SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION vs. UNION OF INDIA

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 13 OF 2015

J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

Page 1 2 1. In this Court one gets used to writing common orders, for orders are written either on behalf of the Bench, or on behalf of the Court. Mostly, dissents are written in the first person. Even though, this is not

adjudicating upon the prayer for my recusal, from hearing the matters in hand, reasons for my continuation on the Bench, also need to be expressed by me. Not for advocating any principle of law, but for laying down certain principles of conduct. 2. This order is in the nature of a prelude – a precursor, to the determination of the main controversy. It has been necessitated, for deciding an objection, about the present composition of the Bench. As already noted above, J. Chelameswar, J. has rendered the decision on the objection. The events which followed the order of J. Chelameswar, J., are also of some significance. In my considered view, they too need to be JUDGMENT narrated, for only then, the entire matter can be considered to have been fully expressed, as it ought to be. I also need to record reasons, why my continuation on the reconstituted Bench, was the only course open to me. And therefore, my side of its understanding, dealing with the perception, of the other side of the Bench. 3(i) A three-Judge Bench was originally constituted for hearing these matters. The Bench comprised of Anil R. Dave, J. Chelameswar and Madan B. Lokur, JJ.. At that juncture, Anil R. Dave, J. was a part of the 1+2 collegium, as also, the 1+4 collegium. The above combination heard Page 2 3 the matter, on its first listing on 11.3.2015. Notice returnable for 17.3.2015 was issued on the first date of hearing. Simultaneously, hearing in Y. Krishnan v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition (MD)

raised in the bunch of cases in hand, was stayed till further orders. (ii) On the following date, i.e., 17.3.2015 Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.13 of 2015), Mr. Anil B. Divan, Senior Advocate, in Bar Association of India v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.108 of 2015), Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate, in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.83 of 2015) and Mr. Santosh Paul, Advocate, in Change India v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.70 of 2015), representing the petitioners were heard. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Attorney General for India, advanced submissions in JUDGMENT response. The matter was shown as part-heard, and posted for further hearing on 18.3.2015. (iii) The proceedings recorded by this Court on 18.3.2015 reveal, that Mr. Santosh Paul, (in Writ Petition (C) No.70 of 2015) was heard again on 18.3.2015, whereupon, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Solicitor General of India, also made their submissions. Thereafter, Mr. Dushyant A. Dave, Senior Advocate – and the President of Supreme Court Bar Association, addressed the Bench, as an intervener. Page 3 4 Whereafter, the Court rose for the day. On 18.3.2015, the matter was adjourned for hearing to the following day, i.e., for 19.3.2015. (iv) The order passed on 19.3.2015 reveals, that submissions were

Nedumpara. When Mr. Fali S. Nariman was still addressing the Bench, the Court rose for the day, by recording inter alia, “The matters remained Part-heard.” Further hearing in the cases, was deferred to 24.3.2015. (v) On 24.3.2015, Mr. Fali S. Nariman and Mr. Anil B. Divan, were again heard. Additionally, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi concluded his submissions. On the conclusion of hearing, judgment was reserved. On 24.3.2015, a separate order was also passed in Writ Petition (C) No.124 of 2015 (Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, through Secretary General and others). It read as under: “The application filed by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara to argue in person before the Court is rejected. The name of Mr. Robin Mazumdar, AOR, who was earlier appearing for him, be shown in the Cause List.” JUDGMENT (vi) On 7.4.2015, the following order came to be passed by the three-Judge Bench presided by Anil R. Dave, J.: “1. In this group of petitions, validity of the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’) has been challenged. The challenge is on the ground that by virtue of the aforestated amendment and enactment of the Act, basic structure of the Constitution of India has been altered and therefore, they should be set aside. 2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and the parties appearing in-person at length. 3. It has been mainly submitted for the petitioners that all these petitions should be referred to a Bench of Five Judges as per the provisions of Page 4 5

in any collegium proceedings. JUDGMENT 5. Based on the order passed by the three-Judge Bench on 7.4.2015, Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, constituted a five-Judge Bench, comprising of Anil R. Dave, Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ. 6. On 13.4.2015 the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014, were notified in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary). Both the above enactments, were brought into force with effect from 13.4.2015. Accordingly, on 13.4.2015 Anil R. Dave, J. became an ex officio Member Page 5 6 of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, on account of being the second senior most Judge after the Chief Justice of India, under the mandate of Article 124A (1)(b).

“List the matters before a Bench of which one of us (Anil R. Dave, J.) is not a member.” It is, therefore, that Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, reconstituted the Bench with myself, J. Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ., to hear this group of cases. 8. When the reconstituted Bench commenced hearing on 21.4.2015, Mr. Fali S. Nariman made a prayer for my recusal from the Bench, which was seconded by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara (petitioner-in-person in Writ Petition (C) No.124 of 2015), the latter advanced submissions, even though he had been barred from doing so, by an earlier order dated JUDGMENT 24.3.2015 (extracted above). For me, to preside over the Bench seemed to be imprudent, when some of the stakeholders desired otherwise. Strong views were however expressed by quite a few learned counsel, who opposed the prayer. It was submitted, that a prayer for recusal had earlier been made, with reference to Anil R. Dave, J. It was pointed out, that the above prayer had resulted in his having exercised the option to step aside (– on 15.4.2015). Some learned counsel went to the extent of asserting, that the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J. was not only unfair, but was also motivated. It was also suggested, that the Bench should be Page 6 7 reconstituted, by requesting Anil R. Dave, J. to preside over the Bench. The above sequence of facts reveals, that the recusal by Anil R. Dave, J. was not at his own, but in deference to a similar prayer made to him.

was increased, wherein, he was still the presiding Judge. 9(i) Mr. Fali S. Nariman strongly refuted the impression sought to be created, that he had ever required Anil R. Dave, J. to recuse. In order to support his assertion, he pointed out, that he had made the following request in writing on 15.4.2015: “The provisions of the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 have been brought into force from April 13, 2015. As a consequence, the Presiding Judge on this Bench, the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil R. Dave, has now become (not out of choice but by force of Statute) a member ex officio of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, whose constitutional validity has been challenged. It is respectfully submitted that it would be appropriate if it is declared at the outset – by an order of this Hon’ble Court – that the Presiding Judge on this Bench will take no part whatever in the proceedings of the National Judicial Appointments Commission.” JUDGMENT Learned senior counsel pointed out, that he had merely requested the then presiding Judge (Anil R. Dave, J.) not to take any part in the proceedings of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, during the hearing of these matters. He asserted, that he had never asked Anil R. Dave, J. not to hear the matters pending before the Bench. (ii) The submission made in writing by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara for the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J. was in the following words: Page 7 8

JUDGMENT Page 8 9

JUDGMENT 10. When my recusal from the reconstituted Bench was sought on 21.4.2015, I had expressed unequivocally, that I had no desire to hear the matters. Yet, keeping in view the reasons expressed in writing by Mr. Fali S. Nariman, with reference to Anil R. Dave, J. I had disclosed in open Page 9 10 Court, that I had already sent a communication to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, that I would not participate in the proceedings of the 1+4 collegium (of which I was, a member), till the disposal of these matters.

the day the hearing in these matters commenced. Surprisingly, on that account, his recusal was never sought, and he had continued to hear the matters, when he was so placed (from 11.3.2015 to 7.4.2015). But for my being a member of the 1+4 collegium, a prayer had been made for my recusal. 11. It was, and still is, my personal view, which I do not wish to thrust either on Mr. Fali S. Nariman, or on Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara, that Anil R. Dave, J. was amongst the most suited, to preside over the reconstituted Bench. As noticed above, he was a part of the 1+2 collegium, as also, the 1+4 collegium, under the ‘collegium system’; he JUDGMENT would continue to discharge the same responsibilities, as an ex officio Member of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, in the ‘Commission system’, under the constitutional amendment enforced with effect from 13.4.2015. Therefore, irrespective of the system which would survive the adjudicatory process, Anil R. Dave, J. would participate in the selection, appointment and transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary. He would, therefore, not be affected by the determination of the present controversy, one way or the other. Page 10 11 12. The prayer for my recusal from the Bench was pressed by Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, in writing, as under:

JUDGMENT The above prayer for my recusal was supported by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara, petitioner-in-person, in writing, as under: “…..Hon’ble Shri Justice J.S. Khehar, the presiding Judge, a Judge whom the Petitioner holds in high esteem and respect, a Judge known for his uprightness, impartiality and erudition, the Petitioner is afraid to say, ought not to preside over the Constitution Bench deciding the constitutional validity or otherwise of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 (“the said Acts”, for short). His Lordship will be a member of the collegium if this Hon’ble Court were to hold that the said Page 11 12

JUDGMENT 13. As a Judge presiding over the reconstituted Bench, I found myself in an awkward predicament. I had no personal desire to participate in the hearing of these matters. I was a part of the Bench, because of my nomination to it, by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. My recusal from the Bench at the asking of Mr. Fali S. Nariman, whom I hold in great Page 12 13 esteem, did not need a second thought. It is not as if the prayer made by Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara, was inconsequential. 14. But then, this was the second occasion when proceedings in a

Bench, and thereafter, had substituted him by nominating me to the Bench. It was therefore felt, that reasons ought to be recorded, after hearing learned counsel, at least for the guidance of Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, so that His Lordship may not make another nomination to the Bench, which may be similarly objected to. This, coupled with the submissions advanced by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Harish N. Salve and Mr. K.K. Venugopal, that parameters should be laid down, led to a hearing, on the issue of recusal. 15. On the basis of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel, the Bench examined the prayer, whether I should remain on the JUDGMENT reconstituted Bench, despite my being a member of the 1+4 collegium. The Bench, unanimously concluded, that there was no conflict of interest, and no other justifiable reason in law, for me to recuse from the hearing of these matters. On 22.4.2015, the Bench passed the following short order, which was pronounced by J. Chelameswar, J.: “A preliminary objection, whether Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar should preside over this Bench, by virtue of his being the fourth senior most Judge of this Court, also happens to be a member of the collegium, was raised by the petitioners. Elaborate submissions were made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondents. After hearing all the learned counsel, we are of the unanimous opinion that we do not see Page 13 14 any reason in law requiring Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar to recuse himself from hearing the matter. Reasons will follow.” 16. After the order was pronounced, I disclosed to my colleagues on the Bench, that I was still undecided whether I should remain on the Bench,

would have nothing of it. They were unequivocal in their protestation. 17. Despite the factual position noticed above, I wish to record, that it is not their persuasion or exhortation, which made me take a final call on the matter. The decision to remain a member of the reconstituted Bench was mine, and mine alone. The choice that I made, was not of the heart, but that of the head. The choice was made by posing two questions to myself. Firstly, whether a Judge hearing a matter should recuse, even though the prayer for recusal is found to be unjustified and unwarranted? Secondly, whether I would stand true to the oath of my JUDGMENT office, if I recused from hearing the matters? 18. The reason that was pointed out against me, for seeking my recusal was, that I was a part of the 1+4 collegium. But that, should have been a disqualification for Anil R. Dave, J. as well. When he commenced hearing of the matters, and till 7.4.2015, he suffered the same alleged disqualification. Yet, the objection raised against me, was not raised against him. When confronted, Mr. Fali S. Nariman vociferously contested, that he had not sought the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J.. He supported his assertion with proof. One wonders, why did he not seek Page 14 15 the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J.? There is no doubt about the fact, that I have been a member of the 1+4 collegium, and it is likely that I would also shortly become a Member of the NJAC, if the present challenge

That however is the position with reference to four of us (on the instant five-Judge Bench). Besides me, my colleagues on the Bench – J. Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur and Kurian Joseph, JJ. would in due course be a part of the collegium (if the writ-petitioners before this Court were to succeed), or alternatively, would be a part of the NJAC (if the writ-petitioners were to fail). In such eventuality, the averment of conflict of interest, ought to have been raised not only against me, but also against my three colleagues. But, that was not the manner in which the issue has been canvassed. In my considered view, the prayer for my recusal is not well founded. If I were to accede to the prayer for my JUDGMENT recusal, I would be initiating a wrong practice, and laying down a wrong precedent. A Judge may recuse at his own, from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice. That would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never to be acceded to. For that would give the impression, of the Judge had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the objection. A Judge before he assumes his office, takes an oath to discharge his duties without fear or favour. He would breach his oath of office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless justified. It is my duty to discharge my responsibility with Page 15 16 absolute earnestness and sincerity. It is my duty to abide by my oath of office, to uphold the Constitution and the laws. My decision to continue to be a part of the Bench, flows from the oath which I took, at the time of my elevation to this Court. …………………………….J. (Jagdish Singh Khehar) New Delhi; October 16, 2015. JUDGMENT Page 16 17 THE REFERENCE ORDER I. THE CHALLENGE : 1. The question which has arisen for consideration, in the present set

Constitution (99th Amendment) Act), as also, that of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as, the NJAC Act). 2. During the course of hearing on the merits of the controversy, which pertains to the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary (i.e., Chief Justices and Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court), and the transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of one High Court to another, it emerged that learned counsel for the respondents, were inter alia relying on the judgment rendered in S.P. 1 Gupta v. Union of India , (hereinafter referred to as, the First Judges JUDGMENT case); whereas, the learned counsel for the petitioners were inter alia relying on the judgment in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record 2 Association v. Union of India (hereinafter referred to as, the Second 1 1981 (Supp) SCC 87 2 (1993) 4 SCC 441 Page 17 18 3 Judges case), and the judgment in Re: Special Reference No.1 of 1998 , (hereinafter referred to as, the Third Judges case). 3. Per se, the stance adopted by learned counsel for the respondents

the First Judges case, had been overruled by a larger Bench, in the Second Judges case. And furthermore, the exposition of law declared in the Second Judges case, was reaffirmed by the Third Judges case. 4. Visualizing, that the position adopted by the respondents, was not legally permissible, the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and other learned counsel representing the respondents, adopted the only course open to them, namely, to seek reconsideration of the decisions rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases. For the above objective it was asserted, that various vital aspects of the matter, had not been brought to the notice of this Court, when the controversy raised in JUDGMENT the Second Judges case was canvassed. It was contended that, had the controversy raised in the Second Judges case, been examined in the right perspective, this Court would not have recorded the conclusions expressed therein, by the majority. It was submitted, that till the respondents were not permitted to air their submissions, with reference to the unacceptability of the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases, it would not be in the fitness of matters, for this Court to 3 (1998) 7 SCC 739 Page 18 19 dispose of the present controversy, by placing reliance on the said judgments. 5. Keeping in mind the importance and the sensitivity of the

the judgments rendered by this Court, in the Second and Third Judges cases, we permitted them, to detail the basis of their assertions. 6. Before embarking on the issue, namely, whether the judgments rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, needed to be revisited, we propose first of all, to determine whether or not it would be justified for us, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, keeping in view the technical parameters laid down by this Court, to undertake the task. In case, we conclude negatively, and hold that the prayer seeking a review of the two judgments was not justified, that would render a quietus to the matter. However, even if the proposition JUDGMENT canvassed at the behest of the respondents is not accepted, we would still examine the submissions canvassed at their behest, as in a matter of such extreme importance and sensitivity, it may not be proper to reject a prayer for review, on a mere technicality. We shall then endeavour to determine, whether the submissions canvassed at the hands of the respondents, demonstrate clear and compelling reasons, for a review of the conclusions recorded in the Second and Third Judges cases. We shall also venture to examine, whether the respondents have been able to prima facie show, that the earlier judgments could be seen as manifestly Page 19 20 incorrect. For such preliminary adjudication, we are satisfied, that the present bench-strength satisfies the postulated requirement, expressed in the proviso under Article 145(3).

re-look, we would then delve on the merits of the main controversy, without permitting the petitioners to place reliance on either of the aforesaid two judgments. 8. In case, we do not accept the submissions advanced at the hands of the petitioners on merits, with reference to the main controversy, that too in a sense would conclude the matter, as the earlier regime governed by the Second and Third Judges cases, would become a historical event, of the past, as the new scheme contemplated under the impugned Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, along with the NJAC Act, would replace the earlier dispensation. In the above eventuality, the question of JUDGMENT re-examination of the Second and Third Judges cases would be only academic, and therefore uncalled for. 9. However, if we accept the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, resulting in the revival of the earlier process, and simultaneously conclude in favour of the respondents, that the Second and Third Judges cases need a re-look, we would be obliged to refer this matter to a nine-Judge Bench (or even, to a larger Bench), for re-examining the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases. Page 20 21 II. THE BACKGROUND TO THE CHALLENGE: 10. Judges to the Supreme Court of India and High Courts of States, are appointed under Articles 124 and 217 respectively. Additional Judges

Court to another, is made under Article 222. For the controversy in hand, it is essential to extract the original Articles 124 and 217, hereunder: “124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court. (1) There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other Judges. (2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years: Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted: Provided further that— (a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office; (b) a Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4). (2A) The age of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law provide. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of India and— (a) has been for at least five years a Judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or (b) has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession; or (c) is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist. Explanation I. —In this clause "High Court” means a High Court which exercises, or which at any time before the commencement of this Constitution exercised, jurisdiction in any part of the territory of India. Explanation II. —In computing for the purpose of this clause the period during which a person has been an advocate, any period during which a JUDGMENT Page 21 22

“217. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court . — (1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the age of sixty-two years: Provided that— (a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office; (b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court; (c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by his being transferred by the President to any other High Court within the territory of India. (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and— (a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or (b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession; Explanation. — For the purposes of this clause — (a) in computing the period during which a person has held judicial office in the territory of India, there shall be included any period, after he has JUDGMENT Page 22 23

11. The true effect and intent of the provisions of the Constitution, and all other legislative enactments made by the Parliament, and the State legislatures, are understood in the manner they are interpreted and declared by the Supreme Court, under Article 141. The manner in which Articles 124 and 217 were interpreted by this Court, emerges principally JUDGMENT from three-Constitution Bench judgments of this Court, which are now under pointed consideration. The first judgment was rendered, by a seven-Judge Bench, by a majority of 4:3, in the First Judges case on 30.12.1981. The correctness of the First Judges case was doubted by a 4 three-Judge Bench in Subhash Sharma v. Union of India , which opined that the majority view, in the First Judges case, should be considered by a larger Bench. The Chief Justice of India constituted a nine-Judge Bench, to examine two questions. Firstly, whether the opinion of the 4 1991 Supp (1) SCC 574 Page 23 24 Chief Justice of India in regard to the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and to the High Courts, as well as, transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts, was entitled to primacy? And

Second Judges case, overruled the judgment in the First Judges case. The instant judgment was rendered on 6.10.1993. Consequent upon doubts having arisen with the Union of India, about the interpretation of the Second Judges case, the President of India, in exercise of his power under Article 143, referred nine questions to the Supreme Court, for its opinion. A nine-Judge Bench answered the reference unanimously, on 28.10.1998. 12. After the judgment of this Court in the Second Judges case was rendered in 1993, and the advisory opinion of this Court was tendered to the President of India in 1998, the term “consultation” in Articles 124(2) JUDGMENT and 217(1), relating to appointment (as well as, transfer) of Judges of the higher judiciary, commenced to be interpreted as vesting primacy in the matter, with the judiciary. This according to the respondents, had resulted in the term “consultation” being understood as “concurrence” (in matters governed by Articles 124, 217 and 222). The Union of India, then framed a Memorandum of Procedure on 30.6.1999, for the appointment of Judges and Chief Justices to the High Courts and the Supreme Court, in consonance with the above two judgments. And Page 24 25 appointments came to be made thereafter, in consonance with the Memorandum of Procedure. 13. As per the position expressed before us, a feeling came to be

which would replace the prevailing procedure, for appointment of Judges and Chief Justices of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India, contemplated under Articles 124(2) and 217(1). It was felt, that the proposed Commission should be broad based. In that, the Commission should comprise of members of the judiciary, the executive and eminent/important persons from public life. In the above manner, it was proposed to introduce transparency in the selection process. 14. To achieve the purported objective, Articles 124 and 217 were inter alia amended, and Articles 124A, 124B and 124C were inserted in the Constitution, through the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, by JUDGMENT following the procedure contemplated under Article 368(2), more particularly, the proviso thereunder. The amendment, received the assent of the President on 31.12.2014. It was however given effect to, with effect from 13.4.2015 (consequent upon its notification in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) Part II, Section 1). Simultaneously therewith, the Parliament enacted the NJAC Act, which also received the assent of the President on 31.12.2014. The same was also brought into force, with effect from 13.4.2015 (by its notification in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) Part II, Section 1). The above constitutional amendment Page 25 26 and the legislative enactment, are subject matter of challenge through a bunch of petitions, which are collectively being heard by us. In order to effectively understand the true purport of the challenge raised by the

were requested to “…(a) obtain from all additional Judges working in the JUDGMENT High Courts… their consent to be appointed as permanent Judges in any other High Court in the country…” The above noted letter required, that the concerned appointees “…be required to name three High Courts, in order of preference, to which they would prefer to be appointed as permanent Judges; and (b) obtain from persons who have already been or may in the future be proposed by you for initial appointment their consent to be appointed to any other High Court in the country along with a similar preference for three High Courts…”. The Union Law Minister, in the above letter clarified, that furnishing of their consent or Page 26 27 indication of their preference, would not imply any commitment, at the behest of the Government, to accommodate them in accordance with their preferences. In response, quite a few additional Judges, gave their

18.3.1981 was a direct attack on the “independence of the judiciary”, and an uninhibited assault on a vital/basic feature of the Constitution. A series of Advocates’ Associations in Bombay passed resolutions, condemning the letter dated 18.3.1981, as being subversive of “judicial independence”. They demanded the withdrawal of the letter. Since that was not done, a writ petition was filed by the above Associations in the Bombay High Court, challenging the letter dated 18.3.1981. An interim order was passed by the High Court, restraining the Union Law Minister and the Government from implementing the letter dated 18.3.1981. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the above interim order, came to JUDGMENT be dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court. The above interim order, was assailed before this Court. While the matter was pending before this Court, the Union Law Minister and the Government of India, filed a transfer petition under Article 139A. The transfer petition was allowed, and the writ petition filed in the Bombay High Court, was transferred to the Supreme Court. (ii) A second petition was filed by V.M. Tarkunde, in the High Court of Delhi. It raised a challenge to the constitutional validity of the letter dated 18.3.1981. One additional ground was raised with reference to the Page 27 28 three additional Judges of the Delhi High Court, namely, O.N. Vohra, S.N. Kumar and S.B. Wad, JJ., whose term was expiring on 6.3.1981. Rather than being appointed for a further term of two years, their

besides being subversive of the “independence of the judiciary”. This writ petition was also transferred for hearing to the Supreme Court. So far as the circular letter dated 18.3.1981 is concerned, the Supreme Court, on an oral prayer made by the petitioner, directed that any additional Judge who did not wish to respond to the circular letter may not do so, and that, he would neither be refused extension nor permanent appointment, on the ground that he had not sent a reply to the letter dated 18.3.1981. Thereafter, the appointment of S.B. Wad, J., was continued, as an additional Judge for a period of one year from 7.6.1981, but O.N. Vohra and S.N. Kumar, JJ., were not continued beyond 7.6.1981. JUDGMENT (iii & iv). A third writ petition, was filed by J.L. Kalra and others, who were practicing Advocates, in the Delhi High Court. And a fourth writ petition was filed by S.P. Gupta, a practicing Advocate, of the Allahabad High Court. The third and fourth writ petitions were for substantially the same reliefs, as the earlier two petitions. (v) A fifth writ petition, was filed by Lily Thomas. She challenged a transfer order dated 19.1.1981, whereby the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras was transferred as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala. The above order had been passed by the President, under Article Page 28 29 222(1), after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Likewise, the transfer of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna to the Madras High Court was challenged by asserting, that the power of transfer under

could only be made with the consent of the concerned Judge, and only in public interest, and after full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (vi & vii) A sixth writ petition was filed by A. Rajappa, principally challenging the order dated 19.1.1981, whereby some Chief Justices had been transferred. One additional submission was raised in this petition, namely, that the transfer of the Chief Justices had been made without the prior consultation of the Governors of the concerned States, and further, that the said transfers were not in public interest, and therefore, violated the procedural requirements contained in Article 217(1). The JUDGMENT seventh writ petition was filed by P. Subramanian, on the same grounds, as the petition filed by A. Rajappa. (viii) An eighth writ petition was filed by D.N. Pandey and Thakur Ramapati Sinha, practicing Advocates, of the Patna High Court. In this petition, Justice K.B.N. Singh, the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court was impleaded as respondent no.3. On a prayer made by respondent no.3, he was transposed as petitioner no.3. As petitioner no.3, Justice K.B.N. Singh filed a detailed affidavit asserting, that his transfer had been made as a matter of punishment, and further, that it had been Page 29 30 made on irrelevant and on insufficient grounds, and not in public interest. And further that, it was not preceded by a full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

appointment of Judges, and the extension of the term of appointment of additional Judges, on the expiry of their original term. And secondly, the transfer of Judges and Chief Justices from one High Court to another. 16. The opinions recorded in the First Judges case, insofar as they are relevant to the present controversy, are being summarized herein: P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was): (i) On the subject of independence of the judiciary, it was opined, that “…The concept of independence of judiciary is a noble concept which inspires the constitutional scheme and constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity. If there is one principle JUDGMENT which runs through the entire fabric of the entire Constitution, it is the principle of the rule of law and under the Constitution, it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the task of keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective…The judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive, and therefore, it is absolutely essential that the judiciary must be free from executive pressure or influence and this has been secured by the Constitution makers by making elaborate provisions Page 30 31

the judiciary” was not limited only to the independence from executive pressure or influence, but it was a much wider concept, which took

power, it was held, was exercisable only “…after consultation with the JUDGMENT Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, the Chief Justice of the High Court…” It was concluded, that it was clear on a plain reading of the above two Articles, that the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and such other Judges of the High Court and of the Supreme Court (as the Central Government may deem necessary to consult), were constitutional functionaries, having a consultative role, and the power of appointments rested solely and exclusively in the decision of the Central Government. It was pointed out, that the above power was not an unfettered power, in the sense, that the Central Page 31 32 Government could not act arbitrarily, without consulting the

Government was to act, only after consulting the constitutional

the material he has and the course he proposes. The Chief Justice, in JUDGMENT turn, must collect necessary information through responsible channels or directly, acquaint himself with the requisite data, deliberate on the information he possesses and proceed in the interests of the administration of justice to give the President such counsel of action as he thinks will further the public interest, especially the cause of the

5 the Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case would apply with equal force to determine the scope and meaning of the term “consultation” within the 5 (1977) 4 SCC 193 Page 32 33 meaning of Articles 124(2) and 217(1). Each of the constitutional

have for his consideration, full and identical facts bearing upon

was for the Central Government to decide, whose opinion should be JUDGMENT accepted. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, that in the consultative process, primacy should be that of the Chief Justice of India,

judicial fraternity, was rejected for the reason, that each of the constitutional functionaries was entitled to equal weightage. With reference to appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, it was held, that the Chief Justice of India was required to be consulted, but the Central Government was not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, even though, his opinion was entitled to Page 33 34

30).

Chief Justice of India alone, with reference to the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, was not a very satisfactory mode of appointment, because wisdom and experience demanded, that no power should rest in

honest and well-meaning. It was suggested, that it would be more appropriate if a collegium would make the recommendations to the President, with regard to appointments to the higher judiciary, and the recommending authority should be more broad based. If the collegium was comprised of persons who had knowledge of persons, who may be fit Page 34 35 for appointment to the Bench, and possessed the qualities required for such appointment, it would go a long way towards securing the right kind of Judges, who would be truly independent (paragraph 31).

be obtained through the letter dated 18.3.1981, from additional Judges JUDGMENT or Judges prior to their permanent appointment, would have no meaning, so far as the Chief Justice of India was concerned, because irrespective of the fact, whether the additional Judge had given his consent or not, the Chief Justice of India would have to consider, whether it would be in public interest to allow the additional Judge to be appointed as a permanent Judge in another High Court (paragraph 54).

S.N. Kumar, J., (who was discontinued by the Central Government, while he was holding the position of additional Judge), it was concluded, that it Page 35 36 would be proper if the Union of India could find a way, to place the letter dated 7.5.1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court to the Law Minister, before the Chief Justice of India, and elicit his opinion with reference to that letter. And thereupon consider, whether S.N. Kumar, J., should be reappointed as additional Judge.

felt, that Judges had to be protected against interference, direct or JUDGMENT indirect. It was concluded, that the constitutional provisions should not be construed in a manner, that would tend to undermine the concept of “independence of the judiciary” (paragraph 119).

additional Judge of a High Court, it was permissible to drop him by not giving him another term, though the volume of work, pending in the High Court, required the services of another Judge? It was opined, that the tenure of an additional Judge, was only dependent on the arrears of work, or the temporary increase in the business of a High Court. And Page 36 37 since an additional Judge was not on probation, his performance could not be considered to determine, whether he was fit for appointment as a permanent Judge. Therefore, it was concluded, that if the volume of

Court, in connection with S.N. Kumar, J., it was opined, that when allegations were levelled against a Judge with respect to the discharge of his duties, the only reasonable course open, which would not undermine the “independence of the judiciary” was, to proceed with an inquiry into the allegations and remove the Judge, if the allegations were found to be true (in accordance with the procedure laid down under Article 124(4) and (5) read with Article 218). It was felt that, dropping an additional Judge, at the end of his initial term of office, on the ground that there were allegations against him, without properly ascertaining the truth of Page 37 38 the allegations, was destructive of the “independence of the judiciary” (paragraph 123).

Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India, the view expressed JUDGMENT was, that the President should accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, unless such opinion suffered from any obvious infirmity. And that, the President could not act as an umpire, and choose between the two opinions (paragraph 134).

5 case , wherein it was concluded, that mass transfers were not contemplated under Article 222(1), it was opined, that the President could transfer a Judge from one High Court to another, only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. And that, the Chief Justice Page 38 39 of India must consider in each case, whether the proposed transfer was in public interest (paragraph 138). (vii). With reference to the transfer of K.B.N. Singh, CJ., from the Patna

concluded, that a transfer made after complying with Article 222, would JUDGMENT not mar or erode the “independence of the judiciary” (paragraph 345).

outside the State, and for having 1/3rd Judges in every High Court from outside the State, it was expressed, that Article 222 conferred an express power with the President, to transfer a Judge (which includes, Chief Justice) from one State to another. In determining as to how this power had to be exercised, it was felt, that the President undoubtedly possessed an implied power to lay down the norms, the principles, the conditions and the circumstances, under which the said power was to be exercised. Page 39 40 A declaration by the President regarding the nature and terms of the policy (which virtually meant a declaration by the Council of Ministers) was quite sufficient, and absolutely legal and constitutional (paragraph

Kumar, J., as an additional Judge, after the expiry of his term of JUDGMENT appointment, was endorsed.

effective consultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India were drawn. That the consultation, must be full and effective, and must precede the actual transfer of the Judge. If consultation with the Chief Justice of India had not taken place, before transferring a Judge, it was held, that the transfer would be unconstitutional. All relevant data and necessary facts, must be provided to the Chief Justice of India, so Page 40 41 that, he could arrive at a proper conclusion. Only after the above process was fully complied with, the consultation would be considered full and effective. It was felt, that the Chief Justice of India owed a duty, both to

V.D. Tulzapurkar, J.: JUDGMENT (i). Insofar as the question of “independence of the judiciary” is concerned, it was asserted that all the Judges, who had expressed their opinions in the matter, had emphasized, that the framers of the Constitution had taken the utmost pains, to secure the “independence of the Judges” of the higher judiciary. To support the above contention, several provisions of the Constitution were referred to. It was also pointed out, that the Attorney General representing the Union of India, had not dispute the above proposition (paragraph 639). Page 41 42 (ii). With reference to additional Judges recruited under Article 224(1), from the fraternity of practicing Advocates, it was pointed out, that an undertaking was taken from them at the time of their initial

Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court would require them to furnish a further undertaking, that if they decline to accept such permanent judgeship (though offered), or if they resigned from the office of the additional judgeship, they would not practice before the Bombay High Court, or any court or tribunal subordinate to it. Based on the aforesaid undertakings, the contention advanced was, that a legitimate expectancy, and an enforceable right to continue in office, came to be conferred on the additional Judges recruited from the Bar. It was felt, that it was impossible to construe Article 224(1), as conferring upon the appointing authority, any absolute power or discretion in the matter of appointment JUDGMENT of additional Judges to a High Court (paragraphs 622 and 624). (iii) All submissions made on behalf of the respondents, that granting extension to an additional Judge, or making him a permanent Judge was akin to a fresh appointment, were rejected. It was concluded, that extension to an additional Judge, or making him permanent, did not require re-determination of his suitability under Article 217(1) (paragraph 628). (iv). While dealing with the question of continuation of an additional Judge, in situations where there were facts disclosing suspected Page 42 43 misbehaviour and/or reported lack of integrity, the view expressed was, that while considering the question of continuation of a sitting additional Judge, on the expiry of his initial term, the test of suitability

sanction, was provided for holding an inquiry, against the Judge concerned, with reference to any suspected misbehavior and/or lack of integrity (paragraph 628). (v) On the scope of consideration, for continuation as a sitting additional Judge (on the expiry of a Judge’s initial term), it was opined, that the consultative process should be confined only to see, whether the preconditions mentioned in Article 224(1) existed or not, or whether, pendency of work justified continuation or not. It was held, that the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Article 217(1), could not and should not, be resorted to (paragraph 629). JUDGMENT (vi). On the question of primacy of the Chief Justice of India, with reference to Article 217(1), the view expressed was, that the scheme envisaged therein, by implication and intent, clearly gave primacy to the advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India. It was however sought to be clarified, that giving primacy to the advice of the Chief Justice of India, in the matter of appointment of Judges of the High Court, should not be construed as a power to veto any proposal. And that, if the advice of the Chief Justice of India, had proceeded on extraneous or non germane considerations, the same would be subject to judicial review, just as the Page 43 44 President’s final decision, if he were to disregard the advice of the Chief Justice of India, but for justified and cogent reasons. Interpreting Article 217(1) in the above manner, it was felt, would go a long way in preserving

18.3.1981, it was asserted, that even a policy transfer, without fixing the JUDGMENT requisite mechanism or modality of procedure, would not ensure complete insulation against executive interference. Conversely it was felt, that a selective transfer in an appropriate case, for strictly objective reasons, and in public interest, could be non-punitive. It was therefore concluded, that each case of transfer, whether based on policy, or for individual reasons, would have to be judged on the facts and circumstances of its own, for deciding, whether it was punitive (paragraph 649). Page 44 45 (x) It was concluded, that by requiring a sitting additional Judge, to give his consent for being appointed to another High Court, virtually amounted to seeking his consent for his transfer from his own High

the above judgment (paragraph 652). And further, that the circular letter clearly exuded an odour of executive dominance and arrogance, intended to have coercive effects on the minds of sitting additional Judges, by implying a threat to them, that if they did not furnish their consent to be shifted elsewhere, they would neither be continued nor made permanent. The above letter, was held to be amounting to, executive interference with the “independence of the judiciary”, and thus illegal, unconstitutional and void. Any consent obtained thereunder, was also held to be void JUDGMENT (paragraph 654). (xi) It was also concluded that, the advice of the Chief Justice of India, would be robbed of its real efficacy, in the face of such pre-obtained consent, and it would have to be regarded as having been issued malafide and for a collateral purpose, namely, to bypass Article 222(1) and to confront the Chief Justice of India, with a fait accompli , and as such, the same was liable to be declared as illegal and unconstitutional (paragraph 655). Page 45 46 (xii) The above circular letter dated 18.3.1981, was also held to be violative of Article 14, since invidious discrimination was writ large on the face of the circular letter. For this additional reason, the letter of the

(xiii) On the subject of non-continuation of S.N. Kumar, J., it was held, that it was abundantly clear from the correspondence and notings, that further details and concrete facts and materials relating to his integrity, though specifically asked for by the Chief Justice of India, were not furnished, and the letter dated 7.5.1981, which contained such details and concrete facts and materials, were kept away from him, leading to the inference, that facts which were taken into consideration by the Union Law Minister and the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court (which provided the basis to the appointing authority, not to extend the appointment of S.N. Kumar, J.), were not placed before the Chief Justice JUDGMENT of India, and therefore, there was neither full nor effective consultation, between the President and the Chief Justice of India, as required by Article 217(1). It was accordingly concluded, that the decision against S.N. Kumar, J., stood vitiated by legal mala fides , and as such, was liable to be held void and non est, and his case had to be sent back to the President, for reconsideration and passing appropriate orders, after the requisite consultation was undertaken afresh (paragraphs 664 and 666 to 668). Page 46 47 (xiv) With respect to the validity of the transfer of K.B.N. Singh, CJ., it was felt, that in the absence of any connivance or complicity, since no unfair play was involved in the procedure followed by the Chief Justice of

transfer was accordingly held to be valid (paragraph 680). D.A. Desai, J.: (i) After noticing, that the President under Article 74, acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and that, while acting under Article 217(3), the President performs functions of grave importance. It was felt, that it could not be said that while exercising the power of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, the President was performing either judicial or quasi judicial functions. The function of appointment of Judges was declared as an executive function, and as such, it was held, that Article 74 would come into operation. And therefore concluded, that JUDGMENT the President would have to act, on the advice of the Council of Ministers, in the matter of appointment of Judges under Article 217 (paragraph 715). And therefore it came to be held, that the ultimate power of appointment under Article 217, “unquestionably” rested with the President. (ii) It was pointed out, that before exercising the power of appointment of a Judge (other than the Chief Justice of a High Court), the President was under a constitutional obligation, to consult the three constitutional functionaries, mentioned in Article 217 (paragraphs 718 and 719). And Page 47 48 that the aforementioned three constitutional functionaries were at par with one another. They were coordinate authorities, without any relative hierarchy, and as such, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India could

(iii) It was also concluded, that on the expiry of the original term of appointment of an additional Judge under Article 224, the continuation of the concerned Judge, would envisage the re-adoption of the procedure contained in Article 217 (paragraphs 736 and 745). (iv) It was felt, that there was no gainsaying, that a practice which had been followed for over 25 years, namely, that an additional Judge was always considered for a fresh tenure, if there was no permanent vacancy, and if there was such a vacancy, he was considered for appointment as a permanent Judge. It was held, that the contention of the Attorney General, that such additional Judge had no priority, preference, JUDGMENT weightage or right to be considered, and that, he was on par with any other person, who could be brought from the market, would amount to disregarding the constitutional scheme, and must be rejected (paragraph 759). It was held, that when a Judge was appointed for a term of two years, as an additional Judge, it was sufficient to contemplate, that his appointment was not as a permanent Judge. And therefore, if a permanent vacancy arose, the additional Judge could not enforce his appointment against the permanent vacancy (paragraph 762). Page 48 49 (v) It was also concluded, that the term of an additional Judge could not be extended for three months or six months, since such short term appointments, were wholly inconsistent and contrary to the clear

(vi) On the subject of extension of the term of an additional Judge, it was felt, that it was not open to the constitutional functionaries, to sit tight over a proposal, without expressing their opinion on the merits of the proposal, and by sheer inaction, to kill a proposal. It was accordingly opined, that when the term of an additional Judge was about to expire, it was obligatory on the Chief Justice of the High Court, to initiate the proposal for completing the process of consultation, before the period of initial appointment expired (paragraph 772). (vii) With reference to the non-extension of the tenure of S.N. Kumar, J., it was felt, that when two high constitutional functionaries, namely, the JUDGMENT Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India, had met with a specific reference to his doubtful integrity, the act of not showing the letter dated 7.5.1981 to the Chief Justice of India, would not detract from the fullness of the consultation, as required by Article 217. Accordingly, it was held, that there was a full and effective consultation, on all relevant points, including those set out in the letter dated 7.5.1981. And the claim of the concerned Judge for continuation, was liable to be rejected. It was however suggested, that the Government of India could even now, show the letter dated 7.5.1981 to the Chief Justice Page 49 50 of India, and request him to give his comments. After receiving his comments, the Government of India could decide afresh, whether S.N. Kumar, J., should be re-appointed as an additional Judge of the Delhi

(viii) On the question, whether the consent of the concerned Judge should be obtained prior to his transfer under Article 222(1), it was concluded, that the requirement of seeking a prior consent, as a prerequisite for exercising the power of transfer under Article 222(1), deserved to be rejected (paragraph 813). It was however observed, that the above power of transfer under Article 222(1) could not be exercised in the absence of public interest, merely on the basis of whim, caprice or fancy of the executive, or its desire to bend a Judge to its own way of thinking. Three safeguards, namely, full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the exercise of power only aimed at public JUDGMENT interest, and judicial review — in case the power was exercised contrary to the mandate of law, were suggested to insulate the “independence of the judiciary”, against an attempt by the executive to control it (paragraphs 813 to 815). (ix) It was also concluded, that the transfer of an individual Judge, for something improper in his behavior, or conduct, would certainly cast a slur or attach a stigma, and would leave an indelible mark on his character. Even the High Court to which he was transferred would shun him, and the consumers of justice would have little or no faith in his Page 50 51 judicial integrity. Accordingly it was concluded, that a transfer on account of any complaint or grievance against a Judge, referable to his conduct or behaviour, was impermissible under Article 222(1).

selective transfer would cast a slur or stigma on him. It was felt, that the transfer did not appear to be in public interest. The order of transfer dated 20.12.1980 was accordingly, considered to be vitiated, and as such, was declared void. R.S. Pathak, J. (as he then was): (i) With reference to the issue of “independence of the judiciary”, it was observed, that while the administration of justice drew its legal sanction from the Constitution, its credibility rested in the faith of the people. Indispensable to such faith, was the “independence of the judiciary”. An independent and impartial judiciary, it was felt, gives JUDGMENT character and content to the constitutional milieu (paragraph 874). (ii) On the subject of appointment of Judges to High Courts, it was essential for the President, to consult the Governor of the State, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. It was pointed out, that three distinct constitutional functionaries were involved in the consultative process, and each had a distinct role to play (paragraph 887). In a case where the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, were agreed on a recommendation, it was within reason to hold, that the President would ordinarily accept the Page 51 52 recommendation, unless there were strong and cogent reasons, for not doing so (paragraph 889). It was however pointed out, that the President was not always obliged to agree, with a recommendation, wherein the

Constituent Assembly debates, a proposal was made, that the appointment of a Judge should require the “concurrence” of the Chief Justice of India, and the above proposal was endorsed by the Law Commission of India, yet the proposal had fallen through, and as such, the Constitution as it presently exists, contemplated “consultation” and not “concurrence” (paragraph 890). (iii) On the question, as to whether the Chief Justice of India had primacy, over the recommendation made by the Chief Justice of the High Court, it was felt, that the Chief Justice of India did not sit in appellate judgment, over the advice tendered by the Chief Justice of the High JUDGMENT Court. It was pointed out, that the advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India, emerged after taking into account, not only the primary material before him, but also, the assessment made by the Chief Justice of the High Court. And therefore, when he rendered his advice, the assessment of the Chief Justice of the High Court, must be deemed to have been considered by him. It was pointed out, that from the constitutional scheme, it appeared, that in matters concerning the High Courts, there was a close consultative relationship, between the President and the Chief Justice of India. In that capacity, the Chief Justice of India Page 52 53 functioned, as a constitutional check, on the exercise of arbitrary power, and was the protector of the “independence of the judiciary” (paragraph 891).

appointment of a permanent Judge, must be made in the manner prescribed in Article 217(1). Accordingly, it was felt, that there was no reason to suspect, that a person found fit for appointment as an additional Judge, and had already gained proficiency and experience, would not be appointed as a Judge for a further period, in order that the work may be disposed of (paragraph 893). (v) It was also opined, that the judiciary by judicial verdict, could not decide, how many permanent Judges were required for a High Court. And if a Court was not competent to do that, it could not issue a direction to the Government, that additional Judges should be appointed JUDGMENT as permanent Judges (paragraph 895). Accordingly it was felt, that there was no doubt whatever, that the provision of Article 217(1) would come into play, when an additional Judge was to be considered for further appointment as an additional Judge, or was to be considered for appointment as a permanent Judge (paragraph 897). (vi) With reference to the non-continuation of S.N. Kumar, J., it was pointed out, that the allegations contained in the letter dated 7.5.1981 strongly influenced the decision of the Government. Since the aforesaid letter was not brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of India, it was Page 53 54 inevitable to conclude, that the process of consultation with the Chief Justice of India was not full and effective, and the withholding of important and relevant material from the Chief Justice of India, vitiated

requirements contained in Article 217(1). It was felt, that the issue pertaining to the continuation of S.N. Kumar, J., needed to be reconsidered, and a decision needed to be taken, only after full and effective consultation (paragraph 904). (vii) On the issue of transfer of Judges under Article 222(1), it was concluded, that the consent of the concerned Judge was not one of the mandated requirements (paragraph 913). It was pointed out, that the transfer of a Judge, could be made only in public interest, and that no Judge could be transferred, on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity. The question of invoking Article 222(1), for purposes of punishing a JUDGMENT Judge, was clearly ruled out (paragraphs 917 and 918). It was clarified, that the Judge proposed to be transferred, did not have a right of hearing. And that, the scope and degree of inquiry by the Chief Justice of India, fell within his exclusive discretion. All that was necessary was, that the Judge should know why his transfer was proposed, so that he would be able to acquaint the Chief Justice of India, why he should not be so transferred. It was further clarified, that the process of consultation envisaged under Article 222(1) required, that all the material in Page 54 55 possession of the President must be placed before the Chief Justice of India (paragraph 919). (viii) It was held that, it was open to the Judge, who was subjected to

(ix) It was also felt, that the power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another, could constitute a threat, to the sense of independence and impartiality of the Judge, and accordingly, it was held, that the said power should be exercised sparingly, and only for very strong reasons (paragraph 921). (x) On the validity of the transfer of K.B.N. Singh, CJ., it was concluded, that the considerations on which the transfer had been made, could be regarded as falling within the expression “public interest”, and therefore, the order of transfer did not violate Article 222(1). (xi) Insofar as the validity of the letter of the Union Law Minister dated JUDGMENT 18.3.1981 is concerned, it was observed, that neither the proposal nor the consent given thereto, had any legal status. In the above view, it was held, that the circular letter could not be acted upon, and any consent given pursuant thereto, was not binding. E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was): (i) With reference to the “independence of the judiciary”, it was opined, that the same was one of the central values on which the Constitution was based. It was pointed out, that in all countries, where the rule of law prevailed, and the power to adjudicate upon disputes between a man and Page 55 56 a man, and a man and the State, and a State and another State, and a State and the Centre, was entrusted to a judicial body, it was natural that such body should be assigned a status, free from capricious or

(ii) Referring to Article 217(1) it was asserted, that each of the three functionaries mentioned therein, had to be consulted before a Judge of a High Court could be appointed. It was pointed out, that each of the consultees, had a distinct and separate role to play. Given the distinct roles assigned to them, which may to some extent be overlapping, it could not be said, that the Chief Justice of India occupied a position of primacy, amongst the three consultees (paragraph 1019). (iii) The power of appointment of a Judge of a High Court was considered to be an executive power (paragraph 1023). Accordingly, while making an appointment of a High Court Judge, the President was JUDGMENT bound to act, on the advice of his Council of Ministers, and at the same time, giving due regard to the opinions expressed by those who were required to be consulted under Article 217(1). Despite the above, it was felt, that there was no scope for holding, that either the Council of Ministers could not advise the President, or the opinion of the Chief Justice of India was binding on the President. Although, it was felt, that such opinion should be given due respect and regard (paragraph 1032). It was held, that the above method was intrinsic in the matter of appointment of Judges, as in that way, Judges may be called people’s Page 56 57 Judges. If the appointments of Judges were to be made on the basis of the recommendations of Judges only, then they will be Judges’ Judges, and such appointments may not fit into the scheme of popular

of appointment for permanent Judges, additional Judges, or acting Judges. All of them were required to be appointed by the same process, namely, in the manner contemplated under Article 217(1) (paragraph 1061). The appointment of almost all High Court Judges initially as additional Judges under Article 224(1), and later on as permanent Judges under Article 217(1), was not conducive to the independence of judiciary (paragraph 1067). It was held, that the Constitution did not confer any right upon an additional Judge, to claim as of right, that he should be appointed again, either as a permanent Judge, or as an additional Judge. Accordingly, it was held, that there was no such JUDGMENT enforceable right (paragraph 1074). (v) Despite the above, it was observed, that in the absence of cogent reasons for not appointing an additional Judge, the appointment of somebody else in his place, would be an unreasonable and a perverse act, which would entitle the additional Judge, to move a Court for appropriate relief, in the peculiar circumstances (paragraph 1086). It was held, that having regard to the high office, to which the appointment was made, and the association of high dignitaries, who had to be Page 57 58 consulted before any such appointment was made, the application of principles of natural justice, as of right, was ruled out (paragraph 1087). (vi) With reference to Article 222, it was opined, that the consent of the

a Judge of a High Court to another High Court, could not be construed as a fresh appointment, in the High Court to which the Judge was transferred. An order of transfer made under Article 222, it was held, was liable to be struck down by a Court, if it could be shown, that it had been made for an extraneous reason, i.e., on a ground falling outside the scope of Article 222. Under Article 222, a Judge could be transferred, when the transfer served public interest. It was held, that the President had no power to transfer a High Court Judge, for reasons not bearing on public interest, or arising out of whim, caprice or fancy of the executive, or because of the executive desire to bend a Judge to its own way of JUDGMENT thinking (paragraphs 1097, 1099 and 1132). (vii) It was held, that Article 222 cannot be resorted to on the ground of alleged misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge (paragraph 1139). (viii) Based on the opinion expressed by several expert bodies, it was opined, that any transfer of a Judge of a High Court under Article 222, in order to implement the policy of appointing Chief Justice of every High Court from outside the concerned State, and of having at least 1/3rd of Judges of every High Court from outside the State, would not be unconstitutional (paragraph 1164). Page 58 59 (ix) The letter of the Union Minister of Law dated 18.3.1981, was found to be valid. All contentions raised against the validity thereof were rejected (paragraph 1239).

