Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 19
PETITIONER:
PILIBHIT ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO.(P) LTD. & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SPECIAL OFFICER (ELECTRICITY) & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/10/1996
BENCH:
N.P SINGH, S.B. MAJMUDAR
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
S.B. Majmudar, J.
The appellant Electric Supply Co. has brought in
challenge the judgment and award dated 31st March 1980
rendered by Special Officer under Section 7-A as substituted
in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to
as ’the Act’) by U.P. Act 14 of 1976. The appellant,
original licensee, under the Act had sought appropriate
compensation under the aforesaid provision from the Special
Officer entrusted with the task of determining the purchase
price of the appellant’s Undertaking acquired under Section
6-A as inserted by the very same Act of the U.P.
Legislature. This appeal by grant of special leave under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India was pressed at the
time of final hearing by their learned senior counsel Shri
Salve and learned counsel Shri Gupta on the following
grounds:
1. In the impugned award the Special Officer had
erroneously excluded supervision charges actually incurred
by the appellant from the book value of the assets as
defined by the Explanation to Section 7-A(2).
2. The Special Officer had erroneously deducted from
the book value of the assets of the appellant an amount of
Rs.2,48,718/- being the purported depreciation on works paid
for by the consumers.
3. The Special Officer had erroneously deducted an
amount of Rs.2,67,622/- pertaining to variations in the
energy bill raised by the Board which were seriously
disputed by the appellant. In the aforesaid item ultimately
the claim was reduced to Rs.60.603.78.
4. The Special Officer had erroneously deducted from
the amount payable to the appellant an amount of Rs.
92,727/- on account of the purported balance in the Consumer
Rebate Reserve Account and an amount of Rs.46,826/- on
account of the purported balance in the Tariffs and
Dividends Control Reserve Account. So far as this item of
claim is concerned ultimately the learned counsel for the
appellant confined the claim to the total amount of
Rs.76,423/- being the purported inflated balance in the
Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve Account and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 19
Rs.38,211/- being such balance in the Consumer Rebate
Reserve Account.
In the special Leave petitions originally two
additional claims were also put forward as item no.2
consisting of Rs.35.483/-and item no.5 consisting of
Rs.1,15,111/- but at the time of hearing of this appeal
these two claims were not pressed. We are, therefore,
concerned with the aforesaid four claims surviving for
consideration.
Backdrop facts
Before we deal with these claims. It will be necessary
to note a few relevant background facts. The appellant-
licensee was functioning under the provisions of the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 having licence to generate electrical
energy for being supplied to consumers in Pilibhit town of
Uttar Pradesh. It was a purchaser of the licensee rights
from the earlier licensee named M/s Champion Electrical
Engineering works. The said license had got its licence
form 1935. On 1st April 1954 M/s Champion Electrical
Engineering Works transferred to the appellant its licence
to generate electricity in Pilibhit town. Thus the
appellant became a transfere-licensee and held Pilibhit
Electric Licence, 1935 from first April 1954. The said
licence was revoked as per the provisions of clause (3) of
U.P. Ordinance 1937 of 1975 in exercise if the powers vested
in the U.P State under Section 6-A of the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910 as inserted in the aforesaid Act by the said
Ordinance Pursuant to the said revocation of the appellant’s
licence and acquisition of its assets, the U.P. State
Electricity Board took over the electrical under taking of
the appellant at 00.00 Hrs. On 1st December 1975. On such
acquisition of the assets of the appellant and the taking
over of the electrical undertaking of the appellant by the
U.P. State Electricity Board and as the Undertaking of the
appellant-licensee stood statutorily acquired for the
purpose of State Electricity Board under Section 6-A of the
Act, the question arose regarding determination of
appropriate compensation to be paid to the erstwhile
Licensee for acquisition of its assets under the Act. The
determination of the amount was to be made under Section 7-
A as substituted by the U.P. Amending Act. That task was
statutorily assigned to a Special Officer. The Special
Officer after hearing the appellants representative on
diverse claims put forward under the said provision for
determination of appropriate amount of compensation passed
the impugned award 31st March 1980.
The aforesaid award is brought in challenge by the
appellant ex-licensee by filing this appeal in quest of
additional compensation. At this stage it may be stated
that direct writ petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India Challenging the constitutional
validity of section 7-A of the parent Act were pending in
this Court since 1972. Consequently the appellant
challenged the impugned award directly in this Court after
obtaining special leave as stated above. A constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of Tinsukjia Electric Supply
Co. Ltd. v. state of Assam and Ors. 1989 (2) SCR 544 upheld
three vires of the said provision. Consequently this appeal
survived for consideration of the payment of proper
compensation to the appellant ex-licensee whose licence was
also revoked and whose undertaking got acquired under the
said Section 7-A as substituted in the state of U.P by
Amending Act 14 of 1976.
Statutory background
Before adverting to the aforesaid four claims for
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 19
compensation it will be necessary to note the relevant
statutory provisions. The Indian Electricity Act, 1910
deals with supply of energy and licences 1) connection
therewith. As per section 3 of the said Act the state
Government said on application made in the prescribed form
and on payment of the prescribed fees, if any grant after
consulting the state Electricity Board, Licence to any
person to supply energy in any specified area, and also to
lay down or place electric supply-lines for the conveyance
and transmission of energy ’State Electricity Board’ as
defined by Section 2(11) of the Act, in relation too any
state means the state Electricity Board, if any, constituted
for the state under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply)
Act, 1948 (54 of 1948), and includes any Board which
function in that state under sections 6 and 7 of the said
Act. The appellant was the transferee-licensee functioning
under the said Act and was entrusted with the right to
generate electricity through its undertaking functioning at
Pilibhit in U.P. State. It is this undertaking of the
appellant which came to be acquired under Section 6-A of the
Act as inserted by Section 3 of the U.P. Act 14 of 1976.
