Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
JAGIIT SINGH & ANR.ETC
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/01/1995
BENCH:
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
BENCH:
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)
CITATION:
1995 AIR 705 1995 SCC (1) 745
JT 1995 (1) 445 1995 SCALE (1)131
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.:
S.L.P.(C) 11609 of 1994:
1. Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the writ petition
filed by the respondents, Jagjit Singh and Jaswant Singh.
The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are not
in dispute and may be stated. Indeed, they speak for
themselves.
3. An auction as held by the Chandigarh Administration on
September 29, 1975 wherein the respondents were the highest
bidders in respect of a plot admeasuring 338 sq.yrds. in
Sector 31A, Chandigarh for a sum of Rs.34,500/- The right
sold in auction was the lease-hold for ninety nine years.
An allotment letter was issued on November 27, 1975. The
respondents deposited 25% of the money immediately. The
balance consideration was payable in three equal
instalments, the first of which fell due on September 27,
1976. The respondents defaulted in paying the same
whereupon the Estate Officer issued a notice to show cause
as to why the lease in their favour be not cancelled. After
giving due opportunity to the respondents, the lease was
cancelled, at the same time forfeiting a sum of
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Rs.3,450/- representing 10% of the premium. The respondents
preferred an appeal to the Chief Administrator against the
said action which was dismissed on May 2, 1978. The Chief
Administrator, however, reduced the amount of forfeiture
from 10% to 2 1/2%. A revision preferred against the Chief
Administrator’s order was dismissed by the Chief
Commissioner on January 1, 1979. The respondents then
applied to the Estate Officer for refund of the amount paid
by them. After deducting the amount forfeited, the amount
deposited by them was refunded in full on April 25, 1979.
4. Having obtained the refund of their amount, the
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respondents filed a review petition before the Chief
Commissioner seeking review of his order dated January 1,
1979. It was dismissed on January 10, 1980. A second
review petition, however, met with success. The Chief
Commissioner directed that the plot shall be restored to the
respondents provided they make the entire payment within
sixty days from the date of his order, He directed that in
default of such payment, the review petition shall stand
dismissed, vide Chief Commissioner’s order dated May 9,
1985. Instead of paying the amount within the time
prescribed, the respondents queried how the amount of Rs.
1.02 lakhs (directed to be deposited by the Chief Com-
missioner in his order dated May 9, 1985) was arrived at.
Be that as it may, they failed to comply with the order of
the Chief Commissioner, with the result that the second
review petition filed by them also stood dismissed. The
respondents then filed yet another petition, styling it as a
mercy petition, before the advisor to the Administrator
which too was dismissed.
5. On December 3, 1990, the respondents started yet
another round by ’filing W.P.No. 15477 of 1990 in the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana offering to pay the amount
aforesaid with 12% interest. The High Court recorded the
respondents’ offer and directed them to bring a draft for
the full amount on the next day of the hearing. The
respondents produced a draft in a sum of Rs. 1,72,402.56p
before the court on January 15, 1991 which was kept in safe
custody of the Registrar. The writ petition was, however,
dismissed on March 18, 1991 holding that since the respon-
dents were persistent defaulters and also because the prices
of plots have gone up steeply meanwhile, the plot cannot be
restored to them, A review petition filed by the respondents
was dismissed by the court on July 29, 1991.
6. Having failed in the High Court, the respondents
approached the Estate Officer yet again to settle their case
in the light of an alleged policy of the government to
restore the plots to defaulters by charging forfeiture
amount of 5%. This request was rejected by the Estate
Officer on October 18, 1991. After all this, the
respondents approached the High Court once again with
W.P.(C) No.3394 of 1992 for a direction to the respondents
to implement the alleged policy of the Chandigarh
Administration to restore the plot by charging a forfeiture
amount of 5%. They also challenged the cancellation of
lease (effected in the year 1977) in this writ petition.
They deposited a sum of Rupees two lakhs purporting to be
under the orders of the High Court. The writ petition has
been allowed by the High Court on October 14, 1993 on the
ground that inasmuch as in another case pertaining to Smt.