Judge of the Delhi High Court, was held to be justified (paragraph 1128). (xi) The transfer of K.B.N. Singh, CJ., was held to have been made strictly in consonance with the procedure indicated in the Sankalchand 5 Himatlal Sheth case . It was accordingly concluded, that there was no ground to hold, that the above transfer was not considered by the Chief Justice of India, in a fair and reasonable way. On the facts and circumstances of the case, it was concluded that it was not possible to hold that the above transfer was either illegal or void (paragraphs 1252 and 1257). The Second Judges Case - (1993) 4 SCC 441: JUDGMENT 17. For the purpose of adjudication of the present issue, namely, whether the judgment rendered by this Court in the Second Judges case needs to be re-examined, it is not necessary to delineate the views expressed by the individual Judges, as the conclusions drawn by them are per se not subject matter of challenge. The limited challenge being, that vital aspects of the matter, which needed to have been considered were not canvassed, and therefore, could not be taken into consideration in the process of decision making. In the above perspective, we consider Page 59 60 it just and proper to extract hereunder, only the conclusions drawn by the majority view:

High Court by the Chief Justice of that High Court; and for transfer of a Judge/Chief Justice of a High Court, the proposal has to be initiated by the Chief Justice of India. This is the manner in which proposals for appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts as well as for the transfers of Judges/Chief Justices of the High Courts must invariably be made. (3) In the event of conflicting opinions by the constitutional functionaries, the opinion of the judiciary ‘symbolised by the view of the Chief Justice of India’, and formed in the manner indicated, has primacy. (4) No appointment of any Judge to the Supreme Court or any High Court can be made, unless it is in conformity with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. (5) In exceptional cases alone, for stated strong cogent reasons, disclosed to the Chief Justice of India, indicating that the recommendee is not suitable for appointment, that appointment recommended by the Chief Justice of India may not be made. However, if the stated reasons are not accepted by the Chief Justice of India and the other Judges of the Supreme Court who have been consulted in the matter, on reiteration of the recommendation by the Chief Justice of India, the appointment should be made as a healthy convention. (6) Appointment to the office of the Chief Justice of India should be of the seniormost Judge of the Supreme Court considered fit to hold the office. (7) The opinion of the Chief Justice of India has not mere primacy, but is determinative in the matter of transfers of High Court judges/Chief Justices. (8) Consent of the transferred Judge/Chief Justice is not required for either the first of any subsequent transfer from one High Court to another. (9) Any transfer made on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India is not to be deemed to be punitive, and such transfer is not justiciable on any ground. (10) In making all appointments and transfers, the norms indicated must be followed. However, the same do not confer any justiciable right in any one. JUDGMENT Page 60 61

Attorney General had conceded, that the opinion recorded by the JUDGMENT majority in the Second Judges case, had been accepted by the Union of India and, as such, would be binding on it. Paragraph 11 is accordingly reproduced hereunder: “11. We record at the outset the statements of the Attorney General that (1) the Union of India is not seeking a review or reconsideration of the judgment in the Second Judges case (1993) 4 SCC 441 and that (2) the Union of India shall accept and treat as binding the answers of this Court to the questions set out in the Reference.” 19. It is likewise necessary to extract herein, only the final summary of conclusions expressed in the Third Judges case, which are placed below: “1. The expression "consultation with the Chief justice of India" in Articles 217(1) of the Constitution of India requires consultation with a Page 61 62

JUDGMENT III. MOTION BY THE RESPONDENTS, FOR THE REVIEW OF THE SECOND AND THIRD JUDGES CASES: 20. It was the contention of the learned Attorney General, that in the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel representing Page 62 63 the petitioners, for adjudication of the merits of the controversy, emphatic reliance had been placed on the judgments rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases. It was the contention of the

determine, whether the conclusions recorded therein, could withstand the original provisions of the Constitution, viewed in the background of the debates in the Constituent Assembly. 21. In order to record the facts truthfully, it was emphasized, that the submissions advanced by him, could not be canvassed on behalf of the Union of India as in the Third Judges case, the Union had consciously accepted as binding the judgment rendered in the Second Judges case. Despite the above, the Attorney General was emphatic, that the Union of India could not be debarred from seeking reconsideration of the judgment rendered by this Court in the Second Judges case. In order to dissuade JUDGMENT the learned Attorney General from the course he insisted to pursue, it was suggested, that the determination by this Court in the Second Judges case would not prejudice the claim of the Union of India, if the Union could establish, that the “basic structure” of the Constitution, namely, the “independence of the judiciary” would not stand compromised by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act. Despite the instant suggestion, the Attorney General pleaded, that he be allowed to establish, that the determination rendered by the nine-Judge Bench in the Second Judges case, was not sustainable in law. At his insistence, Page 63 64 we allowed him to advance his submissions. Needless to mention, that if the Attorney General was successful in persuading us, that the said judgment did not prima facie lay down the correct legal/constitutional

additionally uphold the challenge to the impugned constitutional amendment, and strike down the same, failing which the new regime would replace the erstwhile system. 22. First and foremost, our attention was drawn to Article 124 of the Constitution, as it existed, prior to the present amendment. It was submitted that Article 124 contemplated, that the Supreme Court would comprise of the Chief Justice of India, and not more than seven other Judges (unless, the Parliament by law, prescribed a larger number). It was submitted, that clause (2) of Article 124 vested the power of appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, with the President. The JUDGMENT proviso under Article 124(2) postulated a mandatory “consultation” with the Chief Justice of India. Appointments contemplated under Article 124, also required a non-mandatory “consultation” with such other Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, as the President may deem necessary. It was accordingly submitted, that the consultation contemplated under Article 124(2), at the hands of the President was wide enough to include, not only the collegium of Judges, in terms of the judgment rendered by this Court in the Second Judges case, but each and every single Judge on the strength of the Supreme Court, and also Page 64 65 the Judges of the High Courts of the States, as the President may choose to consult. It was submitted, that only a limited role assigned to the Chief Justice of India, had been altered by the judgment in the Second

the term “consultation” expressed in Article 124 with reference to the Chief Justice of India, had been interpreted to mean “concurrence”. And accordingly, the President has been held to be bound, by the recommendation made to him, by the Chief Justice of India and his collegium of Judges. It was contended, that the above determination, was wholly extraneous to the plain reading of the language engaged in Article 124 (in its original format). It was asserted, that there was never any question of “concurrence”, as Article 124 merely contemplated “consultation”. It was contended, that the above “consultation” had been made mandatory and binding, on the President even in a situation where, JUDGMENT the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice and the collegium of Judges, was not acceptable to the President. It was asserted, that it was not understandable, how this addition came to be made to the plain and simple language engaged in framing Article 124. It was submitted, that once primacy is given to the Chief Justice of India (i.e., to the collegium of Judges, contemplated under the Second and Third Judges cases), then there was an implied exclusion of “consultation”, with the other Judges of the Supreme Court, and also, with the Judges of the High Courts, even though, there was an express provision, empowering the President to Page 65 66 make up his mind, after consulting the other Judges of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the High Courts, as he may choose. 23. The Attorney General further contended, that the interpretation

the following illustration. That even if all the Judges of the Supreme Court, recommend a name, to which the Chief Justice of India alone, was not agreeable, the said recommendee could not be appointed as a Judge. This illustration, it was submitted, placed absolute power in the hands of one person – the Chief Justice of India. 24. The learned Attorney General, then invited the Court’s attention to Article 125, so as to contend, that the salary payable to the Judges of the Supreme Court has to be determined by the Parliament by law, and until such determination was made, the emoluments payable to a Judge would be such, as were specified in the Second Schedule. It was submitted, JUDGMENT that the Parliament was given an express role to determine even the salary of Judges, which is a condition of service of the Judges of the Supreme Court. He also pointed to Article 126, which contemplates, the appointment of one of the Judges of the Supreme Court, to discharge the functions of Chief Justice of India, on account of his absence or otherwise, or when the Chief Justice of India, was unable to perform the duties of his office. The Court’s attention was also drawn to Article 127, to point out, that in a situation where the available Judges of the Supreme Court, could not satisfy the quorum of the Bench, required to Page 66 67 adjudicate upon a controversy, the Chief Justice of India could continue the proceedings of the case, by including therein, a Judge of a High Court (who was qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court), in

manifestly inter-twined with administration of justice, by allowing the President to appoint a Judge of the High Court, as a Judge of the Supreme Court on ‘ ad hoc’ basis. Reference was then made to Article 128, whereby the Chief Justice of India, with the previous approval of the President, could require a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, or a person who has held office as a Judge of a High Court, and was duly qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court, to sit and act as a Judge of the Supreme Court. It was pointed out, that this was yet another instance, where the President’s noticeable role in the functioning of the higher judiciary, was contemplated by the Constitution itself. The JUDGMENT Court’s attention was then drawn to Article 130, whereunder, even though the seat of the Supreme Court was to be at Delhi, it could be moved to any other place in India, if so desired by the Chief Justice of India, with the approval of the President. Yet again, depicting the active role assigned to the President, in the functioning of the higher judiciary. Likewise, the Court’s attention was invited to Articles 133 and 134, providing for an appellate remedy in civil and criminal matters respectively, to the Supreme Court, leaving it open to the Parliament to vary the scope of the Courts’ appellate jurisdiction. Insofar as Article 137 Page 67 68 is concerned, it was pointed out, that the power of review of the judgments or orders passed by the Supreme Court, was subject to the provisions of any law made by the Parliament, or any rules that may be

falling in the Union List, as the Parliament may choose to confer. Similar reference was made to clause (2) of Article 138, wherein further jurisdiction could be entrusted to the Supreme Court, when agreed to, by the Government of India and by any State Government, if the Parliament by law so provides. Based on the above, it was contended, that Article 138 was yet another provision, which indicated a participatory role of the Parliament, in the activities of the Supreme Court. Likewise, this Court’s attention was drawn to Article 139, whereby the Parliament could confer, by law, the power to issue directions, orders or writs, in addition to the framework demarcated through Article 32(2). This, according to the JUDGMENT learned Attorney General, indicated another participatory role of the Parliament in the activities of the Supreme Court. Pointing to Article 140, it was submitted, that the Parliament could by law confer upon the Supreme Court supplemental powers, in addition to the powers vested with it by the Constitution, as may appear to the Parliament to be necessary or desirable, to enable the Supreme Court to exercise its jurisdiction more effectively. It was submitted, that one Article after the other, including Article 140, indicated a collective and participatory role of the President and the Parliament, in the activities of the Supreme Page 68 69 Court. Having read out Article 142(2), it was asserted, that even on the subject of securing the attendance of any person, and the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any

referred to Article 145, whereunder, it was open to the Parliament to enact law framed by the Parliament, for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court. In the absence of any such law, the Supreme Court had the liberty to make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the Court, with the approval of the President. It was submitted, that even on elementary issues like procedure, the Parliament and/or the President were assigned a role by the Constitution, in activities strictly in the judicial domain. With reference to the activities of the Supreme Court, the Court’s attention was also drawn to Article 146, which envisages that appointments of officers and JUDGMENT servants of the Supreme Court, were to be made by the Chief Justice of India. It was pointed out, that the authority conferred under Article 146, was subservient to the right of the President, to frame rules requiring future appointments to any office connected to the Supreme Court, to be made, only in consultation with the Union Pubic Service Commission. The aforesaid right of appointing officers and servants to the Supreme Court, is also clearly subservient to the right of the Parliament, to make provisions by enacting law on the above subject. In the absence of a legislation, at the hands of the Parliament, the conditions of service of Page 69 70 officers and servants of the Supreme Court would be such, as may be prescribed by rules framed, by the Chief Justice of India. The rules framed by the Chief Justice, are subject to the approval by the President,

Court’s attention was invited to Article 217, whereunder, the authority of appointing a Judge to a High Court was vested with the President. The President alone, was authorized to make such appointments, after “consultation” with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. The Court’s attention was also drawn to Article 221, whereunder, the power to determine the salary payable to a Judge, was to be determined by law to be enacted by the Parliament. Till any such law was framed by the Parliament, High Court Judges would be entitled to such salaries, as were specified in the Second Schedule. The allowances payable to Judges of the High Court, JUDGMENT as also, the right in respect of leave of absence and pension, were also left to the wisdom of Parliament, to be determined by law. And until such determination, Judges of the High Courts were entitled to allowances and rights, as were indicated in the Second Schedule. The Court’s attention was also drawn to Article 222, wherein, the President was authorized, after “consulting” the Chief Justice of India, to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another. Inviting the Court’s attention to the provisions referred to in the foregoing two paragraphs contained in Part V, Chapter IV – The Union Judiciary, and Part VI, Chapter V – The High Courts in Page 70 71 the States, it was asserted, that the role of the President, and also, that of the Parliament was thoughtfully interwoven in various salient aspects, pertaining to the higher judiciary. Exclusion of the executive and the

transfer of Judges and Chief Justices of one High Court to another, was clearly against the spirit of the Constitution. 26. It was submitted, that the method of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was not the “be all” or the “end all”, of the independence of the judiciary. The question of independence of the judiciary would arise, with reference to a Judge, only after his appointment as a Judge of the higher judiciary. It was submitted, that this Court had repeatedly placed reliance on the debates in the Constituent Assembly, so as to bring out the intention of the framers of the Constitution, with reference to constitutional provisions. In this behalf, he placed reliance on T.M.A. JUDGMENT 6 Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka , Re: Special Reference No.1 of 7 8 2002 , and also on S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab . The following observations in the last cited judgment were highlighted: “33. Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with an object-oriented approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. The words used may be general in terms but, their full import and true meaning, has to be appreciated considering the true context in which the same are used and the purpose which they seek to achieve. Debates in the Constituent Assembly referred to in an earlier part of this judgment clearly indicate that a non-member’s inclusion in the Cabinet was considered to be a 6 (2002) 8 SCC 481 7 (2002) 8 SCC 237 8 (2001) 7 SCC 126 Page 71 72

9 For the same purpose, he referred to Indra Sawhney v. Union of India , and drew the Court’s attention to the opinion expressed therein: “217. Further, it is clear for the afore-mentioned reasons that the executive while making the division or sub-classification has not properly applied its mind to various factors, indicated above which may ultimately defeat the very purpose of the division or sub-classification. In that view, para 2( i ) not only becomes constitutionally invalid but also suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and arbitrariness. xxx xxx xxx 772. We may now turn to Constituent Assembly debates with a view to ascertain the original intent underlying the use of words “backward class of citizens”. At the outset we must clarify that we are not taking these debates or even the speeches of Dr Ambedkar as conclusive on the meaning of the expression “backward classes”. We are referring to these debates as furnishing the context in which and the objective to achieve which this phrase was put in clause (4). We are aware that what is said during these debates is not conclusive or binding upon the Court because several members may have expressed several views, all of which may not be reflected in the provision finally enacted. The speech of Dr Ambedkar on this aspect, however, stands on a different footing. He was not only the Chairman of the Drafting Committee which inserted the expression “backward” in draft Article 10(3) [it was not there in the original draft Article 10(3)], he was virtually piloting the draft Article. In his speech, he explains the reason behind draft clause (3) as also the reason for which the Drafting Committee added the expression “backward” in the clause. In this situation, we fail to understand how can anyone ignore his speech while trying to ascertain the meaning of the said expression. That the debates in Constituent Assembly can be relied upon as an aid to interpretation of a constitutional provision is borne out by a series of decisions of this Court. [See Madhu Limaye, in re, AIR 1969 SC 1014, Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (Subba Rao, JUDGMENT 9 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 Page 72 73

10 Reliance was also placed on Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala , and this Court’s attention was invited to the following: “1088. Before I refer to the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, I must first consider the question whether the Constituent Assembly Debates can be looked into by the Court for construing these provisions. The Advocate-General of Maharashtra says until the decision of this Court in H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur and others v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85 - commonly known as Privy Purses case - debates and proceedings were held not to be admissible. Nonetheless counsel on either side made copious reference to them. In dealing with the interpretation of ordinary legislation, the widely held view is that while it is not permissible to refer to the debates as an aid to construction, the various stages through which the draft passed, the amendments proposed to it either to add or delete any part of it, the purpose for which the attempt was made and the reason for its rejection may throw light on the intention of the framers or draftsmen. The speeches in the legislatures are said to afford no guide because members who speak in favour or against a particular provision or amendment only indicate JUDGMENT their understanding of the provision which would not be admissible as an aid for construing the provision. The members speak and express views which differ from one another, and there is no way of ascertaining what views are held by those who do not speak. It is, therefore, difficult to get a resultant of the views in a debate except for the ultimate result that a particular provision or its amendment has been adopted or rejected, and in any case none of these can be looked into as an aid to construction except that the legislative history of the provision can be referred to for finding out the mischief sought to be remedied or the purpose for which it is enacted, if they are relevant. But in Travancore Cochin and others v. Bombay Company Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 366, the Golaknath case (supra), the Privy Purses case (supra), and Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, (1971) 2 SCC 779, there are dicta against referring to the speeches in the Constituent Assembly and in the last mentioned case they were referred to as supporting the conclusion 10 (1973) 4 SCC 225 Page 73 74 already arrived at. In Golaknath case (supra), as well as Privy Purses case (supra), the speeches were referred to though it was said not for interpreting a provision but for either examining the transcendental character of Fundamental Rights or for the circumstances which necessitated the giving of guarantees to the rulers. For whatever purpose speeches in the Constituent Assembly were looked at though it was always claimed that these are not admissible except when the meaning was ambiguous or where the meaning was clear for further support of the conclusion arrived at. In either case they were looked into. Speaking for myself, why should we not look into them boldly for ascertaining what was the intention of our framers and how they translated that intention? What is the rationale for treating them as forbidden or forbidding material. The Court in a constitutional matter, where the intent of the framers of the Constitution as embodied in the written document is to be ascertained, should look into the proceedings, the relevant data including any speech which may throw light on ascertaining it. It can reject them as unhelpful, if they throw no light or throw only dim light in which nothing can be discerned. Unlike a statute, a Constitution is a working instrument of Government, it is drafted by people who wanted it to be a national instrument to subserve successive generations. The Assembly constituted Committees of able men of high calibre, learning and wide experience, and it had an able adviser, Shri B.N. Rau to assist it. A memorandum was prepared by Shri B.N. Rau which was circulated to the public of every shade of opinion, to professional bodies, to legislators, to public bodies and a host of others and was given the widest publicity. When criticism, comments and suggestions were received, a draft was prepared in the light of these which was submitted to the Constituent Assembly, and introduced with a speech by the sponsor Dr Ambedkar. The assembly thereupon constituted three Committees: (1) Union Powers Committee; (2) Provincial Powers Committee; and (3) Committee on the Fundamental Rights and Minorities Committee. The deliberations and the recommendations of these Committees, the proceedings of the Drafting Committee, and the speech of Dr Ambedkar introducing the draft so prepared along with the report of these Committees are all valuable material. The objectives of the Assembly, the manner in which they met any criticism, the resultant decisions taken thereupon, amendments proposed, speeches in favour or against them and their ultimate adoption or rejection will be helpful in throwing light on the particular matter in issue. In proceedings of a legislature on an ordinary draft bill, as I said earlier, there may be a partisan and heated debate, which often times may not throw any light on the issues which come before the Court but the proceedings in a JUDGMENT Constituent Assembly have no such partisan nuances and their only concern is to give the national a working instrument with its basic structure and human values sufficiently balanced and stable enough to allow an interplay of forces which will subserve the needs of future generations. The highest Court created under it and charged with the duty of understanding and Page 74 75

11 12 State of Punjab , and on Manoj Narula v. Union of India . 27. Having emphasized, that Constituent Assembly debates, had been adopted as a means to understand the true intent and import of the provisions of the Constitution, reference was made in extenso to the Constituent Assembly debates, with reference to the provisions (more particularly, to Article 124) which are subject matter of the present consideration. It was pointed out, that after the constitution of the Constituent Assembly, the issue of judicial appointments and salaries was taken up by an ad hoc committee on the Supreme Court. The JUDGMENT committee comprised of S. Varadachariar (a former Judge of the Federal Court), B.L. Mitter (a former Advocate General of the Federal Court), in addition to some noted jurists – Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar, K.M. Munshi and B.N. Rau (Constitutional Adviser to the Constituent Assembly of India). The ad hoc committee presented its report to the Constituent Assembly on 21.5.1947. With reference to judicial independence, it modified the consultative proposal suggested in the Sapru Committee report, by recommending a panel of 11 persons, 11 (1974) 2 SCC 831 12 (2014) 9 SCC 1 Page 75 76 nominated by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Alternatively, it was suggested, that the panel would recommend three candidates, and the President in consultation with the Chief

independence, it was recommended, that the panel should have a tenure of ten years. Based on the above report, it was submitted, that the proposal suggested a wider participation of a collegium of Judges, politicians and law officers, in addition to the President and the Chief Justice of India, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Learned Attorney General went on to inform the Court, that on the basis of the above report, B.N. Rau prepared a memorandum dated 30.5.1947, wherein he made his own suggestions. The above suggestions related to Judges of the Supreme Court, as also, of High Courts. The Court was also informed, that the Union Constitution Committee JUDGMENT presented its report to the Constituent Assembly on 4.7.1947, also pertaining to appointments to the higher judiciary. Yet another memorandum, on the Principles of a Model Provincial Constitution was prepared by the Constitutional Adviser on 13.5.1947, relating to appointments to the higher judiciary, which was adopted by the Provincial Constitution Committee. Reliance was placed by the Attorney General, on the speech delivered by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on 15.7.1947, wherein he expressed the following views: Page 76 77 “The committee have given special attention to the appointment of judges of the High Court. This is considered to be very important by the committee and as the judiciary should be above suspicion and should be above party influences, it was agreed that the appointment of High Court judges should be made by the President of the Union in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of the Provincial High Court and the Governor with the advice of the Ministry of the Province concerned. So there are many checks provided to ensure fair appointments to the High Court.” The Court was informed, that the first draft of the new constitution prepared by B.N. Rau was presented to the Constituent Assembly in October 1947, wherein, it was expressed that Judges of the Supreme Court, would be appointed by the President, in consultation with the sitting Judges of the Supreme Court, and Judges of High Courts in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, except in the matter of appointment of the Chief Justice of India himself. It was suggested, that this was the immediate precursor to Article 124(2) of the Constitution, as it was originally framed. 28. It was pointed out, that in the above report prepared by the JUDGMENT Constitutional Adviser, the following passage related to the judiciary: “Regarding the removal of judges, he (Justice Frankfurter, Judge, Supreme Court of the United States of America) drew attention to a provision which had just been proposed in New York State – the provision has since been approved and which had the support of most of the judges and lawyers in this country. The provision is reproduced below: 9-a (1) A judge of the court of appeals, a justice of the supreme court, a judge of the court of claims… (types of judges) may be removed or retired also by a court on the judiciary. The court shall be composed of the chief judge of the court of appeals, the senior associate judges of the court of appeals and one justice of the appellate division in each department designated by concurrence of a majority of the justices of such appellate division… (2) No judicial officer shall be removed by virtue of this section except for cause or be retired except for mental or physical disability preventing the proper performance of his judicial duties, nor unless he shall have been Page 77 78

It was submitted, that the above suggestion of vesting the power of impeachment, in-house by the judiciary itself, as recommended by Justice Frankfurter, was rejected. It was pointed out, that the second draft of the Constitution was placed before the Constituent Assembly on 21.2.1948. Articles 103 and 193 of the above draft, pertained to appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts. It was submitted, that several public comments were received, with reference to the second draft. In this behalf, a memorandum was also received, from the Judges of the Federal Court and the Chief Justices of the High Courts which, inter alia, expressed as under: JUDGMENT “It seems desirable to insert a provision in these articles (Draft Articles 103(2) and 193(2) to the effect that no person should be appointed a judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court who has at any time accepted the post of a Minister in the Union of India or in any State. This is intended to prevent a person who has accepted office of a Minister from exercising his influence in order to become a judge at any time. It is the unanimous view of the judges that a member of the Indian Civil Service should not be a permanent Chief Justice of any High Court. Suitable provision should be made in the article for this.” It was submitted, that in response to the above memorandum, B.N. Rau made the following observations: “It is unnecessary to put these prohibitions into the Constitution. The Attorney-General in England is invariably one of the Ministers of the Crown and often even a Cabinet Minister; he is often appointed a judge Page 78 79

JUDGMENT It was pointed out, that none of the above proposals were accepted. Reference was also made to the Editor of the Indian Law Review and the Members of the Calcutta Bar Association, who made the following suggestions: “That in clause (4) of Article 103 the words “and voting” should be deleted, as they consider that in an important issue as the one Page 79 80 contemplated in this clause, opportunity should be as much minimized as practicable for the legislators for remaining neutral.” to which, the response of B.N. Rau was as under:

With reference to the suggestions regarding non-reduction of salaries of Judges, the Constitutional Adviser made the following comments: “The constitutional safeguard against the reduction of salary of the Chief Justice and the judges of a High Court below the minimum has been prescribed in article 197 so as to prevent the Legislatures of the States from reducing the salaries below a reasonable figure. It is hardly necessary to put such a check on the power of Parliament to fix the salaries of the judges of the Supreme Court.” The suggestions made by Pittabhi Sitaramayya and others, with reference to officers, and servants and the expenses of the Supreme Court, were also highlighted. They are extracted hereunder: “That in article 122, for the words “the Chief Justice of India in consultation with the President” the words “the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India” be substituted.” JUDGMENT The response of the Constitutional Adviser was as follows: “The provision for the fixation of the salaries, allowances and pensions of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court by the Chief Justice of India in consultation with the President contained in clause (1) of article 122 is based on the existing provision contained in section 242(4) of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted. The Drafting Committee considered such a provision to be necessary to ensure the independence of the judiciary, the safeguarding of which was so much stressed by the Federal Court and the High Courts in their comments on the Draft Constitution.” 29. It was pointed out, that the second draft of the Constitution, was introduced in the Constituent Assembly on 4.11.1948. The Court’s Page 80 81 attention was drawn to the discussions, with reference to appointments to the higher judiciary, including the suggestion of B. Pocker Sahib, who proposed an alternative to Article 103(2). Reference was also made to the

appointment of Judges. It was submitted, that the above suggestion was rejected by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, who felt that it would be dangerous to enable the Chief Justice to veto the appointment of a Judge to the higher judiciary. The opinion of T.T. Krishnamachari was also to the following effect: “[T]he independence of the Judiciary should be maintained and that the Judiciary should not feel that they are subject to favours that the Executive might grant to them from time to time and which would naturally influence their decision in any matter they have to take where the interests of the Executive of the time being happens to be concerned. At the same time, Sir, I think it should be made clear that it is not the intention of this House or of the framers of this Constitution that they want to crate specially favoured bodies which in themselves becomes an Imperium in Imperio, completely independent of the Executive and the legislature and operating as a sort of superior body to the general body politic”. JUDGMENT 30. The proposals and the decision taken thereon, were brought to our notice, specially the observations made by K.T. Shah, K.M. Munshi, Tajamul Husain, Alladi Krishnaswami Aayar, Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, and finally Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had stated thus: “Finally, BR Ambedkar said: Mr. President, Sir, I would just like to make a few observations in order to clear the position. Sir, there is no doubt that the House in general, has agreed that the independence of the Judiciary from the Executive should be made as clear and definite as we could make it by law. At the same Page 81 82 time, there is the fear that in the name of the independence of the Judiciary, we might be creating, what my Friend Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari very aptly called an "Imperium in Imperio" . We do not want to create an Imperium in Imperio , and at the same time we want to give the Judiciary ample independence so that it can act without fear or favour of the Executive. My friends, if they will carefully examine the provisions of the new amendment which I have proposed in place of the original article 122, will find that the new article proposes to steer a middle course. It refuses to create an Imperium in Imperio, and I think it gives the Judiciary as much independence as is necessary for the purpose of administering justice without fear or favour.” 31. Having extensively brought to our notice, the nature of the debates before the Constituent Assembly, and the decisions taken thereon, the learned Attorney General ventured to demonstrate, that the participation of the executive in the matter of appointment of high constitutional functionaries, “could not – and did not”, impinge upon their independence, in the discharge of their duties. Illustratively, reliance was placed on Part IV Chapter V of the Constitution, comprising of 4 Articles of the Constitution (Articles 148 to 151), dealing with the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. It was submitted, that duties JUDGMENT and powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, delineated in Article 149, revealed, that the position of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, was no less in importance vis-a-vis the Judges of the higher judiciary. Pointing out to Article 148, it was his contention, that the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India is made by the President. His removal under clause (1) of Article 148 could only, in the like manner, be made on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India. Just like a Judge of the Supreme Court, his salary and other conditions of service were to be determined by Page 82 83 Parliament by law, and until they were so determined, they were to be as expressed in the Second Schedule. Further more, just like a Judge of the Supreme Court, neither the salary of the Comptroller and

appointment. In a similar fashion, as in the case of the Supreme Court, persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, were to be subject to such conditions of service, as were determined by law made by Parliament, and till such legislative enactment was made, their conditions of service were determinable by the President, by framing rules, in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. Based on the above, it was contended, that even though the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, was exclusively vested with the executive, there had never been an adverse murmur with reference to his being influenced by the executive. The inference sought JUDGMENT to be drawn was, that the manner of “appointment” is irrelevant, to the question of independence. Independence of an authority, according to the learned Attorney General, emerged from the protection of the conditions of the incumbent’s service, after the appointment had been made. 32. In the like manner, our attention was drawn to Part XV of the Constitution, pertaining to elections. It was submitted, that Article 324 vested the superintendence, direction and control of elections to the Parliament, and the Legislatures of every State, and election to the offices of President and Vice-President, with the Election Commission. The Page 83 84 Election Commission in terms of Article 324(2) was comprised of the Chief Election Commissioner, and such number of other Election Commissioners as the President may from time to time fix. It was

was subject to the provisions of law made by Parliament. It was further pointed out, that under Article 324(5), the conditions of service and the tenure of the office of the Election Commissioners (and the Regional Commissioners) is regulated in the manner, as the President may by rules determine. Of course, subject to, enactment of law by Parliament. So as to depict similarity with the matter under consideration, it was contended, that the proviso under Article 324(5) was explicit to the effect, that the Chief Election Commissioner could not be removed from his office, except in like manner, and on like grounds, as a Judge of the Supreme Court. And further more, that the conditions of service of the JUDGMENT Chief Election Commissioner, could not be varied to his disadvantage, after his appointment. It was contended, that the Indian experience had been, that the Chief Election Commissioner, and the other Election Commissioners, had functioned with absolute independence, and that, their functioning remained unaffected, despite the fact that their appointment had been made, by the executive. It was submitted, that impartiality/independence emerged from the protection of the conditions of service of the incumbent after his appointment, and not by the method or manner of his appointment. Page 84 85 33. It was also the contention of the learned Attorney General, that implicit in the scheme of the Constitution, was a system of checks and balances, wherein the different constitutional functionaries participate in

JUDGMENT “The problem to be solved will often be not so much legal as political, social or economic, yet it must be solved by a court of law. For where the dispute is, as here, not only between Commonwealth and citizen but between Commonwealth and intervening States on the one hand and citizens and States on the other, it is only the Court that can decide the issue, it is vain to invoke the voice of Parliament.” There is ample evidence in the Constitution itself to indicate that it creates a system of checks and balances by reason of which powers are so distributed that none of the three organs it sets up can become so pre-dominant as to disable the others from exercising and discharging powers and functions entrusted to them. Though the Constitution does not lay down the principle of separation of powers in all its rigidity as is the case in the United States Constitution but it envisages such a separation to a degree as was found in Ranasinghe’s case. The judicial review provided expressly in our Constitution by means of Articles 226 Page 85 86

“77. Another contention raised by the petitioners is that the Scheme violates the principle of separation of powers under the Constitution. The concept of separation of powers, even though not found in any particular constitutional provision, is inherent in the polity the Constitution has adopted. The aim of separation of powers is to achieve the maximum extent of accountability of each branch of the Government. 78. While understanding this concept, two aspects must be borne in mind. One, that separation of powers is an essential feature of the Constitution. Two, that in modern governance, a strict separation is neither possible, nor desirable. Nevertheless, till this principle of accountability is preserved, there is no violation of separation of powers. We arrive at the same conclusion when we assess the position within the constitutional text. The Constitution does not prohibit overlap of functions, but in fact provides for some overlap as a parliamentary democracy. But what it prohibits is such exercise of function of the other branch which results in wresting away of the regime of constitutional accountability. JUDGMENT 13 (2010) 5 SCC 538 Page 86 87

all its rigidity as is the case in the United States Constitution yet it envisages such a separation to a degree as was found in Ranasinghe case. The judicial review provided expressly in our Constitution by means of Articles 226 and 32 is one of the features upon which hinges the system of checks and balances.” JUDGMENT and conclusion no.5, which is reproduced as under: “….. (5) Indian Constitution does not recognise strict separation of powers. The constitutional principle of separation of powers will only be violated if an essential function of one branch is taken over by another branch, leading to a removal of checks and balances.” Last of all, the learned Attorney General placed reliance on State of U.P. 14 v. Jeet S. Bisht , wherein this Court held: “78. Separation of powers in one sense is a limit on active jurisdiction of each organ. But it has another deeper and more relevant purpose: to act 14 (2007) 6 SCC 586 Page 87 88 as check and balance over the activities of other organs. Thereby the active

serious and sharp cleavage of opinion on the subject, which is being canvassed before this Court. Relying on the judgment rendered by in the 5 Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case , he pointed out, that in the aforesaid judgment, this Court had arrived at the conclusion, that the term “consultation” could not be deemed to be “concurrence”, with reference to Article 222. In conjunction with the above, he invited our attention to 11 the judgment in the Samsher Singh case , wherein a seven-Judge Bench, which was dealing with a controversy relating to Judges of subordinate courts, and the impact of Article 311, had examined the question whether the President was to act in his individual capacity, i.e., JUDGMENT at his own discretion; or he was liable to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, as mandated under Article 74. Reliance was placed on the following observations from the aforesaid judgment: “149. In the light of the scheme of the Constitution we have already referred to, it is doubtful whether such an interpretation as to the personal satisfaction of the President is correct. We are of the view that the President means, for all practical purposes, the Minister or the Council of Ministers as the case may be, and his opinion, satisfaction or decision is constitutionally secured when his Ministers arrive at such opinion satisfaction or decision. The independence of the Judiciary, which is a cardinal principle of the Constitution and has been relied on to justify the deviation, is guarded by the relevant article making consultation with the Chief Justice of India obligatory. In all conceivable cases consultation with that highest dignitary of Indian justice will and Page 88 89 should be accepted by the Government of India and the Court will have an opportunity to examine if any other extraneous circumstances have entered into the verdict of the Minister, if he departs from the counsel given by the Chief Justice of India. In practice the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the rejection of his advice being ordinarily regarded as prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order. In this view it is immaterial whether the President or the Prime Minister or the Minister for Justice formally decides the issue.” 35. It was submitted, that the aforesaid observations as were recorded 11 in the Samsher Singh case , were relied upon in the Second Judges case. This Court, it was pointed out, had clarified that the observations 11 recorded in paragraph 149 in the Samsher Singh case , were merely in the nature of an obiter. It was submitted, that the aforesaid observations 11 in the Samsher Singh case , were also noticed in paragraph 383 (at page 665), wherein it was sought to be concluded, that the President, for all practical purposes, should be construed, as the concerned Minister or the Council of Ministers. Having noticed the constitutional provisions regarding “consultation” with the judiciary, this Court had expressed, JUDGMENT that the Government was bound by such counsel. Reference was then made to the judgment of this Court in the First Judges case, wherein it was held, that “consultation” did not include “concurrence”, and further, that the power of appointment of Judges under Article 124, was vested with the President, and also, that the President could override the views of the consultees. Last of all, to substantiate his submission(s) pertaining to the cleavage of opinion, reliance was placed on the 10 Kesavananda Bharati case , wherein a thirteen-Judge Bench of this Page 89 90 Court, had held, with reference to the power of amendment under Article 368, that the concept of “basic structure”, was a limitation, to the otherwise plenary power of amendment of the Constitution.

15 General placed reliance on Suraz India Trust v. Union of India , and invited our attention to the following: “3. Shri A.K. Ganguli, learned Senior Advocate, has submitted that the method of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge is mentioned in Article 124(2) of the Constitution of India which states: “124. (2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years. Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.” It may be noted that there is no mention: (i) Of any Collegium in Article 124(2). (ii) The word used in Article 124(2) is “consultation”, and not “concurrence”. (iii) The President of India while appointing a Supreme Court Judge can consult any Judge of the Supreme Court or even the High Court as he deems necessary for the purpose, and is not bound to consult only the five seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court. 4. That by the judicial verdicts in the aforesaid two cases, Article 124(2) has been practically amended, although amendment to the Constitution can only be done by Parliament in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 368 of the Constitution of India. 5. That under Article 124(2) while appointing a Supreme Court Judge, the President of India has to consult the Chief Justice of India, but he may also consult any other Supreme Court Judge and not merely the four JUDGMENT seniormost Judges. Also, the President of India can even consult a High Court Judge, whereas, according to the aforesaid two decisions the President of India cannot consult any Supreme Court Judge other than the four seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court, and he cannot consult any High Court Judge at all. 15 (2012) 13 SCC 497 Page 90 91

JUDGMENT Page 91 92

“15. The petitioner has no locus to maintain the petition in regard to the prayers claiming relief for the benefit of the individual Governors. At all events, such prayers no longer survive on account of passage of time. However, with regard to the general question of public importance referred to the Constitution Bench, touching upon the scope of Article 156(1) and the limitations upon the doctrine of pleasure, the petitioner has the necessary locus.” Thus, Mr Ganguli submits that considering the gravity of the issues involved herein, the matter should be entertained. 12. While dealing with the issue of reference to the larger Bench, Mr Ganguli has placed a very heavy reliance on the recent order of this Court dated 30-3-2011 in Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL (2011) 4 SCC 450, wherein considering the issue of interpretation of the constitutional provisions and validity of the Act involved therein, a three-Judge Bench presided over by the Hon’ble Chief Justice has referred the matter to a nine-Judge Bench. 13. At this juncture, Mr Ganguli as well as Mr Vahanvati have submitted that even at the stage of preliminary hearing for admission of the petition, the matter requires to be heard by a larger Bench as this matter has earlier been dealt with by a three-Judge Bench and involves very complicated legal issues. 14. In view of the above, we place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate directions.” JUDGMENT It was pointed out, that when the above matter was placed before a three-Judge Bench of this Court, the same was dismissed on the ground of locus standi. Yet, since the above order was passed in the absence of the petitioner trust, an application had been moved for recall of the above order. It was his assertion, that whether or not a recall order was passed with reference to the questions raised, it was apparent, that a Page 92 93 Bench of this Court has already expressed the view, that the conclusions drawn in the Second and Third Judges cases, need a relook. 37. Finally, to support the above suggestions, the Court’s attention was

Second Judges case, very strong and adverse views were expressed. The aforesaid views are contained in paragraphs 25.448 to 25.497. For reasons of brevity, it is not possible for us to extract the same herein. Suffice it to state, that the submissions advanced by the learned Attorney General, as have been detailed in the foregoing paragraphs, were more or less, in accord with the views expressed by H.M. Seervai. 38. In order to contend, that it was open to this Court, to make a reference for reconsideration of the matters already adjudicated upon, the learned Attorney General, invited our attention to Jindal Stainless 16 Limited v. State of Haryana .

16 (2010) 4 SCC 595 Page 93 94

submissions by highlighting the main features of the Constitution (67th JUDGMENT Amendment) Bill, 1990. He invited our attention, to the proposed amendments of Articles 124, 217, 222 and 231, and more particularly, to the inserstion of Part XIIIA in the Constitution, under the heading “National Judicial Commission”. Article 307A was proposed as the singular Article in Part XIIIA. Based on the constitution of the National Judicial Commission, it was asserted, that the above Bill, had been introduced, to negate the effect of the judgment of this Court in the First Judges case. It was submitted, that when the aforesaid Bill was introduced in the Parliament, the Supreme Court Bar Association, of Page 94 95 which Mr. Venugopal himself was the then President, organized a seminar on 1.9.1990, for the purpose of debating the pros and cons of th the Constitution (67 Amendment) Bill, 1990. It was submitted, that a

the seminar, were placed before the House, and were passed either unanimously or with an overwhelming majority. It was submitted, that the aforesaid resolutions were forwarded to the Chief Justice of India, through a covering letter dated 5.10.1990. It was pointed out, that resolutions were also passed, at the conclusion of the Chief Justices’ Conference, held between 31.8.1990 and 2.9.1990, wherein also, the th provisions of the Constitution (67 Amendment) Bill, 1990, were deliberated upon. It was submitted, that he had made a compilation of the resolutions passed at the Chief Justices Conference, and the conclusions drawn in the Second Judges case, which would give a bird’s JUDGMENT eye view, of the views expressed. The compilation to which learned counsel drew our attention, is being extracted hereunder: “…(1) The process of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts is an integrated ‘participatory consultative process’ for selecting the best and most suitable persons available for appointment; and all the constitutional functionaries must perform this duty collectively with a view primarily to reach an agreed decision, subserving the constitutional purpose, so that the occasion of primacy does not arise. (2) Initiation of the proposal for appointment in the case of the Supreme Court must be by the Chief Justice of India, and in the case of a High Court by the Chief Justice of that High Court; and for transfer of a Judge/Chief Justice of a High Court, the proposal has to be initiated by the Chief Justice of India. This is the manner in which proposals for appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts as well as for Page 95 96

Based on the aforesaid compilation, it was contended, that the judgment rendered in the Second Judges case, completely obliterated three salient features of Article 124. Firstly, under the original Article 124, the main voice was that of the President. It was submitted, that the voice of the President was totally choked in the Second Judges case. Secondly, Article 124, as it was originally framed, vested the executive with primacy, in JUDGMENT respect of the appointments to the higher judiciary, whereas the position was reversed by the Second Judges case, by vesting primacy with the judiciary. Thirdly, the role of the Chief Justice of India, which was originally, that of a mere consultee, was “turned over its head”, by the decision in the Second Judges case. Now, the collegium of Judges, headed by the Chief Justice of India, has been vested with the final determinative authority for making appointments to the higher judiciary. And the President is liable to “concur”, with the recommendations made. Based on the above assertions, it was the submission of the learned Page 96 97 counsel, that by wholly misconstruing Article 124, the Supreme Court had assumed the entire power of appointment. And the voice of the executive had been completely stifled. It was submitted, that the judiciary

provisions of the Constitution, and thereafter, the Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution in terms of Article 368. It was submitted, that the role assigned to the Constituent Assembly, as also to the Parliament, has been performed by this Court in the Second Judges case. It was submitted, that all this had been done in the name of “judicial independence”. The above logic was sought to be seriously contested by asserting, that judicial independence could not stand by itself, there was something like judicial accountability also, which had to be kept in mind. 41. It was also contended, that the judiciary had taken upon itself, the JUDGMENT exclusive role of making appointments to the higher judiciary, without taking into consideration any of the stakeholders. It is submitted, that the judiciary is meant for the litigating community, and therefore, the litigating community was liable to be vested with some role in the matter of appointments to the higher judiciary. Likewise, it was pointed out, that there were about ten lakhs lawyers in this country. They also had not been given any say in the matter. Even the Bar Associations, which have the ability to represent the lawyers’ fraternity, had been excluded from any role in the process of appointments. It was highlighted, that under Page 97 98 the old system, all the above stakeholders, had an opportunity to make representations to the executive, in the matter of appointments to the higher judiciary. But, that role has now been totally excluded, by the

of conclusions (recorded in paragraph 486, in the Second Judges case) that the majority opinion in the First Judges case, insofar as, it had taken a contrary view, relating to primacy of the role of the Chief Justice of India, in matters of appointments and transfers, and the justiciability of these matters, as well as, in relation to judge-strength, did not commend itself as being the correct view. Accordingly it was concluded, that the relevant provisions of the Constitution including the constitutional scheme must now be construed, understood and implemented, in the manner indicated in the conclusions drawn in the Second Judges case. The above determination, according to learned JUDGMENT counsel, was absolutely misconceived, as the same totally negated the effect of Article 74, which required the President to act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. According to learned counsel, the President would now have to act as per the dictate of the Chief Justice of India and the collegium of Judges. It was submitted, that it was impermissible in law, for a party to make a decision in its own favour. This, according to learned counsel, is exactly what the Supreme Court had done in the Second Judges case. It was contented, that the impugned constitutional amendment was an effort at the behest of the Page 98 99 Parliament, to correct the above historical aberration. Learned counsel concluded, by asserting, that there were two Houses of Parliament under the Constitution, but the Supreme Court in the Second Judges case, had

submitted, that when the Union of India and the States which ratified the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, seek reconsideration of the Second Judges case, was it too much, that the Union and the States were asking for? 42. Following the submissions noticed hereinabove, we heard Mr. K. Parasaran, Senior Advocate, who also supported the prayer made by the learned Attorney General. It was submitted, that the appointment of Judges had nothing to do with “independence of the Judge” concerned, or the judicial institution as a whole. It was submitted, that subsequent to their appointment to the higher judiciary, the conditions of service of JUDGMENT Judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court were securely protected. Thereafter, the independence of the Judges depended on their judicial conscience, and the executive has no role to play therein. 43. It was asserted, that the Judges who expressed the majority view, in the Second Judges case, entertained a preconceived notion about the “basic structure”, even before hearing commenced, in the Second Judges case. In this behalf, he placed reliance on the resolutions passed at the conclusion of the Chief Justices’ Conference, held between 31.8.1990 and 2.9.1990. It was asserted, that the controversy had not been adjudicated Page 99 100 on the basis of an independent assessment, of the views expressed in the Constituent Assembly debates (with reference to the text of Article 124). It was submitted, that the interpretation rendered on Article 124,

provisions. According to learned senior counsel, the judiciary had encroached into the executive power of appointment of Judges. This amounted to encroaching into a constitutional power, reserved for the executive, by the Constitution. It was asserted, that the power of amendment of the Constitution, vested in the Parliament under Article 368, was only aimed at keeping the Constitution in constant repair. It was submitted, that the aforesaid power vested with the Parliament, could not have been exercised by the Supreme Court, by substituting the procedure of appointment of Judges, in the manner the Supreme Court felt. It was submitted, that in the Second Judges case, as also, the Third JUDGMENT Judges case, the Supreme Court had violated the “basic structure”, by impinging upon legislative power. It was contended, that it was imperative for this Court to have a re-look at the two judgments, so as to determine, whether there had been a trespass by the judiciary, into the legislative domain. And, if this Court arrives at the conclusion, that such was the case, it should strike down its earlier determination. It was further submitted, that the majesty of the Constitution, must be maintained and preserved at all costs, and there should be no hesitation in revisiting any earlier judgment, so as to correct an erroneous decision. Page 100 101 With the aforesaid observations, learned counsel commended the Bench, to accept the prayer made by the learned Attorney General, and to make a reference for reconsideration of the judgments rendered by this Court, in the Second and Third Judges cases, to a Bench with an appropriate strength. 44. Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, Senior Advocate, also supported the submissions for reference to a larger Bench. It was submitted, that the conclusions drawn by this Court in the Second Judges case, and the Third Judges case, were liable to be described as doubtful, because a large number of salient facts, had not been taken into consideration, when the same were decided. It was the contention of the learned counsel, that the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners, on merits, could not be supported by the text of the constitutional provisions, and that, the petitioners’ reliance squarely based on the majority judgment in the Second Judges case, as was further explained JUDGMENT in the Third Judges case, was seriously flawed. It was submitted, that the thrust of the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners on merits had been, not only that the consultation with the Chief Justice of India was mandatory, but the opinion of the collegium of Judges was binding on the executive. It was asserted, that neither of the above requirements emerged from the plain reading of Article 124. It was asserted, that the basis of the learned counsel representing the petitioners, to assail the impugned constitutional amendment, as also the NJAC Act, was squarely premised on the above determination. It was Page 101 102 asserted, that the conclusion of primacy of the judiciary, in the matter of appointment of Judges in the higher judiciary, could not be supported by any text of the original constitutional provisions. It was, accordingly

