REENA HAZARIKA vs. THE STATE OF ASSAM

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL   NO.1330 OF 2018 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2440 of 2018) REENA HAZARIKA ....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF ASSAM      ...RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted. 2.  The appellant is the wife of the deceased convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,000/­ and in default, imprisonment for one month. 3. The   deceased   resided   along   with   the   appellant   and   his minor daughter CW­1, Miss Puja Hazarika, aged about 9 years, in the tenanted premises belonging to PW­1 Manoj Kumar Deka, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR Date: 2018.10.31 15:34:48 IST Reason: PW­2   Dipen   Deka   and   PW­3   Bhrigumoni   Deka,   who   are brothers.  The appellant is stated to have assaulted the deceased 1 in the intervening night of 10.05.2013/11.05.2013. PWs. 1, 2 and 3 are stated to have heard noises and on going there, found the deceased with head injury attributed to a fall, but that the deceased was otherwise alright.  They were unable to take him to the   hospital   because   of   rains   and   the   unavailability   of   an ambulance.  According to the post­mortem report proved by PW­ 6, Dr. Ritu Raj Chaliha the deceased had the following injuries on his person :­

All injuries were ante mortem and caused by moderately heavy sharp cutting weapon and homicidal in nature. 2 4. The Trial Court and the High Court held that the present was a case of circumstantial evidence.   The last seen theory establishes the presence of the appellant with the deceased at night. Her unnatural conduct because she was not crying, she was the assailant of the deceased.  5.  Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the courts below have erred in holding that the links in the chain of   circumstances   stood   established   leading   to   the   only inescapable conclusion of the appellant being the assailant and no   other   hypothesis   of   innocence   being   possible.     PW­6   has deposed that the injuries were caused by a moderately heavy sharp cutting weapon such as a  dao , and that the fracture of the temporal   bone   may   have   been   caused   by   a   moderate   heavy weapon.  The recovery from the place of occurrence, as proved by PW­7 S.I. Nilomani Malakar, is of an ordinary knife used for cutting betel nut, one feet long with a bent sharp point.  Chop injuries were not possible with the same.  The alleged knife was not even shown to PW­6 for eliciting opinion if the injuries could have been caused by the same.  3 6. Miss Diksha Rai, learned counsel for the State submitted that the appellant was last seen with the deceased in the room, confirmed   by   CW­1.   The   appellant   has   failed   to   offer   any explanation of the circumstances as to how the death occurred at night.  Her unnatural conduct in not even weeping was also noticed by PW­7.  The knife used for assault, and blood soaked clothes of the deceased have also been recovered.  7. We have considered the respective submissions, the orders of the courts below, as also the evidence available on record. Normally this court under Article 136 of the Constitution, would be reluctant in appeal to interfere with the concurrent findings of two courts by reappreciating the facts and evidence. But in an appropriate   case,   if   this   court   finds   that   there   has   been erroneous consideration and appreciation of facts and evidence, leading to miscarriage of justice, this court is duty bound to ensure that ultimately justice prevails. It is a well established principle of criminal jurisprudence that several accused may go free, but an innocent person should not be punished. In  Anant (1960) 2 SCR 460 this Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay,  court observed as follows :­ 4 “16.  Ordinarily, it is not the practice of this Court   to   re­examine   the   findings   of   fact reached by the High Court particularly in a case   where   there   is   concurrence   of   opinion between the two Courts below. But the case against   the   appellant   is   entirely   based   on circumstantial evidence, and there is no direct evidence that he administered a poison, and no poison has, in fact been detected by the doctor,   who   performed   the   post­mortem examination,   or   by   the   Chemical   Analyser. The inference of guilt having been drawn on an examination of a mass of evidence during which subsidiary findings were given by the two Courts below, we have felt it necessary, in view of the extraordinary nature of this case, to satisfy ourselves whether each conclusion on   the   separate   aspects   of   the   case,   is supported by evidence and is just and proper. Ordinarily, this Court is not required to enter into an elaborate examination of the evidence, but we have departed from this rule in this particular   case,   in   view   of   the   variety   of arguments that were addressed to us and the evidence of conduct which the appellant has sought   to   explain   away   on   hypotheses suggesting innocence. These arguments, as we have stated in brief, covered both the factual as well as the medical aspects of the case, and have necessitated a close examination of the evidence once again, so that we may be in a position to say what are the facts found, on which our decision is rested.” 8. The   essentials   of   circumstantial   evidence   stand   well established by precedents and we do not consider it necessary to reiterate the same and burden the order unnecessarily. Suffice it 5 to   observe   that   in   a   case   of   circumstantial   evidence   the prosecution is required to establish the continuity in the links of the   chain   of   circumstances,   so   as   to   lead   to   the   only   and inescapable   conclusion   of   the   accused   being   the   assailant, inconsistent or incompatible with the  possibility of any other hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused.  Mere invocation of the last seen theory, sans the facts and evidence in a case, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act,1872 unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case.  