Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BRAJA KISHORE JAGDEV
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
LINGRAJ SAMANTARAY & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/07/2000
BENCH:
S. Rajendra Babu, J. & Shivaraj V. Patil, J.
JUDGMENT:
RAJENDRA BABU, J. :
The respondents made a claim in respect of an institution Sri
SidhaBaladev Jew, Bie-Sodharpur, P.O. Baku in the district of
Puri; that the said institution had been established by some
unknown founder the origin of which had been lost in antiquity
and the institution has all along been treated as a public
religious institution; that the respondents ancestors were
entrusted with the management of all the affairs of the said
institution including seva-puja of the deity and possessing all
the lands of the deity and such right of maintaining the
institution was inherited by their heirs; that they have been
rendering seva-puja to the deity as marfatdars without any
intervention at any time whatsoever and therefore are in
possession of all the properties of the deity, paying rents to
the authorities in respect of the landed properties and from out
of the usufruct received from the landed properties by their
ancestors; that no property has been separately set apart and
given to the marfatdars to be enjoyed by them in lieu of their
service; that such right of inheriting the office of
marfatdarship has been in practice since the time of the founder
and is regulated by custom; that they have been functioning as
marfatdars since the time of the founder till todayand they have
also been recognized as Hereditary Trustees by the Revenue and
other authorities from time to time.
In the year 1955, the respondents claimed by filing an
application under Section 64 of the Orissa Hindu Religious
Endowments Act, 1939, that the institution of the endowments
thereof to be their private property made by the respondents and
contested by the appellant and others and the same was dismissed.
Thereafter the matter went to the High Court in appeal and
ultimately the decision of the lower Court was upheld and the
appeal was disallowed. Another application under Section 42 of
the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 [hereinafter
referred to as the Act] was filed in the year 1959-60 which was
also dismissed but for default. Thereafter a non-hereditary
trust board was appointed under Section 68 of the Act and under
whose control sevas are performed to the said deity. Another
application was filed to adjudicate their claims as hereditary
trustees under the Act on the basis of the pleadings set out
earlier in this order. The appellant pleaded that by custom or
otherwise the respondents were not ever treated as hereditary
trustees of the institution.
Three issues were raised by the Assistant Commissioner as to (i)
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whether the petition was maintainable; (ii) whether the
appellant is barred by the principle of res judicata; (iii)
whether respondents are hereditary trustees. With regard to
issue Nos.1 and 2, he found in favour of the respondents. Thus
the only issue remaining to be considered is whether the
respondents are the Hereditary Trustees of Sri Sidhabaladev Jew
of Village Sodharpur, P.O. Baku, District Puri. The Assistant
Commissioner noticed that heavy burden lies upon respondents to
establish that they are Hereditary Trustees of the institution of
the deity since the time of the foundation of deity or is
regulated by custom or specially provided by founder so long as
such scheme is in force. He, in detail, considered the said
aspect of the matter and came to the conclusion that respondents
could only be marfatdars, that is, only servants of the
institution, who are liable for dismissal in the event of
non-performance of seva/puja of the deity and not Hereditary
Trustees. He also noticed that even the respondents case is
that the institution of the deity and entrusting the management
thereof had been lost in antiquity. Therefore some good material
should have been produced by the respondents to establish their
claim. On discussion of the other material on record the
Assistant Commissioner rejected the claim made by the
respondents. The matter was carried in appeal to the High Court
and the High Court allowed the same. The basis upon which the
High Court proceeded to hold the respondents as Hereditary
Trustees is that there was material to show that the respondents
are marfatdars and if they are marfatdars, they should be taken
to be trustees. It was also held that since the origin of the
temple was lost in antiquity, on principle of lost grant, the
respondents should be deemed to be hereditary trustees.
The definition of Hereditary Trustee is set out in the Act.
Under the said provision Hereditary Trustee means the Trustee of
the religious institution succession to whose office devolves by
hereditary right since the time of the founder or is regulated by
custom or is specifically provided for by the founder so long as
such scheme of succession is in force. In order to lay a claim
that they are Hereditary Trustees it has to be established that
the members of the family have been in charge of the management
of the affairs of the deity as trustees and succession to their
office devolve on them by hereditary right since the time of the
founder and the scheme was in force until filing of the
application under Section 41 of the Act. Assuming that every
single member of the family of the respondents were acting as
marfatdars of the deity for some time may not by itself be
sufficient to establish their case that they are Hereditary
Trustees as provided in Section 3(6) of the Act. The other
criteria like succession to office of the trustee devolving by
hereditary right since the time of the founder or being regulated
by custom and such scheme is in force till the time of
application under Section 41 of the Act has to be established by
adducing cogent evidence.
Let us test the material placed before the court in the light of
what we have stated. The argument that was advanced in the
present case is that being marfatdars the respondents are
trustees. However, the High Court proceeds to analyse the matter
on the basis that there is no impediment to the person who was in
charge of rendering religious duty of the deity to be a trustee
of the institution in as much as the definition of a trustee
includes any person in whom the administration of the religious
institution is assigned. This approach of the High Court results
in examining the matter from a wrong end. What is to be seen is
whether respondents, though hereditary trustees, were engaged as
marfardars and not the other way. Merely because a person is
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in charge of the administration of the deity though as a trustee
will not make him a hereditary trustee unless the conditions
thereto are fulfilled to which we have adverted to earlier. In
the present case, the claim of the respondents is not that they
are trustees but that they are hereditary trustees under the
relevant provision. Therefore the view of the High Court in this
respect is not well founded particularly when the view set up by
the authorities below could not be termed as unreasonable or
improper.
The other basis upon which the High Court passed its judgment is
that the requirements of law that they are Hereditary trustees
since the time of founder occurring in the definition of
Hereditary Trustee is lost in antiquity and therefore it is not
possible to have any direct evidence to establish the line of
succession but could be derived in the doctrine of lost grant.
It is open to court to infer grant from immemorial use when such
user is open, as of right and without interruption but grant will
not be inferred if the user can be explained otherwise. The
fiction of a lost grant is a mere presumption from long
possession and exercise of user by easement with acquiescence of
the owner, that there must have been originally a grant to the
claimant, which had been lost. There can be no such
presumption of a lost grant in favour of a person who
constitute trustees in succession. We do not think that, with
the material on record, any such interference is possible.
Firstly, contention had been advanced before the courts that the
deity is a private trust and not covered by the enactment;
having failed in that regard now they want to hang on to the fact
that they are hereditary trustees. In establishing the same they
have miserably failed by not producing evidence of any kind. In
the circumstances we have no hesitation in setting aside the
order made by the High Court and restore that of the Assistant
Commissioner to which we have adverted to earlier. The appeal is
allowed accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to
costs.