45. According to the learned counsel, the primary objection raised, at the behest of the petitioners, opposing the reconsideration of the decision rendered in the Second Judges case, was based on the observations recorded in paragraph 10 of the Third Judges case, wherein the statement of the then Attorney General for India, had been recorded, that the Union of India was not seeking a review or reconsideration of the judgment in the Second Judges case. It was submitted, that the aforesaid statement, could not bar the plea of reconsideration, for all times to come. It was further submitted, that the above statement would not bind the Parliament. It was contended, that the statement to the effect, that JUDGMENT the Union of India, was not seeking a review or reconsideration of the Second Judges case, should not be understood to mean, that it was impliedly conceded, that the Second Judges case had been correctly decided. It was pointed out, that the advisory jurisdiction under Article 143, which had been invoked by the Presidential Reference made on 23.7.1998, requiring this Court to render the Third Judges case, was neither appellate nor revisionary in nature. In this behalf, learned 17 counsel placed reliance on Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal , 17 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96(II) Page 102 103 wherein it was held, that an order passed by the Supreme Court, could be reviewed only when its jurisdiction was invoked under Article 137 of the Constitution (read with Rule 1 of Order 40 of the Supreme Court

a Presidential Reference made under Article 143. In fact, this Court in the above judgment, had gone on to conclude, that if the power of review was to be read in Article 143, it would be a serious inroad into the “independence of the judiciary”. It was therefore submitted, that the statement of the then Attorney General, during the course of hearing of the Third Judges case, could not be treated as binding, for all times to come, so as to deprive the executive and the legislature from even seeking a review of the judgments rendered. It was therefore contended, that it was implicit while discharging its duty, that this Court was obliged to correct the errors of law, which may have been committed in the past. JUDGMENT Learned counsel contended, that a perusal of the judgment of this Court 4 in the Subhash Sharma case , clearly brought out, that no formal request was made to this Court for reconsideration of the legal position declared by this Court in the First Judges case. Yet, this Court, on its own motion, examined the correctness of the First Judges case, and suo motu , made a reference of the matter, to a nine-Judge Bench, to reconsider the law declared in the First Judges case. Page 103 104 46. While pointing to the reasons for reconsideration of the law laid down by this Court in the Second Judges case (read with the Third Judges case), learned senior counsel, asserted, that the essence of Article

and canvassed and summarized the following salient features emerging therefrom: “i. The authority to appoint Judges of the higher judiciary was vested in the President. ii. The above power of appointment by the President, was subject to only one condition, namely, ‘consultation’. iii. The above consultation was a two-fold – one which in the opinion of the President may be deemed necessary, and the other which was mandatory. iv. The mandatory consultation was with the Chief Justice of India. The consultation which the President may have ‘if deemed necessary for the purpose, was with judges of the Supreme Court and also of the High Courts in the states, as may be felt appropriate. v. There was no limitation on the power, scope and ambit of the President to engage in consultation, he may not only with the judges of the Supreme Court, but may also consult judges of High Courts as he may deem necessary, for this purpose. vi. There was also no limitation on the President’s power of consultation. He could consult as many judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts which he deemed necessary for the purpose. vii. Having regard to the object and purpose of the appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court, and that, such appointment was to the highest judicial office in the Republic, was clearly intended to be broad-based, interactive, informative and meaningful, so that, the appointment was made of the most suitable candidate. viii. This aspect of the power of consultation of the President, as had been provided had been completely ignored in the majority judgment in Second Judges’ case. And the focus has been confined only to the consultation, with the Chief Justice of India. ix. The interpretation of the consultative process, and the procedure laid down, in the majority judgement in the Second Judges case, that the President’s power of consultation, was all-pervasive had been ‘circumscribed’, having been so held expressly in paragraph 458 (by Justice J.S. Verma) in the Second Judges’ case. JUDGMENT Page 104 105

47. According to learned senior counsel, a perusal of the judgment in 4 the Subhash Sharma case would reveal, that reconsideration of the judgments in the First Judges case, was only on two issues. Firstly, the status and importance of consultation, and the primacy of the position of the Chief Justice of India. And secondly, the justiceability of fixation, of the judge-strength of a Court. It was asserted, that no other issue was JUDGMENT referred for reconsideration. This assertion was sought to be supported 4 with the following observations, noticed in the Subhash Sharma case : “49. …..Similarly, the writ application filed by Subhash Sharma for the reasons indicated above may also be disposed of without further directions. As and when necessary the matter can be brought before the court. As in our opinion the correctness of the majority view in S.P. Gupta case [(1981) Supp. SCC 87] should be considered by a larger bench we direct the papers of W.P. No.1303 of 1987 to be placed before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a bench of nine Judges to examine the two questions we have referred to above, namely, the position of the Chief Justice of India with reference to primacy and, secondly, justiciability of fixation of Judge strength.” Page 105 106 It was asserted, that there was no scope or occasion for the Bench hearing the Second Judges case, to rewrite the Constitution, on the subject of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was

obiter dicta . In the Second Judges case, the ratio decidendi , according to learned counsel, was limited to the declaration of the legal position, only on the two issues, referred to the larger Bench for consideration. Thus viewed, it was asserted, that all other conclusions recorded in the Second Judges case, on issues other than the two questions referred for reconsideration, cannot legitimately be described as binding law under Article 141. To support the above contention, reliance was placed on 18 Kerala State Science and Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. , wherein this Court held as under: “8. It is fairly well settled that when reference is made on a specific issue either by a learned Single Judge or Division Bench to a larger Bench i.e. Division Bench or Full Bench or Constitution Bench, as the case may be, the larger Bench cannot adjudicate upon an issue which is not the question referred to. (See Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India [(1981) Supp. SCC 38], Samaresh Chandra Bose v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [(1972) 2 SCC 476] and K.C.P. Ltd. v. State Trading Corpn. of India [(1995) Supp. (3) SCC 466].” JUDGMENT 48. Learned senior counsel submitted, that in the Second Judges case, this Court assigned an innovative meaning to the words “Chief Justice of India”, by holding that the term “Chief Justice of India” in Article 124, included a plurality of Judges, and not the individual Chief Justice of 18 (2006) 6 SCC 258 Page 106 107 India. This, according to learned counsel, was against the plain meaning and text of Article 124. Learned counsel, went on to add, that this Court in the Second Judges case, had laid down an inviolable rule of seniority,

Court to another. It also concluded, that any transfer of a Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court, made on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, would be deemed to be non-punitive. In sum and substance, learned counsel contended, that the Second Judges case, laid down a new structure, in substitution to the role assigned to the Chief Justice of India. The conclusions recorded in the Second Judges case, according to learned counsel, could not be described as a mere judicial interpretation. It was asserted, that the same was nothing short of judicial activism (or, judicial legislation). 49. Learned senior counsel then invited the Court’s attention, to the JUDGMENT principles laid down for reconsideration, or review of a previous judgment. For this he pointedly invited the Court’s attention to Bengal 19 Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar , Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. 20 Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay , and Union of India v. Raghubir 21 Singh . Learned counsel also referred to Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. 22 Indian Institute of Chemical Biology , wherein it was observed: 19 (1955) 6 SCR 603 20 (1974) 2 SCC 402 21 (1989) 2 SCC 754 22 (2002) 5 SCC 111 Page 107 108

JUDGMENT It was submitted, that Kuldip Singh, J., in the Second Judges case, had recorded as follows: Page 108 109

which was bound to be exercised in consonance with Article 74. It was JUDGMENT contended, that the functioning of the President, in the absence of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, could not just be imagined under the scheme of the Constitution. And therefore, the substitution of the participatory role of the Council of Ministers (or, the Minister concerned), with that of the Chief Justice of India in conjunction with his collegium, was just unthinkable. And secondly, that the First Judges case, was wrongly overruled, and the correct law for appointment of Judges, vis-à-vis the role of the executive, was correctly laid down in the First Judges case, by duly preserving the “independence of the judiciary”. It Page 109 110 was submitted, that reference to a larger Bench was inevitable, because it was not open to the respondents, to canvass the above submission, before a five-Judge Bench.”

however similar. It was their contention, that a Constitutional Court revisits constitutional issues, from time to time. This, according to learned counsel, has to be done because the Constitution is a living document, and needed to be reinvented, to keep pace with the change of times. It was submitted, that this may not be true for other branches of law, wherein judgments are not revisited, because the Courts were expected to clearly and unambiguously follow the principle of stare decisis, with reference to laws dealing with private rights. Insofar as the controversy in hand is concerned, it was submitted, that the conclusions recorded by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, indicated JUDGMENT doubtful conclusions, because a large number of salient facts (as have been recorded above), had not been taken into consideration. It was submitted, that expediency in a controversy like the one in hand, should be in favour of the growth of law. It was submitted, that in their view this was one such case, wherein the issue determined by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, needed to be re-examined by making a reference to a larger Bench. Learned counsel pointed out, that the submissions made in the different petitions filed before this Court, were not supported by the text of any constitutional provision, but only relied Page 110 111 on the legal position declared by this Court, in the above two cases. In such an important controversy, according to learned counsel, this Court should not be hesitant in revisiting its earlier judgments. Mr.

in the Second and Third Judges cases? He answered the same through another query, how can appointments of Judges be by Judges? The above position was again posed differently, by putting forth a further query, can primacy rest with the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary? 51. Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned Senior Advocate, in support of his contention, that the matter needed to be heard by a larger Bench, placed reliance on Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of 23 India , and invited our attention to question no.5 of the reference made by this Court: JUDGMENT “5. Whether the majority decision in State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. [(2004) 10 SCC 201] could be read as departing from the law laid down in the seven-Judge Bench decision in India Cement Ltd. v. State of T.N. [(1990) 1 SCC 12)?” It was pointed out, that the above question came to be framed because in 24 State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. , this Court by a majority of 4:1 had clarified the judgment rendered by a seven-Judge 25 Bench of this Court in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu . This Court had to frame the above question, and refer the matter to a 23 (2011) 4 SCC 450 24 (2004) 10 SCC 201 25 (1990) 1 SCC 12 Page 111 112 nine-Judge Bench. Learned counsel, then placed reliance on 26 Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India , wherein this Court had observed as under:

In view of the above, it was contended, that this Court while examining the merits of the controversy in hand, was bound to rely on the judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases, to record its conclusions. Referring to the factual position narrated above, it was submitted, that this Court would not be in a position to effectively adjudicate on the issues canvassed, till the matter was referred to a nine-Judge Bench (or even, a still larger Bench). 52. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General of India submitted, that JUDGMENT he would support the claim for reference to a larger Bench, by relying upon two judgments, and say no more. First and foremost, he placed 19 reliance on the Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. case , which it was pointed out, had considered the judgment in State of Bombay v. United Motors 27 (India) Ltd. . The matter, it was submitted, came to be referred to a seven-Judge Bench, to decide whether the judgment needed to be reconsidered. This process, according to learned Solicitor General, need to be adopted in the present controversy as well, so as to take a fresh call 26 (1992) 4 SCC 97 27 (1953) SCR 1069 Page 112 113 on the previous judgments. Learned Solicitor General then placed reliance on Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 28 Bombay North , wherein a seven-Judge Bench held as under:

28 (1965) 2 SCR 908 Page 113 114 constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations: — What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and review and revise its earlier decisions. These considerations become still more significant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of a Bench of five learned Judges of this Court. ….. The principle of stare decisis, no doubt, cannot be pressed into service in cases where the jurisdiction of this Court to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions is invoked; but nevertheless, the normal principle that judgments pronounced by this Court would be final, cannot be ignored, and unless considerations of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so, this Court should and would be reluctant to review and revise its earlier decisions. That, broadly stated, is the approach which we propose to adopt in dealing with the point made by the learned Attorney-General that the earlier decisions of this Court in the New Jehangir Mills case, (1960) 1 SCR 249 and the Petlad Co. Ltd. case, (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 871, should be reconsidered and revised. Let us then consider the question of construing s. 66(4) of the Act. Before we do so, it is necessary to read sub-section (1), (2) and (4) of s. 66. Section 66(1) reads thus: — JUDGMENT Page 114 115 "Within sixty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under sub-section (4) of section 33, the assessee or the Commissioner may, by application in the prescribed form, accompanied where application is made by the assessee by a fee of one hundred rupees, require the appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order, and the Appellate Tribunal shall within ninety days of the receipt of such application draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court." …..” Based on the above, it was asserted, on the basis of the factual and legal position projected by the learned Attorney General, that the position declared by this Court in the Second Judges case, as also, in the Third Judges case, was clearly erroneous. It was submitted, that the procedure evolved by this Court for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary having miserably failed, not because of any defect in the independence of the procedure prescribed, but because of the “intra-dependence of the Judges”, who took part in discharging the responsibilities vested in the collegium of Judges, certainly required a re-examination. 53. It is apparent from the submissions advanced at the hands of the JUDGMENT learned counsel representing the Union of India and the different State Governments, that rather than choosing to respond to the assertions made with reference to the constitutional validity of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 and the NJAC Act, had collectively canvassed, that the present five-Judge Bench should refer the present controversy for adjudication to a Bench of nine or more Judges, which could effectively revisit, if necessary, the judgments rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases. In view of the aforesaid consideration, we are of the view, that the observations recorded by this Page 115 116 15 Court, in the Suraz India Trust case , as also, the fact that the same is pending before this Court, is immaterial. Consequent upon the instant determination by us, the above matter will be liable to be disposed of, in terms of the instant judgment. IV. OBJECTION BY THE PETITIONERS, TO THE MOTION FOR REVIEW: 54. Mr. Fali S. Nariman, disagreed with the suggestion that the controversy in hand, needed to be decided by a larger Bench. It was his pointed submission, that the issue canvassed had been improperly pressed, by overlooking certain salient features, which had necessarily to be taken into consideration, before a prayer for reference to a larger Bench could be agitated. It was submitted, that all the learned counsel representing the respondents had overlooked the fact, that the interpretation of Article 124 of the Constitution, was rendered in the first instance, by a seven-Judge Bench in the First Judges case. It was JUDGMENT pointed out, that the law declared by this Court in the First Judges case, having been doubted, the matter was referred for reconsideration, before the nine-Judge Bench, which delivered the judgment in the Second Judges case. It was pointed out, that the prayer for revisitation, which is being made at the behest of the learned counsel representing the Union of India and the different participating States, was clearly unacceptable, because the legal position declared by this Court in the First Judges case had already been revisited in the Second Judges case by a larger Constitution Bench. Not only that, it was asserted, that when certain Page 116 117 doubts arose about the implementation of the judgment in the Second Judges case, a Presidential Reference was made under Article 143, resulting in the re-examination of the matter, at the hands of yet another

“11. We record at the outset the statements of the Attorney General that (1) the Union of India is not seeking a review or reconsideration of the judgment in the Second Judges case and that (2) the Union of India shall accept and treat as binding the answers of this Court to the questions set out in the Reference.” It was submitted, that thereupon, the matter was again examined and the declared legal position in the Second Judges case, was reiterated and confirmed, by the judgment rendered in the Third Judges case. Premised on the aforesaid factual position, learned counsel raised a poser, namely, how many times, can this Court revisit the same question? It was asserted, that just because such a prayer seems to be the only way out, for those representing the respondents, the same need not be accepted. JUDGMENT 55. Learned senior counsel pointed out, that the legal position with reference to appointments to the higher judiciary came to be examined and declared, for the first time, in the First Judges case, in 1981. It was submitted, that the aforesaid determination would not have been rendered, had this Court’s attention been drawn to the Samsher Singh 11 case , during the course of hearing, in the First Judges case. It was submitted, that the position declared by this Court in the First Judges case needed to be revisited, was realized during the hearing of the case in 4 the Subhash Sharma case . While examining the justification of the Page 117 118 conclusions drawn by this Court, in the First Judges case, the matter was placed for consideration, before a nine-Judge Bench. It was submitted, that all the issues, which have now been raised at the hands

Second Judges case, clearly arrived at the conclusion, that the earlier judgment rendered in the First Judges case, did not lay down the correct

119

Pointing to the opinion extracted above, it was asserted, that the action of the executive to put off the recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India (disapproving the appointment of a person, as a Judge of the High JUDGMENT Court) would amount to an act of deprival, “violating the sprit of the Constitution”. Inasmuch as, the above demeanour/expression, would give an unjust and unwarranted power to the executive, which was not intended by the framers of the Constitution. The Court went on to hold, that the vesting of such power with the executive, would be wholly inappropriate, and in the nature of arbitrary power. It was also noted, that after this Court rendered its decision in the First Judges case, the Law Minister and the Prime Minister were found to be in such a dominant position, that they could appoint a Judge to the higher Page 119 120 judiciary, despite his being disapproved (or, even when he was not recommended at all) by the Chief Justice of India (and likewise, by the Chief Justice of the High Court). Thus, in the view of M.M. Punchhi, J.,

Accordingly, it was the contention of the learned senior counsel, that one of the minority Judges had also expressed the same sentiments as had been recorded by the majority, on the subject of primacy of the judiciary in matters regulated under Articles 124, 217 and 222. 57. It was submitted, that the issue in hand was examined threadbare by revisiting the judgment rendered in the First Judges case, when this Court reviewed the matter through the Second Judges case. It was submitted, that during the determination of the Third Judges case, the then Attorney General for India had made a statement to the Bench, that the Union of India, was not seeking a review or reconsideration of the JUDGMENT judgment in the Second Judges case. Even though, the opinion tendered by this Court, consequent upon a reference made to the Supreme Court by the President of India under Article 143, is not binding, yet a statement was made by Attorney General for India, that the Union of India had accepted as binding, the answers of this Court to the questions set out in the reference. All this, according to learned counsel, stands recorded in paragraph 11 of the judgment rendered in the Third Judges case. According to learned senior counsel, it was clearly beyond the Page 120 121 purview of the Union of India, to seek a revisit of the Second and Third Judges cases. 58. Besides the position expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, even

examine the correctness of the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases. It was submitted, that such a course could only be adopted, when it was established beyond all reasonable doubt, that the previous judgments were erroneous. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, learned counsel placed reliance on Lt. Col. Khajoor 29 Singh v. Union of India (Bench of 7 Judges), wherefrom learned counsel highlighted the following: “We have given our earnest consideration to the language of Art. 226 and the two decisions of this Court referred to above. We are of opinion that unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which cannot be denied, we should not depart from the interpretation given in these two cases and indeed from any interpretation given in an earlier judgment of this Court, unless there is a fair amount of unanimity that the earlier decisions are manifestly wrong. This Court should not, except when it is demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that its previous ruling, given after due deliberation and full hearing, was erroneous, go back upon its previous ruling, particularly on a constitutional issue.” JUDGMENT 28 Reference was also made to the Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. case , wherein a seven-Judge Bench of this Court held as under: “It must be conceded that the view for which the learned Attorney-General contends is a reasonably possible view, though we must hasten to add that the view which has been taken by this Court in its earlier decisions is also reasonably possible. The said earlier view has been followed by this Court on several occasions and has regulated the procedure in reference proceedings in the High Courts in this country 29 (1961) 2 SCR 828 Page 121 122 ever since the decision of this Court in the New Jehangir Mills, (1960) 1 SCR 249, was pronounced on May 12, 1959. Besides, it is somewhat remarkable that no reported decision has been cited before us where the question about the construction of s. 66(4) was considered and decided in favour of the Attorney-General's contention. Having carefully weighed the pros and cons of the controversy which have been pressed before us on the present occasion, we are not satisfied that a case has been made out to review and revise our decisions in the case of the New Jehangir Mills and the case of the Petlad Co. Ltd. (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 871. That is why we think that the contention raised by Mr. Palkhivala must be upheld. In the result, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is sent back to the High Court with a direction that the High Court should deal with it in the light of the two relevant decisions in the New Jehangir Mills and the Petlad Co. Ltd.” While referring to Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar 30 Pradesh , our attention was drawn to the following observations recorded by the five-Judge Bench:

Learned counsel while relying upon Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. State 31 of Rajasthan (Bench of 5 Judges), referred to the following: “28. …..We are not inclined to agree. The principles governing reconsideration of an earlier decision are settled by the various decisions of this Court. It has been laid down: “This Court should not, accept when 30 (1980) 1 SCC 223 31 (1993) 1 SCC 364 Page 122 123

of the learned counsel representing the respondents for revisiting the JUDGMENT judgments rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, was canvassed on the ground that the observations recorded by this 11 Court in the Samsher Singh case (in paragraph 149) could neither be understood as stray observations, nor be treated as obiter dicta . The reasons expressed by the learned senior counsel on the above issue were as follows: “(i) In the other case relating to the independence of the judiciary (re transfer of High Court Judges) – UOI vs. Sankal Chand Seth, (1977) 4 SCC 193 (5J) – as to whether a Judge of a High Court can be transferred to another High Court without his consent, it was decided by majority that he could be: the majority consisted of Justice Chandrachud, Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali. Page 123 124 (ii) The judgment of Justice Krishna Iyer (on behalf of himself and Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali in Sankal Chand Seth – [with which Bhagwati, J. said he was “entirely in agreement”] reads as follows (paras 115-116): “115. The next point for consideration in this appeal is as to the nature, ambit and scope of consultation, as appearing in Article 222(1 ) of the Constitution, with the Chief Justice of India. The consultation, in order to fulfil its normative function in Article 222(1), must be a real, substantial and effective consultation based on full and proper materials placed before the Chief Justice by the Government. Before giving his opinion the Chief Justice of India would naturally take into consideration all relevant factors and may informally ascertain from the Judge concerned if he has any real personal difficulty or any humanitarian ground on which his transfer may not be directed. Such grounds may be of a wide range including his health or extreme family factors. It is not necessary for the Chief Justice to issue formal notice to the Judge concerned but it is sufficient — although it is not obligatory — if he ascertains these facts either from the Chief Justice of the High Court or from his own colleagues or through any other means which the Chief Justice thinks safe, fair and reasonable. Where a proposal of transfer of a Judge is made the Government must forward every possible material to the Chief Justice so that he is in a position to give an effective opinion. Secondly, although the opinion of the Chief Justice of India may not be binding on the Government it is entitled to great weight and is normally to be accepted by the Government because the power under Article 222 cannot be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily. In the case of Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court, (1969) 3 SCC 36, while interpreting the word "consultation" as appearing in Article 233 of the Constitution this Court observed as follows: “Consultation with the High Court under Article 233 is not an empty formality. So far as promotion of officers to the cadre of District Judges is concerned the High Court is best fitted to adjudge the claims and merits of persons to be considered for promotion....We cannot accept this. Consultation or deliberation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto make their respective points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their views. If one party makes a proposal to the other who has a counter proposal in his mind which is not communicated to the prosper the direction to give effect to the counter proposal without anything more, cannot be said to have been issued after consultation. In Samsher Singh's case, AIR 1974 SC 2192, one of us has struck the same chord. It must also be borne in mind that if the Government departs from the opinion of the Chief Justice of India it has to justify its action by giving cogent and convincing reasons for the same and, if challenged, to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that a case was made out for not accepting the advice of the Chief Justice of India. It seems to us that the word, 'consultation' has been used in Article 222 as a matter of constitutional courtesy in view of the fact that two very high dignitaries JUDGMENT Page 124 125 are concerned in the matter, namely, the President and the Chief Justice of India. Of course, the Chief Justice has no power of veto, as Dr. Ambedkar explained in the Constituent Assembly.” (iii) Justice Chandrachud (in the course of his judgment) agreeing – in paragraph 41 of Sankalchand Seth followed Shamsher Singh (para 149).”

was to be accepted, namely, that the decisions rendered by this Court in the above two cases were required to be re-examined, by a reference to a larger Bench, still the observations recorded in paragraph 149 in the 11 Samsher Singh case would continue to hold the field, as the review of the same had not been sought. V. THE CONSIDERATION: I. 60. In the scheme of the Constitution, the Union judiciary has been dealt in Chapter IV of Part V, and the High Courts in the States, as well as, the Subordinate-courts have been dealt with in Chapters V and VI JUDGMENT respectively, of Part VI. The provisions of Parts V and VI of the Constitution, with reference to the Union and the States judiciaries including Subordinate-courts, have arisen for interpretative determination by this Court, on several occasions. We may chronologically notice the determination rendered by this Court, with reference to the above Parts, especially those dealing with the executive participation, in the matters relating to the Union judiciary, the High Courts in the States, and the Subordinate-courts. During the course of hearing, our attention was invited to the following: Page 125 126 (i) Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 – rendered by a five-Judge Bench, (ii) Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 193 - rendered by a five-Judge Bench,

(v) Re: Special Reference No.1 of 1998, (1998) 7 SCC 739 – rendered by a nine-Judge Bench. This Court on no less than five occasions, has examined the controversy which we are presently dealing with, through Constitution Benches. In 11 the Samsher Singh case , it was concluded, that in all conceivable cases, consultation with the highest dignitary in the Indian judiciary – the Chief Justice of India, will and should be accepted by the Government of India, in matters relatable to the Chapters and Parts of the Constitution referred to above. In case, it was not so accepted, the Court would have JUDGMENT an opportunity to examine, whether any other extraneous circumstances had entered into the verdict of the concerned Minister or the Council of Ministers (headed by the Prime Minister), whose views had prevailed in ignoring the counsel given by the Chief Justice of India. This Court accordingly concluded, that in practice, the last word must belong to the Chief Justice of India. The above position was also further clarified, that rejection of the advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India, would ordinarily be regarded as prompted by oblique considerations, vitiating the order. In a sense of understanding, this Court in the Samsher Singh Page 126 127 11 case , is seen to have read the term “consultation” expressed in Articles 124 and 217 as conferring primacy to the opinion tendered by the Chief Justice. When the matter came to be examined in the Sankalchand

11 Singh case , by holding, that in all conceivable cases, “consultation” with the Chief Justice of India, should be accepted, by the Government of India. And further, that in the event of any departure, it would be open to a court to examine whether, any other circumstances had entered into the verdict of the executive. More importantly, this Court expressly recorded an ardent hope, that the exposition recorded in the Samsher 11 Singh case , would not fall on deaf ears. No doubt can be entertained, that yet again, this Court read the term “consultation” as an expression, conveying primacy in the matter under consideration, to the view expressed by the Chief Justice. The solitary departure from the above JUDGMENT interpretation, was recorded by this Court in the First Judges case, wherein it came to be concluded, that the meaning of the term “consultation” could not be understood as “concurrence”. In other words, it was held, that the opinion tendered by the Chief Justice of India, would not be binding on the executive. The function of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was described as an executive function, and it was held by the majority, that the ultimate power of appointment, unquestionably rested with the President. The opinion expressed by this Court in the First Judges case, was doubted in the Subhash Sharma Page 127 128 4 case , which led to the matter being re-examined in the Second Judges case, at the hands of a nine-Judge Bench, which while setting aside the judgment rendered in the First Judges case, expressed its opinion in

concluded, in the Second Judges case, that the term “consultation” expressed in Articles 124, 217 and 222 had to be read as vesting primacy with the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of India, based on a participatory consultative process. In other words, in matters involving Articles 124, 217 and 222, primacy with reference to the ultimate power of appointment (or transfer) was held, to be vesting with the judiciary. The above position came to be reconsidered in the Third Judges case, by a nine-Judge Bench, wherein the then learned Attorney General for India, made a statement, that the Union of India was not seeking a review, or reconsideration of the judgment in the Second Judges case, and further, JUDGMENT that the Union of India had accepted the said judgment, and would treat the decision of this Court in the Second Judges case as binding. It is therefore apparent, that the judiciary would have primacy in matters regulated by Articles 124, 217 and 222, was conceded, by the Union of India, in the Third Judges case. 61. We have also delineated hereinabove, the views of the Judges recorded in the First Judges case, which was rendered by a majority of 4:3. Not only, that the margin was extremely narrow, but also, the views expressed by the Judges were at substantial variance, on all the issues Page 128 129 canvassed before the Court. The primary reason for recording the view of each of the Judges in the First Judges case hereinbefore, was to demonstrate differences in the deductions, inferences and the eventual

majority of 7:2. Not only was the position clearly expressed, there was hardly any variance, on the issues canvassed. So was the position with the Third Judges case, which was a unanimous and unambiguous exposition of the controversy. We, therefore, find ourselves not inclined to accept the prayer for a review of the Second and Third Judges cases. 62. Having given pointed and thoughtful consideration to the proposition canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondents, we are constrained to conclude, that the issue of primacy of the judiciary, in the matter of appointment and transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary, having been repeatedly examined, the prayer for a JUDGMENT re-look/reconsideration of the same, is just not made out. This Court having already devoted so much time to the same issue, should ordinarily not agree to re-examine the matter yet again, and spend more time for an issue, already well thrashed out. But time has not been the constraint, while hearing the present cases, for we have allowed a free debate, and have taken upon ourselves the task of examining the issues canvassed. Yet, the remedy of review must have some limitations. Mr. Fali S. Nariman, learned senior counsel, is right, in his submission, that the power of review was exercised and stood expended when the First Judges Page 129 130 case was reviewed by a larger Bench in the Second Judges case. And for sure, it was wholly unjustified for the Union of India, which had conceded during the course of hearing of the Third Judges case, that it

been revisited, and the position having been conceded by the Union of India, it does not lie in the mouth of the Union of India, to seek reconsideration of the judicial declaration, in the Second and Third Judges cases. Therefore, as a proposition of law, we are not inclined to accept the prayer of the Union of India and the other respondents, for a re-look or review of the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases. All the same, as we have indicated at the beginning of this order, because the matter is of extreme importance and sensitivity, we will still examine the merits of the submissions advanced by learned counsel. JUDGMENT II. 63. The most forceful submission advanced by the learned Attorney General, was premised on the Constituent Assembly debates. In this behalf, our attention was invited to the views expressed by K.T. Shah, K.M. Munshi, Tajamul Husain, Alladi Krishnaswami Aayar, Ananthasayanam Ayyangar and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. It was pointed out by the learned Attorney General, that the Members of the Constituent Assembly feared, that the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary should not be exclusively vested with the Page 130 131 judiciary. The process of appointment of Judges by Judges, it was contended, was described as Imperium in Imperio, during the Constituent Assembly debates . In responding to the above observations, Dr. B.R.

Members of the Constituent Assembly, that the drafted Article had adopted the middle course, while refusing to create an Imperium in Imperio, in such a manner, that the “independence of the judiciary” would be fully preserved. The exact text of the response of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, has been extracted in paragraph 30 above. 64. It was the contention of the learned Attorney General, that despite the clear intent expressed during the Constituent Assembly debates, not to create an Imperium in Imperio , the Second and Third Judges cases had done just that. It was submitted, that in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, being followed since 1993, JUDGMENT Judges alone had been appointing Judges. It was also contended, that the Constitution contemplates a system of checks and balances, where each pillar of governance is controlled by checks and balances, exercised by the other two pillars. It was repeatedly emphasized, that in the present system of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, the executive has no role whatsoever. It was accordingly the contention of the respondents, that the manner in which Articles 124, 217 and 222 had been interpreted in the Second and Third Judges cases, fell foul of the intent of the Constituent Assembly. This, according to the learned Page 131 132 counsel for the respondents, was reason enough, to revisit and correct, the view expressed in the Second and Third Judges cases. 65. It is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced at the

a Memorandum of Procedure for Appointment of Judges and Chief Justices to the Higher Judiciary was drawn by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs on 30.6.1999. The Memorandum of Procedure aforementioned, is available on the website of the above Ministry. The above Memorandum of Procedure has been examined by us. In our considered view, the Memorandum of Procedure provides for a participatory role, to the judiciary as well as the political-executive. Each of the above components are responsible for contributing information, material and data, with reference to the individual under consideration. While the judicial contribution is responsible for evaluating the JUDGMENT individual’s professional ability, the political-executive is tasked with the obligation to provide details about the individual’s character and antecedents. Our analysis of the Memorandum of Procedure reveals, that the same contemplates inter alia the following steps for selection of High Court Judges: Step 1: The Chief Justice of the concerned High Court has the responsibility of communicating, to the Chief Minister of the State concerned, names of persons to be selected for appointment. Details are furnished to the Chief Minister, in terms of the format appended to the Page 132 133 memorandum. Additionally, if the Chief Minister desires to recommend name(s) of person(s) for such appointment, he must forward the same to the Chief Justice for his consideration.

High Court collegium, regarding the suitability of the names proposed. The entire consultation must be in writing, and these opinions must be sent to the Chief Minister along with the Chief Justice’s recommendation. Step 3: Copies of recommendations made by the Chief Justice of the High Court, to the Chief Minister of the concerned State, require to be endorsed, to the Union Minister of Law and Justice, to the Governor of the concerned State, and to the Chief Justice of India. Step 4: Consequent upon the consideration of the names proposed by the Chief Justice, the Governor of the concerned State, as advised by the Chief Minister, would forward his recommendation along with the entire JUDGMENT set of papers, to the Union Minister for Law and Justice. Step 5: The Union Minister for Law and Justice would, at his own, consider the recommendations placed before him, in the light of the reports, as may be available to the Government, in respect of the names under consideration. The proposed names, would be subject to scrutiny at the hands of the Intelligence Bureau, through the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. The Intelligence Bureau would opine on the integrity of the individuals under consideration. Page 133 134 Step 6: The entire material, as is available with the Union Minister for Law and Justice, would then be forwarded to the Chief Justice of India for his advice. The Chief Justice of India would, in consultation with his

Step 7: Based on the material made available, and additionally the views of Judges of the Supreme Court (who were conversant with the affairs of the concerned High Court), the Chief Justice of India in consultation with his collegium of Judges, would forward his recommendation, to the Union Minister for Law and Justice. The above noted views of Judges of the Supreme Court, conversant with the affairs of the High Court, were to be obtained in writing, and are to be part of the compilation incorporating the recommendation. Step 8: The Union Minister for Law and Justice would then put up the recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India, to the Prime JUDGMENT Minister, who would examine the entire matter in consultation with the Union Minister for Law and Justice, and advise the President, in the matter of the proposed appointments. 66. We shall venture to delineate the actual consideration at the hands of the executive, in the process of selection and appointment of High Court Judges, in terms of the Memorandum of Procedure, as well as, the actual prevailing practice. 67. Steps 1 to 3 of the Memorandum of Procedure reveal, that names of persons to be selected for appointment are forwarded to the Chief Page 134 135 Minister and the Governor of the concerned State. On receipt of the names, the Chief Minister discharges the onerous responsibility to determine the suitability of the recommended candidate(s). Specially the

Minister of the concerned State, has adequate machinery for providing such inputs. It would also be relevant to mention, that the consideration at the hands of the Governor of the concerned State, is also not an empty formality. For it is the Governor, through whom the file processed by the Chief Minister, is forwarded to the Union Minister for Law and Justice. There have been occasions, when Governors of the concerned State, have recorded their own impressions on the suitability of a recommended candidate, in sharp contrast with the opinion expressed by the Chief Minister. Whether or not the Governors participate in the above exercise, is quite a separate matter. All that needs to be recorded is, that there are JUDGMENT instances where Governors have actively participated in the process of selection of Judges to High Courts, by providing necessary inputs. Record also bears testimony to the fact, that the opinion expressed by the Governor, had finally prevailed on a few occasions. 68. The participation of the executive, with reference to the consideration of a candidate recommended by the Chief Justice of High Court, continues further at the level of the Government of India. The matter of suitability of a candidate, is also independently examined at the hands of the Union of Minister for Law and Justice. The Ministry of Page 135 136 Law and Justice has a standard procedure of seeking inputs through the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. Such inputs are made available by the Union Ministry for Home Affairs, by having the integrity, social

examination of the proposal at the hands of the Union Minister for Law and Justice, the file proceeds to the Chief Justice of India, along with the details received from the quarters referred to above. 69. After the Chief Justice of India, in consultation with his collegium of Judges recommends the concerned candidate for elevation to the High Court, the file is processed for a third time, by the executive. On this occasion, at the level of the Prime Minister of India. During the course of the instant consideration also, the participation of the executive is not an empty formality. Based on the inputs available to the Prime Minister, it is open to the executive, to yet again return the file to the Chief Justice of JUDGMENT India, for a reconsideration of the proposal, by enclosing material which may have escaped the notice of the Chief Justice of India and his collegium of Judges. There have been occasions, when the file returned to the Chief Justice of India for reconsideration, has resulted in a revision of the view earlier taken, by the Chief Justice of India and his collegium of Judges. It is therefore clear, that there is a complete comity of purpose between the judiciary and the political-executive in the matter of selection and appointment of High Court Judges. And between them, there is clear transparency also. As views are exchanged in writing, views Page 136 137 and counter-views, are in black and white. Nothing happens secretly, without the knowledge of the participating constitutional functionaries. 70. It is not necessary for us to delineate the participation of the

Memorandum of Procedure, as have been recorded above. Suffice it to state, that it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to contend, that there is no executive participation in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to High Courts. 71. The Memorandum of Procedure, for selection of Supreme Court Judges, provides for a similar participatory role to the judiciary and the political-executive. The same is not being analysed herein, for reasons of brevity. Suffice it to state, that the same is also a joint exercise, with a similar approach. 72. For the reasons recorded by us hereinabove, it is not possible for JUDGMENT us to accept, that in the procedure contemplated under the Second and Third Judges cases, Judges at their own select Judges to the higher judiciary, or that, the system of Imperium in Imperio has been created for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It is also not possible for us to accept, that the judgment in the Second Judges case, has interfered with the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, by curtailing the participatory role of the executive, in the constitutional scheme of checks and balances, in view of the role of Page 137 138 the executive fully described above. We find no merit in the instant contention advanced at the hands of the respondents. III.

apposite understanding of the provisions of the Constitution, it was imperative to refer to the Constituent Assembly debates, which had led to formulating and composing of the concerned Article(s). Reliance was accordingly placed on the debates, which had led to the drafting of Article 124. It was submitted, that the conclusions drawn by this Court, in the Second Judges case, overlooked the fact, that what had been expressly canvassed and raised by various Members of the Constituent Assembly, and rejected on due consideration, had been adopted by the judgment in the Second Judges case. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned Attorney General, that the judgments rendered in the Second and Third JUDGMENT Judges cases recorded a view, diagonally opposite the intent and resolve of the Constituent Assembly. 74. For reasons of brevity, it is not essential for us to extract herein the amendments sought by some of the eminent Members of the Constituent Assembly in the draft provision (to which our attention was drawn). At this stage, we need only to refer to paragraph 772 (already extracted 9 above), from the Indra Sawhney case , in order to record, that it is not essential to refer to individual views of the Members, and that, the view expressed at the end of the debate by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, would be Page 138 139 sufficient to understand what had prevailed, and why. Suffice it to state, that during the course of the Constituent Assembly debates, it was expressly proposed that the term “consultation” engaged in Articles 124

above, this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases had interpreted the word “consultation” in clause (2) of Article 124, and clause (1) of Article 217, as vesting primacy in the judiciary, something that was expressly rejected, during the Constituent Assembly debate. And therefore, the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents was, that this Court had interpreted the above provisions, by turning the Constituent Assembly’s intent and resolve, on its head. It was submitted, that the erroneous interpretation recorded in the Second Judges case, was writ large, even on a cursory examination of the debates. 75. We are of the view, that it would suffice, for examining the above JUDGMENT contention, to extract herein a relevant part of the response of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, to the above noted amendments, in the provisions noted above: “Now, Sir, with regard to the numerous amendments that have been moved, to this article, there are really three issues that have been raised. The first is, how are the Judges of the Supreme Court to be appointed? Now, grouping the different amendments which are related to this particular matter, I find three different proposals. The first proposal is that the Judges of the Supreme Court should be appointed with the concurrence of the Chief Justice. That is one view. The other view is that the appointments made by the President should be subject to the confirmation of two-thirds vote by Parliament; and the third suggestion is that they should be appointed in consultation with the Council of States. Page 139 140

JUDGMENT The first paragraph extracted hereinabove reveals, that there were three proposals on the issue of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court. The first proposal was, that the Judges of the Supreme Court should not be appointed by the President in “consultation” with the Chief Justice of Page 140 141 India, but should be appointed with the “concurrence” of the Chief Justice of India. The second proposal was, that like in the United States, appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court, should be made by the

Court, should be appointed by the President in “consultation” with the Rajya Sabha. 76. The response of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar to all the suggestions needs a very close examination, inasmuch as, even though rightfully pointed out by the Attorney General, and the learned counsel representing the respondents, all the issues which arise for consideration in the present controversy, were touched upon in the above response. Before dwelling upon the issue, which strictly pertained to the appointment of Judges, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar expressed in unequivocal terms, that the unanimous opinion of the Constituent Assembly was, that “our judiciary must be JUDGMENT independent of the executive”. The same sentiment was expressed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar while responding to K.T. Shah, K.M. Munshi, Tajamul Husain, Alladi Krishnaswami Aayar and Anathasayanam Ayyangar (extracted in paragraph 30 above) wherein he emphasized, that “…there is no doubt that the House in general, has agreed that the independence of the Judiciary, from the Executive should be made as clear and definite as we could make it by law…” The above assertion made while debating the issue of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, effectively acknowledges, that the appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, Page 141 142 has a direct nexus to the issue of “independence of the judiciary”. It therefore, does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to assert, that the subject of “appointment” would not fall within the domain/realm of

above, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, cited the manner of appointment of Judges in Great Britain, and pointed out, that in the United Kingdom appointments were made by the Crown, without any kind of limitation, and as such, fell within the exclusive domain of the executive. Referring to the system adopted in the United States, he noted, that Judges of the Supreme Court in the United States, could only be appointed with the “concurrence” of the Senate. Suffice it to state, that the latter reference was to a process of appointment which fell within the domain of the legislature (because the Senate is a legislative chamber in the bicameral legislature of the United States, which together with the U.S. House of JUDGMENT Representatives, make up the U.S. Congress). It is important to notice, that he rejected both the systems, where appointments to the higher judiciary were made by the executive, as well as, by the legislature. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar therefore, very clearly concluded the issue by expressing, that it would be improper to leave the appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court, to be made by the President – the executive (i.e., on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister). In the words of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, it would be dangerous to leave such appointments in the hands of the executive of the day, without any kind Page 142 143 of reservation and limitation. We are therefore satisfied, that the word “consultation” expressed in Articles 124 and 217, was contemplated by the Constituent Assembly, to curtail the free will of the executive. If that

be meant to be read with Article 74. It is therefore not possible for us to accept, that the main voice in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary was that of the President (expressed in the manner contemplated under Article 74). Nor is it possible to accept that primacy in the instant matter rested with the executive. Nor that, the judiciary has been assigned a role in the matter, which was not contemplated by the provisions of the Constitution. It is misconceived for the respondents to assert, that the determination of this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases was not interpretative in nature, but was factually legislative. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, therefore rejected, for the same JUDGMENT reasons, the proposal that appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court should be made by the legislature. But the reason he expressed in this behalf was most apt, namely, the procedure of appointing Judges, by seeking a vote of approval by one or the other (or both) House(s) of Parliament would be cumbersome. More importantly, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was suspicious and distrustful of the possibility of the appointments being directed and impacted by “political pressure” and “political consideration”, if the legislature was involved. We are therefore satisfied, that when the Constituent Assembly used the term “consultation”, in the Page 143 144 above provisions, its intent was to limit the participatory role of the political-executive in the matter of appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary.

