REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ADVISORY JURISDICTION
RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE NO.1 OF 2012
[Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India]
P I N O I O N
D.K. JAIN, J. [FOR S.H. KAPADIA, CJ, HIMSELF,
DIPAK MISRA & RANJAN GOGOI, JJ.]
In exercise of powers conferred under Article 143(1) of the
th
Constitution of India, the President of India has on 12 April,
2012, made the present Reference. The full text of the
Reference (sans the annexures) is as follows:
“WHEREAS in 1994, the Department of
Telecommunication, Government of India (“ GOI ”),
issued 8 Cellular Mobile Telephone Services Licenses
(“ CMTS Licenses ”), 2 in each of the four Metro cities of
Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai for a period of 10
years (the “ 1994 Licenses ”). The 1994 licensees were
selected based on rankings achieved by them on the
technical and financial evaluation based on parameters
set out by the GoI in the tender and were required to
pay a fixed licence fee for initial three years and
subsequently based on number of subscribers subject to
minimum commitment mentioned in the tender
document and licence agreement. The 1994 Licenses
issued by GoI mentioned that a cumulative maximum of
upto 4.5 MHz in the 900 MHz bands would be permitted
based on appropriate justification. There was no
JUDGMENT
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separate upfront charge for the allocation of Spectrum
to the licensees, who only paid annual Spectrum usage
charges, which will be subject to revision from time to
time and which under the terms of the license bore the
nomenclature “licence fee and royalty”. A copy of the
1994 Licenses, along with a table setting out the pre-
determined Licence Fee as prescribed by DoT in the
Tender, is annexed hereto as Annexure I (Colly) .
WHEREAS in December 1995, 34 CMTS Licenses
were granted based on auction for 18
telecommunication circles for a period of 10 years (the
“ 1995 Licenses ”). The 1995 Licenses mentioned that
a cumulative maximum of up to 4.4 MHz in the 900 MHz
bands shall be permitted to the licensees, based on
appropriate justification. There was no separate upfront
charge for allocation of spectrum to the licensees who
were also required to pay annual spectrum usage
charges, which under the terms of the license bore the
nomenclature “licence fee and royalty” which will be
subject to revision from time to time. A copy of the
1995 Licenses, along with a table setting out the fees
payable by the highest bidder, is annexed hereto as
Annexure II (Colly) .
WHEREAS in 1995, bids were also invited for basic
telephone service licenses (“ BTS Licenses ”) with the
license fee payable for a 15 year period. Under the
terms of the BTS Licenses, a licensee could provide
fixed line basic telephone services as well as wireless
basic telephone services. Six licenses were granted in
the year 1997-98 by way of auction through tender for
providing basic telecom services (the “ 1997 BTS
Licenses ”). The license terms, inter-alia, provided that
based on the availability of the equipment for Wireless
in Local Loop (WLL), in the world market, the spectrum
in bands specified therein would be considered for
allocation subject to the conditions mentioned therein.
There was no separate upfront charge for allocation of
spectrum and the licensees offering the basic wireless
telephone service were required to pay annual
Spectrum usage charges, which under the terms of the
license bore the nomenclature “licence fee and royalty”.
JUDGMENT
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A sample copy of the 1997 BTS Licenses containing the
table setting out the license fees paid by the highest
bidder is annexed hereto as Annexure III (Colly) .
WHEREAS in 1997, the Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India Act, 1997 was enacted and the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (the “ TRAI ”) was
established.
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WHEREAS on 1 April, 1999, the New Telecom
Policy 1999 (“ NTP 1999 ”) was brought into effect on
the recommendation of a Group on Telecom (“ GoT ”)
which had been constituted by GoI. A copy of NTP 1999
is annexed hereto as Annexure IV . NTP 1999 provided
that Cellular Mobile Service Providers (“ CMSP ”) would
be granted a license for a period of 20 years on the
payment of a one-time entry fee and licence fee in the
form of revenue share. NTP 1999 also provided that
BTS (Fixed Service Provider or FSP) Licenses for
providing both fixed and wireless (WLL) services would
also be issued for a period of 20 years on payment of a
one-time entry fee and licence fee in the form of
revenue share and prescribed charges for spectrum
usage, appropriate level of which was to be
recommended by TRAI. The licensees both cellular and
basic were also required to pay annual Spectrum usage
charges.
WHEREAS based on NTP 1999, a migration package
for migration from fixed license fee to one time entry
fee and licence fee based on revenue share regime was
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offered to all the existing licenses on 22 July, 1999.
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This came into effect on 1 August 1999. Under the
migration package, the licence period for all the CMTS
and FSP licensees was extended to 20 years from the
date of issuance of the Licenses.
JUDGMENT
WHEREAS in 1997 and 2000, CMTS Licenses were
also granted in 2 and 21 Circles to Mahanagar
Telephone Nigam Limited (“ MTNL ”) and Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited (“ BSNL ”) respectively (the “ PSU
Licenses ”). However, no entry fee was charged for the
PSU Licenses. The CMTS Licenses issued to BSNL and
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MTNL mentioned that they would be granted GSM
Spectrum of 4.4 + 4.4 MHz in the 900 MHz band. The
PSU Licensees were also required to pay annual
spectrum usage charges. A copy of the PSU Licenses is
annexed hereto as Annexure V (Colly) .
WHEREAS in January 2001, based on TRAI’s
recommendation, DoT issued guidelines for issuing
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CMTS Licenses for the 4 Cellular Operator based on
tendering process structured as “Multistage Informed
Ascending Bidding Process”. Based on a tender, 17 new
CMTS Licenses were issued for a period of 20 years in
the 4 Metro cities and 13 Telecom Circles (the “ 2001
Cellular Licenses ”). The 2001 Licenses required that
the licensees pay a one-time non refundable entry fee
as determined through auction as above and also
annual license fee and annual spectrum usage charges
and there was no separate upfront charge for allocation
of spectrum. In accordance with the terms of tender
document, the license terms, inter-alia, provided that a
cumulative maximum of upto 4.4 MHz + 4.4 MHz will be
permitted and further based on usage, justification and
availability, additional spectrum upto 1.8 MHz + 1.8 MHz
making a total of 6.2 MHz + 6.2 MHz, may be
considered for assignment, on case by case basis, on
payment of additional Licence fee. The bandwidth upto
maximum as indicated i.e. 4.4 MHz & 6.2 MHz as the
case may be, will be allocated based on the Technology
requirements (e.g. CDMA @ 1.25 MHz, GSM @ 200 KHz
etc.). The frequencies assigned may not be contiguous
and may not be same in all cases, while efforts would be
made to make available larger chunks to the extent
feasible. A copy of the 2001 Cellular Licenses, along
with a table setting out the fees payable by the highest
bidder, is annexed hereto as Annexure VI .
JUDGMENT
WHEREAS in 2001, BTS Licenses were also issued
for providing both fixed line and wireless basic
telephone services on a continual basis (2001 Basic
Telephone Licenses). Service area wise one time Entry
Fee and annual license fee as a percentage of Adjusted
Gross Revenue (AGR) was prescribed for grant of BTS
Licenses. The licence terms, inter-alia, provided that for
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Wireless Access System in local area, not more than 5 +
5 MHz in 824-844 MHz paired with 869-889 MHz band
shall be allocated to any basic service operator
including existing ones on FCFS basis. A detailed
procedure for allocation of spectrum on FCFS basis was
given in Annexure-IX of the 2001 BTS license. There
was no separate upfront charge for allocation of
spectrum and the Licensees were required to pay
revenue share of 2% of the AGR earned from wireless in
local loop subscribers as spectrum charges in addition
to the one time entry fee and annual license fee. A
sample copy of the 2001 Basic Telephone License along
with a table setting out the entry fees is annexed hereto
as Annexure VII .
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WHEREAS on 27 October, 2003, TRAI
recommended a Unified Access Services Licence
(“ UASL ”) Regime. A copy of TRAI’s recommendation is
annexed hereto as Annexure VIII .
WHEREAS on 11.11.2003, Guidelines were issued,
specifying procedure for migration of existing operators
to the new UASL regime. As per the Guidelines, all
applications for new Access Services License shall be in
the category of Unified Access Services Licence. Later,
based on TRAI clarification dated 14.11.2003, the entry
fee for new Unified Licensee was fixed same as the
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entry fee of the 4 cellular operator. Based on further
recommendations of TRAI dated 19.11.2003, spectrum
to the new licensees was to be given as per the existing
terms and conditions relating to spectrum in the
respective license agreements. A copy of the Guidelines
dated 11.11.2003 is annexed hereto as Annexure IX .
JUDGMENT
WHEREAS consequent to enhancement of FDI limit
in telecom sector from 49% to 74%, revised Guidelines
for grant of UAS Licenses were issued on 14.12.2005.
These Guidelines, inter-alia stipulate that Licenses shall
be issued without any restriction on the number of
entrants for provision of Unified Access Services in a
Service Area and the applicant will be required to pay
one time non-refundable Entry, annual License fee as a
percentage of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) and
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spectrum charges on revenue share basis. No separate
upfront charge for allocation of spectrum was
prescribed. Initial Spectrum was allotted as per UAS
License conditions to the service providers in different
frequency bands, subject to availability. Initially
allocation of a cumulative maximum up to 4.4 MHz +
4.4 MHz for TDMA based systems or 2.5 MHz + 2.5 MHz
for CDMA based systems subject to availability was to
be made. Spectrum not more than 5 MHz + 5 MHz in
respect of CDMA system or 6.2 MHz + 6.2 MHz in
respect of TDMA based system was to be allocated to
any new UAS licensee. A copy of the UASL Guidelines
dated 14.12.2005 is annexed hereto as Annexure X .