Said Section 6-A dealing with ’Revocation of licences and
acquisition of undertaking’ along with its relevant sub-
sections reads as under:
"6-A Revocation of licences and
acquisition of undertaking.-(1) In
this section ’appointed day’ means
in relation to licensees other than
local authorities, December 1, 1975
and in relation to local
authorities being licensees, such
date as may be specified by the
State Government by notification in
that behalf, and different dates
may be specified for different such
undertakings.
(2) Notwithstanding anything
contained in Sections 4, 4-A, 5 and
6, the licence of every
undertaking, unless revoked before
the commencement of the Indian
Electricity (Uttar Pradesh Second
Amendment) Ordinance, 1975, shall
stand revoked with effect form the
appointed day.
(3) On revocation of the licence
under sub-section (2), the
following provisions shall have
effect, namely:-
(a) every undertaking the licence
in respect of which stands revoked
shall by virtue of this section
stand and be deemed to have stood
transferred to and vest and be
deemed to have vested in the State
Electricity Board, hereinafter in
this section called "the Board"
free from any debt, Mortgage or
similar obligation of the licensee
attaching to the undertaking:
Provided that any such debt,
mortgage or similar obligation
shall attach to the amount payable
for the undertaking as mentioned in
clause (h):
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 19
(b)... ... ... ...
(c)... ... ...
(d)... ... ...
(e)... .. ...
(f)... ... ...
(g)... ... ...
(h) the Board shall pay to the
licensee an amount determined in
accordance with the provisions of
Section 7-A:
Provided that the licensee shall be
in addition to the said, be
entitled to interest thereon at the
Reserve Bank rate ruling at the
appointed day plus one per centum
for the period from the appointed
day to the date of payment of the
said amount."
It is not in dispute between the parties that pursuant
to the said provisions the appellant’s undertaking stood
statutorily acquired by the respondent- Bard with effect
from the appointed day, that is, 1.12.1975. So far as form
the question of compensation to be paid to the appellant-
licensee for the aforesaid acquisition of its undertaking is
concerned, Section 7-A is required to be noted. The
relevant provisions of the said Section 7-A in the light of
which the controversy in the present case will have to be
resolved read as under:
"7-A. Determination of amount.-(1)
Where an undertaking of a licensee
had been purchased by the Stare
Electricity Board in consequence of
revocation of his licence under
sub-section (20 of Section 4 or is
sold under sub-section 5 or is
purchased under Section 6 or
acquired under Section 6-A the
amount payable therefore shall
determined as hereinafter provided.
(2) The gross amount payable to
such licensee shall be the
aggregate value of the amounts
specified below-
(1) the book value of all completed
works in beneficial use pertaining
to the undertaking and taken over
by the State Electricity Board the
State Government or local
authority, as the case may be
(excluding works constructed at the
cost of local bodies for street
lighting and works paid for by
consumers), less depreciation
calculated in accordance with the
Sixth Schedule read with the
Seventh Schedule the Electricity
(Supply) Act, 1948:
ii) the book value of all works in
progress taken over, excluding
works paid for by the consumers or
prospective consumers:
(iii) the book value of all stores
including spare parts
taken over, and in the case of
used stores and spare parts, if
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 19
taken over, such sum as may be
decided upon by the Special Officer
referred to in sub-section (6)
(hereinafter referred to as the
Special Officer):
(iv) the book value of all other
fixed assets in use on the date of
vesting under Section 6-A or
Section 7, hereinafter referred to
as the vesting date, and taken
over, less depreciation calculated
in accordance with the said
Schedules:
(v) the book value of all plants
and equipments existing on the
vesting date, if taken over but no
longer in use owing to wear and
tear or to obsolescence, to the
extent such value has not been
written of in the books of the
licensee, less depreciation
calculated in accordance with the
said Schedules:
Explanation- The book value any
fixed asset means its original
cost, and shall comprise-
(1) the purchase price paid by the
licensee for the asset, including
the cost of delivery and all
charges properly incurred in
erecting and bringing the asset in
to beneficial use as shown in the
books of the undertaking;;
(ii) the cost of supervision
actually incurred, but not
exceeding fifteen percent of the
amount referred to in paragraph(1):
Provided that before deciding the
amount under this section, the
licensee shall be given an
opportunity by the Special Officer
of being heard, after giving him a
notice of at least 15 days
therefor.
(3)... ... ...
(4)... ... ...
(5) The purchaser shall be
entitled to deduct the following
sums form the gross amount payable
under the foregoing sub-section to
a licensee-
(a) the amount, if any, already
paid in advance:
(b) where the purchaser is the
State Electricity Board the amount
due, if any, including interest
thereon, from the licensee to the
Board, for energy supplied by the
Board before the vesting date:
(c)... ... ...
(d)... ... ...
(e)... ... ...
(f)... ... ...
(g).. ... ...
(h) the amounts remaining in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 19
Tariffs and Dividends Control
Reserve, Contingencies Reserve and
the Development Reserve, insofar as
such amounts have not been paid
over by the licensee to the
purchaser.
(i)... ... ... ...
(6) The State Government shall
appoint, by order in writing , a
person having adequate knowledge
and experience in matter relating
to accounts, to be Special Officer
to assess the net amount payable
under this section to the licensee,
after making the deductions
mentioned in this section.
(7) (a) The Special Officer may
call for the assistance of such
officers and staff of the State
Government or the State Electricity
Board or the licensee as he may dem
it in assessing the net amount
payable.
(b) The Special Officer shall have
the same powers as are vested in a
Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. (Act V of 1908)
when trying a suit, in respect of
the following matters-
(i) enforcing the attendance of any
person and examining him on oath:
(ii) compelling the production of
documents; and
(iii) issued commissions for the
examination of witnesses.
The Special Officer shall also have
such further powers as may be
specified by the State Government
by notification in the Gazette."
The other relevant statutory provisions which are
required to be noted are found in Electricity Supply Act,
1948. [hereinafter referred to as the Supply Act’] which is
an Act to provide for the rationalisation of the production
and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures
conducive to electrical development. U.P. State Electricity
Board is constituted under Section 5 of the Supply Act. The
State Electricity Board is enjoined by Section 18 of the
Supply Act to arrange in co-ordination with the Generating
Company or Generating companies, if any operating in the
State for the supply of the electricity that may be required
within the state and for the transmission and distribution
of the same, in the most efficient and economical manner.
