X vs. REGISTRAR GENERAL

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION  WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1137 OF 2018 MS. X          ...PETITIONER(S) VERSUS REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF  MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER      ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. The petitioner has approached this Court in the instant writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs: “Issue   an   appropriate   writ,   order   or   direction   in   the a. nature of mandamus to quash and set aside the order dated 11.01.2018 of Chief Justice of the High Court communicated on 25.1.18 of Madhya Pradesh passed after the Full Court Meeting, rejecting the application 1 for reinstatement as violative of Articles 14, 15, 16, 21 r/w. 233, 235 & 311 of the Constitution of India and Natural Justice;  Issue   an   appropriate   writ,   order   or   direction   in   the b. nature   of   mandamus   declaring   that   the   Petitioner's resignation from the post of Additional District Judge VIII, Gwalior dated 15.07.2014 amounts to  constructive dismissal  due to the employer's conduct which applies in   the   Statutory   context   where   the   term "Dismissal/dismissed" is used;  c. Issue   an   appropriate   writ,   order   or   direction   in   the nature of mandamus directing the reinstatement of the Petitioner as an Additional District and Sessions Judge from the date of her resignation i.e. 15.07.2014, with continuity in service at S.No 134 of the list of District Judges(Selection Grade) of the Gradation List according to   Clause   4   of   the   Madhya   Pradesh   Higher   Judicial Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2017,   back   wages   according   to   Clause   3(b)   of   the 2 Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2017 and all service benefits and all consequential reliefs;” The bare minimum facts, necessary for adjudication of 2. the present petition are as under: The   petitioner   was   selected   in   the   competitive examination of Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Services at District Entry Level (direct recruitment from Bar) conducted nd in the year 2011, and stood 2  in the said examination.  On nd st her   selection,   the   petitioner   was   posted   as   a   2   to   1 Additional District and Sessions Judge (hereinafter referred st st to as the “AD & SJ”) at Gwalior on 1  August 2011.  On 1 th October 2012, the petitioner was posted as VIII   AD & SJ, st Gwalior.   In the 1   Annual Confidential Report (hereinafter referred   to   as   the   “ACR”)   of   the   petitioner,   assessed   in January,   2013   by   the   then   District   and   Sessions   Judge (hereinafter referred to as the “D & SJ”) and approved by the then Portfolio/Administrative Judge (hereinafter referred to as “Justice ‘A’”) of  the  High Court of  Madhya Pradesh at 3 Gwalior   Bench   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “MP   High Court”), she was given ‘C/good’ grading.  The petitioner was assigned various additional responsibilities in the year 2013. nd In her 2  ACR, assessed in the month of January, 2014 by the then D & SJ and endorsed by Justice ‘A’, the petitioner was graded ‘B/very good’.   3. It is the case of the petitioner that thereafter, she was sexually harassed by Justice ‘A’.  It is further her case that due to the said sexual harassment and at the instance of rd Justice ‘A’, the then D & SJ addressed a complaint dated 3 July 2014 against her to the MP High Court.  It is further her th case that on 7  July 2014, the Transfer Committee of the MP High Court comprising of two Judges of the MP High Court, approved the transfer of the petitioner from Gwalior to Sidhi. th The said transfer order was conveyed to the petitioner on 8 th July 2014.   On 9   July 2014, the petitioner sent her first representation   to   the   then   Registrar   General   (hereinafter referred to as the “RG”) of the MP High Court, praying for an extension   of   8   months   in   Gwalior   so   that   her   daughter th (studying in Class 12 ) completes her academic session. The 4 th same came to be rejected on 11  July 2014.  The petitioner, who   was   unaware   about   the   rejection   of   her   first th representation, sent her second representation on 11   July 2014, seeking alternative posting to 4 cities namely Sehore, Raisen, Dewas or Ujjain so that her daughter could continue th with her education, which also came to be rejected on 14 July 2014. th 4. The   petitioner   tendered   her   resignation   on   15   July 2014, which was accepted by the Government of Madhya th Pradesh, Law and Legislative Affairs Department on 17  July 2014.  The petitioner was informed about the acceptance of th her resignation on 18  July 2014. st 5. The   petitioner   thereafter   on   1   August   2014   sent   a representation to Hon’ble the President of India, the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to Chief Justice of MP High Court, with the following prayer: (i) Appropriate action be taken, after fact­finding; 5 (ii) Re­consider   circumstances   under   which   petitioner was coerced & exerted duress upon, until the only option she had was to resign; (iii) Institute an appropriate mechanism for redressal of grievances   like   the   above,   of   sub­ordinate   services judicial officers. st th 6. Between   1   August   2014   and   18   December   2014, certain events took place with regard to the Inquiry into the alleged   conduct   of   Justice   ‘A’,   which   culminated   in   the judgment passed by this Court in the case of   Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’. v. Registrar General, 1 .   The said High Court of Madhya Pradesh and Others events are duly recorded in the said judgment and therefore, it is not necessary to refer to them in detail. 7. In pursuance to the aforesaid judgment of this Court, the Chief Justice of India sought a preliminary inquiry report from the then Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court and on   receipt   thereof,   constituted   an   In­House   Committee 1 (2015) 4 SCC 91 6 headed by the then Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court. nd The said In­House  Committee submitted its  report on 2 July  2015.     In  the   meantime,   a  Notice  of   Motion for   the removal   of   Justice   ‘A’   was   moved   by   58   Members   of Parliament   in   the   Rajya   Sabha.     The   said   Motion   was admitted by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha, the then Hon’ble th Vice­President of India on 25  March 2015.   Accordingly, a Judges   Inquiry   Committee   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the “JIC”) came to be constituted under Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) comprising of a sitting Judge of this Court, the then Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court and a Senior Advocate of this Court. Subsequently, in place of the Judge of this Court, who was the Presiding Officer of JIC, another Judge of this Court was made part of the JIC as the Presiding Officer. th The JIC submitted its report on 15  December 2017, which was tabled before the Rajya Sabha, and the Rajya Sabha cleared Justice ‘A’ of all charges. 8. However,   the   JIC   found   that   the   transfer   of   the petitioner was irregular and it was further found that in the 7 circumstances prevailing then, the transfer of the petitioner to   Sidhi   had   become   unbearable   for   her   to   continue   in service,   resulting   in   her   resignation.   The   JIC,   therefore, expressed   its   opinion   that   in   the   interest   of   justice,   the petitioner   should   be   re­instated   in   service,   in   case   she intends to re­join the service.   The JIC clarified that it was not within the purview of the Reference made to them. 9. Pursuant   to   the   recommendation   of   the   JIC,   the petitioner   addressed   a   representation   to   the   then   Chief st Justice of MP High Court on 21  December 2017 for her re­ th instatement in service.  On 25  January 2018, the MP High Court   through   its   RG   communicated   the   rejection   of   the petitioner’s representation by a Full Court in its meeting held th on 11   January 2018.   The petitioner thereafter filed the present   petition   for   the   reliefs   which   have   already   been reproduced hereinabove. 10. During the pendency of this petition, this Court passed th an order on 13   February  2019, requesting the  MP High Court for reconsideration of the issue of re­instatement of the 8 petitioner in service.   The Full Court of the MP High Court th rejected the said representation in its meeting held on 15 February 2019.  The Bench of this Court, which had passed th st the order dated 13   February 2019, vide order dated 21 February 2019, expressed that the said Bench should not deal with the matter on merits and directed the matter to be placed before another Bench. It appears that thereafter again suggestions   were   made   by   this   Court   to   the   parties   to amicably settle the matter.   It appears that at one point of time,   this   Court  also  suggested   that   the   respondent   No.1 should re­consider the issue of petitioner’s re­instatement in service and that after re­instatement, she could be sent on deputation  outside  the  State   or she  could  be  adjusted  in some other State.  It is the case of the petitioner that though the said suggestion was acceptable to her, the MP High Court re­iterated its stand.   In this background, the matter has come up before us. At the outset, it is to be noted that, counsel for the 11. petitioner   clarified   that   the   petitioner   is   not   pressing   the present   matter   on   the   ground   of   sexual   harassment   by 9 Justice ‘A’, but is limiting her submissions with regard to the transfer   order   being   illegal   and   mala   fide ,  and   the consequent resignation amounting to constructive dismissal. We   have   therefore   refrained   ourselves   from   making   any reference to the allegations of sexual harassment made in the petition.  We have also refrained ourselves from mentioning the name of Justice ‘A’ or any of the Judges of the MP High Court, who on the administrative side, had some role to play in the matter, so also the Members of the District Judiciary, who were directly or indirectly involved in the present case. 12. We have heard Ms. Indira Jaising, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the respondents. 