WHEREAS after the introduction of the UASL in 2003
and until March 2007, 51 new UASL Licenses were
issued based on policy of First Come-First Served, on
payment of the same entry fee as was paid for the 2001
Cellular Licenses (the “ 2003-2007 Licenses ”) and the
spectrum was also allocated based on FCFS under a
separate wireless operating license on case by case
basis and subject to availability. Licensees had to pay
annual spectrum usage charges as a percentage of
AGR, there being a no upfront charge for allocation of
spectrum. A copy of the 2003-2007 License, along with
a table setting out the fees payable, is annexed hereto
as Annexure XI (Colly) .
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WHEREAS on 28 August 2007, TRAI revisited the
issue of new licenses, allocation of Spectrum, Spectrum
charges, entry fees and issued its recommendations, a
copy of which is annexed hereto as Annexure XII . TRAI
made further recommendations dated 16.07.2008 which
is annexed hereto as Annexure XIII .
JUDGMENT
WHEREAS in 2007 and 2008, GoI issued Dual
Technology Licences, where under the terms of the
existing licenses were amended to allow licensees to
hold a license as well as Spectrum for providing services
through both GSM and CDMA network. First
amendment was issued in December, 2007. All
licensees who opted for Dual Technology Licences paid
the same entry fee, which was an amount equal to the
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amount prescribed as entry fee for getting a new UAS
licence in the same service area. The amendment to
the license inter-alia mentioned that initially a
cumulative maximum of upto 4.4 MHz + 4.4 MHz was to
be allocated in the case of TDMA based systems (@ 200
KHz per carrier or 30 KHz per carrier) and a maximum of
2.5 MHz + 2.5 MHz was to be allocated in the case of
CDMA based systems (@ 1.25 MHz per carrier), on case
by case basis subject to availability. It was also, inter-
alia, mentioned that additional spectrum beyond the
above stipulation may also be considered for allocation
after ensuring optimal and efficient utilization of the
already allocated spectrum taking into account all types
of traffic and guidelines/criteria prescribed from time to
time. However, spectrum not more than 5 + 5 MHz in
respect of CDMS system and 6.2 + 6.2 MHz in respect of
TDMA based system was to be allocated to the licensee.
There was no separate upfront charge for allocation of
Spectrum. However, Dual Technology licensees were
required to pay Spectrum usage charges in addition to
the license fee on revenue share basis as a percentage
of AGR. Spectrum to these licensees was allocated
10.01.2008 onwards.
WHEREAS Subscriber based criteria for CMTS was
prescribed in the year 2002 for allocation of additional
spectrum of 1.8 + 1.8 MHz beyond 6.2 + 6.2 MHz with a
levy of additional spectrum usage charge of 1% of AGR.
The allocation criteria was revised from time to time. A
copy of the DoT letter dated 01.02.2002 in this regard is
annexed hereto as Annexure XIV .
JUDGMENT
WHEREAS for the spectrum allotted beyond 6.2
MHz, in the frequency allocation letters issued by DoT
May 2008 onwards, it was mentioned inter-alia that
allotment of spectrum is subject to pricing as
determined in future by the GoI for spectrum beyond
6.2 MHz + 6.2 MHz and the outcome of Court orders.
However, annual spectrum usage charges were levied
on the basis of AGR, as per the quantum of spectrum
assigned. A sample copy of the frequency allocation
letter is annexed hereto as Annexure XV.
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WHEREAS Spectrum for the 3G Band ( i.e. 2100
MHz band ) was auctioned in 2010. The terms of the
auction stipulated that, for successful new entrants, a
fresh license agreement would be entered into and for
existing licensees who were successful in the auction,
the license agreement would be amended for use of
Spectrum in the 3G band. A copy of the Notice inviting
Applications and Clarifications thereto are annexed
hereto and marked as Annexure XVI (Colly) . The
terms of the amendment letter provided, inter alia, that
the 3G spectrum would stand withdrawn if the license
stood terminated for any reason. A copy of the
standard form of the amendment letter is annexed
hereto and marked as Annexure XVII .
WHEREAS letters of intent were issued for 122
Licenses for providing 2G services on or after 10 January
2008, against which licenses (the “ 2008 Licenses ”)
were subsequently issued. However, pursuant to the
nd
judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 2 February, 2012
in Writ Petition (Civil) No.423 of 2010 (the “ Judgment ”),
the 2008 Licenses have been quashed. A copy of the
judgment is annexed hereto and marked Annexure
XVIII .
WHEREAS the GoI has also filed an Interlocutory
Application for clarification of the Judgment, wherein the
GoI has placed on record the manner in which the
auction is proposed to be held pursuant to the Judgment
and sought appropriate clarificatory orders/directions
from the Hon’ble Court. A copy of the Interlocutory
Application is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure
XIX .
JUDGMENT
WHEREAS while the GoI is implementing the
directions set out in the Judgment at paragraph 81 and
proceeding with a fresh grant of licences and allocation
of spectrum by auction, the GoI is seeking a limited
review of the Judgment to the extent it impacts
generally the method for allocation of national resources
by the State. A copy of the Review Petition is annexed
hereto and marked as Annexure XX.
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WHEREAS by the Judgment, this Hon’ble Court
directed TRAI to make fresh recommendations for grant
of licenses and allocation of Spectrum in the 2G band by
holding an auction, as was done for the allocation of
Spectrum for the 3G licenses.
WHEREAS, in terms of the directions of this
Hon’ble Court, GoI would now be allocating Spectrum in
the relevant 2G bands at prices discovered through
auction.
WHEREAS based on the recommendations of TRAI
dated 11.05.2010 followed by further clarifications and
recommendations, the GoI has prescribed in February
2012, the limit for spectrum assignment in the Metro
Service Areas as 2x10MHz/2x6.25 MHz and in rest of the
Service Areas as 2x8MHz/2x5 MHz for GSM (900 MHz,
1800 MHz band)/CDMA(800 MHZ band), respectively
subject to the condition that the Licensee can acquire
additional spectrum beyond prescribed limit in the open
market should there be an auction of spectrum subject
to the further condition that total spectrum held by it
does not exceed the limits prescribed for merger of
licenses i.e. 25% of the total spectrum assigned in that
Service Area by way of auction or otherwise. This limit
for CDMS spectrum is 10 MHz.
WHEREAS , in view of the fact that Spectrum may
need to be allocated to individual entities from time to
time in accordance with criteria laid down by the GoI,
such as subscriber base, availability of Spectrum in a
particular circle, inter-se priority depending on whether
the Spectrum comprises the initial allocation or
additional allocation, etc., it may not always be possible
to conduct an auction for the allocation of Spectrum.
JUDGMENT
AND WHEREAS in view of the aforesaid, the
auctioning of Spectrum in the 2G bands may result in a
situation where none of the Licensees, using the 2G
bands of 800 MHz., 900 MHz and 1800 MHz would have
paid any separate upfront fee for the allocation of
Spectrum.
AND WHEREAS the Government of India has
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received various notices from companies based in other
countries, invoking bilateral investment agreements and
seeking damages against the Union of India by reason
of the cancellation/threat of cancellation of the licenses.
AND WHEREAS in the circumstance certain
questions of law of far reaching national and
international implications have arisen, including in
relation to the conduct of the auction and the regulation
of the telecommunications industry in accordance with
the Judgment and FDI into this country in the telecom
industry and otherwise in other sectors.
Given that the issues which have arisen are of
great public importance, and that questions of law have
arisen of public importance and with such far reaching
consequences for the development of the country that it
is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India thereon.
NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of powers
conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the
Constitution of India, I, Pratibha Devisingh Patil,
President of India, hereby refer the following questions
to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and
report thereon, namely:
Q.1 Whether the only permissible method for disposal
of all natural resources across all sectors and in all
circumstances is by the conduct of auctions?
JUDGMENT
Q.2 Whether a broad proposition of law that only the
route of auctions can be resorted to for disposal of
natural resources does not run contrary to several
judgments of the Supreme Court including those of
Larger Benches?
Q.3 Whether the enunciation of a broad principle, even
though expressed as a matter of constitutional law,
does not really amount to formulation of a policy
and has the effect of unsettling policy decisions
formulated and approaches taken by various
successive governments over the years for valid
considerations, including lack of public resources
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and the need to resort to innovative and different
approaches for the development of various sectors
of the economy?
Q.4 What is the permissible scope for interference by
courts with policy making by the Government
including methods for disposal of natural
resources?
Q.5 Whether, if the court holds, within the permissible
scope of judicial review, that a policy is flawed, is
the court not obliged to take into account
investments made under the said policy including
investments made by foreign investors under
multilateral/bilateral agreements?
Q.6 If the answers to the aforesaid questions lead to an
affirmation of the judgment dated 02.02.2012 then
the following questions may arise, viz.
(i) whether the judgment is required to be given
retrospective effect so as to unsettle all
licences issued and 2G spectrum (800, 900,
and 1800 MHz bands) allocated in and after
1994 and prior to 10.01.2008?
(ii) whether the allocation of 2G spectrum in all
circumstances and in all specific cases for
different policy considerations would
nevertheless have to be undone?
JUDGMENT
And specifically
(iii) Whether the telecom licences granted in
1994 would be affected?
(iv) Whether the Telecom licences granted by
way of basic licences in 2001 and licences
granted between the period 2003-2007
would be affected?
(v) Whether it is open to the Government of
India to take any action to alter the terms
of any licence to ensure a level playing field
among all existing licensees?
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(vi) Whether dual technology licences granted
in 2007 and 2008 would be affected?
(vii) Whether it is necessary or obligatory for
the Government of India to withdraw the
Spectrum allocated to all existing licensees
or to charge for the same with
retrospective effect and if so on what basis
and from what date?
Q.7 Whether, while taking action for conduct of auction
in accordance with the orders of the Supreme
Court, it would remain permissible for the
Government to:
(i) Make provision for allotment of Spectrum
from time to time at the auction discovered
price and in accordance with laid down
criteria during the period of validity of the
auction determined price?
