Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SMT. AMBEY DEVI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/1996
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
VENKATASWAMI K. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1513 JT 1996 (3) 674
1996 SCALE (3)121
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment
of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court made in Appeal
from Original Decree No. 220 and 221 of 1957 dated September
21, 1976. The only question that arises in this appeal is:
whether one of the co-sharers can claim enhancement of the
compensation without seeking reference under Section 18 of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the
‘Act’) in a reference at the instance of one of the co-
sharers.
The admitted facts are that 25 acres of land being a
portion of Plot No.400 of Khata No.92 in village Behea in
Shahbad District (renamed Bhojpur) was acquired under
Section 4(1) of the Act for public purpose. Publication of
the notification under Section 4(1) was made on September
14, 1957. In the enquiry under Section 11 made by the Land
Acquisition Officer the appellant had laid her claim for
1/4th share of the compensation along with other co-owners.
It is also found as a fact that in the award made by the
Collector, he apportioned the compensation into 1/4th share
to each of the co-owners and the compensation was received
by the respective parties, one of the co owners sought for
reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 which was
made. The Court had enhanced the compensation. Thereafter,
the appellant filed the appeal claiming enhancement of the
compensation in respect of her land on par with other co-
owners. That claim was rejected by the High Court holding
that the appellant had not made any application under
Section 18 after the award was made by the Collector on
January 6, 1958 ands therefore, she is not entitled to the
enhanced compensation. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that
under Section 53 of the Act, the procedure prescribed under
CPC is applicable to the proceedings of the Civil Court
unless they are inconsistent with any of the provisions
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contained in the Act. Since Order 1, Rule 10 CPC requires
impleadment of all necessary and proper parties, the
appellant being a necessary party to the proceedings, she is
entitled to the same compensation as was awarded to the
other claimants. We find no force in the contention. The
scheme of the Act is inconsistent with CPC regarding the
entitlement to claim compensation under the Act. The CPC
provides only the procedural format to adjudicate the
dispute. After the award was made under Section 11, the Land
Acquisition Officer was required to issue notice under
Section 12 to the parties. As contemplated under Section 30
of the Acts the appellant is entitled to receive the
compensation either under protest or without protest. When
the compensation is received under protest under subsection
(1) of Section 18, the application in writing has to be made
within the limitation prescribed under Section 18(2) to the
Land Acquisition Officer objecting to either extent of the
land, classification, value of the land or apportionment of
the compensation and upon receipt thereof reference to Court
would be made. Thereunder the applicant shall be required to
state the grounds on which he/she objects to the
compensation etc. Valid reference is a pre-condition for the
civil Court to adjudicate the objections raised in the
reference application. In this case, it is found by the High
Court that the appellant had not made any application under
Section 18(1). The jurisdiction of the civil Court to
determine higher compensation, as laid down under Section 23
of the Act, would arise only when a valid reference has been
made under Section 18 within the prescribed limitation. The
jurisdiction of the Court is founded on a valid reference
and then the civil Court gets jurisdiction to determine the
compensation on the basis of the objections raised by the
claimant.
We accept the finding of the High Court that the
appellant had not made any application under Section 18,
though the appellant has asserted that she did make an
application but no evidence has been placed before the High
Court or in this Court. Thus, it is difficult to accept that
such an application was in fact made before the Land
Acquisition Officer within the limitation prescribed under
Section 18(2) of the Act. Accordingly, we hold that the
appellant had not filed any application, as required under
Section 18(1) read with Section 18(2) of the Act. Section 53
does not apply to the facts of the case. The procedure
prescribed under Section 18 and 30 is inconsistent with
the procedure prescribed under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC.
Order 1, Rule 10 CPC would apply to implead a necessary
or proper party to effectuate complete adjudication of
all the disputes having arisen between all the
necessary or proper parties who may be bound by the
decision. That question does not arise since
inconsistent procedure has been prescribed under the
Act. As held earlier, making an application in writing
under sub-section (l) and within the limitation
prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 18 are
conditions precedent for the Land Acquisition Officer
to make a reference under Section 18; only on its
receipt, under Section, 20 civil Court gets jurisdiction
to issue notice and thereafter to conduct enquiry, as
contemplated under the Act. At that stage, the procedure of
trial etc., as contemplated under the CPC, would apply and
Section 53 of the Act would become applicable. It is an
admitted position that the co-owner filed an application and
had sought reference under Section 18 in respect of his
share only. So, it is, as a fact, claims for compensation in
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specie and was paid towards 1/4th share to all the
claimants. By no stretch of imagination, the application
under Section 18 (1) by one of the co-sharers would, be
treated as one made on behalf of all the co-sharers.
Accordingly, we hold that the appellant is not entitled to
lay any higher compensation pursuant to an award, made by
the reference Court under Section 26 at the instance of one
of the co-owners.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed but in the
circumstances without costs.