As per Section 2 sub-section(6) of the Supply Act ’licensee’
means a person licensed. Section 57 of the Supply Act deals
with ’licensee’s charges to consumers’ and it provides that
the provisions of the Sixth Schedule shall be deemed to be
incorporated in the licence of every licensee, not being a
local authority and the licensee is required to comply with
the provisions of the said schedule. The Sixth Schedule to
the Supply Act as it stood on the appointed day when the
appellant’s undertaking was acquired will be referred to by
us at an appropriate stage while we will consider the
aforesaid four claims for additional compensation as put
forward by the learned senior counsel for the appellant .
In the background of the aforesaid statutory provisions
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 19
we now proceed to consider the four claims for additional
compensation pressed for our consideration.
Claim No. 1
This claim is based on Section 7-A sub-section (2)
Explanation (ii) extracted earlier. The appellant contends
that as per the aforesaid provision the gross amount of
compensation payable to the appellant-licensee has to be the
aggregate value of the amount specified in section 7-A (2)
and which would include book value of all completed works in
beneficial use pertaining to the undertaking and taken over
by the state Government as in the present case. As per the
Explanation the book value of any fixed asset means its
original costs and shall also comprise of the cost of
supervision actually incurred but not exceeding the amount
referred to in paragraph (i) of the said Explanation. The
appellant submits that it had incurred form year to year
larges amounts of supervision charges paid to the staff
engaged for having supervision over these fixed assets and
the said claim was wrongly disallowed by the Special
Officer, even though the appellant was entitled to at least
15%/ of the cost of supervision actually incurred by the
appellant as permissible under Explanation (ii) to section
7-A(2). A look at the relevant part of the Award on this
aspect shows that according to the appellant the salary and
wages paid to the officers and supervisory staff of the
undertaking were debited to the Revenue Account and the cost
of the assets amounting to Rs.25,58,581/- as shown in the
audited Balance Sheet was required to be raised by
Rs.3,82,737/- being the supervision charges at the rate of
15%/ of the total supervision charges actually incurred for
supervising and maintaining these assets. This claim was
rejected by the Special Officer on two counts:(i) that as
per the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Supply Act
these supervision charges had to be capitalised by the
appellant forum year to year when they were incurred and as
that was not done these supervision charges could not be
awarded: and (ii) in any case there was no clear evidence
led by the appellant in respect of the said claim. Learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently
submitted that both these reasons given by the Special
Officer were erroneous. In that connection it was submitted
that Section 7-A sub-section (20 Explanation (ii) nowhere
laid down that the costs of supervision actually incurred
should be capitalised the licensee form year to year.
Reference to the Sixth Schedule to the Supply Act showed
that ’original cost’ of the asset was defined as per
paragraph XVII clause (6) to mean in respect of any asset
the cost of the assets to the licensee to which a proper
addition on account of supervision cost not exceeding 15/ of
the cost of referred to in sub-para (a) was to be made.
That this original cost of the asset was meant to be
calculated in connection with the operation of the Sixth
Schedule which operated of its own even independently of the
acquisition proceeding and prior thereto and had a direct
linkage with paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule as applicable
at the relevant time which clearly laid down that
notwithstanding anything containing in the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 and the provisions in the licence of a
licensee, the licensee shall so adjust by enhancing or
reducing them that his clear profit in any year of account
shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount of
reasonable return and that for deciding whether the rates of
electricity charged by the licensee resulted in his clear
profit in any year if account exceeding the amount of
reasonable return or not. The concept of clear profit has
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 19
to be kept in view of ascertaining the lightly of tariff
charges. That the concept of reasonable return is defined
in sub-para (9) of paragraph XVII of Sixth Schedule. It
encompassed in respect of any year of account, the sum of
the amounts mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) thereof. For
finding out whether clear profit in a given accounting year
exceeded reasonable return as laid down in paragraph I of
Sixth Schedule reasonable return had to be calculated for
the year. For determining reasonable return capital base
has to be ascertained as required by clause XVII(9) (a).
For finding out the capital base, original cost of fixed
assets was required to be computed as per clause XVII (i)
(a) and for that purpose original cost was to be ascertained
as per clauses XVII(6) (a) and (c). Thus definition of
original cost of fixed assets for the purpose I of Sixth
Schedule had an entirely different purpose to achieve and
had nothing to do with Explanation (ii) to Section 7-A (2)
of the Act. We find considerable force in this contention.
The aspect of original cost which may include proper
addition on account of supervision not exceeding 15/ of the
cost referred to in sub-para (a) of clause (b) of definition
paragraph XVII of the Sixth Schedule had nothing to do with
the computation of proper compensation payable to the
licensee as per Section 7-A sub-section (2) Explanation
(ii). It is also pertinent to note that the scheme of
compensation reflected by the aforesaid provisions indicated
that cost of supervision actually incurred up to the ceiling
of 15/ of the amount referred to in paragraph (i) of the
Explanation to Section 7-A (2) had to be straightway added
to the book value of fixed assets which was to be paid for
by the acquiring authority. On the other hand the provision
of computation of original cost as found in paragraph XVII
clause (6) of the Sixth Schedule referred to ’proper
addition on account of supervision’ which left a discretion
regarding computation of the amount of supervision and the
said provision did not contain phraseology like ’cost of
supervision actually incurred’ as found in the aforesaid
Explanation to Section 7-A(2). It was, therefore, rightly
contended that concept of capitalization of the cost of
supervision for computing the original cost of the asset for
the purpose of paragraph of the Sixth Schedule had nothing
to do with the cost of supervision actually incurred which
had to be considered as an addition to the book value of the
acquired fixed assets for computing compensation under
Section 7-A sub-section (2).