(ii) Impose a ceiling on the acquisition of
Spectrum with the aim of avoiding the
emergence of dominance in the market by
any licensee/applicant duly taking into
consideration TRAI recommendations in this
regard?
(iii) Make provision for allocation of Spectrum
at auction related prices in accordance with
laid down criteria in bands where there
may be inadequate or no competition (for
e.g. there is expected to be a low level of
competition for CDMA in 800 MHz band and
TRAI has recommended an equivalence
ratio of 1.5 or 1.3X1.5 for 800 MHz and 900
MHz bands depending upon the quantum of
spectrum held by the licensee that can be
applied to auction price in 1800 MHz band
in the absence of a specific price for these
bands)?
JUDGMENT
Q.8 What is the effect of the judgment on 3G Spectrum
acquired by entities by auction whose licences
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have been quashed by the said judgment?
NEW DELHI;
DATED: 12 April 2012 PRESIDENT OF
INDIA ”
A bare reading of the Reference shows that it is occasioned
2.
by the decision of this Court, rendered by a bench of two
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learned Judges on 2 February, 2012 in Centre for Public
1
Interest Litigation & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
(for brevity “ 2G Case ”).
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On receipt of the Reference, vide order dated 9 May,
3.
2012, notice was issued to the Attorney General for India.
Upon hearing the learned Attorney General, it was directed
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vide order dated 11 May, 2012, that notice of the
Reference shall be issued to all the States through their
Standing Counsel; on Centre for Public Interest Litigation
JUDGMENT
(CPIL) and Dr. Subramanian Swamy (petitioners in the 2G
Case ); as also on the Federation of Indian Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Confederation of
Indian Industry (CII), as representatives of the Indian
industry. On the suggestion of the learned Attorney
General, it was also directed (though not recorded in the
order), that the reference shall be dealt with in two parts
1 (2012) 3 SCC 1
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viz. in the first instance, only questions No. 1 to 5 would be
taken up for consideration and the remaining questions
shall be taken up later in the light of our answers to the
first five questions.
At the commencement of the hearing of the Reference on
4.
th
10 July, 2012, a strong objection to the maintainability of
the Reference was raised by the writ petitioners in the 2G
Case . Accordingly, it was decided to first hear the learned
counsel on the question of validity of the Reference.
SUBMISSIONS ON MAINTAINABILITY :
Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, appearing for
5.
CPIL, strenuously urged that in effect and substance, the
Reference seeks to question the correctness of the
JUDGMENT
judgment in the 2G Case , which is not permissible once
this Court has pronounced its authoritative opinion on the
question of law now sought to be raised. The learned
counsel argued that reference under Article 143(1) of the
Constitution does not entail appellate or review
jurisdiction, especially in respect of a judgment which has
attained finality. According to the learned counsel, it is
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evident from the format of the Reference that it does not
express or suggest any ‘doubt’ as regards the question of
fact or law relating to allocation of all natural resources, a
sine-qua-non for a valid reference. In support of the
proposition, learned counsel placed reliance on
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8
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “ Cauvery-II ”) and
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2 [1951] S.C.R. 747
3 [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250
4 [1959] S.C.R. 995
5 [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413
6 (1974) 2 SCC 33
7 (1979) 1 SCC 380
8 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (II)
9 (1998) 7 SCC 739
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Next, it was contended by the learned senior counsel that
6.
if for any reason, the Executive feels that the 2G Case
does not lay down a correct proposition of law, it is open to
it to persuade another bench, before which the said
judgment is relied upon, to refer the issue to a larger
bench for reconsideration. In short, the submission was
that an authoritative pronouncement, like the one in the
2G Case , cannot be short circuited by recourse to Article
143(1).
Learned counsel also contended that the Reference as
7.
framed is of an omnibus nature, seeking answers on
hypothetical and vague questions, and therefore, must not
learned counsel urged that a reference under Article
143(1) of the Constitution for opinion has to be on a
specific question or questions. It was asserted that by
reason of the construction of the terms of Reference, the
manner in which the questions have been framed and the
nature of the answers proposed, this Court would be
entitled to return the Reference unanswered by pointing
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out the aforesaid impediments in answering it. Lastly, it
was fervently pleaded that if the present Reference is
entertained, it would pave the way for the Executive to
circumvent or negate the effect of inconvenient
judgments, like the decision in the 2G Case , which would
not only set a dangerous and unhealthy precedent, but
would also be clearly contrary to the ratio of the decision in
Cauvery II .
Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, while
8.
adopting the arguments advanced by Mr. Soli Sorabjee,
reiterated that from the format of questions No.1 to 5, as
well as from the review petition filed by the Government in
the 2G Case , it is clear that the present Reference seeks
to overrule the decision in the 2G Case by reading down
JUDGMENT
the direction that allowed only ‘auction’ as the permissible
means for allocation of all natural resource, in paragraphs
94 to 96 of the 2G Case , to the specific case of spectrum.
It was argued by the learned counsel that it is apparent
from the grounds urged in the review petition filed by the
Government that it understood the ratio of the 2G Case ,
binding them to the form of procedure to be followed while
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alienating precious natural resources belonging to the
people, and yet it is seeking to use the advisory jurisdiction
of this Court as an appeal over its earlier decision. It was
contended that even if it be assumed that a doubt relating
to the disposal of all natural resources has arisen on
account of conflict of decisions on the point, such a conflict
cannot be resolved by way of a Presidential reference; that
would amount to holding that one or the other judgments
is incorrectly decided, which, according to the learned
counsel, is beyond the scope of Article 143(1). Learned
counsel alleged that the language in which the Reference
is couched, exhibits mala fides on the part of the
Executive. He thus, urged that we should refrain from
giving an opinion.
JUDGMENT
Dr. Subramanian Swamy, again vehemently objecting to
9.
the maintainability of the Reference, on similar grounds,
added that the present Reference is against the very spirit
of Article 143(1), which, according to the constituent
assembly debates, was meant to be invoked sparingly,
unlike the case here. It was pleaded that the Reference is
yet another attempt to delay the implementation of the
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directions in the 2G Case . Relying on the decision of this
Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. Vs. Union of
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India & Ors. , Dr. Swamy submitted that we will be well
advised to return the Reference unanswered.
10. Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, the learned Attorney General for India,
defending the Reference, submitted that the plea
regarding non-maintainability of the Reference on the
ground that it does not spell out a ‘doubt’, is fallacious on a
plain reading of the questions framed therein. According
to him, Article 143(1) uses the word ‘question’ which arises
only when there is a ‘doubt’ and the very fact that the
President has sought the opinion of this Court on the
questions posed, shows that there is a doubt in the mind of
the Executive on those issues. It was stressed that merely
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because the Reference does not use the word ‘doubt’ in
the recitals, as in other cited cases, does not imply that in
substance no doubt is entertained in relation to the mode
of alienation of all natural resources, other than spectrum,
more so when the questions posed for opinion have far
reaching national and international implications. It was
10 (1994) 6 SCC 360
19
Page 19
urged that the content of the Reference is to be
appreciated in proper perspective, keeping in view the
context and not the form.
It was urged that maintainability and the discretion to
11.
decline to answer a reference are two entirely different
things. The question of maintainability arises when ex-
| e Presidential reference d<br>ents of Article 143(1), con<br>tion, which is the power o<br>reference, for good reas<br>inable. In support of the<br>n In Re: The Kerala<br>Keshav Singh and In R | |
|---|
| Keshav | |
Bill, 1978 (supra). According to the learned counsel, the
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question as to whether the reference is to be answered or
not, is not an aspect of maintainability, and is to be
decided only after hearing the reference on merits.
Learned Attorney General, while contesting the plea that in
12.
a reference under Article 143(1), correctness or otherwise
of earlier decisions can never be gone into, submitted that
in a Presidential reference, there is no constitutional
20
Page 20
embargo against reference to earlier decisions in order to
clarify, restate or even to form a fresh opinion on a
principle of law, as long as an inter partes decision is left
unaffected. In support of the contention that in the past,
references have been made on questions in relation to the
correctness of judgments, learned counsel placed reliance
on the decisions of this Court I n Re: The Delhi Laws Act,
1912 (supra), Special Reference No.1 of 1998 (supra),
Keshav Singh (supra) and of the Privy Council In re
11
Piracy Jure Gentium . It was asserted that it has been
repeatedly clarified on behalf of the Executive that the
decision in the 2G Case has been accepted and is not
being challenged. The Reference was necessitated by
certain observations made as a statement of law in the
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said judgment which require to be explicated. Referring to
certain observations in Re: The Berubari Union and
Exchange of Enclaves (supra), learned counsel
submitted that this Court had accepted that a reference
could be answered to avoid protracted litigation.
Learned Attorney General also contended that withdrawal
13.
11 [1934] A.C. 586
21
Page 21
of the review petition by the Government is of no
consequence ; its withdrawal does not imply that the
question about the permissible manner of disposal of other
natural resources, and the issues regarding the
environment for investment in the country, stood settled.
Stoutly refuting the allegation that the reference is mala
fide, learned counsel submitted that in In Re Presidential
Poll (supra), it is clearly laid down that the Court cannot
question the bona fides of the President making the
reference.
Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel, voiced
14.
concerns arising out of an apparent conflict between
provisions of the statutes and the judgment delivered in
the 2G Case ; specifically with reference to Sections 10 and
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11 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1957 (for short, “MMRD Act”), which
prescribe a policy of preferential treatment and first come
first served, unlike the 2G Case , which according to the
learned counsel only mandates auction for all natural
resources. He thus, urged this Court to dispel all
uncertainties regarding the true position of law after the
22
Page 22
judgment in the 2G Case , by holding it as per incuriam in
light of the provisions of the MMRD Act and other statutes.
15. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, appearing on
behalf of CII, while supporting the Reference, fervently
urged that the contention that the Reference deserves to
be returned unanswered due to the absence of the use of
the word ‘doubt’ in the recitals of the Reference, is
untenable. According to the learned counsel, under Article
143(1), the President can seek an opinion on any question
of law or fact that has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is
of such a nature and such public importance that it is
expedient to seek the opinion of this Court. There is no
additional condition that there should be any ‘doubt’ in the
mind of the President. It was submitted by the learned
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counsel that the need for a Presidential reference may also
arise to impart certainty to certain questions of law or fact
which are of such a nature and of such moment as to
warrant seeking opinion of this Court. It was urged that a
pedantic interpretation, by which a Presidential reference
would be declined on semantic considerations, such as the
failure to use the word ‘doubt’ in the reference, should be
23
Page 23
eschewed.
Learned counsel contended that at the stage of making a
16.
reference, it is the satisfaction of the President in relation
to the nature of the question and its importance that is
relevant. As a matter of comity of institutions, this Court
has always declined to go behind the reasons that
prevailed upon the President to make a reference and its
bona fides . Nevertheless, this Court always has the
discretion not to answer any such reference or the
questions raised therein for good reasons. It was stressed
that since this Court does not sit in review over the
satisfaction of the President, the question of jurisdiction
and of maintainability does not arise.
Learned counsel also argued that the premise that earlier
17.
JUDGMENT
judgments of this Court are binding in reference
jurisdiction, and thus any reference, which impinges upon
an earlier judgment should be returned unanswered, is
equally fallacious. It was argued that the principle of stare
decisis and the doctrine of precedent are generally
accepted and followed as rules of judicial discipline and not
jurisdictional fetters and, therefore, this Court is not
24
Page 24
prevented from re-examining the correctness of an earlier
decision. On the contrary, the precedents support the
proposition that this Court can, when exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 143(1), examine the correctness
of past precedents. According to the learned counsel, in
the judgment in Pandit M.S.M. Sharma Vs. Shri Sri
12
Krishna Sinha & Ors. (hereinafter referred to as
“ Sharma ”). Explaining the ratio of the decision in
Cauvery-II , learned counsel submitted that it is clear
beyond any pale of doubt that the said pronouncement
does not lay down, as an abstract proposition of law, that
under Article 143(1), this Court cannot consider the
correctness of any precedent. What it lays down is that
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once a lis between the parties is decided, the operative
decree can only be opened by way of a review. According
to the learned counsel, overruling a judgment — as a
precedent — does not tantamount to reopening the
decree.
Arguing on similar lines, Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned senior
18.
12 [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 806
25
Page 25
counsel appearing on behalf of FICCI, contended that if the
observations in the 2G Case are read as applying to all
natural resources and not limited to spectrum, it would
tantamount to de facto policy formulation by the Court,
which is beyond the scope of judicial review. He also took
a nuanced stance on this Court’s power of reconsideration
over its precedents. It was submitted that a precedent can
be sliced into two parts viz. the decision or operative part
of an order or decree pertaining to the inter partes dispute
and the ratio with respect to the position of law; the former
being beyond this Court’s powers of review once an earlier
bench of this Court has pronounced an authoritative
opinion on it, but not the latter. He thus, urged that this
Court does have the power to reconsider the principles of
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law laid down in its previous pronouncements even under
Article 141.
Mr. Darius Khambata, learned Advocate General of
19.
Maharashtra, submitted that observations in the 2G Case
were made only with regard to spectrum thus, leaving it
open to this Court to examine the issue with regard to
alienation of other natural resources. It was urged that
26
Page 26
even if broader observations were made with respect to all
natural resources, it would still be open to this Court under
Article 143(1) to say otherwise. He also pointed to certain
State legislations that prescribe methods other than
auction and thus, urged this Court to answer the first
question in the negative lest all those legislations be
deemed unconstitutional.
20. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel, appearing on
behalf of the State of U.P., added that when Article 143(1)
of the Constitution unfolds a high prerogative of a
constitutional authority, namely, the President, to consult
this Court on question of law or fact, it contains a no less
high prerogative of this Court to report to the President its
opinion on the question referred, either by making or
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declining to give an answer to the question. In other
words, according to the learned counsel, the issue of a
reference being maintainable at the instance of the
President is an issue different from the judicial power of
this Court to answer or not to answer the question posed in
the reference.
21. Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel
27
Page 27
appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh,
contended that neither history supports nor reality
warrants auction to be a rule of disposal of all natural
resources in all situations. He referred to decisions of this
Court that unambiguously strike a just balance between
considerations of power of the State and duty towards
public good, by leaving the choice of method of allocation
of natural resources to the State, as long as it conforms to
the requirements of Article 14. It was pleaded that the
State be allowed the choice of methodology of allocation,
especially in cases where it intends to incentivize
investments and job creation in backward regions that
would otherwise have been left untouched by private
players if resources were given at market prices.
JUDGMENT
To sum up, the objections relating to the maintainability of
22.
the Reference converge mainly on the following points: (i)
the foundational requirement for reference under Article
143(1) viz. a genuine ‘doubt’ about questions of fact or law
that the executive labours under, is absent; (ii) the filing
and withdrawal of a review petition whose recitals pertain
to the 2G Case would be an impediment in the exercise of
28
Page 28
discretion under Article 143(1); (iii) the language in which
the Reference is couched exhibits mala fides on the part of
the Executive; (iv) in light of enunciation of law on the
point in Cauvery II , entertaining a Presidential reference
on a subject matter, which has been decided upon directly
and with finality, is barred; (v) the present Reference is an
attempt to overturn the judgment of this Court in the 2G
Case , which is against the spirit of Article 143(1) of the
Constitution and (vi) the Executive is adopting the route of
this Reference to wriggle out of the directions in the 2G
Case as the same are inconvenient for them to follow.
DISCUSSION:
23. Before we evaluate the rival stands on the maintainability
of the Reference, it would be necessary to examine the
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scope and breadth of Article 143 of the Constitution, which
reads thus:
“ 143. Power of President to consult Supreme
Court.— (1) If at any time it appears to the President
that a question of law or fact has arisen, or is likely to
arise, which is of such a nature and of such public
importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion
of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the
question to that Court for consideration and the Court
may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report to the
President its opinion thereon.
29
Page 29
(2) The President may, notwithstanding anything in
the proviso to article 131, refer a dispute of the kind
mentioned in the said proviso to the Supreme Court
for opinion and the Supreme Court shall, after such
hearing as it thinks fit, report to the President its
opinion thereon.”
A bare reading at the Article would show that it is couched in
broad terms. It is plain from the language of Article 143(1) that
it is not necessary that the question on which the opinion of the
Supreme Court is sought must have actually arisen. The
President can make a reference under the said Article even at
an anterior stage, namely, at the stage when the President is
satisfied that the question is likely to arise. The satisfaction
whether the question meets the pre-requisites of Article 143(1)
is essentially a matter for the President to decide. Upon receipt
of a reference under Article 143(1), the function of this Court is
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to consider the reference; the question(s) on which the
President has made the reference, on the facts as stated in the
reference and report to the President its opinion thereon.
| he | | usage | of the | word | “ | may | ” | in | the | | latter |
|---|
| part | | of | | Article | | 143(1) imp | lies tha | t | this | | Court | | is | no | t bound | | to |
|---|
| render | | advisory | opinion i | n every | reference | | an | d m | ay | refuse |
|---|
| to | | express | | its | | opinion | for strong, | | compelling | and | | good |
|---|
30
Page 30
the phraseology used in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 143,
P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the majority, held
as follows:
“…whereas in the case of reference made under
Article 143 (2) it is the constitutional obligation of this
Court to make a report on that reference embodying
its advisory opinion, in a reference made under Article
143 (1) there is no such obligation. In dealing with
this latter class of reference, it is open to this Court to
consider whether it should make a report to the
President giving its advisory opinion on the questions
under reference.”
25. Further, even in an earlier judgment in In re: Allocation
of Lands and Buildings Situate in a Chief
Commissioner’s Province and in the matter of
Reference by the Governor-General under S. 213,
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13
Government of India Act, 1935 , the Federal Court had
said that even though the Court is within its authority to
refuse to answer a question on a reference, it must be
unwilling to exercise its power of refusal “ except for good
reasons.” A similar phrase was used in In Re: The Kerala
Education Bill, 1957 (supra) when this Court observed
that opinion on a reference under Article 143(1), may be
13 A.I.R. (30) 1943 FC 13
31
Page 31
declined in a “proper case” and “for good reasons”. In Dr.
M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. (supra), it was added that a
reference may not be answered when the Court is not
competent to decide the question which is based on expert
evidence or is a political one.
26. Having noted the relevant contours of Article 143(1) of the
Constitution, we may now deal with the objections to the
maintainability of the Reference.
27. There is no denying the fact that in the entire Reference
the word ‘doubt’ has not been used. It is also true that in
all previous references, noted in para 5 (supra), it had
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been specifically mentioned that doubts had arisen about
various issues. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Article
143(1) does not use the term ‘doubt’. No specific format
has been provided in any of the Schedules of the
Constitution as to how a reference is to be drawn. The use
of the word ‘doubt’ in a reference is also not a
constitutional command or mandate. Needless to
32
Page 32
emphasise that the expression, ‘doubt’, which refers to a
state of uncertainty, may be with regard to a fact or a
principle. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law
th
Lexicon, 4 Edition , the words ‘doubt’ and ‘question’
have been dealt with in the following manner:-
“Doubt, Question. These terms express the act of the
mind in staying its decision. Doubt lies altogether in
the mind; it is a less active feeling than question ; by
the former we merely suspend decision; by the latter
we actually demand proofs in order to assist us in
deciding. We may doubt in silence. We cannot
question without expressing it directly or indirectly.