13. Smt. Indira Jaising submitted that the MP High Court was  bound  by  the   Transfer  Guidelines/Policy  of   the  High th Court of Madhya Pradesh incorporated on 12  January 2012 (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “Transfer   Policy”).     She submitted   that   as   per   the   Transfer   Policy,   the   annual 10 th transfers normally take place by 15  of March every year and the Judicial Officers transferred are given time to join up to st 1   of April so as to coincide with the academic session in schools.  It is submitted that as per the Transfer Policy, the normal tenure of a Judicial Officer at a particular posting is of 3 years, and a period of 6 months or more is to be treated as a full year.   Accordingly, the petitioner could have been transferred   in  March  2014  as   she  had   already  completed more than 2 years and 6 months till then.   It is submitted th that however, the petitioner was transferred mid­term on 7 July   2014.   It   is   submitted   that   the   mid­term   transfer   as provided under Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy can be made on   the   limited   grounds   mentioned   therein.     Smt.   Jaising submitted that none of the grounds as mentioned in Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy were available in the case of the petitioner. Smt. Jaising further submitted that as per the Transfer 14. Policy if a daughter of a Judicial Officer is studying at the place of his/her current posting and is in the final year of the Board   Examination   or   University   Examination   and   the 11 Educational Institution where the daughter is studying, does not have hostel facility for girls, the said Judicial Officer is permitted to stay over the prescribed period.   She further submitted   that   the   transfer   of   the   petitioner   was   also violative of Clause 16 of the Transfer Policy inasmuch as a Judicial Officer is required to first go from Category ‘A’ city to ‘B’ city, from ‘B’ to ‘C’, from ‘C’ to ‘D’ and from ‘D’ to ‘A’. However,   the   petitioner   was   directly   transferred   from Category   ‘A’   city   to   ‘C’   city.     The   learned   Senior   Counsel submitted that the JIC, in its report, had clearly found the petitioner’s transfer to be contrary to the Transfer Policy. 15. Smt. Jaising further submitted that from the record, it is   clear   that   the   petitioner’s   transfer   was   not   made   on administrative grounds, but on the grounds of the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior.  It is submitted that the JIC had also found that the transfer of the petitioner was made on the basis of the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior. It is submitted that the JIC had further found from the evidence of the then Judge, MP High Court, who was a Member of the Transfer Committee that, the transfer 12 was made solely on the basis of the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior. 16. Smt. Jaising further submitted that from the evidence of the then Judge on the Transfer Committee recorded by the JIC, it was clear that the representations of the petitioner were also not considered by the Transfer Committee in the right earnest. 17. Smt. Jaising submitted that the petitioner’s resignation was an outcome of the circumstances, in which she had no other option but to tender her resignation and as such, was not   a   resignation   in   law   but   a   forced   resignation,   which amounts   to   constructive   discharge.   She   relies   on   the following   judgments   of   the   Court   of   Appeal   of   United Kingdom in support of this proposition: 2 ; Western Excavating (E.C.C) Ltd. v. Sharp 3 Lewis v. Motorworld Garage 2 1978 I.C.R. 22 3 1985 WL 311068 13 She further relied on the following judgments of the US Court of Appeals, Third Circuit to assert the point of hostile work environment and institutional failure: 4 ; Goss v. Exxon 5 Pennsylvania State Police v. Nancy Drew Suders 18. Smt. Jaising submitted that Article 11 of Convention on the   Elimination   of   All   Forms   of   Discrimination   Against Women (CEDAW) to which India is a signatory, provides that a woman should be able to work and discharge family duties at   the   same   time.     She   submitted   that   the   petitioner’s transfer was at such a place, where she could not have been able to simultaneously discharge her duties as a Judicial Officer and her duties towards the family.  As such, the said transfer order was in violation of Article 11 of CEDAW. Smt. Jaising further submitted that the Full Court of 19. the MP High Court has failed to give justice to the petitioner inasmuch   as   her   grievance   was   not   considered.     She submitted that immediately after the petitioner had tendered nd 4 747 F 2  885 5 542 US 129 14 her   resignation,   she   had   made   a   representation   within   a st fortnight i.e. on 1  August 2014 to Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief   Justice  of   the  MP  High  Court  for  reconsidering   the entire issue.   She further submitted that, as suggested by this   Court,   the   petitioner   is   foregoing   her   claims   towards back   wages   and   is   only   interested   in   serving   the   august institution   of   Judiciary.     She   therefore   prayed   that   the petition   be   allowed   and   the   petitioner   be   re­instated   in service with continuity. Per   contra,   Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   the   learned   Solicitor 20. General appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the allegations made by the petitioner with regard to sexual harassment are found to be not established by the JIC.   He submitted that the said findings were recorded as th back as on 15  December 2017, which were not challenged, and   in   any   case,   cannot   be   questioned   or   assailed   in ancillary proceedings like the present one.   15 21. Shri Mehta further submitted that though, the findings of the   JIC   with  regard   to  transfer   of   the   petitioner   being irregular, are beyond the scope of its “Terms of Reference”, at best, the transfer could be construed to be irregular.   He submitted   that   assuming   that   the   transfer   order   of   the petitioner was irregular and even  mala fide , the same having not been challenged at the relevant point of time, the validity thereof cannot be challenged in the present proceedings.  He submitted   that   the   concept   of   “coercion   resulting   into resignation” is a concept, which is developed in the western countries with regard to labour jurisprudence, and that in any case, such reliefs can be granted only when such a fact is duly established by leading evidence. 22. The learned Solicitor General submitted that the only contention of the petitioner with regard to coercion is that she had to resign on account of mid­term transfer order.  He submitted   that   a   transfer   is   an   incidence   of   service.   He submitted   that  a  mid­term   transfer   cannot  be   said   to  be “coercion” so as to force a person to resign from the service. 16 He submitted that for establishing a case of coercion, it will be necessary for a person to establish, by leading cogent evidence, that not only unbearable pressure was built but such   a   pressure   was   intended   not   just   to   trouble   an employee or to victimize an employee but to ensure that the employee   quits   the   job.     He   submitted   that   neither   such circumstances are pleaded nor asserted by the petitioner. In any case, he submitted that in the proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, it will not be possible to arrive at such a finding.   Shri Mehta submitted that in any case, such a plea 23. would   not   be   available   to   a   Judicial   Officer,   who   is discharging the sovereign function of dispensing justice.  He submitted   that   the   Judicial   Officers   are   trained   to   be independent,   fearless,   non­impulsive   and   to   act   in accordance with law and as such, the concept which applies to a workman cannot be applied to a Judicial Officer.   He further submitted that the allegations made by the petitioner with regard to sexual harassment were made only after she resigned from the service. 17 24. Shri Mehta submitted that any decision in the present proceedings will have far­reaching effects in the future. He submitted that if a mere circumstance of mid­term transfer coupled   with   inconvenient   family   circumstances   is considered   by   this   Court   to   be   “coercion”   to   resign   from service,   it   will   open   the   floodgates   of   litigations.     It   is submitted that if such a view is taken by this Court, all similarly situated Judicial Officers would come up with such a plea, inasmuch as every Judicial Officer is bound to have some   or   the   other   inconvenient   family   problems.   He submitted   that   if   such   a   view   is   taken,   it   will   have   far­ reaching   effects   on   the   administration   of   the   District Judiciary. 25. Shri Mehta submitted that the Full Court of the MP High Court has taken a unanimous decision on more than one   occasion   to   reject   the   petitioner’s   representation regarding re­instatement in service.   He submitted that the observations   made   by   the   JIC   with   regard   to   the   re­ instatement of the petitioner were beyond the scope of its 18 “Terms of Reference” and as such, the Full Court of the MP High   Court   has   rightly   rejected   the   representation   of   the petitioner.  He submitted that if a unanimous decision taken by the Full Court of the MP High Court is interfered with by this Court, it will not only stigmatize the individuals manning the institution but the entire institution.  26. Shri Mehta submitted that the submissions, which he is making are not on the instructions of the MP High Court, but are   being   made   by   him   as   an   Officer   of   the   Court.     He submitted that what is sought to be urged by the petitioner is that   the   whole   of   the   MP   High   Court   as   an   Institution connived together and ensured to create such circumstances, that she had no other option but to tender her resignation. He submitted that if the petitioner’s contention is accepted, it will have catastrophic effects.  Shri Mehta submitted that the scope of judicial review 27. by this Court of a decision of the Full Court of a High Court, is very limited.  He submitted that this Court cannot sit in an appeal over the decision of the Full Court of a High Court. 