“the supreme and absolute authority in the matter of making appointments” of Judges. And also, by keeping out the legislators for their obvious political inclinations and biases, which render them unsuitable for shouldering the responsibility. We are therefore of the view, that the judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases cannot be blamed, for not assigning a dictionary meaning to the term “consultation”. If the real purpose sought to be achieved by the term “consultation” was to shield the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, from executive and political involvement, certainly the term “consultation” was meant to be understood as something more JUDGMENT than a mere “consultation”. 79. It is clear from the observations of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, that the President – the executive was required by the provisions of the draft article, to consult “…persons, who were ex hypothesi, well qualified to give proper advice on the matter of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court.” The response of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in a singular paragraph (extracted above), leaves no room for any doubt that Article 124, in the manner it was debated, was clearly meant to propound, that the matter of “appointments of Judges was an integral part of the Page 144 145 “independence of the judiciary”. The process contemplated for appointment of Judges, would therefore have to be understood, to be such, as would be guarded/shielded from political pressure and political considerations.

foregoing paragraphs, also leaves no room for any doubt, that the Constituent Assembly did not desire to confer the Chief Justice of India, with a veto power to make appointments of Judges. It is therefore that a consultative process was contemplated under Article 124, as it was originally drafted. The same mandated consultation not only with the Chief Justice of India, but with other Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Viewed closely, the judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases, were rendered in a manner as would give complete effect to the observations made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar with reference to Article 124 (as originally incorporated). It is clearly erroneous for the JUDGMENT respondents to contend, that the consultative process postulated between the President with the other Judges of the Supreme Court or the High Courts in the States, at the discretion of the President, had been done away with by the Second and Third Judges cases. Nothing of the sort. It has been, and is still open to the President, in his unfettered wisdom, to the consultation indicated in Article 124. Additionally, it is open to the President, to rely on the same, during the course of the mandatory “consultation” with the Chief Justice of India. The above, further demonstrates the executive role in the selection of Judges to the Page 145 146 higher judiciary, quite contrary to the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents. We are satisfied, that the entire discussion and logic expressed during the debates of the Constituent Assembly, could be

that the above debates support the conclusions drawn in the judgments of which review is being sought. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents based on the Constituent Assembly debates. IV. 81. The consideration in hand, also has a historic perspective. We would venture to examine the same, from experiences gained, after the Constitution became operational i.e., after the people of this country came to govern themselves, in terms of the defined lines, and the distinctiveness of functioning, set forth by the arrangement and JUDGMENT allocation of responsibilities, expressed in the Constitution. In this behalf, it would be relevant to highlight the discussion which took place in Parliament, when the Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission on Judicial Reform (1958) was tabled for discussion, in the Rajya Sabha on 24-25.11.1959. Replying to the debate on 24.11.1959, Govind Ballabh Pant, the then Union Home Minister's remarks, as stand officially recorded, were inter alia as under: “Sir, so far as appointments to the Supreme Court go, since 1950 when the Constitution was brought into force, nineteen Judges have been appointed and everyone of them was so appointed on the Page 146 147

The remarks made by Ashoke Kumar Sen, the then Union Law Minister on 25.11.1959, during the course of the debate pertaining to the Law Commission Report, also need a reference: JUDGMENT “.....it is my duty to point out to the honourable House again, as I did in the Lok Sabha when the Law Commission first sent an interim report – call it an interim report or some report before the final one – pointing out that Judges have been appointed on extraneous considerations, we gave them the facts and figures concerning all the appointments made since 1950. We drew their pointed attention to the fact that, as the Home Minister pointed out yesterday, except in the case of one Judge out of the 176 odd Judges appointed since 1950, all were appointed on the advice of the Chief Justice. With regard to the one there was difference of opinion between the local Chief Justice and the Chief Justice of India and the Government accepted the advice of the local Chief Justice rather than the Chief Justice of India. But it was not their nominee. We should have expected the Law Commission, in all fairness, to have dealt with the communication from the Government giving facts of all the appointments not only of the High Courts but of the Supreme Court. I am not saying that they were obliged to do so, but it is only a fair thing to do, namely, when you bring certain accusation in a solemn document like the Law Commission's Report, you should deal with all the arguments for and Page 147 148 against. We should have expected in all fairness that these facts ought to have been dealt with. Unfortunately, no facts are set out so that it is impossible to deal with. If it was said that this had been the case with A, this had been the case with B or C, it would have been easy for us to deal with them. Especially when we had given all the facts concerning the appointment of each and every Judge since 1950.”

and the inferences drawn therefrom, it is more than apparent, that the understanding of those in-charge of working the provisions of the Constitution, relating to the appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was that, the advice of the Chief Justice of India was to be, and was actually invariably accepted, by the President (or whosoever, exercised the power of appointment). 83. Historically again, from the perspective of judicial declarations, the practice adopted on the issue in hand, came to be so understood, in the 11 Samsher Singh case , wherein this Court through a seven-Judge Bench JUDGMENT held as under:

149

recorded, as under:

150

the procedure, for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary (and JUDGMENT also, in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges from one High

constitutional functionaries (referred to in Articles 124, 217 and 222), adopted a procedure, wherein primacy in the decision making process, was consciously entrusted with the judiciary. This position was followed, from the very beginning, after the promulgation of the Constitution, by the executive, at its own. Insofar as the legislature is concerned, it is apparent, that the issue came up for discussion, in a responsive manner when the Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission on Judicial Reforms Page 150 151 (1958), was discussed by the Parliament, as far back as in 1959, just a few years after the country came to be governed by the Constitution. It is

was consciously recorded, after having appreciated the gamut of the JUDGMENT other participating constitutional authorities. In the matter of judicial determination, the issue was examined by a Constitution Bench of the 11 Supreme Court as far back, as in 1974 in the Samsher Singh case , wherein keeping in mind the cardinal principle – the “independence of the judiciary”, it was concluded, that consultation with the highest dignitary in the judiciary – the Chief Justice of India, in practice meant, that the last word must belong to the Chief Justice of India i.e., the primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, must rest with the judiciary. The above position was maintained in the Page 151 152 5 Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case in 1977, by a five-Judge Bench, only to be altered in the First Judges case, by a seven-Judge Bench in 1981, wherein it was held, that the term “consultation” could not be read as

judiciary, with reference to the subjects contemplated under Articles 124, JUDGMENT 217 and 222. In view of the above historical exposition, there is really no legitimate reason for the respondents to seek a review of the judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases. V. 87. Whilst dwelling on the subject of the intention expressed by the Members of the Constituent Assembly, it is considered just and expedient, also to take into consideration the views expressed in respect of the adoption of “separation of powers” in the Constitution. When the draft prepared by the Constituent Assembly came up for debate, Dr. B.R. Page 152 153 Ambedkar proposed an amendment of Article 39A. It would be relevant to mention, that the aforesaid amendment, on being adopted, was incorporated as Article 50 in the Constitution (as originally enacted). It is

the Constitution was being debated before the Constituent Assembly. His participation in the debates of the Constituent Assembly, therefore, was not only in his capacity as a Member of the Constituent Assembly, but also, as a representative of the Government of India. It is necessary to extract hereunder, the views expressed by Jawaharlal Nehru, Bakshi Tek Chand and Loknath Misra, in the above debates, relating to “separation of powers”. Relevant extracts are being reproduced hereunder: “The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (United Provinces: General): …..Coming to this particular matter, the honourable speaker, Pandit Kunzru, who has just spoken and opposed the amendment of Dr. Ambedkar seems to me; if I may say so with all respect to him, to have gone off the track completely, and to suspect a sinister motive on the part of Government about this business. Government as such is not concerned with this business, but it is true that some members of Government do feel rather strongly about it and would like this House fully to consider the particular view point that Dr. Ambedkar has placed before the House today. I may say straight off that so far as the Government is concerned, it is entirely in favour of the separation of judicial and executive functions (Cheers). I may further say that the sooner it is brought about the better (Hear, hear) and I am told that some of our Provincial Governments are actually taking steps to that end now. If anyone asked me, if anyone suggested the period of three years or some other period, my first reaction would have been that this period is too long. Why should we wait so long for this? It might be brought about, if not all over India, in a large part of India, much sooner than that. At the same time, it is obvious that India at the present moment, specially during the transitional period, is a very mixed country politically, judicially, economically and in many ways, and any fixed rule of thumb JUDGMENT Page 153 154

JUDGMENT Page 154 155

JUDGMENT Page 155 156

88. A perusal of the statements made before the Constituent Assembly, which resulted in the adoption of Article 50 of the Constitution reveals, that the first Prime Minister of this country, was entirely in favour of the separation of judicial and executive “functions”. On the subject of separation, it was pointed out, that it was a directive which the Government itself wanted. The statement of Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand in the JUDGMENT Constituent Assembly projects the position, that the idea of separating the judiciary from the executive was mooted for the first time as far back as in 1852, and that thereafter, the political leadership and also public opinion, were directed towards ensuring separation of judicial and executive functioning. He pointed out, that “year in and year out”, the late Man Mohan Ghosh and Bapu Surendranath Banerji had raised the instant question, in all public meetings. And when the Congress first met in Bombay in 1885, the matter of separating the judiciary from the executive, was placed above all other issues under consideration. Page 156 157 Thereafter, not only the politicians of all schools of thought, but even retired officers, who had actually spent their lives in administration, had supported the issue of “separation of powers”. He also highlighted, that

and Englishmen like Sir Arthur Hobhouse and Sir Arthur Wilson (both of whom, subsequently became Members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council), also supported the above reform. The debate, it was pointed out, had been on going, to accept the principle of “separation of powers”, whereby, the judiciary would be kept apart from the executive. He also pointed to instances, indicating interference by Ministers and members of the administration, which necessitated a complete separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive. Loknath Misra fully supported the above amendment, as a matter of principle. It is, therefore, imperative to conclude that the framers of the Constitution while drafting JUDGMENT Article 50 of the Constitution, were clear and unanimous in their view, that there need to be a judiciary, separated from the influences of the executive. 89. Based on the consideration recorded in the immediately preceding paragraphs also, it seems to us, that the necessity of making a detailed reference to the Constituent Assembly debates in the Second Judges case, may well have been regarded, as of no serious consequence, whether it was on the subject of appointment of Judges to the higher Page 157 158 judiciary, as a component of “independence of the judiciary”, or, on the subject of “separation of powers”, whereby the judiciary was sought to be kept apart, and separate, from the executive. This Court having

in the judiciary, the right of the executive to have the final word in the appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was clearly ruled out. And therefore, this Court on a harmonious construction of the provisions of the Constitution, in the Second and Third Judges cases, rightfully held, that primacy in the above matter, vested with the judiciary, leading to the inference, that the term “consultation” in the provisions under reference, should be understood as giving primacy to the view expressed by the judiciary, through the Chief Justice of India. VI. 90. It is imperative to deal with another important submission JUDGMENT advanced by the learned Attorney General, namely, that the issue of “independence of the judiciary” has nothing to do with the process of “appointment” of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was submitted, that the question of independence of a Judge arises, only after a Judge has been appointed (to the higher judiciary), for it is only then, that he is to be shielded from the executive/political pressures and influences. It was sought to be elaborated, that Judges of the higher judiciary, immediately after their appointment were so well shielded, that there could be no Page 158 159 occasion of the “independence of the judiciary” being compromised, in any manner, either at the hands of the executive, or of the legislature. 91. Whilst advancing the instant contention, it was the pointed

“selection and appointment” of Judges, to the higher judiciary, would fall within the purview of “independence of the judiciary”. It was therefore his contention, that it was wrongful to assume, on the basis of the above two judgments, that the question of “appointment” of Judges to the higher judiciary would constitute a component of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. It was the contention of the learned Attorney General, that the Parliament, in its wisdom, had now amended the Constitution, admittedly altering the process of “selection and appointment” of Judges to the higher judiciary (including their transfer). It was further contended, that the process contemplated through the Constitution (99th JUDGMENT Amendment) Act, coupled with the NJAC Act, was such, that it cannot be considered to have interfered with, or impinged upon, the “independence of the judiciary”, and thus viewed, it would not be rightful to conclude, that the impugned constitutional amendment, as also the NJAC Act, were per se violative of the “basic structure”. 92. We may preface our consideration by noticing, that every two years since 1985, a conference of Supreme Court Chief Justices from the Asia Pacific region, has been held by the Judicial Section of the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific. Since its inception, the conference Page 159 160 has served as a useful forum for sharing information and discussing issues of mutual concern among Chief Justices of the region. At its 6th Conference held in Beijing in 1997, 20 Chief Justices adopted a joint

Justices held in Manila, wherein it was signed by 32 Chief Justices from the Asia Pacific region. The Beijing Statement of Principles of the “Independence of the Judiciary” separately deals with appointment of Judges. The position expressed in the above statement with reference to “appointment” of Judges is extracted hereunder: “Appointment of Judges 11. To enable the judiciary to achieve its objectives and perform its functions, it is essential that judges be chosen on the basis of proven competence, integrity and independence. 12.The mode of appointment of judges must be such as will ensure the appointment of persons who are best qualified for judicial office. It must provide safeguards against improper influences being taken into account so that only persons of competence, integrity and independence are appointed. 13. In the selection of judges there must no discrimination against a person on the basis of race, colour, gender, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, marital status, sexual orientation, property, birth or status, expect that a requirement that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned shall not be considered discriminatory. 14. The structure of the legal profession, and the sources from which judges are drawn within the legal profession, differ in different societies. In some societies, the judiciary is a career service; in others, judges are chosen from the practising profession. Therefore, it is accepted that in different societies, difference procedures and safeguards may be adopted to ensure the proper appointment of judges. 15. In some societies, the appointment of judges, by, with the consent of, or after consultation with a Judicial Services Commission has been seen as a means of ensuring that those chosen judges are appropriate for the purpose. Where a Judicial Services Commission is adopted, it should include representatives the higher Judiciary and the independent legal JUDGMENT Page 160 161

the question of the “independence of the judiciary”, must be considered as a misunderstanding of a well recognized position. 93. Whilst dealing with the instant contention, we will also examine if this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, had actually dealt with the issue, whether “appointment” of Judges to the higher judiciary, was (or, was not) an essential component of the principle of “independence of the judiciary”? Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, reference in the first instance, may be made to the Second Judges case, wherein S. Ratnavel Pandian, J., while recording his concurring opinion, supporting the majority view, observed as under: JUDGMENT “47. The above arguments, that the independence of judiciary is satisfactorily secured by the constitutional safeguard of the office that a judge holds and guarantees of the service conditions alone and not beyond that, are in our considered opinion, untenable. In fact we are unable even to conceive such an argument for the reason to be presently stated.” In addition to the above extract, it is necessary to refer to the following observations of Kuldip Singh, J.: “335. Then the question which comes up for consideration is, can there be an independent judiciary when the power of appointment of judges vests in the executive? To say yes, would be illogical....” Page 161 162 From the above it is clear, that the issue canvassed by the learned Attorney General, was finally answered by the nine-Judge Bench, which disposed of the Second Judges case by holding, that if the power of

conversely, that providing safeguards after the appointment of a Judge to the higher judiciary, would not be sufficient to secure “independence of the judiciary”. In the above view of the matter, it is necessary to conclude, that the “manner of selection and appointment” of Judges to the higher judiciary, is an integral component of “independence of the judiciary”. The contentions advanced on behalf of the Union of India, indicating the participation of the President and the Parliament, in the affairs of the judiciary, would have no bearing on the controversy in hand, which primarily relates to the issue of “appointment” of Judges to the higher judiciary. And, extends to transfer of Chief Justices and JUDGMENT Judges from one High Court, to another. The fact that there were sufficient safeguards, to secure the independence of Judges of the higher judiciary after their “appointment”, and therefore, there was no need to postulate, that in the matter of “appointment” also, primacy need not be in the hands of the judiciary, is also not acceptable. It is quite another matter, whether the manner of selection and appointment of Judges, introduced through the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act coupled with the NJAC Act, can indeed be considered to be violative of “independence of the judiciary”. This aspect, shall be examined and determined Page 162 163 independently, while examining the merits of the challenge raised by the petitioners. VII.

the Supreme Court, under Article 124, the President has also been vested with the authority to appoint Judges and Chief Justices of High Courts under Article 217. In both the above provisions, the mandate for the President, inter alia is, that the Chief Justice of India “shall always be consulted”, (the first proviso, under Article 124(2), as originally enacted), and with reference to Judges of the High Court, the language engaged in Article 217 was, that the President would appoint Judges of High Courts “after consultation with the Chief Justice of India” (per sub-Article (1) of Article 217). 95. To understand the term “consultation” engaged in Articles 124 and JUDGMENT 217, it is essential to contrast the above two provisions, with other Articles of the Constitution, whereunder also, the President is mandated to appoint different constitutional authorities. Reference in this behalf may be made to the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, under Article 148. The said provision vests the authority of the above appointment with the President, without any consultative process. The position is exactly similar with reference to appointment of Governors of States, under Article 155. The said provision also contemplates appointments, without any consultative process. The Page 163 164 President is also vested with the authority, to appoint the Chairman and four Members of the Finance Commission, under Article 280. Herein also, the power is exclusively vested with the President, without any

President under Article 316. The aforesaid appointment also does not contemplate any deliberation, with any other authority. Under Article 324, the power of appointment of Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners is vested with the President exclusively. Likewise, is the case of appointment of Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and Members of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes under Article 338, and Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and other Members of the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes under Article 338A. Under the above stated provisions, the President has the exclusive authority to make appointments, without any deliberation with any other JUDGMENT authority. Under Article 344, the President is also vested with the authority to appoint Chairman and other Members to the Commission of Parliament on Official Languages. The instant provision also does not provide for any consultative process before such appointment. The same position emerges from Article 350B, whereunder the President is to appoint a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. Herein too, there is no contemplation of any prior consultation. 96. It is apparent that the Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister as its head, is to “aid and advise” the President in the exercise of his Page 164 165 functions. This position is not disputed by the learned counsel representing the respondents. Interpreted in the above manner, according to the learned Attorney General, in exercising his

truthfully, the authority actually vests in the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. And as such, for all intents and purposes, the authority vested in the President for appointing different constitutional authorities, truly means that the power of such appointment is vested in the executive. 97. If one were to understand the words, as they were expressed in Article 74, in our considered view, it would be difficult to conclude, that “aid and advice” can be treated synonymous with a binding “direction”, an irrevocable “command” or a conclusive “mandate”. Surely, the term “aid and advice” cannot individually be construed as an imperative JUDGMENT dictate, which had to be obeyed under all circumstances. In common parlance, a process of “consultation” is really the process of “aid and advice”. The only distinction being, that “consultation” is obtained, whereas “aid and advice” may be tendered. On a plain readingtherefore, neither of the two (“aid and advice” and “consultation”) can be understood to convey, that they can be of a binding nature. We are of the view, that the above expressions were used, keeping in mind the exalted position which the President occupies (as the first citizen, of the country). As the first citizen, it would have been discourteous to provide, Page 165 166 that he was to discharge his functions in consonance with the directions, command, or mandate of the executive. Since, both the expressions (“aid and advice” and “consultation”), deserve the same interpretation, if any

(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Article 74 came to be amended, and with the insertion of the words “shall … act in accordance with such advice”, the President came to be bound, to exercise his functions, in consonance with the “aid and advice” tendered to him, by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. The instant amendment, in our view, has to be considered as clarificatory in character, merely reiterating the manner in which the original provision ought to have been understood. 98. If “aid and advice” can be binding and mandatory, surely also, the term “consultation”, referred to in Articles 124 and 217, could lead to the JUDGMENT same exposition. The President of India, being the first citizen of the country, is entitled to respectability. Articles 124 and 217, were undoubtedly couched in polite language, as a matter of constitutional courtesy, extended to the first citizen of the country. It is important to notice, that the first proviso under Article 124(2) clearly mandates, that the Chief Justice of India “shall always” be consulted. It was a reverse obligation, distinguishable from Article 74. Herein, the President was obliged to consult the Chief Justice of India, in all matters of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court. The process of Page 166 167 “consultation” contemplated therein, has to be meaningfully understood. If it was not to be so, the above provision could have been similarly worded as those relating to the appointment of the Comptroller and

Service Commission, Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners, Chairperson and Vice Chairperson and Members of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes, as also, those of the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. This contrast between Articles 124 and 217 on the one hand, and the absence of any “consultation”, with reference to the appointments contemplated under Articles 148, 155, 280, 316, 324, 338, 338A, 344 and 350B, leaves no room for any doubt, that the above “consultation” was not a simplicitor “consultation”. And since, the highest functionary in the judicial hierarchy was obliged to be consulted, a similar respectability needed to be bestowed on him. What JUDGMENT would be the worth of the mandatory “consultation”, with the Chief Justice of India, if his advice could be rejected, without any justification? It was therefore, concluded by this Court, that in all conceivable cases, consultation with the highest dignitary in the judiciary – the Chief Justice of India, will and should be accepted. And, in case it was not so acceptd, it would be permissible to examine whether such non acceptance was prompted by any oblique consideration. Rightfully therefore, the term “consultation” used in Articles 124 and 217, as they were originally enacted meant, that primacy had to be given to the Page 167 168 opinion tendered by the Chief Justice of India, on the issues for which the President was obliged to seek such “consultation”. The submission advanced on behalf of the respondents, cannot be accepted, also for the

as at par with Articles 148, 155, 280, 316, 324, 338, 338A, 344 and 350B, wherein the term “consultation” had not been used. Such an interpretation, would be clearly unacceptable. Since the manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, is in contrast with that of the constitutional authorities referred to by the learned Attorney General, the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents with reference to the other constitutional authorities cannot have a bearing on the present controversy. 99. We would unhesitatingly accept and acknowledge the submission made by the learned Attorney General, as has been noticed hereinabove, JUDGMENT but only limited to situations of appointment contemplated under various Articles of the Constitution, where the power of appointment is exclusively vested with the President. As such, there is no room for any doubt that the provisions of the Constitution, with reference to the appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, contemplated that the “aid and advice” (– the “consultation”) tendered by the Chief Justice of India, was entitled to primacy, on matters regulated under Articles 124 and 217 (as also, under Article 222). Page 168 169 VIII. 100. In continuation with the conclusions drawn in the foregoing

the higher judiciary) has also been adopted in Article 233 on the subject of appointment of District Judges. Under Article 233, the power of appointment is vested with the Governor of the concerned State, who is empowered to make appointments (including promotions) of District Judges. This Court, through a five-Judge Bench, in Registrar (Admn.), 32 High Court of Orissa, Cuttack v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy , has held, that recommendations made by the High Court in the consultative process envisaged under Article 233, is binding on the Governor. In the face of the aforestated binding precedent, on a controversy, which is startlingly similar to the one in hand, and has never been questioned, it is quite JUDGMENT ununderstandable how the Union of India, desires to persuade this Court, to now examine the term “consultation” differently with reference to Articles 124 and 217, without assailing the meaning given to the aforesaid term, with reference to a matter also governing the judiciary. VI. CONCLUSION: 101. Based on the conclusions drawn hereinabove, while considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the rival parties, as have been recorded in “V – The Consideration”, we are of the view, that 32 (1999) 7 SCC 725 Page 169 170 the prayer made at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondents, for revisiting or reviewing the judgments rendered by this Court, in the Second and Third Judges cases, cannot be acceded to. The prayer is, accordingly, hereby declined. …………………………….J. (Jagdish Singh Khehar) New Delhi; October 16, 2015. JUDGMENT Page 170 171 THE ORDER ON MERITS I. PREFACE: 1. It is essential to begin the instant order by a foreword, in the nature of an explanation. For, it would reduce the bulk of the instant order, and

dealt with, while hearing the present set of cases. 2. The question which arises for consideration in the present set of cases pertains to the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 [hereinafter referred to as the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act], as also, that of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as, the NJAC Act). The core issue that arises for consideration, relates to the validity of the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary (i.e., Chief Justices and Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court), and transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of one JUDGMENT High Court, to another. 3. This is the third order in the series of orders passed by us, while adjudicating upon the present controversy. The first order, dealt with the prayer made at the Bar, for the “recusal” of one of us (J.S. Khehar, J.) from hearing the present set of cases. As and when a reference is made to the above first order, it would be adverted to as the “Recusal Order”. The second order, considered the prayer made by the learned Attorney General and some learned counsel representing the respondents, seeking a “reference” of the present controversy, to a nine-Judge Bench (or even, Page 171 172 to a further larger Bench) for re-examining the judgment rendered in 2 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (hereinafter referred to as, the Second Judges case), and the advisory

re-establishing, the declaration of the legal position, expounded by this 1 Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (hereinafter referred to as, the First Judges case). As and when a reference is made to the above second order, it would be mentioned as the “Reference Order”. 4. We would, therefore, not examine the issues dealt with in the Recusal Order and/or in the Reference Order, even though they may arise for consideration yet again, in the process of disposal of the present controversy on merits. As and when a reference is made to the instant third order, examining the “merits” of the controversy, it would be adverted to as the “Order on Merits”. JUDGMENT II. PETITIONERS’ CONTENTIONS, ON MERITS: 5. On the subject of amending the Constitution based on the procedure provided for in Article 368, it was submitted by Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, that the power of amendment of the Constitution is not a plenary power. It was pointed out, that the above power was limited, inasmuch as, the power of amendment did not include the power of amending the “core” or the “basic structure” of the Constitution. In this behalf, learned counsel placed reliance on Minerva Page 172 173 33 Mills Ltd. v. Union of India , wherein majority view was expressed through Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., as under:

In the above judgment, the minority view was recorded by P.N. Bhagwati, J., (as he then was), as under:

33 (1980) 3 SCC 625 Page 173 174

With reference to the same proposition, learned counsel placed reliance 34 on Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu . It was submitted, that the acceptance of the principle of “basic structure” of the Constitution, resulted in limiting the amending power postulated in Article 368. 6. According to the learned counsel, it is now accepted, that “independence of the judiciary”, “rule of law”, “judicial review” and JUDGMENT “separation of powers” are components of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. In the above view of the matter, provisions relating to appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, would have to be such, that the above principles would remain unscathed and intact. It was submitted, that any action which would have the result of making appointment of the Judges to the Supreme Court, and to the High Courts, subservient to an agency other than the judiciary itself, namely, by allowing the executive or the legislature to participate in their 34 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 Page 174 175 selection and appointment, would render the judiciary subservient to such authority, and thereby, impinge on the “independence of the judiciary”.

of the Law Commission of India, chaired by M.C. Setalvad), wherein it was debated, that by enacting Articles 124 and 217, the framers of the

extracted hereunder: JUDGMENT 8. It was submitted, that “independence of the judiciary” had been held to mean and include, insulation of the higher judiciary from executive and legislative control. In this behalf, reference was made to 5 Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth , wherein this Court had observed: “50. Now the independence of the judiciary is a fighting faith of our Constitution. Fearless justice is a cardinal creed of our founding document. It is indeed a part of our ancient tradition which has produced great Judges in the past. In England too, from where we have inherited our present system of administration of justice in its broad and essential Page 175 176 features, judicial independence is prized as a basic value and so natural

JUDGMENT In continuation of the instant submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the Second Judges case, and drew our attention to the following observations recorded by S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.: Page 176 177 “54. Having regard to the importance of this concept the Framers of our Constitution having before them the views of the Federal Court and of the High Court have said in a memorandum: “We have assumed that it is recognised on all hands that the independence and integrity of the judiciary in a democratic system of government is of the highest importance and interest not only to the judges but to the citizens at large who may have to seek redress in the last resort in courts of law against any illegal acts or the high-handed exercise of power by the executive … in making the following proposals and suggestions, the paramount importance of securing the fearless functioning of an independent and efficient judiciary has been steadily kept in view. (vide B. Shiva Rao: The Framing of India’s Constitution, Volume I-B, p. 196) 55. In this context, we may make it clear by borrowing the inimitable words of Justice Krishna Iyer, “Independence of the judiciary is not genuflexion, nor is it opposition of Government”. Vide Mainstream – November 22, 1980 and at one point of time Justice Krishna Iyer characterised this concept as a “Constitutional Religion”. 56. Indisputably, this concept of independence of judiciary which is inextricably linked and connected with the constitutional process related to the functioning of judiciary is a “fixed-star” in our constitutional consultation and its voice centres around the philosophy of the Constitution. The basic postulate of this concept is to have a more effective judicial system with its full vigour and vitality so as to secure and strengthen the imperative confidence of the people in the administration of justice. It is only with the object of successfully achieving this principle and salvaging much of the problems concerning the present judicial system, it is inter alia, contended that in the matter of appointment of Judges to the High Courts and Supreme Court ‘primacy’ to the opinion of the CJI which is only a facet of this concept, should be accorded so that the independence of judiciary is firmly secured and protected and the hyperbolic executive intrusion to impose its own selectee on the superior judiciary is effectively controlled and curbed.” JUDGMENT And from the same judgment, reference was made to the following observations of Kuldip Singh, J.: “335. Then the question which comes up for consideration is, can there be an independent judiciary when the power of appointment of judges vests in the executive? To say yes, would be illogical. The independence of judiciary is inextricably linked and connected with the constitutional process of appointment of judges of the higher judiciary. ‘Independence of Judiciary’ is the basic feature of our Constitution and if it means what we have discussed above, then the Framers of the Constitution could have Page 177 178

Based on the above conclusions, it was submitted, that “independence of the judiciary” could be maintained, only if appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary, were made by according primacy to the opinion of the Chief Justice, based on the decision of a collegium of Judges. Only then, the executive and legislative intrusion, could be effectively controlled and curbed. 9. Learned counsel, then ventured to make a reference to the JUDGMENT frequently quoted speech of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (in the Constituent Assembly on 24.5.1949). It was submitted, that the above speech was duly considered in the Second Judges case, wherein this Court concluded as under: “389. Having held that the primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the superior courts vests with the judiciary, the crucial question which arises for consideration is whether the Chief Justice of India, under the Constitution, acts as a “persona designata” or as the leader - spokesman for the judiciary. 390. The constitutional scheme does not give primacy to any individual. Article 124(2) provides consultation with the Chief Justice of India, Judges of the Supreme Court and Judges of the High Courts. Likewise Page 178 179 Article 217(1) talks of Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Plurality of consultations has been clearly indicated by the Framers of the Constitution. On first reading one gets the impression as if the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts have not been included in the process of consultation under Article 217(1) but on a closer scrutiny of the constitutional scheme one finds that this was not the intention of the Framers of the Constitution. There is no justification, whatsoever, for excluding the puisne Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court from the “consultee zone” under Article 217(1) of the Constitution. 391. According to Mr Nariman it would not be a strained construction to construe the expressions “Chief Justice of India” and “Chief Justice of the High Courts” in the sense of the collectivity of Judges, the Supreme Court as represented by the Chief Justice of India and all the High Courts (of the States concerned) as represented by the Chief Justice of the High Court. A bare reading of Articles 124(2) and 217(1) makes it clear that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to leave the final word, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the superior Courts, in the hands of any individual howsoever high he is placed in the constitutional hierarchy. Collective wisdom of the consultees is the sine qua non for such appointments. Dr B.R. Ambedkar in his speech dated May 24, 1949 in the Constituent Assembly explaining the scope of the draft articles pertaining to the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court … xxx xxx xxx 392. Dr Ambedkar did not see any difficulty in the smooth operation of the constitutional provisions concerning the appointment of Judges to the superior Courts. Having entrusted the work to high constitutional functionaries the Framers of the Constitution felt assured that such appointments would always be made by consensus. It is the functioning of the Constitution during the past more than four decades which has brought the necessity of considering the question of primacy in the matter of such appointments. Once we hold that the primacy lies with the judiciary, then it is the judiciary as collectivity which has the primal say and not any individual, not even the Chief Justice of India. If we interpret the expression “the Chief Justice of India” as a “persona designata” then it would amount “to allow the Chief Justice practically veto upon the appointment of Judges” which the Framers of the Constitution in the words of Dr Ambedkar never intended to do. We are, therefore, of the view that the expressions “the Chief Justice of India” and the “Chief Justice of the High Court” in Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution mean the said judicial functionaries as representatives of their respective courts.” JUDGMENT In conjunction with the observations extracted hereinabove, the Court’s attention was also invited to the following further conclusions: Page 179 180

JUDGMENT Page 180 181 10. It was the emphatic contention of the learned counsel, that the conclusions recorded by this Court in the Second Judges case, had been accepted by the executive and the legislature. It was acknowledged, that

judiciary would have an element of plurality. This assertion was sought to be further established, by placing reliance on the Third Judges case. It was submitted, that the conclusions of the majority judgment, in the Second Judges case, were reproduced in paragraph 9 of the Third Judges case, and thereupon, this Court recorded the statement of the then Attorney General, that through the Presidential Reference, the Union of India was not seeking, a review or reconsideration, of the judgment in the Second Judges case. And that, the Union of India had accepted the above majority judgment, as binding. In this context, paragraphs 10 to 12 of the Third Judges case, which were relied upon, are being reproduced JUDGMENT below: “10. We have heard the learned Attorney General, learned counsel for the interveners and some of the High Courts and the Advocates General of some States. 11. We record at the outset the statements of the Attorney General that ( 1 ) the Union of India is not seeking a review or reconsideration of the judgment in the Second Judges case (1993) 4 SCC 441 and that ( 2 ) the Union of India shall accept and treat as binding the answers of this Court to the questions set out in the Reference. 12. The majority view in the Second Judges case (1993) 4 SCC 441 is that in the matter of appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has primacy. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India is “reflective of the opinion of the judiciary, which means that it must necessarily have the element of plurality in its formation”. It is to be formed “after taking into account the view of some other Judges who are traditionally associated with this function”. The Page 181 182

35 conclusion drawn in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India , which is placed below: “136.(iii) The “basic structure” of the Constitution will stand violated if while enacting legislation pertaining to transfer of judicial power, Parliament does not ensure that the newly created court/tribunal conforms with the salient characteristics and standards of the court sought to be substituted.” Learned counsel then asserted, that the “basic structure” of the Constitution would stand violated if, in amending the Constitution and/or enacting legislation, Parliament does not ensure, that the body newly created, conformed with the salient characteristics and the standards of the body sought to be substituted. It was asserted, that the JUDGMENT salient features of the existing process of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, which had stood the test of time, could validly and constitutionally be replaced, but while substituting the prevailing procedure, the salient characteristics which existed earlier, had to be preserved. By placing reliance on Articles 124 and 217, it was asserted, that the above provisions, as originally enacted, were explained by decisions of this Court, starting from 1974 in Samsher Singh v. State of 11 5 Punjab , followed by the Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case in 1977, and 35 (2014) 10 SCC 1 Page 182 183 the Second Judges case in 1993, and finally endorsed in 1998 by the Third Judges case. It was submitted, that four Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court, had only affirmed the practice followed by the

appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, had continued to remain a participatory consultative process, wherein the initiation of the proposal for appointment of a Judge to the Supreme Court, was by the Chief Justice of India; and in the case of appointment of Judges to High Courts, by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. And that, for transfer of a Judge/Chief Justice of a High Court, to another High Court, the proposal was initiated by the Chief Justice of India. It was contended, that in the process of taking a decision on the above matters (of appointment and transfer), the opinion of the judiciary was symbolized through the Chief Justice of India, and the same was based JUDGMENT on the decision of a collegium of Judges, since 1993 – when the Second Judges case was decided. The only exception to the above rule, according to learned counsel, was when the executive, based on stated strong cogent reasons (disclosed to the Chief Justice of India), felt otherwise. However, if the stated reasons, as were disclosed to the Chief Justice of India, were not accepted, the decision of a collegium of Judges on reiteration, would result in the proposed appointment/transfer. This, according to learned counsel, constituted the earlier procedure under Articles 124 and 217. The aforesaid procedure, was considered as Page 183 184 sufficient, to preserve the “independence of the judiciary”. 12. According to learned counsel, it needed to be determined, whether the NJAC now set up, had the same or similar characteristics, in the

was emphatic, that the primacy of the judiciary, had been totally eroded through the impugned constitutional amendment. For the above, learned counsel invited our attention to Article 124A inserted by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act. It was submitted, that the NJAC contemplated under Article 124A would comprise of six Members, namely, the Chief Justice of India, two senior Judges of the Supreme Court (next to the Chief Justice), the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, and two “eminent persons”. It was submitted, that the judges component, which had the primacy (and in a manner of understanding – unanimity), under the erstwhile procedure, had now been reduced to half-strength, in the JUDGMENT selecting body – the NJAC. It was pointed out, that the Chief Justice of India, would now have an equivalent voting right, as the other Members of the NJAC. It was submitted, that even though the Chief Justice of India would be the Chairman of the NJAC, he has no casting vote, in the event of a tie. It was submitted, that under the substituted procedure, even if the Chief Justice of India, and the two other senior Judges of the Supreme Court (next to the Chief Justice of India), supported the appointment/transfer of an individual, the same could be negatived, by any two Members of the NJAC. Even by the two “eminent persons” who Page 184 185 may have no direct or indirect nexus with the process of administration of justice. It was therefore submitted, that the primacy vested with the Chief Justice of India had been fully and completely eroded.

for appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, could only have been initiated by the Chief Justice of India. And likewise, the proposal for transfer of a Judge or the Chief Justice of a High Court, could only have been initiated by the Chief Justice of India. And likewise, the proposal for appointment of a Judge to a High Court, could only have been initiated by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. In order to demonstrate the changed position, learned counsel placed reliance on Article 124B introduced by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, whereunder, the authority to initiate the process, had now been vested with the NJAC. Under the new dispensation, the NJAC alone would JUDGMENT recommend persons for appointment as Judges to the higher judiciary. It was also apparent, according to learned counsel, that the NJAC has now been bestowed with the exclusive responsibility to recommend transfers of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts. Having described the aforesaid alteration as a total subversion of the prevailing procedure, which had stood the test of time, and had secured the independence of the process of appointment and transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary, it was pointed out, that the Parliament had not disclosed the reasons, why the primacy of the Chief Justice of India and the other senior Page 185 186 Judges, had to be dispensed with. Or for that matter, why the prevailing procedure needed to be altered. It was further the contention of learned counsel, that the non-disclosure of reasons, must inevitably lead to the

submissions, with reference to the “basic structure”, and the scope of amending the provisions of the Constitution. Dwelling upon the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution, it was submitted, that this Court 10 in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala , had declared, that the “basic structure” of the Constitution, was not susceptible or amenable to amendment. Inviting our attention to Article 368, it was submitted, that the power vested with the Parliament to amend the Constitution, contemplated the extension of the constituent power, which was exercised by the Constituent Assembly, while framing the Constitution. It was pointed out, that in exercise of the above power, the Parliament JUDGMENT had been permitted to discharge the same role as the Constituent Assembly. The provisions of the Constitution, it was asserted, could be amended, to keep pace with developments in the civil society, so long as the amendment was not in violation of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. It was submitted, that it was not enough, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to determine the validity of the constitutional amendment in question, by limiting the examination to a determination, whether or not the “independence of the judiciary” stood breached, on a plain reading of the provisions sought to be amended. It Page 186 187 was asserted, that it was imperative to take into consideration, judgments rendered by this Court, on the subject. It was asserted, that this Court was liable to examine the declared position of law, in the First,

challenge, were found to be in breach of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, as declared in the above judgments, the impugned constitutional amendment, as also, the legislation under reference, would undoubtedly be constitutionally invalid. 15. In the above context, learned counsel pointed out, that with reference to an amendment to the fundamental right(s), enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, guidelines were laid down by this Court in M. 36 34 Nagaraj v. Union of India , as also, in the Kihoto Hollohan case . It was submitted, that the change through the impugned amendment to the Constitution, (and by the NJAC Act) was not a peripheral change, but JUDGMENT was a substantial one, which was also seemingly irreversible. And therefore, according to learned counsel, its validity would have to be determined, on the basis of the width and the identity tests. It was submitted, that the width and the identity tests were different from the tests applicable for determining the validity of ordinary parliamentary legislation, or a constitutional amendment relating to fundamental rights. The manner of working out the width and the identity tests, it was 36 (2006) 8 SCC 212 Page 187 188 36 submitted, had been laid down in the M. Nagaraj case , wherein this Court held:

JUDGMENT 16. It was submitted, that whilst the Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution; the legislature (– or the executive), had no power to either interpret the Constitution, or to determine the validity of an amendment to the provisions of the Constitution. The power to determine Page 188 189 the validity of a constitutional amendment, according to learned counsel, exclusively rests with the higher judiciary. Every amendment had to be tested on the touchstone of "basic structure” – as declared by the

counsel, constituted the fundamental judicial power, and was no less significant/weighty than the legislative power of Parliament. The importance of the power of judicial review vested with the higher judiciary (to examine the validity of executive and legislative actions), bestowed superiority to the judiciary over the other two pillars of governance. This position, it was pointed out, was critical to balance the power surrendered by the civil society, in favour of the political and the executive sovereignty. 17. In order to determine the validity of the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners, we were informed, that the interpretation placed JUDGMENT by the Supreme Court on Articles 124 and 217 (as they existed, prior to the impugned amendment), would have to be kept in mind. It was submitted, that the term “consultation” with reference to Article 124, had been understood as conferring primacy with the judiciary. Therefore, while examining the impugned constitutional amendment to Article 124, it was imperative for this Court, to understand the term “consultation” in Article 124, and to read it as, conferring primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges, with the judiciary. Under Article 124, according to learned counsel, the President was not required to merely “consult” the Page 189 190 Chief Justice of India, but the executive was to accede to the view expressed by the Chief Justice of India. Insofar as the term “Chief Justice of India” is concerned, it was submitted, that the same had also

Justice of India. Accordingly, it was emphasized, that the individual opinion of the Chief Justice (with reference to Articles 124 and 217) was understood as the institutional opinion of the judiciary. Accordingly, whilst examining the impugned constitutional amendment, under the width and the identity test(s), the above declared legal position, had to be kept in mind while determining, whether or not the impugned constitutional amendment, and the impugned legislative enactment, had breached the “basic structure” of the Constitution. 18. It was contended, that the judgment in the Second Judges case, should be accepted as the touchstone, by which the validity of the JUDGMENT impugned constitutional amendment (and the NJAC Act), must be examined. It was submitted, that the power exercised by the Parliament under Article 368, in giving effect to the impugned constitutional amendment (and by enacting the NJAC Act), will have to be tested in a manner, that will allow an organic adaptation to the changing times, and at the same time ensure, that the “basic structure” of the Constitution 36 was not violated. Relying on the M. Nagaraj case , the Court’s attention was drawn to the following observations: Page 190 191 “18. The key issue, which arises for determination in this case is–whether by virtue of the impugned constitutional amendments, the power of Parliament is so enlarged so as to obliterate any or all of the constitutional limitations and requirements? Standards of judicial review of constitutional amendments 19. The Constitution is not an ephemeral legal document embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It sets out principles for an expanding future and is intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. Therefore, a purposive rather than a strict literal approach to the interpretation should be adopted. A constitutional provision must be construed not in a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that a constitutional provision does not get fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges.” Learned senior counsel, also drew the Court’s attention to similar observations recorded in the Second Judges case. 19. Learned counsel was emphatic, that the impugned constitutional amendment (and the provisions of the NJAC Act), if approved, would remain in place for ten…, twenty…, thirty or even forty years, and therefore, need to be viewed closely and objectively. The provisions will JUDGMENT have to be interpreted in a manner, that the “independence of the judiciary” would not be compromised. It was submitted, that if the impugned provisions were to be declared as constitutionally valid, there would be no means hereafter, to restore the “independence of the judiciary”. 20. According to learned counsel, the question was of the purity of the justice delivery system. The question was about the maintenance of judicial standards. All these questions emerged from the fountainhead, namely, the manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Page 191 192 The provisions of Article 124, it was pointed out, as it existed prior to the impugned amendment, had provided for a system of trusteeship, wherein institutional predominance of the judiciary was the hallmark. It was

of law. The judicial responsibility in the matter of appointment of Judges, according to learned counsel, being the most important trusteeship, could not be permitted to be shared, with either the executive or the legislature. 21. Referring to the amendment itself, it was contended, that merely changing the basis of the legislation, would not be the correct test to evaluate the actions of the Parliament, in the present controversy. It was likewise submitted, that reasonableness and proportionality were also not the correct test(s) to be applied. According to learned counsel, in order to determine the validity of the impugned constitutional JUDGMENT amendment (and the NJAC Act), the Union of India and the ratifying States will have to bear the onus of satisfactorily establishing, that the amended provisions, could under no circumstances, be used (actually misused) to subvert the “independence of the judiciary”. Placing reliance 36 on the M. Nagaraj case , the Court’s attention was invited to the following observations: “22. The question which arises before us is regarding the nature of the standards of judicial review required to be applied in judging the validity of the constitutional amendments in the context of the doctrine of basic structure. The concept of a basic structure giving coherence and durability to a Constitution has a certain intrinsic force. This doctrine Page 192 193

JUDGMENT xxx xxx xxx 30. Constitutional adjudication is like no other decision-making. There is a moral dimension to every major constitutional case; the language of the text is not necessarily a controlling factor. Our Constitution works because of its generalities, and because of the good sense of the judges when interpreting it. It is that informed freedom of action of the judges that helps to preserve and protect our basic document of governance. xxx xxx xxx 35. The theory of basic structure is based on the principle that a change in a thing does not involve its destruction and destruction of a thing is a matter of substance and not of form. Therefore, one has to apply the test of overarching principle to be gathered from the scheme and the placement and the structure of an article in the Constitution. For Page 193 194 example, the placement of Article 14 in the equality code; the placement of Article 19 in the freedom code; the placement of Article 32 in the code giving access to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the theory of basic structure is the only theory by which the validity of impugned amendments to the Constitution is to be judged.”

in its mind, the exact nature of the amendment contemplated through the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act. And the second step was, to

JUDGMENT Page 194 195

JUDGMENT Yet again referring to the width and the identity tests, learned counsel emphasized, that it was imperative for this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to examine whether the power of amendment exercised by the Parliament, was so wide as to make it Page 195 196 excessive. For the above, reference was made to the Madras Bar 35 Association case , wherein this Court recorded the following conclusions:

JUDGMENT Based on the above, it was asserted, that this Court had now clearly laid down, that on issues pertaining to the transfer of judicial power, the salient characteristics, standards and conventions of judicial power, could not be breached. It was also submitted, that evaluated by the aforesaid standards, it would clearly emerge, that the “independence of the judiciary” had been seriously compromised, through the impugned constitutional amendment (and the NJAC Act). Page 196 197 23. It was the submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior Advocate, that the defect in the judgment rendered by this Court in the First Judges case, was that, Article 50 of the Constitution had not been

JUDGMENT xxx xxx xxx 85. Regrettably, there are some intractable problems concerned with judicial administration starting from the initial stage of selection of candidates to man the Supreme Court and the High Courts leading to the present malaise. Therefore, it has become inevitable that effective steps have to be taken to improve or retrieve the situation. After taking note of these problems and realising the devastating consequences that may Page 197 198

xxx xxx xxx 141. Mr Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel expressed his grievance that the principles laid down in Chandra Mohan case (1967) 1 SCR 77, 83… were not appreciated by the learned Judges while dealing with Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 who in his submission, have ignored the principle of harmonious construction which was articulated in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay (1961) 1 SCR 497… According to him, the judgment in Gupta case 1981 Supp SCC 87 may be regarded as per incuriam. He articulates that the expression ‘consultation’ is itself flexible and in a certain context capable of bearing the meaning of ‘consent’ or ‘concurrence’. xxx xxx xxx 154. The controversy that arises for scrutiny from the arguments addressed boils down with regard to the construction of the word ‘consultation’. xxx xxx xxx 170. Thus, it is seen that the consensus of opinion is that consultation with the CJI is a mandatory condition precedent to the order of transfer made by the President so that non-consultation with the CJI shall render the order unconstitutional i.e. void. JUDGMENT 171. The above view of the mandatory character of the requirement of consultation taken in Sankalchand has been followed and reiterated by some of the Judges in Gupta case . Fazal Ali, J. has held in Gupta case : (SCC p. 483, para 569) “(3) If the consultation with the CJI has not been done before transferring a Judge, the transfer becomes unconstitutional.” Venkataramiah, J. in Gupta case has also expressed the same view. 172. In the light of the above view expressed in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, (1977) SCC 4 193… and some of the Judges in Gupta case 1981 Supp SCC 87… it can be simply held that consultation with the CJI under the first proviso to Article 124(2) as well as under Article 217 is a mandatory condition, the violation of which would be contrary to the constitutional mandate. xxx xxx xxx Page 198 199

JUDGMENT the legislators are different from the legislative staff. So also the judges from the judicial staff. The parity is between the political executive, the legislators and the judges and not between the judges and the administrative executive. In some democracies like the USA, members of some State judiciaries are elected as much as the members of the legislature and the heads of the State. The judges, at whatever level they may be, represent the State and its authority unlike the administrative executive or the members of other services. The members of the other services, therefore, cannot be placed on a par with the members of the judiciary, either constitutionally or functionally.” Whereupon, this Court recorded its conclusions. The relevant conclusions are extracted hereunder: Page 199 200

JUDGMENT xxx xxx xxx 196. In the background of the above factual and legal position, the meaning of the word ‘consultation’ cannot be confined to its ordinary lexical definition. Its contents greatly vary according to the circumstances and context in which the word is used as in our Constitution. xxx xxx xxx 207. No one can deny that the State in the present day has become the major litigant and the superior courts particularly the Supreme Court, have become centres for turbulent controversies, some of which with a flavour of political repercussions and the Courts have to face tempest and Page 200 201 storm because their vitality is a national imperative. In such circumstances, therefore, can the Government, namely, the major litigant be justified in enjoying absolute authority in nominating and appointing its arbitrators. The answer would be in the negative. If such a process is allowed to continue, the independence of judiciary in the long run will sink without any trace. By going through various Law Commission Reports (particularly Fourteenth, Eightieth and One Hundred and Twenty-first), Reports of the Seminars and articles of eminent jurists etc., we understand that a radical change in the method of appointment of Judges to the superior judiciary by curbing the executive’s power has been accentuated but the desired result has not been achieved even though by now nearly 46 years since the attainment of independence and more than 42 years since the advent of the formation of our constitutional system have elapsed. However, it is a proud privilege that the celebrated birth of our judicial system, its independence, mode of dispensation of justice by Judges of eminence holding nationalistic views stronger than other Judges in any other nations, and the resultant triumph of the Indian judiciary are highly commendable. But it does not mean that the present system should continue for ever, and by allowing the executive to enjoy the absolute primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges as its ‘royal privilege’. 208. The polemics of the learned Attorney-General and Mr Parasaran for sustaining the view expressed in Gupta case 1981 Supp SCC 87… though so distinguished for the strength of their ratiocination, is found to be not acceptable and falls through for all the reasons aforementioned because of the inherent weakness of the doctrine which they have attempted to defend.” Insofar as the minority judgment authored by A.M. Ahmadi, J., (as he JUDGMENT then was) is concerned, it is only relevant to highlight the first conclusion recorded in paragraph 313, which is reproduced hereunder: “313. We conclude: ( i ) The concept of judicial independence is deeply ingrained in our constitutional scheme and Article 50 illuminates it. The degree of independence is near total after a person is appointed and inducted in the judicial family. …..” 24. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, learned counsel invited our attention to the preamble of the NJAC Act, which is reproduced below: Page 201 202 “An Act to regulate the procedure to be followed by the National Judicial Appointments Commission for recommending persons for appointment as the Chief Justice of India and other Judges of the Supreme Court and Chief Justices and other Judges of High Courts and for their transfers and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

JUDGMENT Page 202 203 Based on the non-disclosure of reasons, why the existing procedure was perceived as unsuitable, it was contended, that the only object sought to be achieved was, to dilute the primacy, earlier vested with the Chief

away, it was pointed out, by substituting the Chief Justice of India, with the NJAC. 25. The primary submission advanced at the hands of Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, was with reference to the violation of the “basic structure”, not only through the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, but also, by enacting the NJAC Act. It was pointed out, that since the commencement of the Constitution, whenever changes were recommended in respect of the appointment of Judges, the issue which remained the focus of attention was, the primacy of the Chief Justice of JUDGMENT India. Primacy, it was contended, had been recognized as the decisive voice of the judiciary, based on a collective decision of a collegium of Judges, representing its collegiate wisdom. It was submitted, that the Chief Justice of India, as an individual, as well as, Chief Justices of High Courts, as individuals, could not be considered as persona designate . It was pointed out, that the judgment rendered in the Second Judges case, had not become irrelevant. This Court, in the above judgment, provided for the preservation of the “independence of the judiciary”. The aforesaid judgment, as also, the later judgment in the Third Judges case, Page 203 204 re-established and reaffirmed, that the Chief Justice of India, represented through a body of Judges, had primacy. According to learned counsel, the individual Chief Justice of India, could not and did not, represent the

responsibility vested with the Chief Justice of India, represented through a collegium of Judges (under Articles 124 and 217 – as originally enacted). Accordingly, it was submitted, that till the system adopted for selection and appointment of Judges, established and affirmed, the unimpeachable primacy of the judiciary, “independence of the judiciary” could not be deemed to have been preserved. 26. Insofar as the issue in hand is concerned, it was the pointed contention of the learned counsel, that the decision rendered by this 37 Court in Sardari Lal v. Union of India , came to be overruled in the 11 Samsher Singh case . Referring to the judgment in the Samsher Singh JUDGMENT 11 case , he invited this Court’s attention to the following observations recorded therein: “147. In J.P. Mitter v. Chief Justice, Calcutta AIR 1965 SC 961 this Court had to consider the decision of the Government of India on the age of a Judge of the Calcutta High Court and, in that context, had to ascertain the true scope and effect of Article 217(3) which clothes the President with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the age of a Judge finally. In that case the Ministry of Home Affairs went through the exercise prescribed in Article 217(3). “The then Home Minister wrote to the Chief Minister, West Bengal, that he had consulted the Chief Justice of India, and he agreed with the advice given to him by the Chief Justice, and so he had decided that the date of birth of the appellant was....It is this decision which was, in due course communicated to the appellant”. When the said decision 37 AIR 1971 SC 1547 Page 204 205

Page 205 206 11 27. It was pointed out, that the decision in the Samsher Singh case , came to be rendered well before the decision in the First Judges case, wherein this Court felt, that Judges could be fearless only if, institutional

authority in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, rested with the Chief Justice of India. It was pointed out, that the above position had held the field, ever since. It was submitted, that “independence of the judiciary” has always meant and included independence in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. 28. Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned Senior Advocate contended, that the NJAC had been created by an amendment to the Constitution. It therefore was a creature of the Constitution. Power had been vested with the NJAC to make recommendations of persons for appointment as JUDGMENT Judges to the higher judiciary, including the power to transfer Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts, from one High Court to another. The above constitutional authority, it was submitted, must be regulated by a constitutional scheme, which must flow from the provisions of the Constitution itself. Therefore, it was asserted, that the manner of functioning of the NJAC must be contained in the Constitution itself. It was submitted, that the method of functioning of the NJAC, could not be left to the Parliament, to be regulated by ordinary law. In order to support his aforestated contention, reliance was placed on entries 77 and 78, Page 206 207 contained in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule. It was submitted, that the power to frame legislation, with reference to entries 77 and 78 was not absolute, inasmuch as, Article 245 authorized the Parliament, to

asserted, that the activities of the NJAC could not be made subject to, or subservient to, the power vested in the Parliament, under entries 77 and 78. 29. It was contended by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior Advocate, that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to demonstrate, that the present political establishment felt, that the judiciary was an obstacle for the implementation of its policies. It was contended, that the entire effort, was to subdue the judiciary, by inducting into the selection process, those who could be politically influenced. In order to project, the concerted effort of the political dispensation, in subverting the JUDGMENT “independence of the judiciary”, learned counsel, in the first instance, pointed out, that the first Bill to constitute a National Judicial Commission [the Constitution (67th Amendment) Bill, 1990] was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 18.5.1990. The statement of its “Objects and Reasons”, which was relied upon, is extracted below: “The Government of India have in the recent past announced their intention to set up a high level judicial commission, to be called the National Judicial Commission for the appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts and the transfer of Judges of the High Courts so as to obviate the criticisms of arbitrariness on the part of the Executive in such appointments and transfers and also to make such appointments without any delay. The Law Commission of India in their Page 207 208

The proposed National Judicial Commission in the above Bill, was to be made a component of Part XIIIA of the Constitution, by including therein Article 307A. The Chief Justice of India, and the next two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court, were proposed to comprise of the contemplated Commission, for making appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court, Chief Justices and Judges to High Courts, and for transfer of High Court Judges from one High Court to another. The above JUDGMENT Commission, omitted any executive and legislative participation. The proposed composition of the Commission, for appointing High Court Judges, included the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Minister or the Governor of the concerned State, the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, and the senior most Judge of that Court. The above Bill also provided for, an independent and separate secretarial staff for the contemplated Commission. It was submitted, that the above amendment to the Constitution, was on account of the disillusionment and incredulity with Page 208 209 the legal position, expounded by this Court in the First Judges case. It was submitted, that the necessity to give effect to the proposed Constitution (67th Amendment) Bill, 1990, stood obviated when this

ignored. 30. Historically, the next stage, was when the Constitution (98th Amendment) Bill, 2003 was placed before the Parliament for its consideration. In the above Bill, the executive participation in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was introduced by making the Union Minister of Law and Justice, an ex officio Member of the Commission. Two eminent citizens (either eminent jurists, or eminent lawyers, or legal academicians of high repute) would also be Members of the Commission. One of them was to be appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, and the JUDGMENT other, in consultation with the Prime Minister. Yet another effort was made (by the previous U.P.A. Government), in the same direction, through the Constitution (120th Amendment) Bill, 2013, on similar lines as the 2003 Bill. It was sought to be pointed out, that there was a consensus amongst all the parties, that the aforesaid Bill should be approved. And that, learned counsel personally, as a Member of the Rajya Sabha, had strongly contested the above move. Learned counsel invited this Court’s attention to the objections raised by him, during the course of the debate before the Rajya Sabha. He emphasized, that he had Page 209 210 submitted to the Parliament, that the Constitution Amendment Bill, needed to be referred to the Select Committee of the Parliament, as the same in his opinion was unconstitutional. An extract of the debate was

JUDGMENT xxx xxx xxx Kapil is my great friend and is one of the Ministers in the Government whose work as the Law Minister I keep supervising and I am happy the manner in which he conducts his Ministry. But, Sir, I must declare today that my conscience, understanding and my duty towards the people of this country, which I regard as my paramount obligation, do not permit me to submit to this kind of legislation. Both the Bills, according to me are evil. The evil, first of all, consists in the misleading Statement of Objects-and-Reasons. You ought to have said with Page 210 211

JUDGMENT Page 211 212 which is consistent with the basic features of the Constitution, namely, the supremacy of the Judiciary and its freedom from any influence of the Executive in the appointment process.