He who suggests doubts does it with caution: he who
makes a question throws in difficulties with a degree
of confidence. We doubt the truth of a position; we
question the veracity of an author. (Crabb.)”
As per the Concise Oxford Dictionary (Tenth Edition) ,
‘question’ means : “a doubt; the raising of a doubt or objection;
JUDGMENT
a problem requiring solution”.
In Black’s Law Dictionary ‘doubt’, as a verb, has been defined
as follows:
“To question or hold questionable.”
The word ‘doubt’, as a noun, has been described as under:-
“Uncertainty of mind; the absence of a settled opinion
or conviction; the attitude of mind towards the
acceptance of or belief in a proposition, theory, or
33
Page 33
statement, in which the judgment is not at rest but
inclines alternately to either side.”
28. The afore-extracted recitals of the instant Reference state
that in the current circumstances, certain questions of law
with far reaching national and international implications
have arisen, including in relation to conduct of the auction
and the regulation of the telecommunications industry in
accordance with the judgment ( 2G Case ) that may affect
the flow of FDI in the telecom industry and otherwise in
other sectors into this country. Thereafter, it is also stated
that questions of law that have arisen are of great public
importance and are of far reaching consequences for the
development of the country and hence, it is thought
expedient to obtain the opinion of this Court. Question
No.1 of the reference reads as follows:-
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“Whether the only permissible method for disposal of
all natural resources across all sectors and in all
circumstances is by the conduct of auctions?”
29. At this juncture, reference may profitably be made to the
decision in In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (supra),
an opinion by a Bench of seven learned Judges, wherein it
was observed as follows:
34
Page 34
“27. We were, at one stage of the arguments, so
much exercised over the undefined breadth of the
reference that we were considering seriously whether
in the circumstances it was not advisable to return
the reference unanswered. But the written briefs filed
by the parties and the oral arguments advanced
before us have, by their fullness and ability, helped to
narrow down the legal controversies surrounding the
Bill and to crystallize the issues which arise for our
consideration. We propose to limit our opinion to the
points specifically raised before us. It will be
convenient to indicate at this stage what those points
are.”
While expressing the hope that, in future, specific questions
would be framed for the opinion of this Court, Y.V. Chandrachud
(as his Lordship then was), speaking for the majority, said:
“30. We hope that in future, whenever a reference is
made to this Court under Article 143 of the
Constitution, care will be taken to frame specific
questions for the opinion of the Court. Fortunately, it
has been possible in the instant reference to consider
specific questions as being comprehended within the
terms of the reference but the risk that a vague and
general reference may be returned unanswered is
real and ought to engage the attention of those
whose duty it is to frame the reference. Were the Bill
not as short as it is, it would have been difficult to
infuse into the reference the comprehension of the
two points mentioned by us above and which we
propose to decide. A long Bill would have presented
to us a rambling task in the absence of reference on
specific points, rendering it impossible to formulate
succinctly the nature of constitutional challenge to
the provisions of the Bill.”
JUDGMENT
35
Page 35
30. From the afore-extracted paragraphs, three broad
principles emerge: (i) a reference should not be vague,
general and undefined, (ii) this Court can go through the
written briefs and arguments to narrow down the legal
controversies, and (iii) when the question becomes
unspecific and incomprehensible, the risk of returning the
reference unanswered arises. In Keshav Singh , this Court
while dealing with the validity of the reference, referred to
earlier decisions and opined as follows:
“…It would thus be seen that the questions so far
referred by the President for the Advisory opinion of
this Court under Article 143(1) do not disclose a
uniform pattern and that is quite clearly consistent
with the broad and wide words used in Article
143(1).”
JUDGMENT
31. An analysis of the afore-noted cases, indicates that neither
has a particular format been prescribed nor any specific
pattern been followed in framing references. The first
principle relates to the ‘form’ and the second pertains to
the ‘pattern of content’. Holistically understood, on the
ground of form or pattern alone, a reference is not to be
returned unanswered. It requires appropriate analysis,
36
Page 36
understanding and appreciation of the content or the issue
on which doubt is expressed, keeping in view the concept
of constitutional responsibility, juridical propriety and
judicial discretion.
32. Thus, we find it difficult to accept the stand that use of the
word ‘doubt’ is a necessary condition for a reference to be
maintainable under Article 143(1). That apart, in our view,
question No.1, quoted above, is neither vague nor general
or unspecific, but is in the realm of comprehension which is
relatable to a question of law. It expresses a ‘doubt’ and
seeks the opinion of the Court on that question, besides
others.
JUDGMENT
33. In so far as the impact of filing and withdrawal of the
review application by the Union of India, against the
decision in the 2G Case on the maintainability of the
instant Reference is concerned, it is a matter of record that
in the review petition, certain aspects of the grounds for
review which have been stated in the recitals of the
Reference as well as in some questions, were highlighted.
37
Page 37
However, there is a gulf of difference between the
jurisdiction exercised by this Court in a review and the
discretion exercised in answering a reference under Article
143(1) of the Constitution. A review is basically guided by
the well-settled principles for review of a judgment and a
decree or order passed inter se parties. The Court in
exercise of power of review may entertain the review
under the acceptable and settled parameters. But, when
an opinion of this Court is sought by the Executive taking
recourse to a constitutional power, needless to say, the
same stands on a different footing altogether. A review is
lis specific and the rights of the parties to the controversy
are dealt with therein, whereas a reference is answered
keeping in view the terms of the reference and scrutinising
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whether the same satisfies the requirements inherent in
the language employed under Article 143(1) of the
Constitution. In our view, therefore, merely because a
review had been filed and withdrawn and in the recital the
narration pertains to the said case, the same would not be
an embargo or impediment for exercise of discretion to
answer the Reference.
38
Page 38
34. As far as the allegation of mala fide is concerned, it is trite
that this Court is neither required to go into the truth or
otherwise of the facts of the recitals nor can it go into the
question of bona fides or otherwise of the authority making
a reference. [See: In Re: Presidential Poll (supra)]. To
put it differently, the constitutional power to seek opinion
of this Court rests with the President. The only discretion
this Court has is either to answer the reference or
respectfully decline to send a report to the President.
Therefore, the challenge on the ground of mala fide, as
raised, is unsustainable.
35. The principal objection to the maintainability of the
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Reference is that it is an indirect endeavour to unsettle and
overturn the verdict in the 2G Case , which is absolutely
impermissible. The stand of the objectors is that the 2G
Case is an authoritative precedent in respect of the
principle or proposition of law that all natural resources are
to be disposed of by way of public auction and, therefore,
the Reference should be held as not maintainable.
39
Page 39
Emphasis in this behalf was on paragraphs 85 and 94 to 96
of the said judgment. In support of the proposition, heavy
reliance was placed on Cauvery II .
36. At the outset, we may note that the learned Attorney
General has more than once stated that the Government of
India is not questioning the correctness of the directions in
the 2G Case , in so far as the allocation of spectrum is
concerned, and in fact the Government is in the process of
implementing the same, in letter and spirit. Therefore, in
the light of the said statement, we feel that it would be
unnecessary to comment on the submission that the
Reference is an attempt to get an opinion to unsettle the
decision and directions of this Court in the 2G Case .
JUDGMENT
Nevertheless, since in support of the aforesaid submission,
the opinion of this Court in Cauvery II has been referred
to and relied upon in extenso , it would be appropriate to
decipher the true ratio of Cauvery II , the lynchpin of the
opposition to maintainability of the present Reference.
40
Page 40
37. Cauvery II was preceded by State of Tamil Nadu Vs.
14
State of Karnataka & Ors. (hereinafter referred to as
“ Cauvery I ” ) , which dwelled on the issue whether the
Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”)
had the power to grant interim relief. In that case,
applications filed by the State of Tamil Nadu for urgent
interim reliefs were rejected by the Tribunal on the ground
that they were not maintainable. This order was
th
challenged, resulting in the judgment dated 26 April,
1991 by this Court, where it was held as follows:
“15. Thus, we hold that this Court is the ultimate
interpreter of the provisions of the Interstate Water
Disputes Act, 1956 and has an authority to decide the
limits, powers and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
constituted under the Act. This Court has not only the
power but obligation to decide as to whether the
Tribunal has any jurisdiction or not under the Act, to
entertain any interim application till it finally decides
the dispute referred to it…”
JUDGMENT
38. The Tribunal had ruled that since it was not like other
courts with inherent powers to grant interim relief, only in
case the Central Government referred a case for interim
relief to it, would it have the jurisdiction to grant the same.
14 1991 Supp (1) SCC 240
41
Page 41
Inter-alia , the Court observed that the Tribunal was wrong
in holding that the Central Government had not made any
reference for granting any interim relief, and concluded
that the interim reliefs prayed for clearly fell within the
purview of the dispute referred by the Central
Government. Accordingly, the appeals preferred by the
State of Tamil Nadu were allowed and the Tribunal was
directed to decide the applications for interim relief.
However, the Court did not decide the larger question of
whether a Tribunal, constituted under the Interstate Water
Disputes Act, 1956 had the power to grant an interim
relief, though the answer to the same may be deduced
from the final direction.
JUDGMENT
39. In pursuance of these directions, the Tribunal decided the
th
application and vide its order dated 25 June, 1991,
proceeded to issue certain directions to the State of
th
Karnataka. Thereafter, on 25 July 1991, the Governor of
Karnataka issued an Ordinance named “The Karnataka
Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991”. Hot
on the heels of the Ordinance, the State of Karnataka also
42
Page 42
instituted a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution
against the State of Tamil Nadu for a declaration that the
Tribunal’s order granting interim relief was without
jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void, etc. The
Ordinance was replaced by Act 27 of 1991. In the context
of these developments, the President made a reference to
this Court under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, posing
three questions for opinion. The third question of the
reference, relevant for the present Reference, was :-
“ 3. Whether a Water Disputes Tribunal constituted
under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief
to the parties to the dispute.”
