The State Of Kerala vs. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd.

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 22-05-2025

Preview image for The State Of Kerala vs. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd.

Full Judgment Text

2025 INSC 757
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9301 OF 2013

STATE OF KERALA & ANOTHER APPELLANTS
VERSUS
ASIANET SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
LTD. & OTHERS RESPONDENTS

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1629 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1765-1766 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1531 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1533 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1534 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1752 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1753 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1755 OF 2020
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.699 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1532 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1687 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1688 OF 2020
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.05.22
15:46:37 IST
Reason:
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1689 OF 2020


Page 1 of 321





CIVIL APPEAL NO.1690 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1548-1549 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.9025 of 2023)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1630 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1726 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1725 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10114 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2147 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1543 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1547 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1680 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1754 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1756 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1530 OF 2020
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.748 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1628 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5867 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5228 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1535 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1679 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1681-1682 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1683 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1684 OF 2020


Page 2 of 321





CIVIL APPEAL NO.1685 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1686 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1580 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1581-1583 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1536 OF 2020

J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
I N D E X

1. Bird’s Eye View of the Controversy: ................................................ 6
2. Facts in brief: ................................................................................. 8
3. Writ Petitions filed before this Court: ........................................... 24
a. W.P. (C) No. 699/2014: ................................................................ 24
b. W.P. (C) No.748/2015: ................................................................. 26
4. Submissions: ................................................................................ 28
a. Submissions on behalf of Appellants: ........................................ 28
b. Submissions of Respondent-States: ............................................ 51
i. State of West Bengal: ............................................................... 51
ii. State of Uttar Pradesh: ........................................................... 53
iii. State of Odisha: ..................................................................... 54
iv. State of Tamil Nadu: .............................................................. 62
v. State of Rajasthan: ................................................................. 70
vi. State of Punjab: ...................................................................... 71
vii. State of Nagaland: ................................................................ 71
viii. State of Andhra Pradesh: ..................................................... 72


Page 3 of 321





ix. Union of India: ....................................................................... 72
c. Reply Arguments: ....................................................................... 73
5. Points for Consideration: .............................................................. 73
6. Legal Framework: ........................................................................ 75
a. Relevant Entries of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution: .. 77
b. Finance Act, 1994 with Relevant Amendments: ......................... 78
c. Relevant Provisions of the State Enactments: ............................ 91
i. Assam Amusements and Betting Tax Act, 1939: ...................... 91
ii. Delhi Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1996: .................. 94
iii. Gujarat Entertainments Tax Act, 1977: ................................. 96
iv. Jharkhand Entertainment Tax Act, 2012: ........................... 104
v. Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976: ........................................ 108
vi. Orissa Entertainment Tax Act, 2006: ................................... 117
vii. Punjab Entertainment Duty Act, 1955: ................................ 120
viii. Rajasthan Entertainments and Advertisements Tax Act, 1957:
................................................................................................. 128
ix. Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act, 1939: ......................... 130
x. Uttar Pradesh Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979: ..... 133
7. Interpretation of Entries of the Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution: .................................................................................. 142
8. State of Karnataka vs. State of Meghalaya: ............................... 157
9. Meaning and Scope of the expression “Luxuries, Entertainments and
Amusements” and Legislative Competence of State Legislatures to
impose Entertainment Tax: ............................................................ 162
a. Luxuries: ................................................................................. 162
b. Entertainments and Amusements: ........................................... 168
c. Amusement: ............................................................................. 171
10. Parameters of Taxation: ........................................................... 180
11. Relevant case law: .................................................................... 184
a. Suresh: .................................................................................... 184
b. Vasant Madhav Patwardhan: ................................................... 194
12. Geeta Enterprises vs. Purvi Communication: ............................ 195
13. “Aspect Theory” or Aspect Doctrine: A Discussion .................... 217


Page 4 of 321





14. Criticism of its Use in Indian Context: ...................................... 219
15. Usage of Aspect Theory in the Indian Context: ......................... 222
16. Aspect Theory: Its Extent and Scope in India: .......................... 246
17. Application of Aspect Theory to the Case at hand: ................... 256
18. Modus Operandi of the Assessees and their aspects: ................ 260
19. Allahabad High Court’s Ruling on retrospective operation of the
Amendment: ................................................................................... 265
20. State of Kerala vs. Asianet: ...................................................... 277
a. Submissions: ............................................................................ 282
b. Judgments relied upon by State of Kerala: .............................. 283
21. Jharkhand High Court’s Ruling: .............................................. 293
22. Summary of Discussion and Conclusions: ................................ 296
a. Constitutional Scheme regarding distribution of Legislative
Powers: ........................................................................................ 298
b. Service Tax: ............................................................................. 303
c. Tax on Luxuries: Entertainments & Amusements .................... 305
d. Parameters of Taxation under State Enactments: ................... 307
e. Geeta Enterprises and Purvi Communications: ......................... 308
f. Aspect Theory: .......................................................................... 310

Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.9025 of
2023.
1.1 Since common questions of law and facts arise in these civil
appeals and writ petitions, they have been heard together and are
being disposed of by this common judgment.
1.2 The Civil Appeals arise from the judgments of the High
Courts of Allahabad, Delhi, Gauhati, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Kerala,


Page 5 of 321





Madras, Orissa, Punjab & Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand
while two writ petitions have been filed before this Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution by M/s Tata Play & Another and M/s
Tata Play Ltd.
Bird’s Eye View of the Controversy :
2. The assessees have filed these appeals assailing the
provisions of the respective State Acts under which tax on
entertainment has charged on them on the premise that their
activity is relatable to the field of entertainment as envisaged under
Entry 62 – List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It is
their contention that they are not liable to pay entertainment tax
(or luxury tax) under the respective provisions of the State
enactments. It is further case of the assessee that they are engaged
in broadcasting of signals etc. through television channels to the
subscribers of those channels hence, possibly they are liable to pay
service tax to the Central Government under Entry 97 – List I of
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. There are however two
writ petitions filed by certain assessees who have also ventilated
their grievance that they are not liable to pay service tax as well.
The question whether the appellants-assessees are liable to pay


Page 6 of 321





entertainment tax under the provisions of the respective State
enactments which are relatable to Entry 62 – List II of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution and are also liable to pay service tax
under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended from
time to time as a provider of a taxable service namely broadcasting
service within the scope and ambit of Entry 97 – List I which is a
residuary entry for the relevant purpose of assessment is the moot
question which arises in these appeals.
2.1 The State of Kerala being aggrieved by the striking down of
the sub-section (iv) of proviso to Section 4 under which the cable
operators who have less than 7,500 connections are being exempt
from payment of entertainment tax and whereas those who have
over and above 7,500 connections are liable to pay the same tax
being discriminatory in nature and being strike down by the Kerala
High Court is questioned by the State of Kerala in its appeal. While
considering the controversy between the parties, the doctrine of
pith and substance in interpreting the entries of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution as well as the aspect theory as
referred to by the learned senior counsel and learned counsel who
have appeared for the respective parties shall be dealt with.


Page 7 of 321





2.2 Since the fields of legislation are in the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution of India and would be referred to during the
course of discussion primarily in List I and List II (Union List and
State List respectively) in these cases, it shall be understood that
any reference to these Lists is only with reference to the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution of India.
Facts in brief:
3. For the sake of convenience, some of the relevant facts are
delineated in the form of a table which is as under:
S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
1.C.A. No.<br>9301/2013<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>17573/2013State of Kerala<br>Versus<br>Asianet Satellite<br>Communications Ltd.28.06.2012The Kerala Tax on<br>Luxuries Act,1976
2.C.A. No.<br>1629/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>1173/2011Tata Sky Limited<br>Versus<br>State of Uttarakhand26.07.2010Uttarakhand<br>(Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainment and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1979)<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009
3.C.A. Nos. 1765-<br>1766/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) Nos.<br>34237 -<br>34238/2014M/s. Tata Sky Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Rajasthan19.08.2014Rajasthan<br>Entertainments &<br>Advertisements<br>Tax Act, 1957 and<br>Rajasthan<br>Entertainments &<br>Advertisements<br>Tax Rules, 1957



Page 8 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
4.C.A. No.<br>1531/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>17300/2015Sun Direct TV Pvt.<br>Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Gujarat12.03.2015Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009 and Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Exhibition by<br>means of Direct-to-<br>Home (DTH)<br>Broadcasting<br>Services) Rules,<br>2010
5.C.A. No.<br>1533/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>22171/2015Dish TV India Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Gujarat12.03.2015Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009 and Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Exhibition by<br>means of Direct-to-<br>Home (DTH)<br>Broadcasting<br>Services) Rules,<br>2010
6.C.A. No.<br>1534/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>20511/2015Bharat Business<br>Channel Ltd.<br>(Now Known as<br>Videocon D2H Ltd.)<br>Versus<br>State of Gujarat12.03.2015Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009 and Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Exhibition by<br>means of Direct-to-<br>Home (DTH)<br>Broadcasting<br>Services) Rules,<br>2010
7.C.A. No.<br>1752/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>4855/2014Bharti Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Jharkhand30.01.2014Jharkhand<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2012



Page 9 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
8.C.A. No.<br>1753/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>6690/2014Tata Play Limited<br>Versus<br>State of Jharkhand30.01.2014Jharkhand<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2012
9.C.A. No.<br>1755/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>8421/2014Reliance Big TV Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Jharkhand30.01.2014Jharkhand<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2012
10.W.P.(C) No.<br>699/2014Tata Play Ltd.<br>Versus<br>Union of IndiaSection 65(105)<br>(zk) and Section<br>65(15) of Finance<br>Act, 1994
11.C.A. No.<br>1532/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>18164/2015Bharati Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Gujarat12.03.2015Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009 and Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Exhibition by<br>means of Direct-to-<br>Home (DTH)<br>Broadcasting<br>Services) Rules,<br>2010
12.C.A. No.<br>1687/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>11304/2018IndusInd Media and<br>Communications Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh19.04.2018Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
13.C.A. No.<br>1688/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>13949/2018MultiTech Digital<br>Services Pvt. Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh09.04.2018Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh



Page 10 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
14.C.A. No.<br>1689/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>14077/2018Siti Networks Limited<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh09.04.2018Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
15.C.A. No.<br>1690/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>22181/2018Bling Ice Network Pvt.<br>Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh09.04.2018Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
16.C.A. Nos. 1548-<br>1549/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No. 4233 -<br>4234/2020Mansion Cable<br>Networks Private<br>Limited<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh09.04.2018Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
17.C.A. No. of<br>2025<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>9025/2023Subhash Chand<br>Versus<br>State of U.P.11.04.2018Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009



Page 11 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
18.C.A. No.<br>1630/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>1185/2011Dish TV India Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttarakhand26.07.2010Uttarakhand<br>(Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainment and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1979) (Amendment)<br>Act, 2009
19.C.A. No.<br>1726/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>4755/2011Bharti Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Punjab25.10.2010Punjab<br>Entertainment Duty<br>Act 1955 (as<br>amended in 2010)
20.C.A. No.<br>1725/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>13448/2011M/s Tata Sky Ltd<br>Versus<br>State of Punjab25.10.2010Punjab<br>Entertainment Duty<br>Act 1955 (as<br>amended in 2010)
21.C.A. No.<br>10114/2011<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>28836/2011Tata Play Ltd.<br>Versus<br>Govt. of NCT of Delhi05.09.2011The Delhi<br>Entertainments and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1996 and the Delhi<br>Entertainments and<br>Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Rules, 2010
22.C.A. No.<br>2147/2012<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>265/2012Bharti Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>Government of NCT of<br>Delhi05.09.2011The Delhi<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1996 and the<br>Delhi<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Rules, 2010
23.C.A. No.<br>1543/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>18256/2012Tata Sky Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Assam22.02.2012The Assam<br>Amusement and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1939 and Rules 9<br>and 9A of the Rules<br>framed thereunder



Page 12 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
24.C.A. No.<br>1547/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>18766/2012Bharati Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Assam22.02.2012The Assam<br>Amusement and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1939 and Rules 9<br>and 9A of the Rules<br>framed thereunder
25.C.A. No.<br>1680/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>28058/2012Tata Sky Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh20.07.2012Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
26.C.A. No.<br>1754/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>7100/2014Dish T.V India Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Jharkhand30.01.2014Jharkhand<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2012
27.C.A. No.<br>1756/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>10192/2014Dish TV India Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Jharkhand30.01.2014Jharkhand<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2012
28.C.A. No.<br>1530/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>17005/2015Tata Play Limited<br>Versus<br>State of Gujarat12.03.2015Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009 and Gujarat<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Exhibition by<br>means of Direct-to-<br>Home (DTH)<br>Broadcasting<br>Services) Rules,<br>2010



Page 13 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
29.W.P.(C) No.<br>748/2015Tata Play Limited<br>Versus<br>Union of India
30.C.A. No.<br>1628/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>1182/2011Bharati Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttarakhand26.07.2010Uttarakhand<br>(Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainment and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1979)<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009
31.C.A. No.<br>5867/2012<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>16255/2012Dish TV India Limited<br>Versus<br>Government of NCT<br>of Delhi05.09.2011The Delhi<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1996 and the<br>Delhi<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Rules, 2010
32.C.A. No.<br>5228/2012<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>20902/2012Dish TV India Ltd.<br>Versus<br>Government of NCT<br>of Delhi05.09.2011The Delhi<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1996 and the<br>Delhi<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Rules, 2010
33.C.A. No.<br>1535/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>23533/2012Tata Play Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Orissa24.04.2012The Orissa<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2006 and<br>Orissa<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2010 along with<br>the Orissa<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Rules, 2010



Page 14 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
34.C.A. No.<br>1679/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>31532/2012Tata Sky Limited.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh20.07.2012Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
35.C.A. Nos. 1681-<br>1682/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) Nos.<br>29366 – 29367<br>/2012New Era<br>Entertainment<br>Network Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh20.07.2012Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
36.C.A. No.<br>1683/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>31096/2012Independent T.V.<br>Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh20.07.2012Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
37.C.A. No.<br>1684/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>31416/2012Bharti Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh20.07.2012Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009



Page 15 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
38.C.A. No.<br>1685/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>31342/2012Bharati Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh20.07.2012Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
39.C.A. No.<br>1686/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>32123/2012Sun Direct TV Pvt.<br>Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Uttar Pradesh20.07.2012Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>Act, 1979 and<br>Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Ordinance, 2009
40.C.A. No.<br>1580/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.<br>10555/2013Tata Sky Limited<br>Versus<br>The State of Tamil<br>Nadu19.10.2012The Tamil Nadu<br>Entertainments<br>Tax Act, 1939 as<br>amended by Tamil<br>Nadu<br>Entertainments<br>Tax (Second<br>Amendment) Act,<br>2011
41.C.A. Nos. 1581-<br>1583/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) Nos.<br>10658 - 10660<br>/2013Bharati Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>Union of India19.10.2012The Tamil Nadu<br>Entertainments<br>Tax Act, 1939 as<br>amended by Tamil<br>Nadu<br>Entertainments<br>Tax (Second<br>Amendment) Act,<br>2011
42.C.A. No.<br>1536/2020<br>Arising out of<br>SLP(C) No.Bharti Telemedia Ltd.<br>Versus<br>State of Orissa14.11.2012The Orissa<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2006 and<br>Orissa



Page 16 of 321





S.No.Case No.Cause TitleImpugned<br>order datedName of<br>enactment
12692/2013Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2010 along with<br>the Orissa<br>Entertainment Tax<br>(Amendment)<br>Rules, 2010

3.1 From the above table, it is evident that most of the Civil
Appeals have been filed by the assessees while Civil Appeal No.
9301 of 2013 has been filed by the State of Kerala assailing the
judgment of the said High Court dated 28.06.2012.
3.2 The Civil Appeals have been filed by the assessees assailing
the orders passed by the High Courts referred to above dismissing
the writ petitions while the State of Kerala has filed its appeal being
aggrieved by some of the findings arrived at by the Kerala High
Court in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution vis-à-vis the
plea regarding discrimination raised by the respondents in the said
Appeal.
3.3 The bird’s eye view of the orders and judgements passed by
the Eleven High Courts referred to above can be gleaned as under:


Page 17 of 321





3.3.1 The High Court of Uttarakhand by way of impugned
judgment dated 26.07.2010 passed in Tata Sky Limited vs. State
of Uttarakhand , Writ Petition (M/B) No. 4 of 2010 held that
amendments to Uttar Pradesh Entertainment and Betting Tax,
1979 levying entertainment tax on DTH services was fully within
the legislative competence of the State and did not encroach upon
the field which the Parliament exclusively has authority to legislate.
Relying on the judgment of this Court in State of West Bengal vs.
Purvi Communication Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 3 SCC 711 (“Purvi
Communication”) , it was observed that the activity carried on by
petitioners therein was not different from that carried out by cable
operators in Purvi Communication . To explain the distinctions
between the imposition of service tax and entertainments tax the
High Court noted that the ‘incidence’ of service tax is on the license
agreement obtained from the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting whereas the ‘incidence’ for the levy of entertainment
tax is based on the individual contracts executed by the petitioner
with its customers.
3.3.2 Similarly, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana High
Court in the impugned judgment dated 25.10.2010 held that the


Page 18 of 321





levy of entertainment duty falls under Entry 62 - List II which
operates in a completely different field from Entry 92C - List I.
Affirming the application of aspect theory to the present facts, it
was observed that levies of service tax and entertainment tax can
co-exist and can be harmonized as they concern different aspects.
Therefore, the High Court upheld the vires of the Punjab
Entertainment Duty Act, 1955, as amended in 2010, which levied
entertainment duty on DTH services and dismissed the petition.
3.3.3 The impugned judgment dated 05.09.2011 of the Delhi
High Court passed in Bharti Telemedia Ltd. vs. Government of
NCT of Delhi, W.P.(C) No. 4935/2011 applied aspects theory to
the facts in hand and held that the State legislature is competent
to levy an entertainment tax on all payments for admission through
DTH. It was observed that the transaction in question has an
aspect of service which is amenable to service tax and an aspect of
entertainment which is amenable to entertainment tax. The writ
petitions were dismissed and challenge to Section 7 of the Delhi
Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1996 was rejected.


Page 19 of 321





3.3.4 Subsequently, Gauhati High Court at Guwahati vide
impugned judgment dated 22.02.2012 dismissed the petitions
challenging the relevant provisions of Assam Amusement and
Betting Tax Act, 1939 in terms of the judgments of the Uttarakhand
High Court dated 26.07.2010 and Punjab and Haryana High Court
dated 25.10.2010. The Gauhati High Court was of the view that the
issues raised were already covered by the aforesaid judgments.
3.3.5 By way of impugned order dated 24.04.2012, the High
Court of Orissa at Cuttack dismissed the writ petition being M/s.
Tata Sky Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, Writ Petition (C) No. 8966 of
2011, and held that the aforesaid decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court dated 25.10.2010 was squarely applicable to
the facts before it.
3.3.6 The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad also dismissed
the writ petition preferred before it vide impugned judgment dated
20.07.2012. The High Court thought it fit to respect the broad
latitude given to legislature in fiscal legislation and thereby rejected
the argument that the rate of entertainment was discriminatory in
comparison with cable operators. It also agreed with the findings


Page 20 of 321





of the Delhi High Court on the application of aspect theory. In the
present batch of petitions, subsequent orders of the Allahabad
High Court dated 09.04.2018, 11.04.2019 and 19.04.2018 are also
challenged. These orders which were passed in terms of the
impugned judgment dated 20.07.2012 are also challenged.
3.3.7 On 19.10.2012, the High Court of Judicature at Madras
vide its order and judgment impugned herein held, in principle,
that there could be a levy of entertainment tax on entertainment
received through DTH services and the pith and substance of the
levy contemplated under Entry 62 - List II is a levy on
‘entertainment’ in contradistinction to service tax levy on providing
of service. The High Court also rejected the argument that Entry
62 - List II only refers to public entertainment and not
entertainment through DTH vis-à-vis public entertainment.
However, in the specific facts and circumstances, the High Court
also held that the impugned charging provision i.e. Section 4-I of
the Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 is inadequate due
to no explicitly mention of the chargeable event and incidence of
tax. Therefore, the writ petitions challenging the levy of
entertainment tax were allowed. In so far as the matters arising


Page 21 of 321





from Madras High Court are concerned, the questions with regard
to legislative competence under Entry 62 – List I and whether DTH
services were exclusively within Entry 92C/97 – List I are
considered in these appeals. Further, the correctness of the
findings of the High Court with regard to the charging section being
defective is assailed by the State of Tamil Nadu in separate appeals
which are not part of this batch of appeals.
3.3.8 The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi vide impugned
judgment dated 30.01.2014 held that the Jharkhand
Entertainment Tax Act, 2012 levying tax on “entertainment”
through DTH, in pith and substance, is on entertainment which
falls under Entry 62 - List II. According to the High Court, the
aforesaid levy is distinguished from tax on “broadcasting service”
under Entry 62 - List II. Having found the State Legislature
competent to levy such “entertainment tax” the High Court
dismissed all the writ petitions.
3.3.9 Impugned order dated 19.08.2014 passed by Rajasthan
High Court conducted a survey of the extant judgments of different
High Courts on the issues raised and of Purvi Communication .


Page 22 of 321





Finally, the High Court dismissed all three writ petitions by way of
the impugned order.
3.3.10 Soon thereafter, the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
by way of impugned judgment dismissed the challenge to the
Gujarat Entertainment Tax (Exhibition by means of DTH
Broadcasting) Rules, 2010 for similar reasons as other High
Courts. The Gujarat High Court relied on Aspect Theory to dissect
the two taxable events herein, firstly , the service of enabling flow of
content and secondly , entertainment from content.
3.3.11 Finally, vide Impugned judgment dated 28.06.2012, the
Kerala High Court allowed WP(C) No.33966 of 2006 (R) on the
ground that the provisions of the impugned Act were
discriminatory inasmuch as they authorized levy and collection
of luxury tax on cable TV operators including petitioners only with
connections of 7500 or above as discriminatory. According to the
High Court, there could be no reasonable classification between
cable TV operators with connections below 7500 and cable TV
operators with connections above 7500 with reference to object of
legislation.


Page 23 of 321





Writ Petitions filed before this Court:
W.P. (C) No.699/2014:
3.4 W.P. (C) No.699/2014 has been preferred by the petitioner
Tata Sky Ltd. (now Tata Play Ltd.) challenging the constitutional
validity of Section 65 (105) (zk) read with Section 65(15) of the
Finance Act, 1994, which impose service tax on the provision of
“Direct to Home” (“DTH”) broadcast facility provided by
the petitioner to its subscribers. In short, the petitioner’s case is
that the entire operation carried on by the petitioner is one single
operation and since only service tax is being imposed on this
activity, the petitioner has been paying service tax on this activity
since the year 2006. However, later the Jharkhand Entertainment
Tax Act, 2012 (Act. No.13 of 2012) came into force taxing, inter alia ,
the activity of the petitioners as an entertainment. As a challenge
to the legality of this imposition has been rejected by the High
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi and several other High Courts,
which is now before this Court, this writ petition has been preferred
contending that once an activity is found to be subject of an
enactment under Entry 62 – List II, the same cannot also be subject
to service tax, which is imposed taking strength from Entry 97 –


Page 24 of 321





List I. Therefore, it is prayed that this Court may declare
unconstitutional the imposition of service tax on the petitioner’s
activity. In the alternative, it is prayed that this Court may declare
that the activity of broadcasting does not constitute providing
entertainment and is thereby amenable to service tax. The prayers
sought for in this writ petition read as under:
“a) Declare that Section 65 (105) (zk) and Section 65(15) of
the Finance Act, 1994, insofar as they purport to impose a
tax on the "Direct to Home" activity provided by the
Petitioner, are lacking in legislative competence and are
thereby unconstitutional;
b) Issue a writ of mandamus and/or such other
appropriate writ, order or directing Respondent No.1, the
Union of India, to pay to the various States, which seek to
collect tax by way of entertainment tax, the amount
collected by them towards service tax in discharge of the
Petitioner's liability towards entertainment tax;
c) In the alternative, declare that the activity of
broadcasting does not constitute providing entertainment
and is thereby amenable to service tax, and a tax by the
States on such activity under Entry 62, List II, Sch. 7 of
the Constitution of India is lacking in legislative
competence;
d) If prayer (c) above is allowed, then issue a writ of
mandamus and/or such other appropriate writ, order or
directing the Respondent States which collect tax by way
of entertainment tax, to pay over the tax collected by them
towards entertainment tax on the service provided by the
Petitioner to the Union of India in discharge of the
Petitioner's liability towards service tax.



Page 25 of 321





e) Pass such other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the interest of justice.”


W.P. (C) No.748/2015:
3.5 The issues raised in W.P.(C) No.748/2015 are similar to
W.P.(C) No.699/2014 inasmuch as the petitioner, M/s Tata Play
Ltd., challenges the constitutional validity of Section 65 (105) (zk)
read with Section 65(15) of the Finance Act, 1994, which imposes
service tax on the provision of DTH broadcast facility provided by
the petitioner to its subscribers. Petitioner also challenges the
constitutional validity of Sections 3(10), 3(11) and Section 15A of
the Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act, 1939, and the
Assessment Order RC No.A2/424/2014-15 (ET) dated 27.08.2015
issued by the Government of Telangana, Commercial Taxes
Department for FY 2011-22, 2012-13 and 2013-14. After re-
organization, the State of Telangana adopted the aforementioned
Act. The petitioner’s principal contention is that the petitioner
cannot be burdened with imposition of ‘service tax’ and
‘entertainment tax’ on the same taxable event i.e. ‘transmission of
signals’. It is also contended that the petitioner as a DTH operator
does not fall within the ambit of a ‘Master Cable Operator’ within


Page 26 of 321





the meaning of the state enactment and therefore no entertainment
tax can be levied on the petitioner’s activity. Furthermore, it is
argued that the State of Telangana cannot seek to levy
Entertainment Tax for the period prior to the existence of the State
of Telangana especially for the areas which now form part of the
Andhra Pradesh. The prayers sought for in this writ petition read
as under:
“(A) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring
Section 65 (105) (zk) r/w Section 65(14) of the Finance Act,
1994 insofar as they purport to impose a tax on the "Direct
to Home" activity provided by the Petitioner, as lacking
legislative competence and thereby unconstitutional;
(B) In the alternative, declare that the activity of
broadcasting does not constitute providing entertainment
and is thereby amenable to service tax and a tax by the
States on such activity under Entry 62, List II, Schedule 7
of the Constitution of India is. lacking in legislative
competence;
(C) Issue an appropriate Writ, Order or direction, declaring
the Section 3(10), 3(11) and Section 15 A of the Andhra
Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act as adopted by the State of
Telangana, in so far as it purports to impose a tax on the
activities carried on by the Petitioner as lacking legislative
competence;
(D) Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or
direction setting aside the Assessment Order (Rc. No. A2/
424/2014-2015 (ET) dated 27.08.2015 (received by the
Petitioner on 07.09.2015) issued by Respondent No. 3 as
illegal, and having been issued without the authority of
law;



Page 27 of 321





(E) Pass such other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the interest of justice.”


Submissions:
4. We have heard learned senior counsel and learned counsel
appearing for the respective assessees/appellants herein and
learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the respective State
as well as learned senior counsel appearing for the Union of India
at length and on several dates.
Submissions on behalf of Appellants:
4.1 Learned senior advocate, Sri Datar, appearing on behalf of
the appellant in C.A. No. 2147/2012, drew our attention to the
conscious use of the word ‘entertainments’ in Entry 62 - List II. It
was contended that the word ‘entertainments’ is not the plural of
‘entertainment’ but is nomen juris. This line of argument was
advanced to contend that the State cannot expand its taxing power
by including DTH services within the meaning of the word
“entertainments”. To buttress his submission, he took us through
the consistent use of the word ‘entertainments’ from the year 1622
onwards in British legislation. It was his argument that this
consistent usage reflects the continuing and underlying intention


Page 28 of 321





of constitutional makers for ‘entertainments’ to mean only public
entertainment to the exclusion of private entertainment. Reliance
in this regard was also placed on Cantonment Board Poona vs.
Western India Theatres Ltd., AIR 1954 BOM 261, wherein the
Bombay High Court held that ‘entertainments’ is used as a
common noun and is to mean ‘entertainments in public’.
4.2 Sri Datar also argued that Entry 31 – List I refers to
‘communication’ and ‘broadcasting’. Therefore, even in the absence
of an express entry taxing telecommunication or broadcasting, it
was contended that these are “services” and can be taxed only by
the Union, even if used for television channels. As “broadcasting
service” includes DTH service, the States do not have the
competence to tax the same service. He also drew our attention to
the omission of Section 129 of the Government of India Act, 1935
that permitted imposing of fees on construction, use of
transmitters, and use of receiving apparatus. This was contended
in light of the fact that DTH operators use an apparatus to receive
signals and further decode them.


Page 29 of 321





4.3 It was further contended that vide Circular No.
61/10/2003-ST dated 14.07.2003, the Ministry of Finance
directed Doordarshan and All India Radio to pay service tax as a
provider of broadcasting services. It was therefore contended that,
even if there is any entertainment through Doordarshan and All
India Radio, it has always been treated as part of broadcasting
service. By way of analogy, it was argued that Radio Tax was also
levied by the Post and Telegraph Department even though radio
provided entertainment. It was put forth that while Entry 31 - List
I covers broadcasting and “other like forms of communication”,
Entry 13 - List II applies to communications not specified in List I
(which actually concerns surface transport).
4.4 Our attention was also drawn to Entry 92C – List I of the
Constitution, which was inserted but not notified. Relying on a
judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of
Kerala vs. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd., (2012) 7 SCC 106,
Sri Datar argued that the subject service tax is within the exclusive
domain of Parliament even though Entry 92C was not notified.
Therefore, it was contended that under Article 246(1) read with


Page 30 of 321





Article 248, only Parliament can levy tax on any kind of services
after the insertion of Entry 92C.
4.5 Furthermore, Sri Datar highlighted that, even the Negative
List under Section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994 in the service tax
regime also specifically excludes tax on entertainments, which,
according to him, means only public entertainments. Therefore, it
was contended that entertainments in public places, theatres, etc.
will be subject to State taxes; whereas the same cinema shown on
a personal device or on DTH/Cable TV can be taxed only by the
Centre as being part of broadcasting service.
4.6 It was also contended by Sri Datar that all the impugned
enactments passed by States have merely included “DTH Services”
or broadcasting service as part of the definition of entertainment
and therefore the tax is levied on the service itself and not on the
entertainment, particularly because the entire value is taxed.
4.7 On the application of aspect theory, learned senior counsel
Sri Datar’s categorical argument was that “Double Aspect” theory
only comes into play when both the Union and States have
legislative competence. However, as Parliament in 2001 declared


Page 31 of 321





its intent to tax DTH services, the aspect theory will have no
application here.
4.8 Furthermore, on the relevancy of Purvi Communication to
the matter at hand, it was pointed out by Sri Datar that while
Parliament levied a tax in the year 2001, the judgment in Purvi
Communication was pronounced in 2005 and has not noted the
legislative history of entertainments and also did not refer to any
entries pertaining to broadcasting or communications.
4.9 As an argument in the alternative, it was contended that
even if the aspect theory was to apply, the impugned enactments
are liable to be struck down as they ignore that in all composite
transaction with different aspects, the legislature provides for
bifurcation; however, herein the State legislatures have not
provided for computation of the value attributable to
entertainment. Only the States of Delhi and Assam have not levied
entertainment tax on the gross consideration. It was contended
that taxation on gross value is prohibited in law and the value of
entertainment cannot be included in the value of service and vice-
a-versa, vide Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Union of


Page 32 of 321





India, (2006) 3 SCC 1 (“Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited”) ; K.
Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2000)
1 SCC 521.
4.10 In that context, it was also argued that where the services
are availed by the weaker section of the society as well, an
interpretation that avoids double taxation should be preferred.
4.11 Sri S.K. Bagaria, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant in Civil Appeal No.1680 of 2020 and Writ Petition
(Civil) No.699 of 2014, contended that the activity of the appellants
herein is primarily broadcasting and has been treated and taxed as
such under the statutes enacted by the Parliament. To show that
the entire field of DTH services is occupied by the Central
Government, Sri Bagaria drew our attention to the order dated
15.03.2001 of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
Government of India, by which DTH broadcasting was permitted in
India.
4.12 According to Sri Bagaria, the fact that neither Entry 62 -
List II nor any other entry in the State List explicitly mentions taxes
on broadcasting shows that any and all taxes on broadcasting can


Page 33 of 321





be imposed exclusively by the Parliament. Reliance in that regard
was placed on Article 248(2) of the Constitution which provides for
the Parliament to make any law imposing a tax not mentioned
either in the Concurrent list or in the State list. Reliance was placed
on the dictum of this Court in Association of Leasing &
Financial Service Companies vs. Union of India, (2011) 2 SCC
352 .
4.13 It was sought to be advanced that the question before this
Court was not merely regarding the scope of taxes on
entertainments but also about the conspicuous absence of taxes
on broadcasting in Entry 62 - List II. In other words, the question
is whether the expression ‘taxes on entertainments’ can be
construed so broadly as to include taxes on broadcasting within it.
The argument advanced was that even a reading of the entries in
their widest amplitude would not enable the respondents to read
into the entry a subject not covered by it. Succinctly stated, the
argument of Sri Bagaria is that giving such a wide interpretation to
Entry 62 - List II will nullify Parliament's power and legislative
competence to levy taxes on broadcasting service as there can be
no overlapping in the field of taxation.


Page 34 of 321





4.14 While Entry 31 - List I is undisputedly acknowledged as a
regulatory entry, it was also argued that a construction as argued
by the appellants will also be fully in line with the structure of the
constitutional scheme, especially that of the Seventh Schedule. As
broadcasting and other like forms of communication are covered
by Entry 31 - List I and service tax on broadcasting is imposed
under Entry 97 - List I, it was argued that there is a discernible
constitutional scheme which necessitates the widest possible
construction of Entry 31- List I. Additionally, it was advanced that
the State List has no mention of broadcasting and other like forms
of communication or taxes on broadcasting whereas State List does
have regulatory entries in the form of Entry 33 – List II concerning
sports, entertainments and amusements, and in the form of Entry
34 – List II for betting and gambling. Thus, Entry 62 – List II relates
to taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments,
amusements, betting and gambling.
4.15 Sri Bagaria, learned senior counsel, placed significant
reliance on the scheme of regulation and definition of broadcasting
by Parliamentary statutes and orders. It was argued that the entire
contour of broadcasting is a subject matter of parliamentary


Page 35 of 321





enactments and, therefore, as all forms, types and varieties of
broadcasting are covered by Parliamentary Law, it is evident that
every facet of regulation of broadcasting is subsumed under Entry
31 – List I and the taxing power for broadcasting is under Entry 97
– List I. Highlighting the importance of broadcasting, it was also
argued that broadcasting and other forms of communication are
subjects of national importance which were intended by the
constitutional framers to be regulated and taxed by the Central
Government only. It is the case of the appellants that upholding
such an interpretation of Entry 62 – List II would be to truly and
correctly reconcile the same with other entries in List I. According
to the appellants, the constitutional scheme is with respect to all
forms, types and contents of broadcasting. The consequences and
effects of broadcasting are not the same thing as legislative subject
matter and, consequently, all forms and attributes of broadcasting
also fall within List I. It is Sri Bagaria’s argument that tax is sought
to be levied merely with reference to the entertainment - causing
attribute of broadcasting and is, therefore, impermissible in law.
4.16 Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in
Special Reference No.1 of 2001, In Re: Association of Natural


Page 36 of 321





Gas vs. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 489 , wherein the validity
of Gujarat Gas (Regulation of Transmission, Supply and
Distribution) Act, 2001 was challenged before the Constitution
Bench. The issue before the Court was whether the State had
legislative competence to make laws on natural gas and liquefied
natural gas under Entry 25 – List II, “ Gas and Gasworks ” or
whether the Parliament was competent to make laws under Entry
53 – List I, “ Regulation and development of oilfields and mineral oil
resources; petroleum and petroleum products; other liquids and
substances declared by Parliament by law to be dangerously
inflammable ”. While the State of Gujarat argued that Entry 25 –
List II must be given the widest possible interpretation and that it
includes all types of gases especially when there are no words of
limitation in the entry itself, this Court considered the consistent
legislative practice in various legislations to hold that the term
“petroleum” or “petroleum products” has been given a wide
meaning to include within itself natural gas and other similar
products. Sri Bagaria, learned senior counsel, contended that
similarly, central legislations passed by Parliament over several
decades included within “broadcasting” any form of


Page 37 of 321





communication like signals, images, sounds of all kinds by
transmission of electromagnetic waves irrespective of the contents
and their natures or types. It was further contended that this
reading will not make Entry 62 – List II a “useless lumber” because
any or all forms of broadcasting was never intended to be covered
by the expression “entertainments”.
4.17 It was categorically argued that the aspect theory has no
application to the activity at hand as the activity of broadcasting is
taxed by the Parliament and the state legislatures have no
legislative competence to tax the same under Entry 62 - List II as
tax on ‘entertainments’. Sri Bagaria would argue that even in
Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India vs.
Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 634 (“Federation of Hotel &
Restaurant Association of India”) this Court rejected the
challenge to the central statute impugned therein as it found that
the subject matter of the impugned statute was in pith and
substance a tax on expenditure and not on luxuries or sale of
goods.


Page 38 of 321





4.18 Sri Gulati, learned senior advocate, argued that at a
foundational level, far from carrying out any activity of
entertainment, the appellant only acts as a conduit in the entire
process of transmission of signals to the subscriber of television
channels. In this context, he outlined that appellants perceive the
nature of their activity as follows:
(i) entire activity of appellants is in relation to transmission of
DTH signals; and
(ii) neither do appellants exercise any control over the content
received from the broadcaster nor do they control exhibition of
the content.
4.19 It was contended that the said activity is aptly described as
only rendering broadcasting service which was earlier amenable to
service tax under Section 65(105)(zk) of the Finance Act, 1994 and
was specifically expanded in 2005 to include DTH signals. That
from the year 2007 onwards, the appellant was discharging service
tax on the entire monthly subscription charges under
‘broadcasting services’ without charging any additional
consideration for set-top boxes and dish antenna. It was argued


Page 39 of 321





that, in substance, this position continued even after the Negative
List regime was brought about in 2012.
4.20 Sri Gulati highlighted that States have enacted statutes
under Entry 62 – List II intending to tax the very same activity as
that of providing “broadcasting service”, which is already amenable
to service tax imposed by the Parliament. According to Sri Gulati,
the provisions of various State enactments levying Entertainment
tax can be categorized as follows:
i. Levy of tax is on admission to entertainment by way of a DTH
connection;
ii. Levy is on entertainment through DTH service, and
iii. No taxable event is specified in the charging provision.
4.21 It was contented that herein there is only one activity of
providing DTH signal and that itself is a service. Reliance was
placed on All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. Union
of India, (2007) 9 SCR 527 (“All India Federation of Tax
Practitioners”) to submit that a service is also an activity. Thus,
it was contended that the only taxable event here being providing
the service of broadcasting, there are no two aspects to the service


Page 40 of 321





provided by the Appellants and only one taxable event i.e. provision
of DTH service does not enable the States under the guise of Entry
62 - List II to levy entertainment tax on the same aspect.
4.22 It was stressed on behalf of the appellants that though
entertainment may, inter alia, be a consequence of DTH service,
but entertainment tax cannot be levied on the activity of provision
of DTH service, vide Godfrey Phillips Ltd. vs. State of U.P.,
(2005) 2 SCC 515 (“Godfrey Phillips”). It was contended that
there being only one taxable event, there can be no confounding of
the service provided herein as both: a service and an
entertainment.
4.23 In the same vein, reliance was placed on Godfrey Phillips
to contend that the word ‘entertainments’ contemplates a tax on
‘activities’ of entertainments and not on any person being
entertained or receiving entertainment per se . As no entertainment
is inherently embedded in the activity conducted by appellants,
namely, broadcasting service, there can be no levy of entertainment
tax on them.


