Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
UNION OF INDIA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PRAFULLA KUMAR SAMAL & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/11/1978
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
DESAI, D.A.
CITATION:
1979 AIR 366 1979 SCR (2) 229
1979 SCC (3) 4
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1986 SC2045 (45)
RF 1990 SC1962 (6)
ACT:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S. 227-order of
discharge by a Special Judge, scope and ambit.
HEADNOTE:
The second respondent, a Land Acquisition officer,
allegedly, by abusing his official position, concealed the
fact that the land which was the subject matter of
acquisition was really Khasmahal land belonging to the
Government and having made it appear that the first
respondent was the undisputed owner of the same, aided and
abetted him in getting a huge sum of money as compensation.
The charge-sheet was submitted before the Special
Judge, and the prosecution requested him to frame a charge
against the respondents under ss. 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act read with s. 120B IPC. The
Special Judge, Puri went through the charge-sheet,
statements made by the witnesses before the police and other
documents, and coming to the conclusion that there was no
sufficient ground for framing a charge against the
respondents, discharged them under s. 227 Cr.P.C. ,1973,
after giving cogent reasons for passing the order of
discharge. In revision the High Court upheld the Special
Judge’s order of discharge.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court
^
HELD: 1. The considerations governing the
interpretation of s. 227 of Cr. P.C. apply mutatis mutandis
to the proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
after the charge-sheet is submitted before the Special
Judge. At the stage of s. 227, the Judge has merely to sift
the evidence in order to find out whether or not, there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
sufficiency of ground would take within its fold, the nature
of the evidence recorded‘by the police, or the documents
produced before the court, which exfacie disclose that there
are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to
frame a charge against him. [231E, 233A-B]
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, [1978] I SCR 257; K. P,
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Raghavan & Anr. v. M. H. Abbas and Anr.. AIR 1967 SC 740;
Almohan Das & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR
520; applied.
2. What has been acquired is merely the Raiyyati or the
lessee’s interest, and as the proprietary interest vests in
the Government itself, there is no question of either
acquiring or claiming compensation for the interest of the
Government. [239B]
Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri &
Ors., AIR 1955 SC 298; and The Special Land Acquisition
officer, Hosanagar v. K. S. Ramachandra Rao & Ors., AIR 1972
SC 2224: applied.
230
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
194 of 1977.
(Appeal from the Judgment and order dated 30-8-76 of
the Orissa High Court in Criminal Revision No. 88/76).
Soli J. Sorabjee, Addl. Sol. Gen. and E. C. Agarwala
and Girish Chandra for the appellant.
Gobinda Mukhoty and N. R. Chowdhary for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal is directed against the
judgment dated 30th August, 1976 of the High Court of Orissa
by which the High Court has upheld the order of the Special
Judge, Puri discharging respondents No. 1 and 2.
The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and
centre round an alleged conspiracy said to have been entered
into between respondents No. 1 and 2 in order to commit
offences under sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read
with section 120-B I.P.C. The main charge against the
respondents was that between 19-2-1972 to 30-3-1972 the
respondent entered into an agreement For the purpose of
obtaining pecuniary advantage for respondent No. 1 P. K.
Samal and in pursuance of the said conspiracy the second
respondent Debi Prasad Jena, who was the Land Acquisition
officer aided and abetted the first respondent in getting a
huge sum of money for a land acquired by the Government
which in fact belonged to the Government itself and
respondent No. 1 was a skew thereof. It is averred in the
chargesheet that respondent No. 1 by abusing his official
position concealed the fact that the land which was the
subject matter of acquisition and was situated in Cuttack
Cantonment was really Khasmahal land belonging to the
Government and having made it appear that he was the
undisputed owner of the same, got a compensation of Rs.
4,18,642.55. The charge-sheet contains a number of
circumstances from which the inference of the conspiracy is
sought to be drawn by the police. After the charge-sheet was
submitted before the Special Judge, the prosecution ousted
him to frame a charge against the respondents. The Special
Judge, Puri after having gone through the charge-sheet and
statements made by the witnesses before the police as also
other documents came to the conclusion that there was no
sufficient ground for framing a charge against the
respondents and he accordingly discharged them under section
227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter
called the Code). The Special Judge has given cogent reasons
231
for passing the order of discharge. The appellant went up to
the High Court in revision against the order of the Special
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Judge refusing to frame the charge, but the High Court
dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant and
maintained the order of discharge passed by the Special
Judge. Thereafter the appellant moved this Court by ar,
application for special leave which having been granted to
the appellant, the appeal is now set for hearing before us.