JUDGMENT
However, while dealing with the reference in Cauvery II , the
Court split the question, viz., whether a Water Disputes Tribunal
constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim
relief into two parts: (i) when a reference for grant of interim
relief is made to the Tribunal, and (ii) when no such reference is
made to it. It was contended by the States of Karnataka and
Kerala that if the Tribunal did not have power to grant interim
relief, the Central Government would be incompetent to make a
43
Page 43
reference for the purpose in the first place and the Tribunal in
turn would have no jurisdiction to entertain such reference, if
made. Dealing with the said submission, after making a
reference to the earlier order, this Court observed that once the
Central Government had made a reference to the Tribunal for
consideration of the claim for interim relief, prayed for by the
State of Tamil Nadu, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the
said request being a part of the reference itself. Implicit in the
said decision was the finding that the subject of interim relief
was a matter connected with or relevant to the water dispute
within the meaning of Section 5(1) of the said Act. It was held
that the Central Government could refer the matter for granting
interim relief to the Tribunal for adjudication.
JUDGMENT
40. The consequence of the Court in coming to the conclusion,
while replying to the third question was that the Tribunal
did not have the jurisdiction to make an interim award or
grant interim relief, would have not only resulted in the
Court overruling its earlier decision between the two
contending parties i.e. the two States, but it would have
also then required the Court to declare the order of the
44
Page 44
Tribunal as being without jurisdiction. The Court therefore,
said :
“83 …Although this Court by the said decision has
kept open the question, viz., whether the Tribunal has
incidental, ancillary, inherent or implied power to
grant the interim relief when no reference for grant of
such relief is made to it, it has in terms concluded the
second part of the question. We cannot, therefore,
countenance a situation whereby question 3 and for
that matter questions 1 and 2 may be so construed
as to invite our opinion on the said decision of this
Court. That would obviously be tantamount to our
sitting in appeal on the said decision which it is
impermissible for us to do even in adjudicatory
jurisdiction. Nor is it competent for the President to
invest us with an appellate jurisdiction over the said
decision through a Reference under Article 143 of the
Constitution.”
These observations would suggest that the Court declined to
construe Article 143 as a power any different from its
adjudicative powers and for that reason, said that what could
not be done in the adjudicatory process would equally not be
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achieved through the process of a reference.
41. The expression, “sitting in appeal” was accurately used. An
appellate court vacates the decree (or writ, order or
direction) of the lower court when it allows an appeal -
which is what this Court was invited to do in Cauvery I.
This Court, in that appeal decided earlier, held that the
Tribunal had the jurisdiction to pass the interim order
45
Page 45
sought by the State of Tamil Nadu. To nullify the interim
order passed by the Tribunal, pursuant to a direction of the
Supreme Court, on the ground that it was without
jurisdiction, would necessarily require vacating the
direction of the Supreme Court to the Tribunal to exercise
its jurisdiction and decide the interim matter. Para 85 of
that decision puts the matter beyond any pale of doubt:
“ 85 ... In the first instance, the language of clause
(1) of Article 143 far from supporting Shri
Nariman's contention is opposed to it. The said
clause empowers the President to refer for this
Court's opinion a question of law or fact which has
arisen or is likely to arise. When this Court in its
adjudicatory jurisdiction pronounces its
authoritative opinion on a question of law, it cannot
be said that there is any doubt about the question
of law or the same is res integra so as to require
the President to know what the true position of law
on the question is. The decision of this Court on a
question of law is binding on all courts and
authorities. Hence under the said clause the
President can refer a question of law only when
this Court has not decided it. Secondly, a decision
given by this Court can be reviewed only under
Article 137 read with Rule 1 of Order 40 of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and on the conditions
mentioned therein. When, further, this Court
overrules the view of law expressed by it in an
earlier case, it does not do so sitting in appeal and
exercising an appellate jurisdiction over the earlier
decision. It does so in exercise of its inherent
power and only in exceptional circumstances such
as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is
delivered in the absence of relevant or material
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46
Page 46
facts or if it is manifestly wrong and productive of
public mischief. [See: Bengal Immunity Company
Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 ]. Under the
Constitution such appellate jurisdiction does not
vest in this Court, nor can it be vested in it by the
President under Article 143. To accept Shri
Nariman's contention would mean that the
advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 is also an
appellate jurisdiction of this Court over its own
decision between the same parties and the
executive has a power to ask this Court to revise
its decision. If such power is read in Article 143 it
would be a serious inroad into the independence of
judiciary.”
42. Eventually, the reference was answered in respect of
question No.3 in the following terms:-
“ Question No.3: (i) A Water Disputes Tribunal
constituted under the Act is competent to grant any
interim relief to the parties to the dispute when a
reference for such relief is made by the Central
Government;
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(ii) whether the Tribunal has power to grant
interim relief when no reference is made by the
Central Government for such relief is a question which
does not arise in the facts and circumstances under
which the Reference is made. Hence we do not deem
it necessary to answer the same.”
43. The main emphasis of Mr. Soli Sorabjee was on the second
part of paragraph 85, which, according to him, prohibits
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Page 47
this Court from overruling a view expressed by it
previously under Article 143(1). We are not persuaded to
agree with the learned senior counsel. The paragraph has
to be read carefully. Sawant J. first considers the case
of a “decision” of this Court whereas in the subsequent
sentence he considers a “view of law” expressed by the
Court, and attempts to explain the difference between the
approaches to these two situations. These words are
sometimes used interchangeably but not hereinabove. We
believe that Justice Sawant consciously draws a difference
between the two by using the words “When, further, this
Court overrules the view of law…” after discussing the
case of a “decision”.
44. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “decision” as “a
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determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and,
in legal context, law”; an “opinion” as “the statement by a
judge or court of the decision reached in regard to a cause
tried or argued before them, expounding the law as
applied to the case, and detailing the reasons upon which
the judgment is based”; and explains the difference
between a “decision” and “opinion” as follows:
48
Page 48
“Decision is not necessarily synonymous with
‘opinion’. A decision of the Court is its judgment; the
opinion is the reasons given for that judgment, or the
expression of the views of the judge.”
45. Therefore, references in Para 85 to “decision” and “view of
law” must be severed from each other. The learned Judge
observes that in case of a decision, the appellate structure
is exhausted after a pronouncement by the Supreme
Court. Therefore, the only option left to the parties is of
review or curative jurisdiction (a remedy carved out in the
judgment in Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra &
15
Anr. ). After the exercise of those limited options, the
concerned parties have absolutely no relief with regard to
the dispute; it is considered settled for eternity in the eyes
of the law. However what is not eternal and still malleable
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in the eyes of law is the opinion or “view of law”
pronounced in the course of reaching the decision. Justice
Sawant clarifies that unlike this Court’s appellate power, its
power to overrule a previous precedent is an outcome of
its inherent power when he says, “…it does not do so
sitting in appeal and exercising an appellate jurisdiction
15 (2002) 4 SCC 388
49
Page 49
over the earlier decision. It does so in exercise of its
inherent power and only in exceptional circumstances….”
This Court has pointed out the difference between the two
expressions in Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra), in the
following words:
“24. There is no gainsaying that the Supreme Court is
the court of last resort — the final court on questions
both of fact and of law including constitutional law.
The law declared by this Court is the law of the land;
it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/tribunals
and authorities in India. In a judgment there will be
declaration of law and its application to the facts of
the case to render a decision on the dispute between
the parties to the lis. It is necessary to bear in mind
that the principles in regard to the highest court
departing from its binding precedent are different
from the grounds on which a final judgment between
the parties, can be reconsidered. Here, we are mainly
concerned with the latter. However, when
reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought
the finality attached both to the law declared as well
as to the decision made in the case, is normally
brought under challenge…”
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Therefore, there are two limitations - one jurisdictional and the
other self-imposed.
46. The first limitation is that a decision of this Court can be
reviewed only under Article 137 or a Curative Petition and
in no other way. It was in this context that in para 85 of
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Page 50
Cauvery II , this Court had stated that the President can
refer a question of law when this Court has not decided it.
Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, is right when he
argues that once a lis between parties is decided, the
operative decree can only be opened in review. Overruling
the judgment - as a precedent - does not reopen the
decree.
47. The second limitation, a self imposed rule of judicial
discipline, was that overruling the opinion of the Court on a
legal issue does not constitute sitting in appeal, but is done
only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the
earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the
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absence of relevant or material facts or if it is manifestly
wrong and capable of causing public mischief. For this
proposition, the Court relied upon the judgment in the
Bengal Immunity case (supra) wherein it was held that
when Article 141 lays down that the law declared by this
Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of
India, it quite obviously refers to courts other than this
Court; and that the Court would normally follow past
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Page 51
precedents save and except where it was necessary to
reconsider the correctness of law laid down in that
judgment. In fact, the overruling of a principle of law is not
an outcome of appellate jurisdiction but a consequence of
its inherent power. This inherent power can be exercised
as long as a previous decree vis-à-vis lis inter partes is not
affected. It is the attempt to overturn the decision of a
previous case that is problematic which is why the Court
observes that “under the Constitution such appellate
jurisdiction does not vest in this Court, nor can it be vested
in it by the President under Article 143.”