Page 41 of 321





4.24 It was also pressed that the position of law permits tax
under Entry 62 - List II only on the act of entertaining and not on
the consequence of an activity being entertainment vide Western
India Theatres vs. Cantonment Board, Poona, 1959 Supp (2)
SCR 63 (“Western India Theatres”) . Highlighting the multitude
of content transmitted by appellants, it was advanced that the
activity of appellants cannot be seen as providing entertainment
insofar as informational and educational shows, news, etc. as these
may not have any element of entertainment at all.
4.25 Another line of argument of appellants advanced before us
relates to a distinction between public entertainment and private
entertainment. By way of analogy to cinema theaters, it was
contended that mere provision of DTH services does not constitute
a ticket “for admission to an entertainment”/or provision of
“entertainment”. It was also contended that for an entertainment
to be taxed as such, it should be open to public where members
are invited. That is to say, Entry 62 – List II is restricted to
entertainments of a public color. – vide Geeta Enterprises vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 4 SCC 202 (“Geeta
Enterprises”) . However, as DTH service is provided to a subscriber


Page 42 of 321





in a private place, the appellants contended that the aspect of
providing DTH service levy of entertainment tax is constitutionally
impermissible. According to Sri Gulati, learned senior counsel, the
words appearing alongside ‘entertainments’ in Entry 62 – List II
must also be taken aid of to interpret the entry as having a public
colour. It was argued that the juxtaposition of amusements, betting
and gambling within one entry indicates that the tax contemplated
is on establishments providing entertainment activities. Similarly,
it was highlighted that the taxable event in various state
legislations is the “admission for an entertainment” and not the
consequence of entertainment.
4.26 The next line of contention taken by the appellants is that
there is no overlap in taxing entries and that it is settled law that
taxing entries must be construed with clarity and precision as to
maintain exclusivity. - Commissioner of Central Excise and
Customs, Kerala vs. Larsen and Toubro Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 170
and Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, (1983) 4
SCC 45 (“Hoechst Pharmaceuticals”).


Page 43 of 321





4.27 On the question of applicability of aspect theory, which has
been relied on by various High Courts, the appellants contend that
the activity of broadcasting is only one indivisible transaction
which cannot be artificially split into two taxable events and,
therefore, the aspect theory would have no applicability here as
splitting is permitted only when the activity represents two distinct
and separate contracts which are discernible as such. - Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited.
4.28 In substance, the contention of the appellants was that the
provision of providing DTH service is only one taxable event which
cannot be split into various aspects to become amenable to
taxation as both a broadcasting service and as entertainments.
Reliance was also placed on the fact that the appellants are
mandated to avail license granted under Section 4 of the Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885 for providing telecommunication services. It
was also highlighted that this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited observed that the license under Section 4 of the Indian
Telegraph Act is for providing telecommunication service and not
for supply of any goods or transfer of right to use any goods. In
furtherance of the same, it was noted by this Court that the


Page 44 of 321





integrity of the telecommunication service or license would
therefore be mutilated if it were to be broken down into pieces to
be taxed as supply of goods or transfer of right to use goods.
4.29 Sri Gulati, learned senior counsel, furthermore argued that
there being no divisible event, the correct test to ascertain the true
nature of the activity herein is the dominant nature test. Having
argued vehemently that the dominant intention of the appellant is
to act only as a conduit for receipt and transmission of
broadcasting signals, he highlighted that the aspect theory will be
of no avail to the States to entrench upon the Union List and tax
services by including the cost of such service in the value of the
goods, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited; Imagic Creative (P)
vide
Ltd. vs. CCT, (2008) 2 SCC 614 (“Imagic Creative”); Larsen and
Toubro Limited vs. State of Karnataka, (2014) 1 SCC 708 .
4.30 Sri Gulati took us through the origin of the aspect theory in
the Canadian jurisprudence whilst highlighting at the outset a
significant distinction between the Canadian and Indian
jurisprudence that must be borne in mind. In Lyle Francis Smith
vs. Her Majesty the Queen, (1960) SCR 776 , and in several


Page 45 of 321





decisions since then, it has been observed by the Supreme Court
of Canada that within the Canadian constitutional scheme, an
overlap is inevitable between the subjects outlining the areas of
legislations to be legislated on by the Parliament of Canada and
provincial legislatures due to the general wording of the subjects
under Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867
respectively. However, it is settled law that in India, there is no
overlap between the taxation entries in List I and List II. It was
highlighted that the double aspect doctrine has been developed to
resolve these situations of inevitable overlap and has been applied
to allow both federal and provincial regulation where powers
overlap. It was contended that the doctrine has, however, never
been allowed to enable the dominion and provincial legislatures to
separately tax two aspects of the same transaction. It was therefore
contented that any transplantation of the doctrine to the Indian
Constitution must be tempered and exercised with caution given
that in the Indian constitutional scheme, there cannot be any
overlap in respect to the entries pertaining to taxation.
4.31 Furthermore, it was contended that the true nature of the
activity of DTH services must be ascertained while keeping in mind


Page 46 of 321





that the DTH operator has no control over the content that is
broadcast or received. It was contended that as the activity would
continue to be a service even if no entertainment value is
transmitted, it must be held that the true nature of the activity is
predominantly that of a broadcasting service. It was repeatedly and
vehemently argued on behalf of appellants that any element of
entertainment is purely incidental to the provision of service.
4.32 Sri Gulati further argued that the pith and substance of the
state legislations, impugned herein, is in the nature of a
broadcasting service. This argument links to the foundational
argument that the activity of providing broadcasting services is not
in the nature of entertainment, and therefore, the levy imposed on
purported entertainment isn't different from service on which
service tax is levied by the central government. It was contended
that states cannot simply deem the whole activity undertaken by
appellant as ‘entertainment’ which in fact is, fundamentally, a
broadcasting service.
4.33 The argument further advanced on behalf of the appellants
was that there is no machinery to exclude the value of service from


Page 47 of 321





the value of entertainment. This was argued as the impugned
legislations, except those of the States of Delhi, Gujarat, and
Assam, do not exclude the value of service from the value of
entertainment before levying entertainment tax. According to the
appellants, it is impermissible to levy entertainment tax on the
value of the gross amount received by the appellants from its
subscribers without segregating the value of service from the value
of entertainment. In substance, the contention of the appellant was
that in the absence of any machinery to compute the measure of
tax for the purpose of levy of entertainment tax, the charge of
entertainment tax itself would fall, vide Commissioner of Income
Tax, Bangalore vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty, (1981) 2 SCC 460.
4.34 Notably, a three-judge bench of this Court in Purvi
Communication has already found that entertainment tax was
leviable against cable operators. However, learned senior counsel
Sri K.K. Venugopal argued that the decision of this Court in Purvi
Communication failed to consider the tests laid down in Geeta
Enterprises and to that extent is per incuriam and sub silentio .
Appellants also contended that the decision in Purvi
Communication is distinguishable as that case was not concerned


Page 48 of 321





with attempts of both Central Government and State Governments
to levy a tax on the same activity but instead dealt with the conflict
between Entry 62 – List II and Entry 31 – List I i.e. between a taxing
entry and a regulatory entry, whereas the conflict herein is between
two taxing entries being Entry 97 – List I and Entry 62 – List II.
4.35 The appellants also contended that if the State legislatures
are held competent to levy entertainment tax under Entry 62 – List
II, then the taxable event would fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the State legislature and consequently the Central
Government would lose competence to levy service tax under Entry
97 – List I.
4.36 Without prejudice to the foregoing arguments, learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellants argued that the
impugned legislations promulgated by the states of Tamil Nadu,
Odisha, Assam and Gujarat fail to provide for a clear and
unambiguous taxable event as they only deem the operations of
DTH operators as entertainment. Therefore, it was contended that
these legislations do not satisfy the test laid down by this Court in
Govind Saran Ganga Saran vs. CST, 1985 Supp SCC 205


Page 49 of 321





(“Govind Saran Ganga Saran”) and must be held to be
unconstitutional. As only the Madras High Court accepted this
argument, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the
impugned judgments arising out of the High Courts including
Orissa, Gauhati and Gujarat are bad in law.
4.37 It was further contended that Section 3 of the Jharkhand
Entertainment Tax Act, 2012, which is the charging section, merely
provides a tax on entertainment and lacks any clear and
unambiguous stipulation to tax entertainment through DTH.
Therefore, in the absence of such express words in the charging
section, there cannot be any levy of entertainment tax. It was also
contended that the Notification dated 14.05.2012 issued by the
State Government under Section 1(3) of the Jharkhand
Entertainment Tax Act, 2012 appointing 27.04.2012 as the date of
implementation of the Act suffers from the vice of imposing
retrospective taxation in the absence of any express legislative
provision providing for it.
4.38 Ms. Shirin Khajuria, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the subscribers, took us through the scheme of the


Page 50 of 321





impugned Act promulgated by the State of Kerala and brought to
our attention that there was a stay on the levy of luxury tax for the
period 2006 to 2010 and therefore the tax has to be collected only
if leviable and not otherwise.
Submissions of Respondent-States:
State of West Bengal:
5. Sri Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the
State of West Bengal in W.P.(C) 699/2014, commenced his
arguments by noting that the writ petitioners have not pressed the
prayers challenging the constitutional validity of Section 65
(105)(zk) and Section 65(15) of the Finance Act, 1994. Further,
arguing in support the constitutional validity of the entertainment
tax imposed under the State enactment, he contended that there
is no conflict between Entry 62 – List II and Entry 97 – List I.
5.1 According to learned senior counsel, this Court’s approach
must be to first interpret Entry 62 – List I, followed by an
examination of the scope of Entry 33 – List I. It was argued that
the scope of Entry 62 – List II can be informed by the judgment of
this Court in Western India Theatres wherein it was held that a


Page 51 of 321





State imposition is on the activity of entertainment. In that case, it
was on the happening of a show in a theater. Reliance was placed
on the following paragraph from Western India Theatres :
“As pointed out by this Court in Navinchandra Mafatlal v.
The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City (1),
following certain earlier decisions referred to therein, the
entries in the legislative list should not be read in a narrow
or restricted sense and that each general word should be
held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which
can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in
it. It has been accepted as well settled that in construing
such an entry conferring legislative powers the widest
possible construction according to their ordinary meaning
must be put upon the words used therein. In view of this
well established rule of interpretation, there can be no
reason to construe the words " taxes on luxuries or
entertainments or amusements " in entry 50 as having a
restricted meaning so -as to confine the operation of the
law to be made thereunder only to taxes on persons
receiving the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements.
The entry contemplates luxuries, entertainments, and
amusements as objects on which the tax is to be imposed.
If the words are to be so regard- ed, as we think they must,
there can be no reason to differentiate between the giver
and the receiver of the luxuries, entertainments, or
amusements and both may, with equal propriety, be made
amenable to the tax. It is true that economists regard an
entertainment tax as a tax on expenditure and, indeed,
when the tax is imposed on the receiver of the
entertainment, it does become a tax on expenditure, but
there is no warrant for holding that entry 50 contemplates
only a tax on moneys spent on luxuries, entertainments or
amusements. The entry, as we have said, contemplates
a law with respect to these matters regarded as objects
and a law which imposes tax on the act of entertaining


Page 52 of 321





is within the entry whether it falls on the giver or the
receiver of that entertainment. . ..”
(emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforesaid to the facts of the instant cases, it was
argued that irrespective of the nomenclature of broadcasting or
entertainment, the activity of the petitioner ends with the TV set
and is therefore carried out for the purpose of entertainment.
5.2 Sri Gupta further argued that where taxing entries are not in
conflict, then there is no need to go the doctrine of pith and
substance. Furthermore, examining the application of aspect
theory in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of
India , he argued that the same has been followed in All India
Federation of Tax Practitioners . It was also argued that Purvi
Communication is not per incuriam and was rightly decided it
being distinguished from Geeta Enterprises for multiple reasons.
State of Uttar Pradesh:
5.3 Learned senior counsel Sri Raizada appearing for the State
of Uttar Pradesh, contended that the judgment in Geeta
Enterprises was adjudicated on the anvil of interpretation of
places of entertainment ’ as it appeared in the 1937 Act whereas the


Page 53 of 321





present impugned levy is imposed under the revised 1979 Act. It
was highlighted that the period of the controversy herein is from
2005–2009 and any dictum under the 1937 Act would have no
bearing on the present case. Furthermore, it was argued that if for
a single transaction two levies are made out or use a measure of
another tax then such an imposition would not be ultra vires the
Constitution. Therefore, it was contended that ‘ entertainments ’ as
it appears in Entry 62 – List II must be given a widest possible
interpretation and it would be erroneous to define entertainment
in a myopic, rigid or straightjacket formula.
State of Odisha:
5.4 Sri Preetesh Kapur, learned senior advocate, appearing for
the State of Odisha in C.A. No.1536/2020 contended that Entry 62
– List II must be read in the widest amplitude possible and a correct
reading of the same allows imposition of tax on the act of
entertaining whether it falls on the provider or receiver of
entertainment, vide Western India Theatres . Furthermore, in
Express Hotels (P) Ltd. vs. The State of Gujarat, 1989 3 SCC
677 (“Express Hotels”) , this Court, while interpreting Entry 62 –
List II on the context of luxuries, observed that a legislative entry


Page 54 of 321





takes within it everything that can fairly and reasonably be said to
be comprehended in it while the actual measure of the levy is a
matter of legislative policy and will be held to be good in law as long
as it has a reasonable nexus with the concept of luxuries. It was
also canvassed that the actual utilization or derivation of
entertainment was irrelevant for the imposition of tax and could be
of any kind including one which may be purely educative vide
Express Hotels or Geeta Enterprises.
5.5 It was further argued that the Orissa Entertainment Tax Act,
2005 as well as the Amendment Act of 2010 are, in pith and
substance, relatable to Entry 62 - List II. Applying the test
expounded by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Purvi
Communication to ascertain whether a tax falls within the ambit
of Entry 62 - List II, learned senior counsel contended that the
amendment in question, whereby entertainment tax was imposed
on DTH operators, is a tax on entertainment.
5.6 Sri Kapur argued that this Court in para 46 of Purvi
Communication has held that the appropriate test is whether the
activity being taxed has a direct and proximate nexus with the


Page 55 of 321





provision (or enjoyment) of entertainment. It was also argued that
once the law is found to be in pith and substance relatable to Entry
62 - List II, the mere imposition of service tax cannot by itself
denude the State legislatures of their legislative competence.
5.7 Sri Kapur sought to contend that when neither entry is
subject to the other, then both entries are required to be
constructed so harmoniously that they are given full effect in their
respective fields. Therefore, both entries herein, though they may
seem overlapping, can indeed be given full effect as they deal with
distinct aspects. States have also placed significant reliance on
‘aspect theory’ or the ‘double aspect doctrine’ to establish that both
Central and State Acts are valid as they seek to levy tax on entirely
different aspects even though they may form part of the same
activity.
5.8 According to Sri Kapur, had the liability been imposed
directly upon the subscriber, the distinction between service tax on
the services rendered by the DTH operator and entertainment tax
upon the subscribers would have been self-evident. It is settled law
that entertainment tax, for administrative convenience, can either


Page 56 of 321





be on the receiver or equally be upon the provider of the content
without causing any alteration to its nature. – Federation of Hotel
& Restaurant Association of India. The same case was also
relied upon to contend that a measure of tax is not determinative
of the nature of the levy.
5.9 Furthermore, it was contended that the argument advanced
by the appellants herein would render Entry 62 – List II redundant
as almost every provision of entertainment would necessarily be
borne out of rendition of some service. According to Sri Kapur, this
is precisely why the distinction between the two aspects must
always be kept in mind.
5.10 On the application of aspects theory, it was contented that
the same is neither contrary to the pith and substance doctrine nor
is it an exception, but only compliments the latter. The
operationalization of aspect theory is explained by suggesting that
two competing enactments, if they deal with distinct aspects of a
transaction, will not restrict each other and will continue to apply
in their respective fields without inviting any question of overlap or
repugnancy. It was submitted that the aspect theory is helpful at


Page 57 of 321





the stage of a “seeming” conflict to determine whether the aspects
legislated upon are distinct and whether there is an overlap or not
at all.
5.11 In response to the arguments of the appellants that Entry
31 read with Entry 97 – List I must be seen as taking out from
Entry 62 – List II a tax on entertainment provided by means of
broadcasting, the State of Orissa contended that such an argument
overlooks the distinct aspects involved in rendition of services and
entertainment. Neither could Entry 31 – List I being a regulatory
entry whittle down the scope of Entry 62 – List II nor could Entry
97 – List I being a residuary entry cull out any aspect from a
specific taxing entry in the State List.
5.12 Pertinently it was also highlighted that this Court in State
of Karnataka vs. State of Meghalaya, (2023) 4 SCC 416
(“State of Karnataka”) , specifically rejected the contention that a
regulatory entry in the Union List must be construed as also
covering all facets of taxation along with and through the residuary
entry, even if that tax may squarely fall within the State List.


Page 58 of 321





5.13 Furthermore, in response to the contentions on Geeta
Enterprises and Purvi Communication , it was contended that
the judgment in Geeta Enterprises categorically notes that this
Court was concerned with the definition of entertainment under a
particular statute and not under Entry 62 – List II. That it would
be wholly erroneous to transplant the limitations and
interpretations made in the context of a statute to be taken to
govern the interpretation of an entry in the Seventh Schedule of
the Constitution, which must be given an interpretation of the
widest possible amplitude.
5.14 It was also highlighted that this Court in Suresh vs. State
of T.N., (1997) 1 SCC 319 (“Suresh”) had already considered the
argument and expressed agreement with the view of the States
herein.
5.15 Summarily, it was also argued that the imposition of tax on
goods or an activity that a person may ultimately enjoy or consume
at home cannot be construed as an invasion of the right to privacy.
5.16 To the argument of the appellants that they are merely
conduits in the chain between broadcasters and subscribers, it was


Page 59 of 321





responded that it is settled law that a tax under Entry 62 – List II
can be on the provider of entertainment as well as or on the
receiver. It was also contended that the DTH operator evidently has
a direct and proximate nexus with the subscriber inasmuch as it
is the DTH operator who enrolls and provides the setup box along
with dish antenna to the subscriber. Finally, it was contended that
the argument of merely being a conduit overlooks the well settled
position that tax can be collected at any convenient stage as long
as a rational connection is maintained. – vide CCE vs. Grasim
Industries Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 233.
5.17 It was also argued that the appellants have erred in relying
on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited to contend that the dominant
intention of the activity must be seen and that there must be
splitting of charges between services and entertainment. Learned
senior counsel submitted that this argument ought to be rejected
as it would be totally erroneous to draw an analogy between
entertainment tax on the one hand and tax on sale of goods on the
other, as in the case of entertainment the entire service rendered
by the provider is for the purpose of entertainment. Even though it
might be one activity, it is on one aspect, the price for services


Page 60 of 321





rendered and, from the point of view of the subscribers, the price
for entertainment. – Federation of Hotel & Restaurant
Association of India.
5.18 According to learned senior counsel, the Court in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited held that tax on sale of goods cannot be
levied on a separate and severable component i.e. services as goods
are only a component of the deemed severable transaction by way
of a fiction. In other words, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited,
it was held that the States lacked jurisdiction to tax the services
component and consequently, lacked the competency to include
the price of services as a measure of tax for sale of goods and vice-
It was for this reason that the judgment in Bharat Sanchar
versa.
Nigam Limited held that value of services cannot be included in
the value of goods. By way of analogy, it was contended that had it
been the case that electromagnetic waves had also been deemed to
be goods and there was an overlap of the entire consideration, only
then would the judgment in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited be
similar to the facts herein.


Page 61 of 321





5.19 It was also contended that the argument of splitting the
consideration between services and entertainment is an indirect
manner of contending that the entire subscription amount cannot
form the measure of tax. It was argued that in case of a composite
transaction including services and sale of goods, a measure for one
is distinct from the other by virtue of there being two deemed
separate transactions. However herein, as the employment of
aspect theory as laid down in the Federation is justified, the full
subscription amount can indeed constitute the measure for both
taxes as the rational nexus between the levy and the measure is
maintained. – vide Mineral Area Development Authority vs.
Steel Authority of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1796.
State of Tamil Nadu:
5.20 Sri Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of Respondent-State of Tamil Nadu in C.A. No.1580/2020
and C.A. No.1581/2020, invited this Court’s attention to the
history of the legislation on the subject in the State of Tamil Nadu.
Promulgated in 1939, the preamble to the Tamil Nadu
Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 reflects that the Act was intended
to impose a tax on amusement and other entertainments in the


Page 62 of 321





st
Province of Madras .” Vide Act No.XVII of 1949 w.e.f. 1 August
1949, the words “a tax” was substituted by “taxes” and by Madras
Act No.V of 1958, the words “amusements and other
entertainments” were substituted by the word “entertainments”.
5.21 Thus, as it stands today, the Tamil Nadu Entertainments
Tax Act, 1939 is “an Act to impose taxes on entertainments in the
State of Tamil Nadu”. It was shown that Section 3(4) of the Act,
which defines “entertainment” was amended to levy tax on gross
collection per show made by the theatres-touring, permanent and
semi-permanent.
5.22 Of note is the charging section of the Act i.e., Section 4
which sought to tax entertainment provided through
cinematograph exhibition in the theatres on payment for
admission. The system of levy gradually underwent changes to pay
a percentage on gross collection and based on theatre location.
Pertinently, it was submitted that in the wake of new age medium
of recreation on television screen through a VCR or cable television
network, the legislature in its wisdom inserted Section 4-D to the
Act w.e.f. 17.05.1984. The aforesaid Section was substituted by


Page 63 of 321





Amendment Act 37 of 1994 with effect from 01.09.1994, which
inserted a charging provision under Section 4-E to levy tax on
entertainment through cable television at 40% of contribution or
subscription or installation or connection charges or charges
collected in any manner for television exhibition. Similarly,
appropriate changes were made to the definition of “entertainment”
under Section 3(4) of the Act to include cable TV and another
source of entertainment. Thereafter, the State of Tamil Nadu,
having taken note of further technological advancement in offering
entertainment through DTH and through IPL matches, inserted
section 4-I in the said Act to levy tax. Therefore, DTH service and
cricket tournaments conducted by the IPL were brought within the
definition of the term ‘entertainment’.
5.23 Aggrieved, several DTH service providers preferred Writ
Petitions before Madras High Court challenging the levy of
entertainment tax. By judgment dated 19.10.2012, the High Court
accepted the contention of DTH service providers that the charging
section was defective and the levy of entertainment tax is contrary
to Article 14; however, the High Court held that the State


Page 64 of 321





Legislature was competent to levy tax on the entertainment aspect
of the DTH services.
5.24 Learned senior counsel submitted that while construing an
entry in a List conferring legislative power, the widest possible
construction according to their ordinary meaning must be given to
the words used therein. – vide Navinchandra Mafatlal vs.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City, AIR 1955 SC 58.
It was submitted that the most liberal and widest construction
must be given to accommodate within an organic Constitution the
changing meaning of the text in tune with an evolving society. In
that context, it was submitted that in today’s society, it is pedantic
to contend that the term ‘entertainment’ does not cover within its
ambit DTH service providers. Furthermore, it was argued that
merely because individuals can derive entertainment in their
private space does not denude the public character of
entertainment through DTH services. The facility of choosing the
time, place, mode or content does not convert entertainment
through DTH into private entertainment and therefore, the subject
matter of tax is not a justifiable ground to read any limitation into
this expression.


Page 65 of 321





5.25 Learned senior counsel vehemently argued that the theory
of occupied field advanced by the appellants herein has already
been rejected by this Court. Our attention was drawn to the
judgment of Madras High Court dated 30.11.1994 in Tamil Nadu
Cable TV Organisers vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No.
16237/1994 . Therein, Section 4-E of the State legislation which
levied an entertainment tax on the entertainment aspect of service
provided by cable operators was challenged in the aforementioned
petition before the Madras High Court. Rejecting the challenge, it
was held that there being nothing in Entry 62 – List II to warrant a
restrictive meaning, the definition of entertainment would not be
restricted to cinematographic exhibitions alone and would include
other forms of entertainment as well. It was submitted that the
challenge made therein was most similar to the challenge made
here against Section 4-I of the same Act. As noted, the Madras High
Court rejected the restricted interpretation of entertainments and
rejected the contention based on the theory of occupied field as it
found that in pith and substance the impugned legislation fell
within Entry 62 - List II. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred before
this Court by cable TV operators which was rejected in Suresh ,


Page 66 of 321





while observing that there was no reason as to why the
entertainment aspect of the transaction could not be taxed.
5.26 It was further argued that in India, the subject of tax can
be the person, thing or activity on which the tax is imposed and
herein the subject of tax is the receiver of entertainment by
subscription to DTH: Godfrey Phillips .
5.27 Sri Radhakrishnan referred to the distinct and different
senses in which the words ‘levied’, ‘paid’ and ‘recoverable’ are used
in Section 4-I of the Act. While the tax is ‘levied’ on entertainment,
it is ‘paid’ on all payments for admission to an entertainment and
it is ‘recovered’ by the proprietor and paid to the government. Sri
Radhakrishnan also agreed that even if the DTH service provider
only acts as a conduit between content providers and the
subscribers, since it is clarified that the subject matter of the tax
is the entertainment derived from the content, there is no scope for
confusing the entertainment with the service of enabling the flow
of content through the DTH system. It was also argued that there
are two aspects of the DTH service; i.e. the service aspect and the
entertainment aspect. The taxable event for the former being the


Page 67 of 321





flow of content through satellites and for the latter being the
entertainment derived from the subscription of the content.
5.28 It was also canvassed that the specific power of taxation
within the legislative competence of State of Tamil Nadu cannot be
fettered by the general power of regulation or the residuary power
of taxation available to the Union Government under Entry 31 or
even Entry 97 – List I. It was contended that this Court has already
observed that legislative competence of the State to levy
entertainment tax could not be fettered by the enactment of any
regulatory enactment law, vide Purvi Communication.
5.29 It was therefore contended that the state’s specific power of
taxation cannot be cut down by regulatory power of the Union. To
assail any question of overlapping in the present case, learned
senior counsel submitted that Entry 62 – List II operates in an
entirely different sphere to that of Entry 92C or Entry 97 – List I.
5.30 It was further contended that a reading of Entry 33 – List II
makes it evident that entertainment and amusement is a class by
itself not subject to Entry 60 – List I. Although cinemas mentioned
in Entry 33 – List II are made subject to Entry 60 – List I relating


Page 68 of 321





to sanctioning of cinematographic films for exhibition, but other
forms of entertainment qua which general power of regulation is
given to the state are not made subject to any entries in List I.
5.31 It was reiterated that this Court has held that under the
Indian Constitution, the scheme of division of taxing powers is not
based on any criterion depending on the incidence of the tax. –
Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. vs. Union of India, AIR
1962 SC 1006. The importance of the doctrine of pith and
substance in deciding the scope of legislation qua the entries in the
three Lists was also emphasized. - MPV Sundararamier & Co. vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 SC 468 (“MPV
Sundararamier”). It was also contended that to decide the true
nature and character of a particular levy with reference to
legislative competence, the Court has to look into the pith and
substance of the legislation as a whole. - All India Federation of
Tax Practitioners. On an application of the aforesaid principles
to the facts of these cases, the learned senior counsel concluded
that taxes on DTH service is on a different subject when compared
to taxes on entertainment as the pith and substance of the relevant
state legislation is to tax the subject of entertainment.


Page 69 of 321





5.32 Sri Radhakrishnan submitted that the question in Geeta
Enterprises was limited to the interpretation of the word
‘entertainment’ as used in Section 2(3) of the United Provinces
Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 and therefore non-
consideration of the ratio of the said case does not make the
judgment in Purvi Communication bad in law.
5.33 Additionally, it was also argued that DTH operators are not
merely engaged as conduits in the service of broadcasting but also
create their exclusive content and channels available to their
subscribers.
State of Rajasthan:
5.34 Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the State of Rajasthan, submitted that if the activity of
the petitioners is within Entry 62 – List II then nothing more is to
be seen and the imposition of service tax is wholly irrelevant. After
taking us through the provisions of the relevant Act promulgated
by the State of Rajasthan Act, it was argued that imposition of
service tax is not a tax on entertainment, validity of which needs to


Page 70 of 321





be determined only by testing if in pith and substance it is
traceable to Entry 62 – List II.
State of Punjab:
5.35 Learned senior counsel Sri Farasat appearing for the State
of Punjab, argued that broadcasting is merely a means to the
entertainment derived, by the content being delivered and that the
imposition of service tax would not detract from the competence of
the State Legislature to levy entertainment tax under Entry 62 –
List II. In the absence of any conclusive intent apparent from the
Constituent Assembly Debates, he argued against drawing any
myopic inference on the scope of Entry 62 – List II.
State of Nagaland:
5.36 Ms. K. Enatoli Sema, learned counsel appearing for the State
of Nagaland in W.P.(C) No.699/2014, brought to our attention that
the relevant state Act was amended in the year 2011 and that the
definition of entertainment includes DTH operators. That the
enactment promulgated by the State of Nagaland has not been
challenged and that in fact even after filing of the writ petition,


Page 71 of 321





entertainment tax has in fact been paid by the writ petitioner
without any protest.
State of Andhra Pradesh:
5.37 Sri Sahel, learned counsel appearing for the State of Andhra
Pradesh in W.P.(C) No.748/2015, similarly highlighted that there
is no challenge to the State Act in the writ petition.
Union of India:
5.38 Learned senior counsel Ms. Nisha Bagchi appearing for the
Union of India in W.P.(C) No.699/2014, submitted that the issue
of service tax has been conceded in almost all High Courts and has
not been disputed as such. She submitted that in view of the
dismissal of the C.A. No. 261/2013 and C.A. Nos. 1582-1583/2020
the prayers (a) and (b) in W.P. Nos. 699/2014 and 748/2015 do
not survive for consideration. She particularly highlighted that the
Delhi High Court dismissed the challenge to the constitutional
validity of service tax, as did Madras High Court, on the basis of
categorical concessions made by the assessees. Learned senior
counsel also submitted that no controversy with regard to payment


Page 72 of 321





of service tax arises in the Civil Appeal arising from the decision of
the Kerala High Court.
Reply Arguments:
5.39 We have heard the arguments made by way of reply by the
respective senior counsel and counsel appearing for the parties .
5.40 We have perused the voluminous material on record as well
as the judicial dicta cited before us.
Points for Consideration:
6. Whether the judgments of the High Courts (Eleven High
Courts) impugned in these cases would call for any interference
and if so, to what extent?
6.1 Whether Purvi Communications has been correctly decided
by this Court?
6.2 Whether the prayers sought for in the writ petitions are to be
granted and if so, to what extent?
6.3 What order?
6.4 On 11.09.2024, learned senior counsel Ms. Nisha Bagchi
submitted that in view of the dismissal of CA No.261/2013 and CA


Page 73 of 321





Nos.1582-1583/2020 by this Court, prayers (a) and (b) in WP
Nos.699/2014 and 748/2015 would not survive for consideration.
By way of response, learned senior counsel Sri Bagaria has also
conceded that the controversy in these writ petitions is essentially
on the imposition of entertainment tax and therefore, prayer (a) in
the writ petitions would not be pressed.
6.5 His submission is placed on record.
6.6 Learned senior counsel Ms. Bagchi also submitted that in the
Civil Appeal which arises from the decision of the Kerala High
Court dealing with luxury tax, there is no controversy with regard
to the payment of service tax by appellants therein.
6.7 The said position is not disputed at the Bar.
6.8 In view of the aforesaid submissions, the issue regarding the
payment of service tax on broadcasting service would be considered
only in light of the issue whether the activity of the appellants
herein is within the scope and ambit of Entry 62 – List II, namely,
providing entertainment to the subscribers or receivers of
entertainment by means of broadcasting through television


Page 74 of 321





channels and the relevant technology applicable for providing
entertainment through television to the subscribers.
6.9 In view of the fact that the correctness of the findings of the
High Court of Madras with regard to the charging section of the
State enactment being defective is assailed by the State of Tamil
Nadu in separate appeals which are not part of this batch of
appeals, the question of correctness or otherwise of the finding of
the High Court does not come up for our consideration here.
Legal Framework:
7. Before proceeding further, it is useful to refer to the relevant
provisions of the Constitution, relevant entries of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the
State Act under considerations. We also would advert to the
relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended from time
to time having a bearing on the controversy in question.
7.1 The following provisions of the Constitution of India are
adverted to as under:
“245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the
Legislatures of States .—(1) Subject to the provisions of
this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole
or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of


Page 75 of 321





a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the
State.
(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be
invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial
operation.
246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by
the Legislatures of States.- (1) Notwithstanding anything
in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution
referred to as the “Union List”).
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament,
and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also,
have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any
State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or
any part thereof with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the “State List”).
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any
matter for any part of the territory of India not included in
a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter
enumerated in the State List.
xxx
248. Residuary powers of legislation.- (1) Subject to
Article 246A, Parliament has exclusive power to make any
law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the
Concurrent List or State List.
(2) Such power shall include the power of making any law
imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.
xxx


Page 76 of 321





265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of
law.— No tax shall be levied or collected except by
authority of law.”

Relevant Entries of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution:

7.2 In order to understand the foundation of the controversy in
these cases, it is necessary to consider Article 246 of the
Constitution and the relevant entries of the two Lists which can be
usefully extracted as under:
“List I – Union List
xxx
31 . Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless,
broadcasting and other like forms of communication.
xxx
92C. Taxes on Services.
[Omitted by the Constitution (One Hundred and First
Amendment) Act, 2016, Section 17(a)(ii) (with effect from
16.09.2016). Prior to omission it read as aforementioned.]
xxx
97. Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III
including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.
xxx
List II – State List
33. Theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas subject
to the provisions of entry 60 of List I; sports,
entertainments and amusements.
xxx


Page 77 of 321





62. Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments,
amusements, betting and gambling.”

Finance Act, 1994 with Relevant Amendments:
7.3 Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (2001 amended) which
deals with various types of service tax, perhaps under the said Act
has defined “broadcasting” as under-
"65. Definitions .- In this Chapter unless the context
otherwise requires,-
(13) "broadcasting" has the meaning assigned to it
in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Prasar Bharti
(Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990
(25 of 1990);"

7.3.1 In view of the aforesaid definition reference has to be made
to Section 2 (c) of the Prasar Bharti (Broadcasting Corporation of
India) Act, 1990 (“Prasar Bharti Act, 1990”, for short), which define
“broadcasting” as under:-
“2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,-
(c) broadcasting' means the dissemination of any
form of communication like signs, signals,
writing, pictures, images and sounds of all
kinds by transmission of electro-magnetic
waves through space or through cables
intended to be received by the general public
either directly or indirectly through the


Page 78 of 321





medium of relay stations and all its
grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly."

7.3.2 Section 65(63) of the Finance Act, 1994 (amended in 2001)
defines "service tax" as under:
"65. Definitions. - In this Chapter unless the context
otherwise requires,-
(63) "service tax" means tax leviable under the
provisions of this Chapter;"

7.3.3 Section 65 (72) (zk) defines “taxable service” with regard to
“broadcasting agency” as a “service provider” as under:
"65. Definitions. - In this Chapter unless the context
otherwise requires,-
(72) "taxable service" means any service provided,-
xxx
(zk) to a client, by a broadcasting agency or
organization in relation to broadcasting, in any
manner;
And the term "service provider" shall be construed
accordingly;"

7.3.4 Section 66(5) specifics the quantum of tax liability on a
'service provider" providing broadcasting services which is
extracted as :


Page 79 of 321





"66. Charge of service tax.-(5) With effect from the date
notified under Section 137 of the Finance Act, 2001, there
shall be levied a service tax at the rate of five per Cent of
the value of the taxable services referred to in sub-clauses
(za), (zb), (zc), (zd), (ze), (zf), (zg), (zh), (zi), (zj), (zk), (zl), (zm),
(zn) and (zo) of clause (72) of Section 65 and collected in
such manner as may be prescribed."

Thus, tax at the rate of five per cent of the value of taxable
services was levied on a broadcasting agency (i.e. five per cent of
the gross amount charged by the service provider).
7.3.5 The term "broadcasting" was re-defined under Section
65(14) of the Finance Act, 1994 by way of 2002 Amendment which
reads as under:-
"65. Definitions.- In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
(14). "broadcasting" has the meaning assigned to it
in clause(c) of Section 2 of the Prasar Bharti
(Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 (25 of
1990) and also includes programme selection,
scheduling or presentation of sound or visual matter
on a radio or a television channel that is intended
for public listening or viewing, as the case may be;
and in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes the activity of selling of
time slots or obtaining sponsorships for
broadcasting of any programme or collecting the
broadcasting charges on behalf of the said agency or


Page 80 of 321





organization, by its branch office or subsidiary or
representative in India or any agent appointed in
India or by any person who acts on its behalf in any
manner;"
7.3.6 The term "broadcasting agency or organization" was also re-
defined under Section 65(15) by way of an amendment in the year
2002 to the Finance Act, 1994, which is extracted as under:-
"65. .- In this Chapter, unless the context
Definitions
otherwise requires,-
(15) "broadcasting agency or organization" means
any agency or organisation engaged in providing
service in relation to broadcasting in any manner
and, in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes its branch office or
subsidiary or representative in India or any agent
appointed in India or any person who acts on its
behalf in any manner, engaged in the activity of
selling of time slots for broadcasting of any
programme or obtaining sponsorships for
programme or collecting broadcasting charges on
behalf of the said agency or organization;"

7.3.7 Section 65 (80) defines the term “service tax” by way of an
amendment to the Finance Act, 1994 in the year 2002, which reads
as under:-
"65. Definitions. - In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
(80) "service tax" means tax leviable under the
provisions of this Chapter;"


Page 81 of 321






7.3.8 Section 65 (90) (zk) again while defining "taxable services",
it included therein a "broadcasting agency" as a "service provider".
Section 65 (90) (zk) of the Finance Act, 2002 is reproduced
hereunder:-
"65. Definitions. - In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
xxx
(90). ''taxable service" means any service provided,-
(zk) to a client, by a broadcasting agency or
organization in relation to broadcasting in any
manner and, in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes service provided by its
branch office or subsidiary or representative in India
or any agent appointed in India or by any person
who acts on its behalf in any manner, engaged in the
activity of selling of time slots for broadcasting of any
programme or obtaining sponsorships for
programme or collecting broadcasting charges on
behalf of the said agency or organization.
- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
Explanation.
declared that so long as the radio or television
programme broadcast is received in India and
intended for listening or viewing, as the case may be,
by the public, such service shall be a taxable service
in relation to broadcasting, even if the encryption of
the signals or beaming thereof through the satellite
might have taken place outside India;
And the term "service provider" shall be construed
accordingly;"


Page 82 of 321







7.3.9 Section 66 (5) of the Finance Act, 2002 specified the
quantum of tax liability on a service provider, providing
broadcasting service to the following effect. Section 66(5) aforesaid
is reproduced hereunder:-
"66. Charge of service tax.-(5) With effect from the date
notified under Section 137 of the Finance Act, 2001 (14 of
2001), there shall be levied a service tax at the rate of five
per cent of the value of the taxable services referred to in
sub-clauses (za), (zb), (zc), (zd), (ze), (zf), (zg), (zh), (zi), (zj),
(zk), (zl), (zm), (zn) and (zo) of clause (90) of Section 65 and
collected in such manner as may be prescribed."

