculpatory part of the statement of the accused to be
inherently improbable, there is no reason why the other part
of the statement which implicates the accused and which the
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court sees no reason to disbelieve, should not be accepted.
In the circumstances, we find no infirmity in the
(1)[1969] 2. S. C. R. 1033.
649
judgment of the High Court in so far as it has accepted the
inculpatory part of statement Ex. A of the accused. There
is in our opinion, no cogent ground to disbelieve the
statement of the accused that the room from which the bag
containing gold bars had been recovered had been taken by
him on rent. This part of the statement clearly goes to
show that the accused was in possession of the gold bars
with foreign markings.
A faint hearted submission was also made at the end to the
effect that statement Ex. A of the accused was hit by
article 20 of the Constitution. There is, in our opinion,
no force in this submission because there is nothing to show
that the accused made that statement as a result of any
compulsion.
We would, therefore, uphold the conviction of the accused.
We see no cogent ground to interfere with his sentence. The
appeal fails and is dismissed.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed
650