48. Therefore, the controversy in Cauvery II was covered by
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the decision rendered by this Court in Cauvery I between
the parties and the decision operated as res judicata and
hence, it was opined that discretion under Article 143(1)
could not be exercised. It has also been observed that this
Court had analysed the relevant provisions of the Inter-
State Water Disputes Act, 1956 and thereafter had come
to the conclusion that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant
interim relief if the question of granting interim relief
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Page 52
formed part of the reference. On this bedrock it was held
that the decision operated as res judicata . It is, therefore,
manifest from Cauvery II that the Court was clearly not
opposed to clarifying the ratio of a previous judgment in
Cauvery I, in the course of an advisory jurisdiction. Afore-
extracted para 85 of Cauvery II , restricts this Court’s
advisory jurisdiction on the limited point of overturning a
decided issue vis-à-vis a ‘dispute’ or lis inter partes .
49. Finally a seven Judge Bench of this Court has clearly held
that this Court, under Article 143(1), does have the power
to overrule a previous view delivered by it. Justice
Chandrachud, C.J. in In re: The Special Courts Bill
(supra) held:
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“101…We are inclined to the view that though it is
always open to this Court to re-examine the question
already decided by it and to overrule, if necessary, the
view earlier taken by it, insofar as all other courts in the
territory of India are concerned they ought to be bound
by the view expressed by this Court even in the exercise
of its advisory jurisdiction under Article 143(1) of the
Constitution.”
53
Page 53
50. There is a catena of pronouncements in which this Court
has either explained, clarified or read down the ratio of
previous judgments. In the very first reference, In Re:
Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (supra), the reference was made
by reason of a judgment of the Federal Court in Jatindra
16
Nath Gupta Vs. The Province of Bihar & Ors. . The
background of that reference was explained by Mukherjea,
J. as under:
“The necessity of seeking the advisory opinion of this
Court is stated to have arisen from the fact that
because of the decision of the Federal Court in
Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar , which
held the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the
Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, ultra
vires the Bihar Provincial Legislature, by reason of its
amounting to a delegation of its legislative powers to
an extraneous authority, doubts have arisen
regarding the validity of the three legislative
provisions mentioned above, the legality of the first
and the second being actually called in question in
certain judicial proceedings which are pending before
some of the High Courts in India.”
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Justice Das in the same opinion, while noting that reliance was
placed by learned counsel for the interveners on the judgment
of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta (supra), recorded
that the learned Attorney General had strenuously challenged
16 [1949-50] F.C.R. 595
54
Page 54
the correctness of the decision of the majority of the Federal
Court in that case. Inter-alia, observing that the reference was
in a way occasioned by that decision, the learned Judge held as
follows:
“I feel bound to say, with the utmost humility and for
reasons given already, that the observations of the
majority of the Federal Court in that case went too far
and, in agreement with the learned Attorney-General,
I am unable to accept them as correct exposition of
the principles relating to the delegation of legislative
power.”
51. In this context, it would be beneficial to refer to Keshav
Singh’s case. In the said case, a reference was made by
the President which fundamentally pertained to the
privileges of the Legislative Assembly and exercise of
jurisdiction by a Bench of the High Court. The High Court
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entertained a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, challenging the decision of the Assembly
committing one Keshav Singh, who was not one of its
members, to prison for its contempt. The issue was
whether by entertaining the writ petition, the Judges of the
High Court were in contempt of the Legislature for
infringement of its privileges and immunities. For the
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Page 55
same, this Court proceeded to construe the relevant
provisions contained in Article 194(3) and its
harmonization with other Articles of the Constitution,
especially Articles 19(1)(a), 21 & 22. In that context, the
decision in “ Sharma ” (supra) came up for consideration.
One of the questions that arose in Sharma’s case was the
impact of Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 on the provisions
contained in the latter part of Article 194(3). The majority
view was that the privilege in question was subsisting at
the relevant time and must, therefore, deemed to be
included under the latter part of Article 194(3). It was held
that Article 19(1)(a) did not apply under the rule of
harmonious construction, where Article 19(1)(a) was in
direct conflict with Article 194(3). The particular provision
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in the latter Article would prevail over the general
provision contained in the former. It was further held that
though Article 21 applied, it had not been contravened.
The minority view, on the other hand, held that the
privilege in question had not been established; even
assuming the same was established and it was to be
included in the latter part of Article 194(3), yet it must be
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Page 56
controlled by Article 19(1)(a) on the ground that
Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution were of paramount importance and must
prevail over a provision like the one contained in Article
194(3) which may be inconsistent with them. The majority
decision also commented on the decision in Gunupati
Keshavram Reddy Vs. Nafisul Hasan & the State of
17
U.P. and observed that the said decision was based
entirely on a concession and could not, therefore, be
deemed to be a considered decision of this Court.
52. The decision in Keshavram Reddy (supra) dealt with the
applicability of Article 22(2) to a case falling under the
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latter part of Article 194(3). It is worth noting that the
minority opinion of Sharma treated Keshavram Reddy ,
as expressing a considered opinion, which was binding on
the Court. In Keshav Singh it was opined that in
Sharma’s case, the majority decision held in terms that
Article 21 was applicable to the contents of Article 194(3),
but on merits, it came to the conclusion that the alleged
17 AIR 1954 SC 636
57
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contravention had not been proved. Commenting on the
minority view it was opined that it was unnecessary to
consider whether Article 21 as such applied because the
said view treated all the Fundamental Rights guaranteed
by Part III as paramount, and therefore, each one of them
could control the provisions of Article 194(3).
53. At that juncture, the Bench stated that in the case of
Sharma , contentions urged by the petitioner did not raise
a general issue as to the relevance and applicability of all
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III at all. The
contravention of only two Articles was pleaded and they
were Articles 19(1)(a) and 21. Strictly speaking, it was,
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therefore, unnecessary to consider the larger issue as to
whether the latter part of Article 194(3) was subject to the
fundamental rights in general, and indeed, even on the
majority view it could not be said that the said view
excluded the application of all fundamental rights, for the
obvious and simple reason that Article 21 was held to be
applicable and the merits of the petitioner’s arguments
about its alleged contravention in his case were examined
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and rejected. Therefore, it was not right to read the
majority decision as laying down a general proposition that
whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of the
latter part of Article 194(3) and any of the provisions of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III, the latter must
always yield to the former. It was further observed that
the majority decision had incidentally commented on the
decision in Keshavram Reddy’s case (supra). Apart from
that there was no controversy about the applicability of
Article 22 in that case, and, therefore, the comment made
by the majority judgment on the earlier decision was partly
not accurate. Their Lordships adverted to the facts in
Sharma’s case wherein the majority judgment had
observed that it “proceeded entirely on a concession of
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counsel and cannot be regarded as a considered opinion
on the subject.” After so stating, the Bench opined thus:
“… There is no doubt that the first part of this
comment is not accurate. A concession was made by
the Attorney-General not on a point of law which was
decided by the Court, but on a point of fact; and so,
this part of the comment cannot strictly be said to be
justified. It is, however, true that there is no
discussion about the merits of the contention raised
on behalf of Mr. Mistry and to that extent, it may have
been permissible to the majority judgment to say that
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it was not a considered opinion of the Court. But, as
we have already pointed out, it was hardly necessary
for the majority decision to deal with the point
pertaining to the applicability of Article 22(2),
because that point did not arise in the proceedings
before the Court in Pandit Sharma’s case. That is why
we wish to make it clear that the obiter observations
made in the majority judgment about the validity or
correctness of the earlier decision of this Court in
Gunupati Keshavram Reddy’s case should not be
taken as having decided the point in question. In
other words, the question as to whether Article 22(2)
would apply to such a case may have to be
considered by this Court if and when it becomes
necessary to do so.”
54. From the aforesaid decision it is clear that while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 143(1) of the Constitution this
Court can look into an earlier decision for the purpose of
whether the contentions urged in the previous decision did
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raise a general issue or not; whether it was necessary to
consider the larger issue that did not arise; and whether a
general proposition had been laid down. It has also been
stated that where no controversy arose with regard to
applicability of a particular facet of constitutional law, the
comments made in a decision could be treated as not
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accurate; and further it could be opined that in an earlier
judgment there are certain obiter observations.
55. Thus, in Keshav Singh, a seven-Judge Bench, while
entertaining a reference under Article 143(1), dealt with a
previous decision in respect of its interpretation involving a
constitutional principle in respect of certain Articles, and
proceeded to opine that the view expressed in Sharma’s
case, in relation to a proposition laid down in Keshavram
Reddy’s case, was inaccurate.
56. At this stage, it is worthy to refer to Supreme Court
Advocates-on-Record Association and Ors. Vs. Union
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18
of India . J.S. Verma, J., (as his Lordship then was)
speaking for the majority, apart from other conclusions
relating to appointment of Judges and the Chief Justices,
while dealing with transfer, expressed thus:
18 (1993) 4 SCC 441
61
Page 61
“(8) Consent of the transferred Judge/Chief
Justice is not required for either the first or any
subsequent transfer from one High Court to another.
(9) Any transfer made on the recommendation
of the Chief Justice of India is not to be deemed to be
punitive, and such transfer is not justiciable on any
ground.
(10) In making all appointments and transfers,
the norms indicated must be followed. However, the
same do not confer any justiciable right in anyone.
(11) Only limited judicial review on the grounds
specified earlier is available in matters of
appointments and transfers.”
As far as the ground of limited judicial review is concerned the
majority opined thus:
“481. These guidelines in the form of norms are not
to be construed as conferring any justiciable right in
the transferred Judge. Apart from the constitutional
requirement of a transfer being made only on the
recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, the
issue of transfer is not justiciable on any other
ground, including the reasons for the transfer or their
sufficiency. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India
formed in the manner indicated is sufficient safeguard
and protection against any arbitrariness or bias, as
well as any erosion of the independence of the
judiciary.
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482. … Except on the ground of want of consultation
with the named constitutional functionaries or lack of
any condition of eligibility in the case of an
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appointment, or of a transfer being made without the
recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, these
matters are not justiciable on any other ground,
including that of bias, which in any case is excluded
by the element of plurality in the process of decision-
making.”