Learned senior counsel Shri Sen for the respondent
vehemently submitted that the cost of supervision mentioned
in the Explanation to Section 7-A (2) has necessarily a
linkage with the Sixth Schedule and Section 57 of the Supply
Act as the Sixth Schedule becomes a part and parcel of the
very licence issued to the licensee and that is why the
Special Officer was justified in insisting that in absence
of capitalization of costs of supervision from year to year
by the appellant the claim was not maintainable for addition
of supervision charges. It is not possible to accept the
aforesaid contention of the learned senior counsel Shri Sen.
In our view the provisions of Sixth Schedule to the Supply
Act are general provisions which were enacted to lay down
guidelines for fixation of licensee’s charges to consumers
as provided in Section 57 of the Supply Act and also for
supplying guidelines to the Rating Committee under Section
57-A and for that purpose various paragraphs of Schedule 6
have been enacted and are made a part and parcel of the
terms and conditions of the licence. But so far as the
question of compensation is concerned, Section 7-A of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 19
Act represents a complete circle. When we turn to the
Explanation to Section 7-A(2) for computing the book value
of any fixed asset, it original cost has to comprise of two
ingredients the purchase paid by the licensee for the asset
and secondly 15 % addition to the said purchase price by way
of cost of supervision actually incurred on such an asset.
It is almost analogous to solatium to be paid for
acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act. No question
of capitalization of such supervision charges from year to
year is contemplated by the said Explanation. All that is
required to be shown by the licensee is whether it had
actually incurred the supervision costs in connection with
the staff engaged for supervision the concerned fixed assets
which were sought to be acquired form the licensee.
Consequently the first ground put forward by the Special
Officer for rejecting this claim cannot be sustained.
However, learned senior counsel for the respondents was
on a firmer ground when he submitted that even on the second
ground also the Special Officer was justified in rejecting
the claim. The special Officer had taken the view that there
was no clear evidence led by the appellant to sustain this
claim on merits. A mere look at the explanation (ii) to
section 7-A(2) shows that before claiming permissible
supervision costs not exceeding 15% of the purchase price of
the asset it has to be shown by the appellant that it had
actually incurred supervision costs by engaging staff for
supervising these fixed assets. In this connection learned
senior counsel for the appellant submitted that all the
relevant documents were in the custody of the Board which
could have been easily called for by the Special Officer for
his scrutiny. Even that apart the balance sheets which were
available on the record of the Special Officer showed that
the appellant had bifurcated various casts incurred on the
staff and one of the specified items was the cost of the
specified items was the cost of supervisory staff incurred
by the appellant during the year. A mere look at a specimen
of one such balance sheet shown to us indicated that a lump
sum figure was shown in the balance sheet as the amount
spent on supervisory staff. It is difficult to appreciate
how this lump sum amount could be treated as the cost of
supervision actually incurred by the appellant by way of
meeting the wages of the staff engaged for supervising the
concerned fixed assets which were subject-matter of
acquisition. It is easy to visualise that supervisory staff
may be engaged by the licensee not only for supervising the
fixed assets but also the office staff. Even that apart
there would be a watchman kept for supervising not only the
factory premises consisting of the relevant fixed assets but
also for supervising the cash room, compound and other
properties of the licensee. Unless clear evidence was
available on record pointing to the actual amount of cost
incurred by the licensee form year to year for meeting the
wage bill of supervisory staff which was entrusted with the
sole duty of supervising over the concerned fixed assets
which ultimately vested in the State and Electricity Board,
it could not be said that the appellant had made out a case
for grant of costs of supervision actually incurred by it in
maintaining these fixed assets and that it had satisfied the
requirements of the Explanation (ii) to Section 7-A(2).
Therefore the second ground on which the Special Officer
rejected the claim cannot be found fault with. Consequently
the first claim for additional compensation is found to be
devoid of any substance and is, therefore, rejected.
That takes us to the consideration of claim No.2.
Claim No.2
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 19
So far as this claim is concerned that appellant
contended that as per Section 7-A(i) the book value of all
completed works in beneficial use pertaining to the
undertaking and taken over by the State Government or local
authority, as the case may be, had to be computed but that
computation must exclude the words constructed at the cost
of the works paid for by the consumers. Thus the works for
which payment emanated from the consumers were not to be
taken into consideration while computing the book value of
the completed works which were taken over from the licensee
by the acquiring authority. Having computed the same, the
question of deduction from the said computation would fall
for consideration as per Section 7-A(2)(i) which provided
that from this total amount of book value of the assets so
computed depreciation calculated in accordance with the
Sixth and Seventh Schedules to the Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948 had to be deducted. That would necessarily mean
depreciation on the computed book value of the acquired
assets which have entered the computation of the book value
as per the first part of Section 7-A(2)(i). What the
Special Officer has done is that while computing the
depreciation on fixed assets for deducting it from the book
value of all completed works as per Section 7A(2)(i) the
depreciation claimed by the assessee on works paid for by
the consumers has also been deducted. That this is contrary
to the express language of Section 7-(2)(i). On the other
hand learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted
that when the legislature has clearly provided for deduction
of depreciation from the book value of all completed works
as per the Sixth Schedule read with the Seventh Schedule as
applicable in 1975 when the appellant’s undertaking was
acquired would also be relevant. The entire paragraph XII of
the Sixth Schedule along with the proviso had to be kept in
view and was rightly kept in view.
In order to appreciate the rival contentions on this
claim it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of
the Sixth Schedule that applied in 1975 when the appellant’s
undertaking was acquired with effect from 1st December 1975.
The relevant provisions for depreciation are found in
paragraphs VI to XII of the Sixth Schedule as applicable at
the relevant time.