19 An interference would be permitted only in the rarest of rare cases. He relies on the following judgments of this Court in support of this proposition: Syed T.A. Naqshbandi and Others v. State of Jammu & 6 ; Kashmir and Others Registrar   General,   High   Court   of   Patna   v.   Pandey 7 ; Gajendra Prasad and Others Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. 8 Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and Others 28. He therefore prays for dismissal of the petition. 29. Before we consider the rival submissions, we clarify that we are not examining the correctness or otherwise of the th decisions of the Full Court of the MP High Court dated 11 th January 2018 and 15  February 2019.  We are conscious of the fact that the scope of judicial review of a decision of the Full   Court   of   a   High   Court   is   extremely   narrow   and   we cannot sit in an appeal over the decision of the Full Court of 6 (2003) 9 SCC 592 7 (2012) 6 SCC 357 8 (2011) 10 SCC 1 20 a High Court. There could be various factors and reasons which could have weighed with the Full Court of the MP High Court   while   rejecting   the   representation   made   by   the th th petitioner in its resolutions dated 11  January 2018 and 15 February 2019.  We have full respect for the authority of the Full Court of the MP High Court to arrive at such a decision. 30. We therefore clarify that we are restricting the scope of enquiry in the present matter only to examine the following issues, on the basis of the factual scenario as has come on record in the present matter: (i) As to whether the order transferring the petitioner th from Gwalior to Sidhi dated 8  July 2014 is legal; (ii) As to whether the orders of the MP High Court dated th th 11   July   2014   and   14   July   2014,   rejecting   the th petitioner’s representations dated 9   July 2014 and th 11  July 2014 respectively, were legal; and (iii) As to whether the resignation of the petitioner dated th 15  July 2014 can be considered to be voluntary or the one which has been forced due to circumstances. 21 31. Though,   the   issue   directly   involved   in   the   present petition is only  the  issue  No.  (iii), we find  that it will be necessary to consider issue Nos. (i) and (ii) inasmuch as our findings on the said issues will have a direct bearing on the finding on issue No. (iii).  32. We further clarify that we are examining the present matter purely considering it as a lis between an employee and an employer, without in any way being influenced by the fact that one of the parties to the lis is the MP High Court on the administrative side, and the other one a Judicial Officer. We are of the considered view that the legal principles, which would   govern   the   dispute   between   an   employer   who   is   a State and an employee, will have to be equally applied in the present case, irrespective of the fact that one of the parties is a High Court and the other one is a Judicial Officer.  Though, arguments have been advanced before us with 33. regard to constructive discharge and the reliance is placed on the   judgments   of   Courts   in   United   Kingdom   and   United States, we do not find it necessary to go into that issue.  We 22 are of the considered view that the law as enunciated by this Court with regard to scope of judicial review of a State action, would squarely cover the issue. With this note, we proceed to examine the facts in the 34. present matter. th 35. No   doubt   that   the   JIC,   in   its   Report   dated   15 December 2017, has come to a clear finding that the transfer of the petitioner was in contravention of the Transfer Policy laid down by the MP High Court and as such, was irregular. The JIC has also come to a finding that the representations made by the petitioner were not appropriately considered by the MP High Court.  The JIC further came to a finding that Justice ‘A’ had interfered with the transfer of the petitioner and   also   had   a   role   to   play   in   the   rejection   of   her representations.  The JIC has also come to a finding that the rd basis of the petitioner’s transfer was the complaint dated 3 July 2014, made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior.   The JIC further found that though, it was the stand of the MP High Court   that   the   transfer   of   the   petitioner   was   on 23 administrative grounds in view of the provisions of Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy, the same was not established.  The JIC has further come to a finding that the circumstances became unbearable   for   the   petitioner,   resulting   in   her   resignation from service. 36. However, it is sought to be urged vehemently on behalf of the respondents that the aforesaid findings of the JIC were beyond the scope of “Terms of Reference” made to it.   Per contra,  it is  strenuously  argued  by  Smt.  Jaising that the aforesaid observations are very much within the scope of the “Terms of Reference” made to the JIC. Without going into that controversy, we find it apposite to re­examine the issue, independent of the findings of the JIC. 37. It is not in dispute that the Transfer Policy has been th incorporated by the MP High Court on 12   January 2012. The   Preamble   of   the   said   Transfer   Policy   states   that   an attempt will be made to effect the transfer and posting of Judicial   Officers   in   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in accordance with the said Guidelines and Policy, and that the 24 same   is   not   enforceable   in   law.   However,   it   states   that notwithstanding anything contained in the said Policy, the interest   of   the   Judicial   System   and   Establishment   in   the State   are   paramount   consideration   for   transfers   and postings.  The salient features of the said Transfer Policy are as under: (i) In accordance with Clause 3 of the Transfer Policy, the places available for posting are divided into 4 Categories mentioned as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’, which are mentioned in Annexure­A; (ii) In accordance with Clause 4 of the Transfer Policy, the annual transfer of Judicial Officers shall be th effected normally by the 15   of March every year and that the Judicial Officers shall be given time for   joining   up   to   the   first   day   of   April   of   the relevant year so as to coincide with the academic session;  25 (iii) In accordance with Clause 5 of the Transfer Policy, the   normal   approximate   tenure   of   posting   at   a place shall be three years; (iv) In accordance with Clause 7 of the Transfer Policy, for computing the tenure of posting of an Officer posted   at   a   particular   place,   the   period   of   6 months or above shall be rounded off and treated as full year; (v) Clause   9   of   the   Transfer   Policy   carves   out   the exceptions in cases where an extension of tenure can   be   granted.   Sub­clause   (a)   of   Clause   9 specifies a ground, that such an extension would be available if a daughter (not son) of the Judicial Officer   is   studying   at   the   place   of   his   current posting,   and   is   in   the   Final   Year   of   a   Board Examination or University Examination, and the educational   Institution   where   such   daughter   is studying, does not have hostel facility for girls. It further provides that the said criteria are for the 26 Officers seeking over­stay in Category ‘A’ places.  It further clarifies that insofar as Category ‘B’, ‘C’ or ‘D’ places are concerned, the said facility would be available irrespective of the ward being a son or a daughter and further provides that the availability of hostel facility will not be essential.   It further provides that the request on the said ground can be   considered   only   if   the   facts   with   regard   to education of the daughter and non­availability of hostel facility in the Institution are certified by the District Judge concerned, after proper verification, and further that the District Judge as well as the Portfolio Judge have no objection to the over­stay of the Officer.   Sub­clause (b) of Clause 9 deals with the cases where over­stay is sought on the ground of illness of a Judicial Officer, his spouse or   children   or   aged   parents.     Sub­clause   (c)   of Clause 9 is a residuary clause, which enables such exceptions on substantial reasons, which in the 27 opinion of the District Judge, the Portfolio Judge or the Chief Justice, are justified; Clause   9   of   the   Transfer   Policy   further provides that if any Judicial Officer submits such a representation covered by sub­clause (a), (b) or (c), to his District Judge for being forwarded to the Registrar   General,   it   will   be   obligatory   for   the District   Judge   to   send   the   representation   along with his comments within one week of its receipt after   the   necessary   verifications.     The   Registry thereafter is required to place the matter before the concerned Portfolio Judge within a week of the last date of the receipt of the representation, and the Portfolio Judge is required to return the file with   his   comments/opinion   within   a   week thereafter; (vi) Clause 10 of the Transfer Policy provides that all such   Judicial   Officers   who   are   seeking   their extension,   shall   also   simultaneously   forward 28 minimum   three   and   maximum   five   options regarding the place of the permissible category or lower category, where they would like to be posted in case the representation is not allowed; (vii) Clause   13   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that extension   of   a   posting   after   the   tenure   period would   be   granted   only   in   exceptional circumstances.     The   said   Clause   13   further provides that the decision regarding extension will be taken by the Chief Justice, or on his behalf, by a Committee of two Judges nominated by the Chief Justice,   within   three   weeks   of   the   last   date   of receipt of representations mentioned above; (viii) Clause 14 of the Transfer Policy provides that the Judicial Officer, who is on deputation or holding an ex­cadre post, would be required to come back to   the   parent   department   after   completing   a maximum period of three years on such posting. It further provides that no extension on deputation 29 shall   be   granted   after   a   period   of   three   years. However,   the   power   of   Chief   Justice   to   grant extension of one year in exceptional circumstances is reserved; (ix) In   accordance   with   Clause   16   of   the   Transfer Policy,   a   transfer   takes   place   normally   from Category ‘A’ to ‘B’, from ‘B’ to ‘C’, from ‘C’ to ‘D’ and from ‘D’ to ‘A’ or lower Category places; (x) In   accordance   with   Clause   17   of   the   Transfer th Policy,   the   Registrar   General   shall,   by   15   of February each year, prepare a list of Officers, who will be completing their tenure/posting.  