JUDGMENT xxx xxx xxx Sir, first of all, let me say this now that the whole judgement of nine Judges is based upon this principle that in the appointment process, the Executive can never have primacy. This is principle number one. It has now become the basic feature of India's Constitution. My grievance today against this Constitution (Amendment) Bill is that you are slowly, slowly now creating a new method by which ultimately you will revert to the system which existed prior to 1993. In other words, the same system would produce those four Judges who destroyed the Indian democracy, human rights and freedom. Sir, kindly see, why. The Constitution Page 212 213

JUDGMENT xxx xxx xxx Sir, I hope, people will avoid this kind of a tragedy in the life of this country. You are today digging the grave of the Constitution of India and the freedom of this country. ...(Interruptions)... That's all I wished to say. ...(Interruptions)...” It was submitted, that in the Rajya Sabha 131 votes were cast in affirmation of the proposed Bill, as against the solitary vote of the learned counsel, against the same on 5.9.2013. It was however pointed out, that the effort did not bear fruit, on account of the intervening declaration for elections to the Parliament. Page 213 214 31. Learned counsel thereafter, invited our attention to the statement of “Objects and Reasons” for the promulgation of the Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, 2014. The Bill which eventually gave rise to the

much debate. It was submitted, that on the following day i.e., 14.8.2014, the same was placed before the Rajya Sabha, and was again passed, without much discussion. It was pointed out, that an issue, as serious as the one in hand, which could have serious repercussions on the “independence of the judiciary”, was sought to be rushed through. 32. It was submitted, that the “Objects and Reasons” of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act were painfully lacking, in the expression of details, which had necessitated the proposed/impugned constitutional amendment. It was submitted, that it was imperative to have brought to the notice of the Parliament, that the Supreme Court had JUDGMENT declared, that the “rule of law”, the “separation of powers” and the “independence of the judiciary”, were “salient and basic features” of the Constitution. And that, the same could not be abrogated, through a constitutional amendment. And further that, the Supreme Court had expressly provided for the primacy of the Chief Justice of India, based on a decision of a collegium of Judges, with reference to the appointments and transfers of Judges of the higher judiciary. 33. It was submitted by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, that the impugned constitutional amendment, so as to introduce Article 124A, ought to be Page 214 215 described as a fraud on the Constitution itself. It was pointed out, that the first effort of introducing Article 124A was made by the previous Government, through the Constitution (120th Amendment) Bill, 2013. In

Sabha passed the above Bill on 5.9.2013, when 131 Members of the Rajya Sabha supported the Bill (with only one Member opposing it). Learned counsel submitted, that he alone had opposed the Bill. It was asserted, that the above fraud was sought to be perpetuated, through the passing of the Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, 2014, by the Lok Sabha on 13.8.2014, and by the Rajya Sabha on 14.8.2014. It was pointed out, that Parliamentarians from different political parties had joined hands. It was submitted, that as a Parliamentarian, he was in a position to assert, that the merits and demerits of the impugned amendment to the Constitution, were not debated, when the Bill was JUDGMENT passed, because of the universal bias entertained by the legislature, against the judiciary. It was submitted, that prejudice and intolerance had arisen, because of the fact that the judiciary often interfered with, and often effaced legislative action(s), as also, executive decision(s). 34. Learned senior counsel also asserted, that the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was wholly ultra vires, as it seriously infringed the “basic structure/feature” of the Constitution i.e., the “independence of the judiciary”. It was submitted, that the veracity of the above constitutional amendment, had to be examined in the light of Article 50. Page 215 216 According to learned counsel, the politicization of the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, would lead to a dilution of the “independence of the judiciary”. It was submitted, that the

of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was pointed out, that the inclusion of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice within the framework of the NJAC, meant the introduction of the Government of the day, into the selection process. It was asserted, that the Union Minister’s inclusion, meant surrendering one-sixth of the power of appointment, to the Government. It was submitted, that in order to understand the true effect of the inclusion of the Union Minister, into the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, one had to keep in mind the tremendous amount of patronage, which the Union Minister for Law and Justice carries, and as such, it would be JUDGMENT within the inference of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, to make the process fallible, by extending his power of patronage to support or oppose candidates, who may be suitable or unsuitable, to the Government of the day. Even though the Union Minister had been assigned only one vote, it was submitted, that he could paralyse the whole system, on the basis of the authority he exercised. To drive home his contention, learned counsel made a reference to the introduction of the book “Choosing Hammurabi – Debates on Judicial Appointments”, Page 216 217 edited by Santosh Paul. In the introduction to the book, the thoughts of H.L. Mencken are expressed in the following words: “But when politicians talk thus, or act thus without talking, it is precisely the time to watch them most carefully. Their usual plan is to invade the constitution stealthily, and then wait to see what happens. If nothing happens they go on more boldly; if there is a protest they reply hotly that the constitution is worn out and absurd, and that progress is impossible under the dead hand. This is the time to watch them especially. They are up to no good to anyone save themselves. They are trying to whittle away the common rights of the rest of us. Their one and only object, now and always, is to get more power in to their hands that it may be used freely for their advantage, and to the damage of everyone else. Beware of all politicians at all times, but beware of them most sharply when they talk of reforming and improving the constitution.” 35. Learned Senior Advocate also contended, that the inclusion of two “eminent persons” in the six-Member NJAC, as provided for, under Article 124A(1) of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was also clearly unconstitutional. It was contended, that there necessarily had to be, an indication of the positive qualifications required to be possessed by the two “eminent persons”, to be nominated to the NJAC. Additionally, it JUDGMENT was necessary to stipulate disqualifications. Illustratively, it was pointed out, that an individual having a conflict of interest, should be disqualified. And such conflict would be apparent, when the individual had a political role. A politician has to serve his constituency, he has to nourish and sustain his vote bank, and above all, he has to conform with the agenda of his political party. Likewise, a person with ongoing litigation, irrespective of the nature of such litigation, would render himself ineligible for serving as an “eminent person” within the framework of the NJAC, because of his conflict of interest. Page 217 218 36. With reference to the inclusion of two “eminent persons” in the NJAC, Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned Senior Advocate, invited our attention to Article 124A, whereunder, the above two “eminent persons” are to be

where there is no such Leader of Opposition, then, leader of the single largest opposition party in the House of the People. Learned counsel submitted, that neither Article 124A, nor any other provision, and not even the provisions of the NJAC Act, indicate the qualifications, of the two “eminent persons”, who have been included amongst the six-Member NJAC. It was sought to be asserted, that in approximately 70 Statutes and Rules, the expression “eminent person” has been employed. Out of the 70 Statutes, in 67, the field in which such persons must be eminent, has been clearly expressed. Only in three statutes, the term “eminent person” was used without any further qualification. It was asserted, that JUDGMENT the term “eminent person” had been left vague and undefined, in Article 124A. It was submitted, that the vagueness of the term “eminent person” was itself, good enough to justify the striking down of the provision. It was emphasized, that the determinative role assigned to the two “eminent persons”, included amongst the six-Member NJAC, was so important, that the same could not be left to the imagination of the nominating committee, which comprised of just men “…with all the failings, all the sentiments and all prejudices which we as common people have…” (relying on the words of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar). Page 218 219 37. Referring to the second proviso under Section 5(2), as well as, Section 6(6) of the NJAC Act, it was submitted, that a recommendation for appointment of a Judge, could not be carried out, if the two “eminent

be given effect to, even though the other four Members of the NJAC including all the three representatives of the Supreme Court approved of the same. It was pointed out, that the two “eminent persons”, therefore would have a decisive say. It was further submitted, that the impact of the determination of the two “eminent persons”, would be such, as would negate the primacy hitherto before vested in the Chief Justice of India. It was pointed out, that a positive recommendation by the Chief Justice of India, supported by two other senior Judges of the Supreme Court (next to the Chief Justice of India), could be frustrated by an opposition at the hands of the two “eminent persons”. The above implied veto power, JUDGMENT according to the learned counsel, could lead to structured bargaining, so as to persuade the other Members of the NJAC, to accede to the names of undesirable nominees (just to avoid a stalemate of sorts). It was submitted, that such a composition had been adversely commented upon 38 by this Court in Union of India v. R. Gandhi . In the judgment, the provision, which was subject matter of consideration, was Section 10-FX. Under the above provision, the Selection Committee for appointing the Chairperson and Members of the Appellate Tribunal, and the President 38 (2010) 11 SCC 1 Page 219 220 and Members of the Tribunal was to be comprised of the Chief Justice of India (or his nominee), besides four Secretaries from different Ministries of the Union Government. This Court recorded its conclusions with reference to the aforesaid provision in paragraph 120(viii), which is being extracted hereunder: “120(viii) Instead of a five-member Selection Committee with the Chief Justice of India (or his nominee) as Chairperson and two Secretaries from the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs and the Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and the Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice as members mentioned in Section 10-FX, the Selection Committee should broadly be on the following lines: (a) Chief Justice of India or his nominee – Chairperson (with a casting vote); (b) A Senior Judge of the Supreme Court or Chief Justice of High Court – Member; (c) Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs –Member; and (d) Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice – Member.” It was submitted, that the purpose sought to be achieved, was not exclusivity, but primacy. It is further submitted, that if primacy was considered to be important for selection of Members to be appointed to a JUDGMENT tribunal, primacy assumed a far greater significance, when the issue under consideration was appointment and transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary. It was accordingly contended, that the manner in which the composition of the NJAC had been worked out in Article 124A, and the manner in which the NJAC is to function with reference to the provisions of the NJAC Act, left no room for any doubt, that the same was in clear violation of the law laid down by this Court, and therefore, liable to be set aside. Page 220 221 38. Learned counsel on the above facts, contested not only the constitutional validity of clauses (c) and (d) of Article 124A(1), but also emphatically assailed the first proviso under Article 124A(1)(d), which

or Women. It was submitted, that these sort of populistic measures, ought not to be thought of, while examining a matter as important as the higher judiciary. It was submitted, that it was not understandable, what the choice of including a person from one of the aforesaid categories was aimed at. In the opinion of learned counsel, the above proviso was farcical, and therefore, totally unacceptable. While members of a particular community may be relevant for protecting the interest of their community, yet it could not be conceived, why such a measure should be adopted, for such an important constitutional responsibility. In the opinion of the learned counsel, the inclusion of such a Member in the JUDGMENT NJAC, was bound to lead to compromises. 39. It was also the contention of Mr. Arvind P. Datar, that Article 124C introduced by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was wholly unnecessary. It was pointed out, that in the absence of Article 124C, the NJAC would have had the inherent power to regulate its own functioning. It was submitted, that Article 124C was a serious intrusion into the above inherent power. Now that, the Parliament had been authorized to regulate the procedure for appointments by framing laws, it would also result in the transfer of control over the appointment process (–of Judges Page 221 222 to the higher judiciary), to the Parliament. It was submitted, that there could not be any legislative control, with reference to appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Such legislative control, according to

behalf, by framing the NJAC Act, and having provided therein, the ultimate control with the Parliament, must be deemed to have crossed the line, and transgressed into forbidden territory, exclusively reserved for the judiciary. Learned counsel contended, that the duties and responsibilities vested in a constitutional authority, could only be circumscribed by the Constitution, and not by the Parliament through legislation. It was submitted, that the NJAC was a creature of the Constitution, as the NJAC flows out of Article 124A. Likewise, the Parliament, was also a creature of the Constitution. It was submitted, that one entity which was the creation of the Constitution, could not JUDGMENT regulate the other, owing its existence to the Constitution. 40. It was pointed out by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior Advocate, that the statement of “Objects and Reasons”, as were projected for the instant legislation, indicated inter alia, that the NJAC would provide “a meaningful role to the judiciary”. It was submitted, that what was meant by the aforesaid affirmation, was not comprehendible to him. It was further highlighted, that it also asserted in the “Objects and Reasons”, that “the executive and the eminent persons to present their viewpoints and make the participants accountable”, was likewise Page 222 223 unintelligible to him. It was submitted, that a perusal of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act (as also, the NJAC Act) would not reveal, how the Members of the NJAC were to be made responsible. It was further

introduce transparency in the selection process. It was contended, that the enactments under reference, amounted to commission of a fraud by Parliament, on the people of the country. As it was not possible to understand, how and who was to be made accountable – the executive, – the “eminent persons”, – the judiciary itself. It was accordingly sought to be asserted, that the Parliament seemed to be asserting one thing, while it was doing something else. Learned counsel also placed reliance on 39 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India , wherefrom the following observations were brought to our notice: “50. Counsel for the Petitioners argued that the language used in Section 66A is so vague that neither would an accused person be put on notice as to what exactly is the offence which has been committed nor would the authorities administering the Section be clear as to on which side of a clearly drawn line a particular communication will fall.” JUDGMENT Based on the above submissions, it was asserted, that the statement of “Objects and Reasons”, could not have been more vague, ambiguous, and fanciful than the ones in the matter at hand. 41. Mr. Anil B. Divan, Senior Advocate, while appearing for the petitioner in the petition filed by the Bar Association of India (Writ Petition (C) No.108 of 2015), first and foremost pointed out, that the Bar 39 2015 (4) SCALE 1 Page 223 224 Association of India represents the High Court Bar Association, Kolkata (West Bengal), The Awadh Bar Association, Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh), the Madras Bar Association, Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the Supreme Court Bar

Nadu), the Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates’ Association, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), the Delhi High Court Bar Association, New Delhi, the Bar Association Mumbai (Maharashtra), the Gauhati High Court Bar Association, Guwahati (Assam), the Punjab & Haryana High Court Bar Association, Chandigarh (Punjab & Haryana), the Bombay Incorporated Law Society, Mumbai (Maharashtra), the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association, Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh), the Advocates’ Association Bangalore (Karnataka), the Central Excise, Customs (Gold) Control Bar Association, New Delhi, the Advocates’ Association, Allahabad (Uttar Pradesh), the Karnataka Advocates’ Federation, JUDGMENT Bangalore (Karnataka), the Allahabad High Court Bar Association (Uttar Pradesh), the Goa High Court Bar Association, Panaji (Goa), the Society of India Law of Firms, New Delhi, the Chhattisgarh High Court Bar Association, Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh), the Nagpur High Court Bar Association, Nagpur (Maharashtra), the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court Bar Association, Madurai (Tamil Nadu), the Jharkhand High Court Bar Association, Ranchi (Jharkhand), the Bar Association of National Capital Region, New Delhi, and the Gulbarga High Court Bar Association, Gulbarga (Karnataka). It was submitted, that all the aforementioned Bar Page 224 225 Associations were unanimous in their challenge, to the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, and the NJAC Act. It was submitted, that the challenge to the former was based on the fact that it violated the “basic

42. Learned counsel had adopted a stance, which was different from the one adopted by others. The submissions advanced by the learned senior counsel, were premised on the fact, that under the constitutional power of judicial review, the higher judiciary not only enforced fundamental rights, but also restricted the legislature and the executive, within the confines of their jurisdiction(s). It was pointed out, that it was the above power, which was the source of tension and friction between the judiciary on the one hand, and the two other pillars of governance i.e., the legislature and the executive, on the other. This friction, it was pointed out, was caused on account of the fact, that while discharging its JUDGMENT responsibility of judicial review, executive backed actions of the legislature, were sometimes invalidated, resulting in the belief, that the judiciary was influencing and dominating the other two pillars of governance. Illustratively, it was pointed out, that in the beginning of independent governance of the country, judicial review led to the setting aside of legislations, pertaining to land reforms and zamindari abolition. This had led to the adoption of inserting legislations in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, so as to exclude them from the purview of judicial review. Page 225 226 43. It was submitted, that the first manifestation of a confrontation between the judiciary and the other two wings of governance, were 40 indicated in the observations recorded in State of Madras v. V.G. Row ,

authority in a crusader’s spirit, but in discharge of the duty plainly laid upon the Courts, by the Constitution. 44. It was submitted, that the legislations placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, from the original 13 items (relating to land reforms and zamindari abolition), multiplied at a brisk rate, and currently numbered about 284. And many of them, had hardly anything to do with land reforms. It was contended, that the decision rendered by this Court 41 in I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab , was a judicial reaction to the uninhibited insertions in the Ninth Schedule, leading to completely eclipsing fundamental rights. It therefore came to be held in the I.C. JUDGMENT 41 Golak Nath case , that Parliament by way of constitutional amendment(s) could not take away or abridge fundamental rights. 45. To project his contention, pertaining to tension and friction between the judiciary and the other two wings of governance, it was submitted, that from 1950 to 1973, there was virtually no attempt by the political-executive, to undermine or influence or dominate over the judiciary. It was pointed out, that during the aforesaid period, when th th Jawaharlal Nehru (upto 27 May, 1964), Gulzari Lal Nanda (upto 9 40 (1952) SCR 597 41 AIR 1967 SC 1643 Page 226 227 th June, 1964), Lal Bahadur Shastri (upto 11 January,1966), Gulzari Lal th Nanda (upto 24 January, 1966) and Indira Gandhi (upto 1972) were running the executive and political governance in India, in their capacity

political-executive leadership. The first, the abolition of the Privy Purses by an executive fiat, which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 42 Madhavrao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India . And the second, the 10 fundamental rights case, namely, the Kesavananda Bharati case , wherein the Supreme Court by a majority of 7:6, had propounded the doctrine of “basic structure” of the Constitution, which limited the amending power of the Parliament, under Article 368. As a sequel to the above judgments, the executive attempted to intimidate the judiciary, by the first supersession in the Supreme Court on 25.4.1973. Thereafter, internal emergency was declared on 25.06.1975, which continued till JUDGMENT 21.03.1977. It was submitted, that during the emergency, by way of constitutional amendment(s), the power of judicial review vested in the higher judiciary, was sought to be undermined. It was submitted, that the intrusion during the emergency came to be remedied when the Janata Party came to power on 22.03.1977, through the 43rd and 44th Constitutional Amendments, which restored judicial review, to the original position provided for by the Constituent Assembly. 46. It was submitted, that in the recent past also, the exercise of the 42 (1971) 1 SCC 85 Page 227 228 power of judicial review had been inconvenient for the political-executive, as it resulted in exposing a series of scams. In this behalf, reference was made to two judgments rendered by this Court, i.e., Centre for Public

legislature can never appreciate that the power of judicial review has been exercised by the higher judiciary, as a matter of public trust. As a sequel to the above two judgments, it was pointed out, that an amount of approximately Rupees two lakh crores (Rs. 20,00,00,00,00,000/-) was gained by the public exchequer, for just a few coal block allocations (for which reliance was placed on an article which had appeared in the Indian Express dated 10.3.2015). And an additional amount of Rupees one lakh ten thousand crores (Rs.11,00,00,00,00,000/-) was gained by the public exchequer from the spectrum auction (for which reliance was placed on an article in the Financial Express dated 25.03.2015). It was submitted, JUDGMENT that the embarrassment faced by the political-executive, has over shadowed the monumental gains to the nation. It was contended, that the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, and the NJAC Act, were truthfully a political-executive device, to rein in the power of judicial review, to avoid such discomfiture. 47. It was also contended, that while adjudicating upon the present controversy, it was imperative for this Court, to take into consideration the existing socio-political conditions, the ground realities pertaining to 43 (2012) 3 SCC 1 44 (2014) 2 SCC 532 Page 228 229 the awareness of the civil society, and the relevant surrounding circumstances. These components, according to learned counsel, were described as relevant considerations, for a meaningful judicial verdict in

of the legislation, it was permissible for a Court to look into the circumstances which had prevailed at the time when the law was passed, and events which had necessitated the passing of the legislation. Referring to the judgment rendered by this Court, in Re: the Special 46 Courts Bill, 1978 , learned counsel placed emphatic reliance on the following: “106. The greatest trauma of our times, for a developing country of urgent yet tantalising imperatives, is the dismal, yet die-hard, poverty of the masses and the democratic, yet graft-riven, way of life of power-wielders. Together they blend to produce gross abuse geared to personal aggrandizement, suppression of exposure and a host of other horrendous, yet hidden, crimes by the summit executives, pro tem, the para-political manipulators and the abetting bureaucrats. And the rule of law hangs limp or barks but never bites. An anonymous poet sardonically projected the social dimension of this systemic deficiency: JUDGMENT The law locks up both man and woman Who steals the goose from off the common, But lets the greater felon loose Who steals the common from the goose. 107. The impact of 'summit' crimes in the Third World setting is more terrible than the Watergate syndrome as perceptive social scientists have unmasked. Corruption and repression-cousins in such situations-hijack developmental processes. And, in the long run, lagging national progress means ebbing people's confidence in constitutional means to social justice. And so, to track down and give short shrift to these heavy-weight criminaloids who often mislead the people by public moral weight-lifting and multipoint manifestoes is an urgent legislative mission partially undertaken by the Bill under discussion. To punish such super-offenders in top positions, sealing off legalistic escape routes and dilatory strategies 45 (1990) 4 SCC 366 46 (1979) 1 SCC 380 Page 229 230

JUDGMENT xxx xxx xxx 117. Let us take a close look at the 'Emergency', the vices it bred and the nexus they have to speedier justice, substantial enough to qualify for reasonable sub-classification. Information flowing from the proceedings and reports of a bunch of high-powered judicial commissions shows that during that hushed spell, many suffered shocking treatment. In the words of the Preamble, civil liberties were withdrawn to a great extent, important fundamental rights of the people were suspended, strict censorship on the press was placed and judicial powers were curtailed to a large extent. xxx xxx xxx 128. Let us view the problem slightly differently. Even if liberty had not been curtailed, press not gagged or writ jurisdiction not cut down, Page 230 231

Last of all, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in 47 Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation , wherein this Court extensively referred to the conditions regarding corruption which prevailed in the country. For the above purpose, it took into consideration the view expressed by the N.N. Vohra Committee Report, bringing out the nexus between the criminal syndicates and JUDGMENT mafia. 48. Reliance was, then placed on the efforts made by the executive on the death of the first Chief Justice of India (after the promulgation of the Constitution), when Patanjali Sastri, J., who was the senior most Judge, was sought to be overlooked. Relying on recorded texts in this behalf, by Granville Austin, George H. Gadbois Jr. and M.C. Chagla, it was submitted, that all the six Judges, at that time, had threatened to resign, 47 (2014) 8 SCC 682 Page 231 232 if the senior most Judge was overlooked for appointment as Chief Justice of India. 49. Referring to the first occasion, when the convention was broken, by

Judges, former Attorneys General, legal luminaries and members of the Bar, throughout the country. M. Hidayatullah, CJ., in a public speech, complimented the three Judges, who were superseded, for having resigned from their office, immediately on the appointment of A.N. Ray, as Chief Justice of India. In the speech delivered by M. Hidayatullah, CJ., he made a reference about rumors being afloat, that the senior most Judge after him, namely, J.C. Shah, J., would not succeed him as the Chief Justice of India. And that, an outsider was being brought to the Supreme Court, as its Chief Justice. His speech highlighted the fact, that all except one sitting Judge of the Supreme Court had agreed to resign in JUDGMENT the event of supersession of J.C. Shah, J.. He had also pointed out, in his speech, that if the decision was taken by the executive, even a day before his retirement, he too would join his colleagues in resigning from his position as the Chief Justice of India. It was accordingly submitted, that the constitutional convention, that the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court would be appointed as the Chief Justice of India, was truly and faithfully recognized as an impregnable convention. To support the aforesaid contention, it was also pointed out, that even in situations wherein the senior most puisne Judge would have a very short tenure, Page 232 233 the convention had remained unbroken, despite the inefficacy of making such appointments. In this behalf, the Court’s attention was drawn to the fact that J.C. Shah, CJ. (had a tenure of 35 days), K.N. Singh, CJ. (had a tenure of 18 days) and S. Rajendra Babu, CJ. (had a tenure of 29 days). 50. It was also the contention of the learned senior counsel, that the executive is an important litigant and stakeholder before the higher judiciary, and as such, the executive ought to have no role, whatsoever, in the matter of appointments/transfers of Judges to the higher judiciary. In this behalf, learned counsel placed reliance on a number of judgments rendered by this Court, wherein the participation of the executive in the higher judiciary, had been held to be unconstitutional, in the matter of appointments of Judges and other Members of tribunals, vested with quasi judicial functions. It was submitted, that the inclusion of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice in the NJAC, was a JUDGMENT clear breach of the judgments rendered by this Court. Additionally, it was pointed out, that two “eminent persons”, who were to be essential components of the NJAC, were to be selected by a Committee, wherein the dominating voice was that of the political leadership. It was pointed out, that in the three-Member Committee authorised to nominate “eminent persons” included the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, besides the Chief Justice of India. It was therefore submitted, that in the six-Member NJAC, three Members would have political-executive lineage. This aspect of the matter, according to Page 233 234 the learned counsel, would have a devastating affect. It would negate primacy of the higher judiciary, and the same would result in undermining the “independence of the judiciary”. Based on the above

amendment and the NJAC Act, the constitutional convention in this country, that the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court would be appointed as the Chief Justice of India, had been breached. It was submitted, that the above convention had achieved the status of a constitutional axiom – a constitutional principle. To substantiate the above contention, it was submitted, that right from 26.01.1950, the senior most puisne Judge of the Supreme Court has always been appointed as the Chief Justice of India except on two occasions. Firstly, the above convention was breached, when A.N. Ray, J., was appointed as Chief Justice of India on 25.4.1973, by superseding three senior most JUDGMENT Judges. It was submitted, that the aforesaid supersession was made on the day following the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the 10 Kesavananda Bharati case . Secondly, the supersession took place during the internal emergency declared by Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. At that juncture, M.H. Beg, J., was appointed as Chief Justice of India on 29.1.1977, by superseding his senior H.R. Khanna, J.. It was contended, that the aforesaid two instances should be considered as aberrations, in the convention pertaining to appointment of Chief Justice of India. Page 234 235 51. Mr. Arvind P. Datar also assailed the constitutional validity of Article 124C, introduced by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act. It was submitted, that the Parliament was delegated with the authority to

Judges of the High Courts”. And the NJAC was empowered to lay down, by regulation, “the procedure of discharging its own functions, the manner of selection of persons for appointment, and such other matters, as may be considered necessary by it”. It was the contention of the learned counsel, that the delegation of power contemplated under Article 124C, amounted to vesting the NJAC, with what was earlier vested with the Chief Justice of India. In this behalf, reference was also made to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the NJAC Act. The power to make rules, has been vested with the Central Government under Section 11, and the power to make regulations has been entrusted to the NJAC under Section JUDGMENT 12. The aforementioned rules and regulations, as drawn by the Central Government/NJAC, are required to be placed before the Parliament under Section 13, and only thereafter, the rules and regulations were to be effective (or not to have any effect, or to have effect as modified). It was submitted, that the entrustment of the procedure of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, and also, the action of assigning the manner in which the NJAC would discharge its functions (of selecting Judges to the higher judiciary), with either the executive or the legislature, was unthinkable, if “independence of the judiciary” was to be Page 235 236 maintained. It was pointed out, that the intent behind Article 124C, in the manner it had been framed, stood clearly exposed, by the aforesaid provisions of the NJAC Act.

Gazette, regulations framed by it, with the overriding condition, that the regulations so framed by the NJAC were to be consistent with the provisions of the NJAC Act, as also, the rules made thereunder (i.e., under Section 11 of the NJAC Act). Having so empowered the NJAC (under Sections 11 and 12 referred to above), and having delineated in Section 12(2), the broad outlines with reference to which the regulations could be framed, it was submitted, that the power to delegate the authority to frame regulations clearly stood exhausted. In that, the Parliament had no jurisdiction thereafter, to interfere in the matter of framing regulations. In fact, according to the learned counsel, JUDGMENT consequent upon the empowerment of the NJAC to frame regulations, the Parliament was rendered functus officio, on the issue of framing regulations. According to learned counsel, the above also established, the inference drawn in the foregoing paragraph. 53. It was also the contention of the learned counsel, that the NJAC constituted, by way of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, would be sustainable, so long as it did not violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution. It was emphasized, that one of the recognized features of the “basic structure” of the Constitution was, the “independence of the Page 236 237 judiciary”. The procedure which the NJAC could adopt for discharging its functions, and the procedure it was liable to follow while holding its meetings, and the ambit and scope with reference to which the NJAC was

counsel, would have ensured the “independence of the NJAC”. It was accordingly contended, that Article 124C breached the “independence of the judiciary”, and also, undermined the independence of the NJAC. 54. The next contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel, was with reference to clause (2) of Article 124A, whereby judicial review was barred, with reference to actions or proceedings of the NJAC, on the ground of the existence of a vacancy or defect in the constitution of the NJAC. Learned counsel then invited this Court’s attention to the exclusion of the power of judicial review, contemplated under Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d), wherein the power of judicial review was JUDGMENT similarly excluded. It was submitted, that this Court struck down a similar provision in the aforesaid Articles, holding that the same were violative of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. In this behalf, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the 34 Kihoto Hollohan case , and referred to the following observations recorded therein: “129. The unanimous opinion according to the majority as well as the minority is that Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule enacts a provision for complete exclusion of judicial review including the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 and of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, it makes in terms and in Page 237 238

Reliance was also placed on the following conclusions recorded by this 48 Court in Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi v. The Speaker . JUDGMENT “43. In Kihoto Hollohan there was no difference between the majority and minority opinions on the nature of finality attaching to the Speaker's order of disqualification made under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, and also that para 7 therein was unconstitutional in view of the non-compliance of the proviso to clause 2 of Article 368 of the Constitution, by which judicial review was sought to be excluded. The main difference in the two opinions was, that according to the majority opinion this defect resulted in the constitution standing amended from the inception with insertion of the Tenth Schedule minus para 7 therein, while according to the minority the entire exercise of constitutional amendment was futile and an abortive attempt to amend the constitution, since Para 7 was not severable. According to the minority view, all decisions rendered by the several Speakers under the Tenth Schedule were, therefore, nullity and liable to be ignored. According to the majority view, para 7 of the Tenth Schedule being unconstitutional and severable, the Tenth Schedule minus para 7 was validly enacted and, 48 AIR 1993 SC 1873 Page 238 239 therefore, the orders made by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule were not nullity but subject to judicial review. On the basis of the majority opinion, this Court has exercised the power of judicial review over the orders of disqualification made by the speakers from the very inception of the Tenth Schedule, and the exercise of judicial review has not been confined merely to the orders of disqualification made after 12th November, 1991 when the judgment in Kihoto Hollohan (1992 (1) SCC 309…) was rendered. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) wrote the majority opinion and, thereafter, on this premise, exercised the power of judicial review over orders of disqualification made prior to 12.11.1991. The basic fallacy in the submission made on behalf of the respondents that para 7 must be treated as existing till 12th November, 1991 is that on that view there would be no power of judicial review against an order of disqualification made by the Speaker prior to 12th November, 1991 since para 7 in express terms totally excludes judicial review.” It was, therefore, the vehement contention of the learned counsel, that clause (2) of Article 124A should be struck down, as being violative of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. 55. Mr. Fali S. Nariman, learned senior counsel, also raised a purely technical plea. It was his contention, that 121st Constitution Amendment Bill, now the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was introduced in the th Lok Sabha on 11 of August, 2014 and was passed by the Lok Sabha on JUDGMENT th 13 of August, 2014. It was further submitted, that the 121st Constitution Amendment Bill was discussed and passed by Rajya Sabha on 14.8.2014. Thereupon, the said Amendment Bill, which envisaged a constitutional amendment, was sent to the State Legislatures for ratification. Consequent upon its having been ratified by 16 State Legislatures, it was placed before the President for his assent. It was pointed out, that the President accorded his assent on 31.12.2014, whereupon, it became the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act. Learned Page 239 240 counsel then invited our attention to Section 1 of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, which reads as under:

having received the assent of the President on 31.12.2014, the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, would not come into force automatically. And that, the same would come into force in terms of the mandate contained in Section 1(2), - “… on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.” It was submitted, that the Central Government notified the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, in the Gazette of India Extraordinary on 13.4.2015. Based on the aforesaid factual position, the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, came into force with effect from 13.4.2015. JUDGMENT 56. In conjunction with the factual position noticed in the foregoing paragraph, learned counsel pointed out, that the NJAC Bill, was also introduced in the Lok Sabha on 11.8.2014. The Lok Sabha passed the Bill on 13.8.2014, whereupon, it was passed by the Rajya Sabha on 14.8.2014. Thereafter, the NJAC Bill received the assent of the President on 31.12.2014, and became the NJAC Act. It was contended, that the enactment of the NJAC Act was based/founded on the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act. It was submitted, that since the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was brought into force on 13.4.2015, the consideration Page 240 241 of the NJAC Bill and the passing of the NJAC Act prior to the coming into force of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, would render it stillborn and therefore nugatory. The Court’s attention was also invited to the fact,

Rajya Sabha. Learned counsel invited this Court’s attention to the following questions and answers, which are recorded on pages 442 to 533

JUDGMENT Page 241 242

JUDGMENT Page 242 243 Shri K. Parasaran: Suppose the Constitutional Amendment is passed, then can this Bill be introduced and discussed as it is? As a hypothetical case, if this Amendment Bill is not passed, can we introduce this Bill and pass it? We will not be able to do it.” (Emphasis supplied) (Page-496).” 57. In other words, it was the contention of the learned counsel, that

Bill, in the teeth of Articles 124(2) and 217(1), as enacted in the original Constitution. It was submitted, that the passing of the said Bill, was in itself unconstitutional, ultra vires and void, because the amended provisions contained in the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, had not come into play. It was submitted, that the passing by the Lok Sabha, as also, by the Rajya Sabha of the 121st Constitution Amendment Bill on 13/14.8.2014, and the ratification thereof by 16 State Legislatures, as also, the assent given thereto by the President on 31.12.2014, would not bestow validity on the NJAC Act. This, for the simple reason, that the JUDGMENT Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was brought into force only on 13.4.2015. In the above view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, till 13.4.2015, Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution of India were liable to be read, as they were originally enacted. In the aforesaid context, it was submitted, that the NJAC Act could not have been passed, till the unamended provisions of the Constitution were in force. And that, the mere assent of the President to the NJAC Act on 31.12.2014, could not infuse validity thereon. Page 243 244 58. In order to substantiate the aforesaid contention, learned counsel 49 placed reliance on A.K. Roy v. Union of India , and invited our attention to the following:

JUDGMENT 49 (1982) 1 SCC 271 Page 244 245

59. It was also the contention of Mr. Fali S. Nariman, that just as a JUDGMENT constitutional amendment was liable to be declared as ultra vires, if it violated and/or abrogated, the “core” or the “basic structure” of the Constitution; even a simple legislative enactment, which violated the “basic structure” of the Constitution, was liable to be declared as unconstitutional. For the instant proposition, learned counsel referred to 35 the Madras Bar Association case , and placed reliance on the following observations recorded therein: “109. Even though we have declined to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners, premised on the "basic structure" theory, we feel it is still essential for us, to deal with the submission advanced on Page 245 246

JUDGMENT Page 246 247 procedure, and was within the domain of the enacting legislature, any infringement to the "basic structure" would be unacceptable. Such submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondents are, therefore, liable to be disallowed, and are accordingly declined.”

advancing the same submissions, as were relied upon by him while assailing the constitutional validity of Articles 124A, 124B and 124C. For reasons of brevity, the aforestated submissions noticed with reference to individual provisions of the NJAC Act are not being repeated again. 61. A challenge was also raised, to the different provisions of the NJAC Act. First and foremost, a challenge was raised to the manner of selection of the Chief Justice of India. Section 5(1) of the NJAC Act, it was submitted, provides that the NJAC would recommend the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court, for being appointed as Chief Justice of India, subject to the condition, that he was considered “fit” to hold the JUDGMENT office. It was contended, that the procedure to regulate the appointment of the Chief Justice of India, was to be determined by Parliament, by law under Article 124C. It was contended, that the term “fit”, expressed in Section 5 of the NJAC Act, had not been elaborately described. And as such, fitness would have to be determined on the subjective satisfaction of the Members of the NJAC. It was submitted, that even though the learned Attorney General had expressed, during the course of hearing, that fitness meant “…mental and physical fitness alone…”, it was always open to the Parliament to purposefully define fitness, in a manner as Page 247 248 would sub-serve the will of the executive. It was submitted, that even an ordinance could be issued without the necessity, of following the procedure, of enacting law. It was asserted, that the criterion of fitness

Court would always be appointed as Chief Justice of India. And that, the aforesaid convention had remained unbroken, even though in some cases the tenure of the appointee, had been short, and as such, may not have enured to the advantage, of the judicial organization as a whole. Experience had shown, according to learned counsel, that adhering to the practice of appointing the senior most Judge as the Chief Justice of India, had resulted in institutional harmony amongst Judges, which was extremely important for the health of the judiciary, and also, for the “independence of the judiciary”. It was submitted, that it would be just and appropriate, at the present juncture, to understand the width of the JUDGMENT power, so as to prevent any likelihood of its misuse in future. It was submitted, that various ways and means could be devised to supersede Judges, and also, to bring in favourites. Past experience had shown, that the executive had abused its authority, when it departed from the above rule in April 1973, by superseding J.M. Shelat, J., the senior most Judge and even the next two Judges in the order of seniority after him, namely, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, and appointed the fourth senior most Judge A.N Ray, as the Chief Justice of India. Again in January 1977 on the retirement of A.N. Ray, CJ., the senior most Judge H.R. Khanna, was Page 248 249 ignored, and the next senior most Judge, M.H. Beg, was appointed as the Chief Justice of India. Such control in the hands of the executive would cause immense inroads, in the decision making process. And could

62. The submission noticed above was sought to be illustrated through the following instance. It was pointed out, that it would be genuine and legitimate for the Parliament to enact, that a person would be considered fit for appointment as Chief Justice of India, only if he had a minimum remaining tenure of at least two years. Such an enactment would have a devastating effect, even though it would appear to be innocuously legitimate. It was contended, that out of the 41 Chief Justices of India appointed till date, only 12 Chief Justices of India, had a tenure of more than two years. Such action, at the hands of the Parliament, was bound to cause discontentment to those, who had a legitimate expectation to JUDGMENT hold the office of Chief Justice of India. It was submitted, that similar instances can be multiplied with dimensional alterations by prescribing different parameters. It was submitted, that the Parliament should never be allowed the right to create uncertainty, in the matter of selection and appointment of the Chief Justice of India, because the office of the Chief Justice of India was pivotal, as it shouldered extremely serious and onerous responsibilities. The exercise of the above authority, it was pointed out, could/would seriously affect the “independence of the judiciary”. In the above context, reference was also made, to the opinion Page 249 250 expressed by renowned persons, having vast experience in the judicial institution, effectively bringing out the veracity of the contention advanced. Reference in this regard was made to the observations of M.C.

existing convention, were in line to be the Chief Justice of India, but were overlooked by preferring a junior. Reference was also made to the opinion expressed by H.R. Khanna, J., (in his book – “Neither Roses Nor Thorns”). Finally, the Court’s attention was drawn to the view expressed by H.M. Seervai (in “Constitutional Law of India – A Critical Commentary’). It was submitted, that leaving the issue of determination of fitness with the Parliament, was liable to fan the ambitions of Judges, and would make them loyal to those who could satisfy their ambitions. It was therefore the contention of the learned counsel, that Section 5, which created an ambiguity in the matter of appointment of the Chief JUDGMENT Justice of India, and could be abused to imperil “independence of the judiciary”, was liable to be declared as unconstitutional. 63. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that on the issue of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, the NJAC was liable to take into consideration ability, merit and suitability (as may be specified by regulations). It was submitted, that the above criteria could be provided through regulations framed under Section 12(2)(a), (b) and (c). It was pointed out, that the regulations framed for determining the suitability of a Judge (with reference to ability Page 250 251 and merit), would be synonymous with the conditions of eligibility. Inasmuch as, a candidate who did not satisfy the standards expressed in the regulations, would also not satisfy, the prescribed conditions of

that the provisions of the NJAC Act, which laid down (or provided for the laying down) substantive conditions for appointment, was clearly beyond the purview of Article 124C, inasmuch as, under the above provision, Parliament alone had been authorised by law, to regulate the procedure for appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, or to empower the NJAC to lay the same down by regulations, inter alia the manner of selection of persons for appointment, as Judges of the Supreme Court. It was submitted, that the NJAC Act, especially in terms of Section 5(2), had travelled far beyond the jurisdictional parameters contemplated under Article 124C. JUDGMENT 64. It was also contended, that while recommending names for appointment of a Judge to the Supreme Court, seniority in the cadre of Judges, was liable to be taken into consideration, in addition to ability and merit. It was submitted, that the instant mandate contained in the first proviso under Section 5(2) of the NJAC Act, clearly breached the “federal structure” of governance, which undoubtedly required regional representation in the Supreme Court. Since the “federal structure” contemplated in the Constitution was also one of the “basic structures” Page 251 252 envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, the same could not have been overlooked. 65. Besides the above, the Court's attention was invited to the second

thereof, opposed the candidature of an individual. It was contended, that placing the power of veto, in the hands of any two Members of the NJAC, would violate the recommendatory power expressed in Article 124B. In this behalf, it was contended, that the second proviso under Section 5(2), would enable two eminent persons (– lay persons, if the submission advanced by the learned Attorney General is to be accepted) to defeat a unanimous opinion of the Chief Justice of India and the two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court. And thereby negate the primacy vested in the judiciary, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. JUDGMENT 66. It was submitted, that the above power of veto exercisable by two lay persons, or alternatively one lay person, in conjunction with the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, would cause a serious breach in the “independence of the judiciary”. Most importantly, it was contended, that neither the impugned constitutional amendment, nor the provisions of the NJAC Act, provide for any quorum for holding the meetings of the NJAC. And as such (quite contrary to the contentions advanced at the hands of the learned Attorney General), it was contended, that a meeting of the NJAC could not be held, without the Page 252 253 presence of the all Members of the NJAC. In order to support his above contention, he illustratively placed reliance on the Constitution (122nd Amendment) Bill, 2014 [brought before the Parliament, by the same

sought to be achieved through the Constitution (122nd Amendment) Bill, 2014, was to insert Article 279A. The proposed Article 279A intended to create the Goods and Services Tax Council. Sub-Article (7) of Article 279A postulated, that “… One-half of the total number of Members of the Goods and Services Tax Council…” would constitute the quorum for its meetings. And furthermore, that “… Every decision of the Goods and Services Tax Council shall be taken at a meeting, by a majority of not less than three-fourths of the weighted votes of the members present and voting …”. Having laid down the above parameters, in the Bill which followed the Bill that led to the promulgation of the Constitution (99th JUDGMENT Amendment) Act, it was submitted, that the omission of providing for a quorum for the functioning of the NJAC, and the omission to quantify the strength required for valid decision making, was not innocent. And that, it vitiated the provision itself. III. RESPONDENTS’ RESPONSE, ON MERITS: 67. The learned Attorney General commenced his response on merits by asserting, that there was no provision in the Constitution of India, Page 253 254 either when it was originally drafted, or at any stage thereafter, which contemplated, that Judges would appoint Judges to the higher judiciary. It was accordingly asserted, that the appointment of Judges by Judges