They read as under:
"VI. (i) There shall be allowed in
each year in respect of
depreciation of fixed assets
employed in the business of
electricity supply such an amount
as would, if set aside annually
throughout the prescribed period
and accumulated at compound
interest at 4 per centum per annum,
produce by the end of the
prescribed period an amount equal
to 90 per cent of the original cast
of the asset after taking into
account the sums already written
off or set aside in the books of
the undertaking. Annual interest on
the accumulated balance will be
allowed as an expense from revenue
as well as the annual incremental
deposit:
Provided that, within 3 months from
the date upon which these
principles are enacted, a licensee
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 19
may elect to adopt the straight
line method of depreciation
accounting in lieu of the compound
interest method above prescribed.
Straight-line method of
depreciation accounting means the
method whereby an allowance is made
in each year in respect of
depreciation of fixed assets
employed in the business of such an
amount as is arrived at by dividing
ninety percent of the original cost
of the asset by the prescribed
method in respect of such asset.’
(2) The year in which any asset
becomes available for use in the
business and the relative cost
thereof shall, in the absence of
satisfactory record, be determined
by the State Government. All sums
credited to depreciation account
shall be invested only in the
business of electricity supply of
the undertaking or where it is not
practicable to so invest them in
investments approved by the State
Government.
(3) Any sums invested in
investments approved by the State
Government under sub-paragraph (2)
shall, as soon as practicable, be
utilized in the business of
electricity supply of the
undertaking and if such sums are
not so utilized they shall not form
part of the capital base under
clause (d) of sub-paragraph (1) of
paragraph XVII.
VII. (1) Where any fixed asset
ceases to be available for use
through obsolescence, inadequacy,
superfluity or for any other
reason, it shall be described in
the books of the licensee as no
longer in use and no further
depreciation in respect thereof
shall be allowed as a charge
against revenue.
(2) The written down cost of such
fixed asset shall be charged
against the Contingencies Reserve :
Provided that where the
accumulations in the Contingencies
Reserve are not sufficient to
permit the charging of the entire
written down cost of the asset, the
excess amount may, be included in
the capital base for the purpose of
clause (a) of sub-paragraph (1) of
paragraph XVII.
(3) The amount for which any such
fixed asset is sold or the amount
of its scrap value when actually
realised shall be credited to the
Contingencies Reserve.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 19
VIII. When any asset has been
written down in the books of the
undertaking to 10 percent, or less
of its original cost, no further
depreciation shall be allowed in
respect of that asset.
IX. When any fixed asset is sold
for an amount exceeding its written
down cost the excess after
deducting all taxes payable thereon
shall be credited to the
Contingencies Reserve.
X. Except with the previous consent
of the State Government, no sums
shall be carried forward to a
reserve and no dividends in excess
of 3 percent shall be paid on share
capital and no other distribution
of profits shall be made to the
shareholders in respect of any year
of account so long as any of the
following sums remain to be written
off in the books of the
undertaking, namely:-
(i) normal depreciation due for
that year of account calculated in
accordance with the provisions of
paragraph VI;
(ii) equated instalment in respect
of arrears of depreciation,
computed in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph XI, for
that year of account;
(iii) arrears, if any, in respect
of normal depreciation referred to
in clause (i), accumulated after
the date of application of the
provisions of the Sixth Schedule to
the licensee;
(iv) arrears, if any, in respect of
equated instalments
referred to in clause (ii).
XI. Arrears of depreciation
calculated in accordance with
paragraph VI may be written off by
equated payments over the remainder
of the prescribed period and the
amount so set aside in the books of
the undertaking may be taken into
account in any year as a special
appropriation for purposes of
assessing the clear profit.
XII. Where contributions are made
by consumers towards the cost of
construction of service lines
constructed after the date on which
this Act comes into force only the
net cost of such service lines
after deducting such contributions
shall be included in the cost of
fixed assets for the purposes of
arriving at the capital base :
Provided that for the purposes of
depreciation under paragraph VI,
the total original cost of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 19
construction of the service lines
shall be taken into account."
It is, of course, true that as mentioned in paragraph
XII of the Sixth Schedules while considering the question of
total capital base which includes the assets consisting of
service lines for installation of which contributions are
made by consumer towards the construction of such service
lines, the net cost of such service lines after deducting
such contributions has to be included in the costs of such
fixed assets. It i also true that, however, for computing
the depreciation as per paragraph VI on such assets, wherein
consumers have contributed towards their acquisition, the
total original cost of construction of the service lines had
to be taken into account. The Special Officer has applied
paragraph XII whole had while deducting the depreciation
from the book value of all completed works which are
acquired from the licensee as per Section 7-A(2) (i). In our
view the said approach of the Special Officer is ex facie
unjustified. The reasons are obvious. Paragraph XII of the
Sixth Schedule to the Supply Act deals with a special type
of asset, namely, service lines which are installed by the
licensee wherein the consumers have contributed towards the
cost of construction of such service lines. For this type of
assets, in computing the capital base of the licensee, the
contribution by the consumers has to be excluded but for
computing depreciation under paragraph VI for such assets,
namely, the service lines, the total original cost of
construction of service lines has to be taken into account
which may include the cost of construction of service lines
incurred by the licensee as well as the other part of the
component of the cost of construction of service lines which
has come from the pockets of the consumers. But entire
paragraph XII deals with only one type of assets, namely,
service lines construction cost of which is wholly or
partially borne by the consumers. Paragraph VI of Schedule
VI, however, is general in nature and covers all types of
fixed assets and the method of computation of depreciation
on these fixed assets. It is axiomatic that fixed assets
employed in the business of electricity supply may consist
of those assets which are wholly acquired at the cost of the
licensee and may also include assets like service lines
which may partly be acquired and installed at the cost of
the licensee and partly out of contribution of the consumers
who would be interested in getting electrical supply at
their own premises and for that purpose they may be willing
and may be made to pay contribution towards extension of
service lines to their premises. Therefore, reference to
service lines in paragraph XII of Schedule VI is with a view
to finding out as to how depreciation has to be computed for
such a special type of asset, namely service lines wherein
consumers have also contributed towards their installation.