7.3.10 A perusal of the provisions of the Finance Act, 2002
reveals, that as hitherto before (under the Finance Act 2001)
service tax at the rate of five per cent of the value of taxable service
was leviable on a service provider rendering broadcasting services
(i.e. five per cent of the gross amount charged by the service
provider) even under the Finance Act, 2002.
7.3.11 Under the Finance Act, 2003, the term "broadcasting"
was re-defined through Section 65(15), which is being extracted
hereunder:-


Page 83 of 321





"65. Definitions.- In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
xxx
(15) '(broadcasting" has the meaning assigned to it
in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Prasar Bharti
(Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 ( 25
of 1990) and also includes programme selection,
scheduling or presentation of sound or visual matter
on a radio or a television channel that is intended
for public listening or viewing, as the case may be;
and in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes the activity of selling of
time slots or obtaining sponsorships for
broadcasting of any programme or collecting the
broadcasting charges on behalf of the said agency
or organization, by its branch office or subsidiary or
representative in India or any agent appointed in
India or by any person who acts on its behalf in any
manner;"

7.3.12 The Finance Act, 2003 also defined the term
''broadcasting agency or organization" in Section 65(16). Section
65(16) of the Finance Act, 2003 is also being reproduced
hereunder:-
"65. Definitions. - In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
(16) "broadcasting agency or organization" means
any agency or organization engaged in providing
service in relation to broadcasting in any manner
and, in the case of a broadcasting agency or


Page 84 of 321





organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes its branch office or
subsidiary or representative in India or any agent
appointed in India or any person who acts on its
behalf in any manner, engaged in the activity of
selling of time slots for broadcasting of any
programme or obtaining sponsorships for
programme or collecting the broadcasting charges
on behalf of the said agency or orgnisation;”

7.3.13 Section 65 (95) of the Finance Act, 2003, defines the
term "service tax".
Section 65 (95) aforesaid is being reproduced hereunder:-
"65. Definitions .- In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
xxx
(95) “service tax” mean tax leviable under the provisions
of this chapter;"

7.3.14 Section 65 (105) (zk) of the Finance Act, 2003 again
while defining the term 'taxable service", it included therein a
"broadcasting agency" as a 'service provider". Section 65(105) (2k)
aforesaid is being extracted hereunder:
"65. Definitions. - In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
xxx


Page 85 of 321






(105) “taxable service" means any service provided,-
(zk) to a client, by a broadcasting agency or
organization in relation to broadcasting in any
manner and, in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes service provided by its
branch office or subsidiary or representative in India
or any agent appointed in India or by any person
who acts on its behalf in any manner, engaged in the
activity of selling of time slots for broadcasting of any
programme or obtaining sponsorships for
programme or collecting the broadcasting charges
on behalf of the said agency or organization.
Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby declared that so long as the radio or
television programme broadcast is received in India
and intended for listening or viewing, as the case
may be, by the public, such service shall be a
taxable ser vice in relation to broadcasting, even if
the encryption of signals or beaming thereof through
the satellite might have taken place outside India;"
and the term "service provider" shall be construed
accordingly;”

7.3.15 Section 66(1) of the Finance Act, 2003 specified, that
quantum of tax liability on a service provider providing
broadcasting services as under:-
"66. Charge of service tax. -(l) There shall be levied a tax
(hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of
eight per cent of the value of the taxable services referred
to in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k),


Page 86 of 321





(l), (m), (n), (o), (p), (q), (r), (s), (t) (u), (v), (w), (x), (y), (z), (za),
(zb), (zc), (zd), (ze), (zf), (zg), (zh), (zi), (zj), (zk), (zl), (zm), (zn),
(zo), (zp), (zq), (zr), (zs), (zt) (zu), (zv), (zw), (zx), (zy), (zz) and
(zza) of clause (105) of Section 65 and collected in such
manner as may be prescribed.”

7.3.16 A perusal of the aforesaid provisions reveals, that
under the Finance Act, 2001, service tax levied on service providers
rendering broadcasting services were enhanced from five per cent
to six per cent of the value of taxable service (i.e. eight per cent of
the gross amount charged by the service provider) under the
Finance Act, 2003.
7.3.17 The provisions of the Finance Act, 2004 on the subject
matter of the controversy in hand were identical to the ones
incorporated under the Finance Act, 2002, and as such, the
relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 2004 are not being
reproduced here.
7.3.18 Insofar as the Finance Act, 2005 is concerned, it re-
defined the term "broadcasting" under Section 65(16). Section
65(16) of the Finance Act, 2005 is being reproduced hereunder:-




Page 87 of 321






"65. Definitions .- In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
xxx
(15) “broadcasting” has the meaning assigned to it
in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Prasar Bharti
(Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 ( 25 of
1990) and also includes programme selection,
scheduling or presentation of sound or visual matter
on a radio or a television channel that is intended
for public listening or viewing, as the case may be;
and in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes the activity of selling of
time slots or obtaining sponsorships for
broadcasting of any programme or collecting the
broadcasting charges or permitting the rights to
receive any form of communication like sign, signal,
writing, picture, image and sounds of all kinds by
transmission of electro-magnetic waves through
space or through cables, direct to home signals or
by any other means to cable operator including
multisystem operator or any other person on behalf
of the said agency or organization, by its branch
office or subsidiary or representative in India or any
agent appointed in India or by any person who acts
on its behalf in any manner;"

7.3.19 Likewise, the term "broadcasting agency or
organization" was again re-defined under Section 65(16) of the
Finance Act, 2005, which is being reproduced hereunder:-




Page 88 of 321






"65. Definitions .- In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
xxx
(16) "broadcasting agency or organization" means
any agency or organization engaged in providing
service in relation to broadcasting in any manner
and, in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes its branch office or
subsidiary or representative in India or any agent
appointed in India or any person who acts on its
behalf in any manner, engaged in the activity of
selling of time slots for broadcasting of any
programme or obtaining sponsorships for
programme or collecting the broadcasting charges or
permitting the rights to receive any form of
communication like sign, signal, writing' picture,
image and sounds of all kinds by transmission of
electro-magnetic waves through space or through
cables, direct to home multisystem operator or any
other person on behalf of the said agency or
organization;"

7.3.20 The term "service tax" retained the same definition as
was assigned to it by the Finance Act, 2003 even for the Finance
Act, 2005. However, sub-clause (zk) as defined in the Finance Act,
2005 was given a different meaning and effect. In this behalf
Section 65(105)(zk) of the Finance Act, 2005 is being reproduced
hereunder:-



Page 89 of 321





"65. Definitions. - In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
xxx
(105) "taxable service" means any service provided,-
(zk) to a client, by a broadcasting agency or
organization in relation to broadcasting in any
manner and, in the case of a broadcasting agency or
organization, having its head office situated in any
place outside India, includes service provided by its
branch office or subsidiary or representative in India
or any agent appointed in India or by any person
who acts on its behalf in any manner, engaged in the
activity of selling of time slots for broadcasting of any
programme or obtaining sponsorships for
programme or collecting the broadcasting charges or
permitting the rights to receive any form of
communication like sign, signal, writing, picture,
image and sounds of all kinds by transmission of
electro-magnetic waves through space or through
cables, direct to home signals or by any other means
to cable operator, including multisystem operator or
any other person on behalf of the said agency or
organization.
Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that so long as the radio or television
programme broadcast is received in India and
intended for listening or viewing, as the case may be,
by the public, such service shall be a taxable service
in relation to broadcasting, even if the encryption of
signals or beaming thereof through the satellite
might have taken place outside India;
and the term "service provider" shall be construed
accordingly;"



Page 90 of 321





7.3.21 The quantum of service tax under the Finance Act
2005, on service providers, rendering broadcasting services was
sustained at the same rate as in the preceding Finance Act, 2004.
7.3.22 A perusal of the provisions of the various Finance Acts
reproduced hereinabove, according to the learned counsel for the
petitioners, reveals, that "service tax" was levied on "Direct-to-
Home" (DTH) broadcasting services thereunder. The aforesaid
'legislation, according' to the learned counsel for the petitioners
had obviously been enacted by the Parliament under Entry 92C of
the Union List, contained in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India.
Relevant Provisions of the State Enactments:
Assam Amusements and Betting Tax Act, 1939 :
7.4 The relevant State Acts can be adverted to as under:
(a) The relevant provisions of Assam Amusements and Betting
Tax Act, 1939 are as under:
“2. Definitions. – In this Chapter, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context –
xxx


Page 91 of 321





(3B) "Cable service" means the transmission by cables of
programme including transmission by cables of any
broadcast television signal;
Explanation-- For the purpose of this clause--
(a) "cable operator" means any person who provides cable
service directly to customer or transmits signal to a sub-
cable operator through a cable television network
otherwise controls or is responsible for the management
and operation of a cable television network;
(b) "sub-cable operator" means a person other than any
owner or person who is a cable operator referred to in this
Explanation who, on the basis of an agreement, contract
or any other agreement made between him and such cable
operator, receives signal from such cable operator and
provides cable service for exhibition of performance, film
or any programme to the customers".
(3C) "cable television network" means any system
consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and
associated signal generation, control and distribution
equipment designed to provide cable service for reception
by multiple subscribers".
(3CC) "direct to home service" means a service for multi
channel distribution of programmes direct to subscribers'
premises by up-linking to a satellite system";
(4) "Entertainment" includes any exhibition, performance,
amusement, game, sport, music, cultural and dramatic
performances, entertainment by electronic devices and
entertainment by direct to home service and cable
television network or a series of exhibitions, performances,
amusements, games, sports, music, cultural and dramatic
performances, entertainment by electronic devices and
entertainment by direct to home service and cable
television network, to which persons are admitted for
payment, and the continuity of which is either broken or
unbroken as the case may be, or is only broken by such


Page 92 of 321





intervals as are in the opinion of the State Government a
normal or usual feature thereof.
xxx
(8) 'Proprietor' in relation to any entertainment means the
owner and shall also include manager, organiser and any
person responsible for, or, for the time being, in charge of
the management thereof;
xxx
(10) "Subscriber" means a person who receives the signal
of cable television network or of direct to home service at
any place indicated by him without further transmitting to
any other person;
Explanation- In case of hotels, each room or premise where
signals of cable television network or of direct to home
service are received shall be treated as a subscriber"
xxx
Section 3C : Tax on cable service and direct to home
service. - (1) The proprietor of a cable television network
providing cable service [and the service provider of the
direct to home service]1 shall be liable to pay
entertainment tax at such rates not exceeding rupees one
thousand and two hundred for every subscriber for every
year, as the Government may from time to time, notify in
this behalf.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude the
Government from notifying different rates of entertainment
tax for household or for different categories of hotels.
(3) Where the subscriber is a proprietor of a hotel, he shall
pay the entertainment tax to the Government on such
condition, and in such manner as may be prescribed and
at such rate as the Government may from time to time
notify and different rates of tax may be notified for different
categories of such subscribers.


Page 93 of 321





(4) The tax payable under this section shall be paid,
collected or realised in such manner as may be
prescribed."

Delhi Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1996 :
(b) The relevant provisions of Delhi Entertainments and
Betting Tax Act, 1996 are as under:
2. Definitions
In this Act, unless the context otherwise require,-
(a) "addressable system" means an electronic device or
more than one electronic devices put in an integrated
system through which television signals and value
added services can be sent in encrypted or
unencrypted form, which can be decoded by the device
or devices at the premises of the subscriber within
limits of the authorization made, on the choice and
request of such subscriber, by the service provider to
the subscriber;

(aa) "admission to an entertainment" includes admission
to any place in which the entertainment is held and in
case of entertainment through cable service and
direct-to-home (DTH) service with or without cable
connection, each connection to a subscriber shall be
deemed to be an admission for entertainment’

xxx

(ha) "direct-to-home (DTH) service" means distribution of
multi-channel television and radio programmes and
similar content by using a satellite system, by
providing signals directly to subscriber's premises
without passing through an intermediary or otherwise;



Page 94 of 321





(i) "entertainment" means any exhibition, performance,
amusement, game, sport or race (including horse race)
or in the case of cinematograph exhibitions, cover
exhibition of news-reels, documentaries, cartoons,
advertisement shorts or slides, whether before or
during the exhibition of a feature film or separately,
and also includes entertainment through cable service
and direct-to-home (DTH) service;
xxx
(m) "payment for admission" includes—
xxx
(vi) any payment made by a person by way of
contribution, subscription, installation or
connection charges or any other charges collected
in any manner whatsoever for entertainment
through direct-to-home (DTH) broadcasting
service for distribution of television signals and
value added services with the aid of any type of
addressable system, which connects a television
set, computer system at a residential or non-
residential place of subscriber's premises, directly
to the satellite or otherwise.
xxx
(s) "subscriber" means a person who receives the signals of
television network and value added services from
multi-system operator or from cable operator or from
direct-to-home (DTH) broadcasting service at a place
indicated by him to the service provider, without
further transmitting it to any other person;

Explanation I: In case of hotels, each room or premises
where signals of cable television network are received
shall be treated as a subscriber;

Explanation II : In case of direct-to-home (DTH), every
television set or computer set receiving the signals
shall be treated as a subscriber;
xxx


Page 95 of 321





7. Tax on cable, video service and direct-to-home (DTH)
service.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there
shall be levied and paid an entertainment tax on all
payments for admission to an entertainment through a
direct-to-home (DTH) or through a cable television network
with addressable system or otherwise, other than
entertainment to which section 6 applies, at such rates not
exceeding rupees six hundred for every subscriber for
every year as the Government may, from time to time,
notified in this behalf, which shall be collected by the
proprietor and paid to the Government in the manner
prescribed.
xxx
8. Information before holding entertainment.-
xxx
(2) No proprietor of a cable television network or video
cinema or Direct-to-Home (DTH) shall provide
entertainment unless he obtains permission from the
Commissioner in the manner prescribed.”

Gujarat Entertainments Tax Act, 1977 :
(c) The relevant provisions of Gujarat Entertainments Tax Act,
1977 are as under:
“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,
xxx
(dd) Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service means a
system of distribution of multi-channel television
programmes in Ku Band by using Satellite system, by
providing television signals direct to the subscriber’s
premises without passing through an intermediary such
as cable operator.



Page 96 of 321





Explanation.- For the purpose of this clause and clause (g),
“Ku Band” ordinarily means the 11.7 – 12.7 GHz (Giga
Hertz) frequency band which splits into two segments, viz.
the first having the frequency of 11.7 – 12.7 GHz, known
as FSS (Fixed Satellite Service) and the other having the
frequency of 12.2 – 12.7 GHz, known as BSS (Broadcasting
Satellite Service), or it may have such other band width as
may be approved by the Government of India from time to
time;
2(e) ‘entertainment’ includes any exhibition, performance,
amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted
for payment or in the case of television exhibition with the
aid of any type of antenna with a cable network attached
to it or cable television, for which persons are required to
make payment by way of contribution or subscription or
installation charges of connection charges or any other
charges collected in any manner whatsoever.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause, the
expression “exhibition” includes any exhibition by
cinematograph including video exhibition or television
exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable
network attached to it or cable television; or Direct-To--
Home (DTH) Broadcasting System;
xxx
2(g) ‘Payment for admission’ includes –
(i) any payment made by a person who, having been
admitted to one part of a place of entertainment, is
subsequently admitted to another part thereof for
admission to which a payment involving tax or more tax is
required;
(ii) any payment for seats or other accommodation in a
place of entertainment;
(iii) any payment for a programme or synopsis of an
entertainment;



Page 97 of 321





(iv) any payment made for the loan or use of any
instrument or contrivance which enables a person to get a
normal or better view or hearing of the entertainment
which, without the aid of such instrument or contrivance,
such person would not get;
(v) any payment for any purpose whatsoever connected
with an entertainment which a person is required to make
a condition of attending or continuing to attend the
entertainment in addition to the payment, if any, for
admission to the entertainment;
(vi) any payment for admission of a motor vehicle into the
auditorium of a cinema known as Drive-in-Cinema;
(vii) any payment made by a person by way of contribution
or subscription or installation charges or connection
charges or any other charges collected in any manner
whatsoever for television exhibition with the aid of any type
of antenna with a cable network attached to it or cable
television;
(viii) any payment made by a person to the proprietor of a
Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service by way of
contribution, subscription, installation charges or
connection charges, or any other charges collected in any
manner whatsoever for Direct-To-Home (DTH)
Broadcasting Service with the aid of any type of set top box
or any other instrument of like nature which connects
television set at a residential or non-residential or any
other place of connection-holder directly to the Satellite;”
2(gg) ‘place of entertainment’ includes a house, building,
tent or any other place where the books of account, ticket
books and other relevant records pertaining to the
entertainment or pertaining to the management of
providing cable connections from any type of antenna or
cable television or pertaining to the management of
providing Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service are
kept or are believed to have been kept;”
xxx


Page 98 of 321





2(j) ‘proprietor’ in relation to any entertainment, includes
the owner thereof, and any person –
(i) responsible for, or for the time being in charge of, the
management thereof, or
(ii) connected in whatsoever manner with the organization
of the entertainment for any duration, or
(iii) charged or entrusted or authorized with the work of
admission to the entertainment, or
(iii-a) a company registered under the Companies Act,
1956, having license to provide Direct-To-Home (DTH)
Broadcasting Service by the Government of India under
section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Wireless
Telegraphy Act, 1933 or;
(iv) responsible for, or for the time being in charge of,
management of providing of maintaining or operating
cable connection from any type of antenna or cable
television;
Whether or not he has obtained license or Certificate of
Registration, if any, for such entertainment under any law
for the time being in force;
2(jj) ‘set top box’ means an apparatus connected to a
television set at a residential or non-residential or any
other place which receives encrypted television signals
through dish antenna from satellite directly and provides
decrypted television signals to the television set, which
enables the viewers to tune into multi-channel television
programmes in Ku Band, on payment, by the connection-
holder, of the charges collected in any manner whatsoever
by the proprietor;
xxx
6C. Registration.- (1) No proprietor providing an
entertainment with the aid of any type of antenna or cable
television or Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service
shall carry on television exhibition without obtaining a
valid Certificate of Registration from the prescribed officer.


Page 99 of 321





(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to
have been contravened if the proprietor having applied for
such registration as provided in this section within three
months from the date of the commencement of the Gujarat
Entertainments Tax (Amendment) Act, 1993, carries on
television exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna
with a cable network attached to it or cable television.
(2A) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not be deemed
to have been contravened if the proprietor having applied
for such registration as provided in this section within
three months from the date of the commencement of the
Gujarat Entertainments Tax (Amendment) Act, 2009,
carries on television exhibition with the aid of Direct-To--
Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service.
(3) Every proprietor providing an entertainment with the
aid of any type of antenna or cable television or Direct-To-
Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service shall apply in such
form, in such manner and on payment of such fee as may
be prescribed to the prescribed officer.
(4) If the prescribed officer is satisfied that the
requirements of provisions of this Act and the rules made
thereunder have been complied with, he shall issue a
Certificate of Registration.
xxx
6E (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, 4,
6, 6A or 6B or any other provisions of this Act, there shall
be levied and paid, by the proprietor of every Direct-To-
Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service, to the State
Government, the entertainments tax, per television set
which receives radio frequency signals for exhibition of
films or moving pictures or series of pictures with the aid
of a set top box or any other apparatus attached to it for
securing transmission through Direct-To-Home (DTH)
Broadcasting Service, a tax at the annual rate of Rs.200
per television set for which such proprietor has provided
Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service Connection.


Page 100 of 321





(2) Where the number of Direct-To-Home (DTH) connection
holders increase in any month during the financial year,
the proprietor shall be liable to pay the tax proportionately
in the manner as may be prescribed.
(3) The tax leviable under this section shall be paid in
advance in quarterly installment of one-fourth of the
annual rate within such period and in such manner as
may be prescribed.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, ‘quarter’
means a period of three months commencing on the 1st
day of April, 1st day of July, 1st day of October or the 1st
day of January of each year, and the term ‘quarterly’ shall
be construed accordingly.”

The relevant provision of Gujarat Entertainments Tax
(Exhibitions by means of Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting
Service) Rules, 2010 are as under:
3. Application for Certificate of Registration. - A
proprietor providing an entertainment with the aid of
Direct to Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service shall apply for
the Certificate of Registration under Section 6C in
Proforma-I in triplicate I and shall be renewable after every
twelve months.
4. Granting of Certificate of Registration.- (1) The
Commissioner may, on receipt of an application in
Proforma-I under rule 3 and having satisfied that all the
rules have been complied with, grant Certificate of
Registration to the proprietor. The Commissioner shall,
while deciding whether to grant or refuse such a certificate
shall have regard to the following matters namely:
(i) the interest of the public generally;
(ii) status of antecedents and the previous experience, if
any, of the proprietor;


Page 101 of 321





(iii) the adequate precaution made for safety, convenience
and comfort of the persons covered under Direct-to-Home
(DTH) Broadcasting Service as per the guidelines issued by
the Government of India from time to time.
Explanation. For the purpose of sub-rule (1) the
expression ‘antecedents’ means the conduct of the
applicant in relation to the regular payment of any tax or
other dues payable by him.
(2) The Certificate of Registration under section 6C shall
be issued Proforma-2 and the Commissioner may
prescribe special condition or conditions to be fulfilled, in
the certificate.
5. Refusal to Grant Certificate.- The Commissioner shall
have absolute discretion to refuse a Certificate of
Registration for grounds to be recorded in writing for
refusal of granting the Certificate of Registration. The
Commissioner before refusing the Certificate shall afford
to the proprietor an opportunity of being heard.
6. Fees.- The fees for a Certificate of Registration shall be
rupees 10 lacs, the fees for renewal of Certificate of
Registration shall be ten thousand and the fees for
duplicate Certificate of Registration shall be rupees five
thousand.
7. Security Deposits.- Every proprietor shall furnish as
required under section 7, security amount of rupee ten
lacs in form of Demand Draft to the Commissioner or shall
deposit the National Savings Certificate or furnish Bank
Guarantee of a Nationalized Bank in favour of Government
of Gujarat, Information and Broadcasting Department on
obtaining Certificate of Registration.
xxx
11. Applicability of other Acts.- The proprietor shall
comply with such of the provisions of the Electricity Act,
2003 (36 of 2003), the Wireless Technology Act, 1933 (17
of 1933), the Telegraph Act, 1885 (13 of 1885), Guidelines,
Policies and Notifications issued by Government of India


Page 102 of 321





from time to time and such other Acts and the rules made
thereunder as are applicable to the Direct-to-Home (DTH)
Broadcasting Services.
12. Free access or public servants on duty.- Free access
to any place in respect of which a certificate is issued
under these rules for Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting
Service shall be given at all hours to the Commissioner or
any officer authorized by the Commissioner, the Collector
or any other officer as may be authorized by the State
Government in the execution of their duties.
13. Receipt for payment.- The proprietor shall give a
receipt to the connection holder for every payment and
shall also furnish the connection number to such
connection holder when he receives payment for
installation charges or any other charges by whatsoever it
may be called. A copy of the receipt shall be kept in the
receipt book by the proprietor till the assessments is
completed and thereafter for a period of one year.
14. Return.- (1) The returns under clause (b) of sub-
section (1) of section 8 shall be furnished to the prescribed
officer.
(2) The returns relating to the payment of tax under section
6E shall be furnished quarterly in every financial year by
the proprietor to the prescribed officer in Proforma-3,
Proforma-4 and Proforma-5 along with challan within
fifteen days of the completion of the respective quarter:
Provided that the return relating to the second and third
quarter of the financial year 2009-10 shall be furnished
within fifteen days from the publication of these rules in
the official Gazette.
(3) Every proprietor shall maintain a register in Proforma-6
for each financial year.
xxx



Page 103 of 321





16. Order of Assessment.- (1) The assessment of tax in
the respect of an entertainment shall be made within thirty
days after the return in respect of such entertainment is
furnished.
(2) After the assessment is made, the prescribed officer
shall serve a notice upon the proprietor for payment of tax,
if any additional amount of tax is found to be due.”

Jharkhand Entertainment Tax Act, 2012 :
(d) The relevant provisions of Jharkhand Entertainment Tax
Act, 2012 are as under:
“2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context,-
xxx
(k) " Direct to Home (DTH) Service " means a system of
distribution of multi-channel television programmes by
using a Satellite system by providing television signals
through Antenna direct or any other similar devices to the
subscriber's premises/hotels/clubs, without passing
through an intermediary such as cable service;
(l)" Direct to Home (DTH) Service provider " means any
person or proprietor or agency, who provide Direct to Home
(DTH) Service, whether by means of "Set top boxes" or any
such antenna or instruments or equipments or any other
similar devices and includes the activation or renewal of
such DTH service.
(m)" Entertainment " includes any exhibition,
performance, amusement, game shows or sports to which
persons are admitted for payment, or in the case of
television exhibition with the aid and any type of antenna
with a cable network attached to it or cable television
network or Direct-to-Home (DTH) Service, for which
persons are required to make payment by way of


Page 104 of 321





contribution or subscription or installation or rent or
security and connection charges or by any other charges
collected in any manner whatsoever; but does not include
magic show and temporary amusement including games
and rides;
For the purposes of this clause -
The expression " exhibition " includes any exhibition by
cinematograph including video exhibition or television
exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable
network attached to it, or cable television network as
provided by the cable operator incidental to cable
service(s);
Explanation. - For the purpose of this provision, exhibition
shall include exhibitions in Multiplex Cinema Complex(s).
The expression " game " includes video games which are
played with the aid of machine which is operated
electronically or mechanically or electro-mechanically for
the purposes of entertainment or otherwise and;
The expression " temporary amusement " means the
amusement rides and games which are not provided on
fairly permanent basis like in amusement park or meals or
fair.
(n)" Entertainment Tax " means a tax levied on
"entertainment" under this Act.
xxx
2(s) " Payment for entertainment " includes –
xxx
(iv) any payment made by a person by way of contribution
or subscription or installation or connection charges or
valuable consideration or any other charge collected in any
manner whatsoever for television exhibition with the aid of
any type of antenna with a cable network attached to it or
cable television network as provided by the cable operator;
or


Page 105 of 321





(v) any payment made by a person to the proprietor of a
Direct to Home (DTH) service by way of contribution,
subscription, installation or rent or security or activation
charges or connection charges, or valuable consideration
or any other charges collected in any manner whatsoever
for Direct to Home (DTH) service with the aid of any type
of set-top box(s) or any other instrument/equipment of like
nature, or any other similar devices, which connects
television set at a residential/hotels/clubs or non-
residential place or a connection holder directly to the
Satellite.
Explanation. - For the purposes or this sub-clause any
expenditure incurred by any co-operative housing society,
residential complexes as valuable consideration or by the
management of any factory, hotels, lodge, bar, permit room
pub, or by a person or group of persons, for the purchase
of any type of antenna or any other apparatus equipments
for securing transmission through the cable network of
cable television attached to it, for its members, or for
workers or customers or for himself or themselves, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be the payment made
under this sub-clause for the television exhibition with the
aid of any type of antenna with cable network attached to
it or cable television network no DTH service provider.
xxx
3. Incidence of entertainment tax. - (1) Save as provided
in sub- section (2), there shall be levied and paid to the
State Government by an assessee: a tax on the
entertainment at the rate(s) as specified in the notification
issued under this Act.
Provided that the State Government may specify different
rate or rates of entertainment tax in respect to different
categories of the entertainments for the different specified
periods and for different specified areas.
Provided further that the rate of entertainment tax shall
not exceed thirty percent of the value of gross collection /
admission charge(s) / subscription(s) / contribution(s) /


Page 106 of 321





rent / security / sponsorship / activation charges or by
any other valuable consideration(s) received or receivable
for providing entertainment(s).
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
entertainment tax shall be levied in relation to
cinematograph exhibition on the proprietor of an
entertainment at compounded rate(s) as specified in the
schedule.
Provided that the state Government may specify different
rate or rates of tax in respect to the different specified areas
and for different specified periods.
Provided further the State Government may specify
different rates in relation to the separate units of Multiplex
Cinema Complex, depending upon their respective sitting
capacity.
4. Assesses to collect entertainment tax from persons
admitted to entertainment. - Save as provided under
sub-section (2) of Section 3 of this Act, every assessee shall
be entitled to collect, from persons admitted to the
entertainment(s), an amount equal to the entertainment
tax payable in respect to the valuable consideration of
tickets or complimentary tickets or the sponsorship
amount.
5. Payment of tax. - Subject to the provisions of this Act
and such rules as may be prescribed, entertainments tax
shall be payable by every assessee for the following class
of entertainments-
(i) For the cinematograph exhibition falling under sub-
section (2) of Section 3, before commencing of the week;
(ii) For the video exhibition falling under sub-section (2) of
Section 3 read with serial number 2 of the schedule, before
commencing of the week;
(iii) for the Multiplex Cinema Complex exhibition falling
under sub-section (2) of Section 3 read with serial number
3 of the schedule, before commencing of the week;


Page 107 of 321





(iv) for the sponsored programmes falling under clause (x)
and (ad) of Section 2, before commencement of such
sponsored programmes
(v) for the cable operators, operating cable television
network and Direct-to-Home Service Provider, and all
other descriptions of entertainment falling under sub-
section (2) of Section 3 read with serial number 4, 5 and 6
th
of the Schedule; by 7 day of the month after the expiry of
the respective month.
Explanation. - If the specified date happens to be holiday,
the next working day shall be treated to be the payment
day.”
Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976 :
(e) The relevant provisions of Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act,
1976 are as under:
“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
xxx
(ca) “cable operator”, means a person engaged in the
business of receiving and distributing satellite television
signals, communication network including production and
transmission of programmes and packages for a monetary
consideration.
xxx
(ee) “luxury” means a commodity or service that
ministers comfort or pleasure;
xxx
(fa) “Luxury provided by a cable operator” means any
service by means of transmission of television signals by
wire, where subscriber’s television set is linked by metallic


Page 108 of 321





co-axial cable or optic fibre cable to a central system called
the ‘headend’ and by using a video cassette or disc or both,
recorder or player or similar such apparatus on which pre-
recorded video cassettes or disc or both are played or
replayed and the films or moving pictures or series of
pictures which are viewed and hear on Television receiving
set at a residential or a non residential place of a
connection holder.
xxx
(g) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this
Act;
(h) “Proprietor” in relation to a hotel, house boat, hall
auditorium, home stay, hospital Kalyanamandapam or
place of like nature includes the person who for the time
being is in charge of the management of such hotel, house
boat, hall, auditorium home stay, hospital or
kalyanamandapam or place of like nature as the case may
be.
xxx
4. Levy and collection of luxury tax. – (1) Subject to
the provisions of this Act, there shall be levied and
collected a tax, hereinafter called the ‘luxury tax’ in respect
of any luxury provided, -
(i) in a hotel, house boat, hall, auditorium or
kalyanamandapam or including those attached to
hotels, clubs, Kalyanamandapam and places of the
like nature which are rented for accommodation for
residence or used for conducting functions, whether
public or private, exhibition;
(ii) by cable operators;
(iii) in a hospital; and
(iv) in a home stay


Page 109 of 321





Provided that the sub-section shall not apply to halls and
auditoriums located within the premises of ‘places of
worship’ owned by such institutions;
Provided that the sub-section shall not apply to halls and
auditoriums located within the premises of ‘places of
worship’ owned by such institutions.
(2) Luxury tax shall be levied and collected, -
xxx
(d) in respect of a cable TV operator at the rate of rupees
five per connection per month,
and shall be collectable from the person enjoying the
luxury:
Provided that no luxury tax shall be payable in respect of
a connection provided by a cable operator engaged in the
distribution of programmes of Doordarshan channels only:
Provided further that luxury tax, if any, collected shall be
paid over to the Government:
xxx
Provided also that a proprietor of a hotel who had claimed
exemption under sub-clause (1) of clause 4 of the Kerala
Finance Bill, 2006 (Bill No. 355 of the XI Kerala Legislative
Assembly) from the 1st day of April 2006 being the charges
of accommodation below rupees two hundred per room per
day, shall be permitted to avail such exemption till 30th
June, 2006.
xxx
(3) The luxury tax shall be collected by the proprietor and
paid within such period and in such manner as may be
prescribed, into a Government treasury" or a Nationalised
Bank notified by Government in this behalf.
xxx


Page 110 of 321





5. Returns. – Every proprietor liable to pay luxury tax
under this Act shall submit such return in such manner
and within such period as may be prescribed.
xxx
The Kerala Finance Act, 2006
3. Amendment of Act 32 of 1976.- In the Kerala Tax on
Luxuries Act, 1976 (32 of 1976), -
(1) in Section 2, -
xxx
(c) after clause (f), the following clause shall be inserted,
namely:-
"(fa) "Luxury provided by a cable operator" means any
service by means of transmission of television signals by
wire, where subscriber's television set is linked by metallic
co-axial cable or optic fibre cable to a central system called
the headend and by using a video cassette or disc or both,
recorder or player or similar such apparatus on which pre-
recorded video cassettes or disc or both are played or
replayed and the films or moving pictures or series of
pictures which are viewed and heard on Television
receiving set at a residential or a non-residential place of a
connection holder;";
xxx
The Kerala Tax on Luxuries Rules, 1976
3. Filing of return. – (1) The return referred to in section
5 shall be
xxx
(b) in Form 1A in the case of cable TV Operator;
xxx



Page 111 of 321





The Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976
(Act 32 of 1976)
(Incorporating Amendments up to the Finance Act,
2010 )
2. Definitions: - In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires: -
xxx
(ca) "cable operator" means a person engaged in the
business of receiving and distributing satellite television
signals, communication network including production and
transmission of programmes and packages for a monetary
consideration"
xxx
"(da) "Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service" means
a system of distribution of multi-channel television
programmes in ku band using a satellite system of
providing television signals direct to the subscriber's
premises in an encrypted form which will be received by an
antenna and decrypted by an electronic device, thus
providing television signals to the television set or other
viewing devices of the subscriber, without passing through
an intermediary such as cable operator.
(db) "Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service Provider"
means, a company registered under the Companies Act,
1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956) having granted license to
provide Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service by the
Government of India under section 4 of the Telegraph Act,
1885(Central Act 13 of 1885) and Indian Wireless
Telegraphy Act, 1933 (Central Act 17 of 1933) and
providing such service within the State.
xxx


Page 112 of 321





(ee) "luxury" means a commodity or service that ministers
comfort or Pleasure:
xxx
(fa) "Luxury provided by a cable operator" means any
service by means of transmission of television signals by
wire, where subscriber's television set is linked by metallic
co-axial cable or optic fibre cable to a central system called
the 'headend' and by using a video cassette or disc or both,
recorder or player or similar such apparatus on which pre-
recorded video cassettes or disc or both are played or
replayed and the films or moving pictures or series of
pictures which are viewed and heard on Television
receiving set at a residential or a non-residential place of a
connection holder;
xxx
"(fd) "Luxury provided by Direct-To-Home (DTH)
Broadcasting Service Provider" means any service by
means of transmission of television signals and the films
or moving pictures or series of pictures which are viewed
and heard on television receiving set or other devices
through a Direct-To-Home (DTH) service at a residential or
a non-residential place of a subscriber, providing pleasure,
comfort and entertainment to the subscribers and
viewers.";
xxx
"(l) "subscriber" means a person who enjoys the luxury by
receiving the signal of cable television network or a direct-
to-home service at a place indicated by him to the cable
operator or the Direct-To-Home (DTH) Service Provider,
without further transmitting it to any other person.";
xxx



Page 113 of 321





4. Levy and collection of luxury tax: (1) Subject to the
provisions of this Act, there shall be levied and collected a
tax, hereinafter called the 'luxury tax', in respect of any
luxury provided,-
xxx
(ii) by cable operators; ("and by Direct-to-Home (DTH)
Service Providers")
xxx
Provided that the sub-section shall not apply to,-
xxx
(iv) to cable operators whose total number of connections,
including those given through franchisees, is seven
thousand and five hundred or less:
Provided further that the cable operators with seven
thousand and five hundred or less connections shall not
be liable to tax from 1st July, 2006
(2) Luxury tax shall be levied and collected, -
xxx
(d) in respect of a cable TV operator("and Direct-to-
Home(DTH) Broadcasting Provider") at the rate of rupees
five per connection per month, and shall be collectable
from the person enjoying the luxury :
xxx
Provided that no luxury tax shall be payable in respect of
a connection provided by a cable operator engaged in the
distribution of programmes of Doordarshan channels only:
Provided further that luxury tax, if any, collected shall be
paid over to the Government:



Page 114 of 321





Provided also that a proprietor of a hotel who had claimed
exemption under sub-clause (1) of clause 4 of the Kerala
Finance Bill, 2006 (Bill No. 355 of the XI Kerala Legislative
Assembly) from the 1st day of April 2006 being the charges
of accommodation below rupees two hundred per room per
day, shall be permitted to avail such exemption till 30th
June, 2006.
(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(2), there shall be levied a luxury tax at the rate of rupees
one hundred per year per member and the same shall be
collected by the person responsible for the management of
the club, by whatever name called.
Explanation: For the purpose of this section, 'club' means
a club which provides more than two facilities like card
room, bar, billiard rooms, snooker room, tennis court,
swimming pool, Sauna Jacuzzi and the like, gymnasium,
golf course, internet facility, video, video compact disk,
digital video disk and computer games and having a
membership strength of at least twenty five.
xxx
(4) In computing the luxury tax, a fraction of a rupee,
which is not a multiple of five paise, shall be rounded of to
the next higher multiple of five paise.
“(5) Every Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service
Provider in the State shall pay luxury tax at the rate of
two per cent on the gross charges received or
receivable by him every month in any manner
including installation charges, subscription charges,
recharges, or other charges by whatever name called
from the subscribers in the State in respect of the
luxury provided by him.";”
xxx


Page 115 of 321





4D. Registration of cable operators and Direct-to-
Home(DTH) Broadcasting Service Provider.- Every cable
operator ("and Direct-to-Home(DTH) Broadcasting Service
Provider") shall get himself registered with such authority
and in such manner, as may be prescribed and the
application for registration shall be accompanied by a
registration fee of Rupees one thousand. The registration
shall be for a period of one year and shall be renewed
annually.
xxx
5. Returns: - Every proprietor liable to pay luxury tax
under this Act shall submit such return in such manner
and within such period as may be prescribed.
ACT 10 of 2010
THE KERALA FINANCE ACT, 2010
6. Amendment of Act 32 of 1976. In the Kerala Tax on
Luxuries Act, 1976 (32 of 1976),-
(1) in section 2,-
(i) after clause (d), the following clauses shall be
inserted, namely:-
"(da) "Direct-To-Home (DTH) Broadcasting
Service" means a system of distribution of multi-
channel television programmes in ku band using
a satellite system of providing television signals
direct to the subscriber's premises in an encrypted
form which will be received by an antenna and
decrypted by an electronic device, thus providing
television signals to the television set or other
viewing devices of the subscriber, without passing
through an intermediary such as cable operator.
xxx



Page 116 of 321





(2) in section 4,-
(i) (a) in sub-section (1), in item (ii), the words, symbols,
brackets and letters "and by Direct-To-Home (DTH) Service
Providers" shall be added at the end:
(b) for the existing proviso to sub-section (1), the following
provisos shall be substituted, namely:-

"Provided that the sub-section shall not apply to.-
xxx
(iv) to cable operators whose total number of connections,
including those given through franchisees, is seven
thousand and five hundred or less:
Provided further that the cable operators with seven
thousand and five hundred or less connections shall not
be liable to tax from 1ª July, 2006;
ACT 16 OF 2011
THE KERALA FINANCE ACT, 2011
6. Amendment of Act 32 of 1976.-In the Kerala Tax on
Luxuries Act, 1976 (32 of 1976), 一
(1) in section 2,-
(i) clause (ca) shall be omitted;
(ii) clause (fa) shall be omitted;

Orissa Entertainment Tax Act, 2006:
(f) The relevant provisions of Orissa Entertainment Tax
Act, 2006 are as under:
“2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context,—


Page 117 of 321





(a) “admission to an entertainment” includes admission to
any place in which the entertainment is held and in case
of entertainment through cable service (or Direct-to-Home
(DTH) Broadcasting Service) each connection to a
subscriber shall be deemed to be an admission for
entertainment;
xxx
(d) “cable television network” means any system consisting
of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal
generation, control and distribution equipment, designed
to provide cable service for reception by multiple
subscribers;
xxx
(e1): Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service” means
system of distribution of multi-channel television
programme in KU Band by using a satellite system, by
providing television signals to a television set with the aid
of set-top box direct to subscribers without passing
through an intermediary such as Cable Operator.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this clause and clause
(k1) “KU Band” ordinarily means the 11.7-12.7 Ghz.
(Gigahertz) frequency band which splits into two segments
viz. the first having the frequency of 11.7-12.2 Ghz. Known
as FSS (Fixed Satellite Service) and the other having the
frequency of 12.2-12.7 Ghz. Known as BSS (Broadcasting
Satellite Service), or it may have such other brand width
as may be approved by the Government of India from time
to time.”
(f) “entertainment” means any cinematographic exhibition
including exhibition of news reels, documentaries,
cartoons, advertisement shots or slides, whether before or
during exhibition of a feature film or separately, and
includes any other exhibition, performance, amusement
and entertainment through cable service (or Direct-to-
Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service);
xxx


Page 118 of 321






7. Tax on cable and DTH service. - (1) The proprietor of
a cable television network providing cable service (and of a
Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service) shall be liable
to pay entertainment tax at such rate as specified in Part
II of the Schedule.
(2) The tax payable under this section shall be paid,
collected or realised in such manner as may be prescribed.
xxx
9. Intimation before holding entertainment.- (1) No
entertainment on which tax is leviable shall be held
without prior information being given to the Commissioner
in the manner prescribed.
(2) No proprietor of a cable television network (or Direct-
to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service) shall provide
entertainment, unless he obtains permission from the
Commissioner in the manner prescribed.
xxx
(3a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections
(2) and (3) where any proprietor of a Direct-to-Home (DTH)
Broadcasting Service is providing entertainment
immediately before the commencement of the Orissa
Entertainment Tax (Amendment) Act, 2010 he may
continue to provide entertainment,—
(a) for a period of three months from the date of
commencement of said amendment Act; or
(b) till the permission under sub-section (2) is granted by
the Commissioner, if an application to that effect is made
in the prescribed manner within the period specified in
clause (a).”