“independence of the judiciary”, including executive overreach, in the matter of appointment and transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary, starting with supersession of senior Judges of the Supreme Court in 1973, followed by, the mass transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary during the emergency in 1976, and thereafter, the second supersession of a senior Judge of the Supreme Court in 1977. It was acknowledged, that there was continuous interference by the executive, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary during the 1980’s. Despite thereof, whilst adjudicating upon the controversy in the First Judges case rendered in 1981, this Court, it was pointed out, had remained JUDGMENT unimpressed, and reiterated the primacy of the executive, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. 68. It was pointed out, that the issue for reconsideration of the decision rendered in the First Judges case arose in Subhash Sharma v. Union of 4 India , wherein the questions considered were, whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, in regard to the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts, as well as, transfer of High Court Judges, was entitled to primacy, and also, whether the matter of fixation of the judge-strength in High Courts, was justiciable? It was asserted, Page 254 255 that the aforesaid two questions were placed for determination by a Constitution Bench of nine Judges (keeping in view the fact that the First Judges case, was decided by a seven-Judge Bench). It was asserted, that

examined matters far beyond the scope of the reference order. It was contended, that the Second Judges case was rendered, without the participation of all the stakeholders, inasmuch as, the controversy was raised at the behest of practicing advocates and associations of lawyers, and there was no other stakeholder involved during its hearing. 69. It was asserted, that the judiciary had no jurisdiction to assume to itself, the role of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was pointed out, that it is the Parliament alone, which represents the citizenry and the people of this country, and has the exclusive jurisdiction to legislate on matters. Accordingly, it was asserted, that the JUDGMENT decisions in the Second and Third Judges cases, must be viewed as legislation without any jurisdictional authority. 70. It was pointed out, that the issue relating to the amendment of the Constitution, pertaining to the subject of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, through a Judicial Commission commenced with the th Constitution (67 Amendment) Bill, 1990. The Bill however lapsed. On the same subject, the Constitution (82nd Amendment) Bill, 1997 was introduced. The 1997 Bill, however, could not be passed. This was followed by the Constitution (98th Amendment) Bill, 2003 which was Page 255 256 introduced when the present Government was in power. In 2003 itself, a National Commission was set up to review the working of the Constitution, followed by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission

introduction of the Bill in 1990, it was submitted, was aimed at setting up a National Judicial Commission, for appointment and transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary. It was pointed out, that no positive achievement was made in the above direction, for well over two decades. Mr. Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, who headed the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution, had also recommended a five-Member National Judicial Commission, whereby, a wide consultative process was sought to be introduced, in the selection and appointment of Judges. It was submitted, that all along recommendations were made, for a participatory involvement of the executive, as well as the judiciary, JUDGMENT in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was th also pointed out, that the Constitution (98 Amendment) Bill, 2003 proposed a seven-Member National Judicial Commission. Thereafter, the Administrative Reforms Commission, proposed a eight-Member National Judicial Commission, to be headed by the Vice-President, and comprising of the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of India, the Law Minister and two leaders of the Opposition. The aforesaid recommendation, was made by a Commission headed by Veerappa Moily, the then Union Law Minister. The present Constitution (99th Page 256 257 Amendment) Act, 2014, whereby Article 124 has been amended and Articles 124A to 124C have been inserted in the Constitution, contemplates a six-Member National Judicial Commission. It was

undesirable persons into the higher judiciary, it was emphasized, that only if five of the six Members of the NJAC recommended a candidate, he could be appointed to the higher judiciary. It was submitted, that the aforestated safeguards, postulated in the amended provisions, would not only ensure transparency, but would also render a broad based consideration. 71. As a counter, to the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners, it was asserted, that the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution was plenary, subject to only one restriction, namely, that the Parliament could not alter the “basic structure” of the Constitution. JUDGMENT And as such, a constitutional amendment must be presumed to be constitutionally valid (unless shown otherwise). For the instant proposition, reliance was placed on Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of 50 51 India , Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar , the 10 Kesavananda Bharati case , (specifically the view expressed by K.S. 52 Hegde and A.K. Mukherjea, JJ.), B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan , and 53 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi . 50 AIR 1951 SC 41 51 AIR 1958 SC 538 52 (1975) 1 SCC 166 53 (2008) 4 SCC 720 Page 257 258 72. It was asserted, that the Parliament was best equipped to assess the needs of the people, and to deal with the changing times. For this, 54 reliance was placed on Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar , State of

Parliament had discharged a responsibility, which it owed to the citizens of this country, by providing for a meaningful process for the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. 73. Referring to the decisions rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, it was asserted, that the way he saw it, there was only one decipherable difference introduced in the process of selection contemplated through the NJAC. Under the system introduced, the judiciary could not “insist” on the appointment of an individual. But the judiciary continued to retain the veto power, to stop the appointment of an individual considered unworthy of appointment. According to him, the JUDGMENT nomination of a candidate, for appointment to the higher judiciary, under the above judgments, could also not fructify, if any two members of the collegium, expressed an opinion against the nominated candidate. It was pointed out, that the above position had been retained in the impugned provisions. According to the learned Attorney General, the only difference in the impugned provisions was, that the right of the judiciary to “insist” on the appointment of a nominee, was no longer available to the judiciary. Under the collegium system, a recommendation made for 54 AIR 1958 SC 731 55 1952 SCR 284 Page 258 259 appointment to the higher judiciary, could be returned by the executive for reconsideration. However, if the recommendation was reiterated, the executive had no choice, but to appoint the recommended nominee. It

that the denial to “insist”, on the appointment of a particular nominee, would surely not undermine the “independence of the judiciary”. The “independence of the judiciary”, according to the learned Attorney General, would be well preserved, if the right to “reject” a nominee was preserved with the judiciary, which had been done. 74. Based on the aforesaid submission, it was asserted, that the process initiated by the Parliament in 1990 (for the introduction of a Commission, for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary), had taken twenty-four years to fructify. The composition of the NJAC introduced through the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, according to JUDGMENT him, meets with all constitutional requirements, as the same is neither in breach of the rule of “separation of powers”, nor that of “the independence of the judiciary”. It was contended, that the impugned provisions preserve the “basic structure” of the Constitution. 75. It was submitted, that the assailed provisions had only introduced rightful checks and balances, which are inherent components of an effective constitutional arrangement. The learned Attorney General also cautioned this Court, by asserting, that it was neither within the domain of the petitioners, nor of this Court, to suggest an alternative Page 259 260 combination of Members for the NJAC, or an alternative procedure, which would regulate its functioning more effectively. Insofar as the present petitions are concerned, it was asserted, that the challenge raised

violated the “basic structure” of the Constitution. 76. It was submitted, that it was not the case of any of the petitioners before this Court, either that the Parliament was not competent to amend Article 124, or that the procedure prescribed therefor under Article 368 had not been followed. In the above view of the matter, it was submitted, that the only scope for examination with reference to the present constitutional amendment was, whether while making the aforestated constitutional amendment, the Parliament had breached, any of the “basic features” of the Constitution. 77(i). For demonstrating the validity of the impugned constitutional JUDGMENT amendment, reliance in the first instance was placed on the 10 Kesavananda Bharati case . Reference was made to the observations of S.M. Sikri, CJ., to contend, that the extent of the amending power under Article 368 was duly adverted to. Reading the preamble to the Constitution, it was pointed out, that the fundamental importance expressed therein was, the freedom of the individual, and the inalienability of economic, social and political justice, as also, the importance of the Directive Principles (paragraph 282). In this behalf, it was also submitted, that the “fundamental features” of the Constitution, Page 260 261 as for instance, secularism, democracy and the freedom of the individual would always subsist in a welfare State (paragraph 283). Leading to the conclusion, that even fundamental rights could be amended in public

out, that the wisdom of the Parliament to amend the Constitution could not be the subject matter of judicial review (paragraph 288), leading to the overall conclusion, that by the process of amendment, it was open to the Parliament to adjust fundamental rights, in order to secure the accomplishment of the Directive Principles, while maintaining the freedom and dignity of every citizen (paragraph 289). Thus viewed, it was felt, that the rightful legal exposition would be, that even though every provision of the Constitution could be amended, the contemplated amendment should ensure, that the “basic foundation and structure” of the Constitution remained intact. In this behalf, an illustrative reference JUDGMENT was made to the features, which constituted the “basic structure” of the Constitution. According to the learned Attorney General, they included, the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of Government, the secular character of the Constitution, the “separation of powers” between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and the federal character of the Constitution (paragraph 292). In addition to the above, it was asserted, that India having signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, had committed itself to retaining such of the fundamental rights, as were incorporated in the above declaration Page 261 262 (paragraph 299). In the above view, according to the Attorney General, the expression “amendment of this Constitution” would restrain the Parliament, from abrogating the fundamental rights absolutely, or from

Parliament could amend every Article of the Constitution (paragraph 475). It was insisted, that the impugned provisions had not breached any of the above limitations. (ii) Reference was then made to the common opinion expressed by J.M. 10 Shelat and A.N. Grover, JJ., (in the Kesavananda Bharati case ) to assert, that one of the limitations with reference to the amendment to the Constitution was, that it could not be amended to such an extent, as would denude the Constitution of its identity (paragraph 537). It was submitted, that the power to amend, could not result in the abrogation of the Constitution, or lead to the framing of a new Constitution, or to alter JUDGMENT or change the essential elements of the constitutional structure (paragraph 539). It was pointed out, that it was not proper, to give a narrow meaning to the power vested in the Parliament to amend the Constitution, and at the same time, to give it such a wide meaning, so as to enable the amending body, to change the structure and identity of the Constitution (paragraph 546). With reference to the power of judicial review, it was contended, that there was ample evidence in the Constitution itself, to indicate that a system of “checks and balances” was provided for, so that none of the pillars of governance would become Page 262 263 so predominant, as to disable the others, from exercising and discharging the functions entrusted to them. It was submitted, that judicial review, provided expressly through Articles 32 and 226, was an incident of the

Constitution, and other relevant provisions thereof, including Article 368, it was submitted that it could be inferred, that the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of Government, sovereignty of the country, the secular and federal character of the Constitution, the demarcation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, the dignity of the individual secured through the fundamental rights, and the mandate to build a welfare State (contained in Parts III and IV), and the unity and the integrity of the nation, could be regarded as the “basic elements” of the constitutional structure (paragraph 582). It was also asserted, that as a society grows, JUDGMENT its requirements change, and accordingly, the Constitution and the laws have to be changed, to suit the emerging needs. And accordingly, the necessity to amend the Constitution, to adapt to the changing needs, arises. Likewise, in order to implement the Directive Principles, it could be necessary to abridge some of the fundamental rights vested in the citizens. The power to achieve the above objective needed, a broad and liberal interpretation of Article 368. Having so held, it was concluded, that even the fundamental rights could be amended (paragraph 634). Reference was made to the fact, that the founding fathers were aware, Page 263 264 that in a changing world, there would be nothing permanent, and therefore, they vested the power of amendment in the Parliament through Article 368, so as to keep the Constitution in tune with, the changing

637). With reference to the above, it was contended, that the Parliament did not have the power to abrogate or emasculate the “basic elements” or “fundamental features” of the Constitution, such as the sovereignty of India, the democratic character of our polity, the unity of the country, and the essential elements of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens. Despite the above limitations, it was pointed out, that the amending power under Article 368 was wide enough, to amend every Article of the Constitution, so as to reshape the Constitution to fulfill the obligations imposed on the State (paragraph 666). And accordingly, it was pointed out, that while recording conclusions, this Court had JUDGMENT observed, that the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was very wide, yet did not include the power to destroy, or emasculate the “basic elements” or the “fundamental features” of the Constitution (paragraph 744). (iii). Reference was then made to the observations of H.R. Khanna, J. (in 10 the Kesavananda Bharati case ). It was pointed out, that from 1950 to 41 1967 till this Court rendered the judgment in the I.C. Golak Nath case , the accepted position was, that the Parliament had the power to amend Part III of the Constitution, so as to take away or abridge the Page 264 265 fundamental rights. Having noticed the fact, that no attempt was made by the Parliament to take away or abridge the fundamental rights, relating to the liberty of a person, and the freedom of expression, it was

Parliament had the power to amend Part III of the Constitution, as long as the “basic structure” of the Constitution was retained (paragraph 1421). If the “basic structure” of the original Constitution was retained, inasmuch as had the original Constitution continued to subsist, even though some of its provisions were changed, the power of amendment would be considered to have been legitimately exercised (paragraph 1430). And therefore, the true effect of Article 368 would be, that the Constitution did not vest with the Parliament, the power or authority for drafting a new and radically changed Constitution, with a different structure and framework (paragraph 1433). Accordingly, subject to the JUDGMENT retention of the “basic structure or framework” of the Constitution, the power vested with the Parliament to amend the Constitution was treated as plenary, and would include the power to add, alter or repeal different Articles of the Constitution, including those relating to fundamental rights. All the above measures were included in the Parliament’s power of amendment, and the denial of such a broad and comprehensive power, would introduce rigidity in the Constitution, as would break the Constitution itself (paragraph 1434). As such, it was held, that the amending power conferred by Article 368, would include the power to Page 265 266 amend the fundamental rights, contained in Part III of the Constitution (paragraph 1435). In this behalf, it was asserted, that the issue, whether the amendment introduced would (or would not) be an improvement over

alone to determine. And Courts, could not substitute the wisdom of the legislature, by their own foresight, prudence and understanding (paragraph 1436). It was asserted, that the amending power of the Parliament must contain the right to enact legislative provisions, for experiment and trial, so as to eventually achieve the best results (paragraph 1437). In the ultimate analysis, it was held, that the amendment of the Constitution had a wide and broad connotation, and would embrace within itself, the total repeal of some of the Articles, or their substitution by new Articles, which may not be consistent, or in conformity with other Articles. And a Court while judging the validity of JUDGMENT an amendment, could only concern itself with the question, as to whether the constitutional requirements for making the amendment had been satisfied? And accordingly, an amendment, made in consonance with the procedure prescribed, could not be struck down, on the ground that it was a change for the worst (paragraph 1442). While examining the question, whether the right to property could be included in the “basic structure or framework” of the Constitution, the answer rendered was in the negative. It was held, that in exercising the power of judicial review, Courts could not be oblivious of the practical needs of the Government. Page 266 267 And that, the power of amendment could be exercised even for trial and error, inasmuch as opportunity had to be allowed for vindicating reasonable belief by experience (paragraph 1535). It was contended, that

in mind eternal good. The possibility, that the power of amendment may be abused, furnished no ground for denial of its existence. According to the Attorney General, it was therefore not correct to assume, that if the Parliament was held entitled to amend Part III of the Constitution, it would automatically and necessarily result in abrogation of the fundamental rights. Whilst concluding, that the right to property did not pertain to the “basic structure or framework” of the Constitution, it was held, that power of amendment under Article 368 did not include the power to abrogate the Constitution, or to alter the “basic structure or framework” of the Constitution. Despite having so concluded, it was held, JUDGMENT that no part of the fundamental rights could claim immunity, from the power of amendment (paragraph 1537). 78. Reference was then made to the judgments rendered by this Court 56 57 in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain , Waman Rao v. Union of India , 36 and the M. Nagaraj case , to contend, that the “basic structure” of the Constitution was to be determined, on the basis of the features which existed in the text of the original enactment of the Constitution, on the date of its coming into force. It was therefore pointed out, that the 56 (1975) Supp SCC 1 57 (1981) 2 SCC 362 Page 267 268 subsequent amendments to the Constitution, could not be taken into consideration, to determine the “basic features” of the Constitution. 79. Having laid down the aforestated foundation, the learned Attorney

promulgated. If the original provisions were to be taken into consideration, according to the learned Attorney General, it would be apparent that the above Articles, expressed that the right to make appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary, being limited only to a “consultative” participation of the judiciary, was in the determinative domain of the executive. It was pointed out, that on the subject of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, the primacy of the Chief Justice of India, through the collegium process, was an innovation of the judiciary itself (in the Second Judges case). The above primacy, was alien to the provisions of the Constitution, as originally enacted. And as JUDGMENT such, the amendment to Article 124, and the insertion of Articles 124A to 124C therein, could not be examined on the touchstone of material, which was in stark contrast with the plain reading of Articles 124 and 217 (as they were originally enacted). It was accordingly asserted, that the present challenge to the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, would not fall within the defined parameters of the “basic structure” concept, elaborated extensively by him (as has been recorded by us, above). The prayers made by the petitioners on the instant ground were therefore, according to the learned Attorney General, liable to be rejected. Page 268 269 80. Having traveled thus far, it was pointed out, that it was important to understand the true purport and effect of the term “independence of the judiciary”. In this behalf, in the first instance, the Court’s attention

taken the view, that it was difficult to hold, that merely because the power of appointment was with the executive, the “independence of the judiciary” would be compromised. In stating so, it was emphasized, that the true principle was, that after such appointment, the executive should have no scope, to interfere with the work of a Judge (paragraph 1033). Based thereon, it was asserted, that the independence of a Judge would not stand compromised, if after his appointment, the role of the executive, to deal with him, is totally excluded. Reference was then made to the opinion expressed by P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) (in the same judgment), to the effect, that the concept of “independence of the JUDGMENT judiciary”, was not limited only to independence from executive pressure/influence, but was relatable to many other pressures and prejudices. And in so recording, it was held, that “independence of the judiciary” included fearlessness of the other power centres, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges belonged (paragraph 1037). Based thereon, it was asserted, that “independence of the judiciary”, included independence from the influence of other Judges as well. And as such, it was concluded, that the composition of the NJAC was such, as would Page 269 270 ensure the independence of the Judges appointed to the higher judiciary, as contemplated in the First Judges case. 81. In conjunction with the issue of “independence of the judiciary”,

and balances. Inasmuch as, each organ of governance while being allowed the freedom to discharge the duties assigned to it, was subjected to controls, at the hands of one of the other organs, or both of the other organs. Illustratively, it was sought to be contended, that all executive authority, is subject to scrutiny through judicial review (at the hands of the judiciary). Likewise, legislation enacted by the Parliament, or the State legislatures, is also subject to judicial review, (at the hands of the judiciary). Even though, the executive and the legislature have the freedom to function and discharge their individual responsibilities, without interference by the other organ(s) of governance, yet the judiciary JUDGMENT has been vested with the responsibility to ensure, that the exercise of executive and legislative functions, is in consonance with law. Likewise, it was submitted, that in the matter of appointment of Judges, Articles 124 and 217 provided for executive control, under the scheme of checks and balances. It was submitted, that the instant scheme of checks and balances, was done away with, by the Second and Third Judges cases, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was asserted, that the position of checks and balances has been restored by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, by reducing the role of the Page 270 271 executive, from the position which existed at the commencement of the Constitution. Referring to the decisions in the Kesavananada Bharati 10 56 case , the Indira Nehru Gandhi case , the Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth

submitted, that this Court had recognized, that the concept of checks and balances, was inherent in the scheme of the Constitution. And that, even though the legislature, the executive and the judiciary were required to function within their own spheres demarcated through different Articles of the Constitution, yet their attributes could never be in absolute terms. It was submitted, that each wing of governance had to be accountable, and till the principle of accountability was preserved, the principle of “separation of powers” would not be achievable. It was therefore contended, that the concept of “independence of the judiciary”, could not be gauged as an absolute end, overlooking the checks and JUDGMENT balances, provided for in the scheme of the Constitution. 82. Having so asserted, it was contended, that in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, the most important and significant feature was, that no unworthy or doubtful appointment should go through, even though at times, the candidature of a seemingly good candidate, may not be accepted. It was asserted, that the NJAC had provided for a complete protection, in the sense noticed hereinabove, by providing in the procedure of appointment, that a negative view 58 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364 59 (1997) 2 SCC 453 Page 271 272 expressed by any of the two Members of the NJAC, would result in the rejection of the concerned candidate. Therefore, merely two Members of the NJAC, would be sufficient to veto a proposal for appointment. It was

“independence of the judiciary” remained completely safeguarded and secured. It was therefore contended, that not only the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, but also the NJAC Act fully satisfied the independence criterion, postulated as a “basic structure” of the Constitution. 83. In order to reiterate the above position, it was asserted, that primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was not contemplated in the Constitution, as originally framed. In this behalf, reference was made to Articles 124 and 217. And in conjunction therewith, adverting to the debates on the subject, by Members of the Constituent Assembly. Thereupon, it was asserted, that the issue of JUDGMENT primacy of the Chief Justice, based on a decision by a collegium of Judges, was a judicial innovation, which required reconsideration. Moreover, it was submitted, that the Second and Third Judges cases, were founded on the interpretation of Articles of the Constitution, which had since been amended, and as such, the very basis of the Second and Third Judges cases, no longer existed. Therefore, the legal position declared in the above judgments, could not constitute the basis, of the contentions advanced at the hands of the petitioners. Furthermore, even if the ratio recorded by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, Page 272 273 was still to be taken into consideration, conclusions (5), (6) and (7) recorded by J.S. Verma, J. (who had transcripted the majority view), show that the primacy of the judiciary was to ensure, that no

which constituted the functional basis for ensuring “independence of the judiciary”, had been preserved in the impugned constitutional amendment, and the NJAC Act. It was accordingly contended, that if the right to insist on the appointment of a candidate proposed by the judiciary, was taken away, from the Chief Justice of India (based on a decision of a collegium of Judges), the same would not result, in the emasculation of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. In other words, the same would not violate the “essential and fundamental features” of the Constitution, nor in the least, the “independence of the judiciary”. 84. Based on the above submissions, the learned Attorney General JUDGMENT invited the Court’s attention to the primary contention advanced by the petitioners, namely, that even if all the three Judges of the Supreme Court who are now ex officio Members of the NJAC, collectively recommended a nominee, such recommendation could be annulled, by the non-Judge Members of the NJAC. Learned Attorney General submitted, that the above contention was limited to the right to “insist” on an appointment. And that, the right to “insist” did not flow from the conclusions recorded in the Second and Third Judges cases. And further, Page 273 274 that the same cannot, by itself, be taken as an incident to establish a breach of the “independence of the judiciary”. 85. Insofar as the Second and Third Judges cases are concerned, it was

the High Courts in which they were functioning), to other High Courts. 5 In the Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case , one of the transferred Judges challenged his transfer, inter alia , on the ground, that his non-consensual transfer was outside the purview of Article 222, as the same would adversely affect the “independence of the judiciary”. Irrespective of the determination rendered, on the challenge raised in the 5 Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case , it was pointed out, the very same question came to be re-agitated in the First Judges case. It was held by the majority, while interpreting Article 222, that the consent of the Judge being transferred, need not be obtained. It was also pointed out, that JUDGMENT ever since the inception of the Constitution, the office of the Chief Justice of India, was occupied by the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court. The above principle was departed from in April 1973, as the next senior most Judge – J.M. Shelat, was not elevated to the office of the Chief Justice of India. Even the next two senior most Judges, after him - K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, were also ignored. The instant supersession by appointing the fourth senior most Judge – A.N. Ray, as the Chief Justice of India, was seen as a threat to the “independence of the judiciary”. Again in January 1977, on the retirement of A.N. Ray, CJ., the senior Page 274 275 most Judge immediately next to him – H.R. Khanna, was ignored and the second senior most Judge – M.H. Beg, was appointed, as the Chief Justice of India. In the above background, the action of the executive,

Second and Third Judges cases, but the implementation of the manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, in consonance therewith, had been subject to, overwhelming and all around criticism, including being adversely commented upon by J.S. Verma, CJ., the author of the majority view in the Second Judges case, after his retirement. In this behalf, the Court’s attention was invited to his observations, extracted hereunder: “My 1993 Judgment, which holds the field, was very much misunderstood and misused. It was in this context, that I said that the working of the judgment, now, for some time, is raising serious questions, which cannot be called unreasonable. Therefore, some kind of re-think is required. My Judgment says the appointment process of High Court and Supreme Court Judges is basically a joint or participatory exercise, between the Executive and the Judiciary, both taking part in it.” JUDGMENT It was therefore contended, that in the changed scenario, this Court ought to have, at its own, introduced measures to negate the accusations leveled against the prevailing system, of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Since no such remedial measures were adopted by the judiciary of its own, the legislature had brought about the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, supplemented by the NJAC Act, to broad base the process of selection and appointment, of Judges to the higher judiciary, to make it transparent, and to render the participants accountable. Page 275 276 86. Having dealt with the constitutional aspect of the matter, the learned Attorney General invited the Court’s attention, to the manner in which judicial appointments were being made in fifteen countries. It was

U.K.), or Committee (Israel), or Councils (France, Italy, Nigeria and Sri Lanka). In four countries, Judges were appointed directly by the Governor General (Australia, Canada and New Zealand), or the President (Bangladesh). It was submitted, that in Germany appointment of Judges was made through a multistage process of nomination by the Minister of Justice, and confirmation by Parliamentary Committees, whereupon, the final order of appointment of the concerned individual, is issued by the President. In the United States of America, Judges were appointed through a process of nomination by the President, and confirmation by the Senate. It was submitted, that in all the fifteen countries referred to JUDGMENT above, the executive was the final determinative/appointing authority. Insofar as the appointments made by the Judicial Appointments Commissions/Committees/Councils (referred to above) were concerned, out of nine countries with Commissions, in two countries (South Africa and Sri Lanka) the executive had overwhelming majority, in four countries (France, Israel, Kenya and U.K.) there was a balanced representation of stakeholders including the executive, in three countries (Italy, Nigeria and Pakistan) the number of Judges was in a majority. In the five countries without Commissions/ Committees/ Councils (Canada, Page 276 277 Australia, New Zealand, Bangladesh and the United States of America), the decision was taken by the executive, without any formal process of consultation with the judiciary. It was pointed out, that in Germany, the

the countries referred to above, was totally independent. Based on the above submissions, it was contended, that the manner of selection and appointment of Judges, could not be linked to the concept of “independence of the judiciary”. It was submitted, that the judicial functioning in the countries referred to above, having been accepted as more than satisfactory, there is no reason, that the system of appointment introduced in India, would be adversely impacted by a singular representative of the executive in the NJAC. It was therefore asserted, that the submissions advanced at the hands of the petitioners, were not acceptable, even with reference to the experience of other JUDGMENT countries, governed through a constitutional framework (some of them, of the Westminster Model). 87. It was further asserted, that the absence of the absolute majority of Judges in the NJAC, could not lead to the inference, that the same was violative of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, so as to conclude, that it would impinge upon the “independence of the judiciary”. It was asserted, that the representation of the judiciary in the NJAC, was larger than that of the other two organs of the governance, namely, the executive and the legislature. In any case, given the representation of the Page 277 278 judiciary in the NJAC, it was fully competent, to stall the appointment of a candidate to the higher judiciary, who was considered by the judicial representatives, as unsuitable. Any two, of the three representatives of the judiciary, were sufficient to veto any appointment supported by others. 88. It was further submitted, that the NJAC was broad based with representatives from the judiciary, the executive and the “two eminent persons”, would not fall in the category of jurists, eminent legal academicians, or eminent lawyers. It was contended, that the intention to include “eminent persons”, who had no legal background was to introduce, in the process of selection and appointment of Judges, lay persons in the same manner, as has been provided for in the Judicial Appointments Commission, in the United Kingdom. 89. It was also the contention of the learned Attorney General, that this would not be the first occasion, when such an exercise has been JUDGMENT contemplated by parliamentary legislation. The Court’s attention was drawn to the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, wherein the highest adjudicatory authority is, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. It was pointed out, that the above Redressal Commission, comprised of Members, with and without a judicial background. The President of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has to be a person, who has been a Judge of the Supreme Court. Illustratively, it was contended, where a matter is being adjudicated upon by a three-Member Bench, two of the Members may not be having any Page 278 279 judicial background. These two non-judicial Members, could overrule the view expressed by a person, who had been a former Judge in the higher judiciary. It was submitted, that situations of the above nature, do

minority, is legally and constitutionally valid. If judicial independence cannot be held to be compromised in the above situation, it was asserted, that it was difficult to understand how the same could be considered to be compromised in a situation, wherein the NJAC has three out of its six Members, belonging to the judicial fraternity. 90. It was sought to be suggested, that the primacy of the judiciary, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, could not be treated as a part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. Furthermore, the lack of absolute majority of Judges in the NJAC, would also not tantamount to the constitutional amendment being rendered JUDGMENT violative of the “basic structure”. In the above view of the matter, it was asserted, that the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel representing the petitioners, on the aspect of violation of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, by undermining the “independence of the judiciary”, were liable to be rejected. 91. With reference to the inclusion of two “eminent persons”, in the six-Member NJAC, it was submitted, that the general public was the key stakeholder, in the adjudicatory process. And accordingly, it was imperative to ensure their participation in the selection/appointment of Page 279 280 Judges to the higher judiciary. Their participation, it was submitted, would ensure sufficient diversity, essential for rightful decision making. It was submitted, that in the model of the commission suggested by M.N.

the Chief Justice of India. In the 2003 Bill, which was placed before the Parliament, the proposed Judicial Commission was to include one eminent person, to be nominated by the executive. The 2013 Bill, which was drafted by the previous political dispensation – the U.P.A. Government, the Judicial Commission proposed, was to have two eminent persons, to be selected by the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. The 2014 Bill, which was drafted by the present political dispensation – the N.D.A. Government, included two eminent persons, to be selected in just about the same manner as was contemplated under the 2013 Bill. The variation JUDGMENT being, that one of the eminent persons was required to belong to the Scheduled Castes, or the Scheduled Tribes, or Other Backward Classes, or Minorities, or Women, thereby fulfilling the obvious social obligation. It was submitted, that their participation in the deliberations, for selection of Judges to the higher judiciary, could not be described as adversarial to the judicial community. Their participation would make the process of appointment, more broad based. 92. While responding to the submissions, advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, to the effect that the Constitution Page 280 281 (99th Amendment) Act, did not provide any guidelines, reflecting upon the eligibility of the “eminent persons”, to be nominated to the NJAC, and as such, was liable to be struck down, it was submitted, that the term

to the debates of the Constituent Assembly, while dealing with the term “distinguished jurist”, contained in Article 124(3), it was pointed out, that the term “distinguished person” was not vague. In the present situation, it was submitted, that since the selection and nomination of “eminent persons”, was to be in the hands of high constitutional functionaries (no less than the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha), it was natural to assume, that the person(s) nominated, would be chosen, keeping in mind the obligation and the responsibility, that was required to be discharged. Reliance in 43 this behalf, was placed on the Centre for Public Interest Litigation case , JUDGMENT to assert, that it was sufficient to assume, that such a high profile committee, as the one in question, would exercise its powers objectively, and in a fair and reasonable manner. Based on the above, it was contended, that it was well settled, that mere conferment of wide discretionary powers, would not vitiate the provision itself. 93. Referring to the required qualities of a Judge recognized in the Indian context, as were enumerated in the “Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct”, and thereupon accepted the world over, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at The Hague, in Page 281 282 November 2002, it was submitted, that the two “eminent persons” would be most suited, to assess such matters, with reference to the nominees under consideration. Whilst the primary responsibility of the Members

executive would be, to determine the character and integrity of the candidate, and the inputs, whether the candidate possessed the values, expected of a Judge of the higher judiciary, would be that of “eminent persons” in the NJAC. It was therefore asserted, that the two “eminent persons” would be “lay persons” having no connection with the judiciary, or even to the profession of advocacy, perhaps individuals who may not have any law related academic qualifications. It was submitted, that the instant broad based composition of the NJAC, was bound to be more suitable, than the prevailing system of appointment of Judges. Relying 38 upon the R. Gandhi case , it was submitted, that it would not be proper JUDGMENT to make appointments, by vesting the process of selection, with an isolated group, or a selection committee dominated by representatives of a singular group – the judiciary. In a matter of judicial appointments, it was submitted, the object ought to be, to pick up the best legally trained minds, coupled with a qualitative personality. For this, according to the Attorney General, a collective consultative process, would be the most suitable. It was pointed out, that “eminent persons”, having no nexus to judicial activities, would introduce an element of detachment, and would help to bring in independent expertise, to evaluate non-legal Page 282 283 competencies, from an ordinary citizen’s perspective, and thereby, represent all the stakeholders of the justice delivery system. It was contended, that the presence of “eminent persons” was necessary, to

presence would also ensure, that the selection process was broad based, and reflected sufficient diversity and accountability, and in sync with the evolving process of selection and appointment of Judges, the world over. 94. The learned Attorney General, then addressed the issue of inclusion of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as an ex officio Member in the NJAC. Reference was first made to Articles 124 and 217, as they were originally enacted in the Constitution. It was submitted, that originally, the power of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was exclusively vested with the President. In this behalf reliance was placed on Article 74, whereunder the President was obliged JUDGMENT to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister. It was pointed out, that the above position, was so declared, by the First Judges case. And as such, from the date of commencement of the Constitution, the executive had the exclusive role, in the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was asserted, that the position was changed, for the first time, in 1993 by the Second Judges case, wherein the term “consultation”, with reference to the Chief Justice of India, was interpreted as “concurrence”. Having been so interpreted, primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the Page 283 284 higher judiciary, came to be transferred from the executive, to the Chief Justice of India (based on a collective decision, by a collegium of Judges). Despite the above, the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice,

against the responsibility assigned to the executive under Articles 124 and 217, as originally enacted. It was pointed out, that by including the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as a Member of the NJAC, the participatory role of the executive, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, had actually been diminished, as against the original position. Inasmuch as, the executive role in the NJAC, had been reduced to one out of the six Members of the Commission. In the above view of the matter, it was asserted, that it was unreasonable for the petitioners to grudge, the presence of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as a Member of the NJAC. JUDGMENT 95. Insofar as the inclusion of the Union Minister in the NJAC is concerned, it was submitted, that there could be no escape from the fact, that the Minister in question, would be the connect between the judiciary and the Parliament. His functions would include, the responsibility to inform the Parliament, about the affairs of the judicial establishment. It was submitted, that his exclusion from the participatory process, would result in a lack of coordination between the two important pillars of governance. Furthermore, it was submitted that the Minister in question, as a member of the executive, will have access to, and will be able to, Page 284 285 provide the NJAC with all the relevant information, about the antecedents of a particular candidate, which the remaining Members of the NJAC are unlikely to have access to. This, according to the learned

executive was a key stakeholder in the justice delivery system, and as such, it was imperative for him to have, a role in the process of selection and appointment of Judges, to the higher judiciary. 96. The learned Attorney General allayed all fears, with reference to the presence of Union Minister, in the NJAC, by asserting that he would not be in a position to politicize the appointments, as he was just one of the six-Members of the NJAC. And that, the other Members would constitute an adequate check, even if the Minister in question, desired to favour a particular candidate, on political considerations. This submission was made by the learned Attorney General, keeping in mind the assumed JUDGMENT fear, which the petitioners had expressed, on account of the political leanings of the Union Minister, with the governing political establishment. It was accordingly asserted, that the presence of one member of the executive, in a commission of six Members, would not impact the “independence of the judiciary”, leading to the clear and unambiguous conclusion, that the presence of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice in the NJAC, would not violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution. Page 285 286 97. Referring to the judgment rendered by this Court, in the Madras 35 Bar Association case , it was submitted that, for the tribunal in question, the participation of the executive in the selection of its

It was submitted, that the above position did not prevail insofar as the higher judiciary was concerned, since the stakeholders before the higher judiciary were diverse. It was, therefore, submitted, that the validity of the NJAC could not be assailed, merely on the ground of presence of the Union Minister, as an ex officio Member of the NJAC. 98. The manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, through the NJAC, it was asserted, would have two major advantages. It would introduce transparency in the process of selection and appointments of Judges, which had hitherto before, been extremely secretive, with the civil society left wondering about, the standards and JUDGMENT the criterion adopted, in determining the suitability of candidates. Secondly, the NJAC would diversify the selection process, which would further lead to accountability in the matter of appointments. It was submitted, that not only the litigating public, or the practicing advocates, but also the civil society, had the right to know. It was pointed out, that insofar as the legislative process was concerned, debates in the Parliament are now in the public domain. The rights of individuals, determined at the hands of the executive, have been transparent under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It was submitted that likewise, the Page 286 287 selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, must be known to the civil society, so as to introduce not only fairness, but also a degree of assurance, that the best out of those willing, were being appointed as Judges.

Amendment) Act, it was asserted, that a constitutional process could not be held up, due to the unavailability (and/or the disability) of one or more Members of the NJAC. So that a defect in the constitution of the NJAC, or any vacancy therein, would not impact the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Article 124A(2) provided, that the proceedings of the NJAC would not be questioned or invalidated on account of a vacancy or a defect in the composition of the NJAC. It was contended, that it was wrongful for the petitioners to frown on Article 124A(2), as there were a number of statutory enactments with similar provisions. In this behalf, the Court’s attention was inter alia JUDGMENT drawn to Section 4(2), of the Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003, Section 4(2), of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013, Section 7, of the National Commission for Backward Classes Act 1993, Section 29A, of the Consumer Protection Act 1986, Section 7, of the Advocates Welfare Act 2001, Section 8, of the University Grants Commission Act 1956, Section 9, of the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993, Section 7, of the National Commission for Minorities Act 1993, Section 8, of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act 2004, Section 24, of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights Page 287 288 and Full Participation) Act 1995, and a host of other legislative enactments of the same nature. Relying on the judgments in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of the City of

it was asserted, that on an examination of provisions of similar nature, this Court had repeatedly held, that modern legislative enactments ensured, that the defects of procedure, which do not lead to any substantial prejudice, are statutorily placed beyond the purview of challenge. It was accordingly asserted, that invalidity on account of a technical irregularity, being excluded from judicial review, the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners, on the constitutional validity of clause (2) of Article 124A, deserved an outright rejection. 100. It was the contention of the learned Attorney General, that the NJAC did not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. It was sought JUDGMENT to be reiterated, that the power of nomination of “eminent persons” was securely and rightfully left to the wisdom of the Prime Minister of India, the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament. It was submitted, that the parameters expressed in Sections 5 and 6 of the NJAC Act, delineating the criterion for selection, by specifically providing, that ability, merit and suitability would expressly engage the attention of the NJAC, while selecting Judges for appointment 60 (1961) 3 SCR 707 61 (1976) 1 SCC 843 62 (1987) 1 SCC 658 63 (2005) 5 SCC 363 Page 288 289 to the higher judiciary, clearly laid out the parameters for this selection and appointment process. It was submitted, that the modalities to determine ability, merit and suitability would be further detailed through

academic publications in reputed journals, the minimum and maximum age, and the like, would be similarly provided for. All these clearly defined parameters, it was contended, would make the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary transparent, and would also ensure, that the candidates to be considered, were possessed of the minimum desired standards. It was submitted, that the Memorandum of Procedure for Appointment and Transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of the High Courts, as also, for elevation of Judges to the Supreme Court, were bereft of any such particulars, and the absence of any prescribed criterion, had resulted in the appointment of Judges, even to the JUDGMENT Supreme Court, which should have ordinarily been avoided. The learned Attorney General made a reference to three instances, which according to him, were universally condemned, by one and all. One of the Judges appointed to this Court, according to him, was a non-performer as he had authored just a few judgments as a Judge of the High Courts of Delhi and Kerala, and far lesser judgments as the Chief Justice of the Uttarakhand and Karnataka High Courts, and less than ten judgments during his entire tenure as a Judge of the Supreme Court. The second Judge, according to him, was notoriously late in commencing Court Page 289 290 proceeding, a habit which had persisted with the said Judge even as a Judge of the Patna and Rajasthan High Courts, and thereafter, as the Chief Justice of the Jharkhand High Court, and also as a Judge of the

habit of tweeting his views, after he had retired. Learned counsel for the respondents, acknowledged having understood the identity of the Judges from their above description by the learned Attorney General, and also affirmed the factual position asserted in respect of the Judges mentioned. The learned Attorney General also handed over to us a compilation (in a sealed cover) about appointments of Judges made to different High Courts, despite the executive having expressed an adverse opinion. The compilation made reference to elevation of five Judges to High Courts (– two Judges to the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, one Judge to the Punjab and Haryana High Court, one Judge to the Patna High Court, and JUDGMENT one Judge to the Calcutta High Court) and three Judges to the Supreme Court. It may be clarified that the objection with reference to the Supreme Court Judges was not related to their suitability, but for the reason that some High Courts were unrepresented in the Supreme Court. We would therefore understand the above position as covering the period from 1993 till date. But it was not his contention, that these elevations had proved to be wrongful. We may only notice, that two of the three Supreme Court Judges referred to, were in due course elevated to the high office of Chief Justice of India. Page 290 291 101. The learned Attorney General vehemently contested the assertion made by the learned counsel representing the petitioners, that the power to frame rules and regulations for the functioning of the NJAC was

and regulations, pertaining to the criterion of suitability. In this behalf, it was submitted, that sufficient guidelines were ascertainable from Articles 124B and 124C. Besides the aforesaid, the Court’s attention was drawn to Sections 5(2), 6(1) and 6(3) of the NJAC Act, wherein the parameters of suitability for appointment of Judges had been laid down. In this behalf, it was also asserted, that Article 124, as originally enacted, had laid down only basic eligibility conditions, for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, but no suitability criteria had been expressed. It was also asserted, that the procedure and conditions for appointment of Judges, were also not prescribed. As against the above, it was pointed out, that JUDGMENT Articles 124B and 124C and Sections 5(2), 6(1) and 6(3) of the NJAC Act, clearly laid down conditions and guidelines for determining the suitability of a candidate for appointment as a Judge. On the basis of the aforementioned analysis, it was submitted, that neither the constitutional amendment was violative of the “basic structure”, nor the NJAC Act, was constitutionally invalid. For the above reasons, it was asserted, that the challenge raised by the petitioners was liable to be rejected. 102. In response to the technical submission advanced by Mr. Fali S. Nariman, namely, that since the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was Page 291 292 brought into force, consequent upon the notification issued by the Central Government in the Official Gazette on 13.4.2015, the consideration of the NJAC Bill and the passing of the NJAC Act, prior to

to Article 118, which authorizes, each House of Parliament, to make rules for regulating their procedure, in the matter of conducting their business.