Consequently on a conjoint reading of paragraph VI and
paragraph XII of Sixth Schedule the depreciation on such
service lines installed by drawing upon the contributions
from the consumers is required to include the total original
cost of construction of such service lines and that would
necessarily include the component of the amount of cost
contributed by the consumers. However that has nothing to do
with the computation of depreciation on the assets which are
acquired by the acquiring authority under Section 6-A read
with Section 7-A(2)(i). It is now well settled that service
lines whose installation had been paid for by the consumers
are not to be compensated for and they vest in the acquiring
authority under Section 6-A read with Section 7-A free of
cost of payment of compensation to the licensee. The logic
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 19
underlying this settled legal position is that as the
licensee had not spent from his pocket for installing such
an asset, he was not required to be compensated for that
part of the asset which was paid for by consumers. A mere
look at Section 7-A(2)(i) shows that the gross amount
payable to such licensee for acquiring his assets amongst
others has to consist of an amount of the book value of all
completed works in the beneficial use pertaining to the
undertaking. While computing such book value of acquired
assets the works paid for by the consumers have to be
ignored and omitted from consideration. Therefore, the
amount of book value computed as per Section 7-A(2)(i) will
consist of only those works which are for beneficial use of
the undertaking which was installed and acquired by the
licensee at its own cost. Having computed this amount the
next question survives about deducting the depreciation on
such acquired assets. That would naturally imply deduction
of depreciation on such assets from the amount so computed
being the book value of the completed works installed and
acquired at the cost of the licensee. If these are the
assets whose book value has to be computed as per Section 7-
A(2)(i) the question of deduction from that amount would
necessarily imply deduction of depreciation on these very
assets. In other words the field is clearly earmarked both
for computation of the book value of the concerned assets as
also fro deduction of depreciation on such assets as
enjoined by the second part of Section 7-A(2)(i) itself. It
is axiomatic that before any depreciation is deducted from
the computed book value of an asset it should be for the
same asset whose book value has been ascertained and from
that value depreciation is to be deducted. It cannot be that
for computing the book value of licensee’s assets only self-
financed assets are to be taken into consideration and not
the works paid for by the consumers but while deducting from
this very amount of book value the depreciation is to be
deducted qua not only the assets whose book value is
computed but also qua the assets belonging to somebody else
like the consumers who have paid for the works. This would
on the face of it be very anomalous and unfair. It is also
pertinent to note that from the book value of the assets
which were financed by the licensee as computed as per
Section 7-A(2)(i) when a question arises about deducting the
depreciation, only the calculation of such depreciation on
the concerned asset is to be done in accordance with Sixth
Schedule because the words advisedly used by the Legislature
in Section 7-A(2)(i) in this connection are less
depreciation calculated in accordance with the Sixth
Schedule read with the Seventh Schedule. Therefore, only the
method of calculation of depreciation has to be applied by
way of reference to the Sixth Schedule. But the type of
asset for which depreciation has to be computed is not to be
gathered from the Sixth Schedule. It has to be gathered from
the very first part of Section 7-A(2)(i), namely, only self-
financed fixed assets whose book value is to be computed by
the Special Officer for payment to the licensee and from
that amount depreciation is to be deducted which would
necessarily mean depreciation on the very same asset which
has undergone the book valuation as per Section 7-A(2)(i).
If for calculating the book value of such assets the works
paid for by the consumers are to be excluded they
necessarily cannot be included for the purpose of
ascertaining deductible depreciation on such assets.
Consequently reference to paragraph XII Schedule VI would be
totally out of picture and redundant so far as the scheme of
Section 7-A sub-section (2)(i) is concerned. It may be that
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 19
the licensee might have obtained benefit of such
depreciation on consumer paid assets under Income Tax Act or
any other statutory provision but that is totally irrelevant
for deciding the question whether the deduction of
depreciation on the concerned assets whose book value is to
be computed as per Section 7-A(2)(i), paragraph XII of Sixth
Schedule could at all be pressed in service. It is,
therefore, not possible to agree with the submission of
learned senior counsel for the respondents and also the
learned counsel who appeared for the State of U.P. that for
the purpose of deducting the depreciation the assets which
are not included in computing the book value as per Section
7-A(2)(i), namely, the consumer-financed assets also could
be taken into consideration. In our view the Special Officer
was patently in error when he computed the depreciation on
the assets under Section 7-A(2)(i) by adding the amount of
depreciation on the service lines which were paid for by the
consumers. Reference to paragraph XII of Sixth Schedule in
this connection was wrongly made and the said paragraph was
wrongly pressed in service by the Special Officer. In this
connection it has also to be kept in view that the amount of
Rs.2,48,718/- being the depreciation amount on the works
constructed at the cost of consumers was not disputed by the
Board and the only contention of the Board before Special
Officer was that as per paragraph XII of Sixth Schedule the
said amount of depreciation was also to be deducted from the
book value of the assets acquired by the Board under Section
6-A read with Section 7-A. As the reliance placed on
paragraph XII of Sixth Schedule by the Special Officer is
found by us to be unjustified and as the amount of
depreciation deducted from the book value on this score is
undisputedly Rs.2,48,718,81 this amount of depreciation
deducted from the book value on this score is undisputedly
Rs.2,48,718.81 this amount must be treated to have been
wrongly deducted from the book value by way of depreciation
on consumer-financed assets, namely, service lines.