The short point which arises for determination in this
case is the scope and ambit of an order of discharge to be
passed by a Special Judge under section 227 of the Code. The
appeal does not raise any new question of law and there have
been several authorities of the High Courts as also of this
Court on the various aspects and grounds on which an accused
person can be discharged, but as section 227 of the Code is
a new section and at the time when the application for
special leave was filed, there was no direct decision of
this Court on the interpretation of section 227 of the Code,
the matter was thought fit to be given due consideration by
this Court.
We might, state, to begin with, that so far as the
present case (offences committed under the Prevention of
Corruption Act) is concerned it is regulated by the
procedure laid down by the Criminal Law Amendment Act under
which the police has to submit, charge-sheet directly to the
Special Judge and the question of commitment to the Court of
Session does not arise, but the Sessions Judge has
nevertheless to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of
sessions cases and the consideration governing the
interpretation of section 227 of the Code apply mutatis
mutandis to these proceedings after the charge-sheet is
submitted before the Special Judge.
Before interpreting and analysing the provisions of
section 227 of the Code so far as pure sessions trials are
concerned, two important facts may be mentioned. In the
first place, the Code has introduced substantial and far
reaching changes in the Code of 1898 as amended in 1955 in
order to cut out delays and simplify the procedure, has
dispersed with the procedure for commitment enquiries
referred to m section 206 to 213 of the Code, of 1898 and
has made commitment more or less a legal formality. Under
the previous Code of 1898 the Magistrate was enjoined to
take evidence of the prosecution witnesses after giving
opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses
2nd was then required to hear the parties and to commit the
acceded to the Court of Session unless he chose to act under
section 209 and found that there was no sufficient ground
for committing the accused person for trial. Under the Code
the Committing Magistrate has been authorised to peruse the
evidence and the documents produced by the
232
police and commit the case straightaway to the Sessions
Court if the case is one which is exclusively triable by the
Sessions Court. Thus, it would appear that the legislature
while dispensing with the procedure for commitment enquiry
under the Code of 1898 has conferred a dual responsibility
on the Trial Judge who has first to examine the case on the
basis of the statement of witnesses recorded by the police
and the documents filed with a view to find out whether a
prima facie case for trial has been made out and then if
such a case is made out to proceed to try the same. In our
view the legislature has adopted this course in order to
avoid frivolous prosecutions and prevent the accused from
being tried of an offence on materials which do not furnish
a reasonable probability of conviction. In the instant case,
as the offences alleged to have been committed by the
respondents fall within the provisions of the Act, the
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Special Judge has been substituted for the Sessions Judge,
the procedure of the Sessions Court having been applied
fully to the trial of such cases. Thus, it is manifest that
the accused has not only one opportunity and that too before
the Sessions Judge for showing that no case for trial had
been made out. This was obviously done to expedite the
disposal of the criminal cases.
Secondly, it would appear that under section 209 of the
Code of 1898 the question of discharge was to be considered
by a Magistrate. This power has now been entrusted to a
senior Judge, namely, the Sessions Judge who is to conduct
the trial himself and who has to decide before commencing
the trial as to whether or not charges should be framed in a
particular case against the respondents The discretion,
therefore, is to be exercised by a senior and more
experienced Judge so as to exclude any abuse of power. In
this view of the matter, it is manifest that if the Sessions
Judge exercises his discretion in discharging the accused
for reasons recorded by him, his discretion should not
normally be disturbed by the High Court or by this Court.
Section 227 of the Code runs thus:-
"If, upon consideration of the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that
there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record
his reasons for so doing."
The words ’not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post
office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution,
but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the
case in order to determine whether a case for trial
233
has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this
fact, it is not A necessary for the court to enter into the
pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing
of evidence and probabilities which is really his function
after the trial starts. At the stage of section 227, the
Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out
whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take
within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the
police or the documents produced before the court which ex
facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances
against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.:
The scope of section 227 of the Code was considered by
a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of
Bihar v. Ramesh Singh(1) where Untwalia, J. speaking for the
Court observed as follows:-
"Strong suspicion against the accused, if the
matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take
the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of
the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a
strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that
there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence then it is not open to the Court
to say that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the
guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the
initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing
the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused
is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved.
But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie
whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not.
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If the evidence which the Prosecutor pro poses to
adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully
accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination
or rebut ted by the defence evidence; if any, cannot
show that the accused committed the offence then there
will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the
trial".
This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may
not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it
may be sufficient for the satisfaction of ths Sessions Judge
in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under
the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing
Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of
commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out.
(1) [1978]1 S.C.R. 287.