Prakash Rani, the Administrator had restored the plot to her
even after her writ petition was dismissed by the High
Court, the respondents must also be restored the plot on the
same terms. The High Court pointed out that Prakash Rani’s
matter was
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settled before the Lok Adalat and the Estate Officer agreed
to waive the forfeiture by charging 5% of the premium amount
by his orders dated September 4, 1991 but when the
respondents’ case was taken up by Estate Officer on October
1, 1989, he rejected the respondents’ case, which, says the
the High Court, amounts to discriminatory treatment. When
it was pointed out by the counsel for the Administration
that the case of Prakash Rani was different inasmuch as in
that case the amount paid by the allottee was never returned
to her as has been done in the case of respondents, the High
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Court merely brushed aside the argument and allowed the writ
petition directing the appellants herein (respondent to the
writ petition) to restore the site to the respondents (writ
petitioners) inasmuch as they had already paid up the entire
amount of auction money including penal interest. The court
observed that if on taking an account, any further amount is
found due, a demand can be raised against the respondents
according to rules. It is this order which is questioned in
this appeal.
7. In our opinion, the writ petition could not have been
allowed by the High Court for more than one reason,
viz., (1) on the default of the respondents to pay the first
instalment on the prescribed date, the lease in their favour
was cancelled after due notice and hearing as far back as
1977. They also took back the amount deposited by them
minus the amount forfeited. This happened in 1978-79. Hav-
ing taken back the amount, they could not have agitated
their right to the plot by filing consecutive review
petitions before the Chief Commissioner or by filing writ
petition seeking restoration of the plot. Not only the
lease was cancelled but they had acquiesced in it by taking
back the money; (2) Be that as it may, when their second
review petition was allowed by the Chief Commissioner
permitting them to pay the entire amount within sixty days,
the respondents failed to avail of the said concession.
This happened in the year 1985; (3) Their writ petition
filed in the year 1990 (W.P.No.15477 of 1990) seeking
restoration of the plot was dismissed on the ground that
they were persistent defaulters and also on the ground that
because of the rise in prices, the plot cannot be restored
to them. This happened in March, 1991. Even a review
petition filed by the respondents was rejected by the High
Court. The filing of W.P.(C) No.3394 of 1992 (from which
this appeal arises) in the above circumstances was thus
nothing but a desperate gamble. The only ostensible reason
given for filing this second writ petition was the alleged
policy of the Administration to restore the plots to
defaulters on their paying 5% of the premium amount. It is,
however, significant that the writ petition has not been
allowed on the basis of the said policy, if any, but on a
different ground altogether. It is this: inasmuch as in the
case of Prakash Rani, the plot was restored to her on
charging 5% of the premium amount notwithstanding the dis-
missal of her writ petition by the High Court, the plot of
the respondents should also be restored to them. Firstly,
the judgment of the High Court does not show that the High
Court has investigated the facts and circumstances of
Prakash Rani’s case nor has it recorded any finding that her
case is identical in all respects to the respondents’ case.
The High Court does not also say that the point of
distinction pointed out by the Administration’s counsel,
viz., that the said lady had never taken back her amount and
that her amount was
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lying with the Administration, is not correct. And yet her
case has been made the basis for allowing the respondents’
writ petition upholding the plea of discrimination.
8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle,
if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been
allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and
indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many
such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such
pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact
that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order
in the case of another person similarly situated can never
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be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner
on the plea of discrimination. The order infavour of the
other person might be legal and valid or it might not be.
that has to be investigated first before it can be directed
to befollowed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in
favour of the other person isfound to be contrary to laiv or
not ivarranted in the facts and circumstances of his case,
it is obvious that such illegal or uni,oarranted order
cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling ilie
respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass
another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and
discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised
for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority
has passed one illegal/ unwarranted order, it does not
entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat
that illegality over again and again. The
illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if A can be
done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the
court should direct the appropriate authority to correct
such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it
cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be
made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the
respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is
not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such
illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate
complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas
would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do
incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a
negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case
the order in favour of the other person is found to be a
lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar
relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that
the petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’ case.
But then why examine another person’s case in his absence
rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is
present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not
more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement
of the petioner before the court to the relief asked for in
the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into
the correctness of the order made or action taken in another
person’s case, which other person is not before the case nor
is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course
barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable
nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore
the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ ju-
risdiction and say that because in one case a particular
order has been passed or a particular action has been taken,
the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether
such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise.
Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and
legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The
orders and actions of the
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authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the
Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to
the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial
world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by
authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we
express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper
case arises.)