Before parting with the discussion on this claim we may
mention one impermissible exercise undertaken by the Special
Officer. At page 40 of the impugned Award it has been
mentioned that the Special Officer having found that as the
matter was of considerable judicial importance it was
considered prudent to take legal advice from Legal
Remembrance to U.P. Government and as the legal Remembrance
opined that clauses XI and XII of the Sixth Schedule to the
Electricity (Supply) Act would seem to provide an answer to
the question raised they had to be kept in view and that
Special Officer agreed with the said opinion of the Legal
Remembrance. It has to be kept in view that the Special
Officer exercising quasi-judicial functions under Section 7-
A of the Act who has the same powers as are vested in a
Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when
trying a suit, in respect of the matters enumerated in
Section 7-A sub-section 7(7)(b) could not have called for
such an opinion of Legal Remembrance and even though Section
7-A clause (7)(a) permits the Special Officer to have the
assistance of such officers and staff of the State
Government or the State Electricity Board or the licensee as
he may deem fit in assessing the net amount payable, it had
to be done in presence of the licensee and an opportunity
should have been given to the licensee to meet such an
opinion. As that has not been done in the present case such
an exercise on the part of the Special Officer and the
reliance placed by him on the opinion of the Legal
Remembrance obtained behind the back of the licensee must be
treated to be totally an incompetent and uncalled for
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 19
exercise and such an opinion should have been completely
ignored by the Special Officer. The second claim has,
therefore, got to be accepted. We accordingly hold that the
Special Officer has wrongly deducted from the book value of
the assets as computed under Section 7-A(2)(i) an amount of
Rs.2.48,718.81 and that amount is required to be added back
to the book value of the assets which is to be made payable
to the appellant-licensee by way of additional compensation.
Claim No.3
So far as this claim is concerned, as noted earlier,
the appellant ultimately confined the claim on this head to
Rs.60,603,78. This claim refers to the electricity dues on
the electricity supplied by the Board to the licensee during
the period prior to the appointed day. The fuel escalation
clause binding on the licensee entitled the Board to claim
this amount. These amounts pertain to the period from
October 1972 to November 1975. It is true that in connection
with these amounts of claim various bills were issued by the
Electricity Board to the appellant. At page 69 of the
impugned Award the entire table has been extracted by the
Special Officer. The said table shows that at serial nos. 1
to 8 different bills were issued by the Board to the
appellant between 25th July 1974 and 12th November 1975. But
there are last two bills dated 24th March 1976 and 2nd
September 1976 which were obviously issued after the
appointed day. It was, therefore, contended by the learned
senior counsel for the appellant that for at least the
amounts covered by these two bills which consisted of Rs.
51,286,70 and 9,317.08 respectively totalling to
Rs.60,603,78 the appellant could not have been made
responsible as the bills were issued after the take-over.
Learned senior counsel for the respondent-Board on the other
hand submitted that these two bills referred to the period
prior to the take-over, namely, bill dated 24.3.1976 was for
a period form October 1974 to November 1975 and bill dated
2.9.1976 was for October and November 1975. In this
connection he invited our attention to Section 7-A(5)(b)
which in terms provided that from the amount of compensation
payable to the licensee the Special Officer was entitled to
deduct the amount due to the State Electricity Board which
was predecessor of the undertaking for energy supplied by
the Board to the licensee before the vesting date. That as
this energy was admittedly supplied to the licensee by the
Board which was the predecessor of this undertaking before
the vesting date, that is, 1.12.1975 the predecessor Board
was entitled to deduct the said sum from the amount payable
to the licensee for such acquisition and purchase as
computed under Section 7-A(1) read with sub section (2). In
our view the aforesaid contention of learned senior counsel
for the respondent is well sustained on the statutory scheme
of Section 7-A(5)(b). The Special Officer was certainly
entitled to deduct from the amount payable to the licensee
for the acquisition of his undertaking the amount due to the
Board by way of supply of energy to the licensee. Even
though the bill might have been issued after the acquisition
and the appointed day as the bills referred to the period
prior to the appointed day in connection with the
electricity admittedly supplied by the Board to the
licensee, the licensee was statutorily bound to reimburse
the Board to the extent of these bills and that amount could
be legitimately deducted from the computed amount of
compensation by the Special Officer as enjoined by Section
7-A sub-section (5)(b). Consequently learned senior counsel
for the appellant was not justified in submitting that in
such a case the Board should have been asked to file a
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 19
separate suit and as such suit was not filed the Board could
not have deducted this amount from the amount payable to the
licensee under Section 7-A(2)(i). This claim, therefore, is
found to have been rightly refused by the Special Officer
and accordingly it stands rejected. That takes us to the
consideration of the last claim.
Claim No.4
As noted earlier this claim now is confined to
Rs.76,423/-. It consists of deduction of Rs.38,212/- by way
of Tariffs & Dividends Control Reserve. This deduction is
effected by the Special Officer as per Section 7-A sub-
section (5)(h). A mere look at the said provision shows that
from the amount of compensation payable to the purchaser to
Special Officer can deduct the amounts remaining in Tariffs
and Dividends Control Reserve. Contingencies Reserve and the
Development Reserve, insofar as such amounts have not been
paid over by the licensee to the purchaser. It is obvious
that these are trust amounts in the hands of the licensee
which are ultimately to be paid over to the consumers and at
the time of acquisition of its undertaking the said Reserves
have to be handed over to the purchaser, namely, the Board.
But what is to be handed over to the Board by the licensee
is the amount remaining in the Tariffs and Dividends Control
Reserve. So far as the figures of the outstanding amounts in
these reserves were concerned they were supplied by the
licensee to the Special Officer. Accordingly an amount of
Rs.8,615/- stood credited to the Tariffs and Dividends
Control Reserve while an amount of Rs.54,560/- stood in the
Consumer Rebate Reserve which was also part and parcel of
Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve. However by a very
curious piece of reasoning the Special Officer artificially
inflated the balances of these reserves and held that
Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve should be treated to
be showing the balance of Rs.46,826/- instead of Rs.8,615/-
while the Consumer Rebate Reserve balance should be inflated
to Rs.97,727/- instead of Rs.54,560/-. The process by which
this inflation was done for the purpose of deduction under
Section 7-A(5)(h) also makes an interesting reading. The
Special Officer agreed with the appellant that for the
purpose of computing depreciation of assets financed by the
appellant which had to be deducted from the book value of
these assets as per Section 7-A(2)(i) extra depreciation
charged by the licensee on these assets and which was
effectively got considered by the Income Tax authorities
could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of
Section 7-A(2)(i) as such excess depreciation was not
contemplated or covered by the Sixth or the Seventh
Schedule. Having accepted this contention, the Special
Officer reduced the figure of deductible depreciation on
these self-financed assets under Section 7-A(2)(i) and to
that extent the book value of the self-financed assets got
inflated and that benefit became available to the appellant.