Page 119 of 321





The relevant provisions of Orissa Entertainment Tax Rules,
2006 are as under:
“12. Permission to operate cable television network or
connection for the Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting
Service. – (1) The proprietor of a cable television network
or a Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service shall
submit to the Commissioner an application in Form XA
within fifteen days from the date of commencement of
these rules bringing the Direct-to-Home (DTH)
Broadcasting Service under the purview of the Act or at
least fifteen days before the date of such entertainment
and shall furnish any other information which may be so
required by the Commissioner for the purpose.
(2) The Commissioner, after making such enquiry as he
may deem proper and after being satisfied that the
application is in order, shall issue certificate in form XIIIA
permitting the proprietor of a cable television network or a
Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Service.”

Punjab Entertainment Duty Act, 1955 :
(g) The relevant provisions of the Punjab Entertainment Duty
Act , 1955 are as under:
“2. Definitions. - In this Act unless the context otherwise
requires -
(a) 'admission to an entertainment’ includes admission
to any place in which the entertainment is being held or is
to be held and where television exhibition is being provided
with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable network
attached to it or cable television or direct-to-home
television in residential or non-residential areas of which
persons are required to make payment by way of
contribution or subscription or installation and connection


Page 120 of 321





charges or any other charges collected in any manner,
whatsoever.
xxx
(aa) 'antenna' means an apparatus which received
television signals which enable viewers to tune into
transmissions including national or international satellite
transmissions and which is erected or installed for
exhibition of films or moving pictures or series of pictures
by means of transmission of television signals by wire
where subscriber’s television sets at the residential or non-
residential place are linked by metallic coaxial cable or
optio-fibre cable to a central system called the head-end,
on payment by the connection holder of any contribution
or subscription or installation and connection charges or
any other charges collected in any manner whatsoever.

(aaa) 'cable television’ means a system organised on
payment by a connection holder of any contribution or
subscription or installation and connection charges or any
other charges collected in any manner whatsoever, for
exhibition of films or moving pictures or series of pictures
by means of transmission of television signals by wire
where subscriber's television set is linked by metallic
coaxial cable or optio-fibre cable to a central system called
the head-end, by using a video cassette or disc or both,
recorder or player or similar such apparatus on which
prerecorded vide cassettes or discs or both are played or
replayed and the films or moving pictures or series of
pictures which are viewed and heard on the television
receiving set at a residential or non-residential place of a
connection holder.

(b) 'Commissioner' means the Excise and Taxation
Commissioner, Punjab, for the time being;
(bb) “direct-to-home television” means the reception of
satellite programmes with the aid of a dish by a subscriber
in his home or any other place for exhibition of films or
moving pictures or series of pictures on payment basis;


Page 121 of 321





(bbb) “dish” means a large circular antenna for receiving
television signals from a satellite;”;
(c) 'Entertainment Tax Officer' means the officer
appointed as such under this Act;
(d) 'entertainment' includes any exhibition, performance,
amusement, game, sport or race to which persons are
ordinarily admitted on payment for exhibition of films or
moving pictures or series of pictures which are shown in a
cinema house or on the television receiving set, with the
aid of any type of antenna with a cable net work attached
to it or cable television or dish relating to direct-to-home
television network for which persons are required to make
payment by way of contribution or subscription or
installation and connection charges or any other charges
collected in any manner whatsoever.

Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause, the
expression “Cinema house” shall have the same meaning
as has been assigned to it in the Punjab Entertainments
Tax (Cinematograph Shows) Act, 1954 (Punjab Act 8 of
1954).

(e) 'payment for admission' includes –

(i) any payment made by a person admitted to any part
of a place of entertainment and in a case where such
person is subsequently admitted to another part thereof
for admission to which an additional payment is required,
such additional payment, whether actually made or not;

(ii) in cases of free, surreptitious, unauthorised or
concessional entry, whether with or without the knowledge
of the proprietor, the payment which would have been
made if the person concerned had been admitted on
payment of the full charges ordinarily chargeable for such
admission;

(iii) any payment for any purpose whatsoever connected
with an entertainment which a person is required to make
as a condition of attending or continuing to attend the


Page 122 of 321





entertainment in addition to the payment, if any, for
admission to the entertainment;
(iv) any payment made by a person by way of
contribution or subscription of installation and connection
charges or any other charges collected in any manner
whatsoever for television exhibition with the aid of any type
of antenna with a cable network attached to it or cable
television or a dish relating to direct-to-home television
network.
(f) 'prescribed' means prescribed by rules made under
this Act;
(g) 'proprietor' in relation to any entertainment includes
the owner, partner or a person responsible for the
management thereof and any person responsible for or for
the time being incharge of the management for providing
cable connection from any type of antenna or cable
television or for providing direct-to-home television service.
xxx
3. Duty on payments for admission to entertainments.
(1) A person admitted to an entertainment shall be liable
to pay an entertainment duty at a rate of twenty-five per
centum, which shall be collected by the proprietor and
rendered to the Government in the prescribed manner.
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), the Government may, by notification, levy lumpsum
entertainment duty at a rate not exceeding, -
(a) eight thousand rupees per annum in the local area
of a City constituted as such under the Punjab Municipal
Corporation Act, 1976, or of a Municipality declared as
such under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911; and
(b) Six thousand rupees per annum in areas other than
the local areas specified in clause (a);
in respect of entertainments arranged by a proprietor by
replay of video cassette player or video record player and
the lumpsum duty so levied shall be recoverable from the
proprietor,
(1-B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), a proprietor may, at his option, pay in lump sum
entertainment duty on an amusement park at the rates,


Page 123 of 321





specified in the Schedule appended to this Act, per annum
per ride.
SCHEDULE
(See Section 3 (1-B)
Category<br>of ridesDescription of<br>ridesRate of duty per<br>ride<br>(in Rupees)
123
A1. Dragon Roller<br>Coaster<br>2. Big Apple<br>3.Dragon Coaster<br>4. Roller Coaster<br>5. Bumper Car<br>6. Cyclone<br>7. Striking Cars<br>8. Go karts<br>9. Water Chute<br>10. Octopus<br>11. Twister<br>12. Enterprise<br>13. Kamikaze<br>14. Rainbow<br>15. Power Tower<br>16. Family SwingerSixty thousand
B1. Break Dance<br>2. Caterpillar<br>3. Paratrooper<br>4. Round AboutForty thousand



Page 124 of 321





5. Train<br>6. Dream Boat<br>7. Formula Cars<br>8. Family Slide<br>9. Love Boats<br>10. My Fair Lady<br>11. Tea Cup or<br>Cup and Saucer<br>12. Gandola<br>13. Jumping Frogs<br>14. Parachute<br>Towers<br>15. Ship or<br>Pandulum<br>16. Harakiri<br>17. Slide<br>18. Razzle Dazzle<br>19. Ferris Wheel<br>20. Rock ‘N’ Roll<br>21. Telecombat<br>22. Bumper Boats
C1. Baby Train<br>2. Toto Train<br>3. Fun Spin<br>4. Fun Channel<br>5. Vintage Cat<br>6. Jingle Ride<br>7. Scooters<br>8. Guided CarsTwenty<br>thousand



Page 125 of 321





9. Money Tree<br>10. Snail<br>11. Kiddie Boats<br>12. Coin<br>Operated Rides<br>13. Children<br>Slide<br>14. Any other un-<br>specified Ride<br>15. Merry Go<br>Round<br>16. Carousel<br>17. Water Merry<br>18. Go Round<br>19. Sun and<br>Moon<br>20. Mini Coaster<br>21. Water Canal<br>22. Crazy<br>Submarine
D1. Boating<br>2. Play Pen<br>3. Little Kingdo<br>4. Funny Boats<br>5. Kids Castle<br>6. Bike Mania<br>7. Water Slide

(1-B) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1) Government may, by notification, levy lump-
sum entertainment duty of amusement park at a rate not
exceeding rupees sixty thousand per annum.


Page 126 of 321





(b) A proprietor may, however, opt to pay an
entertainment duty either under sub-section (1) or he may
pay lump-sum entertainment duty under the proceeding
clause (a).
(2) A draft of the proposed order specifying the rate of
entertainments duty referred to in sub-section (1) shall be
notified for the information of all persons likely to be
affected thereby and it shall take effect only after the
Government has considered all objections received within
a period of thirty days from the date of such publications,
and has notified the same again, with or without
modification:
Provided that if the Government consider that such an
order should be brought into force at once, the final
notification may issue without previous publication:
Provided further that Government may impose an
entertainments duty on complimentary tickets at a
different from that imposed on other kinds of payment for
admission subject to the maximum specified in sub-
section (1).

(3) Until such time as the duty referred to in sub-
sections (1) and (2) has been finally notified, the
entertainments duty shall be levied at the rates in force in
this behalf immediately before the commencement of this
Act.
(3-A) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the amount
of duty shall be calculated to the nearest multiple of 5 naye
paise by ignoring 2 naye paise or less and counting more
than 2 naye paise as 5 naye paise.
(4) The final notification specifying the rates of
entertainment duty shall be laid before the Legislature at
the session immediately following its publication.

3.A. Entertainment duty is not leviable in case tax is
paid under Punjab Act 8 of 1954 .- Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, no entertainment duty
shall be leviable on the proprietor who is able to pay
entertainment tax under the Punjab Entertainment Tax
(Cinematograph Shows) Act, 1954.


Page 127 of 321






(3B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
sections (l), (1-A), (2) and (3), in the case of entertainment
provided with the aid of antenna or cable television to a
connection holder, the proprietor of such entertainment
shall pay entertainment duty of fifteen thousand rupees
per annum at a time.
(3C) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
in the case of entertainment, provided with the aid of dish,
relating to direct-to-home television, the proprietor of such
entertainment shall pay entertainment duty at the rate of
ten per cent of the charges, received by such proprietor
from the subscriber. The entertainment duty shall be paid
th
by the proprietor by the 10 day, commencing from the
close of the concerned calendar month.”


Rajasthan Entertainments and Advertisements Tax Act,
1957 :

(h) The relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Entertainments
and Advertisements Tax Act, 1957 are as under:
“3. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the subject or context
otherwise requires,-
xxx
(4A).- “direct to home broadcasting service” means
distribution of multi channel television programmes by
using satellite system by providing television signals direct
to the premises of subscribers without passing through an
intermediary such as cable services.
(4AAA.)- “levy of tax on direct to home broadcasting
service ”- The proprietor of a direct to home broadcasting
service shall be liable to pay entertainment tax at such
rates, not exceeding twenty percent of the monthly
subscription charges per subscriber, as the State
Government may from time to time, notify in the Official


Page 128 of 321





Gazette, in this behalf and different may be notified for
different categories of subscribers
(5) “entertainment” includes –
(i) any exhibition, (show), performance, amusement,
game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment.
(ii) providing cable service to a subscriber.
(iii) providing direct to home broadcasting service and,
(6) “entertainment tax” means the tax levied and
charged under section 4, 4AA and 4AAA and the
expression 4AA shall be deemed to have been inserted with
effect from 26.03.1999 and the expression 4AAA shall be
deemed to have been inserted with effect from 25.02.2008
and includes the additional tax payable under section 6A,
xxx
(8) “proprietor” in relation to an entertainment includes
any person responsible for, or for the time being in-charge
of the management thereof;
xxx
(11A) “subscriber” means a person who receives the
signals of cable television network at a place indicated by
him to the proprietor of the cable television network
without further transmitting it to any other person;
Explanation : In case of hotels each room or premises
where facility for receiving signals of cable television
network have been attached shall be treated as a
subscriber.”

The relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Entertainments
and Advertisements Tax Rules, 1957 are as under
“Rules 18BBBB.- Permission to be obtained to operate
direct to home broadcasting service.


Page 129 of 321





(1) the proprietor of a direct to home broadcasting
service shall submit to the Commissioner an application
within fifteen days from the date on which these rules
come into force or at least within fifteen days of his
commencing entertainment through direct to home
broadcasting service, whichever is later.
(2) the proprietor shall submit to the Commissioner a
security of an amount fixed by the Commissioner along
with any other information which may be so required by
the Commissioner.

Rules 18BBBBB.- Payment of tax for direct to home
broadcasting service.

(1) The proprietor of a direct to home broadcasting
service liable to pay tax in accordance with section 4AAA
of the Act, shall maintain a true and correct record of the
number of subscribers, the amount received from each
subscriber and the amount of tax.
(2) The proprietor of a Direct to Home broadcasting
service shall be required to deposit tax payable within
seven days of the close of each calendar month.

(3) The proprietor of a Direct to Home broadcasting
service shall file quarterly return in Form S-7 in duplicate,
within fifteen days of the end of each quarter along with
proof of deposit of tax payable under the Act.”

Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 :
(i) The relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Entertainments
Tax Act, 1939 are as under:
“3. Definitions: In this Act, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context :
xxx


Page 130 of 321





(3B) “direct to home service” means distribution of multi-
channel television programmes by using a satellite system
by providing television signals direct to subscribers’
premises without passing through an intermediary such
as cable operator;
xxx
3(4) “entertainment” means a horse race or cinematograph
exhibition to which persons are admitted on payment; or
television exhibition for which persons are required to
make payment by way of contribution, or subscription, or
installation or connection charges or any other charges
collected in any manner whatsoever or an amusement or
a recreation parlour where a game such as bowling,
billiards, snooker or the like is provided or direct to home
service or a cricket tournament conducted by the Indian
Premier League.
xxx
3(9) “proprietor” in relation to any entertainment means a
licensee of Cinematograph exhibition under the Tamil
Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1995 (Tamil Nadu Act
No.IX of 1955) or the licensee of an Exhibition of
Cinematograph film on Television Screen through Video
Cassette Recorder or through Cable Television Network
under the Tamil Nadu Exhibition of Films on Television
Screen through Video Cassette Recorders and cable
Television Network (Regulation) Act, 1984 (Tamil Nadu Act
No. VII of 1984) or any person providing Television
exhibition or any person providing amusement or any
person providing recreation parlour or any person
providing direct to home service or the Indian Premier
League and includes the State Government, any local
authority or any person responsible for the management
thereof.
xxx
3(11) “Television exhibition” means an exhibition with the
aid of any type of antenna with a cable network attached


Page 131 of 321





to it or a cable television, of a film or moving picture or
series of moving pictures, by means of transmission of
television signals by wire where subscribers’ television sets
at residential or non-residential place are linked by
metallic coaxial cable or optic fibre cable to a central
system called the head-end.
xxx
4-I. Tax on direct to home service.—(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in Sections 4 and 7, there shall be
levied and paid to the State Government a tax (hereinafter
referred to as the “entertainment tax”) calculated at the
rate of thirty per cent of the gross charges excluding the
service tax, received by the provider of a direct to home
service.
(2) The tax levied under sub-section (1) shall be recoverable
from the proprietor.
(3) The provisions of this Act (other than Sections 4, 7 and
13) and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be,
apply in relations to the tax payable under sub-section (1).
xxx
4-E. Tax on television exhibition.- (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in Sections 4 and 7, there shall be
levied and paid to the State Government a tax (hereinafter
referred to as the entertainment tax) on television
exhibition at the following rates namely:-

(i)Within the limits of the<br>Municipal Corporation of<br>Chennai, Madurai,<br>Coimbatore,<br>Tiruchirapalli, Tirunelveli,<br>Salem or any other<br>Corporation that may be<br>constituted under any law<br>for the time being in force;Six thousand<br>rupees per month.



Page 132 of 321





(ii)Within the limits of the<br>Municipalities constituted<br>under the Tamil Nadu<br>District Municipalities Act,<br>1920 (Tamil Nadu Act No.<br>V of 1920)Three thousand<br>rupees per month
(iii)Within the limits of Town<br>Panchayats constituted<br>under the Tamil Nadu<br>District Municipalities Act,<br>1920 (Tamil Nadu Act No.<br>V of 1920) or any other<br>area not specified in items<br>(i), (ii) , or (iv)One thousand<br>and five hundred<br>rupees per month
(iv)Within the limits of Village<br>Panchayats constituted<br>under the Tamil Nadu<br>Panchayats Act, 1994<br>(Tamil Nadu Act No. 21 of<br>1994).One thousand<br>rupees per month.


(2) The tax levied under sub-section (1) shall be recoverable
from the proprietor.

(3) The provisions of this Act other than Sections 4, 4-B,
4-D, 4-F, 4-G, 5-F, 5-G, 6(1), 7 and 13 and the rules made
there under shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the
tax payable under sub- section (1).

Uttar Pradesh Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 :
(j) The relevant provisions of Uttar Pradesh Entertainment
and Betting Tax Act, 1979 as amended by Uttar Pradesh
Entertainment and Betting Tax (Amendment) Ordinance,
2009 are as under:


Page 133 of 321





2. Definitions.- In this Act-
(a) ‘admission to an entertainment’ includes admission
to any place which the entertainment is held or any place
wherefrom entertainment is provided by means of the cable
television network of Direct to Home service or any other
emerging transmission by whatever name called.”
(a-1) ‘amusement park’ mean a place wherein various
type of amusements, which includes games or rides or
water sports, water park, splash pool etc. but does not
include exhibition by means of cinematograph and video,
are provided on payment of admission.”
xxx
(ee) ‘cable operator’ means any person who provides
cable service through a cable television network or
otherwise controls or is responsible for the management
and operation of cable television network and includes the
proprietor of a hotel who provides cable service in the hotel
through his own cable television network”;
xxx
(f-1) ‘Direct-to-Home service’ means a system of
distribution of multi-channel television programmes in Ku
band by using a satellite system, by providing television
signals direct to the subscriber’s premises without passing
through an intermediary such as cable operator.”
(g) ‘entertainment’ includes any exhibition,
performance, amusement, game, sport or race (including
horse rase) to which persons are admitted for payment and
in the case of cinematograph exhibition, includes
exhibition of news-real, documentaries, cartoons,
advertisement shorts or slides, whether before or during
the exhibition of a feature film or separately,; It also
includes any activity notified as entertainment by the State
Government from time to time.”


Page 134 of 321





xxx
(i-1) ‘Ku Band’ ordinarily means the 11.7 to 12.7
Gigahertz frequency band which splits into two segments
namely Fix Satellite Service having the frequency of the
11.7 to 12.2 Gigahertz and Broadcasting Satellite service
having the frequency of 12.2 to 12.7 Gigahertz, or any
other band of width as may be approved by the
Government of India and from time to time.”
xxx
(k.1) “Multi System Operator” means a cable operator
who receives a programming service from a broadcaster or
his authorized agencies and retransmits the same or
transmits his own programming service for simultaneous
reception either by multiple subscribers directly or
through one or more local cable operators, and includes
his authorized distribution agencies by whatever name
called.
(l) ‘payment for admission’ includes-
(i) any payment for seats or other accommodation in any
form in a place of entertainment;
(ii) any payment for a programme or synopsis of an
entertainment;
(iii) any payment made for the loan or use of any
instrument or contrivance which enables a person to
get a normal or better view of hearing or enjoyment of
the entertainment, which without the aid of such
instrument or contrivance such person would not get;
(iv) any payment, by whatever name called or any
purposes whatsoever, connect with an entertainment,
which a person is required to make in any form as a
condition of attending or continuing to attend the
entertainment, either in addition to payment, if any,


Page 135 of 321





entertainment or without any such payment for
admission.
(v) any payment made by a person, who having been
admitted to one part of a place of entertainment is
subsequently admitted to another part thereof, for
admission to which a payment involving tax or more
tax is required.
Explanation.-Any subscription raise or donation collected
in connection with an entertainment in any form shall be
deemed to be payment for admission;
(vi) Any payment made by a person by way of contribution
or subscription or installation and connection charges
or any other charges collected in any manner
whatsoever, by whatever name called, for television
exhibition through cable television network or any
other such network by whatever name called, attached
to television set or any other device at a residential or
non-residential place of a connection holder; or
(vii) Any payment made by person to the proprietor of a
Direct-to-Home service or any other service by
whatever name called, by way of contribution or
subscription or installation and connection charges or
any charges collected in any manner by whatever
name called either directly or through any agency
established for the purpose for Direct-to-Home service
with the aid of set top box or any other device of like
nature which connects television set or any other
device at a residential or non-residential place of a
connection holder directly to the satellite without
passing through an intermediary such as cable
operator;
Explanation-For the purposes of sub-clauses (vi) and (vii)
any expenditure incurred by any co-operative society
including a co-operative housing society or by the


Page 136 of 321





management of any factory, hotel, lodge, bar, permit room,
pub or by a person or group of persons for the purchase of
any type of antenna or any other apparatus for securing
transmission through cable television network, Direct-to-
Home service or any other service by whatever name called,
for its member or for workers or customers or for himself
or themselves, as the case may be shall be deemed to be
payment made under the sub-clause;
(viii) Where in any entertainment admission has been
allowed on a gross payment, such gross payment shall
be deemed to be aggregate payment”.

(l-l) 'Place of entertainment includes-
(i) a house, building, tent, site to be used for purpose of
cinema building or other structure and description of
transport whatsoever;
(ii) any addition to the place of entertainment;
(iii) a house building, tent or any other place where the
books of account, ticket books or any other relevant
records pertaining to the entertainment or pertaining
to the management of providing cable service or
Direct-to-Home service or Broadband service or any
emerging transmission services, by whatever name
called, are kept or purported to have been kept;.
xxx
(m) 'proprietor' in relation to any entertainment includes
any person-
(i) connected with the organisation of the entertainment, or
(ii) charged with the work of admission to the
entertainment, or
(iii) responsible for, or for the time being in-charge of the
management thereof, or
(iv) any cable operator registered under Section 4 of the
Cable Television Network (Regulation) Act, 1995 (Act


Page 137 of 321





No. 7 of 1995) or any person responsible for or for time
being in charge of management of providing cable
connection through cable television network or any
other emerging technology; or
(v) any company registered under the Company Act, 1956
having license to provide Direct-to-Home service or
any other emerging transmission services by whatever
name called by the Government of India under Section
4 of the Telegraph Act, 1985 and the Indian Wireless
Telegraph Act, 1933 or any agent thereof appointed for
the purpose of sale, letting on rent or distribution of
equipment related thereto;".
xxx
(p-1) television signal receiver' means any device, by
whatever name called, used to receive and/or decode the
transmission programme of particular channel and
without which no person is able to see a particular channel
programme."
(p-2) 'television signal receiver agency' means a place of
entertainment by whatever name called, where business of
selling or letting on hire or distribution or exchange or
putting into circulation in any manner whatsoever of
television signal receiver.".
xxx
(t) Words and expressions used in this Act but not defined,
shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in
the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1952.
(u) Words and expression used in this Act not defined,
shall have the same meaning as respectively assigned to
them in the Uttar Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Act, 1955
or the rules made thereunder and the Cable Television
Network (Regulation) Act, 1995 and the rules made
thereunder.
3. Tax on entertainment. - (1) Subject to the provisions
of this Act, there shall be levied and paid on all Aggregate
payments required for admission to any entertainment


Page 138 of 321





other than an entertainment to which Section 4 or Section
4-A or Section 4-B applies or a compounded payment is
made under the proviso to this sub-section an
entertainment tax at such rate not exceeding one hundred
and fifty per cent of each such payments as the State
Government may form time to time notify in this behalf,
and the tax shall be collected by the proprietor from the
person making the payment for admission and paid to the
Government in the manner prescribed.
Provided that a proprietor of a cinema or cable operator in
a local area having a population not exceeding one lac.
may, in lieu of payment under this sub-section, pay a
compounded payment to the State Government on such
conditions and in such manner as may be prescribed and
at such rate as the State Government may from time to
time notify, and different rates of compounded payments
may be notified for different categories of local areas.
Provided further that in the case of cable service, the
proprietor of the cable service control room/multi system
operator shall be liable to pay the tax irrespective of the
fact whether he collect it directly from the person making
the payment for admission or indirectly through an
associate or franchise cable operator or an agent, who in
turn collects it from the person making the payment:
Provided also that a proprietor of a cinema, in lieu of
payment under this sub-section, shall make a lump sum
payment to the State Government on such conditions and
restrictions and in such manner as may be prescribed and
at such rate as the State Government may from time to
time notify, and different rates of lump sum payments may
be notified for different categories of local areas or cinemas
or for different payment for admission.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude the State
Government form notifying different rate of entertainment
tax for different areas or for different classes of
entertainment or for different Aggregate payment required
for admission to entertainment.


Page 139 of 321





(2-a) It shall be lawful for the State Government to notify
lump sum rate of entertainment tax for any entertainment
or class of entertainments or for different payment for
admission to entertainment or for different area;
(3) Where the aggregate payment required for admission to
an entertainment together with any other charge leviable
under this Act, is not a multiple of one rupee then
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or any notification issued
thereunder, the tax shall be increase to such extent and be
so computed that the aggregate of such aggregate payment
and other charges is rounded off to the next higher
multiply of one rupee and such increased tax shall also be
collected by the proprietor and paid to the State
Government in such manner as may be prescribed,
(4) If in any entertainment, referred to in sub-section (1),
to which admission is generally on payment, any person is
admitted free of charge or on a concessional rate, the same
amount of tax shall be payable as would have been payable
had such person been admitted on full payment.
(5) Where the Aggregate payment required for admission to
an entertainment, referred to in sub-section (1), is made
wholly or partly, by means of a lump sum paid as
subscription, contribution, donation or otherwise, the tax
shall be paid on the amount of such lump sum and on the
amount of Aggregate payment required for admission if any
made otherwise.
(6) Where in hotel or a restaurant, entertainment by way of
cabaret or floor show (by whatever name called, by
excluding a mere band in attendance or recorded music) is
provided alongwith any meal or refreshment with a view to
attracting customers, whether or not Aggregate payment
required for admission is charged distinctly for such
entertainment, Thirty per cent of the amount payable by
the customer such meal or refreshment or the amount
charge distinctly for such entertainment, whichever is
higher, shall be deemed to be the Aggregate payment


Page 140 of 321





required for admission to such entertainment and the tax
shall be levied and pain accordingly.
(7) Where in a hotel, entertainment by way of cable service
is provided in rooms or other places, the entertainment so
provided in each room or other place shall be deemed to be
a separate entertainment and the subscription for
admission to each such entertainment shall be deemed to
be equal to the amount of subscription charged from a
subscriber in the vicinity of the hotel by the cable operator
providing cable service in the hotel, and the tax shall be
levied and paid on the basis of such subscription:
Provided that where the cable operator himself is the
proprietor of the hotel, the subscription for admission to
each such entertainment shall be deemed to be equal to
the amount of subscription charged from a subscriber in
the vicinity of the hotel by any other cable operator.
Explanation.- (1) For the purposes of this sub-section and
clause (ee) of Section 2, 'hotel' includes an
accommodational unit wherein rooms are provided to the
customers on rent, but does not include the units
approved under the 'Paying Guest Scheme' of the
Department of Tourism of the State Government.
Explanation - (2) For the purposes of this Act, the
expression aggregate payment shall mean a sum paid by a
person for admission to the entertainment which shall
include entertainment tax and other amount required to
be paid under this Act but does not include any fee or other
charges which is not a part of entertainment tax under this
Act."
The State Legislature of Uttarakhand amended the Uttar
Pradesh Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (as applicable to
the State of Uttarakhand) by Act No.4 of 2009 notified on
16.03.2009 which are as under:


Page 141 of 321





Section 2 – Definitions.–
xxx
(ff) “Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting” a service for
multi-channel distribution programmes direct to
subscriber’s premises without passing through an
intermediary such as cable operator by uplinking to a
satellite system.
Section 2(g) has been amended as under –
(g) “Entertainment” includes Direct-to-Home Broadcasting
service and any and any exhibition, performance,
amusement, game, sport or race (including horse race) to
which persons are admitted for payment and in the case of
cinematograph exhibition, includes exhibition of news-
reel, documentaries, cartoons, advertisement shorts or
slides, whether before or during the exhibition of a feature
film or separately.”

Interpretation of Entries of the Lists of the Seventh Schedule
of the Constitution:

8. With regard to the distribution of legislative subjects under
the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, it is
necessary to state that the Devolution Rules drawn under the
Government of India Act, 1919 and thereafter the Government of
India Act, 1935 are the precursors to the distribution of legislative
powers between the Union and the States. Some of the salient
aspects concerning the distribution of legislative powers between
the Parliament and State Legislature as per the three Lists in the
backdrop of constitutional provisions could be alluded to. Article


Page 142 of 321





246 of the Constitution deals with the distribution of legislative
powers between the Union and the States. The said Article has to
be read along with the three Lists, namely, the Union List, the State
List and the Concurrent List. The taxing powers of the Union as
well as the States are also demarcated as separate entries in the
Union List as well as the State List i.e. List I and List II respectively.
The entries in the Lists are fields of legislative powers conferred
under Article 246 of the Constitution. In other words, the entries
define the areas of legislative competence of the Union and the
State Legislature. (vide: State of Karnataka).
8.1 The legislative power to impose a tax or impost can be
traced to either List I - Union List or List II - State List. List III -
Concurrent List which gives powers to both Union as well as the
States to legislate on a subject does not contain any taxation entry.
Entry 47 - List III states that fees in respect of any of the matters
in that List but not including fees taken in any Court could be
levied and collected by an authority of law either by the Union or
the State Legislature. Similarly, Entry 66 - List II states that fees
in respect of any of the matters in List II but not including fees
taken in any Court could be collected by the State Legislature. In


Page 143 of 321





a similar vein, Entry 96 - List I gives power to levy fee in respect of
subjects enumerated in List I but not including fees taken in any
Court.
8.2 On the aspect of interpretation of legislative entries in the
three Lists, the principles are apposite as discussed in State of
Karnataka:
8.2.1 The power to legislate which is dealt with under Article 246
has to be read in conjunction with the entries in the three Lists
discussed above which define the respective areas of legislative
competence of the Union and State Legislatures. While interpreting
these entries, they should not be viewed in a narrow or myopic
manner but by giving the widest scope to their meaning,
particularly, when the vires of a provision of a statue is assailed. In
such circumstances, a liberal construction must be given to the
entry by looking at the substance of the legislation and not its mere
form.
8.2.2 However, while interpreting the entries, in the case of an
apparent conflict between the entries in the Lists, every attempt
must be made by the Court to harmonise or reconcile them. Where


Page 144 of 321





there is an apparent overlapping between two entries, the doctrine
of pith and substance is applied to find out the true character of
the enactment and the entry within which it would fall. The
doctrine of pith and substance, in short, means, if an enactment
substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the
Constitution upon the legislature which enacted it, the same
cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally
encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. Also, in a
situation where there is overlapping, the said doctrine has to be
applied to determine to which entry, a piece of legislation could be
related to by examining the true character of the enactment or a
provision thereof. Due regard must be had to the enactment as a
whole and to its scope and objects. It is said that the question of
invasion into another legislative territory has to be determined by
substance and not by degree. According to the pith and substance
doctrine, if a law is in its pith and substance within the competence
of the Legislature which has made it, it will not be invalid because
it incidentally touches upon the subject lying within the
competence of another Legislature.


Page 145 of 321





8.2.3 In case of any conflict between entries in List I and List II,
the power of Parliament to legislate under List I will supersede
when, on an interpretation, the two powers cannot be reconciled.
But if a legislation in pith and substance falls within any of the
entries of List II, the State Legislature's competence cannot be
questioned on the ground that the field is covered by Union list or
the Concurrent list ( vide Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee vs. Bank of
Commerce, Khulna, AIR 1947 P.C. 60). It was further observed
that in distinguishing between the powers of the divided
jurisdictions under Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the
Government of India Act, 1935, it is not possible to make a clean
cut between the powers of the various legislatures. They are bound
to overlap from time to time, and the rule which has been evolved
by the Judicial Committee whereby an impugned statute is
examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true character
for the purpose of determining in which particular list the
legislation falls, applies to Indian as well as to Dominion legislation.
8.2.4 The Privy Council quoted with approval, the observations of
Gwyer, CJ in A.L.S.P.P.L. Subrahmanyan Chettiar vs.
Muttuswami Goundan, AIR 1941 FC 47 wherein it was observed


Page 146 of 321





that overlapping of subject-matter is not avoided by substituting
three lists for two, or even by arranging for a hierarchy of
jurisdictions. It was observed that “Subjects must still overlap, and
where they do the question must be asked what in pith and
substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is
made, and in what list is its true nature and character to be found.
If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation
would be stifled at birth, and many of the subjects entrusted to
provincial legislation could never effectively be dealt with”. In the
said case, it was further observed that the dominant position of the
Central Legislature (Parliament) with regard to matters in List I and
List III is established. But the rigour of the literal interpretation is
relaxed by the use of the words “with respect to” which signify “pith
and substance”, and do not forbid a mere incidental encroachment.
The learned Chief Justice Gwyer further added as under:
“It must inevitably happen from time to time that
legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one
list, touches also on a subject in another list, and the
different provisions of the enactment may be so closely
intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal
interpretation would result in a large number of statutes
being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting
them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere.
Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial


Page 147 of 321





Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to
ascertain its “pith and substance”, or its “true nature and
character,” for the purpose of determining whether it is
legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that.”

8.2.5 Where one entry is made “subject to” another entry, all that
it means is that out of the scope of the former entry, a field of
legislation covered by the latter entry has been reserved to be
specially dealt with by the appropriate legislature. Also, when one
entry is general and another specific, the latter will exclude the
former on a subject of legislation. If, however, they cannot be fairly
reconciled, the power enumerated in List II must give way to List
I.
8.2.6 But once the legislation is found to be ‘with respect to’ the
legislative entry in question, unless there are other constitutional
prohibitions, the power would be unfettered. It would also extend
to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and
reasonably be said to be comprehended in that topic or category of
legislation ( United Provinces vs. Atiqa Begum, AIR 1941
vide
FC 16).


Page 148 of 321





8.2.7 Another important aspect while construing the entries in
the respective Lists is that every attempt should be made by the
Court to harmonise the contents of the entries so that
interpretation of one entry should not render the entire content of
another entry nugatory ( vide Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. vs.
State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044). This is especially so
when some of the entries in a different List or in the same List may
overlap or may appear to be in direct conflict with each other. In
such a situation, a duty is cast on the Court to reconcile the entries
and bring about a harmonious construction. Thus, an effort must
be made to give effect to both entries and thereby arrive at a
reconciliation or harmonious construction of the same. It is only
when such attempt to reconcile fails that the non-obstante clause
in Article 246(1) should be applied as a matter of last resort as
observed in Re: The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor
Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, AIR 1939 FC 1 by
Gwyer, C.J. in the following words:
“for the clause ought to be regarded as a last resource, a
witness to the imperfections of human expression and
the fallibility of legal draftsmanship”.



Page 149 of 321





8.2.8 The sequitur to the aforesaid discussion is that if the
Legislature passes a law which is beyond its legislative competence,
it is a nullity ab-initio . The legislation is rendered null and void for
want of jurisdiction or legislative competence vide RMD
Chamarbaugwalla vs. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
8.2.9 On a close perusal of the entries in the three Lists, it is
discerned that the Constitution has divided the topics of legislation
into the following three broad categories:
(i) Entries enabling laws to be made;
(ii) Entries enabling taxes to be imposed; and
(iii) Entries enabling fees and stamp duties to be collected.
8.2.10 Lists I and II are divided essentially into two groups :
one, relating to the power to legislate on specified subjects and the
other, relating to the power to tax. Thus, the entries on levy of taxes
are specifically mentioned. Therefore, as such, there cannot be a
conflict of taxation power of the Union and the State. Thus, in
substance the taxing power can be derived only from a specific
taxing entry in an appropriate List. Such a power has to be
determined by the nature of the tax and not the measure or
machinery set up by the statute. In Hoechst Pharmaceuticals, it


Page 150 of 321





has been categorically held that taxation is considered as a distinct
matter for purposes of legislative competence.
8.2.11 It would be relevant to discuss the following two
judgments of this Court in detail in order to bring out the pertinent
principles of interpretation of taxation entries in List II even when
regulation of an activity is provided under an entry in List I. They
are: (i) MPV Sundararamier and Union of India vs. H.S.
Dhillon, (1971) 2 SCC 779 (“H.S. Dhillon”).
8.2.12 In paragraph 51 of MPV Sundararamier, it was
observed as under:
“51. In List I Entries 1 to 81 mention the several matters
over which Parliament has authority to legislate. Entries
82 to 92 enumerate the taxes which could be imposed by
a law of Parliament. An examination of these two groups of
entries shows that while the main subject of legislation
figures in the first group, a tax in relation thereto is
separately mentioned in the second. Thus, Entry 22 in List
I is “Railways”, and Entry 89 is “Terminal taxes on goods
or passengers, carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on
railway fares and freights”. If Entry 22 is to be construed
as involving taxes to be imposed, then Entry 89 would be
superfluous. Entry 41 mentions “Trade and commerce
with foreign countries; import and export across customs
frontiers”. If these expressions are to be interpreted as
including duties to be levied in respect of that trade and
commerce, then Entry 83 which is “Duties of customs
including export duties” would be wholly redundant.
Entries 43 and 44 relate to incorporation, regulation and


Page 151 of 321





winding up of corporations. Entry 85 provides separately
for corporation tax. Turning to List II, Entries 1 to 44 form
one group mentioning the subjects on which the States
could legislate. Entries 45 to 63 in that List form another
group, and they deal with taxes. Entry 18, for example, is
“Land” and Entry 45 is “Land revenue”. Entry 23 is
“Regulation of mines” and Entry 50 is “Taxes on mineral
rights”. The above analysis—and it is not exhaustive of the
entries in the Lists—leads to the inference that taxation is
not intended to be comprised in the main subject in which
it might on an extended construction be regarded as
included, but is treated as a distinct matter for purposes
of legislative competence. And this distinction is also
manifest in the language of Article 248 clauses (1) and (2)
and of Entry 97 in List I of the Constitution. Construing
Entry 42 in the light of the above scheme, it is difficult to
resist the conclusion that the power of Parliament to
legislate on inter-State trade and commerce under Entry
42 does not include a power to impose a tax on sales in the
course of such trade and commerce.”

On the above analysis, it was categorically inferred in MPV
Sundararamier that taxation was not intended to be comprised
in the main subject in which it might, on extended construction,
be regarded as included but is to be treated as a distinct matter for
the purpose of legislative competence. But while saying so, in the
said case, reliance was also placed on Article 286 of the
Constitution.
8.2.13 It was observed in H.S. Dhillon that Entry 97 - List I
conferred the residuary powers on Parliament. Article 248 of the


Page 152 of 321





Constitution which speaks of residuary powers of legislation
confers exclusive power on Parliament to make any law with
reference to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List
or the State List . But at the same time, it provides that such a
residuary power shall include a power of making any law imposing
a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists . It is thus clear that
if any power to tax is clearly mentioned in List II, the same would
not be available to be exercised by Parliament based on the
assumption of a residuary power.
8.2.14 In fact, the judgment in H.S. Dhillon was by a majority
of 4 : 3 to the effect that the power to legislate in respect of a matter
does not carry with it a power to impose a tax under our
constitutional scheme. Thus, there is nothing like an implied power
to tax. The source of power to legislate on a subject which does not
specifically speak of taxation cannot be so interpretated by
expanding its width as to include therein the power to tax, by
implication or by necessary inference. Reliance was also placed
on Cooley on Taxation to the following effect:
“There is no such thing as taxation by implication. The
burden is always upon the taxing authority to point to the


Page 153 of 321





act of assembly which authorises the imposition of the tax
claimed.”

