Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9726-9727 OF 2010
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 14520-14521 of 2010)
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. &
ORS.
— APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
SUBRATA BORAH CHOWLEK , ETC. — RESPONDENT (S)
O R D E R
D.K. JAIN, J.:
Leave granted.
2. The present appeals, by special leave, are directed against order and
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judgment dated 29 January, 2010 passed by a Division Bench of the
Gauhati High Court, whereby appellants’ application seeking
condonation of delay of 59 days in preferring the appeal was rejected and
their writ appeal was dismissed in limine as being barred by limitation.
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3. The respondents herein filed writ petitions in the High Court seeking
regularization of their services from the dates of their initial appointment
with consequential benefits. A learned Single Judge of the High Court,
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vide his judgment dated 29 April 2009, allowed the writ petitions, and
directed appellant No.2 viz. the Assam Oil Division of the Indian Oil
Corporation to treat the respondents as having been regularly appointed
from the date of their initial appointment, and to give them all the
consequential service benefits.
4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellants preferred an appeal
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before the Division Bench of the High Court on 29 July 2009, along
with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. It was
pleaded that the delay of 59 days had occasioned because of the time
taken by the company’s consultant at Delhi, mainly on account of
summer vacation.
5. As afore-mentioned, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
appeal, on the ground of limitation, observing thus:
“As such, the averments made in the application do not disclose
any weighty or convicting cause to construe the same as
sufficient within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. The
applicant corporation had since the delivery of the judgment
and order involved been cavalier and nonchalant in its
approach. No urge or concern to act with expedition or dispatch
in view of the period of limitation prescribed is discernible in
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its enterprise to decide the next course of action following the
decision of the Single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the applicants are
not entitled to the equitable relief of condonation of delay, they
having utterly failed to offer a sufficient cause therefore in
filing the accompanying writ appeals.”
6. As stated above, the appellants had pleaded that the delay in filing the
appeal was unintentional and bona fide in as much as on receiving an
uncertified copy of the judgment, they sought legal opinion from their
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local lawyer on 7 May 2009, which was received by them on 21 May
2009. Thereafter, the same was forwarded to the General Manager (HR),
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Refinery Headquarters, New Delhi on 28 May 2009. Vide his letter
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dated 6 June 2009, the said General Manager sought some documents,
including a certified copy of the judgment. Subsequently, the General
Manager forwarded the case file to the company’s legal advisors at New
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Delhi on 18 June 2009. The said legal advisors gave their opinion on 7
July 2009, advising the appellants to file an appeal against the judgment
of the Single Judge; the proposal was approved by the headquarters of the
appellants; whereafter the case file was handed over to the counsel for
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preparing and filing the appeal, which was ultimately filed on 29 July
2009.
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7. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant
case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in
filing the appeal and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to
condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a
party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it
is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally follow a
liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides
can be imputed to the party. (See: Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal
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Kumari & Ors. ; The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator ,
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Howrah Municipality & Ors. ; N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.
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Krishnamurthy ; Sital Prasad Saxena Vs. Union of India & Ors. )
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8. In Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , this Court
held that:
“In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two
important considerations. The first consideration is that the
expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an
appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to
treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words,
when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-
holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat
the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be
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(1969) 1 SCR 1006
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(1972) 1 SCC 366
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(1998) 7 SCC 123
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(1985) 1 SCC 163
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(1962) 2 SCR 762
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light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot
be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown
discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the
appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the
court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf
should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been
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observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan
“Section 5 gives the court a discretion which in respect of
jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial
power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles
which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’
receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is
imputable to the appellant.”
9. Similarly, in Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vs.
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Gobardhan Sao & Ors . , this Court observed that:
“But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with
the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule
and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting
party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the
courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps
within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the
other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning
delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic
and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished
should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable
points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing
enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom
the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit.
While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance
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(1890) ILR 13 Mad 269
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(2002) 3 SCC 195
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between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the
parties either way.”
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10. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Ahmed Jaan , while observing that
although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which,
in similar circumstances is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot
but take a practical view of the working of the Government without
being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels, highlighted
the following observations of this Court in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok
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Ao & Ors. :
“It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies
proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing
the files from table to table and keeping it on table for
considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a
routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the
process of their making decision is a common feature.
Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If
the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no
person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis
suffers, is public interest. The expression ‘sufficient cause’
should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-
oriented approach rather than the technical detection of
sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors
which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires
adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented
process.”(See also: Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition,
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(2008) 14 SCC 582
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(2005) 3 SCC 752
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Kerala Vs. K.V. Ayisumma ; State of Haryana Vs. Chandra
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Mani & Ors. )
11. It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages
the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court, and makes no
distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a
strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dependant on
the actions of its officials, who
often do not have any personal interest in its transactions, may lead to
grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain amount of latitude is
permissible in such cases.
12. Examined on the touch-stone of the afore-noted observations, we are of
the view that in the present case, the conduct of the appellants does not
indicate inaction, negligence or mala fides. The explanation furnished for
the marginal delay of 59 days, in our opinion, constitutes a sufficient
cause and therefore, deserves to be accepted.
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(1996) 10 SCC 634
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(1996) 3 SCC 132
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13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed; the impugned
judgment is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the Division
Bench of the High Court for consideration on merits. There shall be no
order as to costs.
.……………………………………
(D.K. JAIN, J.)
.…………………………………….
(H.L. DATTU, J.)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 12, 2010.
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