JUDGMENT Referring to the proviso under Rule 66, it was acknowledged that the rule read independently, fully justified the submissions of Mr. Fali S. Nariman. It was however pointed out, that it was open to the Parliament to seek a suspension of the above rule under Rule 388. Rule 388 is also extracted hereunder:

The learned Attorney General then handed over to us, the proceedings of the Lok Sabha dated 12.8.2014, inter alia , including the Constitution Page 292 293 (121st Amendment) Bill, and the NJAC Bill. He invited our attention to the fact, that while moving the motion, the then Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice had sought, and was accorded approval, for the

Premised on the strength of the Rules framed under Article 118, learned JUDGMENT Attorney General, also placed reliance on Article 122, which is being reproduced below:

Based on Article 122, it was submitted, that the Constitution itself contemplated, that the validity of the proceedings in the Parliament, could not be called in question, on the ground of alleged irregularity in Page 293 294 procedure. While reiterating, that the procedure laid down by the Parliament under Article 118, had been duly complied with, it was submitted, that even if that had not been done, as long as the power of

behalf, reference was also made to Article 246, so as to contend, that the competence of the Parliament to enact the NJAC Act was clearly and

64 AIR 1941 FC 72 Page 294 295

Reliance was also placed on Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna 65 Sinha , wherefrom the following observations were brought to our notice:

65 1961 (1) SCR 96 Page 295 296 Based on the aforesaid submissions, it was the vehement contention of the learned Attorney General, that there was no merit in the technical objections raised by the petitioners while assailing the provisions of the NJAC Act.

on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh. While reiterating a few of the legal submissions canvassed by the learned Attorney General, he emphasized, that the judgments rendered by this Court, in the Second and Third Judges cases, turned the legal position, contemplated under the original Articles 124 and 217, on its head. It was submitted, that this Court has been required to entertain a public interest litigation, in an unprecedented exercise of judicial review, wherein it is sought to be asserted, that the “independence of the judiciary”, had been encroached by the other two organs of governance. It was contended by learned counsel, that the instant assertion was based on a misconception, as JUDGMENT primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was never vested with the judiciary. It was pointed out, that primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was vested with the executive under Articles 124 and 217, as originally enacted. Furthermore, this Court through its judgments culminating in the First Judges case, while correctly interpreting the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution, had rightly concluded, that the interaction between the executive and the Chief Justice of India (as well as, the other Judges of the higher judiciary) was merely “consultative”, and that, the executive Page 296 297 was entirely responsible for discharging the responsibility of appointment of Judges including Chief Justices, to the higher judiciary. It was submitted, that the Second Judges case, by means of a judicial

Judges. It was pointed out, that after the rendering of the Second Judges case, appointments of Judges commenced to be made, in the manner expressed by the above Constitution Bench. It was asserted, that there had been, an all around severe criticism, of the process of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, as contemplated by the Second and Third Judges cases. It was contended, that the selection process was now limited to Judges selecting Judges, without any external participation. It was also asserted, that the exclusion of the executive from the role of selection and appointment of Judges was so extensive, that the executive has got no right to initiate any candidature, for appointment of JUDGMENT Judges/Chief Justices to the higher judiciary. Such an interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, it was pointed out, had not only resulted in reading the term “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 as “concurrence”, but has gone far beyond. It was sought to be asserted, that in the impugned amendment to the Constitution, the intent contained in the original Articles 124 and 217, has been retained. The amended provisions, it was pointed out, have been tilted in favour of the judiciary, and the participatory role, earlier vested in the executive, has been severely diluted. It was submitted, that even though no element of Page 297 298 primacy had been conferred on the judiciary by Article 124, as originally enacted, primacy has now been vested in the judiciary, inasmuch as, the NJAC has the largest number of membership from the judicial fraternity.

contemplated under the amended provisions. It was therefore asserted, that it was a far cry, for anyone to advocate, that the role of the judiciary in the manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary having been diluted, had impinged on its independence. 104. It was contended, that the author of the majority view in the Second Judges case (J.S. Verma, J., as he then was), had himself found fault with the manner of implementation of the judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases. It was submitted that Parliament, being the voice of the people, had taken into consideration, the criticism levelled by J.S. Verma, J. (besides others), to revise the process of appointment of Judges JUDGMENT contemplated under the Second and Third Judges cases. Having so contended, learned counsel asserted, that if this Court felt that any of the provisions, with reference to selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, would not meet the standards and norms, which this Court felt sacrosanct, it was open to this Court to read down the appropriate provisions, in a manner as to round off the offending provisions, rather than quashing the impugned constitutional and legislative provisions in their entirety. Page 298 299 105. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General of India submitted, that the entire Constitution had to be read as a whole. In this behalf, it was contended, that each provision was an integral part of the Constitution,

6 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka , R.C. Poudyal v. Union of 66 36 10 India , the M. Nagaraj case , and the Kesavananda Bharati case . Based on the above judgments, it was asserted, that the term “President”, as it existed in Articles 124 and 217, if interpreted holistically, would lead to the clear and unambiguous conclusion, that the President while discharging his responsibility with reference to appointment of Judges/Chief Justices to the higher judiciary, was bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, as contemplated under Article 74. It was contended, that the aforesaid import was rightfully examined and interpreted with reference to Article 124, in the First Judges case. But JUDGMENT had been erroneously overlooked, in the subsequent judgments. Accordingly, it was asserted, that there could be no doubt whatsoever, while examining the impugned constitutional amendment, as also, the impugned legislative enactment, that Parliament had not breached any component of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. 106. It was also contended, that in case the challenge raised to the impugned constitutional amendment, was to be accepted by this Court, and the legal position declared by this Court, was to be given effect to, 66 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 Page 299 300 the repealed provisions would not stand revived, merely because the amendment/legislation which were being assailed, were held to be unconstitutional. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is

struck down, would revive the original/substituted Article, was a matter which had already been referred to a nine-Judge Constitutional Bench. In order to support the aforesaid contention, and to project the picture in its entirety, reliance was placed on, Property Owners’ Association v. State 67 68 of Maharashtra , Property Owners’ Association v. State of Maharashtra , 69 and Property Owners’ Association v. State of Maharashtra . It was submitted, that the order passed by this Court, wherein the reference to a nine-Judge Constitution Bench had been made, was a case relating to the constitutionality of Article 31C. It was pointed out that Article 31C, as originally enacted provided, that “…notwithstanding anything JUDGMENT contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State, towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it was inconsistent with, the rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19”. It was submitted, that the latter part of Article 31C, which provided “…and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give 67 (1996) 4 SCC 49 68 (2001) 4 SCC 455 69 (2013) 7 SCC 522 Page 300 301 effect to such policy…” had been struck down by this Court in the 10 Kesavananda Bharati case . It was contended, that when the matter pertaining to the effect of the striking down of a constitutional

the aforesaid issue. 108. The second contention advanced at the hands of the learned Solicitor General, was based on Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the General Clauses Act. It was contended, that an amendment which had deleted some part of the erstwhile Article 124 of the Constitution, and substituted in its place something different, as in the case of Article 124, by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, would not result in the revival of the original Article which was in place, prior to the constitutional amendment, even if the amendment itself was to be struck down. It was submitted, that if a substituted provision was declared as JUDGMENT unconstitutional, for whatever ground or reason(s), the same would not automatically result in the revival of the repealed provision. In order to support the aforesaid contention, reliance was placed on Ameer-un-Nissa 70 Begum v. Mahboob Begum , Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of 71 72 Madras , B.N. Tewari v. Union of India , Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. 73 Rangappa Baliga & Co. , Mulchand Odhavji v. Rajkot Borough 70 AIR 1955 SC 352 71 AIR 1963 SC 928 72 AIR 1965 SC 1430 73 (1969) 1 SCC 255 Page 301 302 74 Municipality , Mohd. Shaukat Hussain Khan v. State of Andhra 75 Pradesh , State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. 76 77 Ltd. , India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore ,

through a repealing enactment, would not revive anything repealed thereby. Reliance was also placed on, State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal 79 Singh , Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots’ Association of India v. 80 Director General of Civil Aviation , and State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam 81 Sunder , to contend, that the settled legal proposition was, whenever an Act was repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. It was pointed out, that consequent upon the instant repeal of the earlier provisions, the earlier provisions must be deemed to have been obliterated/abrogated/wiped out, wholly and completely. The instant contention was sought to be summarized by asserting, that if a JUDGMENT substituted provision was to be struck down, the question of revival of the original provision (which had been substituted, by the struck down provision) would not arise, as the provision which had been substituted, stood abrogated, and therefore had ceased to exist in the statute itself. It was therefore submitted, that even if the challenge raised to the 74 (1971) 3 SCC 53 75 (1974) 2 SCC 376 76 (1977) 1 SCC 643 77 (1975) 3 SCC 512 78 (2000) 2 SCC 536 79 (2011) 5 SCC 305 80 (2011) 5 SCC 435 81 (2011) 8 SCC 737 Page 302 303 impugned constitutional amendment was to be accepted by this Court, the originally enacted provisions of Articles 124 and 217 would not revive.

entertained, as it has been raised prematurely. It was submitted, that the challenge raised by the petitioners was based on assumptions and presumptions, without allowing the crystallization of the impugned amendment to the Constitution. It was asserted, that the position would crystalise only after rules and regulations were framed under the NJAC Act. It was submitted, that the question of “independence of the judiciary”, with reference to the amendments made, could be determined only after the NJAC Act was made operational, by laying down the manner of its functioning. Since the pendency of the present litigation had delayed the implementation of the provisions of the amendment to JUDGMENT the Constitution, as also to the NJAC Act, it would be improper for this Court, to accede to a challenge based on conjectures and surmises. 110. Mr. K. Parasaran, Senior Advocate, entered appearance on behalf of the State of Rajasthan. He submitted, that he would be supporting the validity of the impugned constitutional amendment, as also, the NJAC Act, and that, he endorsed all the submissions advanced on behalf of the Union of India. It was his contention, that Judges of the higher judiciary were already burdened with their judicial work, and as such, they should not be seriously worried about the task of appointment of Judges, which Page 303 304 by the impugned amendment, had been entrusted to the NJAC. In his view, the executive and the Parliament were accountable to the people, and therefore, they should be permitted to discharge the onerous

answerable, to the people of this country, for the appointments they would make. 111. On the issue of inclusion of two “eminent persons” in the six-Member NJAC, it was asserted, that the nomination of the “eminent persons” was to be made by the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. All these three individuals, being high ranking constitutional functionaries, should be trusted, to discharge the responsibility bestowed on them, in the interest of the “independence of the judiciary”. It was submitted, that if constitutional functionaries, and the “eminent persons”, could not be JUDGMENT trusted, then the constitutional machinery itself would fail. It was pointed out, that this Court had repeatedly described, that the Constitution was organic in character, and it had an inbuilt mechanism for evolving, with the changing times. It was asserted, that the power vested with the Parliament, under Article 368 to amend the provisions of the Constitution, was a “constituent power”, authorizing the Parliament to reshape the Constitution, to adapt with the changing environment. It was contended, that the above power vested in the Parliament could be exercised with the sole exception, that “the basic structure/features” of Page 304 305 the Constitution, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the 10 Kesavananda Bharati case , could not be altered/changed. According to the learned senior counsel, the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act was

manner, impinge upon the “independence of the judiciary”. 112. Referring to Article 124A, it was asserted, that the NJAC was a six-Member Commission for identifying, selecting and appointing Judges to the higher judiciary. It could under no circumstances, be found wanting, with reference to the assertions made by the petitioners. It was pointed out, that the only executive representative thereon being the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, it could not be inferred, that the executive would exert such influence through him, as would undermine the independence of the five other Members of the Commission. It was submitted, that the largest representation of the JUDGMENT Commission, was that of Judges of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as, the Chief Justice of India, and the two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court were ex officio Members of the NJAC. 113. With reference to the two “eminent persons” on the NJAC, it was his contention, that they could not be identified either with the executive or the legislature. For the nomination of the two “eminent persons”, the Selection Committee comprises of one member of the executive, one member of the legislature, and one member of the judiciary. In the above view of the matter, it was asserted, that the contention, that the two Page 305 306 “eminent persons” in the Commission would support the executive/the legislature, was preposterous. It was therefore the submission of the learned senior counsel, that the “independence of the judiciary” could not

114. It was also contended, that the proceedings before the NJAC would be more transparent and broad based, and accordingly, more result oriented, and would ensure, that the best candidates would be selected for appointment as Judges to the higher judiciary. 115. It was asserted, that the NJAC provided for a consultative process with persons who were ex-hypothesi , well qualified to give proper advice in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was accordingly the assertion of learned counsel, that the determination rendered by this Court, in the Second and Third Judges cases, was not in consonance with the intent, with which Articles 124 and 217 were JUDGMENT originally enacted. It was therefore submitted, that the subject of “independence of the judiciary”, with reference to the impugned constitutional amendment, should not be determined by relying on the Second and Third Judges cases, but only on the basis of the plain reading of Articles 124 and 217, in conjunction with, the observations expressed by the Members of the Constituent Assembly while debating on the above provisions. It was submitted, that whilst the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, would be in an effective position to provide necessary inputs, with reference to the character and antecedents of the Page 306 307 candidate(s) concerned (in view of the governmental machinery available at his command), the two “eminent persons” would be in a position to participate in the selection process, by representing the general public,

116. It was submitted, that since any two Members of the NJAC, were competent to veto the candidature of a nominee, three representatives of the Supreme Court of India, would be clearly in a position to stall the appointment of unsuitable candidates. It was therefore contended, that the legislations enacted by the Parliament, duly ratified in terms of Article 368, should be permitted to become functional, with the constitution of the NJAC, and should further be permitted to discharge the responsibility of appointing Judges to the higher judiciary. It was submitted, that in case of any deficiency in the discharge of the said responsibility, this Court could suo motu negate the selection process, or exclude one or both JUDGMENT of the “eminent persons” from the selection process, if they were found to be unsuitable or unworthy of discharging their responsibility. Or even if they could not establish their usefulness. It was submitted, that this Court should not throttle the contemplated process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, through the NJAC, without it’s even having been tested. 117. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, Senior Advocate, entered appearance on behalf of the State of Maharashtra. It was his contention, while endorsing the submissions advanced on behalf of the Union of India, that the Page 307 308 impugned Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was a rare event, inasmuch as, the Parliament unanimously passed the same, with all parties supporting the amendment. He asserted, that there was not a

Besides the above, it was asserted, that even the State legislatures ratified the instant constitutional amendment, wherein the ruling party, as also, the parties in opposition, supported the amendment. Based on the above, it was contended, that the instant constitutional amendment, should be treated as the unanimous will of the people, belonging to all sections of the society, and therefore the same could well be treated, as the will of the nation, exercised by all stakeholders. 118. It was submitted, that the amendment under reference should not be viewed with suspicion. It was pointed out, that Articles 124 and 217 contemplated a dominating role for the executive. It was contended, that JUDGMENT the judgment in the Second Judges case, vested primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, with the Chief Justice of India and his collegium of Judges. This manner of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, according to learned counsel, was unknown to the rest of the world, as in no other country, the appointment of Judges is made by Judges themselves. Indicating the defects of the collegium system, it was asserted, that the same lacked transparency, and was not broad based enough. Whilst acknowledging, the view expressed by J.S. Verma, CJ., that the manner of appointment Page 308 309 of Judges contemplated by the Second and Third Judges cases was very good, it was submitted, that J.S. Verma, CJ., himself was disillusioned with their implementation, as he felt, that there had been an utter failure

illegality in the constitutional amendment? Or, whether the appointment of Judges contemplated through the NJAC violated the “basic structure” of the Constitution? And, whether the “independence of the judiciary” stood subverted by the impugned constitutional amendment? It was asserted, that it was wrong to assume, that the manner of appointment of Judges, had any impact on the “independence of the judiciary”. In this behalf, it was pointed out, that the independence of Judges, did not depend on who appointed them. It was also pointed out, that independence of Judges depended upon their individual character. Learned counsel reiterated the position expounded by Dr. B.R. JUDGMENT Ambedkar, during the Constituent Assembly debates. He submitted, that the concept of “independence of the judiciary” should not be determined with reference to the opinion expressed by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases, but should be determined with reference to the debates in the Constituent Assembly, which led to the crystallization of Articles 124 and 217, as originally enacted. 119. Learned counsel placed reliance on Lord Cooke of Thorndon in his article titled “Making the Angels Weep”, wherein he scathingly criticized the Second Judges case. Reference was also made to his article “Where Page 309 310 Angels Fear to Tread”, with reference to the Third Judges case. The Court’s attention was also drawn to the criticism of the Second and Third Judges cases, at the hands of H.M. Seervai, Fali S. Nariman and others,

case – J.S. Verma, CJ.. It was, accordingly, the contention of the learned senior counsel, that whilst determining the issue of “independence of the judiciary”, reference should not be made to either of the above two judgments, but should be made to the plain language of Articles 124 and 217. Viewed in the above manner, it was asserted, that there would be no question of arriving at the conclusion, that the impugned constitutional amendment, violated the basic concepts of “separation of powers” and “independence of the judiciary”. 120. Even though, there were no guidelines, for appointment of the two “eminent persons”, emerging from the Constitution (99th Amendment) JUDGMENT Act, and/or the NJAC Act, yet it was submitted, that it was obvious, that the “eminent persons” to be chosen, would be persons who were well versed in the working of courts. On the Court’s asking, learned senior counsel suggested, that “eminent persons” for the purpose could only be picked out of eminent lawyers, eminent jurists, and even retired Judges, or the like. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is obvious that learned senior counsel had adopted a position, diametrically opposite to the one canvassed by the learned Attorney General. Another aspect, on which we found a little divergence in the submission of Mr. Page 310 311 T.R. Andhyarujina was, that in many countries the executive participation in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was being brought down. And in some countries it was no

process of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary was evolving, so as to be vested in Commissions of the nature of the NJAC. And as such, it was wholly unjustified to fault the same, on the ground of “independence of the judiciary”, when the world over Commissions were found to have been discharging the responsibility satisfactorily. 121. Mr. Tushar Mehta, Additional Solicitor General of India, entered appearance on behalf of the State of Gujarat. He adopted the submissions advanced by the learned Attorney General, as also, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, the learned Solicitor General. It was his submission, that the system innovated by this Court for appointment of Judges to the JUDGMENT higher judiciary, comprising of the Chief Justice and his collegium of Judges, was a judicial innovation. It was pointed out, that since 1993 when the above system came into existence, it had been followed for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, till the impugned constitutional amendment came into force. It was asserted that, in the interregnum, some conspicuous events had taken place, depicting the requirement of a change in the method and manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Learned counsel invited our attention to the various Bills which were introduced in the Parliament for the purpose Page 311 312 of setting up a Commission for appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary, as have already been narrated hereinbefore. It was pointed out, that several representations were received by the Government of the

aspiration of the citizens of the country. The resultant effect was, the passing of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, and the NJAC Act, by the Parliament. It was submitted, that the same came to be passed almost unanimously, with only one Member of Rajya Sabha abstaining. It was asserted, that this was a rare historical event after independence, when all political parties, having divergent political ideologies, voted in favour of the impugned constitutional amendment. In addition to the above, it was submitted, that as of now 28 State Assemblies had ratified the Bill. It was asserted, that the constitutional mechanism for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, had operated for a JUDGMENT sufficient length of time, and learning from the experience emerging out of such operation, it was felt, that a broad based Commission should be constituted. It was contended, that the impugned constitutional amendment, satisfied all the parameters for testing the constitutional validity of an amendment. Learned Additional Solicitor General similarly opposed, the submissions advanced at the hands of the petitioners challenging the inclusion of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as a Member of the NJAC. He also found merit in the inclusion of two “eminent persons”, in the NJAC. It was contended, that the term Page 312 313 “eminent persons”, with reference to appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was by itself clear and unambiguous, and as and when, a nomination would be made, its authenticity would be understood. He

advancing submission about the identity of those who could be nominated as “eminent persons” to the NJAC. It was submitted, by 82 placing reliance on Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. State of Punjab , 83 49 K.A. Abbas v. Union of India , and the A.K. Roy case , that similar submissions advanced before this Court, with reference to vagueness and uncertainty of law, were consistently rejected by this Court. According to learned counsel, with reference to the alleged vagueness in the term “eminent persons”, in case the nomination of an individual was assailed, a court of competent jurisdiction would construe it, as far as may be, in accordance with the intention of the legislature. It was asserted, that it JUDGMENT could not be assumed, that there was a political danger, that if two wrong persons were nominated as “eminent persons” to the NJAC, they would be able to tilt the balance against the judicial component of the NJAC. It was submitted, that the appointment of the two “eminent persons” was in the safe hands, of the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha. In the above view of the matter, the learned Additional Solicitor General, concluded with the prayer, that 82 (1969) 1 SCC 475 83 (1970) 2 SCC 780 Page 313 314 the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners deserved to be rejected. 122. Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, Senior Advocate, entered appearance on

detailed submissions had already been advanced by counsel who had entered appearance before him, he chose to limit the same. It was the primary contention of the learned senior counsel, that the impugned constitutional amendment, as also the NJAC Act, did not in any manner violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution. According to the learned senior counsel, the impugned constitutional amendment, furthers and strengthens the “basic structure” principle, of a free and independent judiciary. It was his submission, that the assertions made at the hands of the petitioners, to the effect that the impugned constitutional amendment, impinges upon the “basic structure” of the Constitution, JUDGMENT and the “independence of the judiciary”, were wholly misconceived. It was submitted, that this Court had not ever held, that the primacy of the judiciary through the Chief Justice of India, was an essential component of the “independence of the judiciary”. It was asserted, that while considering the challenge raised by the petitioners to the impugned constitutional amendment, it would be wholly unjustified to approach the challenge by assuming, that the primacy of the judiciary through the Chief Justice of India, would alone satisfy the essential components of “separation of power” and “independence of the judiciary”. It was Page 314 315 submitted, that the introduction of plurality, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was an instance of independence, rather than an instance of interference. With reference to

any ulterior motives. It was asserted, that the adoption of the NJAC for selection of Judges to the higher judiciary, would result in the selection of the best out of those willing to be appointed. With reference to the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as an ex officio Member of the NJAC, it was submitted, that the mere participation of one executive representative, would not make the process incompatible, with the concept of “independence of the judiciary”. In this behalf, emphatic reliance was placed on the observations of E.S. Venkataramiah, J., from two paragraphs of the First Judges case, which are being extracted hereunder: JUDGMENT “1033. As a part of this very contention it is urged that the Executive should have no voice at all in the matter of appointment of Judges of the superior courts in India as the independence of the judiciary which is a basic feature of the Constitution would be in serious jeopardy if the executive can interfere with the process of their appointment. It is difficult to hold that merely because the power of appointment is with the executive, the independence of the judiciary would become impaired. The true principle is that after such appointment the executive should have no scope to interfere with the work of a Judge.” “1038. The foregoing gives a fairly reliable picture of the English system of appointments of Judges. It is thus seen that in England the Judges are appointed by the Executive. “Nevertheless, the judiciary is substantially insulated by virtue of rules of strict law, constitutional conventions, political practice and professional tradition, from political influence.” It was finally submitted by learned counsel, that a multi-member Page 315 316 constitutional body, was expected to act fairly and independently, and not in violation of the Constitution. It was contended, that plurality by itself was an adequate safeguard. Reliance in this behalf was placed on

Constitution, and that, it was in consonance with the concept of a free and independent judiciary, by further strengthening the “basic structure” of the Constitution. 123. Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, Senior Advocate, entered appearance on behalf of the State of Jharkhand. He asserted, that he should be taken as having adopted all the submissions addressed, on behalf of the Union of India. While commencing his submissions, he placed reliance on Article 124(4) and proviso (b) under Article 217(1) to contend, that Judges of the higher judiciary, could not be removed except by an order passed by the President, after an address by each House of Parliament, JUDGMENT supported by a majority of the total membership of that House, and by a majority of not less than 2/3rd of the Members of the House present and voting, had been presented to the President, on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. In this behalf, learned senior counsel placed reliance on Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that the power to appoint includes the power to suspend or dismiss. Read in conjunction with Article 367, which mandates, that unless the context otherwise required, the provisions of the General Clauses Act 84 (1995) 4 SCC 611 Page 316 317 1897, would apply to the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, in the same manner as they applied to the interpretation of an Act of the legislature. Based on the aforesaid, it was sought to be

not demand primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges of the higher judiciary, as an integral component of the “independence of the judiciary”. It was submitted, on the issue of “independence of the judiciary”, the question of manner of appointment was far less important, than the question of removal from the position of Judge. Adverting to the manner of removal of Judges of the higher judiciary, in accordance with the provisions referred to hereinabove, it was asserted, that in the matter of removal of a Judge from the higher judiciary, there was no judicial participation. It was solely the prerogative of the legislature. That being so, it was contended, that the submissions advanced at the behest of the JUDGMENT petitioners, that primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges, should be vested in the judiciary, was nothing but a fallacy. 124. The second contention advanced by learned senior counsel was, that it should not be assumed as if the NJAC, would take away the power of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, from the judiciary. It was submitted, that three of the six Members of the NJAC belonged to the judiciary, and that, one of them, namely, the Chief Justice of India was to preside over the proceedings of the NJAC, as its Chairperson. Thus viewed, it was submitted, that it was wholly misconceived on the Page 317 318 part of the petitioners to contend, that the power of appointment of Judges, had been taken away from the judiciary, and vested with the executive. It was submitted, that there was nothing fundamentally illegal

It was also contended, that the manner of appointment of Judges, contemplated through the NJAC, could not be perceived as violative of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, by the mere fact, that any two Members of the NJAC can veto a proposal of appointment of a Judge to the higher judiciary. And that, the above would result in the subversion of the “independence of the judiciary”. In support of the aforestated submissions, it was highlighted, that the manner of appointment of Judges, which was postulated in the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases, do not lead to the inference, that if the manner of appointment as contemplated therein was altered, it would violate the JUDGMENT “basic structure” of the Constitution. 125. Mr. Yatindra Singh, learned Senior Advocate, entered appearance as an intervener. He contended, that the preamble to the Constitution of India, Article 50 (which provides for separation of the judiciary from the executive), the oath of office of a Judge appointed to the higher judiciary, the security of his tenure including the fixed age of retirement, the protection of the emoluments payable to Judges including salary and leave, etc., the fact that the Judges appointed to the higher judiciary served in Courts of Record, having the power to punish for contempt, and Page 318 319 the provisions of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850, and the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, which grant immunity to them from civil as well as criminal proceedings, are incidents, which ensured

“independence of the judiciary”. It was pointed out, that insofar as the determination of the validity of the impugned constitutional amendment was concerned, it was not essential to make a reference to the judgments rendered by this Court in the Second and Third Judges cases. It was submitted, that the only question that needed to be determined insofar as the present controversy is concerned, was whether, the manner of appointment postulated through the NJAC, would interfere with “independence of Judges”. In this behalf, it was firstly asserted, that neither the Second nor the Third Judges case had concluded, that the manner of appointment of Judges would constitute the “basic structure” JUDGMENT of the Constitution. Nor that, the manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary as postulated in the Second and Third Judges cases, if breached, would violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution. It was submitted, that the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases merely interpreted the law, as it then existed. It was asserted, that the above judgments did not delve into the question, whether any factor(s) or feature(s) considered, were components of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. Page 319 320 126. Learned senior counsel, also placed reliance on the manner of appointment of Judges in the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan to contend, that in all these countries

justification for this Court to infer, if the manner of appointment of Judges was altered from the position contemplated in the Second and Third Judges cases, to the one envisaged by the impugned constitutional amendment, it would affect the “independence of the Judges”. It was submitted, that different countries in the world had adopted different processes of selection for appointment of Judges. Each country had achieved “independence of the judiciary”, and as such, it was presumptuous to think that Judges appointed by Judges alone, can discharge their duties independently. 127. Learned senior counsel also pointed out, that the “collegium JUDGMENT system” was not the only process of appointment of Judges, which could achieve the “independence of the judiciary”. Had it been so, it would have been so concluded in the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases. It was the submission of the learned senior counsel, that “independence of the judiciary” could be achieved by other methods, as had been adopted in other countries, or in a manner, as the Parliament deemed just and proper for India. It was asserted, that the manner of appointment contemplated by the impugned constitutional amendment had no infirmity, with reference to the issue of Page 320 321 “independence of the judiciary”, on account of the fact, that there was hardly any participation in the NJAC, at the behest of organs other than the judiciary.

available. The failure of the “collegium system”, according to the learned senior counsel, was apparent from the opinion expressed by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in the foreword to the book “Story of a Chief Justice”, authored by U.L. Bhat, J. The “collegium system” was also adversely commented th upon, by Ruma Pal, J., while delivering the 5 V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture on the topic “An Independent Judiciary”. Reference in this behalf, was also made to the observations made by S.S. Sodhi, J., a former Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, in his book “The Other Side of Justice”, and the book authored by Fali S. Nariman, in his autobiography “Before Memory Fades”. It was contended, that the JUDGMENT aforesaid experiences, and the adverse all around comments, with reference to the implementation of the “collegium system”, forced the Parliament to enact the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, which provided for a far better method for selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, than the procedure contemplated under the “collegium system”. It was submitted, that whilst the NJAC did not exclude the role of the judiciary, it included two “eminent persons” with one executive nominee, namely, the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as Members of the NJAC. Since the role of the Page 321 322 executive/Government in the NJAC was minimal, it was preposterous to assume, that the executive would ever be able to have its way, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was

the selection process broad based. While concluding his submissions, it was also suggested by the learned counsel, that the NJAC should be allowed to operate for some time, so as to be tested, before being scrapped at its very inception. And that, it would be improper to negate the process even before the experiment had begun. 129. Mr. Dushyant A. Dave, Senior Advocate and President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, submitted that the only question that needed to be adjudicated upon, with reference to the present controversy was, whether the manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, through the NJAC, would fall within the constitutional frame JUDGMENT work? Learned senior counsel commenced his submissions by highlighting the fact, that parliamentary democracy contemplated through the provisions of the Constitution, was a greater basic concept, as compared to the “independence of the judiciary”. It was submitted, that the manner in which submissions had been advanced at the behest of the petitioners, it seemed, that the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, is placed at the highest pedestal, in the “basic structure doctrine”. Learned senior counsel seriously contested the veracity of the aforesaid belief. It was submitted, that if those Page 322 323 representing the petitioners, were placing reliance on the judgment rendered in the Second Judges case, to project the aforesaid principle, it was legally fallacious, to do so. The reason, according to learned senior

it premised on an elaborate discussion, with reference to the subject under consideration, nor was reliance placed on the Constituent Assembly debates. It was pointed out, that the judgment in the Second Judges case was rendered, on the basis of the principles contemplated by the authors of the judgment, and not on any principles of law. It was accordingly asserted, that the petitioners’ contentions, deserved outright rejection. 130. Learned senior counsel invited this Court’s attention to the fact, 10 that the judgments rendered in the Kesavananda Bharati case , the 33 85 Minerva Mills Ltd. case , and I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu , JUDGMENT wherein the concept of “basic structure” of the Constitution was formulated and given effect to, were all matters wherein on different aspects, the power of judicial review had been suppressed/subjugated. It was submitted, that none of the aforesaid judgments could be relied upon to determine, whether the manner of appointment of the Judges to the higher judiciary, constituted a part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. It was therefore, that reliance was placed on Article 368 to contend, that the power to amend the Constitution, had been described 85 (2007) 2 SCC 1 Page 323 324 as a “constituent power”, i.e., a power similar to the one which came to be vested in the Constituent Assembly, for drafting the Constitution. It was submitted, that no judgment could negate or diminish the

advanced passionate submissions with reference to various appointments made, on the basis of the procedure postulated in the Second and Third Judges cases. Reference was pointedly made to the appointment of a particular Judge to this Court as well. It was pointed out, that the concerned Judge had decided a matter, by taking seisin of the same, even though it was not posted for hearing before him. Thereafter, even though a review petition was filed to correct the anomaly, the same was dismissed by the concerned Judge. While projecting his concern with reference to the appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary under the collegium system, learned senior counsel emphatically pointed out, that JUDGMENT the procedure in vogue before the impugned constitutional amendment, could be described as a closed-door process, where appointments were made in a hush-hush manner. He stated that the stakeholders, including prominent lawyers with unimpeachable integrity, were never consulted. It was submitted, that inputs were never sought, from those who could render valuable assistance, for the selection of the best, from amongst those available. It was pointed out, that the process of appointment of Judges under the collegium system, was known to have been abused in certain cases, and that, there were certain inherent Page 324 325 defects therein. It was submitted, that the policy of selection, and the method of selection, were not justiciable, being not amenable to judicial review, and as such, no challenge could be raised to the wrongful

reference to appointments to the higher judiciary, reliance was placed on Registrar (Admn), High Court of Orissa, Cuttack v. Sisir Kanta 32 Satapathy , to contend, that in spite of having noticed the judgments rendered in the Second Judges case, this Court struck a note of caution, with reference to the control, vested in the High Courts, over the subordinate judiciary. It was pointed out, that it had been held, that control had to be exercised without usurping the power vested with the executive, especially the power under Articles 233, 234 and 235. It is submitted, that the power of the executive in the matter of appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary, could not be brushed aside, without JUDGMENT any justification. It was contended, that it was improper to assume, that only the judiciary could appoint the best Judges, and the executive or the legislature could not. 132. Learned senior counsel also made an impassioned reference, to the failure of the judiciary, to grant relief to the victims of the 1984 riots in Delhi, and the 2003 riots in Gujarat. It was also asserted, that justice had been denied to those who deserved it the most, namely, the poor citizenry of this country. It was pointed out, that the manner of appointment of Judges, through the “collegium system”, had not Page 325 326 produced Judges of the kind who were sensitive to the rights of the poor and needy. It was the assertion of the learned senior counsel, that the new system brought in for selection and appointment of Judges to the

achieve the best results, it was always open to this Court to provide such guidelines. V. THE DEBATE AND THE DELIBERATION: I. 133. The Union Government, as also, the participating State Governments, were all unanimous in their ventilation, that the impugned constitutional amendment, had been passed unanimously by both the JUDGMENT Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, wherein parliamentarians from all political parties had spoken in one voice. The Lok Sabha had passed the Bill with 367 Members voting in favour of the Bill, and no one against it (the Members from the AIADMK – 37 in all, had however abstained from voting). The Rajya Sabha passed the Bill with 179 Members voting in favour of the Bill, and one of its Members – Ram Jethmalani, abstaining. It was submitted, that on account of the special procedure prescribed under the proviso to Article 368(2), the Bill was ratified in no time by half the State Legislatures. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor Page 326 327 General of India, had informed the Court, that as many as twenty-eight State Assemblies, had eventually ratified the Bill. It was assented to by the President on 31.12.2014. It was therefore asserted, that the

the desire of the nation. Based on the fact, that impugned constitutional amendment reflected the will of the people, it was submitted, that it would not be appropriate to test it through a process of judicial review, even on the touchstone of the concept of “basic structure”. 134. Learned counsel representing the petitioners, described the aforesaid assertion as misplaced. The contention was repulsed by posing a query, whether the same was the will of the nation of the “haves”, or the will of the nation of the “have-nots”? Another question posed was, whether the impugned constitutional amendment represented the desire of the rich, the prosperous and the influential, or the poor and the needy, JUDGMENT whose conditions, hopes and expectations had nothing to do with the impugned constitutional amendment? It was submitted, that the will of the nation, could only be decided by a plebiscite or a referendum. It was submitted, that the petitioners would concede, that it could certainly be described as the overwhelming will of the political-executive. And no more. It was asserted, that the impugned constitutional amendment had an oblique motive. The amendment was passed unanimously, in the opinion of the petitioners, for the simple reason, that the higher judiciary Page 327 328 corrects the actions of the executive and the legislatures. This, it was pointed out, bothers the political-executive. 135. With reference to the will of the people, it was submitted, that the

constitutional amendment was “law” with reference to Part III of the Constitution, and therefore, was subject to the constraint of the fundamental rights, in the said part. It was pointed out, that the Parliament, had invoked Article 368, while passing the Constitution (25th Amendment) Act, 1971. By the above amendment, a law giving effect to the policy of the State under Articles 39(b) and 39(c) could not be declared void, on the ground that it was inconsistent with the fundamental rights expressed through Articles 14, 19 and 31. Article 31C also provided, that a legislative enactment containing such a “declaration”, namely, that it was for giving effect to the above policy of JUDGMENT the State, would not be called in question on the ground, that it did not factually gave effect to such policy. It was pointed out, that this Court in 10 the Kesavananda Bharati case , had overruled the judgment in the I.C. 41 Golak Nath case . This Curt, while holding as unconstitutional the part of Article 31C, which denied judicial review, on the basis of the “declaration” referred to above, also held, that the right of judicial review was a part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, and its denial would result in the violation of the “basic structure” of the Constitution. Page 328 329 136. Proceeding further, it was submitted, that on 12.6.1975, the election of Indira Gandhi to the Lok Sabha was set aside by the Allahabad High Court. That decision was assailed before the Supreme Court.

Parliament, of the Prime Minister and the Speaker could not be assailed, nor could the election be held void, or be deemed to have ever become void, on any of the grounds on which an election could be declared void. In sum and substance, by a deeming fiction of law, the election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker would continue to be valid, irrespective of the defect(s) and illegalities therein. By the above amendment, it was provided, that any pending appeal before the Supreme Court would be th disposed of, in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution (39 Amendment) Act, 1975. The aforesaid amendment was struck down by this Court, by declaring that the same amounted to a negation of the JUDGMENT “rule of law”, and also because, it was “anti-democratic”, and as such, violated the “basic structure” of the Constitution. It was submitted, that as an answer to the striking down of material parts of Article 39A of the Constitution, the Parliament while exercising its power under Article 368, had passed the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, by an overwhelming majority. Through the above amendment, the Parliament added clauses (4) and (5) to Article 368, which read as under: “(4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article whether before or after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution Page 329 330 (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be called in question in any court on any ground. (5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article.”

the amending power of the Parliament under Article 368 was limited, inasmuch as, it had no right to repeal or abrogate the Constitution, or to destroy its “basic or essential features”. 137. Learned senior counsel pointed out, that over the years, yet another stratagem was adopted by the Parliament, for avoiding judicial interference in the working of the Parliament. In this behalf, reference th was made to the Constitution (45 Amendment) Bill, 1978, wherein it was provided, that even the “basic structure” of the Constitution could be amended, on its approval through a referendum. The amendment added JUDGMENT a proviso to Article 368(2) postulating, that a law compromising with the “independence of the judiciary” would require ratification by one half of the States, and thereupon, would become unassailable, if adopted by a simple majority vote in a referendum. Through its aforesaid action, the Government of the day, revealed its intention to compromise even the “independence of the judiciary”. Though the above Bill was passed by an overwhelming majority in the Lok Sabha, it could not muster the two-thirds majority required in the Rajya Sabha. It was pointed out, that the propounder of the Bill was the then Janata Party Government, and Page 330 331 not the Congress Party Government (which was responsible for the emergency, and the earlier constitutional amendments). It was therefore asserted, that it should not surprise anyone, if all political parties had

138. It was submitted, that the intention of the legislature and the executive, irrespective of the party in power, has been to invade into the “independence of the judiciary”. It was further submitted, that attempts to control the judiciary have been more pronounced in recent times. In this behalf, the Court’s attention was drawn to the judgments in Lily 86 Thomas v. Union of India , and Chief Election Commissioner v. Jan 87 Chaukidar . It was pointed out, that in the former judgment, this Court held as invalid and unconstitutional, Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which provided inter alia, that a Member of Parliament convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment for JUDGMENT not less than two years, would not suffer the disqualification contemplated under the provision, for a period of three months from the date of conviction, or if the conviction was assailed by way of an appeal or revision – till such time, as the appeal or revision was disposed of. By the former judgment, convicted Members became disqualified, and had to vacate their respective seats, even though, the conviction was under challenge. In the latter judgment, this Court upheld the order passed by the Patna High Court, declaring that a person who was confined to 86 (2013) 7 SCC 653 87 (2013) 7 SCC 507 Page 331 332 prison, had no right to vote, by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 62(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Since he/she was not an elector, therefore it was held, that he/she could not

139. It was pointed out, that Government (then ruled by the U.P.A.) introduced a series of Bills, to invalidate the judgment rendered by this 87 Court in the Jan Choukidar case . This was sought to be done by passing the Representation of the People (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2013, within three months of the rendering of the above judgment. It was submitted, that it was wholly misconceived for the learned counsel representing the Union of India, and the concerned States to contend, that the determination by the Parliament and the State Legislatures, with reference to constitutional amendments, could be described as actions which the entire nation desired, or represented the will of the people. It JUDGMENT was submitted, that what was patently unconstitutional, could not constitute either the desire of the nation, or the will of the people. 140. Referring to the “collegium system” of appointing Judges to the higher judiciary, it was pointed out, that the same was put in place by a decision rendered by a nine-Judge Bench, in the Second Judges case, through which the “independence of the judiciary” was cemented and strengthened. This could be achieved, by vesting primacy with the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was further pointed out, that the collegium system Page 332 333 has been under criticism, on account of lack of transparency. It was submitted, that taking advantage of the above criticism, political parties across the political spectrum, have been condemning and denouncing the

impugned constitutional amendment, for interfering with the judicial process. This oblique motive, it was asserted, could not be described as the will of the people, or the will of the nation. 141. In comparison, while making a reference to the impugned constitutional amendment and the NJAC Act, it was equally seriously contended, that the constitutional amendment compromised the “independence of the judiciary”, by negating the “primacy of the judiciary”. With reference to the insinuations levelled by the Union of India and the concerned State Governments, during the course of hearing, reference was made to an article bearing the title “Structure JUDGMENT Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts”, authored by Nick Robinson. Reference was made to the following expositions made therein: “Given their virtual self-selection, judges on the Indian Supreme Court are viewed as less politicised than in the United States. The panel structure of the Court also prevents clear ideological blocks from being perceived (even if there are more “activist” or “conservative” judges) there is not the sense that all the judges have to assemble together for a decision to be legitimate or fair in the eyes of the public. Quite the opposite, judges are viewed as bringing different skills or backgrounds that should be selectively utilized.” Page 333 334 142. It was submitted, that the method of appointment, evolved through the Second and Third Judges cases, had been hailed by several jurists, who had opined that the same could be treated as a precedent worthy of

in the United Kingdom. 143. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the position assumed by the learned counsel representing the rival parties, it is essential to hold, that every constitutional amendment passed by the Parliament, either by following the ordinary procedure contemplated under Article 368(2), or the special procedure contemplated in the proviso to Article 368(2), could in a sense of understanding, by persons not conversant with the legal niceties of the issue, be treated as the will of the people, for the simple reason, that parliamentarians are considered as representatives of the people. In our view, as long as the stipulated JUDGMENT majority supports a constitutional amendment, it would be treated as a constitutional amendment validly passed. Having satisfied the above benchmark, it may be understood as an expression of the will of the people, in the sense noticed above. The strength and enforceability of a constitutional amendment, would be just the same, irrespective of whether it was passed by the bare minimum majority postulated therefor, or by a substantial majority, or even if it was approved unanimously. What is important, is to keep in mind, that there are declared limitations, Page 334 335 on the amending power conferred on the Parliament, which cannot be breached. 144. An ordinary legislation enacted by the Parliament with reference to

in the State List and the Concurrent List, in a sense of understanding noticed above, could be treated as enactments made in consonance with the will of the people, by lay persons not conversant with the legal niceties of the issue. Herein also, there are declared limitations on the power of legislations, which cannot be violated. 145. In almost all challenges, raised on the ground of violation of the “basic structure” to constitutional amendments made under Article 368, and more particularly, those requiring the compliance of the special and more rigorous procedure expressed in the proviso under Article 368(2), the repeated assertion advanced at the hands of the Union, has been the JUDGMENT same. It has been the contention of the Union of India, that an amendment to the Constitution, passed by following the procedure expressed in the proviso to Article 368(2), constituted the will of the people, and the same was not subject to judicial review. The same argument had been repeatedly rejected by this Court by holding, that Article 368 postulates only a “procedure” for amendment of the Constitution, and that, the same could not be treated as a “power” vested in the Parliament to amend the Constitution, so as to alter, the “core” of the Constitution, which has also been described as, the “basic Page 335 336 features/basic structure” of the Constitution. The above position has been projected, through the judgments cited on behalf of the petitioners, to which reference has been made hereinabove.

inasmuch as, only 37 Members from the AIADMK had consciously abstained from voting in the Lok Sabha, and only one Member of the Rajya Sabha – Ram Jethmalani, had consciously abstained from voting in favour thereof, it cannot be accepted, that the same is exempted from judicial review. The scope of judicial review with reference to a constitutional amendment and/or an ordinary legislation, whether enacted by the Parliament or a State Legislature, cannot vary, so as to adopt different standards, by taking into consideration the strength of the Members of the concerned legislature, which had approved and passed the concerned Bill. If a constitutional amendment breaches the JUDGMENT “core” of the Constitution or destroys its “basic or essential features” in a manner which was patently unconstitutional, it would have crossed over forbidden territory. This aspect, would undoubtedly fall within the realm of judicial review. In the above view of the matter, it is imperative to hold, that the impugned constitutional amendment, as also, the NJAC Act, would be subject to judicial review on the touchstone of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, and the parameters laid down by this Court in that behalf, even though the impugned constitutional amendment may have been approved and passed unanimously or by an Page 336 337 overwhelming majority, and notwithstanding the ratification thereof by as many as twenty-eight State Assemblies. Accordingly, we find no merit in the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents, that

II. 147. It was the submission of the learned Attorney General, that the “basic features/basic structure” of the Constitution, should only be gathered from a plain reading of the provision(s) of the Constitution, as it/they was/were originally enacted. In this behalf, it was acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the petitioners, that the scope and extent of the “basic features/basic structure” of the Constitution, was to be ascertained only from the provisions of the Constitution, as originally enacted, and additionally, from the interpretation placed on the concerned provisions, by this Court. The above qualified assertion made JUDGMENT on behalf of the petitioners, was unacceptable to the learned counsel representing the respondents. 148. The above disagreement, does not require any detailed analysis. 36 The instant aspect, stands determined in the M. Nagaraj case , wherein it was held as under: “...The question is – whether the impugned amendments discard the original Constitution. It was vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates that the impugned amendments have been promulgated by Parliament to overrule the decisions of this Court. We do not find any merit in this argument. Under Article 141 of the Constitution the pronouncement of this Court is the law of the land.” Page 337 338 149. The cause, effect and the width of a provision, which is the basis of a challenge, may sometimes not be apparent from a plain reading thereof. The interpretation placed by this Court on a particular provision, would

the vital silences hidden therein, based on a harmonious construction of the provision, in conjunction with the surrounding provisions, would also have been taken into consideration. The mandate of Article 141, obliges every court within the territory of India, to honour the interpretation, conclusion, or meaning assigned to a provision by this Court. It would, therefore be rightful, to interpret the provisions of the Constitution relied upon, by giving the concerned provisions, the meaning, understanding and exposition, assigned to them, on their interpretation by this Court. In the above view of the matter, it would neither be legal nor just, to persist JUDGMENT on an understanding of the concerned provision(s), merely on the plain reading thereof, as was suggested on behalf of the respondents. Even on a plain reading of Article 141, we are obligated, to read the provisions of the Constitution, in the manner they have been interpreted by this Court. 150. The manner in which the term “consultation” used in Articles 124, 217 and 222 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, has been considered at great length in the “Reference Order”, and therefore, there is no occasion for us, to re-record the same yet again. Suffice it to notice, that the term “consultation” contained in Articles 124, 217 and 222 will Page 338 339 have to be read as assigning primacy to the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of India (based on a decision, arrived at by a collegium of Judges), as has been concluded in the “Reference Order”. In the Second

which the provisions were adopted by the Constituent Assembly, on 26.11.1949 (-which took effect on 26.01.1950). Thus viewed, we reiterate, that in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, and also, in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges from one High Court to any other High Court, under Articles 124, 217 and 222, primacy conferred on the Chief Justice of India and his collegium of Judges, is liable to be accepted as an integral constituent of the above provisions (as originally enacted). Therefore, when a question with reference to the selection and appointment (as also, transfer) of Judges to the higher judiciary is raised, alleging that the “independence JUDGMENT of the judiciary” as a “basic feature/structure” of the Constitution has been violated, it would have to be ascertained whether the primacy of the judiciary exercised through the Chief Justice of India (based on a collective wisdom of a collegium of Judges), had been breached. Then alone, would it be possible to conclude, whether or not, the “independence of the judiciary” as an essential “basic feature” of the Constitution, had been preserved (-and had not been breached). III. Page 339 340 151. We have already concluded in the “Reference Order”, that the term “consultation” used in Articles 124, 217 and 222 (as originally enacted) has to be read as vesting primacy in the judiciary, with reference to the

Chief Justices and Judges of one High Court, to another. For arriving at the above conclusion, the following parameters were taken into consideration: (i) Firstly, reference was made to four judgments, namely, the 11 Samsher Singh case , rendered in 1974 by a seven-Judge Bench, wherein keeping in mind the cardinal principle – the “independence of the judiciary”, it was concluded, that consultation with the highest dignitary in the judiciary – the Chief Justice of India, in practice meant, that the last word must belong to the Chief Justice of India, i.e., the primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary JUDGMENT must rest with the judiciary. The above position was maintained in the 5 Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth case in 1977 by a five-Judge Bench, wherein it was held, that in all conceivable cases, advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India (in the course of his “consultation”), should principally be accepted by the Government of India, and that, if the Government departed from the counsel given by the Chief Justice of India, the Courts would have an opportunity to examine, if any other extraneous circumstances had entered into the verdict of the executive. In the instant judgment, so as to emphasize the seriousness of the Page 340 341 matter, this Court also expressed, that it expected, that the above words would not fall on deaf ears. The same position was adopted in the Second Judges case rendered in 1993 by a nine-Judge Bench, by a majority of

J., (as he then was) one of the Judges on the Bench, who supported the minority opinion, also endorsed the view, that the action of the executive to put off the recommendation(s) made by the Chief Justice of India, would amount to an act of deprival, “violating the spirit of the Constitution”. In sum and substance therefore, the Second Judges case, almost unanimously concluded, that in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, primacy in the decision making process, unquestionably rested with the judiciary. Finally, the Third Judges case, rendered in 1998 by another nine-Judge Bench, reiterated the position rendered in the Second Judges case. JUDGMENT (ii) Secondly, the final intent emerging from the Constituent Assembly debates, based inter alia on the concluding remarks expressed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, maintained that the judiciary must be independent of the executive. The aforesaid position came to be expressed while deliberating on the subject of “appointment” of Judges to the higher judiciary. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar while responding to the sentiments expressed by K.T. Shah, K.M. Munshi, Tajamul Husain, Alladi Krishnaswami Aayar and Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, noted the view of the Constituent Assembly, that the Members were generally in Page 341 342 agreement, that “independence of the judiciary”, from the executive “should be made as clear and definite as it could be made by law”. The above assertion made while debating on the issue of appointment of

higher judiciary, had a direct nexus with “independence of the judiciary”. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar declined the proposal of adopting the manner of appointment of Judges, prevalent in the United Kingdom and in the United States of America, and thereby, rejected the subjugation of the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, at the hands of the executive and the legislature respectively. While turning down the latter proposal, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was suspicious and distrustful, that in such an eventuality, appointments to the higher judiciary, could be impacted by “political pressure” and “political considerations”. JUDGMENT (iii) Thirdly, the actual practice and manner of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, emerging from the parliamentary debates, clearly depict, that absolutely all Judges (except in one case) appointed since 1950, had been appointed on the advice of the Chief Justice of India. It is therefore clear, that the political-executive has been conscious of the fact, that the issue of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, mandated the primacy of the judiciary, expressed through the Chief Justice of India. In this behalf, even the learned Attorney General had conceded, that the supersession of senior Judges of the Supreme Court, Page 342 343 at the time of the appointment of the Chief Justice of India in 1973, the mass transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary during the emergency in 1976, and the second supersession of a Supreme Court Judge, at the time of the appointment of the Chief Justice of India in 1977, were executive aberrations. (iv) Fourthly, the Memorandum of Procedure for appointment of Judges and Chief Justices to the higher judiciary drawn in 1950, soon after India became independent, as also, the Memorandum of Procedure for appointment of Judges and Chief Justices to the higher judiciary redrawn in 1999, after the decision in the Second Judges case, manifest that, the executive had understood and accepted, that selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary would emanate from, and would be made on the advice of the Chief Justice of India. (v) Fifthly, having adverted to the procedure in place for the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, the submission JUDGMENT advanced on behalf of the respondents, that the Second and Third Judges cases had created a procedure, where Judges select and appoint Judges, or that, the system of Imperium in Imperio had been created for appointment of Judges, was considered and expressly rejected (in the “Reference Order”). Furthermore, the submission, that the executive had no role, in the prevailing process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary was also rejected, by highlighting the role of the executive in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Whilst recording the above conclusions, it was maintained (in the Page 343 344 “Reference Order”), that primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, was with the Chief Justice of India, and that, the same was based on the collective wisdom of a collegium of Judges.

(and in the matter of their transfer) under Articles 124, 217 (and 222), must be deemed to be vested in the executive, because the President by virtue of the constitutional mandate contained in Article 74, had to act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers, was rejected by holding, that primacy in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, continued to remain with the Chief Justice of India, and that, the same was based on the collective wisdom of a collegium of Judges. In recording the above conclusion, reliance was placed on Article 50. Reliance was also placed on Article 50, for recording a further conclusion, that if the power of appointment of JUDGMENT Judges was left to the executive, the same would breach the principles of “independence of the judiciary” and “separation of powers”. 152. In view of the above, it has to be concluded, that in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, as also, in the matter of their transfer, primacy in the decision making process, inevitably rests with the Chief Justice of India. And that, the same was expected to be expressed, on the basis of the collective wisdom, of a collegium of Judges. Having so concluded, we reject all the submissions advanced at the Page 344 345 hands of the learned counsel for the respondents, canvassing to the contrary. IV.