8.2.15 Thus, the power to tax is not an incidental power.
Although legislative power includes incidental and subsidiary
power under a particular entry dealing with a particular subject,
the power to impose a tax is not such a power which could be
implied under our Constitution. Therefore, it was held that the
power to legislate in respect of inter-State trade and commerce
(Entry 42 -List I) did not carry with it the power to tax the sale of
goods which are subject of inter-State trade and commerce, before
the insertion of Entry 92-A - List I and such power belonged to the
States under Entry 54 - List II subject to Article 286 of the
Constitution. (See: Builders’ Association of India vs. Union of
India, (1989) 2 SCC 645)
8.2.16 Delving further on the distinction between the power to
regulate and control and the power to tax, it has been observed by
this Court that there is a significant distinction between the two
primary purposes of legislation. The primary purpose of taxation is
to collect revenue. Power to tax may be exercised for regulating an
industry, commerce or any other activity. The purpose of levying


Page 154 of 321





such tax is the exercise of sovereign power for effectuating
regulation although incidentally, the levy may contribute to the
revenue. Taking a leaf from Cooley on his work on taxation, it was
observed that the distinction between a demand of money under
the police power and one made under the power to tax, is not so
much one of form as of substance.
8.2.17 In view of the detailed discussion made above, we find
that the dictum of this Court in MPV Sundararamier analysing
the entries in Lists I and II dealing with various subjects of
legislation and entries concerning taxation being separate and
distinct must be borne in mind while interpreting the impugned
provisions of the State Acts. That is the constitutional scheme. In
this regard, we reiterate what has been observed in Hoechst
Pharmaceuticals , to the effect that taxation is considered to be a
distinct matter for purposes of legislative competence and the
power to tax cannot be deduced from the general legislative entry
as an ancillary power. Also, a power to legislate as to the principal
matter specifically mentioned in the entry shall also include within
its expanse legislation touching only upon incidental and ancillary
matters. But the power to levy tax cannot be considered to be an


Page 155 of 321





incidental and ancillary matter while interpreting an entry in the
Lists concerning legislative competence of Parliament or legislature
of any State to enact laws on the subjects mentioned in the entry.
8.2.18 As a sequitur, it is observed that Entry 97 - List I which
is the residuary entry relatable to Article 248 of the Constitution
cannot be invoked or pressed into service when a specific entry
empowering Parliament or the Legislature of a State to pass laws
regarding the taxation on any subject is specifically enumerated
either in List I or List II.
8.2.19 It would also be useful to mention that since the
legislative competence to pass a law relating to taxation being
specific and distinct in List I or List II, such an entry is not found
in List III. In other words, both Parliament as well as the Legislature
of a State cannot have the competence to levy tax on a particular
subject and hence, there is no specific entry regarding taxation in
List III or the Concurrent List. In fact, Entry 47 - List III refers only
to power to impose “fees in respect of any of the matters in the List
but not including fees taken in any court”. The distinction between
the power to levy fees and the power to levy a tax is well known and


Page 156 of 321





it would not be necessary to go into that aspect of the matter in the
present cases except to highlight that there is no entry for taxation
in the Concurrent List. Therefore, while interpreting a taxation
entry in List I or List II, all efforts must be made to interpret them
in such a way as to give content and meaning to the same having
regard to the constitutional scheme under which the distribution
of legislative powers have been envisaged in the Seventh Schedule
and bearing in mind and the object and intent behind them.
State of Karnataka vs. State of Meghalaya:
8.3 The controversy in the aforesaid case was regarding the
interpretation to be given to the expression ‘betting and gambling’
in Entries 34 and 62 - List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution of India. Further, whether “lotteries organised by the
Government of India or the Government of a State”, which is a
subject in Entry 40 - List I also encompasses the power to levy tax
on the said lotteries? Consequently, whether under Entry 62 - List
II the State Legislature is denuded of the power to levy tax on the
said subject? In other words, whether the subject covered in Entry
40 - List I restricts the scope and ambit of Entries 34 and 62 - List
II? If the answer is in the affirmative, whether the State Legislatures


Page 157 of 321





have no legislative competence to levy tax on lotteries organised by
the Government of India or the Government of a State.
Consequently, the question in these cases was, whether, the
Legislatures of the States of Karnataka and Kerala had the
legislative competence to enact the Karnataka Act, 2004 and the
Kerala Act, 2005 respectively.
8.3.1 After examining the entries in List I and List II, it was
observed that the expression “betting and gambling” finds a
mention in Entry 34 – List II and taxes on, inter alia, betting and
gambling are leviable having regard to Entry 62 – List II. Thus, the
activity of betting and gambling and taxes on betting and gambling
are subjects falling within List II i.e. they are State subjects. If
conduct of lotteries is held to come within the scope of the
expression ‘betting and gambling’ then the regulation and control
of the said activity as well as the taxation on lotteries are squarely
within the contours of the legislative powers of the State. However,
only lotteries organised by the Government of India or the
Government of a State, even though, they come within the scope of
the expression ‘betting and gambling’ have been carved out of
Entry 34 - List II dealing with betting and gambling inasmuch as


Page 158 of 321





Entry 40 - List I (Union List) deals with lotteries organised by the
Government of India or the Government of a State. This implies
that conduct of lotteries by the Government of India or the
Government of a State, even though, is betting and gambling within
the meaning of Entry 34 and Entry 62 - List II, nevertheless, those
entries are denuded inasmuch as the State Legislature has no
legislative powers to pass any law on the subject lotteries organised
by the Government of India or the Government of a State. If such
is the simplistic interpretation to be given, the matter would rest.
However, that is not so. This Court observed that:
“158.2 The expression “betting and gambling” is also
found in Entry 34 of List II. We have discussed at length
above the content of the said expression and as to what it
encompasses. The activity of “betting and gambling”
includes, inter alia, lotteries. Lotteries can be conducted
by the Government of India or the Government of States or
authorised by a State or be conducted by private entities
in a State. Thus, a lottery conducted by any of the above
entities, Government or private is an activity falling within
the nomenclature of “betting and gambling” which is the
subject in Entry 34 List II. But what has been carved out
of Entry 34 of List II is only lotteries conducted by the
Government of India or the Government of any State.
Therefore, all other types of lotteries continue to remain
within the scope and ambit of “betting and gambling” as
an activity in Entry 34 of List II.”



Page 159 of 321





8.3.2 In the above backdrop, Entry 40 – List I and Entries 34
and 62 - List II were considered to assess whether there is any
apparent conflict or overlapping between the same. It was observed
that with regard to lotteries organized by the Government of India
or Government of a State are concerned, they continue to remain
within the scope and ambit of Entry 62 - List II dealing with, inter
alia , betting and gambling in so far levy of tax is concerned. But in
order to have uniformity of laws throughout the country governing
such lotteries, the framers of the Constitution had intentionally
included the said activity referred to above in Entry 40 – List I.
Consequently, Parliament has legislative competence to pass laws
on lotteries organized by the Government of India or the
Government of any State, uniformly throughout the country, as the
conduct of such lotteries by the sovereign State is a source of
revenue. Therefore, in order to enhance the faith of the people in
the organization and conduct of such lotteries throughout the
territories of India by the Government of India or the Government
of any State, the said regulation by Parliament is enabled by
placing the subject in Entry 40 – List I. Consequently, the Lotteries
(Regulation) Act, 1998 had been passed by Parliament which is


Page 160 of 321





regulatory in nature. But the question, whether, while interpreting
Entry 40 - List I alongside Entries 34 and 62 - List II, the power to
tax lotteries organized by Government of India or the Government
of a State was also taken away from Entry 62 - List II and was to
be read within the ambit of Entry 40 - List I was considered. It was
held that the power to tax remains in Entry 62 – List II with the
State Legislature for which in paragraph 158 of the said judgment,
twelve reasons were assigned. It was ultimately held that Entry 62
- List II is a specific taxation entry on luxuries, including taxes on
entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling. Since
lotteries conducted by any entity or organization was nothing but
betting and gambling, the State Legislatures would have the power
to tax lotteries under Entry 62 - List II as lotteries would come
within the nomenclature of betting and gambling irrespective of
who conducts them.
8.4 Therefore, before approaching Entry 97 - List I which is a
residuary entry in the Union List (List I), it would be necessary to
first interpret the relevant taxation entry in the State List and it is
only in the absence of there being legislative competence in the
relevant taxation entry in the State List could such a power be


Page 161 of 321





traced to Entry 97 - List I in the residuary list provided such a
power is not also traceable to any entry in the Union List. This is
because in List I itself the entries concerning taxation are separate
and distinct. Such entries are from Entries 82 to 92-B and Entry
96 - List I deals with fees in respect of any of the matters in the List
but not including fees taken in any court. Therefore, the power to
tax can be read under Entry 97- List I which is only a residuary
entry, if the same is not enumerated separately in List I or in List
II in which latter case it would come within the legislative
competence of the State Legislature.
8.5 From the aforesaid discussion, we would have to deduce and
give a finding whether the activity conducted by the assessees
herein falls within the nomenclature of entertainments under
Entry 62 – List II thereby recognizing legislative competence with
the State legislature to impose a tax on the assessees herein.
Meaning and Scope of the expression “Luxuries,
Entertainments and Amusements” and Legislative
Competence of State Legislatures to impose Entertainment
Tax:

Luxuries:
8.6 The expression “entertainments and amusements” finds a
place both in Entries 33 as well as 62 – List II. The former is a


Page 162 of 321





regulatory entry while the latter is a taxation entry. Entry 33 – List
II, on the one hand, speaks of theatres and dramatic performances,
while on the other hand, it deals with sports, entertainments and
amusements. Cinemas are also covered within Entry 33 – List II
subject to Entry 60 – List I which deals with sanctioning of
cinematograph films for exhibition. The taxation entry (Entry 62 –
List II) essentially grants or reserves legislative competence to the
State Legislature to impose taxes on “luxuries” which expression
includes entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling.
Thus, the aforesaid four expressions have been brought under the
umbrella of the word “luxuries” so as to enable a State Legislature
to tax these activities. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the
meaning and content of the expression “luxuries, entertainments
and amusements”.
8.7 In Express Hotels, this Court observed that luxury connotes
extravagance or indulgence as distinguished from the needs and
necessities of life. Taxes on luxuries is not limited to things tangible
and corporeal but the entry encompasses all the manifestations
and emanations which comprehend the elements of extravagance
and indulgence that differentiates luxury from necessity. There can


Page 163 of 321





be elements of extravagance or indulgence in the quality of service
as well as activities.
8.8 It was observed that luxuries covered both corporeal and
incorporeal services and thus refers to goods and services as noted
above. Further, there are two aspects of luxury, the first being
objects and services which are intrinsically capable of fostering a
sense of luxury and second, the recipient of such articles or
services who consumes them experiences such gratification. Since
“luxuries” can be both goods and services, what is relevant is the
common denominator of the luxury element/potential of goods and
services.
Reference could be made to Oxford English Dictionary,
(Second Edition, Volume IX), wherein it is stated that luxury could
among other things be defined as –
(i) abundance, sumptuous enjoyment;
(ii) the habitual use of, or indulgence in, what is choice or costly;
(iii) refined and intense enjoyment; means of luxurious
enjoyment;


Page 164 of 321





(iv) in a particularised sense: something which conduces to
enjoyment or comfort in addition to what are accounted as the
necessaries. Hence, in recent use, something which is desirable
but not indispensable; and
(v) as an attribute such as luxury coach, cruise duty, edition,
flat, liner, shop, tax, trade.
8.9 In short, the connotation of the word luxury is something
which conduces enjoyment over and above the necessities of life to
which one takes with a view to enjoy, amuse or entertain oneself.
8.10 In the same vein, in A.B. Abdul Kadir vs. State of Kerala,
(1976) 3 SCC 219 (“A.B. Abdul Kadir”), it was observed that the
connotation of the word “luxury” is something which conduces
enjoyment over and above the necessities of life. It denotes
something which is superfluous and not indispensable and to
which one takes with a view to enjoy, amuse or entertain oneself.
An expenditure on something which is in excess of what is required
for economic and personal well-being would be expenditure on
luxury although the expenditure is of a nature which is incurred


Page 165 of 321





by a large number of people, including those not economically well
off.
8.11 Further, in Godfrey Phillips, it was observed that the
expression “luxury” must be understood in a sense analogous to
that of the less general words such as entertainments,
amusements, gambling and betting which are clubbed with it. This
is by way of the application of the principle of interpretation known
as noscitur a sociis . Thus, luxuries is also capable of meaning an
activity and has primarily and traditionally been defined as such.
It is only derivatively and recently used to connote an article of
luxury. If luxuries is understood as meaning something which is
purely for enjoyment and beyond the necessities of life, then,
entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling would come
within its scope and ambit. Further, these are all activities.
8.12 In Western India Theatres, this Court observed that the
ordinary meaning has to be given to the word “luxury”. This means
that it would refer to goods and services which foster “luxury”, a
sense of abundance, enjoyment and gratification. Further taxes on
luxuries, entertainments or amusements cannot have a restricted


Page 166 of 321





meaning so as to confine the operation of the law only to taxes on
persons receiving the luxuries, entertainments or amusements.
The entry contemplates luxury, entertainments and amusements
as objects on which the tax is to be imposed, if so there can be no
reason to differentiate between the giver and the receiver of the
luxuries, entertainments and amusements and both may, with
equal propriety be made amenable to the tax. Thus luxury tax can
be imposed on those who provided it also. It was further observed
that the concept of luxuries in the legislative entry takes within it
everything that can fairly and reasonably be said to comprehended
in it. The actual measure of the levy is a matter of legislative policy
and convenience so long as the legislation has a reasonable nexus
with the concept of luxuries in the broad and general sense in
which the expressions in legislative list are comprehended, the
legislative competent extends to all matters “with respect to” that
field of topic of legislation.
It was further observed that the taxable event need not
necessarily be the actual utilization or the actual consumption, as
the case may be, of the luxury. Once the legislative competence and
the nexus between the taxing power and the subject of taxation is


Page 167 of 321





established, the other incidence are matter of fiscal policy behind
the taxing law. The measure of the tax is not the same thing as and
must be kept distinguished from the subject of the tax.
8.13 In Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of
India, the concept of luxuries in Entry 62 – List II was also
considered and in the said case, the aspect theory was also applied.
Entertainments and Amusements:
8.14 According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon,
th
6 Edition, Volume II, the word ‘entertainment’ includes any
exhibition, performance, game, sport and any other form of
amusement to which persons are ordinarily admitted on payment.
It also means “work in connection with, or for the purposes of, any
cinema, exhibition or entertainment”. The expression
‘entertainment’ includes hospitality of any kind and also
expenditure on business gift with the aim of advertising to the
general public. It is an activity that provides amusement and would
include public performances including games and sports,
exhibition, amusement to which persons are admitted for
payments.


Page 168 of 321





8.15 Readers Digest’s Family Word Finder defines the word
“entertainment” to mean amusement, diversion, distraction,
recreation, fun, play, good time, pass time, novelty, pleasure,
enjoyment and satisfaction. Entertainment denotes that which
serves for amusement and ‘amusement’ is defined as a pleasurable
occupation of the sense or that which furnishes it as sports or
music.
8.16 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary has defined
‘entertainment’ as an act of diverting, amusing or causing
someone’s time to pass agreeably.
th
8.17 According to Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11 Edition
(Revised) as cited in Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. vs. Regional
Director, ESI Corporation, (2014) 9 SCC 657 (paragraph 43.1),
“entertainment” means ‘the action of providing or being provided
with amusement or enjoyment. An event or performance designed
to entertain’.
8.18 In State of Karnataka vs. Drive-in Enterprises, (2001) 4
SCC 60 , it was observed that the word “entertainment” is wide
enough to comprehend in it, the luxury or comfort with which a


Page 169 of 321





person entertains himself. It includes viewing a cinema film inside
a driving theatre along with a car/motor vehicle.
8.19 In Purvi Communication , the expression “entertainments”
under Entry 62 – List II was held to include performance, film or
programmes shown to the viewers through the cable television
network.
8.20 Thus, the expression “entertainments” is a word of general
import and in common parlance, it includes cinema shows,
dramatic performances, etc. The expression ‘entertainments’ used
in Entry 62 - List II does not draw a distinction between one who
derives amusement and one who caters to it. It covers both
categories.
8.21 This Court has interpreted the expression “entertainments”
in a broad and wide manner and not restricted to entertainment in
a public place. With the advancement of technology, there can be
entertainment provided within the private space or the household
also by means of television or other electronic gadgets as well as in
a motor vehicle. The growth of technology is such that there is now
entertainment available even on a mobile phone (cell phone or even


Page 170 of 321





on a smart watch). Thus, the expression “entertainments” cannot
be interpreted in a narrow, pedantic or in a myopic way. With the
advancement in technology, there can be several modes in which
the activity of entertainment can be provided or received. However,
what is essential is the object of providing or receiving signals etc.
which must be for the purpose of entertainment.
Amusement:
8.22 The expression “amusement” in Entry 62 – List II would
mean diversion, pass time or enjoyment or a pleasurable
occupation of the senses or that which furnished it vide M.J.
Sivani vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770.
8.23 Entry 62 - List II is a specific taxation entry on luxuries,
including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and
gambling. The expression “entertainments and amusements”
would have to be read ejusdem generis . The tax is thus on the
activity of “entertainments and amusements” as it is on the activity
of betting and gambling. Hence under Entry 62 - List II, the specific
power to tax an activity which is “entertainments and
amusements” is reserved with the State Legislature and cannot be


Page 171 of 321





read within the scope and ambit of Entry 31 - List I which is
inherently restricted in its scope to include “broadcasting and other
like forms of communication” (Entry 31 – List I). We say so for the
following reasons:
8.23.1 First, when a specific entry regarding taxation is
provided in List II empowering the State Legislature to levy tax on
a subject, namely, “entertainments and amusements” amongst
other similar activities, the same cannot be read by implication in
an entry of List I, namely, Entry 31 - List I which is a regulatory
entry. This is because a taxation entry is separate and distinct from
an entry dealing on a particular subject. This principle has been
adequately explained by this Court in several judgments such
as MPV Sundararamier and was followed in Hoechst
Pharmaceuticals as discussed above.
8.23.2 Second, a taxation entry or legislative power to levy a tax
on “entertainments and amusements” in the instant case, cannot
be split between Parliament and the State Legislature when the
said power is expressly enumerated in Entry 62 - List II. This is the
constitutional scheme under the three Lists. This is also evident on


Page 172 of 321





a perusal of the entries of List III (Concurrent List) which empowers
both the Union as well as State Legislature to enact laws on
subjects mentioned therein and the power to levy a tax is
conspicuous by its absence.
8.23.3 Third, the object and purpose of Entry 62 - List II is to
tax the activity of “entertainments and amusements”.
8.23.4 Fourth, theatres and dramatic performances, cinemas,
sports, entertainments and amusements are subjects enumerated
in Entry 33 - List II and are State subjects, therefore, regulation of
such activities within a State is complemented by the power of the
State legislature to also tax the said activity under Entry 62 – List
II. This is because what is being taxed is an entertainment and
amusement activity which is squarely covered under Entry 62 -
List II. Therefore, the State legislature has the competence to tax
the activities enumerated in Entry 33 - List II.
8.23.5 Fifth, the contention of the assessees that the subject
being placed in Entry 31 - List I would also empower only
Parliament to impose a tax on the same by way of implication under


Page 173 of 321





the said entry itself is not a correct interpretation of the entries in
the Lists.
8.23.6 Sixth, Entry 97 - List I can be invoked only when any
matter is not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not
mentioned in the said Lists. There is no specific entry for levy of
tax on entertainments and amusements in List I. It is only in Entry
62 - List II. Thus, Entry 62 - List II gives legislative competence to
a State Legislature to levy a tax on, inter alia, “entertainments and
amusements”. This would also include a tax on organisation and
conduct of entertainments and amusements within the State when
permission has been given by a State Government to conduct such
an activity of entertainments and amusements in whatever form it
may be. Thus, Entries 33 and 62 of List – II which, inter alia, deal
with “entertainments and amusements” have to be interpreted
identically and the expressions given an identical meaning.
8.23.7 Seventh, when the State Government has the legislative
competence to levy a tax on, inter alia, entertainments and
amusements (as a specific taxation entry is provided to levy tax on
the said activity under Entry 62 - List II), the said entry must be


Page 174 of 321





interpreted comprehensively and not in a restricted or narrow
manner by excluding from the purview of the said entry, taxation
on entertainments and amusements conducted through television
by the medium of broadcasting.
8.23.8 Eighth, such a power to levy taxes on entertainments
and amusements cannot be read into Entry 31 - List I by
implication or into Entry 97 - List I as a residuary power. Such
interpretation, if endorsed, would do violence to the manner of
interpretation of entries in the Lists and prove to be contrary to the
Articles of the Constitution and judgments of this Court cited
above.
8.23.9 Ninth, if the State Government permits any species of
entertainments or amusements activity within the State in terms
of Entry 33 - List II, then the State also has legislative competence
to tax such an activity as per Entry 62 - List II.
8.23.10 Tenth, Entry 31 - List I is meant only for the purpose of
regulation. The said entry cannot be expanded to cover the power
to levy taxes on entertainments and amusements by Parliament
when such a power is envisaged in Entry 62 - List II. Parliament,


Page 175 of 321





therefore, cannot tax an entertainment or amusement activity, on
the strength of Entry 31 - List I. It may however regulate the said
activity to the extent permissible under Entry 31 – List I. Any
impost strictly for the purpose of regulation of broadcasting is
permissible so long as it is not a tax on entertainment or
amusement which is only within the ambit of only Entry 62 - List
II.
8.23.11 Eleventh, any entertainment or amusement activity
conducted by a private entity in a State or authorised by a State
Government can be regulated only by the State Legislature. This is
because Entry 33 - List II which deals with, inter alia,
entertainments and amusements, also includes television
entertainment. The regulation could be of Cable Television
operators in the State.
8.24 The definition of broadcasting in Section 65(13) of the
Finance Act, 1994 as amended in 2001 is as per the meaning
assigned to it in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Prasar Bharti Act,
1990. The said Act is made pursuant to Entry 31 – List I which
deals with posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless, broadcasting


Page 176 of 321





and other like forms of communications. The quintessence of Entry
31 – List I is communication which could be through various modes
as referred to above. However, Entry 62 – List II deals with taxes
on luxuries which is a totally distinct entry as opposed to
communication which is the subject-matter of Entry 31 – List I and
within the nomenclature of the expression “luxury”, is included
inter alia entertainments and amusements.
8.24.1 Therefore, on a plain reading of the said entries, it is very
apparent that broadcasting is a form of communication and
entertainment is a species of luxuries under Entry 62 – List II.
There is no doubt that there are various modes of entertainments.
Geeta Enterprises is a case which is restricted to certain modes
of entertainments but with the advancement of technology, we have
noted that entertainment could be through television and other
digital devices including cell phone or smart phone. The expression
“entertainments” in whatever mode it may be, come within the
nomenclature or genre of luxuries which totally distinct from the
expression “communication”. It may be that the activity of
entertainment is achieved through communication and in that
sense could be through the mode of broadcasting and in that


Page 177 of 321





sense, broadcasting and communication is for the purpose of the
entertainment. Hence, in our view, the State Legislature were fully
justified in imposing entertainment tax under Entry 62 – List II.
That broad casting through T.V. cable network and cable operators
is for carrying out the activity of entertainment and in pith and
substance falls within the scope and ambit of Entry 62 – List II.
However, the means adopted is through broadcasting which is a
means of communication under Entry 31 – List I and therefore
incidentally touches upon the subject under Entry 31 – List I.
8.24.2 Insofar as the argument that broadcasting falls only
within the scope and ambit of Entry 31 – List I is concerned, it has
to be viewed only as a form of communication and for the purpose
of imposition of service tax, broadcasting is given meaning which
is attributed to clause (c) of Section 2 of the Prasar Bharti Act, 1990
which as already noted as a regulatory entry. A regulatory entry
cannot be a basis for imposition of a tax as this Court way back in
MPV Sundararamier expressed. That a taxation entry is exclusive
and de hors a regulatory entry and cannot be read by way of an
implication into a regulatory entry. That apart, in H.S. Dhillon,
this Court has specifically stated that if a tax falls within the scope


Page 178 of 321





and ambit of an entry in a particular list then the same cannot be
read into the residuary list, namely, Entry 97 – List I. In the
circumstances, we find that the borrowing of the definition
“broadcasting” from the Prasar Bharti Act, 1990 for the purpose of
imposition of service tax on a broadcaster and thereby including a
person who is in the entertainment industry to also liable to pay
service tax, is not a levy in the nature of entertainment tax. Thus,
a levy of service tax on a broadcaster is not a levy on an activity
which is in the realm of entertainment. Conversely, a levy of
entertainment tax by a State under Enter 62 – List II is not a levy
on the activity/service of broadcasting but on the activity of
providing and receiving entertainment.
8.25 In conclusion we hold that the tax sought to be imposed by
the State Legislatures by way of the impugned Acts, is traceable to
the power conferred on the State Legislatures under Entry 62 - List
II. The said entry contemplates imposition of taxes, inter alia , on
the entire genus of “entertainments and amusements”. The pith
and substance of the provisions of the State Act referred to above
are in the realm of taxation of providers/receivers of
entertainment/amusement as luxuries within the said Entry


Page 179 of 321





through the medium of television which involves broadcasting
service which is regulated under Entry 31 – List I as a form of
communication in accordance with Prasar Bharti Act, 1990.
Parameters of Taxation:
8.26 A legislative enactment which provides for the imposition of
a tax must specify the following parameters of taxation:
(i) The taxable event which forms the basis of levy, also referred
to as “subject” of a tax;
(ii) The measure of the tax;
(iii) The rate(s) of taxation; and

(iv) The incidence of the tax.
8.27 The said parameters are each distinct and must not be
conflated with the others. The components of tax, as stated above
have been characterised in Govind Saran Ganga Saran . In the
said case, it was also laid down that a legislative scheme which
seeks to impose a tax, ought to define each of the aforestated
components with certainty and precision. The observations of
Pathak, C.J. in the aforesaid case can be extracted as under : (SCC
pp. 209-10, para 6)



Page 180 of 321





“6. The components which enter into the concept of a tax
are well known. The first is the character of the imposition
known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event
attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the
person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to
pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is
imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value to which
the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If
those components are not clearly and definitely
ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in
point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the
legislative scheme defining any of those components of the
levy will be fatal to its validity.”

8.28 This Court, in State of Karnataka, applied the aforesaid
parameters of taxation in the context of the State enactments for
collection of tax on conduct of lotteries that is encompassing the
activity of betting and gambling. Paragraphs 111.1 – 111.4 are
apposite to the present case and they read as under:
“111.1. In the context of the tax sought to be imposed by
the impugned Acts, the basis of levy is the conduct of
lotteries within the State of Karnataka or Kerala. In other
words, the subject of taxation is the conduct of lottery
schemes , by the Government of India or the Government
of other States, within the State of Kerala or Karnataka.
While it has rightly been stated by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents that the conduct
of lotteries involves a host of events such as formulation
and notification of scheme of lotteries, printing,
transportation and sale of lottery tickets, etc. all these
events constituting the conduct of the lotteries are
ultimately for the participation of persons, within the State
of Karnataka or Kerala. Therefore, the subject of tax is the
conduct of lottery schemes, within the State of Karnataka


Page 181 of 321





or Kerala, which is enabled by the propensity of persons to
participate in the lottery schemes.
111.2. The measure of taxation in the instant case is the
draw ”. The impugned legislations contemplate two kinds
of draws, namely, bumper draw and draw other than a
bumper draw.
111.3. The rate of tax , is a dependent variable and is to
be determined based on the measure. In the instant case,
the rate of tax under the Karnataka Act, 2005 is Rupees
one lakh and fifty thousand in respect of a bumper draw
and Rupees one lakh in respect of any other draw.
Similarly, in the Kerala Act, 2005, the rate of tax is Rupees
ten lakhs in respect of a bumper draw and Rupees two
lakhs and fifty thousand in respect of any other draw.
111.4. The incidence of the tax is on the promoters of
the lotteries i.e. on the Government of India or a the
Government of a State or a Union Territory or any country
organising, conducting or promoting a lottery, within the
State of Karnataka or Kerala, or any person or entity
appointed by the said Government or country in this
behalf. The impugned Acts require registration of
promoters and all provisions requiring filing of the returns
of draws and payment of tax, are to operate in relation to
promoters. Therefore, the incidence of the tax, falls on the
promoters of the lotteries.”

8.29 The above analogy be applied in the context of the legislative
enactments of the States under consideration and the following
table would bring out the aforesaid parameters of taxation in the
context of the activity of providing and receiving entertainment:


Page 182 of 321





S.<br>No.StatesTaxable<br>Event or<br>subject of<br>taxationMeasure<br>of TaxRate of TaxIncidence<br>of Tax
1Assam Amusements<br>and Betting Tax Act,<br>1939Section<br>3C read<br>with<br>S.2(4)Section<br>3CSection 3CSection 3C<br>read with<br>S.3C(4)
2Delhi Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax Act,<br>1996Section 7Section 7Section 7Section 7
3Gujarat<br>Entertainments Tax<br>Act, 1977Section<br>6E(1)Section<br>6E(1)Section<br>6E(1)Section<br>6E(1)
4Jharkhand<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2012Section 3Section 3Proviso to<br>Section 3Section 3<br>& Section<br>4
5Orissa Entertainment<br>Tax Act, 2006Section 7Section 7Section 7Section 7
6Punjab<br>Entertainment Duty<br>Act, 1955Section<br>3CSection<br>3CSection 3CSection 3C
7Rajasthan<br>Entertainments and<br>Advertisements Tax<br>Act, 1957Section<br>4AAA read<br>with<br>Section 5<br>and 6Section<br>4AAANotification<br>S.O.443 dt.<br>25.02.2008Section<br>4AAA
8Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainment and<br>Betting Tax Act, 1979<br>as amended by U.P.<br>Ordinance No. 4 of<br>2009 w.e.f.<br>16.06.2009Section 3<br>read with<br>S.2(a)Section 3<br>read with<br>S.2(l)(vii)Section 3Section 3<br>read with<br>S. 2(v)



Page 183 of 321





S.<br>No.StatesTaxable<br>Event or<br>subject of<br>taxationMeasure<br>of TaxRate of TaxIncidence<br>of Tax
9Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainment and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1979, as amended by<br>Uttarakhand<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009 dt. 16.03.2009Section 3<br>read with<br>S. 2(g)Section 3<br>read with<br>S. 2(g)Section 3<br>read with S.<br>2(g)Section<br>read with<br>S. 2(g)


8.30 The parameters of taxation when juxtaposed with the
relevant provisions of the State Acts under consideration, it is
evident that the parameters of taxation can be clearly discerned
from the aforesaid provision of the State Acts all relatable to the
subject “entertainment” on which the tax is levied coming within
scope and ambit of Entry 62 – List II.
Relevant case law:
Suresh:
9. The judgment of this Court in Suresh is relevant to the issues
herein and deserves deliberation. Suresh arose from an appeal
against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in
Tamil Nadu Cable TV Organisers Association vs. Government
of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No.10013/1994 dt. 30.11.1994 (“Tamil


Page 184 of 321





Nadu Cable TV Organisers Association”) . In the aforesaid case,
the constitutional validity of sub-sections (2A), (2-B), (11) of section
3 and section 4-E of the Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act, 1939
as amended by Act 37 of 1994 (“1994 Act”) with the relevant Rules
in G.O.P. No.265 dt. 18.08.1994 was under challenge. The purpose
of the 1994 Act was to levy entertainment tax on exhibition of films
or moving pictures or series of pictures through cable television.
“Cable television” was defined in clause (2-B) of section 3 as
follows:
““cable television” means a system organised for television
exhibition by using a video cassette or disc or both,
recorder or player of similar such apparatus on which pre-
recorded video cassettes or discs or both are played or
replayed and the films or moving pictures or series of
pictures which are viewed and heard on the television
receiving set at a residential or non-residential place of a
connection holder.”

“Television exhibition” was defined in clause (11) of section 3
as follows:
““television exhibition” means an exhibition with the aid of
any type of antenna with a cable network attached to it or
cable television, of a film, or moving picture or series of
moving pictures, by means of transmission of television
signals by wire where subscribers’ television sets at
residential or non-residential place are linked by metallic


Page 185 of 321





coaxial cable or optic fibre cable to a central system called
the head-end.”

Section 4E is the charging section which was introduced for
the first time as follows:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4
and 7, there shall be levied and paid to the State
Government a tax (hereinafter referred to as the
entertainments tax) calculated at forty per cent of the
amount collected by way of contribution or subscription
or installation or connection charges or any other charges
collected in any manner whatsoever for television
exhibition.
(2) The tax levied under sub-section (1) shall be
recoverable from the proprietor.
(3) The provisions of this Act (other than Sections 4, 4B,
4D, 5, 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E, 5F, 5G, 6(1), 7 and 13) and the
rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, apply in
relation to the tax payable under sub-section (1).”

9.1 It is relevant here to list the major issues of the writ
petitioners therein. They are as follows:
I. The State Legislature has no competence to pass the impugned
Act inasmuch as the subject falls entirely within List I of
Schedule VII to the Constitution.
II. The Union of India has passed a legislation viz., Cable
Television Network (Regulation) Ordinance 9 of 1994 and also


Page 186 of 321





framed the Cable Television Rules of 1994. Thus, by the
doctrine of “occupied field”, the State Legislature has no power
to pass the impugned Act.
III. The impugned Act violates the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution of India, as it operates as an unreasonable
restriction on the freedom of speech and expression of the
citizens of this country.
IV. The tax levied by the Amendment Act is not a ‘tax on
entertainment’ even as defined by the Act. It is a colourable
legislation and is a fraud on the legislative powers for the
following reasons:

a. Installation Charges and connection charges paid by the
viewer cannot form part of the charges for entertainment.
b. In effect, it is a tax on trade, profession or calling, falling
within the scope of Entry 60 - List II read with Article 276
of the Constitution of India.
c. The transmission through the Cable Television Network is
not only of films or moving pictures but also of several
educative programmes. In effect, it is partly a tax on


Page 187 of 321





education. The entertainment part of the transmission will
be less than 10% of the total transmission. As there is no
provision for apportionment of the tax on entertainment
and on other non-entertainment programmes, the entire
levy is illegal and invalid.
d. There is no nexus between the object of the legislation and
the provision contained in the Act, and therefore, it is
unconstitutional.
V. The provisions of the Act violates Article 14 of the Constitution
of India for the following reasons:
a. It does not impose a tax on Door darshan and those who
own a disc antenna including posh hotels and other
organisations.
b. The Act treats unequals as equals inasmuch as the levy is
the same with reference to rural operators as well as urban
operators.
VI. Essentially, the tax levied by the impugned Act is one on
private enjoyment by the people in their respective houses and
not on public entertainment.


Page 188 of 321





VII. The provisions of the Act are unreasonable due to the following
reasons.
a. The rate of tax is unduly exorbitant and wholly
unreasonable so as to practically annihilate the business
of the Cable TV Operators.
b. The provision for security deposit of Rs. 10,000 under Rule
21C is an unreasonable restriction on the business.
c. The provision for inspection of the place from where such
television exhibition is provided, under Section 11 of the
Act is unwarranted and an unreasonable restriction on the
business.
9.2 As regards Issue I questioning the legislative competence,
petitioners therein argued that the subject matter was governed by
Entry 31 and Entry 60 - List I or alternatively, it would fall under
the residuary Entry 97 - List I as it was a matter not enumerated
in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule. It was also argued that
the Act defined “entertainment” to mean “a horse-race or
cinematograph exhibition to which persons are admitted on
payment” and this definition had been holding the field since 1939


Page 189 of 321





and therefore the expression ‘entertainment’ was a nomen juris for
“a horse-race or cinematograph exhibition”.
9.3 However, the High Court opined that modern statutes have to
be interpreted under new facts and situations and that old
meaning cannot be given to the expression used therein by relying
on the maxim contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in
lege (contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law).
It then opined that the Indian Constitution has always been held
to be an organic instrument and the expressions used in the
Constitution cannot be restricted to the facts and circumstances
which prevailed at the time of the passing of the Constitution. By
relying on cases such as Geeta Enterprises and Express Hotels ,
the High Court held that the meaning of the word ‘entertainments’
used in Entry 62 - List II is not confined to the definition of the said
word as found in the Madras Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 and
that the impugned Act falls within Entry 62 - List II.
9.4 With regard to Issue II dealing with repugnancy and
occupied field, the Court rejected the argument of petitioners that
the impugned Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Central


Page 190 of 321





Ordinance 9 of 1994 since it had found that the subject-matter fell
within Entry 62 - List II.
9.5 On the contention regarding violation of Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution, the Court also rejected the argument that the
taxation curtails the freedom of expression of the various national
and international television operators by holding that the Cable TV
Operators are not prevented from expressing their views on any
particular matter.
9.6 As regards Issue IV(a), petitioners contended that the charges
for installation or connection are only for the purpose of laying own
connecting wires and cables which will not be a recurring
expenditure and they cannot be termed as charges paid for the
enjoyment of entertainment. The High Court rejected this
contention, noting that whatever amount was paid by the viewer to
the Cable TV Operator for installation or connection or for
transmission of different programmes, all that was intended as
payment for enjoying the entertainment. It also decided Issue IV(b)
in favour of the State noting that the incidence of tax was on
entertainment as such and not on any individual. As regards Issue
IV(c), the Court rejected the contention of the petitioners that the


Page 191 of 321





tax was mostly on non-entertainment programmes which were of
high educational value, and since it was not possible to apportion
the tax between entertainment programmes and non-
entertainment programmes, the entire levy had to be struck down
as unconstitutional. It held that if the pith and substance of the
Act brought an enactment within the scope of a particular
legislative entry, it could neither be dissected into different parts
nor could it be held that the major part of it fell outside the scope
of the entry. It rejected the contention of the petitioner as regards
Issue IV(d) at the very outset.
9.7 Issue V dealt with Article 14 and the Court reiterated the
principles of law relating to classification in a fiscal enactment that
the legislature has wide latitude in such matters. It noted that the
classification was based on intelligible differentia having nexus
with the object of the enactment and that there was no hostile
discrimination whatsoever against Cable TV operators. As regards
the urban/rural classification, the Court noted that merely
because the operators in rural areas may not get as many
customers as the operators get in urban areas, it cannot be a
ground to provide differential rates, as the incidence of tax was on


Page 192 of 321





entertainment and it was the same whether the viewer was in a
village or a town or a city.
9.8 Issue VI invoked a right to privacy argument. According to
the petitioners, due to the imposition of tax, the charges for getting
such connections became out of reach for ordinary people and
hence were deprived of watching programmes on the television in
the privacy of their respective abodes. The Court dismissed this
contention as far-fetched. It also noted that the tax was imposed
only on the proprietor, and the law does not mandate that the same
be passed on to consumers.
9.9 With regard to Issue VII, the Court reiterated the well-
settled principle that it has no concern with the wisdom of the
legislature in prescribing the rate of tax. It opined that when there
was no prohibition in the Act against the proprietor passing on the
tax liability to the customers, there was nothing wrong in the taxing
enactment to prescribe the furnishing of security for the proper
payment of tax. It also held as regards provisions for inspection
that the Legislature was always entitled to make provisions to
enable the proper enforcement of the levy. Holding so, it dismissed
all the petitions.


Page 193 of 321





9.10 The Supreme Court in Suresh upheld this decision of the
Madras High Court. It felt unnecessary to deal with all its
conclusions except the submissions relating to i) freedom of speech
and expression; ii) colourable legislation; and iii) the rate of tax. It
noted that the activity of the appellants therein was a combination
of two rights i.e. business and speech – sub-clause (g) and (a) of
clause (1) of Article 19 and that there was no reason why the
business part of it could not be taxed. It also noted that the State
had duly explained its reasons for imposing tax at the rate of 40%
and that since the appellants also carried on business, it was their
duty to share the burden of the State by paying taxes like any other
business.
Vasant Madhav Patwardhan:
9.11 A similar matter had come up before the Bombay High
Court in Vasant Madhav Patwardhan vs. State of
Maharashtra, 2000 SCC OnLine Bom 244 wherein operators of
Cable Television filed a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution
challenging the constitutional validity of an amendment to the
Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923. The said Act imposed a
tax on the entertainment provided by the Cable TV network.


Page 194 of 321





9.12 The Bombay HC discussed Tamil Nadu Cable TV
Organisers Association and Suresh in detail. It noted that the
judgments above substantially covered the scope and controversy
raised before it and that the substance of the legislations both in
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu were markedly similar. It noted that
the Constitution is an organic document and that the vision of the
founding fathers cannot, by a process of artificial construction, be
frozen at the scientific knowledge and technology which was
available at the point of time when the Constitution was drafted.
Consequently, it upheld the competence of the State to levy the tax.
An appeal against this judgment before the Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal No. 7167 of 2000 was dismissed on the ground that the
“point involved in this appeal is squarely covered by the judgment
of this Court in Suresh ”.
Geeta Enterprises vs. Purvi Communication:
10. During the course of the arguments, learned senior counsel
Sri KK Venugopal submitted that the three Judge Bench judgment
of this Court in Purvi Communication is per incuriam as it did not
follow the reasoning of the coordinate Bench judgment in Geeta
Enterprises and therefore, the correctness of Purvi


Page 195 of 321





Communication must be examined by a larger Bench of five
judges.
10.1 While the three judge bench in Geeta Enterprises held that
the levy of entertainment tax necessitates that the entertainment
in question have a public colour, the coordinate bench deciding
Purvi Communication did not take note of the same and erred in
holding that state legislatures are competent to impose
entertainment tax under Entry 62 – List II on the services rendered
by Cable TV Operators. In that regard, Sri Venugopal placed
reliance on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court
in State of M.P. vs. Abha Sethi, (1999) 4 SCC 32 wherein Geeta
Enterprises was cited with approval and its correctness affirmed.
10.2 Learned senior counsel further argued that the 1979 Act was
amended in 2009 to introduce entertainment tax on DTH services.
Our attention was drawn to the charging section of the 1979 Act
i.e. Section 3, which, according to Sri Venugopal, predicates the
levy of entertainment tax upon “admission to an entertainment”. It
was argued that watching television within the boundaries of one’s
home cannot be considered “admission to an entertainment”.


