Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1152
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.4069 of 2024)
SHOBHIT KUMAR MITTAL …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ANOTHER …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of the order dated 27.02.2024 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.2676 of 2024 dismissing the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.09.24
19:13:40 IST
Reason:
application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
Page 1 of 14
preferred by the accused/appellant, Shobhit Kumar Mittal and
thereby refusing to quash the proceedings arising out of FIR
No.347 of 2023 dated 09.11.2023 registered at PS Civil Lines,
Meerut. The said FIR was filed by Smt. Jyoti Garg, the
complainant/respondent No.2, against her husband, Mohit Mittal;
her mother-in-law, Shashi Mittal and appellant No.1 herein who is
her brother-in-law under Sections 323 and 498A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”, for short) and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (“Dowry Act”, for short).
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the complainant/
respondent No.2 got married to Mohit Mittal, brother of the
accused/appellant herein on 01.05.2014. After a few months into
the marriage, on account of marital discord, the complainant/
respondent No.2 left her matrimonial home and started residing at
her parental home. Thereafter, both the parties initiated multiple
matrimonial proceedings against each other which are not really
germane to the facts of the present appeal.
4. On 09.11.2023, the complainant/respondent No.2 lodged FIR
No.347 of 2023 with Police Station Civil Lines, Meerut under
Page 2 of 14
Sections 323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Act against her husband, mother-in-law and the accused/
appellant herein.
5. On perusal of the FIR dated 09.11.2023, the allegations
contained in the same can be crystallized as hereunder:
i. The complainant/respondent No.2 got married to Mohit
Mittal and within ten days of marriage, she started facing
harassment for dowry.
ii. The appellant along with the husband and mother-in-law of
complainant/respondent No.2 got her to write a consent
letter which was signed by her uncle and four other relatives
after which she was allowed to live at her matrimonial house.
iii. On 10.12.2022, due to repeated harassment related to
dowry, a vein of the complainant/respondent No.2 in the
brain burst and consequently her right hand and right leg
got paralyzed due to which the complainant/respondent
No.2 had to undertake physiotherapy.
Page 3 of 14
6. Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the accused/
appellant, along with the mother-in-law and husband of the
complainant/respondent No.2, filed Writ Petition No.2676 of 2024
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court
of Allahabad praying for the quashing of FIR No.347 of 2023.
7. The Allahabad High Court, vide impugned order dated
27.02.2024 refused to quash the proceedings arising out of the said
FIR. It was observed by the High Court that although the prayer
made in the said Writ Petition was to quash the FIR, the
accused/appellant sought the relief of grant of protection under
Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”, for
short) only; and that on perusal of the said FIR, a prima facie case
of commission of a cognizable offence was made out.
8. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 27.02.2024, the
accused/appellant has preferred the present appeal praying for
quashing of FIR No.347 of 2023 dated 09.11.2023.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the accused/appellant and
learned counsel for the respondent-State as well as respondent-
complainant. We have perused the material on record.
Page 4 of 14
10. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the bar and the material on record.
11. In the instant case, the allegations in the FIR pertain to
Sections 323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Act.
12. Section 323 of the IPC deals with punishment for voluntarily
causing hurt.
13. Section 498A of the IPC deals with offences committed by the
husband or relatives of the husband subjecting cruelty towards the
wife.
14. An offence is punishable under Section 323 of IPC when a
person commits an act with an intention to cause or with
knowledge that the said act is likely to cause bodily pain, disease
or infirmity to another person. Such an act or omission is
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with
both.
Page 5 of 14
15. Similarly, an offence is punishable under Section 498A of the
IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty,
which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three
years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC
defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean
any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b) therein. The first limb
of clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states
that “cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as
is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of
clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that
cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental
or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation
to Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include
harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.
Page 6 of 14
16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with the penalty for
giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who gives, takes,
or abets the giving or taking of dowry shall face a punishment of
imprisonment for a minimum term of five years and a fine not less
than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever
is greater. Section 4 of the Dowry Act talks about the penalty for
demanding dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry
directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or
guardians of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees.
17. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts and
circumstances of the present case and after examining the FIR, the
High Court was right in refusing to quash the criminal proceedings
arising out of FIR No.347 of 2023 dated 09.11.2023 under Section
323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act, as
against the appellant herein.