(i.e., Chief Justices, and Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court), and the transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of one High Court to another, contemplated through the impugned constitutional amendment, retains and preserves primacy in the decision making process, with the judiciary? It was the emphatic contention of the learned Attorney General, the learned Solicitor General, the learned Additional Solicitor General, and a sizeable number of learned senior counsel who represented the respondents, that even after the impugned constitutional amendment, primacy in the decision making process, under Articles 124, 217 and 222, has been retained with the judiciary. Insofar as the instant JUDGMENT aspect of the matter is concerned, it was contended on behalf of the respondents, that three of the six Members of the NJAC were ex officio Members drawn from the judiciary - the Chief Justice of India, and two other senior Judges of the Supreme Court, next to the Chief Justice. In conjunction with the aforesaid factual position, it was pointed out, that there was only one nominee from the political-executive – the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice. It was submitted, that the remaining two Members, out of the six-Member NJAC, were “eminent persons”, who were expected to be politically neutral. Therefore, Page 345 346 according to learned counsel representing the respondents, primacy in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, and also, in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges

154. In conjunction with the aforesaid submission, it was emphatically pointed out, that the provisions of the NJAC Act postulate, that the NJAC would not recommend a person for appointment as a Judge to the higher judiciary, if any two Members of the NJAC, did not agree with such recommendation. Based on the fact, that the Chief Justice of India and the two other senior Judges of the Supreme Court, were ex officio Members of the NJAC, it was asserted, that the veto power for rejecting an unsuitable recommendation by the judicial component of the NJAC, would result in retaining primacy in the hands of the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, JUDGMENT and also, in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges from one High Court to another. This according to learned counsel for the respondents, was because the judicial component would be sufficient, in preventing the other Members of the NJAC, from having their way. 155. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the above contention, there can be no doubt, that in the manner expressed by the learned counsel, the suggested inference may well be justified on paper. The important question to be considered is, whether as a matter of practicality, the impugned constitutional amendment can be considered Page 346 347 to have sustained, primacy in the matter of decision making, under the amended provisions of Articles 124, 217 and 222, in conjunction with the inserted provisions of Articles 124A to 124C, with the judiciary?

over simplified and narrow approach. The primacy vested in the Chief Justice of India based on the collective wisdom of a collegium of Judges, needs a holistic approach. It is not possible for us to accept, that the primacy of the judiciary would be considered to have been sustained, merely by ensuring that the judicial component in the membership of the NJAC, was sufficiently capable, to reject the candidature of an unworthy nominee. We are satisfied, that in the matter of primacy, the judicial component of the NJAC, should be competent by itself, to ensure the appointment of a worthy nominee, as well. Under the substituted scheme, even if the Chief Justice of India and the two other senior most JUDGMENT Judges of the Supreme Court (next to the Chief Justice of India), consider a nominee to be worthy for appointment to the higher judiciary, the concerned individual may still not be appointed, if any two Members of the NJAC opine otherwise. This would be out-rightly obnoxious, to the primacy of the judicial component. The magnitude of the instant issue, is apparent from the fact that the two “eminent persons” (-lay persons, according to the learned Attorney General), could defeat the unanimous recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India and the two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court, favouring the appointment of an Page 347 348 individual under consideration. Without any doubt, demeaning primacy of the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. The reason to describe it as being obnoxious is this

profession of advocacy, perhaps individuals who may not have any law related academic qualification, such lay persons would have the collective authority, to override the collective wisdom of the Chief Justice of India and two Judges of the Supreme Court of India. The instant issue, is demonstrably far more retrograde, when the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice also supports the unanimous view of the judicial component, because still the dissenting voice of the “eminent persons” would prevail. It is apparent, that primacy of the judiciary has been rendered a further devastating blow, by making it extremely fragile. 157. When the issue is of such significance, as the constitutional JUDGMENT position of Judges of the higher judiciary, it would be fatal to depend upon the moral strength of individuals. The judiciary has to be manned by people of unimpeachable integrity, who can discharge their responsibility without fear or favour. There is no question of accepting an alternative procedure, which does not ensure primacy of the judiciary in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary (as also, in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts, to other High Courts). In the above stated position, it is not possible to conclude, that the combination contemplated for constitution Page 348 349 of the NJAC, is such, that would not be susceptible to an easy breach of the “independence of the judiciary”. 158. Articles 124A(1)(a) and (b) do not provide for an adequate

Judges to the higher judiciary, and therefore, the same are liable to be set aside and struck down as being violative of the “basic structure” of the Constitution of India. Thus viewed, we are satisfied, that the “basic structure” of the Constitution would be clearly violated, if the process of selection of Judges to the higher judiciary was to be conducted, in the manner contemplated through the NJAC. The impugned constitutional amendment, being ultra vires the “basic structure” of the Constitution, is liable to be set aside. V. 159. It is surprising, that the Chief Justice of India, on account of the JUDGMENT position he holds as pater familias of the judicial fraternity, and on account of the serious issues, that come up for judicial adjudication before him, which have immeasurable political and financial consequences, besides issues of far reaching public interest, was suspected by none other than Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, during the course of the Constituent Assembly debates, when he declined to accept the suggestions made by some Members of the Constituent Assembly, that the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary should be made with the “concurrence” of the Chief Justice of India, by Page 349 350 observing, that even though the Chief Justice of India was a very eminent person, he was after all just a man with all the failings, all the sentiments, and all the prejudices, which common people have. And

plurality of Judges, by including in the consultative process (at the discretion of the President of India), not only Judges of the Supreme Court of India, but also Judges of High Courts (in addition to the mandatory consultation with the Chief Justice of India). One would also ordinarily feel, that the President of India and/or the Prime Minister of India in the discharge of their onerous responsibilities in running the affairs of the country, practically all the time take decisions having far reaching consequences, not only in the matter of internal affairs of the country on the domestic front, but also in the matter of international relations with other countries. One would expect, that vesting the JUDGMENT authority of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary with any one of them should not ordinarily be suspect of any impropriety. Yet, the Constituent Assembly did not allow any of them, any defined participatory role. In fact the debate in the Constituent Assembly, removed the participation of the political-executive component, because of fear of being impacted by “political-pressure” and “political considerations”. Was the view of the Constituent Assembly, and the above noted distrust, legitimate? Page 350 351 160. A little personal research, resulted in the revelation of the concept of the “legitimate power of reciprocity”, debated by Bertram Raven in his article – “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of

having dealt with various psychological reasons which influenced the personality of an individual, reference was also made to the “legitimate power of reciprocity”. It was pointed out, that the reciprocity norm envisaged, that if someone does something beneficial for another, the recipient would feel an obligation to reciprocate (“I helped you when you needed it, so you should feel obliged to do this for me.” – Goranson and Berkowitz, 1966; Gouldner, 1960). In the view expressed by the author, the inherent need of power, is universally available in the subconscious of the individual. On the satisfaction and achievement of the desired power, there is a similar unconscious desire to reciprocate the favour. JUDGMENT 161. The psychological concept of the “legitimate power of reciprocity”, was also highlighted by Dennis T. Regan of the Cornell University in his article – “Effects of a Favour and Liking on Compliance”. It was pointed out, that there was sufficient evidence to establish, that favours do generate feelings of obligation, and the desire to reciprocate. According to the author, the available data suggested, that a favour would lead to reported feelings of obligation, on the part of its recipient. 162. In his book “Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion” – Robert Cialdini, Regent’s Professor Emeritus of Psychology and Marketing at Page 351 352 Arizona State University, in Chapter II titled – “Reciprocation”, expressed the view, that “possibly one of the most potent compliance techniques, was the rule of reciprocation, which prompts one to repay, what someone

compelled to cancel the debt…often against his/her better judgment”. It was pointed out, that the rule of reciprocation, was widespread across the human cultures, suggesting that it was fundamental to creating interdependencies on which societies, cultures, and civilizations were built. It was asserted, that in fact the rule of reciprocation assured, that someone who had given something away first, has a relative assurance, that this initial gift will eventually be repaid. In the above view of the matter, nothing would be lost. Referring to Marcel Nauss, who had conducted a study on gift giving, it was emphasised, that “there is an obligation to give, an obligation to receive, and an obligation to repay”. JUDGMENT According to the author, it was in the above network of indebtedness, that the first giver could exploit the favour, and would rightfully assume the role of a compliance practitioner. And accordingly it was concluded, that although the obligation to repay constituted the essence of the reciprocity rule, it was the obligation to receive, that made the rule so easy to exploit. Describing the power of reciprocity, Cialdini in his article expressed, that the person who gives first remains, in control; and the person who was the recipient, always remained in debt. It is pointed out, that the above situation was often deliberately created, and Page 352 353 psychologically maintained. It was also the view of the author, that the more valuable, substantial and helpful the original favour, the more indebted the recipient would continue to feel. In the above article, a

Referring also to the views of the renowned cultural anthropologists – Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, it was affirmed, that humans lived in a “web of indebtedness”. Therefore it was felt, that reciprocity was a debt and a powerful psychological tool, which was all, but impossible to resist. 163. Under the constitutional scheme in place in the United States of America, federal Judges are nominated by the President, and confirmed by the Senate. The issue being debated, namely, the concept of “the legitimate power of reciprocity”, therefore directly arises in the United States, in the matter of appointment of federal Judges. The first favour to the federal Judge is extended by the President, who nominates his JUDGMENT name, and further favours are extended by one or more Member(s) of the Senate, with whose support the Judge believes he won the vote of confirmation. An article titled as “Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary”, written by Laura E. Little (Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law, as far back as in 1995), deals with the issue in hand, pointedly with reference to appointment of Judges. The article reveals, that the issue of reciprocity has been a subject of conscious debate, with reference to the appointment of Judges for a substantial Page 353 354 length of time. The conclusions drawn in the above article are relevant to the present controversy, and are being extracted hereunder:

JUDGMENT 164. It is however pertinent to mention, that in her article, Laura E. Little has expressed, what most moral philosophers believed, that gratitude has significant moral components. And further, that gratitude has a ready place in utilitarian moral systems, which were designed to ensure the greatest good for the greatest number of individuals. The concept of Page 354 355 gratitude was however intertwined with loyalty by Laura E. Little, as in her view, gratitude and loyalty, were closely related. A beneficiary could show gratitude to a benefactor, through an expression of loyalty. The

ties, and religious devotion. Insofar as the patterns of behaviour in the Indian cultural system is concerned, a child is always obligated to his parents for his upbringing, and it is the child’s inbuilt moral obligation, to reciprocate to his parents by extending unimpeachable loyalty and gratitude. The above position finds replication in relationships of teacher and taught, master and servant, and the like. In the existing Indian cultural scenario, an act of not reciprocating towards a benefactor, would more often than not, be treated as an act of grave moral deprivation. When the favour extended is as important as the position of judgeship in the higher judiciary, one would best leave it to individual imagination, to JUDGMENT determine the enormity of the reciprocal gratitude and loyalty. 165. The consideration recorded hereinabove, endorses the view, that the political-executive, as far as possible, should not have a role in the ultimate/final selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Specially keeping in mind the enormity of the participation of the political-executive, in actions of judicial adjudication. Reciprocity, and feelings of pay back to the political-executive, would be disastrous to “independence of the judiciary”. In this, we are only reiterating the position adopted by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. He feared, that with the Page 355 356 participation of the political-executive, the selection of Judges, would be impacted by “political pressure” and “political considerations”. His view, finds support from established behavioural patterns expressed by

of finalization of appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary. VI. 166. The jurisdictions that have to be dealt with, by Judges of the higher judiciary, are large and extensive. Within the above jurisdictions, there are a number of jurisdictions, in which the executive is essentially a fundamental party to the lis . This would inter alia include cases arising out of taxing statutes which have serious financial implications. The executive is singularly engaged in the exploitation of natural resources, often through private entrepreneurs. The sale of natural resources, which also, have massive financial ramifications, is often subject to judicial JUDGMENT adjudication, wherein also, the executive is an indispensable party. Challenges arising out of orders passed by Tribunals of the nature of the Telecom Disputes Settlement & Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, and the like, are also dealt with by the higher judiciary, where also the executive has a role. Herein also, there could be massive financial implications. The executive is also a necessary party in all matters relating to environmental issues, including appeals from the National Green Tribunals. Not only in all criminal matters, but also in high profile scams, which are no longer a rarity, the executive has an Page 356 357 indispensable role. In these matters, sometimes accusations are levelled against former and incumbent Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Union Cabinet, and sometimes against former and incumbent Chief

Tribunal, and the Armed Forces Appellate Tribunal come up before the Judges of the higher judiciary. These adjudications also sometimes include, high ranking administrators and armed forces personnel. Herein too, the executive is an essential constituent. This is only a miniscule part of the extensive involvement of the political-executive, in litigation before the higher judiciary. 167. Since the executive has a major stake, in a majority of cases, which arise for consideration before the higher judiciary, the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as an ex officio Member of the NJAC, would be clearly questionable. In today’s world, people are JUDGMENT conscious and alive to the fact, that their rights should be adjudicated in consonance of the rules of natural justice. One of the rules of natural justice is, that the adjudicator should not be biased. This would mean, that he should neither entertain a prejudice against either party to a lis , nor should he be favourably inclined towards any of them. Another component of the rule of bias is, that the adjudicator should not have a conflict of interest, with the controversy he is to settle. When the present set of cases came up for consideration, a plea of conflict of interest was raised even against one of the presiding Judges on the Bench, which Page 357 358 resulted in the recusal of Anil R. Dave, J. on 15.4.2015. A similar prayer was again made against one of us (J.S. Khehar, J.), on 21.4.2015, on the ground of conflict of interest. What needs to be highlighted is, that bias,

are not on one or the other side of the adjudicatory process. The political-executive in contrast, in an overwhelming majority of cases, has a participatory role. In that sense, there would/could be an impact/effect, of a decision rendered one way or the other. A success or a defeat – a win or a loss. The plea of conflict of interest would be available against the executive, if it has a participatory role in the final selection and appointment of Judges, who are then to sit in judgment over matters, wherever the executive is an essential and mandatory party. The instant issue arose for consideration in the Madras Bar Association 35 case . In the above case a five-Judge Bench considered the legality of JUDGMENT the participation of Secretaries of Departments of the Central Government in the selection and appointment of the Chairperson and Members of the National Tax Tribunal. On the above matter, this Court held, as under: “131.Section 7 cannot even otherwise be considered to be constitutionally valid, since it includes in the process of selection and appointment of the Chairperson and Members of NTT, Secretaries of Departments of the Central Government. In this behalf, it would also be pertinent to mention that the interests of the Central Government would be represented on one side in every litigation before NTT. It is not possible to accept a party to a litigation can participate in the selection process whereby the Chairperson and Members of the adjudicatory body are selected….” Page 358 359 The position herein is no different. The Attorney General however attempted to distinguish the matter in hand, from the controversy decided in the cited case by asserting, that in cases adjudicated upon by

the higher judiciary. The rebuttal, clearly avoids the issue canvassed. One would assume from the response, that the position was conceded to the extent of matters, where the executive was a party to the lis . But that itself would exclude the selected Judges from hearing a large majority of cases. One would therefore reject the response of the Union of India. 168. We are of the view, that consequent upon the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, a Judge approved for appointment with the Minister’s support, may not be able to resist or repulse a plea of conflict of interest, raised by a litigant, in a matter when the executive has an adversarial role. In the NJAC, the Union Minister in JUDGMENT charge of Law and Justice would be a party to all final selections and appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary. It may be difficult for Judges approved by the NJAC, to resist a plea of conflict of interest (if such a plea was to be raised, and pressed), where the political-executive is a party to the lis . The above, would have the inevitable effect of undermining the “independence of the judiciary”, even where such a plea is repulsed. Therefore, the role assigned to the political-executive, can at best be limited to a collaborative participation, excluding any role in the final determination. Therefore, merely the participation of the Union Page 359 360 Minister in charge of Law and Justice, in the final process of selection, as an ex officio Member of the NJAC, would render the amended provision of Article 124A(1)(c) as ultra vires the Constitution, as it impinges on the principles of “independence of the judiciary” and “separation of powers”. VII. 169. The learned Attorney General had invited our attention to the manner in which judicial appointments were being made in fifteen countries. It was submitted, that in nine countries Judges were appointed either through a Judicial Appointments Commission, or through a Judicial Appointments Committee, or through a Judicial Appointments Council. It was highlighted, that in four countries, Judges were appointed directly by the executive, i.e., by the Governor General or the President. We were informed, that in one European country, Judges were nominated by the Minister of Justice and confirmed by the Parliamentary Committee. In the United States of America, Judges were JUDGMENT appointed through a process of nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. It was highlighted, that in all the fifteen countries, the executive was the final determinative/appointing authority. And further that, in all the countries, the executive had a role to play in the selection and appointment of Judges. The foresaid factual position was brought to our notice for the singular purpose of demonstrating, that executive participation in the process of selection and appointment of Judges had not made the judiciary in any of the fifteen countries, subservient to the political-executive. It was asserted, Page 360 361 that the countries referred to by him were in different continents of the world, and there was no complaint with reference to the “independence of the judiciary”. The point sought to be driven home was, that the mere

judiciary”. 170. The aforestated submission does not require an elaborate debate.

Page 361 362

171. Despite our having dealt with the submission canvassed at the hands of the learned Attorney General based on the system of

of the present controversy, a paper written in November 2008, by Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg of the Law School, University of Chicago, came to hand. The paper bore the caption – “Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence”. The paper refers to comparative evidence, of the ongoing debate, about the selection and discipline of Judges. The article proclaims to aim at two objectives. Firstly, the theory of formation of Judicial Councils, and the dimensions on which they differ. And secondly, the extent to which different designs of Judicial Council, affect judicial quality. These two issues were JUDGMENT considered as of extreme importance, as the same were determinative of the fact, whether Judges would be able to have an effective role in implementing social policy, as broadly conceived. It was observed, that Judicial Councils had come into existence to insulate the appointment, promotion and discipline of Judges from partisan political influence, and at the same time, to cater to some level of judicial accountability. It was the authors’ view, that the Judicial Councils lie somewhere in between the polar extremes of letting Judges manage their own affairs, and the Page 362 363 alternative of complete political-executive control of appointments, promotions and discipline. 172. According to the paper, France established the first High Council of

was asserted, that the Italian model was, thereupon, followed in other countries. The model established in Spain and Portugal comprised of a significant proportion of Members who were Judges. These models were established, after the fall of dictatorship in these countries. Councils created by these countries, are stated to be vested with, final decision making authority, in matters pertaining to judicial promotion, tenure and removal. According to the paper, the French model came into existence as a consequence of concerns about excessive politicization. Naturally, the process evolved into extensive independence of judicial power. Yet, judicial concern multiplied manifolds in the judiciary’s attempt to give JUDGMENT effect to the European Convention of Human Rights. And the judiciary’s involvement in the process of judicial review, in the backdrop of surmounting political scandals. The paper describes the pattern in Italy to be similar. In Italy also, prominent scandals led to investigation of businessmen, politicians and bureaucrats (during the period from 1992 to 1997), which resulted in extensive judicial participation, in political activity. The composition of the Council in Italy, was accordingly altered in 2002, to increase the influence of the Parliament. Page 363 364 173. The paper noted, that the French-Italian models had been adopted in Latin America, and other developing countries. It was pointed out, that the World Bank and other similar multilateral donor agencies, insist

Judiciary, was considered as a refinement of the Judicial Council model. The perceived Supreme Council of Magistracy, requires that at least half of the Members are Judges, even though, some of the Members of the Supreme Council are drawn from the Parliament. It was the belief of the authors of the paper, that the motivating concern for adoption of the Supreme Councils, in the French-Italian tradition, was aimed at ensuring “independence of the judiciary” after periods of undemocratic rule. Perhaps because of concerns over structural problems, it was pointed out, that external accountability had emerged as a second goal for these Supreme Councils. Referring to the Germany, Austria and Netherlands JUDGMENT models, it was asserted, that their Councils were limited to playing a role in selection (rather than promotion and discipline) of Judges. Referring to Dutch model, it was pointed out, that recent reforms were introduced to ensure more transparency and accountability. 174. It was also brought out, that Judicial Councils in civil law jurisdictions, had a nexus to the Supreme Court of the country. Referring to Costa Rica and Austria, it was brought out, that the Judicial Councils in these countries were a subordinate organ of the Supreme Court. In some countries like Brazil, Judicial Councils were independent Page 364 365 bodies with constitutional status, while in others Judicial Councils governed the entire judiciary. And in some others, like Guatemala and Argentina, they only governed lower courts.

Reform Act, 2005 created a Judicial Appointments Commission, which was responsible for appointments solely based on merit, had no executive participation. It was pointed out, that New Zealand and Australia were debating whether to follow the same. The above legislation, it was argued, postulated a statutory duty on Government Members, not to influence judicial decisions. And also, excluded the participation of the Lord Chancellor in all such activities, by transferring his functions to the President of the Courts of England and Wales, (formerly designated as Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales). 176. Referring to the American experience, it was noted, that concern JUDGMENT over traditional methods of judicial selection (either by politicians or by election) had given way to “Merit Commissions” so as to base selection of Judges on merit. Merit Commissions, it was felt, were analogous to Judicial Councils. The system contemplated therein, was non-partisan. The Judicial Selection Commission comprised of judges, lawyers and political appointees. 177. Referring to the works of renowned jurists on the subject, it was sought to be concluded, that in today’s world, there was a strong consensus, that of all the procedures, the merit plan insulated the Page 365 366 judiciary from political pressure. In their remarks, emerging from the survey carried out by them, it was concluded, that it was impossible to eliminate political pressure on the judiciary. Judicial Commissions/

was their view that once given independence, Judges were more useful for resolving a wider range of more important disputes, which were considered essential, given the fact that more and more tasks were now being assigned to the judiciary. 178. In analyzing the conclusions drawn in the article, one is constrained to conclude, that in the process of evolution of societies across the globe, the trend is to free the judiciary from executive and political control, and to incorporate a system of selection and appointment of Judges, based purely on merit. For it is only then, that the process of judicial review will effectively support nation building. In JUDGMENT the subject matter, which falls for our consideration, it would be imperative for us, to keep in mind, the progression of the concepts of “independence of the judiciary” and “judicial review” were now being recognized the world over. The diminishing role of executive and political participation, on the matter of appointments to the higher judiciary, is an obvious reality. In recognition of the above trend, there cannot be any greater and further participation of the executive, than that which existed hitherto before. And in the Indian scenario, as is presently conceived, through the judgments rendered in the Second and Third Judges cases. Page 366 367 It is therefore imperative to conclude, that the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice in the final determinative process vested in the NJAC, as also, the participation of the Prime Minister and

the People), in the selection of “eminent persons”, would be a retrograde step, and cannot be accepted. VIII. 179. The only component of the NJAC, which remains to be dealt with, is with reference to the two “eminent persons” required to be nominated to the NJAC. It is not necessary to detail the rival submissions on the instant aspect, as they have already been noticed extensively, hereinbefore. 180. We may proceed by accepting the undisputed position, that neither the impugned constitutional amendment, nor the NJAC Act postulate any JUDGMENT positive qualification to be possessed by the two “eminent persons” to be nominated to the NJAC. These constitutional and legislative enactments do not even stipulate any negative disqualifications. It is therefore apparent, that the choice of the two “eminent persons” would depend on the free will of the nominating authorities. The question that arises for consideration is, whether it is just and appropriate to leave the issue, to the free will and choice, of the nominating authorities? 181. The response of the learned Attorney General was emphatic. Who could know better than the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India, or Page 367 368 the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha (and when there is no such Leader of Opposition, then the Leader of the single largest Opposition Party in the Lok Sabha)? And he answered the same by himself, that if

to take a decision on the matter – neither the legislature, nor the executive, and not even the judiciary. The Attorney General then quipped – surely this Court would not set aside the impugned constitutional amendment, or the NJAC Act, on such a trivial issue. He also suggested, that we should await the outcome of the nominating authorities, and if this Court felt that a particular individual nominated to discharge the responsibility entrusted to him as an “eminent person” on the NJAC, was inappropriate or unacceptable or had no nexus with the responsibility required to be shouldered, then his appointment could be set aside. 182. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the matter, we are of JUDGMENT the view, that the issue in hand is certainly not as trivial, as is sought to be made out. The two “eminent persons” comprise of 1/3rd strength of the NJAC, and double that of the political-executive component. We could understand the import of the submission, only after hearing learned counsel. The view emphatically expressed by the Attorney General was that the “eminent persons” had to be “lay persons” having no connection with the judiciary, or even to the profession of advocacy, perhaps individuals who may not have any law related academic qualification. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel who represented the State Page 368 369 of Maharashtra, which had ratified the impugned constitutional amendment, had appeared to support the impugned constitutional amendment, as well as, the NJAC Act, expressed a diametrically opposite

retired Judges, or the like, having an insight to the working and functioning of the judicial system. It is therefore clear, that in the view of the learned senior counsel, the nominated “eminent persons” would have to be individuals, with a legal background, and certainly not lay persons, as was suggested by the learned Attorney General. We have recorded the submissions advanced by Mr. Dushyant A. Dave, learned senior counsel – the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, who had addressed the Bench in his usual animated manner, with no holds barred. We solicited his view, whether it would be proper to consider the inclusion of the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association and/or JUDGMENT the Chairman of the Bar Council of India, as ex officio Members of the NJAC in place of the two “eminent persons”. His response was spontaneous “Please don’t do that !!” and then after a short pause, “… that would be disastrous !!”. Having examined the issue with the assistance of the most learned and eminent counsel, it is imperative to conclude, that the issue of description of the qualifications (– perhaps , also the disqualifications) of “eminent persons” is of utmost importance, and cannot be left to the free will and choice of the nominating authorities, irrespective of the high constitutional positions held by them. Page 369 370 Specially so, because the two “eminent persons” comprise of 1/3rd strength of the NJAC, and double that of the political-executive component, and as such, will have a supremely important role in the

for having not laid down the qualifications of eligibility for being nominated as “eminent persons”, and for having left the same vague and undefined. 183. It is even otherwise difficult to appreciate the logic of including two “eminent persons”, in the six-Member NJAC. If one was to go by the view expressed by the learned Attorney General, “eminent persons” had been included in the NJAC, to infuse inputs which were hitherto not available with the prevailing selection process, for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Really a submission with all loose ends, and no clear meaning. He had canvassed, that they would be “lay persons” having no JUDGMENT connection with the judiciary, or even with the profession of advocacy, perhaps individuals who did not even have any law related academic qualification. It is difficult to appreciate what inputs the “eminent persons”, satisfying the qualification depicted by the learned Attorney General, would render in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. The absurdity of including two “eminent persons” on the NJAC, can perhaps be appreciated if one were to visualize the participation of such “lay persons”, in the selection of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the Chairman and Members of the Page 370 371 Finance Commission, the Chairman and Members of the Union Public Service Commission, the Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commissioners and the like. The position would be disastrous. In our

184. The sensitivity of selecting Judges is so enormous, and the consequences of making inappropriate appointments so dangerous, that if those involved in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, make wrongful selections, it may well lead the nation into a chaos of sorts. The role of “eminent persons” cannot be appreciated in the manner expressed through the impugned constitutional amendment and legislative enactment. At best, to start with, one or more “eminent persons” (perhaps even a committee of “eminent persons”), can be assigned an advisory/consultative role, by allowing them to express their opinion about the nominees under JUDGMENT consideration. Perhaps, under the judicial component of the selection process. And possibly, comprising of eminent lawyers, eminent jurists, and even retired Judges, or the like having an insight to the working and functioning of the judicial system. And by ensuring, that the participants have no conflict of interest. Obviously, the final selecting body would not be bound by the opinion experienced, but would be obliged to keep the opinion tendered in mind, while finalizing the names of the nominated candidates. Page 371 372 185. It is also difficult to appreciate the wisdom of the Parliament, to introduce two lay persons, in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, and to simultaneously vest with them a

for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court, and persons being considered for appointment as Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts, cannot be appointed, if any two Members of the NJAC do not agree to the proposal. In the scheme of the selection process of Judges to the higher judiciary, contemplated under the impugned constitutional amendment read with the NJAC Act, the two “eminent persons” are sufficiently empowered to reject all recommendations, just by themselves. Not just that, the two “eminent persons” would also have the absolute authority to reject all names unanimously approved by the remaining four Members of the NJAC. That would obviously include the power to reject, the JUDGMENT unanimous recommendation of the entire judicial component of the NJAC. In our considered view, the vesting of such authority in the “eminent persons”, is clearly unsustainable, in the scheme of “independence of the judiciary”. Vesting of such authority on persons who have no nexus to the system of administration of justice is clearly arbitrary, and we hold it to be so. The inclusion of “eminent persons”, as already concluded above (refer to paragraph 156), would adversely impact primacy of the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary (as also their transfer). For the reasons Page 372 373 recorded hereinabove, it is apparent, that Article 124A(1)(d) is liable to be set aside and struck down as being violative of the “basic structure” of the Constitution.

some references to past appointments to the Supreme Court, so as to trumpet the accusation, that the “collegium system” had not functioned efficiently, inasmuch as, persons of the nature referred to by him, came to be selected and appointed as Judges of the Supreme Court. In a manner as would be in tune with the dignity of this Court, he had not referred to any of the Judge(s) by name. His reference was by deeds. Each and every individual present in the Court-hall, was aware of the identity of the concerned Judge, in the manner the submissions were advanced. The projection by the learned Attorney General was joyfully projected by the print and electronic media, extensively highlighting the JUDGMENT allusions canvassed by the learned Attorney General. 187. If our memory serves us right, the learned Attorney General had made a reference to the improper appointment of three Judges to the Supreme Court. One would have felt, without going into the merits of the charge, that finding fault with just three Judges, despite the appointment of over a hundred Judges to the Supreme Court, since the implementation of the judgment rendered in the Second Judges case (pronounced on 6.10.1993) – M.K. Mukherjee, J., being the first Judge appointed under the “collegium system” on 14.12.1993, and B.N. Kirpal, Page 373 374 CJ., the first Chief Justice thereunder, having been appointed as Judge of the Supreme Court on 11.9.1995, under the “collegium system”, should be considered as no mean achievement.

the period he remained a Judge and Chief Justice of different High Courts in the country, as also, the period during which he remained a Judge of this Court. The failure of the “collegium system”, was attributed to the fact, that such a person would have been weeded out, if a meaningful procedure had been in place. And despite his above disposition, the concerned Judge was further elevated to the Supreme Court. The second instance cited by him was, in respect of a Judge, who did not abide by any time schedule. It was asserted, that the Judge, was inevitably late in commencing court proceedings. It was his contention, that past experience with reference to the said Judge, indicated a similar JUDGMENT demeanour, as a Judge of different High Courts and as Chief Justice of one High Court. It was lamented, that the above behaviour was not sufficient, in the process adopted under the “collegium system”, to reject the Judge from elevation to the Supreme Court. The third Judge was described as an individual, who was habitually tweeting his views, on the internet. He described him as an individual unworthy of the exalted position of a Judge of the Supreme Court, and yet, the “collegium system” had supported his appointment to the Supreme Court. Page 374 375 189. Just as it was impossible to overlook a submission advanced by the Attorney General, so also, it would be improper to leave out submissions advanced on a similar note, by none other than the President of the

included a reference to a Judge of this Court, who had allegedly taken on his board a case, which was not assigned to his roster. It was alleged, that he had disposed of the case wrongfully. Before, we dwell on the above contention, it is necessary to notice, that the charge leveled, does not relate to an allegedly improper selection and appointment. The accusation is limited to a wrongful determination of “one” case. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is necessary for us to notice, that a review petition came to be filed against the alleged improper order, passed by the said Judge. The same was dismissed. After the Judge demitted office, a curative petition was filed, wherein the alleged JUDGMENT improper order passed by the concerned Judge, was assailed. The same was also dismissed. Even thereafter, a petition was filed against the concerned Judge, by impleading him as a party-respondent. The said petition was also dismissed. We need to say no more, than what has been observed hereinabove, with reference to the particular case, allegedly wrongly decided by the concerned Judge. 190. It is imperative for us, while taking into consideration the submissions advanced by the learned Attorney General, to highlight, that the role of appointment of Judges in consonance with the judgment Page 375 376 rendered in the Second Judges case, envisages the dual participation of the members of the judiciary, as also, the members of the executive. Details in this behalf have been recorded by us in the “Reference Order”.

responsible. Therefore, to single out the judiciary for criticism, may not be a rightful reflection of the matter. 191. It is not within our realm to express our agreement or disagreement with the contentions advanced at the hands of the learned Attorney General. He may well be right in his own perception, but the misgivings pointed out by him may not be of much significance in the perception of others, specially those who fully appreciate the working of the judicial system. The misgivings pointed out by the learned Attorney General, need to be viewed in the background of the following considerations: Firstly, the allegations levelled against the Judges in question, do not JUDGMENT depict any lack of ability in the discharge of judicial responsibility. Surely, that is the main consideration to be taken into account, at the time of selection and appointment of an individual, as a Judge at the level of the higher judiciary. Secondly, none of the misgivings expressed on behalf of the respondents, are referable to integrity and misdemeanor. Another aspect, which cannot be compromised, at the time of selection of an individual, as a Judge at the level of the higher judiciary. Nothing wrong at this front also. Page 376 377 Thirdly, not in a single of the instances referred to above, the political-executive had objected to the elevation of the Judges referred to. We say so, because on our asking, we were furnished with the details of

Fourthly, no allegation whatsoever was made by the Attorney General, with reference to Judges, against whom objections were raised by the political-executive, and yet, they were appointed at the insistence of the Chief Justice, under the “collegium system”. Fifthly, that the political-executive disposition, despite the allegations levelled by the learned Attorney General, chose to grant post-retirement assignments, to three of the four instances referred to, during the course of hearing. A post-retirement assignment was also allowed by the political-executive, to the Judge referred to by Mr. Dushyant A. Dave. In the above factual scenario, either the learned Attorney General had got it JUDGMENT all wrong. And if he is right, the political-executive got it all wrong, because it faltered despite being aware of the factual position highlighted. Lastly, it has not been possible for us to comprehend, how and why, a Judge who commenced to tweet his views after his retirement, can be considered to be unworthy of elevation. The fact that the concerned Judge started tweeting his views after his retirement, is not in dispute. The inclusion of this instance may well demonstrate, that all in all, the functioning of the “collegium system” may well not be as bad as it is shown to be. Page 377 378 192. The submissions advanced by Mr. Dushyant A. Dave were not limited just to the instance of a Judge of the Supreme Court. He expressed strong views about persons like Maya Kodnani, a former

pillar to post, to get anticipatory bail. He also made a reference to convicted politicians and film stars, who had been granted relief by two different High Courts, as also by this Court. It was his lament, that whilst film stars and politicians were being granted immediate relief by the higher judiciary, commoners suffered for years. He attributed all this, to the defective selection process in vogue, which had resulted in the appointment of “bad Judges”. He repeatedly emphasized, that victims of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, and the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat, had not got any justice. It was his contention, that Judges selected and appointed through the process presently in vogue, were to JUDGMENT blame. He also expressed the view, that the appointed Judges were oblivious of violations of human rights. It was submitted, that it was shameful, that courts of law could not deliver justice, to those whose fundamental and human rights had been violated. 193. It is necessary to emphasise, that under every system of law, there are two sides to every litigation. Only one of which succeeds. The question of how a matter has been decided would always be an issue of debate. The party, who succeeds, would feel justice had been done. While the party that loses, would complain that justice had been denied. Page 378 379 In the judicial process, there are a set of remedies, that are available to the parties concerned. The process contemplates, culmination of proceedings at the level of the Supreme Court. Once the process has run

Court is right, but that, there has to be a closure. Most of the instances, illustratively mentioned by the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, pertained to criminal prosecutions. The adjudication of such controversies is dependent on the adequacy of evidence produced by the prosecution. The nature of the allegations (truthful, or otherwise), have an important bearing, on the interim relief(s) sought, by the parties. The blame for passing (or, not passing) the desired orders, does not therefore per se, rest on the will of the adjudicating Judge, but the quality and authenticity of the evidence produced, and the nature of the allegations. Once all remedies available stand exhausted, it does not lie in the mouth JUDGMENT of either the litigant, or the concerned counsel to imply motives, without placing on record any further material. It also needs to be recorded, that while making the insinuations, learned senior counsel, did not make a pointed reference to any High Court Judge by name, nor was it possible for us to identify any such Judge, merely on the basis of the submissions advanced, unlike the instances with reference to Judges of the Supreme Court. In the above view of the matter, it is not possible for us to infer, that there are serious infirmities in the matter of selection and Page 379 380 appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, under the prevailing “collegium system”, on the basis of the submissions advanced before us. 194. It is apparent that learned counsel had their say, without any

judiciary. We have also recorded all the submissions (hopefully) in terms of the contentions advanced, even in the absence of supporting pleadings. We will be failing in discharging our responsibility, if we do not refer to the parting words of Mr. Dushyant A. Dave – the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, who having regained his breath after his outburst, did finally concede, that still a majority of the Judges appointed to the High Courts and the Supreme Court, were/are outstanding, and a miniscule minority were “bad Judges”. All in all, a substantial emotional variation, from how he had commenced. One can only conclude by observing, that individual failings of men who are JUDGMENT involved in the actual functioning of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, do not necessarily lead to the inference, that the system which selects them, and assigns to them their role, is defective. X. 195. It must remain in our minds, that the Indian Constitution is an organic document of governance, which needs to change with the evolution of civil society. We have already concluded, that for far more Page 380 381 reasons than the ones, recorded in the Second Judges case, the term “consultation”, referred to selection of Judges to the higher judiciary, really meant, even in the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution, that

open to the Parliament, while exercising its power under Article 368, to provide for some other alternative procedure for the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, so long as, the attributes of “separation of powers” and “independence of the judiciary”, which are “core” components of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, are maintained. 196. That, however, will depend upon the standards of the moral fiber of the Indian polity. It cannot be overlooked, that the learned Attorney General had conceded, that there were certain political upheavals, which had undermined the “independence of the judiciary”, including an JUDGMENT executive overreach, at the time of appointment of the Chief Justice of India in 1973, followed by the mass transfer of Judges of the higher judiciary during the emergency in 1976, and thereafter a second supersession, at the time of appointment of another Chief Justice of India in 1977. And further, the interference by the executive, in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary during the 1980’s. 197. An important issue, that will need determination, before the organic structure of the Constitution is altered, in the manner contemplated by the impugned constitutional amendment, would be, whether the civil Page 381 382 society, has been able to maneuver its leaders, towards national interest? And whether, the strength of the civil society, is of a magnitude, as would be a deterrent for any overreach, by any of the pillars of governance? At

reason, that it is not yet sufficiently motivated, nor adequately determined, to be in a position to act as a directional deterrent, for the political-executive establishment. It is therefore, that the higher judiciary, which is the savior of the fundamental rights of the citizens of this country, by virtue of the constitutional responsibility assigned to it under Articles 32 and 226, must continue to act as the protector of the civil society. This would necessarily contemplate the obligation of preserving the “rule of law”, by forestalling the political-executive, from transgressing the limits of their authority as envisaged by the Constitution. JUDGMENT 198. Lest one is accused of having recorded any sweeping inferences, it will be necessary to record the reasons, for the above conclusion. The Indian Express, on 18.6.2015, published an interview with L.K. Advani, a veteran BJP Member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha, under the caption “Ahead of the 40th anniversary of the imposition of the Emergency on 25.6.1975”. His views were dreadfully revealing. In his opinion, forces that could crush democracy, were now stronger than ever before. He asserted, “I do not think anything has been done that gives me the assurance that civil liberties will not be suspended or destroyed again. Page 382 383 Not at all”!! It was also his position, that the emergency could happen again. While acknowledging, that the media today was more alert and independent, as compared to what it was, when emergency was declared

and civil liberties. With reference to the civil society, he pointed out, that hopes were raised during the Anna Hazare mobilization against corruption, which according to him, ended in a disappointment, even with reference to the subject of corruption. This when the poor and downtrodden majority of this country, can ill afford corruption. Of the various institutions, that could be held responsible, for the well functioning of democracy in this country, he expressed, that the judiciary was more responsible than the other institutions. 199. On the above interview, Mani Shankar Aiyar, a veteran Congress Member of Parliament in the Rajya Sabha, while expressing his views JUDGMENT noticed, that India could not be “emergency proof”, till the Constitution provided for the declaration of emergency, at the discretion of an elected Government. He pointed out, that it should not be forgotten, that in 1975, emergency had been declared within the framework of the Constitution. It was therefore suggested, that one of the solutions to avoid a declaration of emergency could be, to remove Part XVIII of the Constitution, or to amend it, and “to provide for only an external emergency”. He however raised a poser, whether it would be practical to do so? One would venture to answer the same in the negative. And in Page 383 384 such situation, to trust, that the elected Government would act in the interest of the nation. 200. The stance of L.K. Advani was affirmed by Sitaram Yechury, a

201. The present N.D.A. Government was sworn in, on 26.5.2014. One believes, that thereafter thirteen Governors of different States and one Lieutenant Governor of a Union Territory tendered their resignations in no time. Some of the Governors demitted their office shortly after they were appointed, by the previous U.P.A. – dispensation. That is despite the fact, that a Governor under the Constitutional mandate of Article 156(3) has a term of five years, from the date he enters upon his office. A Governor is chosen out of persons having professional excellence and/or personal acclaim. Each one of them, would be eligible to be nominated as an “eminent person” under Article 124A(1)(d). One wonders, whether JUDGMENT all these resignations were voluntary. The above depiction is not to cast any aspersion. As a matter of fact, its predecessor – the U.P.A. Government, had done just that in 2004. 202. It is necessary to appreciate, that the Constitution does not envisage the “spoils system” (also known as the “patronage system”), wherein the political party which wins an election, gives Government positions to its supporters, friends and relatives, as a reward for working towards victory, and as an incentive to keep the party in power. Page 384 385 203. It is also relevant to indicate, the images of the “spoils system” are reflected from the fact, that a large number of persons holding high positions, in institutions of significance, likewise resigned from their

some, even less than a month. Those who left included bureaucrats from the All India Services occupying coveted positions at the highest level, Directors/Chairmen of academic institutions of national acclaim, constitutional authorities (other than Governors), Directors/Chairmen of National Research Institutions, and the like. Seriously, the instant narration is not aimed at vilification, but of appreciation of the ground reality, how the system actually works. 204. From the above, is one to understand, that all these individuals were rank favorites, approved by the predecessor political-executive establishment? Or, were the best not chosen to fill the slot by the JUDGMENT previous dispensation? Could it be, that those who get to hold the reins of Government, introduce their favourites? Or, whether the existing incumbents, deserved just that? Could it be, that just like its predecessor, the present political establishment has now appointed its rank favourites? What emerges is, trappings of the spoils system, and nothing else. None of the above parameters, can be adopted in the matter of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. For the judiciary, the best out of those available have to be chosen. Considerations cannot be varied, with a change in Government. Demonstrably, that is exactly what Page 385 386 has happened (repeatedly?), in the matter of non-judicial appointments. It would be of utmost importance therefore, to shield judicial appointments, from any political-executive interference, to preserve the

appointment of Judges to the, higher judiciary would be a safe way to do so. 205. In conclusion, it is difficult to hold, in view of the factual position expressed above, that the wisdom of appointment of Judges, can be shared with the political-executive. In India, the organic development of civil society, has not as yet sufficiently evolved. The expectation from the judiciary, to safeguard the rights of the citizens of this country, can only be ensured, by keeping it absolutely insulated and independent, from the other organs of governance. In our considered view, the present status of the evolution of the “civil society” in India, does not augur the JUDGMENT participation of the political-executive establishment, in the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, or in the matter of transfer of Chief Justices and Judges of one High Court, to another. XI. 206. It may be noticed, that one of the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners was, that after the 121st Constitution Amendment Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, it was sent to the State Legislatures for ratification. Consequent upon the ratification by Page 386 387 the State Legislatures, in compliance of the mandate contained in Article 368, the President granted his assent to the same on 31.12.2014, whereupon it came to be enacted as the Constitution (99th Amendment)

Government, in the Official Gazette. And consequent upon the issuance of the above notification, the amendment was brought into force, through a notification, with effect from 13.4.2015. It was the submission of the petitioners, that the jurisdiction to enact the NJAC Act, was acquired by the Parliament on 13.4.2015, for the simple reason, that the same could not have been enacted whilst the prevailing Articles 124(2) and 217(1) were in force, as the same, did not provide for appointments to be made by a body such as the NJAC. It was submitted, that the NJAC Act was promulgated, to delineate the procedure to be followed by the NJAC while recommending appointments of Judges and Chief Justices, to the higher JUDGMENT judiciary. It was contended, that procedure to be followed by the NJAC could not have been legislated upon by the Parliament, till the Constitution was amended, and the NJAC was created, as a constitutional entity for the selection and appointment (as also, transfer) of Judges at the level of the higher judiciary. The NJAC, it was asserted, must be deemed to have been created, only when the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was brought into force, with effect from 13.4.2015. It was submitted, that the NJAC Act received the assent of the President on 31.12.2014 i.e., on a date when the NJAC had not yet come into Page 387 388 existence. For this, learned counsel had placed reliance on the A.K. Roy 49 case , to contend, that the constitutional amendment in the instant case would not come into force on 13.12.2014, but on 13.4.2015.

contended, that the power of veto vested in two Members of the NJAC, through the second proviso under Section 5(2) of the NJAC Act (in the matter of appointment of the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court), and Section 6(6) of the NJAC Act (in the matter of appointment of Chief Justices and Judges of High Courts) could not be described as laying down any procedure. It was submitted, that the above provisions clearly enacted substantive law. Likewise, it was contended, that the amendment of the words “after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose”, on being substituted by the words JUDGMENT “on the recommendation of the National Judicial Appointments Commission referred to in Article 124A”, as also, the deletion of the first proviso under Article 124(2) which mandated consultation with the Chief Justice of India, and the substitution of the same with the words, “on the recommendation of the National Judicial Appointments Commission referred to under Article 124A”, would result in the introduction of an absolutely new regimen. It was submitted, that such substitution would also amount to an amendment of the existing provisions of the Constitution, and as such, the same would also require the postulated Page 388 389 ratification provided in respect of a constitutional amendment, under the proviso to Article 368(2). And since the NJAC Act, had been enacted as an ordinary legislation, the same was liable to be held as non est on

208. Since it was not disputed, that the Parliament had indeed enacted Rules of Procedure and the Conduct of Business of Lok Sabha under Article 118, which contained Rule 66 postulating, that a Bill which was dependent wholly or partly on another Bill could be “introduced” in anticipation of the passing of the Bill, on which it was dependent. Leading to the inference, that the 121st Constitution Amendment Bill, on which the NJAC Bill was dependent, could be taken up for consideration (by introducing the same in the Parliament), but could not have been passed till after the passing of the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, on which it was dependent. JUDGMENT 209. Whilst there can be no doubt, that viewed in the above perspective, we may have unhesitatingly accepted the above submission, and in fact the same was conceded by the Attorney General to the effect, that the dependent Bill can “… be taken up for consideration and passing in the House, only after the first Bill has been passed by the House…”. But our attention was invited by the Attorney General to Rule 388, which authorises the Speaker to allow the suspension, of a particular rule (which would include Rule 66). If Rule 66 could be suspended, then Rule 66 would not have the impact, which the petitioners seek through the Page 389 390 instant submission. It is not a matter of dispute, that the then Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice had sought (under Rule 388 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Lok Sabha) the

NJAC Bill for consideration. Since the validity of Rule 388 is not subject matter of challenge before us, it is apparent, that it was well within the competence of the Parliament, to have taken up for consideration the NJAC Act, whilst the Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, on which the NJAC Act was fully dependent, had still not been passed, in anticipation of the passing of the Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill. 210. The principle contained in Rule 66, even if the said rule had not been provided for, would always be deemed to have been impliedly there. In the absence of a foundation, no superstructure can be raised. The instant illustration is relateable to Rule 66, wherein the pending Bill JUDGMENT would constitute the foundation, and the Bill being introduced in anticipation of the passing of the pending Bill, would constitute the superstructure. Therefore, in the absence of the foundational Bill (-in the instant case, the 121st Constitution Amendment Bill), there could be no question of raising the infrastructure (-in the instant case, the NJAC Act). In our considered view, it was possible in terms of Rule 388, to introduce and pass a Bill in the Parliament, in anticipation of the passing of the dependent Bill – the Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill. But, it is still not possible to contemplate, that a Bill which is dependent wholly (or, in Page 390 391 part) upon another Bill, can be passed and brought into operation, till the dependent Bill is passed and brought into effect. 211. It is however necessary to record, that even though the position

the NJAC Bill, could not have been given effect to, till the foundational enactment had become operational. In the instant case, the NJAC Act, would have failed the test, if it was given effect to, from a date prior to the date on which, the provisions of the enactment on which it was dependent – the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, became functional. In other words, the NJAC Act, would be stillborn, if the dependent provisions, introduced by way of a constitutional amendment, were yet to come into force. Stated differently, the contravention of the principle contemplated in Rule 66, could not have been overlooked, despite the suspension of the said rule, and the dependent enactment could not JUDGMENT come into force, before the depending/controlling provision became operational. The sequence of facts narrated hereinabove reveals, that the dependent and depending provisions, were brought into force simultaneously on the same date, i.e., on 13.4.2015. It is therefore apparent, that the foundation – the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, was in place, when the superstructure – the NJAC Act, was raised. Thus viewed, we are satisfied, that the procedure adopted by the Parliament at the time of putting to vote the NJAC Bill, or the date on which the NJAC Page 391 392 Act received the assent of the President, cannot invalidate the enactment of the NJAC Act, as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 212. One is also persuaded to accept the contention advanced by the