But the Special Officer thereafter proceeded to hold that
because the appellant had obtained this excess depreciation
from the Income Tax authorities that would have got added to
its revenue in the relevant years and this additional
benefit would have got added to its reserves and, therefore,
the amount of excess depreciation which was not deducted
from the book value of the acquired assets as per Section 7-
A(2)(i) had to be added back to the concerned Tariffs and
Dividends Control Reserve and Consumer Rebate Reserve and
that is how he ploughed back these extra depreciation
amounts which could not be deducted under Section 7-A(5)(h).
In our view on the clear language of Section 7-A(5)(h) such
an exercise is not contemplated. While deducting the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 19
depreciation from the book value of the concerned assets as
per Section 7-(2)(i) the amount of extra depreciation which
is de hors the permissible scheme of the Sixth Schedule read
with Seventh Schedule of the Supply Act has to be ignored.
Once that is done Section 7-A(2)(i) gets completely
exhausted and complied with. Upto that stage the Special
Officer was with the appellant, but then he thought that
this extra benefit of additional depreciation which was
already earned by the appellant from the Income Tax
Department must be deducted from the purchase price as per
Section 7-A(5)(h) by artificially inflating the balance of
the concerned Reserves. So far as this exercise, undertaken
by the Special Officer, is concerned it is not permissible
on the express language of Section 7-A(5)(h). The said
provision clearly indicates that whatever amounts have
remained in the concerned Reserve Accounts with the licensee
on the date of acquisition have to be paid over to the
purchaser. Thus actual balances of these Reserves as
reflected from the books of accounts of the licensee, had to
be handed over to the Board. The said provision nowhere
permits an exercise of artificially inflating the balances
of these Reserves which are not reflected by the books of
accounts of the licensee, on the supposition that these
extra depreciations which the licensee must have earned from
year to year on these assets and which is not covered by the
Sixth or Seventh Schedule of the Supply Act must have
swelled the revenues of the licensee under Income Tax Act
and, therefore, must necessarily have gone to the concerned
Reserve Accounts. Before that stage is reached it is just
possible that the license might have utilized the extra
depreciation earned according to the Income Tax Act
provisions for swelling its own profits while might not have
been diverted to Reserves but might have been utilized for
other purposes including giving dividends to its
shareholders or in purchasing other assets which would
naturally get accounted for under Section 7-A(2)(i) itself.
There are number of contingencies contemplated in the
accounting practices followed by the licensee in connection
with its business activities which might have utilized in
diverse ways extra depreciation amounts earned by the
licensee from Income Tax authorities. Therefore, it was not
permissible for the Special Officer to conclude that
necessarily these extra depreciations earned by the licensee
must have been utilized for swelling the balances of the
concerned Reserves and, therefore, the actual balances did
not reflect the real balances. It is also to be kept in view
that balances in these concerned Reserves would rise over
number of years during which the licensee carries on its
business and they are not necessarily confined to only one
year or the last year when the acquisition takes place. They
are a product of working of the concern over years and also
get reflected by the accounting practices and the business
practices resorted to and adopted by the licensee over
years. Consequently there was no material with the Special
Officer to come to a definite conclusion that the extra
depreciations earned by the licensee over years from the
Income Tax Department must have got channelised into these
Reserves and, therefore, the apparent balances in these
Reserves were not the real balances and had to be inflated
accordingly with a view to seeing that what goes out from
the deductible depreciation under Section 7-A(2)(i) must
necessarily get deducted under Section 7-A(5)(h). In our
view, therefore, the Special Officer was clearly in error in
deducting the total amount of Rs. 76,423/- consisting of the
artificially inflated balances in the aforesaid two Reserves
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 19
from the amount of compensation payable to the licensee as
per Section 7-A(5)(h). The fourth claim, therefore, is found
to be well sustained and must be accepted by holding that
the appellant was entitled to an additional compensation of
Rs.76,423/- on this count.
In view of the aforesaid discussion on the main claims
for additional compensation as canvassed before us it must
be held that the appellant would be entitled to additional
compensation on Claim no.2 amounting to Rs.2,48,718/- and
Claim No.4 amounting to Rs.76,423/-. The total of these two
figures works out to Rs.3,25,141/-. We are informed by the
learned senior counsel for the appellant that even the
awarded amount has still not been paid by the respondents.
To recapitulate the award was passed as early as on 31st
March 1980. As per Section 6-A sub-section (3)(h) of the
Act, the Electricity Board is enjoined to pay the licensee
an amount determined in accordance with the provisions of
Section 7-A and as per the proviso to that Section the
licensee shall in addition to the said amount, be entitled
to interest thereon at the Reserve Bank rate ruling at the
appointed day plus one per centum for the period from the
appointed day to the date of payment of the said amount. As
even the awarded amount as per the Award of 31st March 1980
is still not paid to the appellant the Board has to be
directed to pay up to the appellant the amount as awarded by
the Special Officer by his Award with interest thereon at
the relevant Reserve Bank rate ruling at the appointed day,
that is, 1.12.1975 plus one percent for the period from the
date of award to the date of actual payment to the
appellant--licensee. In addition thereto the additional
amount awarded by our present order, namely, Rs.3,25,141/-
will also have to be paid by the respondent-Board to the
appellant-licensee with interest thereon at the Reserve Bank
rate also from the appointed date, that is, 1.12.1975 plus
one percent interest on the said amount for the period from
1.12.1975 till the date of actual payment of this additional
amount of Rs.3,25,141/-. All the aforesaid amounts with
interest as directed hereinabove shall be paid by the
respondent-Board to the appellant-licensee on or before 31st
March 1997. The demand for additional amount as reflected by
claims nos. 1 and 3 stand rejected. The appeal is
accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent. As cut of the
four claims for additional compensation as pressed for in
this appeal two are granted by us and two are rejected and
as the success is equally shared by both the sides there
will be no order as to costs
.