Page 7 of 14
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by
complainant/respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than
claiming that the husband and his family along with the
accused/appellant herein mentally harassed her with a demand
for dowry, the complainant/respondent No.2 has not provided any
specific details or described any particular instance of harassment.
She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in
which the alleged harassment occurred or the details of the nature
of demand or its particulars. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and
precise allegations. Furthermore, the complainant/respondent
No.2 has failed to impress the Court as to how the alleged
harassment has any proximate relationship to the said injury and
nerve damage that she sustained, so as to punish her in-laws
under Section 323 IPC. There is no remote or proximate act or
omission attributed to the accused/appellant that implicates him
or assigns him any specific role in the said FIR for the offence of
hurt as defined under Section 319 IPC. Furthermore, merely
stating that the accused/appellant has mentally harassed the
complainant/respondent No.2 with respect to a demand for dowry
does not fulfill the ingredients of Section 498A of IPC specially in
Page 8 of 14
absence of any cogent material or evidence on record to
substantiate the said allegations. The term “cruelty” cannot be
established without specific instances. The tendency of invoking
the aforesaid provisions, without mentioning any specific detail,
weakens the case of the prosecution and casts serious aspersions
on the probability of the version of the complainant. Therefore, this
Court cannot ignore the missing specifics in the FIR which is the
basic premise for invoking the criminal machinery of the State. In
such cases involving allegations of cruelty and harassment, there
would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be
required to be spelt out by the complainant against perpetrators in
specific terms to initiate criminal proceedings against them.
Therefore, mere general allegations of harassment without pointing
out the specific details would not be sufficient to continue criminal
proceedings against any person.
19. Courts have to be careful and cautious in dealing with
complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration
while dealing with matrimonial disputes where the allegations have
Page 9 of 14
to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection in order to
prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law.
20. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment of
this Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Suppl (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to
paragraph 102 therein, wherein this Court observed as hereunder:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases
by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except
Page 10 of 14
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
21. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial
tests, we find that none of the offences alleged against the accused/
appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations
Page 11 of 14
of cruelty, mental harassment and voluntarily causing hurt against
the accused/appellant herein are vague and general in nature and
therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal
squarely applies to the facts of this case. It is neither expedient nor
in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution
emanating from the FIR to continue.
22. Furthermore, at this juncture, we find it appropriate to quote
the observations of this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs.
State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735 wherein it was observed:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in
a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute,
without specific allegations indicating their active
involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-
recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there
is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the
husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a
matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping
accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or
particularised allegations cannot form the basis for
criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in
such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the
legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of
innocent family members. We say so for the reason that
while the complainant/respondent No.2 has made vague
and omnibus allegations against the accused/appellant
herein, she has failed to justify the same before this Court.
Such actions would create significant divisions and
distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary
strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts.
Page 12 of 14
xxx
30. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of
an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a
woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift
intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as
there have been a notable rise Page 22 of 26 in matrimonial
disputes across the country, accompanied by growing
discord and tension within the institution of marriage,
consequently, there has been a growing tendency to
misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for
unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his
family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations
during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to
the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for
use of arm-twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family.
Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the
IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek
compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife.
Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned
against prosecuting the husband and his family in the
absence of a clear prima facie case against them.
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman
who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been
contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should
remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint
or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the
intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not
encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a
counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage
sought by the first appellant-husband of the second
respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the
IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said
provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman
who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home
primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security in the form of dowry. However,
sometimes it is misused as in the present case.”
Page 13 of 14
23. In the aforementioned facts of the case and keeping the
judicial dicta rendered by this Court in mind, we find that the
impugned order dated 27.02.2024 of the High Court ought to be
set aside and is set aside. Consequently, FIR No.347 of 2023 dated
09.11.2023 lodged at Police Station Civil Lines, Meerut and all
consequent proceedings initiated pursuant thereto stand quashed,
only qua the accused/appellant herein.
24. It is needless to observe that the observations made in the
present appeal shall not come in the way of any other proceedings
pending between the parties which shall be decided on their own
merits and in accordance with law.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 24, 2025.