Page 196 of 321





Therefore, it was contended that the charging section does not
apply to the activity of the assessees herein. Placing reliance on
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, it was further argued that the
dominant nature of the activity of the assessees is that of
broadcasting and this Court must be circumspect in holding
otherwise.
10.3 The crux of the submission was that in Geeta
Enterprises , the word ‘entertainment’, as used in section 2(3) of
the Uttar Pradesh Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937
impugned therein, was interpreted to require a ‘public colour’. He
submitted that such an interpretation was in line with the meaning
of the word ‘entertainments’ in Entry 62 - List II, which has
historically required a ‘public colour’. The relevant paragraphs in
Geeta Enterprises are as follows (p.818):
“Thus, on a consideration of the legal connotation of the
word entertainment as defined in various books, and
other circumstances of the case as also on a true
interpretation of the word as defined in s. 2 (3) of the Act,
it follows that the show must pass the following tests to
fall within the ambit of the aforesaid section :
1. that the show, performance, game or sport, etc.
must contain a public colour in that the show
should be open to public in a hall, theatre or any


Page 197 of 321





other place where members of the public are
invited or attend the show .
2. …”
(emphasis supplied)

10.4 Sri Venugopal, learned senior counsel submitted that Purvi
Communication ignored this requirement of ‘public colour’ and
proceeded to hold that the performance, film or programme shown
to the viewers through the cable television network came within the
meaning of ‘entertainments’ under Entry 62 - List II to make law
for the levy and collection of tax on such entertainments.
10.5 Sri Shisodia, learned senior counsel, on the other hand
submitted that, as regards the question of whether cable TV
operators may be taxed under the impugned Act when it is the
subscribers who spend on entertainment, the judgment of this
Court in Purvi Communication squarely covers it. Therein, this
Court held that,
“37. In our view, the respondents as a cable operator, for
the purpose of levy and collection of tax under Sub-section
(4a) of Section 4A of the Act have direct and close nexus
with the entertainments made available to the viewer
through their cable television network. The performance,
film or programmes shown to the viewers through the
cable television network come within the meaning of
entertainments and therefore within the legislative
competence of the State Legislature under Entry 62 of List


Page 198 of 321





II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India to make
law for the levy and collection of tax on such
entertainments.
38. A tax under Entry 62 of List II of Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution of India may be imposed not only
on the person spending on entertainment but also on
the act of a person entertaining, or the subject of
entertainment. It is well settled by this Court that
such tax may be levied on the person offering or
providing entertainment or the person enjoying it.
xxx
39 . In the tax matters, the State Legislature is free to, if it
has legislative competence, to choose the persons from
whom the tax levied on entertainments is to be collected.
In other words, what are taxed are the entertainments,
which is very much within the ambit of Entry 62 of List II
of Seventy Schedule.”
(emphasis supplied)

10.6 We are of the view that Purvi Communication is not per
incuriam and need not be referred to a larger Bench. To
substantiate our reasons, let us revisit Geeta Enterprises and
Purvi Communication in light of Entry 62 - List II.
10.7 In Geeta Enterprises , the petitioner therein permitted
persons to enter the premises without any charge to view a show
on the video which consisted mainly of sports, games etc. played
on the screen of the video. Electronic machines were imported from
Japan and the mechanism for playing the machine was so designed


Page 199 of 321





that a coin of fifty paise was to be inserted into a strong box built
within the machine, the keys of which was with the manufacturer.
After the show was over, a representative of the manufacturing
company would come, open the box collect the money and pay the
share of the hire-petitioner therein out of the collected sale
proceeds. The charge of inserting the coin was released only from
those who wanted to operate the video machine at the rate of fifty
paise for a show lasting up to thirty seconds.
10.8 In Geeta Enterprises , the applicability of entertainment tax
on the video game installed by the petitioner therein was under
question. The modus operandi was that a machine with a video
screen was installed in the parlour of the petitioner. There was no
admission fee for people to enter the parlour, but a coin of 50 naya
paise was to be inserted into a strong box built within the machine
to play the video game. The question was, whether this modus
operandi would fall within the interpretation of the word
"Entertainment" as used in section 2(3) of the Uttar Pradesh
Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the 1937 Act). Section 2(3) of the 1937 Act provided that:


Page 200 of 321





"entertainment" includes any exhibitional, performance,
amusement, game or short to which persons are admitted
for payment."

10.8.1 This Court went into the different meanings of
‘entertainment’ to arrive at a conclusion that it has been used in a
very wide sense to include within its ambit, entertainment of any
kind including one which may be purely educative. It rejected the
contention of the petitioner therein that video games do not fall into
the definition as no admission fee was charged from the viewers. It
held that (at p.817),
“…when a number of people without any admission fee
enter a hall for entertainment and enjoy the games it
becomes a public show and the hall where the video is
played becomes a public hall and· amounts therefore
to a public exhibition which is squarely covered by the
first limb (exhibitional) of the definition of
entertainment in Sub-section 3 extracted above.”
(emphasis supplied)

10.8.2 Finally, the Court affirmed the views of the Allahabad
High Court in Gopal Krishna Agarwal vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1982) All. L.J. 607 which held that entertainment tax
was leviable on video games. It approved the High Court’s
reasoning that,


Page 201 of 321





“With the advance of civilization ·and scientific
developments new forms of entertainment have come into
existence. Video Games are probably the latest additions
to the means of entertainment. These games require skill
and precision as so many other games do. They are a
source of amusement and enjoyment to those who
participate in the games. Others who stand by and watch
also derive some pleasure and amusement though not to
the same degree. Admission to the premises where the
Video Machines are installed may be free but payment is
admittedly made if one wants to play the game. The money
charged for use of the Video Machine is an admission to
entertainment and the payment made by the person who
uses the Machine is the payment for admission. In any
case it is a payment for admission.”

Section 3 of the 1937 Act, i.e. the charging section imposed
tax on all payment for admission to any entertainment
(entertainment tax). The question was, whether or not the aforesaid
show would fall within the four corners of the expression
“entertainment” which was defined to include any exhibitional,
performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are
admitted for payment under the said statute. Having regard to the
aforesaid definition and bearing in mind the varying definitions of
the expression entertainment, it was observed that Section 2(3) of
the said Act required certain tests to be applied in order to
ascertain whether the activity fell within the aforesaid section. It


Page 202 of 321





was in the context of the definition of the expression entertainment
in the Act under consideration therein that this Court laid down
the test. Ultimately, this Court observed that the video show in the
instant case was exigible to tax under Section 3 of the Act
considered therein and the Writ Petitions filed were dismissed. This
decision pertains to the period prior to the ushering of television in
the country.
10.8.3 On a reading of this judgment, it becomes clear that the
interpretation of the word ‘entertainments’ includes newer forms of
entertainment such as video games, while at the same time it
viewed entertainment to have a public character.
10.9 Let us now consider Purvi Communication . In this case,
the respondent therein was carrying on business as a multi-system
operator (MSO) and engaged in receiving and providing TV signals
to individual cable operators of various localities. Communication
signals known as TV signals broadcasted by various satellite
channels were received and distributed to sub-cable operators. The
process involved in the business consisted of establishment of the
state-of-the-art control rooms and spreading the cable networks.
The said network signals were being given to various sub-cable


Page 203 of 321





operators with whom the respondents had franchise agreement.
According to the respondents therein, the object of the MSOs was
to capture signals from various satellites and to put all of them in
proper format/frequencies so that all those signals can travel
together in cables without encroaching upon and interfering with
other signals for the reception and distribution by the so-called
cable operators. The signals are transmitted through the satellites
by the various broadcasters from their earth up-linking stations in
various parts of the world.
Respondent No.1 therein entered into franchise agreement
with the individual cable operator of various localities and on the
basis of the said agreement, it transmitted the said signals to the
said individual sub-cable operators against a price. The individual
sub-cable operators on the basis of the monthly subscription
provided the said TV signals to the individual subscribers of the
locality.
10.9.1 The State of West Bengal sought to impose a tax on
MSOs engaged in receiving and providing television signals to
individual cable operators of various localities by amending the


Page 204 of 321





West Bengal Entertainment-cum-Amusement Tax Act, 1982 (“the
1982 Act”). Some of the relevant definitions under the Act were
with regard to the expressions “cable operators”, “sub-cable
operators”, “cable service”, “cable television network”, “subscriber”
and “gross receipt”. The said Act was amended in 1998 by omitting
sub-section (4) of Section 4A and inserting a new sub-section (4a)
which provided that,
“(4a) Where any owner, or any person for the time being in
possession, of any electrical, electronic or mechanical
device, is a cable operator and receives through such
device the signal of any performance, film or any other
programme telecast, and thereafter such owner or person,
against payment received or receivable,-
i. exhibits such performance, film or programme
through cable television network directly to
customers, or
ii. transmits such signal to a sub-cable operator, who
in turn provides cable service for exhibition of such
performance, film or programme to the customers,
such owner or person shall be liable to pay tax from the
month in which he exhibits such performance, film or
programme or transmits such signal to a sub-cable
operator on the basis of his monthly gross receipt at such
rate, not exceeding twenty five per centum of the monthly
gross receipt, as may be specified by the State Government
by notification published in the Official Gazette.”

10.9.2 Aggrieved by the imposition of entertainment tax and the
demand notices issued, the respondents therein challenged the


Page 205 of 321





vires of the 1998 Amendment made to the 1982 Act as well as the
demand notices before the Taxation Tribunal and being aggrieved
by its decision approached the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
10.9.3 It was contended on behalf of the sub-cable operators
that they were not providing any entertainment within the meaning
of Entry 62 – List II as providing the cable link up to the viewers
was the only role. That the sub-cable operator was merely
transmitting the signals received by the cable operator which were
in the form of audio-video signal. Per contra, the State of West
Bengal in the said case submitted that the cable operators were
engaged in receiving and providing TV signals to individual sub-
cable operators of various localities and such cable operators on
their part transmit the signals to their respective subscribers, who
are the actual consumers who get the benefit of the entertainment
from the signals. That the signals received by the sub-cable
operators are utilized for providing information and entertainment
to their customers. That respondent No.1 before this Court was a
cable operator and the MSOs like the respondent company were
not only providing the input to the localized cable operators in their


Page 206 of 321





business of providing cable TV connections and transmission or
programme through cables but the MSOs were also concerned with
value added services like internet, telephone and transmission of
data. It was argued that the respondent therein did not carry on
any activity which constituted entertainment or amusement. That
the MSOs were different from sub-cable operators. It was
contended that a cable operator in a locality who is actually
providing the entertainment to his subscribers may be liable to pay
tax but those who function at an intermediary stage cannot be held
liable to pay the said tax.
10.9.4 It was further submitted that the taxable event, namely,
the act or activity of entertainment must have a direct and
proximate connection with the assessee on which it falls and must
itself constitute entertainment. That unless an activity in question
qualifies as entertainment itself, the taxable event of entertainment
cannot arise. If the activity in question is not the taxable event
(entertainment), the levy cannot be sustained.
10.9.5 The High Court of Calcutta allowed the writ petition filed
by the MSO and declared section 4A(4a) of the 1982 Act as ultra
vires the Constitution.


Page 207 of 321





10.9.6 On appeal by the State, the MSO submitted that they
merely capture signals from various satellites and put all of them
in proper format/frequencies for the reception and distribution by
the sub-cable operators. However, the Court allowed the appeal by
the State. While considering Section 4-A (4-a) of the State Act, it
was observed that the purpose of the said provision was to levy and
collection of the tax from any person who provides cable service
directly to consumers or transmits to a sub-cable operators
through a cable television network and otherwise controls or is
responsible for the management and operation of a cable television
network and such person has been defined as cable operator being
a taxable person exclusively for the purpose of levy and collection
of entertainment tax. Only when a cable operator so defined
receives through any electrical, electronic and mechanical device,
the signal of any performance, film or any other programme
telecast and provides cable service directly to consumers or
transmits signals to a sub-cable operator through a cable television
network and otherwise controls or is responsible for the
management and operation of cable television network, he would
be liable. Therefore, a cable operator is the source of entertainment


Page 208 of 321





to the individual subscribers because, it is he who receives the
signal of performance, film, and any programme which is
transmitted or given to a large number of sub-cable operators
(although they call them as cable operator). The viewers enjoy, or
are entertained by such performance, film, or programme because
of receiving and transmitting video or audio-visual signals through
coaxial cable or any other device by the respondents. No
entertainment can be presented to the viewers unless a cable
operator transmits the video and audio signals to a sub-cable
operator for instantaneous presentation of any performance, film
or any programme on their TV screen. The sub-cable operators are
mere franchisees who receive signals for transmission to the
viewers only on payment of a price promised or paid in terms of
agreements entered by and between them. Therefore, the
respondents as a cable operator have direct and proximate nexus
with the entertainment provided by them through their cable
television network and as such, they are the taxable person in
respect of their gross receipts in relation to any month for providing
entertainments to the individual viewers. This Court observed that
the respondents therein as cable operators for the purpose of levy


Page 209 of 321





and collection of tax had direct and close nexus with the
entertainments made available to the viewer through their cable
television network. The performance, film or programmes shown to
the viewers through the cable television network come within the
meaning of entertainments and therefore within the legislative
competence of the State Legislature under Entry 62 - List II to make
law for the levy and collection of tax on such entertainments. This
Court further observed in paragraphs 38 and 39 is as under:
“38. A tax under Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution may be imposed not only on the person
spending on entertainment but also on the act of a person
entertaining, or the subject of entertainment. It is well
settled by this Court that such tax may be levied on the
person offering or providing entertainment or the person
enjoying it. The respondents are admittedly engaged in the
business of receiving broadcast signals and then
instantaneously sending or transmitting such visual or
audio-visual signals by coaxial cable, to subscribers'
homes through their various franchisees. It has been made
possible for the individual subscribers to choose the
desired channels on their individual TV sets because of
cable television technology of the respondents and of
sending the visual or audio-visual signals to sub-cable
operators, and instantly retransmitting such signals to
individual subscribers for entertaining them through their
franchisees. The respondents' act is, no doubt, an act of
offering entertainment to the subscribers and/or viewers.
The respondent is very much directly and closely involved
in the act of offering or providing entertainment to
subscribers who are on his record. For the fact of offering


Page 210 of 321





or providing entertainment to the subscribers and/or
viewers, the respondents receive charges, which are
realised or collected by their franchisee from the ultimate
subscribers. Their franchisee, called as sub-cable operator
under the said 1982 Act having no independent role to
offer or provide entertainments to the subscribers
inasmuch as franchisees have to depend entirely on the
respondents' communication network and this
communication network of the respondents consists of
receiving and sending visual images and audio and other
information for preparation of the subscribers and/or
viewers; without the communication network service of the
respondents, no entertainments can be offered or provided
to the subscribers and/or viewers.
39. In the tax matters, the State Legislature is free, if it has
legislative competence, to choose the persons from whom
the tax levied on entertainments is to be collected. In other
words, what are taxed are the entertainments, which is
very much within the ambit of Entry 62 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule. It is the respondents who as cable
operator for the purpose of the said 1982 Act are engaged
in the business of providing or offering entertainments
which include showing of films, various serials, cricket
matches and dramatic performances to the subscribers,
and the tax is imposed on the act of offering such
entertainments in this way to such subscribers and/or
viewers. The entire communication network service is built
up and controlled by the respondents. Whatever amount
is received or receivable by the respondent in respect of
providing such entertainments is taxable under sub-
section (4- a ) of Section 4-A of the said 1982 Act which has
a direct and sufficient nexus with the entertainments.”



Page 211 of 321





10.9.7 It is thus clear that the cable operator, respondent No.
1 is the exhibitor in this case and also the provider of the
entertainment to the customer. Hence, he alone can be asked to
pay the tax on the entertainment that has resulted from this
exhibition. This provision, therefore, does not cross the bounds of
Entry 62 - List II and is intra vires . Providing a cable link up to the
viewers' end is the only role of sub-cable operator. It is, therefore,
inconceivable that despite putting forth the ready entertainment in
the form of signal on the cable line, the cable operator cannot be
said to be providing the entertainment within the meaning of Entry
62 - List II. So long as the State Act remains within the ambit of
Entry 62 - List II and is not offending the provisions of Article 286
of the Constitution or the laws made thereunder, the State Act's
validity is beyond question.
10.9.8 This Court further observed that in the said case,
respondent No.1 therein sends visual images and audio signals for
presentation to the individual subscribers in their homes through
their feeder line i.e. coaxial cable or any other device used for
transmitting audio and visual signals in terms of clause (2) of the
said agreement. The franchisee has access to the signals provided


Page 212 of 321





by respondent No.1. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the price
or prices received or receivable by respondent No.1 is the amount
received or receivable by him for transmitting the signal for
exhibition of any performance, film or any other programme
telecast and the aggregate of such prices or amounts is the gross
receipt of respondent No.1 in relation to any month or part thereof.
10.9.9 It was observed with reference to Western India
Theatres that existence of means or providing entertainment
would be sufficient to support a law imposing tax thereon and that
the means of providing entertainment provides the nexus between
the taxing power and the subject of tax. It was further observed
that if one is looking at the means of providing entertainment, both
the cable operator and the sub-cable operator play equally
significant role in providing such means of entertainment, namely,
transmission of signals received from the satellites. In one sense
the cable operator plays a more pivotal role than the sub-cable
operator since the signals are received by him through his devices
and transmitted while a sub-cable operator makes provision for
continued instantaneous transmission of the signals.


Page 213 of 321





10.9.10 It was further observed that the impugned legislation
was in pith and substance not relating to broadcasting but one
relating to entertainment within the scope and ambit of Entry 62 –
List II. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal
were allowed by setting aside the judgment of the Calcutta High
Court.
10.9.11 On a perusal of the judgment in Purvi Communication ,
it can be observed that there was no specific question raised as to,
whether, the act of transmission by MSO has a ‘public colour’ to it.
In fact, the Court was never required to go into such a question,
for the impugned provision, i.e. section 4A(4a) of the 1982 Act, did
not require such a ‘public colour’ to the activities of MSO.
10.10 There are other substantial differences between Geeta
Enterprises and Purvi Communication as the table below
enumerates due to which Geeta Enterprises and Purvi
Communication cannot be compared.
Geeta EnterprisesPurvi Communication
Impugned Provision
Definition of ‘entertainment’<br>under section 2(3) of the 1937<br>Act (UP Act)Amended section 4A(4a) of the<br>1982 Act (West Bengal Act)



Page 214 of 321





Activity subject to taxation
Video game operated on<br>payment, in a parlour whose<br>admission is free to publicTransmission of signals by<br>MSOs of any performance, film<br>or any other programme<br>telecast.
Date of Enactment of the provision impugned therein
19371998
Discussion on Entry 62 - List II
NoYes


10.11 It was submitted by Sri Venugopal, learned Senior
Counsel that the interpretation of the word ‘entertainments’ in
Entry 62 - List II is restricted to ‘public entertainments’ and this
Court was not right in Purvi Communication to hold that the
impugned provision therein was constitutionally valid without
determining whether that provision fell within the restricted
interpretation of ‘entertainments’.
10.12 We do not agree with this limited interpretation of the
word ‘entertainments’. We hold in line with the principle that words
in entries must be given a broad, liberal and expansive
interpretation. As discussed above, the impugned activity of
transmission in Purvi Communication would still fall under its
ambit.


Page 215 of 321





10.13 It is true that in the earlier times, many people did not
have access to personal devices through which they could be
entertained. The entertainments, therefore, were mostly restricted
to those performed or displayed in public. With developments in
technology, it has become possible for such entertainments to be
experienced / enjoyed directly at home. In other words, what has
changed is the manner in which entertainments are accessed or
consumed. Nowadays, entertainment is available on a cell/mobile
phone in our hands. The forum or platform for entertainment as
well as the manner of perception has changed, namely, from
direct/live viewing to digital viewing but the content is essentially
the same, of course, with varieties of programmes, having regard
to the target viewers/audience of such entertainment, etc. That,
however, does not change the fact that such entertainment is
curated and transmitted for the benefit of the public at large.
Therefore, interpreting the activity taxed in Purvi Communication
in this manner, we hold that television viewing via DTH would still
fall within the ambit of “public entertainments”.
10.14 We also take note that the question of interpretation of
‘entertainments’ in Geeta Enterprises pertained to the


Page 216 of 321





interpretation of the 1937 Act and not Entry 62 – List II as it
appears in the Constitution. The judgment in Geeta Enterprises
can never be a binding precedent for the question raised before this
Court in Purvi Communication . Therefore, whereas the scope of
interpretation for Geeta Enterprises was limited to interpretation
of a provision in a statute we would be remiss to hold Purvi
Communication as per incuriam for its failure to take note of
Geeta Enterprises. Therefore, we find no reason to doubt the
correctness of Purvi Communication .
“Aspect Theory” or Aspect Doctrine: A Discussion
11. In Canada, the distribution of legislative powers is provided
in Sections 91 and 92 of its Constitution Act, 1867, dividing entries
between the Federal Government (under section 91) and the
Provincial Government (under section 92). The ‘Aspect’ theory, also
known as the ‘double aspect doctrine’, is a tool of constitutional
interpretation used in Canada to resolve issues which arise when
both the Federal and the Provincial Governments have the right to
legislate on a subject matter.


Page 217 of 321





11.1 Lord Haldane, in Union Colliery Co. of British Columbia
vs. Bryden, 1899 AC 580 at 587 , commented on the ‘aspect
theory’ as follows:
“It is remarkable the way this Board has reconciled the
provisions of section 91 and section 92, by recognizing
that the subjects which fall within section 91 in one
aspect, may, under another aspect, fall under section
92."

11.2 The Constitution Bench of this Court, in Federation of
Hotel & Restaurant Association of India , explained this theory
by quoting from the book ‘Canada’s Federal System’ by AHF Lefroy.
The Bench noted as under:
“14. In Lefroy's 'Canada's Federal System' the learned
author referring to the "aspects of legislation" under
Sections 91 and 92 of the Canadian Constitution i.e.,
British North America Act 1867 observed that "one of the
most interesting and important principles which have
been evolved by judicial decisions in connection with the
distribution of Legislative Power is that subjects which
in one aspect and for one purpose fall within the
power of a particular legislature may in another
aspect and for another purpose fall within another
legislative power. Learned author says: " ..... that by
'aspect' must be understood the aspect or point of
view of the legislator in legislating the object,
purpose, and scope of the legislation that the word is
used subjectively of the legislator, rather than objectively
of the matter legislated upon."

(emphasis supplied)



Page 218 of 321





Criticism of its Use in Indian Context:
11.3 Some scholars have criticised the transposition of the
Canadian ‘aspect theory’ to Indian jurisprudence on the ground
that the framework of distribution of legislative competence in
Canada is different from that in India and hence, that theory which
is used in Canada cannot be transposed to Indian contexts.
11.4 To substantiate this proposition, it is relevant to note that,
firstly , the aspect theory in Canada is used to resolve conflicts in
legitimacy to legislate on all subject matters, rather than
restricting its use only to entries concerning taxation. In India, the
doctrine of pith and substance is predominantly used to resolve
conflicts when two entries in different Lists of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution conflict with each other. As already noted, the
doctrine of pith and substance means that “if an enactment
substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the
Constitution upon the legislature which enacted it, it cannot be
held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches upon
matters assigned to another legislature” [Goodyear India Ltd. vs.
State of Haryana, (1990) 2 SCC 71, para 71] .


Page 219 of 321





11.5 Secondly , as regards taxation in Canada, it appears that
Section 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 therein empowers their
Parliament to legislate on “the raising of Money by any Mode or
System of Taxation” whereas, under section 92(2), the Provinces
therein are empowered to legislate only on “Direct Taxation within
the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial
Purposes”. This means that the Parliament therein has greater
legislative competence to impose a wide range of taxes, but the
Provinces therein are restricted to impose only direct taxes.
Therefore, the scope for the use of ‘Aspect theory’ in taxation
matters is limited in Canada. This distribution of taxation powers
in Canada is markedly different from that in India. Under our
Constitution, the subject matters of taxation available to
Parliament are enumerated in Entries 82 to 97 - List I and those
available to the State legislatures are in Entries 45 to 63 - List II.
There is no taxation entry in List III or the Concurrent List.
11.6 There are also alternate propositions as regards this theory.
For e.g., Sri Karthik Sundaram, in the book ‘Tax, Constitution and
the Supreme Court’ (OakBridge Publishing Pvt. Ltd. 2024, p.112),
argues that “the ‘aspect theory’ can, in some cases, be viewed as


Page 220 of 321





an exception to the doctrine of ‘pith and substance’”. Contrarily,
Sri V Niranjan, K.C. in Chapter 26 titled ‘Legislative Competence’
in the Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, argues that
there is no distinction between the doctrine of pith and substance
and the aspect theory in the Indian context.
11.7 Despite the above observations, on a perusal of the cases in
India which have referred to this theory, it would be evident that
the use of ‘aspect theory’ in the Indian jurisprudence differs from
its usage in Canada and that it is home-grown and innovated to
suit the Indian context particularly in matters relating to taxation.
In other words, while we may have borrowed the theory from
Canada, its application in the Indian context has been within the
context of the framework of the Indian Constitution. The theory is
applied so as to save a provision of taxation rather than to a
situation where a legislature’s competence to tax is determined. In
other words, the aspect doctrine is applied to ascertain whether a
legislature can tax on a particular aspect of a transaction/activity
rather than on competence of a legislature vis-à-vis the scope of
entries in List I or List II.


Page 221 of 321





11.8 To elaborate, it is necessary to revisit some significant
judgments which have dealt with the concept of ‘Aspect theory’ and
some judgments that have laid down principles for interpretation
of entries governing taxation in the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution.
Usage of Aspect Theory in the Indian Context:
11.9 In International Tourist Corporation vs. State of
Haryana, (1981) 2 SCR 364 , the vires of Section 3(3) of the
Haryana Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1952 insofar as it
permitted the levy of tax on passengers and goods carried by their
carriages plying entirely along the National Highways was
questioned. The appellants therein argued that the Parliament had
the exclusive jurisdiction under Entry 23 read with Entry 97 - List
I to legislate in respect of National Highways, including levy of taxes
on goods and passengers carried on National Highways. This
Court, however, noted that Entry 97-List I itself is specific in that,
in case of a tax, a matter can be brought under that entry only if it
is not mentioned in either of List I or List II. This Court further
opined that a regulatory and compensatory tax should be upheld
if there exists a “specific, identifiable object behind the levy and a


Page 222 of 321





nexus between the subject and the object of levy”. Having found
this nexus, it upheld the imposition of tax under the impugned
section.
11.10 Thereafter, in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant
Association of India, the Constitution Bench of this Court had to
decide the constitutional validity of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1987
(Central Act 35 of 1987) which envisaged a tax at 10 per cent ad
valorem on “chargeable expenditure” incurred in the class of hotels
wherein “room charges” for any unit of residential accommodation
were Rs. 400 per day or more per individual. The Union sought to
sustain the legislative competence to enact the impugned law
under Article 248 read with Entry 97 - List I.
11.10.1 One argument of the appellants therein relevant to this
case was that the law was, in pith and substance, really one
imposing a tax on luxuries or on the price paid for the sale of goods.
It is relevant to note here that a tax on luxuries is an exclusive
subject matter of States under Entry 62 - List II. The other
contention was that the particular impost under the impugned law,
having regards to its nature and incidence, is really not an
“expenditure tax” at all as it does not accord with the economists’


Page 223 of 321





notion of such a tax. The question therefore was whether the
economists’ concept of such a tax qualifies and conditions the
legislative power and whether “expenditure” laid out on what may
be assumed to be “luxuries” or on the purchase of goods admits of
being isolated and identified as a distinct aspect susceptible of
recognition as being distinct field of tax legislation.
11.10.2 This Court referred to the ‘Aspect theory’ used in Canada
by quoting Lefroy’s ‘Canada’s Federal System’ who opined that “one
of the most interesting and important principles which have been
evolved by judicial decisions in connection with the distribution of
legislative power is that subjects which in one aspect and for one
purpose fall within the power of a particular legislature may in
another aspect and for another purpose fall within another
legislative power.
“… that by ‘aspect’ must be understood the aspect or
point of view of the legislator in legislating the object,
purpose and scope of the legislation that the word is used
subjectively of the legislator, rather than objectively of the
matter legislated upon.”

This Court further opined that,
Indeed, the law 'with respect to' a subject might
incidentally 'affect' another subject in some way; but that
is not the same thing as the law being on the latter



Page 224 of 321





subject. There might be overlapping; but the overlapping
must be in law. The same transaction may involve two
or more taxable events in its different aspects. But
the fact that there is an overlapping does not detract
from the distinctiveness of the aspects.”

(emphasis supplied)
11.10.3 Reference was made to Lord Simonds in Governor
General in Council vs. Province of Madras, (1945) FCR 179:
AIR 1945 PC 98 in the context of concepts of Duties of Excise and
Tax on Sale of Goods in the following words:
“… The two taxes, the one levied on manufacturer in
respect of his goods, the other on a vendor in respect of his
sales, may, as is there pointed out, in one sense overlap.
But in law there is no overlapping. The taxes are separate
and distinct imposts. If in fact they overlap, that may be
because the taxing authority, imposing a duty of excise,
finds it convenient to impose that duty at the moment
when the excisable article leaves the factory of workshop
for the first time on the occasion of its sale. …”
11.10.4 Referring to the “aspect” doctrine stated in Laskin’s
“Canadian Constitutional Law”, the Constitution Bench further
noted that the “aspect” doctrine bears some resemblances to those
noted above but, unlike them, deals not with what the “matter” is
but with what it “comes within” … In this regard it was observed
as under:
“It is trite that the true nature and character of the
legislation must be determined with reference to a


Page 225 of 321





question of the power of the legislature. The
consequences and effect of the legislation are not the
same thing as the legislative subject matter. It is the
true nature and character of the legislation and not
its ultimate economic results that matters.”
(emphasis supplied)

11.10.5 In other words, this Court held that the subject matter
of a tax is different from the measure of its levy and that the
measure of a tax does not determine its essential character or of
the competence of the legislature. The Court therefore accepted the
submission of the learned Attorney General and held that the
distinct ‘aspect’, namely, the ‘expenditure’ aspect of the transaction
fell within the subject-matter of the Union and that it had the
legislative competence to impose a tax.
11.11 The Constitution Bench of this Court had to again
decide on similar facts in Elel Hotels & Investments Ltd. vs.
Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 698 (“Elel Hotels & Investments”) .
In this case, the Hotel Receipts Tax Act, 1980 imposed a special
tax of 15% on the gross receipts of certain hotels, where the room
charges for residential accommodation provided to any person
during the previous year was Rs.75 or more per day per individual.
The petitioners therein argued that the reliance on Entry 82 – List


Page 226 of 321





I in support of the tax was wholly misconceived and the tax in pith
and substance was an impost under Entry 62 – List II reserved to
the States. The respondents however submitted that the word
‘income’ in Entry 82 – List I should not be read in a narrow and
pedantic sense, but must be given its widest amplitude. The Court
agreed with the respondents therein and opined that,
“The cardinal rule of interpretation is that the entries in
the legislative lists are not to be read in a narrow or
restricted sense and that each general word should be held
to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can
fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it… In
construing the words in a constitutional document
conferring legislative power the most liberal
construction should be put upon the words so that the
same may have effect in their widest amplitude .”
(emphasis supplied)

11.11.1 While this Court herein did not explicitly use the ‘aspect
doctrine’, it is implied from its reasoning that by interpreting the
word ‘income’ liberally, the impugned legislation had an aspect of
‘income’ and hence the Union had the legislative competence to
impose tax on the subject-matter.
11.12 In State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd.,
(2004) 10 SCC 201 , the Constitution Bench of this Court
summarised the principles as regards interpretation of taxation


Page 227 of 321





entries in List I and List II. While it did not explicitly refer to the
‘aspect theory’, it opined on different aspects of a transaction as
follows:
“141. As held in Goodricke Group Ltd. [1995 Supp (1) SCC
707] which we have held as correctly decided, this Court
has noted the principle of law well established by several
decisions that the measure of tax is not determinative
of its essential character. The same transaction may
involve two or more taxable events in its different
aspects. Merely because the aspects overlap, such
overlapping does not detract from the distinctiveness
of the aspects. In our opinion, there is no question of
conflict solely on account of two aspects of the same
transaction being utilised by two legislatures for two levies
both of which may be taxes or fees or one of which may be
a tax and the other a fee falling within two fields of
legislation respectively available to the two.”

(emphasis supplied)

11.13 In All India Federation of Tax Practitioners , the
Court was concerned with the constitutional validity of the levy of
service tax on Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountant and
Architects by Finance Act, 1994 and Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, and
the legislative competence of Parliament to impose service tax
under Entry 97 - List I, in view of Entry 60 - List II which is also a
taxation entry and mentions, “Taxes on professions, trades,
callings and employments” and Article 276 of the Constitution.


Page 228 of 321





This Court held that Entry 60 – List II which refers to ‘professions’
cannot be extended to include services and opined, “this is what is
called as an Aspect Theory”. But it said no more on the theory.
However, from its reasoning that Entry 60 - List II concerns a tax
on the status and cannot be read to include every activity
undertaken or service rendered by a chartered accountant/cost
accountant/ architect, this Court suggested that the activity in
question i.e. service rendered by such professionals did not have
an aspect that can be covered by Entry 60 - List II which was only
regarding being a part of a particular profession. It was further
observed that a tax cannot be levied under the Finance Act, 1994
and its amendments without service being provided whereas a
professional tax under Entry 60 - List II is a tax on his status. It is
the tax on the status as a Cost Accountant or a Chartered
Accountant. As long as a person or a firm remains in the
profession, he/it has to pay professional tax. That tax has nothing
to do with the commercial activities which he undertakes for his
client. Even if the chartered accountant has no work throughout
the accounting year, still he has to pay professional tax. He has to
pay the tax till he remains in the profession. This is the ambit and


Page 229 of 321





scope of Entry 60 - List II which is a taxing entry. Therefore, Entry
60 contemplates tax on professions, as such.
11.13.1 Referring to Western India Theatres Ltd. it was
observed that Entry 50 of the Provincial List of the Government of
India Act, 1935 contemplated a tax on entertainment or
amusement as objects on which a tax was to be imposed and
therefore it was not possible to differentiate between the
entertainment provider and the entertainment receiver.
11.13.2 It was also highlighted that the importance of the
judgment in Western India Theatres Ltd. was in the fact that it
made a distinction between tax imposed for the privilege of carrying
on any trade or calling on one hand and a tax on every show, that
is to say on every incidence of the exercise of the particular trade
or calling. It was held that if there was no show, there was no tax.
It was held that the impugned tax on entertainment levied by the
Cantonment Board was a tax on the act of entertainment resulting
in a show and, therefore, the impugned law imposing tax on
entertainment fell under Entry 50 of the Provincial List in Schedule
VII to the Government of India Act, 1935 and not under Entry 46
of the Provincial List (similar to Entry 60 - List II). Therefore, it was


Page 230 of 321





held that Bombay legislature had power to enact the law imposing
tax on entertainment which had nothing to do with the law
imposing tax on the privilege of carrying on any profession, trade
or calling under Entry 46 (similar to Entry 60 - List II in the present
case). Therefore, this Court had clarified the dichotomy between
tax on privilege of carrying on any trade or calling on one hand and
the tax on the activity which an entertainer undertakes on each
occasion. The tax on privilege to practise the profession, therefore,
falls under Entry 60 - List II. It is quite different from tax on
services. Keeping in mind the aforestated dichotomy, it is clear that
tax on service does not fall under Entry 60 - List II. Therefore,
Parliament has absolute jurisdiction and legislative competence to
enact the law imposing tax on services under Entry 97 - List I.
11.14 In Union of India vs. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd., (2018)
13 SCR 139 (“Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd.”) , this Court explicitly
held that, “the principle is well settled that two taxes/imposts
which are separate and distinct imposts and on two different
aspects of a transaction are permissible as “in law there is no
overlapping”.” In this case the bone of contention between the
parties was whether an Indian importer can be subject to the levy


Page 231 of 321





of Integrated Goods and Service Tax (“IGST”) on the component of
ocean freight paid by the foreign seller to a foreign shipping line,
on a reverse charge basis. The notifications impugned in the said
case whether amounted to leading to double taxation was
considered.
11.14.1 The contention of the respondents therein was that the
transaction between the foreign exporter and the respondents was
already subject to IGST under Section 5 of the IGST Act read with
Section 3(7) and 3(8) of the Customs Tariffs Act as “supply of
goods”, and an additional levy of IGST on imported goods, that is
on the supply of transportation service, by designating the importer
as the recipient could amount to double taxation. The transaction
involved three parties, namely the foreign exporter, the Indian
importer and the shipping line. The first leg of the transaction
involved a CIF contract, wherein the foreign exporter sells the
goods to the Indian importer and the cost of insurance and freight
are the responsibility of the foreign exporter. In other words, the
foreign exporter is liable to ensure that the goods reach their place
of destination and the Indian importer pays the transaction value
to the exporter. The second leg of the transaction involved an


Page 232 of 321





agreement between the foreign exporter and the shipping line
(whether foreign or Indian) for providing services for transport of
goods to the destination i.e., in the territory of India. The appellant-
Union of India contended that the contract between the foreign
exporter and the foreign shipping line – of which the Indian
importer is not a party – cannot be deemed to be a part of
“composite supply” within the meaning of Section 2(30) of the
Central Goods and Service Tax Act (“CGST Act”). It was contended
that while the first leg of the transaction, between the foreign
exporter and Indian importer, is (according to the submission) a
composite supply, the second leg is an independent transaction. In
this regard, the Union of India relied on the decision of this Court
in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Mc Dowell & Co, (1996) 3 SCR
721 (“Mc Dowell”) to contend that a single element can constitute
a levy and a part of the value for another transaction. Further the
Union Government urged that the levy is on different aspects of the
transaction.
11.14.2 This contention was not acceded to by this Court. It was
ultimately held that the impugned levy imposed on the “service”
aspect of the transaction is in violation of the principle of


Page 233 of 321





“composite supply” enshrined under Section 2(30) read with
Section 8 of the CGST Act. Since the Indian importer is liable to
pay IGST on the “composite supply”, comprising of supply of goods
and supply of services of transportation, insurance, etc. in a CIF
contract, a separate levy on the Indian importer for the “supply of
service” by the shipping line would be in violation of Section 8 of
the CGST Act. Hence the appeal filed by the Union of India was
dismissed.
11.15 The judgment of this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited appears to have approached the application of ‘aspect
theory’ differently. The principal issue which arose therein was,
whether, the nature of transaction by which mobile phone
connections (through SIM cards) are enjoyed is a sale or a service
or both. If it is a sale then the States are legislatively competent to
levy sales tax on the transaction under Entry 54 – List II but if it is
a service, then the Parliament alone can levy service tax under
Entry 97 – List I but if the nature of the transaction partakes of the
character of both sale and service, then the moot question would
be whether both legislative authorities could levy their separate
taxes together or only one of them. The contention of the appellants


Page 234 of 321





therein was that the transaction in question was merely a service
and therefore only the Union had the competence to levy tax
thereon. However, the respondents States argued that the
transaction was a deemed sale under Article 366(29A)(d) of the
Constitution read with the charging sections in their various sales
tax enactments and therefore they were competent to levy sales tax
on the transactions.
11.15.1 The impugned judgments therein had held that there
was a sale of SIM cards by the service providers to the subscribers
and that it is factually and legally distinct from the activity of giving
connection or activation of SIM cards. However, this Court held
that the expression ‘goods’ do not include electromagnetic waves
or radio frequencies for the purpose of Article 366(29A)(d) and that
the goods in telecommunication are limited to the handsets
supplied by the service provider.
11.15.2 This Court clarified that what a SIM card represents is
ultimately a question of fact. That in determining such an issue,
the Assessing Authorities had to keep in mind the principle that if
the SIM card was not sold by the assessee to the subscribers but
was merely part of the services rendered by the service providers,


Page 235 of 321





then a SIM card could not be charged separately to sales tax.
However, if the parties intended that the SIM card would be a
separate object of sale, only then it would be open to the Sales Tax
Authorities to levy sales tax thereon. Therefore, the Court held that,
as far as SIM cards were concerned, the issue was left for
determination by the Assessing Authorities.
11.15.3 Further, this Court noted that the State would have had
the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement to
render service and impose tax on the sale, only if the transaction
in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is
discernible as such. It held that the test for composite contracts,
other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A), would be the
intention of the parties and if there was no intention of sale of
goods, then the State cannot impose a sales tax even if the contract
could be disintegrated. Furthermore, the Court held that it would
be possible for the State to tax the sale element provided there is a
discernible sale and only to the extent relatable to such sale.
11.15.4 As regards the ‘aspect theory’, this Court noted that the
High Court in the impugned judgment therein could not have used
the theory to “enable the value of the services to be included in the


Page 236 of 321





sale of goods or the price of goods in the value of the service” and
that the ‘aspect theory’ merely deals with legislative competence. It
further noted, observing on the judgment of this Court in
Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India that:
"subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall
within the power of a particular legislature may in another
aspect and for another purpose fall within another
legislative power. They might be overlapping; but the
overlapping must be in law. The same transaction may
involve two or more taxable events in its different aspects.
But the fact that there is overlapping does not detract from
the distinctiveness of the aspects".