16-817 SCI/78
234
In the case of K. P. Raghavan and Anr. v. M. H. Abbas
and Anr.(1) this Court observed as follows:-
"No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under
S. 209, Cr. P.C. is not to act as a mere Post office
and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before
him is fit for 8 commitment of the accused to the Court
of Session".
To the same effect is the later decision of this Court in
the case of Almohan Das and ors. v. State of West Bengal(2)
where Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-
"A Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended
to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to
sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for
seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for
commitment; and not whether there is sufficient
evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie
evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit;
it is the duty to discharge the accused: if there is
some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be
based, he must commit the case".
In the aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope
and ambit of section 209 of the Code of 1898.
Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question
of framing the charges under section 227 of
the Code has the undoubted power to sift and
weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out:
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained the
Court will be, fully justified in framing a
charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case
would naturally depend upon the facts of each
case and it is difficult to lay down a rule
of universal application. By and large
however if two views are equally possible and
the Judge is satisfied that the evidence
produced before him while
(1) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 740.
(2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 520.
235
giving rise to some suspicion but not grave
suspicion against the accused, he will be
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fully within his right to discharge the
accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under
section 227 of the Code the Judge which
under the present Code is a senior and
experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post
office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution,
but has to consider the broad probabilities
of the case, the total effect of the evidence
and the documents produced before the Court,
any basic infirmities appearing in the case
and so on. This however does not mean that
the Judge should make a roving enquiry into
the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the
evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
We shall now apply the principles enunciated above to
the present case in order to find out whether or not the
courts below were legally justified in discharging the
respondents.
Respondent No. 1 was a Joint Secretary in the Ministry
of Information and Broadcasting from April, 1966 to January,
1969. Later he worked as Joint Secretary in the Ministry of
Foreign Trade till 12-11-1971. Thereafter, respondent No. 1
was working as Joint Secretary, Ministry of Education and
Social Welfare. The second respondent worked as Land
Acquisition officer in the Collectorate, Orissa from
February 1972 to 18th August, 1973.
In the year 1969 the All-India Radio authorities were
desirous of having a piece of land for construction of
quarters for their staff posted at Cuttack. In this
connection, the said authorities approached respondent No. 1
who had a land along with structure in the Cantonment at
Cuttack. As the All-India Radio authorities found this land
suitable, they approached respondent No. 1 through his
mother for selling the land to them by private negotiation.
As this did not materialise, the All-India Radio authorities
moved the Collector of Cuttack to assess the price of the
land and get it acquired. Accordingly, the Tehsildar of the
area directed the Revenue officer, Cuttack; to fix the
valuation of the land of respondent No. 1. The Revenue
officer reported back that the land belonged to respondent
No. 1 and was his private land and its value would be fixed
at Rs. 3000 per guntha. It is common ground that the land in
question was situated in Cuttack Cantonment and was a
Khasmahal land which was first leased out to one Mr. Boument
as far back as 1-9-1943 for a period of 30 years. The lease
was given for building purposes. In 1954. Mrs. Boument who
inherited the property after her husband’s death transferred
the
236
land to respondent No. 1 with the consent of the Khasmahal
authorities. When respondent No. 1 came to know that the
land in question was required by the All-India Radio
authorities, he wrote a letter to Mr. . S. Gill on 28th
October, 1970 suggesting that the land- may be acquired but
price fixed by mutual consent. It may be pertinent to
mention here that in this, letter a copy of which being Ex.
D-4 (12) is to be found at page 86 of the paper-book,
respondent No. 1 never concealed the fact that the land
really belonged to the Government. In this connection,
respondent No. 1 wrote thus:-
"I have represented to you against the revenue
authorities quoting a higher price for similar
Government land more adversely situated and a lower
price for my land despite its better strategic
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location".
We have mentioned this fact because this forms the very
pivot of the case of the appellant in order to assail the
judgment of the courts below. A perusal of this letter
clearly shows that respondent No. 1 made no attempt to
conceal that the land in question was, a Government land
which was leased out to his vendor. A copy of the original
agreement which also has been filed shows that under the
terms of the lease, the same is entitled to be renewed
automatically at the option of the lessee and unless the
lessee violates the conditions of the lease, there is no
possibility of the lease being resumed. As it is, the lease
had been continuing from the year 1943 and there was no
possibility or its not being renewed on 1-9-1973 when the
period expired. In these circumstances, therefore, it cannot
be said that the letter written by respondent No. 1 referred
to above was an evidence of a criminal intention on the part
of respondent No. 1 to grab the huge compensation by
practising fraud on the Government. Respondent No. 1 a high
officer of the Government and was a lessee of the
Government, a fact which he never concealed and if he was
able to get a good customer for purchasing his land or
acquiring the same, there was no harm In writing to the
concerned authority to fix the proper valuation and take the
land. There, was no question of any concealment or
malpractice committed by respondent No. 1.