It further provides that the Judicial Officers whose request for  over­stay   has   been   allowed   will  be  excluded from that list and the Officers whose request for pre­mature   transfer   has   been   allowed,   will   be added to that list.  The said Clause also requires to prepare a chart mentioning therein the details as required   under   the   said   Clause.     The   purpose 30 appears to be, to ensure an equitable distribution of judicial work for Officers all over the State; (xi) Clause 18 of the Transfer Policy provides that an attempt should be made to post the husband and wife   at   the   same   place,   if   both   are   working   as Judicial Officers in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It further provides that, if that is not possible, an attempt should be made to post them at nearby places; (xii) Clause   19   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that whenever a close relative of a Judicial Officer is suffering   from   a   serious   ailment,   he   shall   be granted preference by posting in a place where or near   which   proper   treatment   facilities   for   these ailments are available; (xiii) Clause   20   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that Judicial   Officers,   who   are   suffering   from   any physical disability, which is certified to be more than 40% by the appropriate Medical Board, would 31 be   granted   preference   in   the   matter   of   their posting to such place where they are not required to travel frequently; (xiv) Clause   21   of   the   Transfer   Policy   requires   that Judicial Officers, who have undergone posting for a period of two years or more in outlying Courts or in ‘D’ Category places, will be given preference in the   transfer   of   their   posting   at   District Headquarters only; (xv) Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy provides that a Judicial   Officer   may   be   transferred   even   before completion of the prescribed tenure or in mid­term in case his performance is found to be below the norms prescribed or if grounds exist for initiating inquiry against him.   It further provides that he may   also   be   transferred   before   completing   the prescribed   tenure   in   public   interest   or   in   the interest of administration if so decided by the High Court; 32 (xvi) In   accordance   with   Clause   23   of   the   Transfer Policy, a Judicial Officer, who has a year or less to retire as on first day of April, is entitled to posting of his choice at a place, where or near which, he proposes to settle after his retirement; (xvii) Clause 24 of the Transfer Policy which could be construed   as   a   residuary   clause   reserves   the power   of   the   Chief   Justice   to   issue   general   or particular   directions   which   are   not   specifically covered by the Policy. It further provides that in case   of   any   doubt   with   regard   to   Policy   or   its implementation,   the   clarification   issued   by   the Chief Justice will be treated as part of the Policy; (xviii) Clause 25 of the Transfer Policy provides that no representation   against   transfers   ordered   by   the High Court will normally be entertained except on a serious ground, which did not exist on the date of the issuance of the order of transfer; 33 (xix) Clause 26 of the Transfer Policy which is a non­ obstante   clause   provides   that   notwithstanding anything contained therein, the Chief Justice or on his   behalf,   a   Committee   of   two   senior   Judges nominated   by   the   Chief   Justice,   will   have overriding powers to pass any order regarding the transfer or posting of any Judicial Officer at any time; (xx) Clause 28 of the Transfer Policy enables the Chief Justice   to   delegate   his   powers   to   any   other Judge/Officer or Committee of Judges/Officers for implementation of the Policy/Guidelines. 38. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   Transfer   Policy incorporated by the MP High Court has provided in detail, the procedure that is required to be followed with regard to effecting the transfer of the Judicial Officers, their tenure at a particular   posting,   the   circumstances   in   which   the   case should be considered for permitting the Judicial Officers to 34 stay beyond the prescribed period and the manner in which the representation is to be considered etc. 39. No doubt that the said Transfer Policy is only a set of Guidelines   for   internal   administration   of   the   District Judiciary   issued   by   the   MP   High   Court.   However,   while exercising its functions on the administrative side, the MP High   Court  would   also  be   a  State   within  the  meaning   of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.  We may gainfully refer to the following observations made by this Court in the case of   Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle 9 Feed Industries : “ 8.  The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct   enforceable   right,   but   failure   to   consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of   the   principle   of   non­arbitrariness,   a  necessary concomitant   of   the   rule   of   law.   Every   legitimate expectation   is   a   relevant   factor   requiring   due consideration   in   a   fair   decision­making   process. Whether   the   expectation   of   the   claimant   is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it   is   to   be   determined   not   according   to   the 9 (1993) 1 SCC 71 35 claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh   what   would   otherwise   have   been   the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision   of   the   public   authority   reached   in   this manner   would   satisfy   the   requirement   of   non­ arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent. 9.  In  Council   of   Civil   Service   Unions  v.  Minister   for the Civil Service  [1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)]   the   House   of   Lords   indicated   the   extent   to which   the   legitimate   expectation   interfaces   with exercise   of   discretionary   power.   The   impugned action   was   upheld   as   reasonable,   made   on   due consideration of  all relevant factors including the legitimate expectation of the applicant, wherein the considerations  of  national  security   were   found   to outweigh that which otherwise would have been the reasonable   expectation   of   the   applicant.   Lord Scarman pointed out that “the controlling factor in determining   whether   the   exercise   of   prerogative power is subject to judicial review is not its source but its subject­matter”. Again in  Preston ,  in re  [1985 AC 835 : (1985) 2 All ER 327] it was stated by Lord Scarman   that   “the   principle   of   fairness   has   an important place in the law of judicial review” and “unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can be such that it is an abuse or excess of power”. These decisions of the House of Lords give a similar indication   of   the   significance   of   the   doctrine   of legitimate   expectation.   Shri   A.K.   Sen   referred to  Shanti   Vijay   and   Co.  v.  Princess   Fatima Fouzia  [(1979) 4 SCC 602 : (1980) 1 SCR 459] which 36 holds   that   court   should   interfere   where discretionary power is not exercised reasonably and in good faith.” 40. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right.  It is further held that the failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary.  It has been held that the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the   principle   of   non­arbitrariness,   which   is   a   necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a   relevant   factor   requiring   due   consideration   in   a   fair decision­making   process.   Whether   the   expectation   of   the claimant   is   reasonable   or   legitimate   in   the   context   is   a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it   is   to   be   determined   not   according   to   the   claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important   considerations   may   outweigh,   what   would otherwise   have   been   the   legitimate   expectation   of   the 37 claimant. It has been held that a   bona fide   decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement   of   non­arbitrariness   and   withstand   judicial scrutiny. It has been held that the principle of fairness has an important place in the law of judicial review and that unfairness in the purported exercise of power can be such that it is abuse or excess of power. The court should interfere where discretionary power is not exercised reasonably and in good faith. 41. It could thus be seen that though the Transfer Policy may not be enforceable in law, but when the Transfer Policy has been framed by the MP High Court for administration of the   District   Judiciary,   every   Judicial   Officer   will   have   a legitimate expectation that such a Policy should be given due weightage, when the cases of Judicial Officers for transfer are being considered. In  this   background,   we   will   examine   the   undisputed 42. facts.  Undisputedly, in the chart which was prepared by the 38 then RG for ensuring the general transfers, which were to be effected in the month of March 2014, the petitioner’s name did not figure. It   is   further   clear   that   in   the   agenda   prepared   for 43. consideration   of   mid­term   transfers   to   be   effected   in   the month   of   July   2014,   again   the   petitioner’s   name   did   not appear.   It can further be seen from the depositions of the then Judge of the MP High Court, who was a Member of the Transfer Committee and that of the then RG of the MP High Court before the JIC, that the basis for the transfer of the rd petitioner was the complaint dated 3  July 2014, addressed by the then D & SJ, Gwalior.  It is to be noted that within days,   the   decision   regarding   transferring   the   petitioner   to Sidhi,   which   is   about   507   kms.   away   from   Gwalior,   was th taken by the Transfer Committee on 7  July 2014, and was approved by the Competent Authority on the very same day. The said transfer order was conveyed to the petitioner on the th next day that is on 8  July 2014. 39