If the links in the chain of circumstances itself are not complete, and the prosecution is unable   to   establish   a   prima   facie   case,   leaving   open   the possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner, the onus will not shift to the accused, and the benefit of doubt will have to be given.   9.    Before proceeding with the discussion further, we deem it proper to notice that the appellant did not have the benefit of a lawyer of her choice, both before the trial court and the High Court,   naturally   because   of   some   handicap.     She   had   to   be provided legal assistance by the Legal Services Authority.  This is 6 not to make any comment or observation on the nature of the defence made available to the appellant, but only to notice her handicap in establishing her innocence.  10. PW­1 deposed that he was told by the deceased at about 11:00 p.m. on 10.05.2013 that he had suffered a head injury because of a fall, and that the witness did not provide any first aid to the deceased though he along with his brother PW­2, did try to call an ambulance at about 12:00 am.  Additionally, that he did  not  see   any   other   injuries   on   the   deceased.     On   the contrary, CW­1 deposed that PW­1 had applied Dettol to the wounds of the deceased. 11. Contrary   to   the   statement   of   PW­1,   his   brother,   PW­2 deposed   that   he   was   woken   up   at   about   2­3   a.m.   by   the appellant who was crying and told him that her husband had suffered   head   injury.     The   deceased   is   then   stated   to   have himself told the witness that the injury was not serious.   The contradiction   in   the   evidence   of   PW­1   and   PW­2   is   further compounded   by   the   third   brother   PW­3,   deposing   that   PW­2 informed him of the injury to the deceased at 12.00 am.  All the 7 three witnesses have deposed that the deceased was of heavy built, because of which they were unable to take him to the hospital   on   the   motor­cycle,   for   treatment.   The   post   mortem however recites that the deceased was of average built.   If the deceased   had   merely   suffered   a  head   injury  by   fall and   was otherwise fit to talk to the witnesses, we see no reason why he could   not   have   been   taken   to   the   hospital   on   a   motorcycle. While PW­3 states that the deceased was wearing clothes, the post­mortem report shows that the deceased was brought in an underwear only.   The clothes of the deceased were found near the well in a gunny bag.  But PW­7 did not consider it necessary to have the blood group examined by the FSL, which in our opinion in the facts of the case is a major lapse. 12. The   post­mortem   report   makes   it   evident   that   the   chop wounds could not have been caused by the small knife alleged to have been recovered.     Fracture of the temporal bone with the knife was an impossibility. PW­6 in the deposition ruled out that the injury could be caused by a fall.  The post mortem did not find any alcohol in the body of the deceased.   The witness also opined   that   injury   no.   4   could   have   been   caused   while   the 8 deceased may have attempted to save himself from assault.  The multiple injuries could certainly not have been caused by one person   and   tells   an   entirely   different   story   by   itself   that   the assailants may have been more than one.   The chop injuries were possible by a moderate and heavy weapon like a  dao .  In our   opinion   also,   if   the   deceased   was   of   average   built,   it   is difficult to accept, according to normal prudence and human behaviour and capacity, that the appellant being a woman, could have made such severe and repeated assault on the deceased, who was her husband, with a small knife, without any resistance and suffered no injury herself.  13. PW­7 claimed to have found a knife with the smell of Dettol. Even if the knife had been wiped to erase traces of blood the wooden handle could have revealed much if it had been sent to the FSL.  The witness again offers no explanation why he did not do   so.       No   bottle   of   Dettol   has   been   recovered.     There   is absolutely no evidence that the deceased would often assault the appellant and the minor child in a drunken condition.  The fact that   PW­7   did   not   notice   tears   in   the   eyes   of   the   appellant, deemed as unnatural conduct by the courts below, cannot be 9 sufficient   to   draw   an   adverse   inference   of   guilt   against   the appellant. The appellant being in a helpless situation may have been   stunned   into   a   shock   of   disbelief   by   the   death   of   her husband.  It  is not uncommon human behaviour that on the death   of   a   near   relative,   or   upon   witnessing   a   murderous assault, a person goes into complete silence and stupor showing no reaction or sensibility.  We also find it difficult to believe and rely   upon   the   evidence   of   CW­1   primarily   because   of   her minority. If the deceased had been assaulted by the appellant in the room at night, it would certainly have led to noise and shouts and   the   witness   could   not   have   possibly   slept   throughout without waking up. 14.   PW­1   deposed   that   he   informed   the   police   the   next morning   at   about   8:00   a.m.     But   PW­7   has   deposed   that information was given at the police station by PW­1 at about 12:00 p.m. on 11.05.2013 and the General Diary entry no. 452 made   in   the   police   station   at   12.20   p.m.,   and   the   F.I.R. registered   at   7:45   p.m.     These   are   suspicious   circumstances which leaves enough time for planning after thinking for the manner in which allegations were to be made for deflecting that 10 the occurrence took place in a manner other than what may have happened actually.  15.  In the background of the aforesaid discussion regarding the nature of evidence and the manner of its appreciation, we deem it proper to set out the English translation in the paper book of defence taken by the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as follows:­ “Ans: On the date of occurrence at about 8­ 8:30 while I have returned from my work at Satgaon, I saw that my husband was lying in the room with bleeding injury.   