11.15.5 It further held that no one denies the legislative
competence of States to levy sales tax on sales provided that the
necessary concomitants of a sale are present in the transaction and
the sale is distinctly discernible in the transaction. After narrating
the Constitutional history which led to the amendment of Article
366 by insertion of clause (29-A) by the Forty Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution, it was observed that of all the different kind of
composite transactions, the draftsman of the Forty Sixth
Amendment chose three specific situations namely, a works
contract, a hire-purchase contract and a catering contract to bring
them within the fiction of a deemed sale. Of these three, the first


Page 237 of 321





and third involve a kind of service and sale at the same time. Apart
from these two cases where splitting of the service and supply has
been constitutionally permitted in sub clause (b and f) of Clause
(29-A) of Article 366, there is no other service which has been
permitted to be so split. It was further observed that if there is an
instrument of contract which may be composite in form in any
case, other than the exceptions in Article 366 (29-A), unless the
transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts
and is discernible as such, then the State would not have the power
to separate the agreement to sale from the agreement to render
service and impose tax on the sale. The test therefore for the
composite contract other than those mentioned in Article 366 (29-
A) continues to be: did the parties have in mind or intend separate
right arising out of the sale of goods? If there was no such intention
there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test
for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or other is
to ask what is the substance of the contract. In other words, the
court termed it ‘the dominant nature test’.
11.15.6 It was further observed that what a SIM Card represents
is ultimately a question of fact. It was also observed that the States


Page 238 of 321





have the power to levy sales tax on sales provided the necessary
concomitants of a sale are present in the transaction and the sale
is distinctly discernible in the transaction. This does not however
allow the State to entrench upon the Union List and tax any service
by including the cost of such service in the value of the goods. Even
in those composite contracts which are by legal fiction deemed to
be divisible under Article 366 (29-A), the value of the goods involved
in the execution of the whole transaction cannot be assessed to
sales tax. For the same reason the Centre cannot include the value
of the SIM Card, if they are found ultimately to be goods, in the
cost of the service.
11.15.7 Therefore, this Court did not apply the aspect theory in
the aforesaid judgment because it did not find an aspect of sale in
the activity of mobile phone connections. It was observed that the
aspect theory would not apply to enable the value of the services to
be included in the sale of goods or the price of goods in the value
of the service.
11.15.8 In the aforesaid case, reference was made to Gujarat
Ambuja Cements Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 214 . In
this case, the writ petitions were filed challenging the


Page 239 of 321





constitutional validity of Sections 116 and 117 of the Finance Act,
2000 and Section 158 of the Finance Act, 2003 by which the
decision of this Court in Laghu Udhyog Bharti vs. Union of
India, (1999) 6 SCC 418 (“Laghu Udhyog Bharti”) striking down
Rules 2 (1)(d)(xii) and (xvii) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (as
amended in 1997) was sought to be overcome. The writ petitioners
were the customers or the clients of goods transport operator and
of forwarding and clearing agents. One of the contentions raised
was that the Parliament was not competent to levy the service tax
as it encroached upon the States Government power as defined in
Entry 56 – List II which pertains to “taxes on goods and passengers
carried by road or an inland waterways”. That Parliament could not
by resorting to the residuary Entry 97 – List I circumvent Entry 56
– List II and in the guise of levying service tax in fact, levy a tax on
transport of goods. The imposition of service tax on the customers
was challenged by many of the writ petitioners in Laghu Udhyog
Bharti but in the later case the legislative competency to levy
service tax on carriage of goods by transport operators was not
considered. It was contended that the subject fell under Entry 56
– List II and therefore could not come within Entry 23 read with


Page 240 of 321





Entry 97 – List I. This contention was not accepted. In paragraph
27 of this judgment, it was observed that there is a distinction
between the object of tax, the incidence of tax and the machinery
for the collection of the tax. The distinction is important but is apt
to be confused. Legislative competence is to be determined with
reference to the object of the levy and not with reference to its
incidence or machinery. There is a further distinction between the
objects of taxation in our constitutional scheme. The object of tax
may be an article or substance such as a tax on land and buildings
under Entry 49 - List II, or a tax on animals and boats under Entry
58 - List II or on a taxable event such as manufacture of goods
under Entry 84 - List I, import or export of goods under Entry 83 -
List I, entry of goods under Entry 52 - List II, or sale of goods under
Entry 54 - List II to name a few. Dealing with Entry 56 – List II it
was held that the subject matter of taxation under that entry are
goods and passengers. The phrase “carried by road or natural
waterways” carves out the kinds of goods or passenger which or
who can be subject to tax under the entry. After making an analysis
of the entry with reference to the dictum in Rai Ramakrishna vs.
State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667, it was observed that entry 66


Page 241 of 321





read with Section 65 (41)(j) and 67 (m-a) in Chapter V of the
Finance Act, 1994 did not seek to levy tax on goods or passengers
but the service of transportation itself which is a distinct levy from
what is envisaged under Entry 56 – List II. It may be that both the
levies are to be measured on the same basis but that does not make
the levy the same. Placing reference on Federation of Hotels and
Restaurant Association of India , it was observed that service tax
is not a levy on passengers and goods but on the event of service
in connection with the carriage of goods; it is not therefore, possible
to hold that the Act in pith and substance is within the States’
exclusive power under Entry 56 - List II. It was further observed
that the point at which the collection of the tax is to be made is a
question of legislative convenience and part of the machinery for
realisation and recovery of the tax. The manner of the collection
has been described as “an accident of administration; it is not of
the essence of the duty”. It will not change and does not affect the
essential nature of the tax. Subject to the legislative competence of
the taxing authority, a duty can be imposed at the stage which the
authority finds to be convenient and the most effective, whatever
stage it may be. The Central Government is therefore legally


Page 242 of 321





competent to evolve a suitable machinery for collection of the
service tax subject to the maintenance of a rational connection
between the tax and the person on whom it is imposed. By Sections
116 and 117 of the Finance Act, 2000, the tax is sought to be levied
on the recipients of the service. They cannot claim that they are
not connected with the service since the service is rendered to
them. It was observed that if in substance, the statute is not
referrable to a field given to the State, the Court will not by any
principle of interpretation allow a statute not covered by it to
intrude upon this field.
11.16 It is relevant at this juncture to discuss the judgment of
this Court in Imagic Creative. In that case, the appellant-
company was an advertising agency which used to create original
concept and design advertising material, brochures, annual
reports etc. for its clients. It used to file its returns for service tax
under Finance Act, 1994 and also for sales tax under Karnataka
Sales Tax Act, 1957. There was no express contract between the
appellant and their clients. But their purchase order and invoice
showed three categorical divisions; i) the amount of service tax on
the specific design and production; ii) the amount of sales tax on


Page 243 of 321





the specified item on the first sale; and iii) when certain items are
outsourced, the tax payable on resale of the said goods in terms of
section 6(4) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. The assessing
authority concerned, however, held that the entire activity
undertaken by the appellant therein was a comprehensive contract
and hence the entire sale value including the creation of concept
and design, formed part of the value of sale and was accordingly
liable to tax. The said order was confirmed by Tribunal as well as
High Court.
11.16.1 The question before this Court was, whether, the
charges collect towards the services for the evaluation of the proto-
type conceptual design (that is creation of concept), on which
service tax has been paid under the Finance Act, 1994 as amended
from time to time are liable to tax under Karnataka Value Added
Tax Act, 2003. This Court allowed the appeal filed by the appellant
therein. It held that payments of service tax as also Value Added
Tax are mutually exclusive and therefore, they should be held to
be applicable having regard to their respective parameters. It noted
that a distinction must be borne in mind between an indivisible
contract and a composite contract and that if in a contract, an


Page 244 of 321





element to provide service is contained, the purport and object for
which the Constitution was amended so as to insert Article
366(29A) must be kept in mind.
11.16.2 It was observed that the appellant in the said case
(Imagic Creative) admittedly was a service provider and therefore
was assessable to a service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 which
is a Parliamentary statute. That while interpreting a taxing statute
under Article 246 of the Constitution read with Seventh Schedule
thereof, the Court may have to take recourse to various theories
including “aspect theory”, as was noticed by this Court in
Federation of Hotels and Restaurant Association of India. It
was further observed that where a Parliamentary and State Act
come up for consideration, an endeavour has to be made to see
that provisions of both the Acts are made applicable. That payment
of service tax and also VAT are mutually exclusive, they should be
held to be applicable having regard to the respective parameters of
service tax and the sales tax as envisaged in a composite contract
as contradistinguished from an indivisible contract. It may consist
of different elements providing for attracting different nature of
levy. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that in a case of this nature,


Page 245 of 321





sales tax would be payable on the value of the entire contract,
irrespective of the element of service provided.
Aspect Theory: Its Extent and Scope in India:
11.17 On a perusal of the significant judgments of this Court
which have used or referred to ‘aspect theory’, two observations
can be made at the outset: first, it is discerned that Courts in India
have not used ‘aspect theory’ in the manner that is applicable in
Canada; and second, there appears to be a lack of clarity as to its
conceptual contours. For e.g., there is no clarity on i) the instances
when ‘aspect theory’ needs to be applied; or ii) whether ‘aspect
theory’ has any relevance in determining the legislative competence
of the Union or a State in enacting a tax legislation. The judgment
in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited opines that aspect theory is
‘merely concerned with legislative competence’, whereas the
judgment in Imagic Creative expressly suggested that in the
matter of interpretation of a taxing statute, in the context of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the Court may have to take
recourse to various theories including the “aspect theory” as was
noticed by this Court in Federation of Hotels and Restaurants
Association of India. Amidst this uncertain jurisprudence,


Page 246 of 321





several impugned judgments in the present cases have referred to
the ‘aspect theory’ to uphold the validity of several State
legislations imposing entertainment tax. It therefore becomes
necessary to examine the conceptual contours of this theory.
11.18 To appreciate the extent and the context of the use of
‘aspect theory’ in India, it would be instructive to reiterate some
well-established principles of interpretation of taxation entries.
Some of the relevant principles are reiterated as follows:
i. In interpreting expressions in the Legislative Lists of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, a wide meaning should
be given to the entries.

ii. In the scheme of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, there
exists a clear distinction between the general subjects of
legislation and heads of taxation. They are separately
enumerated.
iii. As the fields of taxation are to be found clearly enumerated in
Lists I and II, there can be no overlapping in law. There may
be overlapping in fact, but there can be no overlapping in law .


Page 247 of 321





iv. In the first instance, the pith and substance or true nature
and character of the legislation must be determined with
reference to the legislative subject matter and the charging
section;
v. The measure of tax is not a true test of the nature of tax;
vi. The same transaction may involve two or more taxable events
in its different aspects. Merely because the aspects overlap,
such overlapping does not detract from the distinctiveness of
the aspects.
11.19 Having noted few established principles of interpretation
of taxation entries, there are three specifics that must be kept in
mind while discussing this theory. The first is the taxation entries
provided for in List I and List II; the second is the legislation which
seeks to impose a tax on a subject-matter; and the third is the
activity on which tax is sought to be imposed by the legislative
enactment.
11.20 We observe that based on a reading of the cases
discussed earlier and the provisions of the Constitution, especially
Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution which deals with legislative


Page 248 of 321





relations between the Union and the States and distribution of
legislative powers, that the legislative competence is determined by
applying the doctrine of pith and substance which governs the
relation between the entries provided in the three Lists of the
Seventh Schedule while considering the vires of a legislation
impugned on the basis of the principle of legislative competence.
The aspect theory has no relevance in determining the
constitutionality of any provision on the ground of legislative
competence. Rather, aspect theory concerns the relation between
the legislation which seeks to impose a tax on a subject-matter and
the activity sought to be taxed. In other words, the constitutional
validity of a taxing statute on the grounds of legislative competence
has to be examined in the context of the doctrine of pith and
substance as envisaged under Article 246 of the Constitution of
India to ascertain whether a particular legislature i.e., Parliament
or a State Legislature, as the case may be, has the competence to
legislate in relation to the particular field of legislation while
interpreting the field of legislation as epitomised in the respective
entries in the three Lists. A broad perspective of the entries must
be envisaged. Once the contours of the entry under which a


Page 249 of 321





legislation is made is ascertained, the next step is to study the
legislation in question in order to ascertain whether it is covered or
falls within the contours of an entry. If it does fall within the
contours of a particular entry in a particular List, then that
particular legislature which has enacted it would have the
legislative competence to enact such a legislation. If it incidentally
touches upon an entry in another List, it does not render it invalid.
That means that so long as a piece of legislation is in pith and
substance coming within an entry in a particular List, it would be
valid as the legislature which has enacted, has the legislative
competence to do so.
11.21 The aspect theory has really no role to play as regards
determining legislative competence of a particular legislation, since
the Constitution does not envisage such a test. However, in the
Indian context, the ‘aspect theory’ is relevant to determine the
applicability of a taxing statute on the activity sought to be taxed
i.e., whether the statute covers a transaction/activity which falls
within a specific taxation entry either in List I or in List II. An
activity may have multiple aspects on which different legislatures
can impose a tax falling within its legislative competence. In such


Page 250 of 321





a situation, the courts would save the tax from a challenge on the
basis of the aspect theory by discerning which aspect of the activity
falls within the subject matter of tax under a legislation relatable
to a particular entry of a List in the Seventh Schedule. Such a
determination of the aspects which are present in an activity is a
factual inquiry. Thus, an activity could be taxed by two different
legislatures on the basis of the entries in the respective Lists
without there being a clash and within their legislative competence.
However, the aspect of the activity which is being taxed must be
relatable to the legislation under a specific entry of a particular List
so as to be within legislative competence of a particular legislature.
11.22 This is in contrast to the applicability of this theory in
Canada, where this theory is used therein to determine legislative
competence of a federal or provincial legislature to enact a
particular law. The reason why we observe that the aspect theory
has no relevance in determining the constitutional validity of a
legislation is that such a ground is not prescribed anywhere in the
Constitution. This Court in Mc Dowell held that the power of the
Parliament or, for that matter, the State legislature, to legislate can
be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone,


Page 251 of 321





viz., (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III of the Constitution or
any other constitutional provision. This Court was categorical in
noting that there was no third ground. Similarly, in Anjum Kadari
vs. Union of India, 2024 INSC 831 , this Court had to decide
whether a statute can be struck down for violation of basic
structure of the Constitution, and based on a survey of prior
judgments, held as follows:
“55. From the above discussion, it can be concluded that
a statute can be struck down only for the violation of
Part III or any other provision of the Constitution or
for being without legislative competence . The
constitutional validity of a statute cannot be challenged for
the violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. The
reason is that concepts such as democracy, federalism,
and secularism are undefined concepts. Allowing courts to
strike down legislation for violation of such concepts will
introduce an element of uncertainty in our constitutional
adjudication. Recently, this Court has accepted that a
challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute for
violation of the basic structure is a technical aspect
because the infraction has to be traced to the express
provisions of the Constitution. Hence, in a challenge to the
validity of a statute for violation of the principle of
secularism, it must be shown that the statute violates
provisions of the Constitution pertaining to secularism.”
(emphasis supplied)


Page 252 of 321





11.23 We have already discussed earlier in this judgment that
in case of an apparent overlapping between two entries, the
doctrine of pith and substance is applied to find out the true
character of the enactment and the entry within which it would
fall. This doctrine is not a judicial innovation, but is derived from
the phrase ‘subject to’ and ‘with respect to’ in Article 246 of the
Constitution of India. However, such a derivation cannot be made
vis-à-vis ‘aspect theory’ from any provision of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, as far as determining the constitutional validity of
a taxing statute is concerned, when it is challenged on the ground
of legislative competence, it is the doctrine of pith and substance
that would be applicable, rather than the aspect theory.
11.24 Thus, in our view, the aspect theory, in the Indian
context, comes into play at the level of determining the applicability
of a taxing statute on the activity sought to be taxed. Invariably, an
activity conducted by an assessee which is sought to be taxed by a
legislation, may have different aspects. The aspect theory is used
to determine if, in fact, there are different aspects within the
activity sought to be taxed and whether, the taxable event which


Page 253 of 321





forms the basis of the levy in a legislative enactment corresponds
to any aspect in the activity sought to be taxed.
11.25 It would be illustrative to consider the facts of the case
in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited to explain the application of
this theory. In that case, the principal question to be decided was
the nature of the transaction by which mobile phone connections
were enjoyed. On the one hand, the petitioners therein contented
that they were merely licensees under Section 4 of the Telegraph
Act, 1885 and that they provided ‘telecommunication services’ as
provided under section 2(k) of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India Act, 1997. That service tax was imposed on them under the
Finance Act, 1994 on the basis of the tariff realised from the
subscribers. They further contended that in providing such service
there were in fact no 'sales' effected by the service providers and
that the SIM card was merely an identification device for granting
access and was a means to access services. On the other hand, the
States contented that the transaction was a deemed sale under
Article 366 (29A)(d) of the Constitution read with the charging
sections in their various sales tax enactments and therefore they
were competent to levy sales tax on the transactions.


Page 254 of 321





11.26 This Court, inter alia, clarified that electromagnetic
waves or radio frequencies are not goods, and therefore, there
cannot be a ‘sale’ of such waves or frequencies. It held that a
telephone service is nothing but a service. That there was no sale
element apart from the obvious one relating to the handset, if any.
However, as regards SIM card, it observed that “what a SIM card
represents is ultimately a question of fact as has been correctly
submitted by the States”. It held that if the parties intended that
the SIM card would be a separate object of sale, only then it would
be open to the Sales Tax Authorities to levy sales tax thereon.
Therefore, as far as SIM cards were concerned, the Court left the
issue for determination by the Assessing Authorities.
11.27 If we proceed to understand the above facts from the
perspective of aspect theory enunciated above, it would be clear
that the question in essence in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
was whether there was an aspect of sale in the activity of the
petitioners therein and consequently, whether the States could
validly impose sales tax thereon. This is nothing but a question of
the applicability of the various state enactments on the activity in
question, rather than a question of the validity of the enactment .


Page 255 of 321





The Court ultimately held that electromagnetic waves were not
‘goods’. However, it left the issue of SIM cards to the determination
of Assessing Authorities. This meant that, on a case-to-case basis,
the Assessing Authorities had to determine whether there was an
aspect of sale in the activity they sought to bring to tax, by
examining whether the parties intended that the SIM card was a
separate object of sale. In other words, the Assessing Authorities
had to make a factual enquiry as to whether there was an aspect
of sale in the activity they sought to tax under the relevant sales
tax legislation. If there was an aspect of sale, then sales tax was
leviable but if it was purely service then sales tax could not be
levied. But what would be the position if an activity has an aspect
of sale as well as service? Applying the said analogy to the instant
case, the question is, what is the consequence if an activity has an
entertainment aspect as well as a service aspect/element.
Application of Aspect Theory to the Case at hand:
11.28 To determine whether there are different aspects to the
activity conducted by the assessees herein which is sought to be
taxed by the Union under the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended in
different years) as a service tax and by the States under different


Page 256 of 321





State legislations as entertainment tax, it is first necessary to
examine the taxable events which form the basis of levy of the
legislative enactments impugned herein. Thereafter, the modus
operandi of the activity undertaken by the assessees herein needs
to be understood. Thereafter, a factual determination as to,
whether, the taxable event which forms the basis of the levy under
the Central and the State enactments corresponds to different
aspects of the activity under consideration must be undertaken.
12. Under the Finance Act, 1994 as amended from time to time,
the expression “broadcasting” is defined in Section 65(15) in terms
of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Prasar Bharti Act, 1990 which
defines it to mean the dissemination of any form of communication
through space or through cables intended to be received by the
general public either directly or indirectly through medium of relay
stations and all its grammatical expressions and cognate
expressions are to be construed accordingly. Under Section 65 (72)
(zk) “broadcasting agency” is a service provider and the service
rendered by a such an entity is a taxable service. The expression
‘taxable service’ is defined in Section 65(105)(zk) to mean any


Page 257 of 321





service provided to a client, by a broadcasting agency or an
organization in relation to broadcasting, in any manner.
12.1 Section 66 (5) of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended from time
to time is the charging section and service tax at the rate of 5% of
the value of the taxable service (broadcasting service in the instant
case) as defined above is chargeable to tax. Thus, the tax is 5% of
the value of taxable services levied on the service provider
rendering broadcasting services.
12.2 The expression “broadcasting” has been expanded from time
to time to include not only dissemination of any form of
communication but also programme selection, scheduling or
presentation of sound or visual matter on a radio or a television
channel that is intended for public listening or viewing, as the case
may be, irrespective of where the location of the broadcasting
agency is. In the year 2002, Section 65 (90) (zk) was amended
whereby the “broadcasting agency” could provide service by its
representative in India or any agent appointed in India or by any
person appointed to act on his behalf in any manner. This is


Page 258 of 321





irrespective of whether encryption of the signals of beaming thereof
through satellite might have taken place outside India or not.
12.3 The definition of “broadcasting” read with “broadcasting
agency or organization” was amended in the year 2003, wherein it
said that a “broadcasting agency” or organization means any
agency or organization engaged in providing service in relation to
broadcasting in any manner irrespective of its location and
includes inter alia a representative in India or any agent appointed
in India engaged in the activity of selling of time slots for
broadcasting of any programme or obtaining sponsorships for
programme or collecting the broadcasting charges on behalf of the
said agency or organisation.
12.4 In the year 2005, the Finance Act, 1994 was again amended
to define “broadcasting” to include a broadcasting agency or an
organization collecting the broadcasting charges for transmission
of electromagnetic waves through space or through cables, direct
to home signals or by any other means to cable operator including
multisystem operator or any other person on behalf of the said
agency or an organization through any representative or agent


Page 259 of 321





appointed in India. Thus, service tax was levied on direct to home
(DTH) broadcasting services.
Modus Operandi of the Assessees and their aspects:
13. As regards the business of the assessees herein, they are
DTH broadcasting service providers licensed by the Central
Government in terms of the provisions of Section 4 of the Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885 and Section 5 of the Indian Wireless
Telegraphy Act, 1933. Their modus operandi is that they set up a
hub which enables them to downlink signals from the satellites of
various broadcasters of TV channels (Star, BBC, etc.), then they
uplink those signals to their own Ku Band (such as INSAT 4CR
satellite) designated transponders for transmission of the signals
in Ku band. These signals are received by the dish antennae which
are installed at the subscribers’ premises. Since these signals are
in encrypted form they are decrypted by the Set-Top Boxes and the
viewing cards inside these boxes enable subscribers to view the
various TV channels on their TV sets. Invariably, the set-top boxes
are installed without any consideration and remain the property of
the assessees.


Page 260 of 321





13.1 If we closely examine the modus operandi of the activity
undertaken by the assessees, it would be evident that their activity
involves at least two aspects: the first, is the act of relaying the
signals from the satellites of various broadcasters of TV channels,
and the second, is the object of such relaying of the signals, which
is the effect of the content delivered to the subscriber. This effect is
nothing but the entertainment of the subscribers. In other words,
the activity of the assessees involves at least two aspects which
correspond to the subject-matter of the levy under the Central
Finance Act, 1994, namely, broadcasting service and the respective
State enactments as providing entertainment to the subscribers.
13.2 It is the contention of the assessees that their activity merely
involves the relaying of the signals and they are in no way related
to the content that these signals carry and are not concerned with
providing entertainment. However, as held in Purvi
Communication , no entertainment can be presented to the
viewers unless the broadcaster transmits the signals for
instantaneous presentation of any performance, film or any
programme on their T.V. screen. The second aspect here concerns
not the kind of content of the signals, rather it is the effect of the


Page 261 of 321





decryption of the signals by the Set-Top Boxes and the viewing
cards inside these boxes provided by the assessees. Without the
apparatus provided for by the assessees to decrypt the signals, the
subscriber would not be able to watch the content that is
transmitted, the content being for the purpose of entertainment. In
other words, the State enactments are concerned about
broadcasting for the purpose of entertainment. It makes an
assumption that whatever be the content, the very act of
presentation of any performance, film or any programme on the
T.V. screen leads to entertainment which is reckoned to be a
luxury. Therefore, the assessees as DTH operators have direct and
proximate nexus with Entry 62 – List II. The entertainment
provided by them through their modus operandi is a luxury within
the meaning of that entry.
13.3 Although, the case at hand is different from Purvi
Communication in two respects; however, in our view, these
differences are immaterial and only support the view that the
observations in Purvi Communication are squarely applicable to
the modus operandi of the assessees and the second aspect herein.
Firstly , in the present case, the mode of transmission is through


Page 262 of 321





DTH broadcasting services and not transmission via cable.
Secondly , the present is a case of direct transmission by the
assessees to the customers and not through a hierarchical network
of cable operators. In our view, both these differences do not
detract from the view of this Court in Purvi Communication that
the activity of providing and receiving broadcast signals and then
relaying them ahead is ‘no doubt, an act of offering entertainment to
the subscribers and/or viewers’ and, consequently, the State
legislatures are competent to enact laws under Entry 62 – List II
imposing taxes on entertainment. The first difference noted above
merely speaks to the difference in medium of transmission and
does not deviate from the essential nature of the activity, as
discussed in Purvi Communication . The second differentiation,
again, only makes clearer the proximity of the assessees herein
with the act of entertainment. In some manner, it is fair to suggest
that the defence of lack of remoteness to the act of entertainment
taken by the cable-operators in Purvi Communication is, in fact,
not available to the assessees herein and therefore they are not on
a better footing, at least on this limited question.


Page 263 of 321





13.4 Furthermore, with reference to our semantical survey of
entertainments ’ above, the assessees are clearly engaged in ‘work
in connection with, or for the purposes of, any cinema, exhibition
or entertainment.’ Juxtaposing our view with the observations of
this Court in Purvi Communication, we also find that the activity
of the assessees is an ‘action of providing or being provided with
amusement or enjoyment’.
13.5 The first aspect discussed above correlates with the
imposing of service tax by the Parliament, and the second aspect
correlates with the imposition of entertainment tax by the States,
through their respective enactments. Thus, the activity of
entertainment falls within the scope and ambit of Entry 62 – List II
as being a specie of luxury. The service of broadcasting rendered
falls under Entry 97-List I. Therefore, both the taxes, one, by the
State Legislature and the other, by the Parliament are leviable on
the activity of the assessees herein. This is because by rendering
the service of broadcasting, the assesses are entertaining the
subscribers within the meaning of Entry 62-List II. There may be
an overlapping, in fact, inasmuch as different aspects of the same
activity is being taxed under two different legislations by two


Page 264 of 321





different legislatures. But, there is no overlapping in law. This is
because the activity of broadcasting is a service and liable to service
tax imposed by the Parliament (Entry 97 – List I) and the activity
of entertainment is a subject falling under Entry 62-List II and
therefore, the assessees herein are liable to pay entertainment tax
as well. Hence, the State Legislatures as well as the Parliament,
both have the legislative competence to levy entertainment tax as
well as service tax respectively on the activity carried out by the
assessees herein.
Allahabad High Court’s Ruling on retrospective operation of
the Amendment:

14. Another question which arises in relation to the Impugned
Judgment dated 27.07.2012 of the Allahabad High Court is
whether notices issued before the Amendments of 2009 came in
force could demand entertainment tax for the period before express
provisions in respect of DTH services were inserted in the U.P.
Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (‘the 1979 Act’). In other
words, whether the amendments were merely clarificatory in
nature and entertainment tax on DTH services could be levied


Page 265 of 321





retrospectively? A brief legislative history of the 1979 Act is relevant
for our consideration:
i. The Act was promulgated in 1979. Sub-clause (a) to Section
2 defined ‘admission to entertainment’ to include admission
to any place in which entertainment is held. Sub-clause (g) to
Section 2 defined ‘entertainment’. Section 2(l) defined
‘payment for admission’. On a conjoint reading, Section 2(g)
read with Section 2(a) defined the scope of entertainment
chargeable to tax under Section 3 of the Act.
ii. In 1995, to bring cable services within the scope of the Act,
the State Legislature vide U.P. Act No. 28 of 1995 amended
the 1979 Act by defining ‘cable services’ and ‘cable television
network’ and inserting Section 4C, a separate charging
section for levying entertainment tax on cable services. Sub-
section (2) of Section 4C provided that the tax payable under
this section shall be paid, collected and realized in such
manner as may be prescribed. Therefore, the collection
machinery was prescribed within the section itself.


Page 266 of 321





iii. In 2001, the State Legislature by way of U.P. Act No. 15 of
2001 amended the 1979 Act again by inserting the definition
of ‘cable operator’.
iv. Pertinently, the U.P. Ordinance No. 4. Of 2009 dated
16.06.2009 amended several provisions of the 1979 Act to
provide for imposition of entertainment tax on DTH services.
Sub-clause (a) was amended to broaden ‘admission to
entertainment’ to include entertainment provided by means
of cable television network or DTH. After sub-clause (f) to
Section 2, sub-clause (f-1) was inserted defining ‘Direct-to-
Home service’ to effectively expand the scope of the charging
section to include direct to home services. The definition of
‘payment for admission’ in Section 2(l) was expanded by
inserting sub-clause (vi) and sub-clause (vii) which included
‘contribution or subscription or installation and connection
charges or any other charges’ collected for television
exhibition though cable television network or for the purpose
of DTH service. The State Legislature passed the bill by which
the Ordinance was promulgated into the Act which was


Page 267 of 321





th
notified on 27 August 2009 and came into force w.e.f. on
16th June 2009.
th
v. On September 4 , 2009, a Notification No. 1672/XI-Ka.Ni.-6-
2009-M.(92)-2009 was issued under the Act notifying the
rates of entertainment tax. For DTH Services, Item No. 5
provided a levy of 25 per cent out of each aggregate payment.
14.1 We may note that we are concerned only with the period
prior to 16.06.2009 i.e. the day prior to coming into force of the
express provisions for DTH services inserted in the 1979 Act.
14.2 The impugned judgment took note of the view of Patna High
Court in Sky Vision T.V vs. State of Bihar, 1995 (2) BJLR 845
which had held that the imposition of entertainment tax on cable
operators was liable to be set aside in the absence of specific
charging section and relevant specific entry for cable services.
Impugned Judgment also noted the judgment of the Uttarakhand
High Court in Dish TV India Ltd. vs. State of Uttarakhand, W.P.
(M/S) No. 2562/2007 wherein the learned Single Judge allowed a
batch of writ petitions preferred by service providers by holding
that in absence of any specific provision in the 1979 Act – the State


Page 268 of 321





of Uttarakhand had adopted the 1979 Act - no entertainment tax
can be levied on DTH services. The Uttarakhand High Court also
negatived the argument that merely because express provisions to
tax cable services were present on the statute book they could be
broadly read to tax DTH Services. The learned Single Judge had,
despite holding in favour of the service providers, observed that it
was open to the legislature to introduce appropriate amendments.
Aggrieved, an appeal was preferred by the State of Uttarakhand
before the Division Bench in, inter alia , Special Appeal No. 21/2009
which was also dismissed on the ground that DTH services were
not covered under the Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the Division
Bench, the State had preferred SLP(C) No. 14605/2009 which was
dismissed in limine by this Court vide order dated 16.07.2009.
14.3 On the other hand, the Impugned Judgment cited with
approval the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur
in Tata Sky Ltd. vs. State of M.P., W.P. No.10148/2009 which
had upheld the levy of entertainment tax on DTH services even for
the period when no specific provision was present in the Madhya
Pradesh Entertainments Duty and Advertisements Tax Act, 1936
(‘M.P. 1936 Act’) for levy of entertainment tax on DTH


Page 269 of 321





services. Some sections of the M.P. 1936 Act are relevant to extract
herein. Section 2(b) defined "entertainment" as:
"'Entertainment' includes any exhibition, performance,
amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted
for payment."

14.4 Section 2(d) defined "payment for admission". At the time of
consideration by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Section 2(d) read
as under :
"2(d). 'Payment for admission' includes—
(i) any payment for seats or other accommodation in any
form in a place of entertainment ;
(ii) any payment for a programme or synopsis of an
entertainment ;
(iii) any payment made for the loan or use of any
instrument or contrivance which enables a person to get a
normal or better view or hearing or enjoyment of the
entertainment, which without the aid of such instrument
or contrivance, such person would not get;
(iv) any payment made by a person by way of contribution
or subscription or installation and connection charges or
any other charges, by whatever name called, for providing
access to any entertainment, whether for a specific period
or on a continuous basis;
(v) any payment, by whatever name called for any purpose
whatever, connected with an entertainment, which a
person is required to make in any form as a condition of
attending, or continuing to attend the entertainment,
either in addition to the payment, if any, for admission to
the entertainment or without any such payment for
admission;


Page 270 of 321





(vi) any payment, made by a person, who having been
admitted to one part of the place of entertainment is
subsequently admitted to another part thereof, for
admission to which a payment involving tax or more tax is
required;
Explanation I.—Any subscription raised or donation
collected in connection with an entertainment in any form
shall be deemed to be payment for admission.
Explanation II.—Where entertainment is provided as part
of any service by any person, whether forming an integral
part of such service or otherwise the charges received by
such person for providing the service shall be deemed to
include charges for providing entertainment or access to
entertainment also."

14.5 Section 4 provided the machinery for effectuating the
charge. Pertinent for our interest is that Section 3-B, which was
inserted in the M.P. 1936 Act with effect from 01.04.2000, dealt
with cable operators. Sub-section (1) of Section 3-B dealt with
entertainment duty payable by cable operator and it made a cable
operator, providing access to entertainments through cable service
to subscribers of such service, not being owner or occupants of
rooms of hotel or lodging house, liable to pay duty at the rate of
twenty rupees per month per subscriber in urban and cantonment
areas.


Page 271 of 321





14.6 The High Court, after surveying observations of this Court
on the scope of ‘entertainment’, held that even in the absence of a
specific section the inclusive definition of "entertainment" under
section 2(b) would subsume the "entertainments" provided by DTH
services and tax on DTH services can, therefore, be realised from
the service provider the said expression in any case used in a plural
sense under the Constitution.
14.7 Significantly, the aforesaid judgment of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court was overruled by this Court in Tata Sky Ltd.
vs. State of M.P., (2013) 4 SCC 656 (“Tata Sky v. M.P.”) holding
that DTH services are not covered by the provisions of Section 3
read with Sections 2(a), 2(b) and 2(d) of the M.P. 1936 Act. It was
noted that the history of legislative amendments showed that the
M.P. Act of 1936 was inadequate to bring shows by video cassette
recorder or video cassette and player and cable T.V. operations
within the tax net, and hence specific sections were brought in. It
was also noted by this Court that the collection machinery for levy
of entertainment tax on cable TV operations was in-built and
provided within the respective provisions of Section 3-B and lay not
within Section 4, which provided the general collection machinery.


Page 272 of 321





Holding that as the M.P. Act of 1936 was concerned only with
place-related entertainment, DTH services could not be brought
within the tax net.
14.8 Coming back to the impugned judgment, it was argued
before the Allahabad High Court that DTH services were not
covered under the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979
prior to the 2009 amendments, and this was apparent from the fact
that the State had to bring in specific amendments to levy
entertainment tax on DTH services as well as to prescribe a
charging machinery for such a levy, which was earlier absent.
Additionally, it was argued that there is no taxation by implication
and therefore the express provisions for levy of entertainment tax
on cable operators in the 1979 Act cannot be given a reading so
broad to also include DTH services. Summarily, it was argued that
substantial amendments were brought in the Act which cannot be
given retrospective effect. However, this argument was negatived
by the High Court by observing that inclusion of the words ‘Direct-
to-Home service’ in Section 2(f-1) and Section 2(l)(vi) and (vii) was
only by way of clarification to include DTH services.


Page 273 of 321





14.9 According to the High Court, Section 3 i.e. the charging
section made it clear that the tax is on entertainment and when
viewed broadly, the emphasis of the Act was on entertainment and
not the means through which such entertainment was being
provided to the subscriber. Furthermore, the High Court did not
accept the contention of the writ petitioners therein that there is a
difference between cable services and DTH services. Reliance was
placed on the judgment of this Court in Purvi Communication to
observe that the tax is not on the vehicle for transporting the
contents and the method, but is on the entertainment itself. Noting
that as modern technologies develop ‘ it will not be necessary for the
Act to be amended again to impose entertainment tax on such
entertainments ’ as the principal activity will continue to remain
entertainment and not the method by which the entertainment is
provided, the High Court held that entertainment tax on DTH
service is liable to be paid both for pre-amended period as well as
after the amendments discussed above.
14.10 Useful to note is that both the learned Single Judge and
the Division Bench of the Uttarakhand High Court had concluded
that the State could not treat DTH service providers on par with


Page 274 of 321





cable operators for levy of entertainment tax due to the stark
technological differences between the two. It stands to reason that
these technological differences also manifest into the specificity
and operations of these services. Similar provision for taxing cable
operations was also present in the M.P. Act of 1936.
14.11 As the Impugned Judgment was pronounced on
27.07.2012 and the judgment of this Court was pronounced on
16.04.2013, the High Court did not have the benefit of this Court’s
opinion in Tata Sky v. M.P. Even otherwise, in our view, there
needs to be a specific inclusion of DTH services within the ambit of
entertainment in the charging provision of the relevant taxing
statute. In the absence of specificity, the lacuna of a missing
taxable event persists insofar as bringing DTH services within the
taxing net is concerned. It is trite law that no vagueness can be
permitted in taxing statutes neither can a tax be levied by
implication. Precisely this lacuna was sought to be filled by way of
substantial amendments brought in by Amending Act of 2009.
Furthermore, when the charging Section 4C levied entertainment
tax on a ‘cable television network’ providing cable service, the
statutory definitions of ‘cable service; and ‘cable television network’


Page 275 of 321





could not be so broadly read to include DTH services. Inserted in
1995, Section 2(ee), in essence, defined cable service to mean the
‘transmission by cables of programmes’ and Section 2(eee), in
essence, defined ‘cable television network’ to mean a system
designed to provide ‘cable service for reception by multiple
subscribers;’. In our view, to countenance reading in DTH service
in the aforesaid carefully incised definitions would be to militate
against the literal meaning of words. We need not reiterate that the
activity of the DTH service does not involve transmission by cables
of programmes. For these reasons, we are of the view that the State
of U.P. cannot take strength from the unamended 1979 Act to levy
entertainment tax for any period before the amendments came in
force. Consequently, the conclusion of the Allahabad High Court
that the entertainment tax on DTH service is thus liable to be paid
both for pre-amended period as well as after the amendment is not
correct. The amendments made cannot be construed to be a
clarification to include the DTH service as a new technology and
method within the purview of the Act. Hence, in the above context
and to the limited extent, the appeal filed against the judgment of
the Allahabad High Court is allowed.