Apart from this, the contention of the appellant that
the fact that the land being Khasmahal land belonging to the
Government was deliberately suppressed by the respondents is
completely falsified by the circumstances discussed
hereinafter:
The land in question was situated in a Cantonment
area and it is not disputed that all lands in the
Cantonment area were Khasmahal Lands belonging to the
Government.
237
The High Court in this connection has observed as
follows:
"Government authorities admit that the land in
question was known to be Khasmahal land from the very
inception. This must lead to an inference that the
authorities knew that the interest of the opposite
party No. 1 in the land was that of a lessee and the
State Government was the proprietor".
The High Court has further observed that a number of
witnesses who were examined by the police had stated that it
was common Knowledge that all khasmahal lands in the
Cantonment area in Cuttack were Government lands Relying on
the statement of Mr. T. C. Vijayasekharan, Collector,
Cuttack, the High Court observed as follows:-
"Shri Vijayasekharan who has admittedly played an
important role in the land acquisition proceeding has
said that it is a matter of common knowledge that all
khasmahal lands in Cantonment area at Cuttack are
Government lands. He has further categorically stated
that Shri P. M. Samantray did not put undue pressure of
any kind".
Furthermore, it would appear that Mr. B. C. Mohanty,
Land Acquisition officer submitted a report about the land
in question on 15th February, 1971 in which he had clearly
mentioned that the land in question was Government land and
that respondent No. 1 was a Pattidar in respect of the land
as shown in the record. Thus, one of the important premises
on the basis of which the charge was sought to be framed has
rightly been found by the High Court not to exist at all.
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The records of the Government showed the nature of the land.
Respondent No. 1 at no time represented to the All-India
Radio authorities or the Government that the land was his
private one and the records of the Government clearly went
to show that the land was a Government land. In these
circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that respondent
No. 1 acted illegally in agreeing to the land being acquired
by the Government.
Another important circumstance relied on by the
appellant was the great rapidity with which the land
acquisition proceedings started and ended clearly shows that
the respondents had joined hands to get the lands acquired
and the compensation paid to respondent No. 1. In this
connection, reliance was placed on the fact that the copies
of the records of rights were prepared on 30th March, 1972
in which the land was no doubt shown as having been owned by
the State. Bhujarat report was also prepared on the same
date. Respondent No. 1 presented his copy of the deed of
transfer also on the same date and respondent No. 2 made the
award for Rs. 4,18,642.55 also on the same
238
date. The entire amount was disbursed also on the same date
and possession also was handed over on the same date. Prima
facie, it would appear that the Officer acted in great hurry
perhaps at the instance of respondent No. 1. These
circumstances are clearly explainable and cannot be said to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis bu the guilt of
respondent No. 1. Admittedly, the All-India Radio
authorities were in a great hurry to get the land acquired
and take possession of the same. As respondent No. 1 was a
high officer of the I.A.S. cadre there may have been a
natural anxiety on the part of the small officers posted in
the district of Cuttack to oblige respondent No. 1 by
completing the proceedings as early as possible and meeting
the needs of the All-India Radio.
It would, however, appear that once notices under
section 9(1) and 10(1) of the Land Acquisition Act were
issued and the objection filed by the appellant was
withdrawn, because there was no one else in the field, there
was no impediment in the way of acquiring the land and
taking possession from respondent No. 1. In fact, it would
appear as pointed out by the High Court that as far back as
22nd February 1972 the Land Acquisition officer who was a
person other than the second respondent had sent a letter to
the Government with the counter signature of the Collector
for sanctioning the estimate of acquisition of 2 acres of
land belonging to respondent No. 1. Later, however, the area
of the land was reduced from 2 acres to 1.764 acres and
revised estimates as desired by the Revenue department were
sent on 7-3-1972. This estimate amounted to Rs. 4,18,642 55
and was sent through the A.D.M’s letter,on 8-3-1972. The
Home Department by their letter dated 11-3-1972 sanctioned
the aforesaid estimate. There after, the Government
indicated to the Collector that an award might be passed for
acquiring 1.764 acres of land. These facts apart from
negativing the allegations of criminal conduct against the
respondents demonstrably prove the untruth of the
circumstance relied upon in the charge-sheet, namely, that
unless the respondent No. 1 and 2 acted in concert and
conspiracy with each other, respondent No. 1 could not have
known the exact figure of the compensation to be awarded to
him. In this connection, reliance was placed on a letter
written by respondent No. 1 to the Vigilance officer, L. S.