40

41

42 addressed a complaint to the then RG, seeking her transfer out of Gwalior, the matter was placed immediately before the Transfer Committee within days and the Transfer Committee approved the transfer of the petitioner.  Immediately after the receipt   of   the   transfer   order,   the   petitioner   made   a th representation   on   9   July   2014,   specifically   pointing   out th therein that her daughter was studying in Class 12  and also undergoing FIITJEE coaching. The said representation was rejected   within   two   days.   The   petitioner   had   a   legitimate expectation   of   her   representation   being   considered specifically in view of Clause 9(a) of the Transfer Policy.  The Transfer Policy provides that on such representation being made,   the   RG   shall   obtain   the   comments   of   the   District Judge within a week and on receiving his comments after necessary   verifications,   it   was   required   that   the   matter should be placed before the concerned Portfolio Judge within a week, who was required to return the file within a period of one week thereafter, with his comments/opinion. 43 47. Undisputedly,   neither   the   procedure   as   prescribed under   Clause   9   of   the   Transfer   Policy   of   obtaining   the comments from the District Judge and the Portfolio Judge were complied with, nor the Transfer Committee considered the provisions of Clause 9(a) of the Transfer Policy. 48. When sub­clause (a) of Clause 9 of the Transfer Policy provided, that the case of a Judicial Officer for an extension should be considered if such Judicial Officer’s daughter (not son) was to appear for the final year of Board Examination or University   Examination,   and   when   such   educational Institution where such daughter is studying, does not have hostel   facility   for   girls,   the   petitioner   had   a   legitimate expectation   that   the   MP   High   Court   would   consider   her request   in   accordance   therewith.     Not   only   that,   such   a concession of extension would have been available only if the District   Judge   certified   that   there   is   no   hostel   facility available   in   such   educational   Institution.     It   also   further required the comments to be obtained by the RG from the District Judge and the Portfolio Judge of the MP High Court. 44 From the perusal of the Transfer Policy, it is clear that total 3 weeks’ period is provided between the date of the receipt of the representation and the decision thereon.  However, in the present case, within two days from the submission of the representation,   the   Transfer   Committee   rejected   the   same without considering sub­clause (a) of Clause 9 of the Transfer Policy. It is a different matter that inviting comments from the   District   Judge   would   have   been   just   a   formality, inasmuch as the transfer was effected on his complaint itself. 49. The matter does not end here.  On rejection of her first representation,   the   petitioner   addressed   her   second representation, requesting that she be posted at any of the four cities mentioned in the said representation so that her daughter could continue with her education.   However, the then RG made an endorsement that the said representation is   on   similar   ground   as   mentioned   in   the   earlier th representation dated 9  July 2014, which has already been rejected.   The Transfer Committee endorsed that in view of the order already passed in the earlier representation dated 45 th 9  July 2014, no further reconsideration is to be made.  Both the representations of the petitioner are made with different requests.   Whereas the first representation requests for her retention at Gwalior for a period of 8 months so that her daughter could continue with her education at Gwalior; in the second representation, she had requested to be posted at either of the 4 places, where her daughter could continue with her education.  However, the second representation was rejected on the ground that the earlier representation made on similar ground also stands rejected.   The petitioner had a legitimate expectation in view of 50. Clause 10 of the Transfer Policy to have her case considered for posting at any of the 4 places in the event her request for retention at the then present posting was not considered and as such, she made the second representation.   We are at pains to say that the rejection of the second representation depicts total non­application of mind by the then RG as well as the then Judge of the Transfer Committee of the MP High Court.   The proposal of the then RG was made in a casual 46 manner and  accepted  by the  then Judge on the  Transfer Committee in a mechanical manner. 51. The transfer is sought to be justified in view of Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy.  One of the grounds on which the transfer could be made in mid­term, is that the performance of   such   Judicial   Officer   is   found   to   be   below   the   norms prescribed.     The   same   is   admittedly   not   available   in   the present case. The petitioner’s performance in the assessment th made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior on 15  January 2014 for the assessment year 2013, has been found to be ‘very good’. That   leaves   us   with   the   second   ground   available   under Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy, that a transfer can be made if the grounds exist for initiating an inquiry against such a Judicial Officer.  The same is also not the case here. 52. It   is   sought   to   be   urged   that   the   transfer   of   the petitioner was made in the public interest or in the interest of the administration inasmuch as there was a requirement of an   Additional   Judge   at   Sidhi.     The   then   Judge   on   the 47 Transfer   Committee   has   specifically   admitted   in   his deposition before the JIC that at the relevant point of time, the pendency at the 4 places which were mentioned by the petitioner  in  her  second   representation,   was   much  higher than at Sidhi.  He has further admitted that though the posts were vacant at the said 4 places, there was no vacancy at Sidhi.     As   per   the   Transfer   Policy,   a   Judicial   Officer   is required to be transferred from Category ‘A’ city to Category ‘B’ city, from ‘B’ to ‘C’, from ‘C’ to ‘D’ and from ‘D’ to ‘A’. However,  in the   case of  the  petitioner, the   petitioner  was directly transferred from Gwalior, which is Category ‘A’ city to Sidhi, which is Category ‘C’ city. The 4 cities which have been mentioned by the petitioner in her second representation are ‘B’   Category   cities.   Coupled   with   the   admission   that   the transfer of the petitioner was effected on the basis of the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior, it is difficult to accept the contention on behalf of the MP High Court that the transfer of the petitioner was made in the public interest or in the interest of the administration. 48 53. The   learned   Solicitor   General   argued   that   vide   the th impugned transfer order dated 8  July 2014, as many as 26 Judicial Officers were transferred and not just the petitioner. The perusal of the said transfer order would reveal that in many   cases,   the   Judicial   Officers   who   were   either   on deputation  or ex­cadre  posts,  have  been brought in  main stream.   It is also found that many of the Judicial Officers covered by the said transfer order were posted at the same place inasmuch as from the posting on deputation, they have been   brought   in  the   main   stream.   In  any   case,   it  is   not pointed out as to whether the said Judicial Officers were also facing   the   same   difficulty,   as   was   being   faced   by   the petitioner.   It is also not brought on record as to whether those   Judicial   Officers   had   made   any   representation   and their representations were rejected in an identical manner.   At   this   juncture,   we   may   refer   to   the   following 54. observations   made   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Kumari 49

10 (1991) 1 SCC 212 50

51 act which was done, was fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 56. We have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has established that her transfer order was in contravention of the   Transfer   Policy   and   that   the   rejection   of   her   two representations, in addition of being contrary to the Transfer Policy,   were   also   arbitrary.     As   such,   the   petitioner   has discharged   her   burden   and   the   onus   is   shifted   on   the respondent No.1 to show that the petitioner’s transfer order was fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case.  We find that the respondent No.1 has utterly failed to discharge its burden.  On the contrary, the admissions made before the JIC by the then Judge on the Transfer Committee clearly show that the transfer was made solely on the basis of the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior without verifying the veracity thereof.  Not only this, but it is evident that   the   then   Judge   had   not   looked   into   the   annexures attached   with   the   representation,   which   included   the   fee receipts etc. of the petitioner’s daughter.   52