Page 276 of 321





State of Kerala vs. Asianet:
15. By the impugned order dated 28.06.2012 passed in W.P.(C)
No. 33966/2006 (R), the Kerala High Court, while hearing the
matter after it being remanded by this Court, held that the
impugned provisions of The Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976(for
short, ‘the Kerala Act of 1976’) which authorized the levy and
collection of luxury tax on cable TV operators only with connections
of 7500 or above was discriminatory and hence the impugned
provision was struck down for being unconstitutional and invalid.
15.1 The proceedings in the first round of the same writ petition
are germane to the impugned judgment. By judgment dated
27.08.2009 the High Court had initially dismissed the writ petition
filed by Cable TV Operators challenging the constitutional validity
of levy of luxury tax with effect from 01.04.2006. However, this
Court by order dated 03.02.2011 in C.A. 1433-34/2011 had
remanded the matter back to the Kerala High Court to consider the
additional grounds under Article 14 raised by the Cable TV
Operators.


Page 277 of 321





15.2 While hearing the matter upon remand, the impugned
judgment dated 28.06.2012 was passed. Pertinent to note is that
by way of amendment dated 11.11.2011 all cable operators were
deleted from the purview of the Kerala Act of 1976 w.e.f.
01.04.2011. Hence, the impugned judgment was only concerned
with recovery of arrears of luxury tax for the period 2006-2010.
15.3 By way of the Kerala Finance Act, 2006, the State legislature
amended the Kerala Act of 1976 and introduced luxury tax on cable
TV operators @ Rs.5/- per connection to be collected and remitted
from every subscriber of cable TV. Initially, the amendment made
with effect from 01.04.2006 was challenged on several grounds:
f irstly , the service provided by the cable TV operators did not
amount to “luxury” within the meaning of Entry 62 - List II as well
as the definition of “luxury” contained in the Act. Secondly , the
impugned provisions were discriminatory and violative of Article 14
of the Constitution in as much Direct to-Home operators providing
the same service to consumers were not subjected to luxury tax.
As the Kerala High Court dismissed the writ petition, the cable TV
operators challenged the decision before this Court. During the
pendency of the appeals in this Court, the Government of Kerala


Page 278 of 321





retrospectively amended the Kerala Act of 1976 by exempting cable
TV operators who had less than 7500 connections w.e.f.
01.07.2006. As the writ petitioner therein came within the taxing
net, this retrospective amendment was used as a new ground
before this Court along with the argument that the Kerala High
Court had not considered the challenge on the anvil of Article 14 of
the Constitution with reference to Direct-to-Home operators who
were also providing the same service.
15.4 In the second round of litigation before the High Court, the
first contention raised by the cable TV operators was that Section
2(ee) of the Kerala Act of 1976 defines “luxury”, however, cable TV
connection cannot be considered a “luxury” as it is subscribed by
a large number of people in the State and monthly contribution is
only around Rs.200/-. This argument was rejected by the High
Court relying on the decision of this Court in Purvi
Communication . It noted that even though “entertainment” as
such is not specifically defined under the Kerala Act of 1976 and
only the expression “luxury” is, the High Court noticed that Entry
62 - List II specifically covers “entertainments” separately and


Page 279 of 321





therefore the State can levy tax on “entertainments” as tax on
“luxury” under the said entry of the Constitution.
15.5 Furthermore, relying on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited ,
the High Court held that the same transaction may attract liability
as service tax as well as liability for tax under any other permissible
in law. Therefore, the High Court held that the service rendered by
cable TV operators involved “entertainment” to subscribers and
attracted luxury tax as well as service tax.
15.6 However, the third contention raising an Article 14 challenge
by the cable TV operators was accepted by the High Court. The
High Court held that by way of the 2010 Amendment
retrospectively exempting all cable TV operators who have less than
7500 connections from tax liability was an unreasonable
classification made as the cable TV operators who have above 7500
connections are discriminated by making them solely liable to pay
luxury tax. After noting that the amendment puts more than 90%
of the operators outside the taxing limit, it was observed that the
classification defeats the intent of the legislation as the incidence
of tax is intended to be on the subscribers for the entertainment


Page 280 of 321





they enjoy, and the cable TV operator is only a collecting agency by
virtue of the charge on them under the Act. That the subscriber is
agnostic to whether the facility enjoyed by him is provided by a
cable TV operator serving above or below 7500 connections and
that such a distinction enables the subscriber to avoid tax liability
by joining an operator with less than 7500 connections. Finally,
the High Court noted that the Amendment of 2011 had completely
deleted cable TV operators from the purview of the Kerala Act of
1976 and that the matter only served the purpose of collecting
arrears from the cable TV operators with connections above 7500
for the period from 2006 to 2010.
15.7 Although the High Court had already accepted the Article 14
argument, the Cable TV Operators requested the High Court to
consider the additional ground of discrimination and violation of
Article 14 with reference to the DTH operators, who provide the
same service as cable TV operators to the subscribers. The High
Court while rejecting this contention held the argument is
academic in nature because during 2006 when luxury tax was
introduced on cable TV operators, Direct-to-Home connections
(DTH) were not in vogue and as and when the DTH operations


Page 281 of 321





became extensive, the Government introduced luxury tax on DTH
operators. It was observed that the ground of discrimination
cannot be considered hypothetically or theoretically and it has
application only when the parties in relation to whose operations
discrimination is alleged also are in actual and effective business.
15.8 Therefore, in sum and substance, the provisions of the state
Act authorizing levy and collection on Cable TV Operators with
connections of 7500 or above was declared as unconstitutional for
being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Submissions:
15.9 On behalf of the State of Kerala, Sri Shishodia, learned
senior counsel, has argued that the State has a wide discretion in
selecting the persons or objects it will tax, and that a statute is not
open to attack on the ground that it taxes some persons or objects
and not others, vide East India Tobacco Company vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (1963) 1 SCR 404 (“East India Tobacco
Company”) .




Page 282 of 321





Judgments relied upon by State of Kerala:
15.10 A few of the judgments relied upon by Sri Shishodia,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Kerala, in
support of his contentions, are discussed as follows:
15.10.1 As regards the applicability of tests of discrimination in
a taxing law, this Court in East India Tobacco Company held
that while taxation laws must also pass the test of Article 14, in
deciding whether a taxation law is discriminatory or not, it is
necessary to bear in mind that the State has a wide discretion in
selecting the persons or objects it will tax, and that a statute is not
open to attack on the ground that it taxes some persons or objects
and not others. This Court noted that it is only when the law
operates unequally within a range of its selection and such
inequality cannot be justified on the basis of any valid
classification, that the law would be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
15.10.2 Further, this Court in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty
vs. State of Karnataka, (1989) Supp. (1) SCC 696 (“P.M.
Ashwathanarayana”) and in R.K. Garg vs. Union of India,


Page 283 of 321





(1981) 4 SCC 675 noted that the State enjoys the widest latitude
where measures of economic regulation are concerned, and that
courts give a larger discretion to the Legislature when it comes to
matters of the latter’s preferences of economic and social policies.
As further held in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant
Association of India , the test of the vice of discrimination in a
taxing law are, therefore, less rigorous.
15.11 On the question of the constitutionality of classification on
the basis of criterion such as scale of operations, profits of
businesses, etc., the following judgments were cited:
(i) In Kodar vs. State of Kerala, (1974) 4 SCC 422 , this Court
rejected a contention that the impugned provision therein imposing
different rates of tax upon different dealers depending upon their
turnover which in effect meant that the rate of tax on the sale of
goods would vary with the volume of the turnover of a dealer was
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court held that a
legislative classification making the burden of the tax heavier in
proportion to the increase in turnover would be reasonable. As
regards the reasoning for the same, this Court noted,


Page 284 of 321





“A classification, depending upon the quantum of the
turnover for the purpose of exemption from tax has been
upheld in several decided cases. By parity of reasoning,
it can be said that a legislative classification making
the burden of the tax heavier in proportion to the
increase in turnover would be reasonable . The basis is
that just as in taxes upon income or upon transfers at
death, so also in imposts upon business, the little man, by
reason of inferior capacity to pay, should bear a lighter
load of taxes, relatively as well as absolutely, than is borne
by the big one. The flat rate is thought to be less efficient
than the graded one as an instrument of social justice. The
large dealer occupies a position of economic
superiority by reason of his greater volume of his
business .”
(emphasis supplied)
(ii) Similarly, in Kerala Hotel and Restaurant Association vs.
State of Kerala, (1990) 2 SCC 502, the question before this Court
was, whether, the taxing of only the sale of costlier cooked food in
posh eating houses (determined on the basis of their annual
turnover or as determined by Tourism Department of Government
of India) while exempting cooked food sold in modest eating houses
at lesser prices violates Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court
held that the classification so made cannot be termed as arbitrary,
as it was within the limits up to which the legislature is given a free
hand for making classification in a taxing statute.


Page 285 of 321





(iii) Further, the question in Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 223 was, inter alia ,
whether the differential purchase tax imposed by weight, and not
price, of sugarcane bought by factories and units, at one rupee 25
paise per quintal and 50 paise per quintal respectively, was
discriminatory. This Court held that:
“A classification based on scale of operations, product
manufactured and other substantial differences bearing
on production capacity, profits of business and ability to
pay tax, is constitutionally valid and the feeble contention
counsel put forward that there is discrimination between
owners of factories and units must fail without much
argument.”

15.12 That, this Court has held that it is for the State to decide
what economic and social policy it should pursue and what factors
advance those social and economic policies, vide P.M.
Ashwathanarayana .
15.13 Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in
Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India wherein
this Court, in the facts therein, held that the basis of classification
in enactment cannot be said to be arbitrary or unintelligible, nor
as being without a rational nexus with the object of law. In that


Page 286 of 321





case, a hotel where a unit of residential accommodation was priced
at over Rs 400 per day per individual was classified as luxury in
the legislative wisdom by virtue of the economic superiority of those
who might enjoy its custom, comforts and services.
15.14 It was also contended that the High Court erred in
relying on statistics regarding the cable TV operators and their
subscribers to hold that more than 90% of the operators being
outside the scope of taxation detracts from the intent of the
legislation. It was contended that such an exercise is one only
within the executive domain. In the same vein, it was also argued
that economic legislation is empirical in nature as well as based on
experimentation and therefore, ordinarily must allow for greater
latitude to be given to the legislature. Reliance was also placed on
TwyFord Tea Co. vs. State of Kerala, 1970 (1) SCC 189 to
contend that in matters of classification for taxation the burden of
proof is on the person alleging discrimination and such burden is
heavier when a taxing statute is challenged.
15.15 In our view, the facts of this case, C.A. No 9301/2013,
and the issues raised herein stand on a different footing from other


Page 287 of 321





cases in this batch of appeals, which is concerned with the
imposition of levy on DTH operators. After the 2010 amendments,
the structure of charging section i.e. Section 4 qua cable operators
stood as such:
(i) Sub-clause(ii) to sub-Section (1) to Section 4 provided for levy
of luxury tax in respect of any luxury provided by cable
operators;
(ii) Sub-clause(iv) to the first proviso to sub-Section (1) to Section
4 provided that sub-Section(1) would not apply to cable
operators with seven thousand and five hundred or
connections or less; and

(iii) Second Proviso to sub-Section (1) to Section 4 provided that
cable operators with seven thousand and five hundred or less
st
connections shall not be liable to tax from 1 July, 2006.
15.16 Pertinently, the Finance Act, 2011(Act No. 16 of 2011)
deleted all cable operators from the purview of the Kerala Act of
1976. Therefore, the impugned judgment dated 28.06.2012 is only
concerned with the levy of luxury tax on only on cable TV operators
from 2006-2010.


Page 288 of 321





15.17 In our view, the High Court erred in holding that the
classification was unreasonable and lacked any rational nexus
with the objects of the Kerala Act of 1976. Indeed, the intent of a
taxing statute is to broaden the tax base and raise revenue for the
State, however it is also settled law that the judiciary will ordinarily
allow for greater latitude to be given to the legislature and defer to
its economic wisdom in taxing statutes. In Income Tax Officer,
Shillong vs. R. Takin Roy Rymbai, (1976) SC 670 , this Court
had usefully held that:
“… Given legislative competence, the legislature has ample
freedom to select and classify persons, districts, goods,
properties, incomes and objects which it would tax, and
which it would not tax. So long as the classification made
within this wide and flexible range by a taxing statute does
not transgress the fundamental principles underlying the
doctrine of equality, it is not vulnerable on the ground of
discrimination merely because it taxes or exempts from tax
some incomes or objects and not others. Nor the mere fact
that tax falls more heavily on some in the same category is
by itself a ground to render the law invalid. It is only when
within the range of its selection, the law operates
unequally and cannot be justified on the basis of a valid
classification, that there would be a violation of Article 14.”

15.18 Further in M/s Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs.
State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1019 , it was observed that:-


Page 289 of 321





“….On questions of economic regulations and related
matters, the Court must defer to the legislative-judgment.
When the power to tax exists, the extent of the burden is a
matter for discretion of the law-makers. It is not the
function of the Court to consider the propriety or justness
of the tax or enter upon the reality of Legislative policy. If
the evident intent and general operations of the tax
legislation is to adjust the burden with a fair and
reasonable degree of equality, the constitutional
requirement is satisfied. ...”

15.19 We find that the aforesaid observations of this Court
squarely exposit the fallacy in the reasoning of the High Court.
Even if the statistics presented before the High Court regarding the
cable TV operators and their subscribers evinced that the
exemption given by the amendment and retrospective exemption
granted by the proviso pushed 90% of the operators outside the
scope of taxation, the High Court ought to have taken note of the
apparent intent of the legislature to tax only those with more than
7500 connections. The High Court was obligated to glean the intent
of the legislation by accounting for the exemption provided and not
by masking it. The exemption and the proviso, inserted by way of
an amendment, was clearly a statutory tool employed by the
legislature to give effect to its conscious decision to levy tax only on
the cable operators with more than seven thousand and five


Page 290 of 321





hundred connections. Furthermore, there is no reason for striking
down a law as unconstitutional merely on the premise that the
subscriber could evade or avoid tax liability simply by taking
services of an operator with less than seven thousand and five
hundred connections. Where the legislation is passed in
accordance with constitutional prescriptions, a good faith
presumption is accorded to the legislature. Similarly, it is
presumed that the legislature acted with due and elaborate
understanding of the societal context for which it legislates. Herein,
the legislature perhaps factored that operators with more than
7500 connections ordinarily give add-on features that closely relate
to the character of luxury. Be that as it may. Unless a violation of
fundamental rights or lack of legislative competence is proved,
Courts must be circumspect in interfering with the validity of
legislations. It is trite law that this threshold is even stricter in
economic legislations.
15.20 In any event, if the High Court was of the view that the
exemption created was unconstitutional then the correct course
would have been to strike down the exemption and direct recovery
of tax payable from all assessees for the relevant time period in


Page 291 of 321





accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 4. Instead, the High
Court has done the opposite. It declared as unconstitutional the
provisions of the Kerala Act of 1976 authorizing levy and collection
on Cable TV Operators with connections of seven thousand and
five hundred and above. As a result, the revenue payable by a
category of assessees who do not fall within the exemption clause
is stalled. This not only affects the State’s exchequer but also does
not further the plea of equality pressed into service by the
assessees. The High Court could have struck down the exemption
and directed all cable TV Operators to pay the tax. Instead, while
holding that there was a discrimination and violation of Article 14
of the Constitution the High Court has granted an exemption to
even the assessee who was liable to pay the entertainment tax
under the Kerala Act. By placing the assessee on par with those
exempted from payment of entertainment tax, the principle of
equality is not applied in its true spirit to the facts of the case.
Rather, the High Court has treated unequals as equals, which is in
fact a detriment to the plea of equality raised by the petitioner
assessee. Rather than striking down the proviso, if the High Court
was of the opinion there was a violation of the equality clause under


Page 292 of 321





the Constitution, the High Court has extended the exemption
clause to the assessee also, which is impressible. As a result, no
cable TV operator would have to pay any entertainment tax. This
lacuna in the judgment requires a course connection and hence
that portion and particularly paragraph No.6 of the judgment of
Kerala High Court dated 28.06.2012 is set aside. The writ petition
filed by the assessee is dismissed and the civil appeal filed by the
State of Kerala is liable to be allowed and is allowed.
15.21 For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the Kerala
High Court is liable to be set aside only on the question of holding
that the levy of luxury tax on cable TV operators above 7500
connections being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India and thereby declaring it to be
unconstitutional.
Jharkhand High Court’s Ruling:
16. The Jharkhand Entertainment Tax Act, 2012 was published
in the Gazette on 27.04.2012. It was however, under Section 1(3),
to come into force on such date as the State Government might, by
notification, direct. The Act was notified by the State Government
only on 14.05.2012 with effect from 27.04.2012 i.e. the date of


Page 293 of 321





publication. We do not find any merit in the argument of the
appellants that the State Government could not have directed the
Act, a taxing statute, to come into force with effect from a date
anterior to the date of the notification.
16.1 It was contended before the High Court that the Notification
dated 14.05.2012 issued by the State Government under Section
1(3) of the Jharkhand Entertainment Tax Act, 2012 appointing
27.04.2012 as the date of implementation of the Act suffers from
the vice of imposing retrospective taxation in the absence of any
express legislative provision providing for it. This argument was
rejected by the High Court vide the impugned judgment. The High
Court speaking through Bhanumati, C.J. (as Her Ladyship then
was), vide the impugned judgment, has relied on the decision of
this Court in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar vs. M. Venkatachalam
Potti, (1956) 29 ITR 349 (“A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar”),
wherein the controversy concerned The Travancore Taxation on
Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1949 (“Travancore Act”)
passed by the Travancore legislature on 07.03.1949. The Act was,
under Section 1(3), to come into force on such date as the
Travancore Government might have by notification in the


Page 294 of 321





Government Gazette appointed. No notification was issued by the
Travancore Government up to 01.07.1949 when the Travancore
State and the Cochin State integrated into the United State of
Travancore and Cochin. On 01.07.1949, the United State of
Travancore and Cochin promulgated an ordinance whereby all
existing laws of Travancore were continued in force till altered,
amended or repealed by competent authority and the “existing law
of Travancore” was therein defined to mean any law in force in the
State of Travancore immediately prior to 01.07.1949. On
26.07.1949, a notification was issued under Section 1(3) bringing
the Travancore Act into force retrospectively from 22.07.1949. It
was contended before the Constitution Bench of this Court that the
notification dated 26.07.1949 could not be given retrospective
effect from 22.07.1949, in absence of any express provision.
16.2 We are conscious the enactment concerned therein did not
impose a tax. However, the question herein simply is, whether, the
Notification dated 14.05.2012 was bad in law for bringing the Act
into operation with effect from the date of publication. In A.
Thangal Kunju Musaliar, this Court had repelled a similar
argument observing that in exercise of the power conferred by


Page 295 of 321





Section 1(3), the Government had the power to issue the
notification bringing the Act into force on any date subsequent to
the passing of the Act. To give retrospective operation would be to
commence the Act from a date prior to the date of its passing which
was not the case in either A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar or is before
us. For these reasons, we find that the High Court was correct in
observing that even though the date of commencement as fixed in
the notification might be anterior to the date of notification, the
State Government had the power to bring into force the Act from
the date of Gazette publication.
Summary of Discussion and Conclusions:
17. We summarise our discussion and conclusions as under:
17.1 The Civil Appeals filed by the appellants/assessees
arising from the judgments of the High Courts of Delhi,
Gauhati, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madras, Orissa, Punjab
& Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand are
dismissed. The appeal filed by the State of Kerala is
allowed. The appeals arising out of the judgments of
Allahabad High Court are allowed in part.



Page 296 of 321






17.2 The provisions relevant to this case under the Kerala
Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976; Uttar Pradesh
Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979; Rajasthan
Entertainments & Advertisements Tax Act, 1957 and
the Rules thereunder; Gujarat Entertainment Tax Act,
1977 and Gujarat Entertainment Tax (Exhibition by
means of Direct-to-Home Broadcasting Services)
Rules, 2010; Jharkhand Entertainment Tax Act, 2012
and Jharkhand Entertainment Tax Rules, 2013;
Punjab Entertainment Duty Act, 1955 (Amendment in
2010); Delhi Entertainment and Betting Tax Rules,
1997; Assam Amusements and Betting Tax Act, 1939;
Orissa Entertainment Tax Rules, 2006, along with the
Orissa Entertainment Tax (Amendment) Tax Rules,
2010 are upheld. The correctness of the findings of the
High Court of Madras with regard to the charging
section in the State enactment being defective is
assailed by the State of Tamil Nadu in separate
appeals which are not part of this batch of appeals,


Page 297 of 321





and accordingly have not been taken up for our
consideration herein.
Insofar as the Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax
Act, 1939 (as adopted by State of Telangana) is
concerned, we do not express any opinion as the
challenge and applicability of the same is pending
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. All
contentions regarding the assessment orders arising
under the Andhra Pradesh State enactment are kept
open to be advanced before the appropriate forum.
17.3 The Writ Petitions filed before this Court under Article
32 of the Constitution of India are accordingly
disposed of.

Constitutional Scheme regarding distribution of Legislative
Powers:

17.4 Article 246 of the Constitution of India emphasises on
Parliamentary supremacy. Also, the residuary powers
of making laws or imposing a tax on any matter not
mentioned under the Concurrent List or State List vest


Page 298 of 321





with the Parliament ( vide Article 248 read with Entry
97 - List I).
17.5 Entry 31 – List I deals with various forms of
communications including broadcasting. The said
Entry does not deal with entertainments or
amusements as luxuries. Entry 97 – List I deals with
any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III
including any tax not mentioned in either of those
lists. Entry 31 - List I is a regulatory entry while Entry
97 - List I, inter alia, can be the basis for imposition of
any tax such as service tax as per the provisions of the
Finance Act, 1994 and its subsequent amendments.
17.6 Entry 33 - List II, inter alia , deals with entertainments
and amusements which is a regulatory entry. Taxes on
luxuries including taxes on entertainments and
amusements can be levied by the State under Entry 62
- List II. While Entry 33 - List II is a regulatory entry,
Entry 62 – List II is a taxation entry, both dealing, inter
alia, with entertainments and amusements.


Page 299 of 321





17.7 Having regard to the judgments of this Court in MPV
Sundararamier and H.S. Dhillon , we observe that
under the Constitution of India, the power to tax is not
an incidental or ancillary power. The power to tax
cannot be implied within a regulatory entry under our
Constitution. There is also a distinction between the
power to regulate and control and the power to tax.
However, occasionally a levy may be imposed as a
regulatory measure. Thus, the taxation entries under
List I and List II (there being no taxation entry in the
Concurrent List) are clearly demarcated within the
scope of the entries in the aforesaid respective Lists.
The effect of this principle is that the subject of
taxation is considered to be a distinct matter for the
purposes of legislative competence and the power to
tax cannot be deduced from the general legislative
entry as an ancillary power.
17.8 Also, a power to legislate as to the principal matters
specifically mentioned in the entries shall also include
within its expanse, a legislation touching upon


Page 300 of 321





incidental and ancillary matters. This principle is
derived from the use of the expression “with respect to”
in Article 246 of the Constitution.
17.9 As a sequitur, reliance can be placed on the dictum of
this Court (majority opinion) in H.S. Dhillon to
observe that Entry 97 - List I which is a residuary entry
relatable to Article 248 of the Constitution cannot be
invoked or pressed into service when a particular entry
empowering the Parliament or the Legislature of a
State to pass laws regarding the taxation on any
subject is specifically enumerated either in List I or
List II.
17.10 Consequently, as there is no taxation entry in List III,
both the Parliament as well as the Legislature of the
State cannot have competence to levy tax on any one
subject of a List.
17.11 Fee in respect of any of the matters in the three Lists
does not include the power to levy tax. The distinction
between the levy of fee and levy of tax is clear and it is


Page 301 of 321





not necessary to go into that aspect in these cases,
except to reiterate that there is no entry for taxation in
the Concurrent List - List III.
17.12 While interpreting taxation entries in List I or List II,
i.e., while determining the legislative competence to
levy a tax, all efforts must be made to interpret them
in such a way as to give expansive content and
meaning to the same having regard to the
constitutional scheme under which the distribution of
legislative powers has been envisaged in the Seventh
Schedule and bearing in mind the object and intent
behind them and also the advances made in human
thought and technology.
17.13 The expression “subject to” and “with respect to” in
Article 246 of the Constitution aids the applicability of
the doctrine of pith and substance to find out the true
character of the enactment and the entry within which
it would fall. The said doctrine is applied to resolve an
issue regarding legislative competence of a legislature


Page 302 of 321





to enact a particular law in relation to a subject
relatable to an Entry in a List under the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution. Any apparent conflict
with respect to an entry in another List is resolved on
the basis of the pith and substance doctrine.
Service Tax:
17.14 The expression “broadcasting” has been assigned the
meaning as per clause (c) of Section 2 of the Prasar
Bharti (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990
in terms of definition clause in Section 65(13) of the
Finance Act, 1994 as amended by the Finance Act,
2001. Under the Prasar Bharti (Broadcasting
Corporation of India) Act, 1990, the expression
“broadcasting” includes dissemination of any form of
communication by transmission of electro-magnetic
waves through space or through cables intended to be
received by the general public either directly or
indirectly through the medium of relay stations.
17.15 The expression “broadcasting” and “broadcasting
agency or organization” has been re-defined with the


Page 303 of 321





object of expanding the same. A television program
broadcast in India for the general public is a taxable
service in relation to broadcasting, even if the
encryption of the signals and beaming thereof through
the satellite might have taken place outside India.
17.16 With the passage of time, the expression
“broadcasting” has included transmission of electro-
magnetic waves through space or through cables,
Direct to Home signals or by any means to cable
operator, including multi-system operator or any other
person acting on behalf of the said agency or
organisation through its branch office, agent,
representative appointed in India or by any person
who acts on its behalf.
17.17 Section 65(72) (zk) defines “taxable service” to include
broadcasting agency as a service provider. Thus, if any
service is provided to a client by a broadcasting agency
or organization in relation to broadcasting in any
manner, it would be a taxable service.


Page 304 of 321





17.18 The expression “broadcasting agency or organization”
means any agency or organization engaged in
providing service in relation to broadcasting in any
manner either having its place of business in India or
outside India, through its branch office, subsidiary or
representative in India or any agent appointed in India
or any person acting on their behalf.
17.19 Section 66 provides for the charge of service tax which
is a charging section. The service tax on a broadcasting
agency is at the rate of five per cent of the value of
taxable services i.e., five per cent of the gross amount
charged by the service provider. Broadcasting service
is a taxable service and the broadcasting service
provider is required to pay service tax under the
provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended from
time to time.
Tax on Luxuries: Entertainments & Amusements
17.20 Bearing in mind the meaning of “entertainments” and
“amusements” and since they come within the scope


Page 305 of 321





of “luxuries”, therefore, the State legislature has
legislative competence to impose entertainment tax
under Entry 62 - List II as a tax on luxuries.
17.21 The expression “tax on luxuries” has been discussed,
inter alia, in Express Hotels, A.B. Abdul Kadir,
Godfrey Phillips, Western India Theatres,
Federation of Hotels and Restaurant Associations
of India.
17.22 The expression “entertainments/ entertainment” has
been discussed in the cases of Geeta Enterprises,
Drive-in Enterprises and Purvi Communications.
The expression “entertainments/entertainment”
includes within its scope and ambit not only the
provider of entertainment but also the receiver, inter
alia, through the medium of television. Thus,
entertainment through television network either
through cable television or DTH through set-top box
with the object of providing entertainment to the
viewer can be taxed in terms of Entry 62 - List II.


Page 306 of 321





Parameters of Taxation under State Enactments:
17.23 The four parameters of taxation as enumerated by this
Court in Govind Saran Ganga Saran with respect to
various provisions of the State enactments under
consideration have been dissected in the form of a
tabulation in para 8.29 of this judgement which is
extracted as under:
S.<br>No.StatesTaxable<br>Event or<br>subject of<br>taxationMeasure<br>of TaxRate of TaxIncidence<br>of Tax
1Assam Amusements<br>and Betting Tax Act,<br>1939Section<br>3C read<br>with<br>S.2(4)Section<br>3CSection 3CSection 3C<br>read with<br>S.3C(4)
2Delhi Entertainments<br>and Betting Tax Act,<br>1996Section 7Section 7Section 7Section 7
3Gujarat<br>Entertainments Tax<br>Act, 1977Section<br>6E(1)Section<br>6E(1)Section<br>6E(1)Section<br>6E(1)
4Jharkhand<br>Entertainment Tax<br>Act, 2012Section 3Section 3Proviso to<br>Section 3Section 3<br>& Section<br>4
5Orissa Entertainment<br>Tax Act, 2006Section 7Section 7Section 7Section 7
6Punjab<br>Entertainment Duty<br>Act, 1955Section<br>3CSection<br>3CSection 3CSection 3C



Page 307 of 321





S.<br>No.StatesTaxable<br>Event or<br>subject of<br>taxationMeasure<br>of TaxRate of TaxIncidence<br>of Tax
7Rajasthan<br>Entertainments and<br>Advertisements Tax<br>Act, 1957Section<br>4AAA read<br>with<br>Section 5<br>and 6Section<br>4AAANotification<br>S.O.443 dt.<br>25.02.2008Section<br>4AAA
8Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainment and<br>Betting Tax Act, 1979<br>as amended by U.P.<br>Ordinance No. 4 of<br>2009 w.e.f.<br>16.06.2009Section 3<br>read with<br>S.2(a)Section 3<br>read with<br>S.2(l)(vii)Section 3Section 3<br>read with<br>S. 2(v)
9Uttar Pradesh<br>Entertainment and<br>Betting Tax Act,<br>1979, as amended by<br>Uttarakhand<br>(Amendment) Act,<br>2009 dt. 16.03.2009Section 3<br>read with<br>S. 2(g)Section 3<br>read with<br>S. 2(g)Section 3<br>read with S.<br>2(g)Section<br>read with<br>S. 2(g)



Geeta Enterprises and Purvi Communications :
17.24 We do not find any contradiction in the judgments of
this Court in Geeta Enterprises and Purvi
Communications as the judgement in Geeta
Enterprises has to be restricted to payment of tax on
video games under the provisions of the 1937 Act of
Uttar Pradesh in which there has been no discussion


Page 308 of 321





under Entry 62 - List II. For ease of reference,
paragraph 10.10 of this judgment is extracted as
under:
10.10 There are other substantial differences
between Geeta Enterprises and Purvi
Communication as the table below enumerates
due to which Geeta Enterprises and Purvi
Communication cannot be compared.
Geeta EnterprisesPurvi Communication
Impugned Provision
Definition of<br>‘entertainment’ under<br>section 2(3) of the 1937<br>Act (UP Act)Amended section 4A(4a)<br>of the 1982 Act (West<br>Bengal Act)
Activity subject to taxation
Video game operated on<br>payment, in a parlour<br>whose admission is free<br>to publicTransmission of signals<br>by MSOs of any<br>performance, film or any<br>other programme<br>telecast.
Date of Enactment of the provision<br>impugned therein
19371998
Discussion on Entry 62 - List II
NoYes

17.25 The discussion on the content and meaning, scope and
ambit of the expression ‘entertainments’ in Geeta
Enterprises
is not comprehensive. This is because,
having regard to the advances in technology resulting
in varied forms of entertainments through various


Page 309 of 321





media and in a variety of ways, not only in a public
place but also in the confines of private space such as
a home, through mobile or a cell phone or smart watch
and other personal devices etc., the expression
‘entertainments’ must be given a broad, liberal and
expansive meaning than what has been discussed in
Geeta Enterprises by this Court.
Aspect Theory:
17.26 Aspect theory or double aspect doctrine is a tool of
constitutional interpretation used in Canada to resolve
issues which arise when both the federal and
provincial government have the right to legislate on a
subject. This Court has applied the aspect theory in
Federation of Hotel and Restaurants Associations
of India, Elel Hotels & Investments, All India
Federation of Tax Practitioners and cases such as
Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. and in Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited. (in a different way).



Page 310 of 321





17.27 In India, there appears to be no clarity on the
application of the aspect theory in the Canadian sense.
One of the reasons being that in India, both the
Parliament as well as the State Legislature do not have
powers to levy tax on the same subject. The aspect
theory has been applied in India essentially to
ascertain whether an activity would fall within the
scope and ambit of an enactment and whether the said
enactment in pith and substance would fall within an
Entry of a particular List of the Seventh Schedule so
as to confer legislative competence to tax that aspect
of the activity. As a result it can be said that one aspect
of an activity, say broadcasting service, can be
amenable to service tax, while the other aspect of the
same activity, namely, providing (of) entertainment to
television viewers (as that is the object of broadcasting)
can be amenable to “luxury tax” under Entry 62 List –
II of the Constitution which could be levied on the
recipients of such entertainment or on the service
providers who are essentially broadcasters.


Page 311 of 321





Broadcasting service being a taxable service under the
provisions of the Finance Act, 1994, read along with
the amendments made from time to time would enable
both the Parliament to impose service tax on
broadcasting service and the State Legislatures having
the legislative competence to levy entertainment tax on
those who provide entertainment to the recipients
(television viewers) to impose a luxury tax.
17.28 We follow the judgment of this Court in Western India
Theatres Ltd. in observing that Entry 62 - List II
contemplates a tax on entertainments or amusements
as objects on which a tax can be imposed and therefore
it is not possible to differentiate between an
entertainment provider and an entertainment receiver.
17.29 If the above reasoning is applied, then both
entertainment tax as well as service tax can be
imposed on the activity of broadcasting through
television for the purpose of entertainment of the
subscriber or the receiver thereof. The two taxes are


Page 312 of 321





different aspects of the same activity which enable two
different legislatures to impose tax under distinct
taxation entries in two different Lists.
17.30 The principle is well settled that two taxes which are
separate and distinct imposed on two aspects of an
activity are permissible, as in law, there is no
overlapping. This is because the taxes are relatable to
distinct taxation entries in separate legislative Lists.
17.31 In the instant case, the Parliament under the Finance
Act, 1994 and its amendments is not imposing a tax
on entertainment. Such a tax is being imposed by the
State Legislatures as entertainment is a luxury within
the meaning of Entry 62 - List II. In the same way, the
Finance Act along with its amendments seeks to
impose a tax on the service rendered by the
broadcasting agency which is imposed under Entry 97
List – I. In the same vein, under Entry 62 List – II, the
State Governments are not imposing any service tax
on the assessees.


Page 313 of 321





17.32 While applying the aspect theory on any activity from
the point of view of two legislatures (Parliament and
State Legislature), in the instant case, imposing tax on
an activity, the following well established principles of
interpretation of tax may as stated in paragraph 11.18
be borne in mind:
“11.18 To appreciate the extent and the
context of the use of ‘aspect theory’ in India, it
would be instructive to reiterate some well-
established principles of interpretation of
taxation entries. Some of the relevant
principles are reiterated as follows:

i. In interpreting expressions in the
Legislative Lists of the Seventh Schedule of
the Constitution, a wide meaning should be
given to the entries.

ii. In the scheme of the Lists in the Seventh
Schedule, there exists a clear distinction
between the general subjects of legislation
and heads of taxation. They are separately
enumerated.

iii. As the fields of taxation are to be found
clearly enumerated in Lists I and II, there
can be no overlapping in law. There may be
overlapping in fact, but there can be no
overlapping .
in law
iv. In the first instance, the pith and substance
or true nature and character of the
legislation must be determined with
reference to the legislative subject matter
and the charging section;


Page 314 of 321





v. The measure of tax is not a true test of the
nature of tax;
vi. The same transaction may involve two or
more taxable events in its different aspects.
Merely because the aspects overlap, such
overlapping does not detract from the
distinctiveness of the aspects.”

17.33 The doctrine of pith and substance is applied to
consider the vires of a legislation impugned on the
basis of the principle of legislative competence in the
context of legislative relationship between the Centre
and the State. We observe that the aspect theory has
no relevance, as such, in determining the
constitutionality of any provision on the ground of
legislative competence in India. Thus, the
constitutional validity of a taxing statute on the
ground of legislative competence has to be examined
in the context of the doctrine of pith and substance as
envisaged under Article 246 of the Constitution of
India read with the respective entries in the List. Once
the contours of an entry under which a legislation is
sought to be made is ascertained, the next step is to


Page 315 of 321





study the legislation in question in order to ascertain
whether it falls within the contours of that Entry. If it
does fall within the contours of a particular entry in a
particular List, then that particular legislature which
has enacted it would have the legislative competence
to enact such a legislation. But a legislation
incidentally touching upon an entry in another List
does not render it invalid, it means that so long as a
piece of legislation is in pith and substance falling
within an entry in a particular List, it would be valid
as the legislature which has enacted it, has the
legislative competence to do so.
17.34 On the other hand, the aspect theory is relevant to
determine the applicability of a taxing statute on the
activity or transaction sought to be taxed i.e., whether
the statute covers an activity which falls within a
specific taxation entry, either in List I or in List II.
Thus, an activity could be taxed by two different
legislatures on the basis of the entries in the respective
Lists without there being a clash and within their


Page 316 of 321





legislative competence. However, the aspect of the
activity which is being taxed must be relatable to the
legislation under a specific entry of a particular List so
as to be within the legislative competence of a
particular legislature.
17.35 Thus, the aspect theory is used to determine if, in fact,
there are different aspects within the activity sought to
be taxed and whether the taxable event which forms
the basis of the levy in a legislative enactment
corresponds to any aspect in the activity sought to be
taxed.
17.36 This is in contrast to the applicability of this theory in
Canada, where this theory is used therein to determine
legislative competence of a federal or provincial
legislature to enact a particular law.
17.37 While applying the aspect theory to the present case,
it is noted that the activity of broadcasting is for the
purpose of entertainment of the subscriber as held in
Purvi Communications. No entertainment can be


Page 317 of 321





presented to the viewers unless the broadcaster
transmits the signals for instantaneous presentation
of any performance, film or any programme on their
television. Thus, there are two aspects in this activity;
the first is the act of transmission of signals of the
content to the subscribers. The second aspect here
concerns not only the content of the signals, but the
effect of the decryption of the signals by the Set-Top
Boxes and the viewing cards inside these boxes
provided by the assessees to the subscribers, which is
providing and receiving of entertainment through the
television. Without the apparatus provided for by the
assessees to decrypt the signals, the subscriber would
not be able to watch the content that is transmitted,
the content being for the purpose of entertainment.
The television entertainment provided by them
through their modus operandi i.e., by broadcasting, is
a luxury within the meaning of Entry 62 - List II. The
assessees who are engaged in the activity of providing
entertainment are liable to pay service tax on the


Page 318 of 321





activity of broadcasting under the provisions of the
Finance Act, 1994 read with relevant amendments and
are also liable to pay entertainment tax in terms of
Entry 62 - List II as being a specie of luxuries.
Therefore, both the taxes, one by the State Legislature
and the other, by the Parliament are leviable on the
activity of the assessees herein. This is because by
rendering the service of broadcasting, the assesses are
entertaining the subscribers within the meaning of
Entry 62 - List II.
There is no overlapping in fact or in law,
inasmuch as different aspects of the same activity are
being taxed under two different legislations by two
different legislatures. This is because the activity of
broadcasting is a service and liable to service tax
imposed by the Parliament (Entry 97 – List I) and the
activity of entertainment is a subject falling under
Entry 62 - List II and therefore, the assessees herein
are liable to pay entertainment tax as well. Hence, the
State Legislatures as well as the Parliament, both have


Page 319 of 321





the legislative competence to levy entertainment tax as
well as service tax respectively on the activity carried
out by the assessees herein.
17.38 As far as the judgment of the Allahabad High Court
dated 20.07.2012 is concerned, we observe that the
High Court could not have construed the amendments
made to the UP Act of 1979 as a clarification to include
the DTH service which is a new technology, within the
purview of the original Act. Hence, to that limited
extent, the appeal filed against the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court is allowed in part.
17.39 The judgment dated 28.06.2012 passed by the Kerala
High Court which declared the levy and collection of
luxury tax on cable TV operators with connections of
7500 or above as unconstitutional for being
discriminatory is incorrect.
17.40 The Kerala High Court could have struck down the
exemption granted and directed all cable TV operators
to pay the tax instead of holding that there is


Page 320 of 321





discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution against the assessees herein. As a result,
the High Court has granted an exemption to the
assessee who is liable to pay entertainment tax under
the Kerala Act. As a result, unequals have been treated
as equals which is detrimental to the plea of equality
sought to be raised by the assessee.
17.41 In the circumstances, paragraph 6 of the judgment of
the Kerala High Court dated 28.06.2012 is set aside.
The Writ Petition filed by the assessee before the High
Court is dismissed and the Civil Appeal filed by the
State of Kerala is allowed.
Parties to bear their respective costs.

…..………………………………….………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)




…..………………………………….………..J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 22, 2025.


Page 321 of 321