Page 14 of 14
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.4069 of 2024)
SHOBHIT KUMAR MITTAL …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ANOTHER …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of the order dated 27.02.2024 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.2676 of 2024 dismissing the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.09.24
19:13:40 IST
Reason:
application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
Page 1 of 14
preferred by the accused/appellant, Shobhit Kumar Mittal and
thereby refusing to quash the proceedings arising out of FIR
No.347 of 2023 dated 09.11.2023 registered at PS Civil Lines,
Meerut. The said FIR was filed by Smt. Jyoti Garg, the
complainant/respondent No.2, against her husband, Mohit Mittal;
her mother-in-law, Shashi Mittal and appellant No.1 herein who is
her brother-in-law under Sections 323 and 498A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”, for short) and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (“Dowry Act”, for short).
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the complainant/
respondent No.2 got married to Mohit Mittal, brother of the
accused/appellant herein on 01.05.2014. After a few months into
the marriage, on account of marital discord, the complainant/
respondent No.2 left her matrimonial home and started residing at
her parental home. Thereafter, both the parties initiated multiple
matrimonial proceedings against each other which are not really
germane to the facts of the present appeal.
4. On 09.11.2023, the complainant/respondent No.2 lodged FIR
No.347 of 2023 with Police Station Civil Lines, Meerut under
Page 2 of 14
Sections 323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Act against her husband, mother-in-law and the accused/
appellant herein.
5. On perusal of the FIR dated 09.11.2023, the allegations
contained in the same can be crystallized as hereunder:
i. The complainant/respondent No.2 got married to Mohit
Mittal and within ten days of marriage, she started facing
harassment for dowry.
ii. The appellant along with the husband and mother-in-law of
complainant/respondent No.2 got her to write a consent
letter which was signed by her uncle and four other relatives
after which she was allowed to live at her matrimonial house.
iii. On 10.12.2022, due to repeated harassment related to
dowry, a vein of the complainant/respondent No.2 in the
brain burst and consequently her right hand and right leg
got paralyzed due to which the complainant/respondent
No.2 had to undertake physiotherapy.
Page 3 of 14
6. Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the accused/
appellant, along with the mother-in-law and husband of the
complainant/respondent No.2, filed Writ Petition No.2676 of 2024
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court
of Allahabad praying for the quashing of FIR No.347 of 2023.
7. The Allahabad High Court, vide impugned order dated
27.02.2024 refused to quash the proceedings arising out of the said
FIR. It was observed by the High Court that although the prayer
made in the said Writ Petition was to quash the FIR, the
accused/appellant sought the relief of grant of protection under
Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”, for
short) only; and that on perusal of the said FIR, a prima facie case
of commission of a cognizable offence was made out.
8. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 27.02.2024, the
accused/appellant has preferred the present appeal praying for
quashing of FIR No.347 of 2023 dated 09.11.2023.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the accused/appellant and
learned counsel for the respondent-State as well as respondent-
complainant. We have perused the material on record.
Page 4 of 14
10. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the bar and the material on record.
11. In the instant case, the allegations in the FIR pertain to
Sections 323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Act.
12. Section 323 of the IPC deals with punishment for voluntarily
causing hurt.
13. Section 498A of the IPC deals with offences committed by the
husband or relatives of the husband subjecting cruelty towards the
wife.
14. An offence is punishable under Section 323 of IPC when a
person commits an act with an intention to cause or with
knowledge that the said act is likely to cause bodily pain, disease
or infirmity to another person. Such an act or omission is
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with
both.
Page 5 of 14
15. Similarly, an offence is punishable under Section 498A of the
IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty,
which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three
years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC
defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean
any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b) therein. The first limb
of clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states
that “cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as
is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of
clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that
cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental
or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation
to Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include
harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.
Page 6 of 14
16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with the penalty for
giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who gives, takes,
or abets the giving or taking of dowry shall face a punishment of
imprisonment for a minimum term of five years and a fine not less
than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever
is greater. Section 4 of the Dowry Act talks about the penalty for
demanding dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry
directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or
guardians of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees.
17. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts and
circumstances of the present case and after examining the FIR, the
High Court was right in refusing to quash the criminal proceedings
arising out of FIR No.347 of 2023 dated 09.11.2023 under Section
323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act, as
against the appellant herein.