11 (2010) 9 SCC 437 53 India  v.  V. Ramakrishnan  [(2005) 8 SCC 394 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1150].)” 58. It is trite that the State is under the obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice — in fact or in law. “Legal malice” or “malice in law” means something done without lawful   excuse.   It   is   an   act   done   wrongfully   and   wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of malice or spite on the part of the State. It would mean exercise of statutory power for “purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended”. It means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the rights of others. 59. No doubt that it is strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioner that the transfer order is  mala fide  and issued at the instance of Justice ‘A’, we do not find it necessary to go into that aspect of the matter.   54 60. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following observations   made   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Somesh 12 : Tiwari v. Union of India and Others

61. This Court has held that normally an order of transfer, which is an incident of service should not be interfered with,

the second ‘malice in law’.  When an order is not based on any   factor   germane   for   passing   an   order   of   transfer   and 12 (2009) 2 SCC 592 55 based on an irrelevant ground, such an order would not be sustainable in law.   62. At the cost of repetition, we may say that though it is the case of the respondent No.1 that the transfer order of the

administrative exigencies, the material placed on record and particularly,   the   depositions   of   the   then   Judge   on   the Transfer Committee and the then RG, would clearly show that it was on the basis of the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior.  It is a different aspect that the JIC had come to   a   specific   finding   of   fact,   that   the   evidence   on   record clearly   shows   that   Justice   ‘A’   had   a   role   to   play   in   the transfer   of   the   petitioner   and   the   rejection   of   her   two representations.  We are therefore of the considered view that

covered by ‘malice in law’ inasmuch as it was passed without taking   into   consideration   the   Guidelines   provided   in   the Transfer   Policy   but   on   the   basis   of   unverified   allegations made in the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior. 56 63. That leaves us with the next issue as to whether the

not. 64. It could be seen that as per Clause 9 of the Transfer Policy, the petitioner is entitled to make a representation to the MP High Court for retaining her at the same posting, and for posting at alternate places of her choice in view of Clause 10 of the Transfer Policy.  When the Transfer Policy provides for making a representation, the petitioner had a legitimate expectation that the said representation would be considered in accordance with it. Consideration of representation is not a formality.   We are not saying for a moment that prior to rejection of the petitioner’s representations, she should have been   heard   or   that   the   reasons   ought   to   have   been communicated for such rejection. However, the least that is expected is that the representation is considered in the right earnest.  When the Transfer Policy provides for a ground on which the representation is to be made, then the least that is 57 expected is that the matter should be considered in reference to the provisions made in the Transfer Policy.   In her first representation, the petitioner had specifically contended that she   should   be   retained   at   Gwalior   on   the   ground   of   her daughter’s   education.     There   was  a  legitimate  expectation that  the   respondent  No.1  ought to  have   considered   as  to whether her case fits in Clause 9(a) of the Transfer Policy. The petitioner was entitled for consideration of her case on the ground that her daughter was to appear in the final year of Board Examination.  The petitioner had specifically stated that her daughter was also undergoing FIITJEE coaching. She   had   further   clearly   stated   that   after   her   daughter completes the academic year, she was willing to abide by the transfer order.  However, in the noting of the then RG, it was mentioned   that   “it   is   gathered   that   adequate   educational facilities including CBSE School are available at Sidhi”.  It is further stated that the Transfer Committee, in its meeting

petitioner   on   administrative   grounds   after   considering   the request of the then D & SJ, Gwalior with regard to conduct 58 and behaviour of the petitioner.   On the said proposal, the then   Judge   on   the   Transfer   Committee   had   directed   the representation of the petitioner to be rejected.   As such, it could be seen that the respondent No. 1 had not at all taken into consideration as to whether the petitioner’s case was required to be considered under Clause 9(a) of the Transfer Policy or not.  

2014 is concerned, the petitioner had specifically stated that since her daughter was preparing for Board and Competitive Exams   and   also   taking   FIITJEE   coaching,   she   may   be transferred   to   such   places   as   Sehore,   Raisen,   Dewas   or Ujjain,   where   her   daughter   could   continue   with   her education.   It could thus be seen that, whereas in the first representation,   the   petitioner   had   sought   retention   at Gwalior, in the second representation, she had requested for posting at any of the 4 places as aforesaid.   However, the

to the effect that “the said representation was made almost on   identical   grounds   as   were   made   in   the   first 59

2014”.  The then Judge on the Transfer Committee made an

already   passed   in   the   earlier   representation,   no   further reconsideration   is   to   be   made”.   It   can   thus   be   seen   that