9. Coming back to the facts of this case, if only the High
Court had looked to the facts of this case instead of
looking to the facts of some other case, we are sure, it
would have dismissed the writ petition in view of the
several facts stated hereinbefore. The High Court fell in
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grave error in allowing the writ petition on the said ground
and in importing the theory of discrimination in such a
situation. Question of discrimination could have arisen
only if two findings were recorded by the High Court, viz.,
(1) the order in favour of Prakash Rani was a legal and
valid one and (2) the case of the writ petitioners was
similar in material respects to the case of Prakash Rani but
she has not been accorded the same treatment. No such find-
ings have been recorded by the High Court in this case.
10. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment
under appeal set aside.The respondents shall pay the costs
of the appellant, which are assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.
S.L.P.(C) No.15931 of 1994:
11. The facts of this case, if anything, are worse.
The respondent was the highest bidder in respect of a plot
in the auction held on July 13, 1974. She paid the first
25% amount but defaulted in paying the first instalment. A
show cause notice was issued to her proposing to cancel the
lease in her favour. Pursuant to the show cause notice, the
respondent appeared and expressed her inability to pay the
amount, whereupon the lease in her favour was cancelled and
an amount of 10% of the premium amount forfeited. The
respondent filed an appeal before the Chief Administrator
contending only that the amount forfeited is high and that
it should be reduced and the balance refunded to her. The
Chief Administrator allowed her appeal and reduced the
amount forfeited. The respondent accordingly took back her
amount minus the forfeited amount, in December, 1976.
Seventeen years later, she filed the writ petition in the
Punjab and Haryana High Court, being CWP No.7760 of 1993,
from which this appeal arises, challenging the order of
cancellation dated March 30, 1971 The writ petition has been
allowed by the High Court on the ground that the matter is
covered by the High Court’s carlier decision in jaswant
Singh v. Chandigarh Administration (1 992 PLJ 522).
12. Inasmuch as the respondent’s writ petition has been
allowed on the only ground that it is covered by the
decision in Jaswant Singh, it is necessary to notice whether
the principle of the said decision governs the facts of this
case. ’Mc two grounds urged by the writ petitioner in
Jaswant Singh, as recorded in Para (3) of the judgment, are:
"(1) the authorities under the Act have no jurisdiction to
order forfeiture of 25% of the premium; (2) that when during
the time allowed by the Chief Administrator to deposit the
amount of forfeiture the review had been filed and the Chief
Commissioner had ordered stay of the operation of the order,
while disposing
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of the review petition, it was incumbent upon the Chief
Administrator to grant time for deposit of the amount due."
A perusal of the facts of the case stated in Paras (2) and
(3) of the judgment clearly discloses that there is
absolutely no similarity in the facts of that case and the
present case. The facts of that case are altogether differ-
ent It is in those facts and circumstances that that writ
petition was allowed. We an: unable to see any relevance of
the principle of the said decision to the case before us.
By saying this, we may not be understood to say that the
decision in Jaswant Singh is correct. We express no opinion
thereon since it is not necessary Br us to do so in this
case.
13.So far as the case,, before us is concerned, the fact
remains that when the lease was cancelled on the respondent
expressing her inability to pay the first or other
instalments, the only contention raised by her in appeal was
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for reduction of the amount forfeited. She never questioned
the cancellation of the lease. On the omount forfeited
being reduced, she coolly took back the money and kept quiet
for a period of seventeen years. It is only after the lapse
of 17 years that she woke up evidently in view of the rise
in prices and approached the High Court more in the nature
of a gamble than for vindicating her legitimate rights. The
explanation given by her for her seventeen years’ slumber
was that she had filed a revision before the Administration
and was awaiting its result. The respondents have denied
the receipt of any such revision. The appellant is not able
to substantiate her plea. Moreover, if indeed she had filed
a revision, she has not explained why did she wait for
seventeen years without making any enquiry about its
progress and without making any efforts to have it disposed
of It is evident that the said plea is a false one, invented
for the purpose of the writ petition. It, therefore,
follows that the High Court was in error in allowing this
writ petition as well. Accordingly, this appeal too is
allowed and the judgment under appeal set aside. The
appellants shall be entitled to their costs from the
respondent, quantified at Rs. 10,000/-.
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