Page 7 of 14
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by
complainant/respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than
claiming that the husband and his family along with the
accused/appellant herein mentally harassed her with a demand
for dowry, the complainant/respondent No.2 has not provided any
specific details or described any particular instance of harassment.
She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in
which the alleged harassment occurred or the details of the nature
of demand or its particulars. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and
precise allegations. Furthermore, the complainant/respondent
No.2 has failed to impress the Court as to how the alleged
harassment has any proximate relationship to the said injury and
nerve damage that she sustained, so as to punish her in-laws
under Section 323 IPC. There is no remote or proximate act or
omission attributed to the accused/appellant that implicates him
or assigns him any specific role in the said FIR for the offence of
hurt as defined under Section 319 IPC. Furthermore, merely
stating that the accused/appellant has mentally harassed the
complainant/respondent No.2 with respect to a demand for dowry
does not fulfill the ingredients of Section 498A of IPC specially in
Page 8 of 14
absence of any cogent material or evidence on record to
substantiate the said allegations. The term “cruelty” cannot be
established without specific instances. The tendency of invoking
the aforesaid provisions, without mentioning any specific detail,
weakens the case of the prosecution and casts serious aspersions
on the probability of the version of the complainant. Therefore, this
Court cannot ignore the missing specifics in the FIR which is the
basic premise for invoking the criminal machinery of the State. In
such cases involving allegations of cruelty and harassment, there
would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be
required to be spelt out by the complainant against perpetrators in
specific terms to initiate criminal proceedings against them.
Therefore, mere general allegations of harassment without pointing
out the specific details would not be sufficient to continue criminal
proceedings against any person.
19. Courts have to be careful and cautious in dealing with
complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration
while dealing with matrimonial disputes where the allegations have
Page 9 of 14
to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection in order to
prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law.
20. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment of
this Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Suppl (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to
paragraph 102 therein, wherein this Court observed as hereunder:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases
by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except
Page 10 of 14
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
21. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial
tests, we find that none of the offences alleged against the accused/
appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations
Page 11 of 14
of cruelty, mental harassment and voluntarily causing hurt against
the accused/appellant herein are vague and general in nature and
therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal
squarely applies to the facts of this case. It is neither expedient nor
in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution
emanating from the FIR to continue.
22. Furthermore, at this juncture, we find it appropriate to quote
the observations of this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs.
State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735 wherein it was observed:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in
a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute,
without specific allegations indicating their active
involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-
recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there
is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the
husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a
matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping
accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or
particularised allegations cannot form the basis for
criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in
such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the
legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of
innocent family members. We say so for the reason that
while the complainant/respondent No.2 has made vague
and omnibus allegations against the accused/appellant
herein, she has failed to justify the same before this Court.
Such actions would create significant divisions and
distrust among people, while also placing an unnecessary
strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts.
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xxx
30. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of
an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a
woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift
intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as
there have been a notable rise Page 22 of 26 in matrimonial
disputes across the country, accompanied by growing
discord and tension within the institution of marriage,
consequently, there has been a growing tendency to
misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for
unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his
family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations
during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to
the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for
use of arm-twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family.
Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the
IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek
compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife.
Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned
against prosecuting the husband and his family in the
absence of a clear prima facie case against them.
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman
who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been
contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should
remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint
or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the
intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not
encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a
counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage
sought by the first appellant-husband of the second
respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the
IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said
provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman
who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home
primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security in the form of dowry. However,
sometimes it is misused as in the present case.”
Page 13 of 14
23. In the aforementioned facts of the case and keeping the
judicial dicta rendered by this Court in mind, we find that the
impugned order dated 27.02.2024 of the High Court ought to be
set aside and is set aside. Consequently, FIR No.347 of 2023 dated
09.11.2023 lodged at Police Station Civil Lines, Meerut and all
consequent proceedings initiated pursuant thereto stand quashed,
only qua the accused/appellant herein.
24. It is needless to observe that the observations made in the
present appeal shall not come in the way of any other proceedings
pending between the parties which shall be decided on their own
merits and in accordance with law.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 24, 2025.
Page 14 of 14