July  2014   is   with  a  request  to  post  her  at  any  of   the  4 alternate   places,   the   noting   that   “the   representation   on identical   grounds   had   already   been   rejected”,   is   factually incorrect. Whereas the first representation of the petitioner was   for   retention   at   Gwalior,   the   second   one   was   for   a posting   at   alternate   place,   where   her   daughter   could continue with her education.   In view of Clause 10 of the Transfer Policy, the petitioner had a legitimate expectation of being considered for an alternate posting, in case her prayer for retention was not to be considered. 66. It could  thus   be  seen  that  the   respondent  No.1   has failed   to   take   into   consideration   the   factors,   which   were required to be considered, while deciding the representation of the petitioner and had taken into consideration the factors 60 which were not relevant.   The then Judge on the Transfer Committee,   in   his   deposition   before   the   JIC,   had   clearly admitted that he had not gone into the annexures, which were attached with the representation of the petitioner.  Non­ consideration of the relevant material and consideration of the   extraneous   material   would   come   into   the   realm   of irrationality.   An   action   which   is   arbitrary,   irrational   and unreasonable would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of   India.   We,   therefore,   find   that   the   rejection   of   the th th representations of the petitioner dated 9  July 2014 and 11 July 2014, would also not stand the scrutiny of law. 67. That leaves us with the next issue as to whether the th petitioner’s   resignation   dated   15   July   2014,   could   be considered as a voluntarily one.   68. The resignation of the petitioner reads thus:   “It  is  most respectfully  submitted  that  I  am unable   to   continue   my   services   as   Additional District and Sessions Judge. As I have been transferred to Sidhi, in the mid academic session of my daughters studying in Class III and Class XII, it affected mostly the crucial stage of career of my class XII daughter.  Therefore I am left with no option but to resign from my post. 61 I   hereby   resign   from   the   post   of   Additional District   and   Sessions   Judge   and   I   am   ready   to submit   my   salary   as   per   rules   and   clear   all   my dues, if any. I   humbly   request   your   kind   self   to   please accept   my   resignation   and   relieve   me   with immediate affect and oblige.” 69. It is sought to be urged on behalf of the respondent No.1, that the said resignation is voluntary, acted upon by the authority and thus, there was severance of relationship between the employer and employee. 70. The learned Solicitor General submitted that it was an impulsive   decision  to  resign   only   on   account  of   mid­term transfer.  He submitted that, to hold that a mid­term transfer would amount to coercion resulting into resignation, would be catastrophic. He further submitted that such a plea would not be available to a Judicial Officer, who is discharging the sovereign function of dispensing justice and who is trained to be   independent,   fearless,   non­impulsive   and   to   act   in accordance with law.   62 71. No   doubt,   that   a   Judicial   Officer   while   discharging his/her   duties,   is   expected   to   be   independent,   fearless, impassionate and non­impulsive. But a Judicial Officer is also a human being.   A Judicial Officer is also a parent. He/she could be a father or a mother. The question would be, whether  a  Judicial  Officer,   while   taking   a  decision  in his/her   personal   matter   as   a   human   being,   in   his/her capacity   of   a   father   or   mother,   would   be   required   to   be guided by the same yardsticks. 72. For considering as to whether the resignation in the present matter could be construed as voluntary or not, the resignation   cannot   be   considered   in   isolation,   but   all   the attendant   circumstances   will   have   to   be   taken   into consideration.   73. Let us consider the facts from the perspective of the petitioner. 74. Insofar as the career of the petitioner is concerned, till th 8   July   2014,  there  were  no  issues.    She  was   posted  at st th Gwalior as AD & SJ on 1   August 2011. On 15   January rd 2013, she was assessed for the period from 3  May 2012 to 63 st 31   December   2012   by   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior,   who assessed her grading as ‘good’, which was approved by the then Portfolio/Administrative Judge of the MP High Court. Between December 2013 and June 2014, the petitioner was th entrusted with various additional responsibilities.   On 15 th January 2014, she was assessed for the period from 8  April st , 2013 to 31   December 2013 by the then D & SJ, Gwalior who assessed her grading as ‘very good’. The same was also endorsed by the then Portfolio/Administrative Judge of the MP High Court.   It is to be noted that the then D & SJ, Gwalior, who had assessed the petitioner’s performance for the assessment year 2012 was a different one than the one who had assessed her performance for the assessment year 2013. 75. On the personal front, both the petitioner’s daughters were taking education at Gwalior.  One of them was in Class rd th 3  and the other one was studying in Class 12  and was also undergoing   FIITJEE   coaching.     Since   her   husband   was required   to   be   in   Delhi   on   account   of   professional   and personal commitments and also that he had to look after his 64 aged parents, the petitioner had to draw a balance between her duties as a Judicial Officer and as a mother. th 76. Till 8   July 2014, everything was smooth but on the said date, came the transfer order transferring her to Sidhi, which was at a far away distance of 507 Kms. from Gwalior. Taking shelter under Clause 9(a) of the Transfer Policy, the petitioner made a representation to the MP High Court on the very next day, requesting the respondent No. 1 that she be retained at Gwalior, at least till her daughter completes her th Class 12   education, but the same was rejected within a short   period   of   two   days.   She   made   her   second th representation on 11  July 2014, requesting the respondent No.1   to   give   her   alternate   posting   at   any   of   the   4   cities mentioned therein, where her daughter could continue with her education. All the 4 cities were Category ‘B’ cities.   In normal circumstances, a Judicial Officer, who is in Category ‘A’ city,  is required to be transferred to Category ‘B’ city. However,   to   her   utter   shock,   the   same   was   also   rejected within three days. 65 77. One cannot imagine the trauma which the petitioner must have faced during this short period of time.  She was also not aware that she was being transferred on the ground of the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior, who himself appears to have joined at Gwalior sometime in 2014, after   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior,   who   had   assessed   the petitioner for the year 2013, was transferred.  She had come to know about the complaint at a much later point of time. In th her first representation dated 9   July 2014, the petitioner elaborated in detail, her precarious situation inasmuch as she  was   required   to  be  both  a  mother   and   father   to  her children and draw a balance between her professional duties and duties towards her daughters. She stated that on receipt of her transfer order, her elder daughter had become meek with fear and anxiety, as she faced an emotional trauma and a bleak prospect.  The petitioner stated that at the cost of her career, she could not disturb the right of her daughter to decent education and curb her prospects for an inspirational life. The petitioner only appealed that in order to avoid the emotional trauma and to support her daughter to complete 66 th her Class 12 , she  should be continued at Gwalior for a short   period.     She   also   assured   that   after   her   daughter th completes   Class   12 ,   she   would   move   on   to   whichever posting allocated to her.   However, the same was rejected th within two days i.e. on 11  July 2014, without following the procedure prescribed under the Transfer Policy. 78. The petitioner made another representation on the very th same   day   i.e.   11   July   2014,   requesting   for   an  alternate posting   either   to   Sehore,   Raisen,   Dewas   or   Ujjain.     She reiterated   the   traumatic   situation   through   which   her daughter was undergoing.  She reiterated that at the cost of her career, she could not disturb the right of her daughter to decent education.  However, the same was again rejected on th 14  July 2014, within a period of four days. 79. The petitioner was a Judicial Officer and a mother too. The Judicial Officer in her must have been battling with the mother in her. On one hand, was her career as a Judicial Officer;   on   the   other   hand,   was   the   possibility   of   her daughter’s   educational   prospects   and   career   coming   into jeopardy, if she shifted to the place of posting at Sidhi.   A 67 possibility of her mind engrossed with a feeling, that she was subjected to injustice by the very Institution of Judiciary, cannot be ruled away.  What was she asking for?  A retention at   Gwalior   for   a   period   of   8   months   till   her   daughter th completes her Class 12 .  In the alternative, posting at any of the 4 cities, which were admittedly in Category ‘B’, where her daughter could have better education facilities, and where the vacancies existed.  80. Denial of her legitimate expectation could have led to desperation, exasperation and frustration.  The frustration of the petitioner is evident from the language used by her in her resignation   letter.     She   stated   that   as   she   had   been transferred   to   Sidhi   in   the   mid­academic   session   of   her th daughter’s Class 12 , it had mostly affected the crucial stage of career of her daughter.  She stated that therefore, she was left   with   no   other   option   but   to   resign   from   her   post.   It appears that in a gruesome battle between a mother and a Judicial Officer, the  Judicial Officer  lost the  battle  to the mother. 68 81. Reaction  of  a  person  to   a  particular   situation  would depend from person to person.   No two individuals can be expected to respond identically to a same situation. It is quite possible   that   some   other   person   in   the   petitioner’s   place, would   have   chosen   to   pursue   one’s   own   career   without bothering about the daughter’s education and prospects of good career. 82. On the very next day of submission of resignation, the MP   High   Court   forwarded   her   resignation   with   the recommendation   to   accept   the   same   and   thereafter, immediately   on   the   very   next   day,   the   respondent   No.   2 accepted the same.   83. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of  Dr. Prabha Atri v. State of U.P. 13 : and Others “ 7.  The   only   question   that   mainly   requires   to   be considered is as to whether the letter dated 9­1­ 1999 could be construed to mean or amounted to a letter of resignation or merely an expression of her intention to resign, if her claims in respect of the 13 (2003) 1 SCC 701 69