On my cry, Manoj Deka and his brothers come there with drink in the hand of one brother.  Thereafter I saw  Manoj Deka was  putting  Dettol  on the wound of my husband.   I also rang to 108 ambulance.     When,   I   wanted   to   call   police Manoj   Deka,   snatched   the   phone   from   me. On   my   crying   neighbouring   peoples   arrived there.  I tried to take my husband to medical but due to non­co­operation my Manoj Deka and others, I failed to take him to Medical.  On that night at about 9.30 expired and Manoj Deka   and   other   neighbours   were   sitting. Subsequently   Manoj   Deka   has   falsely implicated me.  I have the suspicion that my husband was physically assaulted earlier at some   place   by   Mintu  Nath,  Dipak   Das   and Jeetu Deka while taking liquor and brought by husband on injured condition and laid in the room.     I   also   saw   the   lock   of   my   room   in broken condition, when I arrived here.  I have not killed my husband.  I am innocent.”  11 PW­2 has acknowledged in his evidence that he would have drinks   with   the   deceased.       According   to   the   post­mortem report,   the   stomach   of   the   deceased   was   found   empty, suggesting   that   the   assault   had   taken   place   earlier   in   the evening contrary to the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3 suggesting the assault in the late hours of the night by which time the deceased would undoubtedly have had his dinner. 16. Section 313, Cr.P.C. cannot be seen simply as a part of audi   alteram   partem .     It   confers   a   valuable   right   upon   an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right as a constitutional right to a fair trial under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution,   even   if   it   is   not   to   be considered as a piece of substantive evidence, not being on oath under Section 313(2), Cr.P.C.  The importance of this right has been considered time and again by this court, but it yet remains to   be   applied   in   practice   as   we   shall   see   presently   in   the discussion to follow.   If the accused takes a defence after the prosecution evidence is closed, under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. the Court is duty bound under Section 313(4) Cr.P.C. to consider the same.   The mere use of the word ‘may’ cannot be held to 12 confer a discretionary power on the court to consider or not to consider such defence, since it constitutes a valuable right of an accused for access to justice, and the likelihood of the prejudice that may be caused thereby.  Whether the defence is acceptable or not and whether it is compatible or incompatible with the evidence available is an entirely different matter.   If there has been no consideration at all of the defence taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in the given facts of a case, the conviction may well stand vitiated.  To our mind, a solemn duty is cast on the court in dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defence of the   accused   taken   under   Section   313   Cr.P.C.   and   to   either accept or reject the same for reasons specified in writing. 17.   Unfortunately   neither   Trial   Court   nor   the   High   Court considered it necessary to take notice of, much less discuss or observe with regard to the aforesaid defence by the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C.  to  either  accept  or reject  it.   The defence taken cannot be said to be irrelevant, illogical or fanciful in the entirety of the facts and the nature of  other evidence available   as   discussed   hereinbefore.   The   complete   non­ consideration   thereof   has   clearly   caused   prejudice   to   the 13 appellant. Unlike the prosecution, the accused is not required to establish the defence beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused has only to raise doubts on a preponderance of probability as observed in   Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya , AIR 1953 SC 468 observing as follows :­ Bharat “26. We have examined the evidence at length in this case, not because it is our desire to depart from our usual practice of declining to the assess, the evidence in an appeal here, but   because   there   has   been   in   this   case   a departure from the rule that when an accused person but for the word a reasonable defence which is likely to be true,…… then the burden on   the   other   side   becomes   all   the   heavier because   a   reasonable   and   probable   story likely to be true friend pitted against AV and vacillating case is bound to raise a reasonable doubts   of   which   the   accused   must   get   the benefit….” A similar view is expressed in   M. Abbas vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103 as follows :­ “10….On   the   other   hand,   the   explanation given by the appellant both during the cross­ examination of prosecution witnesses and in his   own   statement   recorded   under   Section 313   CrPC   is   quite   plausible.   Where   an accused   sets   up   a   defence   or   offers   an explanation, it is well settled that he is not required   to   prove   his   defence   beyond   a reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of probabilities….”  14     18. The   entirety   of   the   discussion,   in   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case,   the   nature   of   evidence   available coupled with the manner of its consideration, leaves us satisfied that   the   links   in   the   chain   of   circumstances   in   a   case   of circumstantial evidence, cannot be said to have been established leading to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant was the assailant of the deceased, incompatible with any possibility of innocence of the appellant.  The possibility that the occurrence may   have   taken   place   in   some   other   manner   cannot   be completely ruled out.  The appellant is therefore held entitled to acquittal   on   the   benefit  of   doubt.     We   accordingly   order   the acquittal and release of the appellant from custody forthwith, unless wanted in any other case.  19. The appeal is allowed.     …………….........J. [R.F. NARIMAN] ……...................J. [NAVIN SINHA] NEW DELHI OCTOBER 31, 2018. 15