Darbari on 15th March, 1972 where he had mentioned that as
Karta of the H.U.F. he would be getting a compensation of
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Rs. 4,18,642.55 which is to be paid to him on the 10th
March, 1972 and it was argued that unless the two
respondents were in league with each other how could
respondent No. 1 get these details. We are, however, unable
to agree with this contention.
239
We have already mentioned that a fresh estimate for
1.764 acres was prepared and the total compensation was
Rs. 4,18,642.55 as only the Raiyyati or the lessee’s
interest was proposed to be acquired and this letter was
sent to the Government for sanction and the estimate was
sanctioned on 11-3-1972. It was contended that no notice was
given to the Khasmahal department, so that the Government
could claim compensation of the proprietary interest. It is
obvious that what has been acquired in the present case is
merely the Raiyyati or the lessee’s interest and as the
proprietary interest vests in the Government itself, there
is no question of either acquiring or claiming compensation
for the interest of the Government. In the case of Collector
of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Ors.(1) this
Court observed as follows:-
"If the Government has itself an interest in the
land, it has only to acquire the other interests
outstanding therein, so that it might be in a position
to pass it on absolutely for public
user..................... When Government possesses an
interest in land which is the subject of acquisition
under the Act, that interest is itself outside such
acquisition, because there can be no question of
Government acquiring what is its own. An investigation
into the nature and value of that interest will no
doubt be necessary for determining the compensation
payable for the interest outstanding in the claimants,
but that would not make it the subject of acquisition".
To the same effect is a later decision of this Court in the
case of The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Hosanagar v.
K. S. Ramachandra Rao & ors.(1) where this Court observed as
follows:-
"Mr. M. Veerappa, the learned counsel for the
State of Mysore, contends that the Land Acquisition
officer had not assessed the compensation payable for
the rights of the respondents in the land acquired ..
.......We have gone through the Award made by the Land
Acquisition officer. The Land Acquisition officer
appears to have valued the rights of the respondents in
the lands acquired. Whether the valuation made by him
is correct or not cannot be gone into these
proceedings."
As the appellant was naturally interested in finalising
the deal as quickly as possible, there could be no
difficulty in finding out the esti-
(1) AIR 1955 S.C. 298.
(2) AIR 1972 S.C. 2224.
240
mates which had been sanctioned a week before respondent No.
1 wrote the letter to the Vigilance Department. This fact
proves the bona-fide rather than any wrongful conduct on the
part of respondent No. 1 which may lead to an adverse
inference being drawn against him.
Finally, it was argued that what was acquired by the
Government was merely the lessee’s interest, but the
respondent No. 1 appears to have got compensation as the
owner. This is factually incorrect. We have already referred
to the circumstances which clearly show that the Government
was fully aware that it was only the lessee’s interest which
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was being acquired and even the fresh estimate for Rs.
4,18,642. 55, which was sent to the Government was shown as
representing the Raiyyati interest. Mr. Agarwala appearing
for the respondents fairly conceded that having regard to
the nature, character and situation of the land, it could
not be said that the amount of compensation awarded did not
represent the market value of the lessee’s interest of the
land.
On the other hand, in the counter-affidavit at page 87
of the paper book, it has been alleged that 16 sale-deeds
executed during the year 1970 and sale-deeds executed
during the year 1971 pertaining to the village in question
were acquired at the rates varying from Rs. 42,165 to
750,000. The High Court has also pointed out that the
records before the Trial Judge show that the Collector
Vijayasekharan had valued the land at the rate of Rs. 1.70
lakhs per acre as far back 1: as 3-2-1970 and if two years
later the valuation was raised to Rs. 2 lakhs it cannot be
said that the land was in any way over-valued.
Lastly, there does not appear to be any legal evidence
to show any; meeting of mind between respondents No. 1 and 2
at any time. Although the Collector at the time of the
acquisition was a distant relation of respondent No. 1 he
had himself slashed down the rate of compensation
recommended by the Revenue officer from Rs. 2,10,000 to Rs.
2,00,000 and it was never suggested by the prosecution that
the Collector was in any way a party to the aforesaid
conspiracy.
For these reasons, therefore, we find ourselves in
complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court
that there was no sufficient ground for trying the accused
in the instant case. Moreover, this Court could be most
reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of the two
courts in the absence of any special circumstances.
For the reasons given above, the judgement of the High
Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
M.R. Appeal dismissed.
241