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73 simpliciter to avoid facing disciplinary proceedings and that, therefore, the competent authority acted well   within   its   rights   in   treating   it   to   be   a resignation and accepting the same forthwith and as a consequence thereof, directing further not to proceed with the domestic enquiry already ordered. Finally, it has been submitted that if this Court is pleased to interfere in the matter the right of the hospital   authorities   to   pursue   the   disciplinary action already initiated from the stage at which it stood on the date of acceptance of the resignation should   not   be   jeopardized   and   liberty   may   be granted in this regard. 10.  We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side, in the   light   of   the   materials   and   principles,   noticed supra. This is not a case where it is required to consider   as   to   whether   the   relinquishment envisaged under the rules and conditions of service is unilateral or bilateral in character but whether the letter dated 9­1­1999 could be treated or held to be a letter of resignation or relinquishment of the office, so as to sever her services once and for all. The   letter   cannot   be   construed,   in   our   view,   to convey   any   spontaneous   intention   to   give   up   or relinquish   her   office   accompanied   by   any   act   of relinquishment.   To   constitute   a   “resignation”,   it must   be   unconditional   and   with   an   intention   to operate as such. At best, as observed by this Court in the decision in  P.K. Ramachandra Iyer  [(1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] it may amount to a threatened offer more on account of exasperation, to resign on account of a feeling of frustration born out of   an   idea   that   she   was   being   harassed unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a 74 resignation, actual and simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the hospital, that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter dated 9­1­ 1999 does not seek for any of those things to be settled   or   the   disciplinary   proceedings   being scrapped as a sequel to her so­called resignation. The words “with immediate effect” in the said letter could not be given undue importance dehors the context, tenor of language used and the purport as well as the remaining portion of the letter indicating the circumstances in which it was written. That the management of the hospital took up such action forthwith,   as   a   result   of   acceptance   of   the resignation   is   not   of   much   significance   in ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written by the appellant on 9­1­1999. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that as in the case   reported   in  P.K.   Ramachandra   Iyer  [(1984)   2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] the respondents have   seized   an   opportunity   to   get   rid   of   the appellant the moment they got the letter dated 9­1­ 1999, without due or proper consideration of the matter in a right perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The High Court also seems to have completely lost sight of these vital aspects in rejecting the writ petition.” The facts in the above case are somewhat similar to the 84. present case.  The present case is also not a case where it is required   to   consider   as   to   whether   the   relinquishment 75 envisaged   under   the   Rules   and   Conditions   of   Service,   is unilateral or bilateral in character.  In the present case also, the words “with immediate effect” in the resignation letter could not be given undue importance, dehors the context, tenor of language used therein, indicating the circumstances in which it was written. The resignation letter in the present case, as has already been discussed hereinabove, appears to be on account of exasperation and frustration actuated by a     thought, that  injustice was being meted out to her by the very Institution of Judiciary.  We further find that the breakneck speed at which the 85. events have taken place in the present matter, gives rise to a suspicion, that there is something more than which meets rd the eye.  On 3   July 2014, the then D & SJ, Gwalior, who appears   to   have   joined   the   service   a   short   while   ago, addressed a complaint to the then RG. The said D & SJ, Gwalior,   in   his   deposition   before   the   JIC,   has   clearly admitted   that   the   instances   mentioned   in   the   complaint, were not within his personal knowledge, but were on the basis   of   the   complaints   made   to   him   by   other   Judicial 76 Officers. He further admitted that the complaints were with regard to the period, which was before his joining as D & SJ, Gwalior.    He   further   admitted   that  there  were   no  written complaints   by   the   Judicial   Officers   and   that   he   had proceeded to write the complaint on the basis of their oral complaints.  Within days of the said complaint being made, th on 7  July 2014, the Transfer Committee decided to transfer the petitioner from Gwalior to Sidhi.  The transfer order was th issued   on   8   July   2014.   The   petitioner   made   a th representation on the very next day i.e. 9   July 2014, and th the same was rejected within two days i.e. 11   July 2014. th On   11   July   2014,   the   petitioner   made   another representation.  However, that also did not find favour with th respondent No. 1 and was rejected on 14  July 2014, on the ground that the earlier representation on identical grounds th was already rejected.   It is to be noted that 12   July 2014 th was a second Saturday, 13  July 2014 was a Sunday and on th the very next working day i.e. 14   July 2014, her second th representation was rejected. On 15  July 2014, the petitioner th tendered   her   resignation.     On  the   next   day   i.e.  16   July 77 2014,   the   MP   High   Court   with   the   recommendation   for acceptance of the same, forwarded it to respondent No.2.  On th the   very   next   day   i.e.   17   July   2014,   respondent   No.   2 accepted the same. It will not be out of place to mention that in some High 86. Courts,   a   practice   is   followed,   that   whenever   a   Judicial Officer having good track record tenders his/her resignation, an attempt is made by the Senior Judges of the High Court to counsel and persuade him/her to withdraw the resignation. Valuable time and money is spent on training of a Judicial Officer. Losing a good Judicial Officer without counselling him/her   and   without   giving   him/her   an   opportunity   to introspect and re­think, will not be in the interest of either the Judicial Officer or the Judiciary.  We find that it will be in the interest of judiciary that such a practice is followed by all the High Courts.  87. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   in   the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner’s th resignation dated 15  July 2014, could not be construed to st be voluntary.  In any case, immediately in a fortnight, on 1 78 August 2014, the petitioner had made a representation to Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief Justice of the MP High Court for reconsideration of the circumstances under which, she was left with no option but to resign.  Though, it may not be possible to observe that the petitioner was forced to resign, however, the circumstances enumerated hereinabove, would clearly reveal that they were such, that out of frustration, the petitioner was left with no other alternative. 88. It is contended on behalf of the MP High Court that the petitioner, who was on probation, had voluntarily tendered her resignation, which was accepted and as such, led to an irrevocable   severance   of   relationship   of   the   employer   and employee. In this regard, it is to be noted that the petitioner was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years st st on 1   August 2011.   Her probation was completed on 1 August 2013.  Admittedly, there has been no order extending st the period of probation of the petitioner from 1  August 2013 onwards. On the contrary, she was assigned with various additional duties in the year 2013.   Not only this, but her 79 assessment for the assessment year 2013, during which, she would   be   deemed   to   be   confirmed,   was   ‘very   good’.     We therefore   find   that   the   said   contention   is   nothing   but  an after­thought. Insofar   as   the   contention   with   regard   to   delay   is 89. concerned,   we   find   no   merit   in   the   said   contention   also. th Immediately after the petitioner resigned on 15  July 2014, she made a representation to Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief Justice of the MP High Court, requesting to reconsider the circumstances in which she was left with no option but to resign.   The petitioner thereafter had also pursued a writ petition before this Court.   Thereafter, she had participated in the proceedings before the JIC and after the JIC expressed its opinion, that it would be in the interest of justice that she should be re­instated in service, she made a representation to the MP High Court, for re­instatement in service.  After the said   representation   was   rejected,   she   has   immediately approached this Court in the present matter.   We therefore 80 find that the petitioner cannot be denied the reliefs on the so­ called grounds of delay and laches. 90. That leaves us with the last submission of the learned Solicitor   General,   that   if   we   hold   the   resignation   in   the present case  to be  actuated  by  coercion,  it will have  far­ reaching   implications   and   will   open   floodgates   to   the similarly   situated   Judicial   Officers.     Another   submission made is that, if a decision of the Full Court of the MP High Court   is   interfered   with,   it   will   stigmatize   the   entire Institution and have catastrophic effects.   91. We find the said submissions to be totally uncalled for. At the outset, we have clarified that we are only examining the correctness and otherwise of the order of transfer, the rejection   of   the   representations   and   the   question   as   to whether   the   resignation   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case, could be construed to be voluntary or not.  We have not at all gone   into   the   question,   regarding   the   correctness   or otherwise of the decisions of the Full Court of the MP High Court   with   regard   to   the   rejection   of   the   petitioner’s representation.     As   already   discussed   hereinabove,   there 81 might be reasons and factors which might have weighed with the   Full   Court   of   the   MP   High   Court   for   taking   such   a decision.  At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that we have full respect for the authority of the Full Court to arrive at such a decision. As such, there is no question of stigmatizing the Full Court of the MP High Court.  It is a different matter, that if the suggestions made by this Court on more than one occasion   would   have   been   accepted,   the   exercise   of examining the factual scenario, could have been avoided.  In any case, we have restricted our inquiry only to the facts, which we found necessary to decide the present case.   We have refrained ourselves from going into the details of the findings   of   the   JIC,   so   as   to   protect   the   dignity   of   all concerned.   We have refrained ourselves from mentioning a single name in our judgment. 92. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned Solicitor General with regard to stigmatizing the MP High Court is without substance.   93. Insofar as the contention, that if this Court holds the resignation in the present case to be coercive, it will have far­ 82 reaching   effects   on   the   administration   of   judiciary   is concerned, the same is also without substance.   It will be apposite to refer to the following observations made by this Court   in   the   case   of   Union   of   India   and   Others   v. 14 Dhanwanti Devi and Others :

14 (1996) 6 SCC 44 83 It could thus be seen that this Court has held that a decision is an authority only for what it actually decides. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts, proved or assumed to be proved.  The generality of the expressions found there, is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. This Court in the case of  94. The Regional Manager and 15  has succinctly observed Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey thus:

application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear 15 (1976) 3 SCC 334 84 to be similar. It has been held that one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.   As   has   already   been  discussed   hereinabove,   we   may 95. reiterate that we have decided the present matter only on the basis of the peculiar facts and circumstances, as are found in the present matter.  We do hope, that in future, similar facts would never arise for consideration, at least in a lis between a High Court and a Judicial Officer. However, we may remind ourselves of the dictum that law is supreme and no one is above law.  It would be apt to reproduce the words of Thomas

96. Before we part with the judgment, we find it our duty to place on record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Smt. Indira Jaising, learned Senior Counsel and Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India. 97. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed in the following terms: 85 (i) We hold and declare that the petitioner’s resignation from the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge,

2014,   passed   by   the   respondent   No.   2,   thereby accepting the resignation of the petitioner, is quashed and set aside; and (ii) The   respondents   are   directed   to   re­instate   the petitioner   forthwith   as   an   Additional   District   & Sessions Judge.  Though the petitioner would not be entitled   to   back   wages,   she   would   be   entitled   for continuity in service with all consequential benefits

98. No order as to cost.  Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms. ……....….......................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] ..…....….......................J.       [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 10, 2022. 86