57. In Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, (commonly
referred as the “ Second Judges Case ”), question No. 2
reads as follows:
“(2) Whether the transfer of Judges is judicially
reviewable in the light of the observation of the
Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment that ‘such
transfer is not justiciable on any ground’ and its
further observation that limited judicial review is
available in matters of transfer, and the extent and
scope of judicial review.”
While answering the same, the Bench opined thus:
“37. It is to our mind imperative, given the gravity
involved in transferring High Court Judges, that the
Chief Justice of India should obtain the views of the
Chief Justice of the High Court from which the
proposed transfer is to be effected as also the Chief
Justice of the High Court to which the transfer is to be
effected. This is in accord with the majority judgment
in the Second Judges case which postulates
consultation with the Chief Justice of another High
Court. The Chief Justice of India should also take into
account the views of one or more Supreme Court
Judges who are in a position to provide material which
would assist in the process of deciding whether or not
a proposed transfer should take place. These views
should be expressed in writing and should be
considered by the Chief Justice of India and the four
seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.
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These views and those of each of the four seniormost
puisne Judges should be conveyed to the Government
of India along with the proposal of transfer. Unless the
decision to transfer has been taken in the manner
aforestated, it is not decisive and does not bind the
Government of India.”
In the conclusion their Lordships clearly state as follows:
“1 . The expression “consultation with the Chief Justice
of India” in Articles 217(1) and 222(1) of the
Constitution of India requires consultation with a
plurality of Judges in the formation of the opinion of
the Chief Justice of India. The sole individual opinion
of the Chief Justice of India does not constitute
“consultation” within the meaning of the said articles.
2 . The transfer of puisne Judges is judicially
reviewable only to this extent: that the
recommendation that has been made by the Chief
Justice of India in this behalf has not been made in
consultation with the four seniormost puisne Judges of
the Supreme Court and/or that the views of the Chief
Justice of the High Court from which the transfer is to
be effected and of the Chief Justice of the High Court
to which the transfer is to be effected have not been
obtained.”
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58. From the aforesaid, it is demonstrable that while
entertaining the reference under Article 143(1), this Court
had analysed the principles enunciated in the earlier
judgment and also made certain modifications. The said
modifications may be stated as one of the mode or method
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of inclusion by way of modification without changing the
ratio decidendi. For the purpose of validity of a reference,
suffice it to say, dwelling upon an earlier judgment is
permissible. That apart, one cannot be oblivious of the fact
that the scope of limited judicial review, in the Second
Judges Case, which otherwise is quite restricted, was
slightly expanded in the Court’s opinion to the Presidential
reference.
59. It is of some interest to note that almost every reference,
filed under Article 143(1), has witnessed challenge as to its
maintainability on one ground or the other, but all the
same, the references have been answered, except in Dr.
M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. (supra), which was returned
unanswered, mainly on the ground that the reference did
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not serve a constitutional purpose.
60. From the aforesaid analysis, it is quite vivid that this Court
would respectfully decline to answer a reference if it is
improper, inadvisable and undesirable; or the questions
formulated have purely socio-economic or political
reasons, which have no relation whatsoever with any of the
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Page 65
provisions of the Constitution or otherwise are of no
constitutional significance; or are incapable of being
answered; or would not subserve any purpose; or there is
authoritative pronouncement of this Court which has
already decided the question referred.
61. In the case at hand, it is to be scrutinized whether the 2G
Case is a decision which has dealt with and decided the
controversy encapsulated in question No. 1 or meets any
of the criteria mentioned above. As we perceive, the
question involves interpretation of a constitutional
principle inherent under Article 14 of the Constitution and
it is of great public importance as it deals with
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allocation/alienation/disposal/ distribution of natural
resources. Besides, the question whether the 2G Case is
on authoritative pronouncement in that regard, has to be
looked into and only then an opinion can be expressed.
For the said purpose all other impediments do not
remotely come into play in the present Reference.
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62. We are, therefore, of the view that as long as the decision
with respect to the allocation of spectrum licenses is
untouched, this Court is within its jurisdiction to evaluate
and clarify the ratio of the judgment in the 2G Case . For
the purpose of this stage of argumentation, it needs little
emphasis, that we have the jurisdiction to clarify the ratio
of the judgment in 2G Case , irrespective of whether we
actually choose to do so or not. Therefore, the fact that
this Reference may require us to say something different
to what has been enunciated in the 2G Case as a
proposition of law, cannot strike at the root of the
maintainability of the Reference. Consequently, we reject
the preliminary objection and hold that this Reference is
maintainable, notwithstanding its effect on the ratio of the
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2G Case , as long as the decision in that case qua lis inter
partes is left unaffected.
ON MERITS :
63. This leads us to the merits of the controversy disclosed in
the questions framed in the Reference for our advisory
opinion.
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64. As already pointed out, the judgment in the 2G Case
triggered doubts about the validity of methods other than
‘auction’ for disposal of natural resources which, ultimately
led to the filing of the present Reference. Therefore,
before we proceed to answer question No.1, it is
imperative to understand what has been precisely stated
in the 2G Case and decipher the law declared in that case.
65. All the counsel agreed that paragraphs 94 to 96 in the said
decision are the repository of the ratio vis-à-vis disposal of
natural resources in the 2G Case . On the one hand it was
argued that these paragraphs lay down, as a proposition of
law, that all natural resources across all sectors, and in all
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circumstances are to be disposed of by way of public
auction, and on the other, it was urged that the
observations therein were made only qua spectrum.
Before examining the strength of the rival stands, we may
briefly recapitulate the principles that govern the
determination of the ‘law declared’ by a judgment and its
true ratio.
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Article 141 of the Constitution lays down that the ‘law
66.
declared’ by the Supreme Court is binding upon all the
courts within the territory of India. The ‘law declared’ has
to be construed as a principle of law that emanates from a
judgment, or an interpretation of a law or judgment by the
Supreme Court, upon which, the case is decided. [See:
Fida Hussain & Ors. Vs. Moradabad Development
19
Authority & Anr. ]. Hence, it flows from the above that
the ‘law declared’ is the principle culled out on the reading
of a judgment as a whole in light of the questions raised,
upon which the case is decided. [Also see : Ambica
20
Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. and
Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Sun Engineering
21
Works (P) Ltd. ]. In other words, the ‘law declared’ in a
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judgment, which is binding upon courts, is the ratio
decidendi of the judgment. It is the essence of a decision
and the principle upon which, the case is decided, which
has to be ascertained in relation to the subject-matter of
the decision.
19 (2011) 12 SCC 615
20 (1987) 1 SCC 213
21 (1992) 4 SCC 363
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67. Each case entails a different set of facts and a decision is a
precedent on its own facts; not everything said by a Judge
while giving a judgment can be ascribed precedental
value. The essence of a decision that binds the parties to
the case is the principle upon which the case is decided
and for this reason, it is important to analyse a decision
and cull out from it, the ratio decidendi . In the matter of
applying precedents, the erudite Justice Benjamin Cardozo
in “ The Nature of a Judicial Process ”, had said that “if
the judge is to pronounce it wisely, some principles of
selection there must be to guide him along all potential
judgments that compete for recognition” and “almost
invariably his first step is to examine and compare them;”
“it is a process of search, comparison and little more” and
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ought not to be akin to matching “the colors of the case at
hand against the colors of many sample cases” because in
that case “the man who had the best card index of the
cases would also be the wisest judge”. Warning against
comparing precedents with matching colours of one case
with another, he summarized the process, in case the
colours don’t match, in the following wise words:-
70
Page 70
“It is when the colors do not match, when the
references in the index fail, when there is no decisive
precedent, that the serious business of the judge
begins. He must then fashion law for the litigants
before him. In fashioning it for them, he will be
fashioning it for others. The classic statement is
Bacon’s: “For many times, the things deduced to
judgment may be meum and tuum, when the reason
and consequence thereof may trench to point of
estate. The sentence of today will make the right and
wrong of tomorrow.”
68. With reference to the precedential value of decisions, in
22
State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Md. Illiyas this Court
observed:
“…According to the well-settled theory of precedents,
every decision contains three basic postulates: ( i )
findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An
inferential finding of facts is the inference which the
Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; ( ii )
statements of the principles of law applicable to the
legal problems disclosed by the facts; and ( iii )
judgment based on the combined effect of the above.
A decision is an authority for what it actually decides.
What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not
every observation found therein nor what logically
flows from the various observations made in the
judgment…”
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69. Recently, in Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda &
23
Anr. , this Court has observed as follows:
22 (2006) 1 SCC 275
23 (2004) 3 SCC 75
71
Page 71
“…Observations of courts are neither to be read as
Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and
that too taken out of their context. These
observations must be read in the context in which
they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts
are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret
words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy
discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and
not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not
interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes;
their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.”
70. It is also important to read a judgment as a whole keeping
in mind that it is not an abstract academic discourse with
universal applicability, but heavily grounded in the facts
and circumstances of the case. Every part of a judgment is
intricately linked to others constituting a larger whole and
thus, must be read keeping the logical thread intact. In this
regard, in Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. Vs.
JUDGMENT
24
State of Karnataka & Ors. , the Court made the
following observations:
“The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be found
out only on reading the entire judgment. In fact, the
ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the
judgment itself. The answer to the question would
necessarily have to be read in the context of what is
set out in the judgment and not in isolation. In case of
any doubt as regards any observations, reasons and
24 (2003) 6 SCC 697
72
Page 72
principles, the other part of the judgment has to be
looked into. By reading a line here and there from the
judgment, one cannot find out the entire ratio
decidendi of the judgment.”
| . The ratio of th<br>and appreciate | |
|---|
| . In the 2G Case, the Bench framed five quest<br>Questions No. (ii) and (v) pertain to the factual matrix<br>are not relevant for settling the controversy at hand.<br>remaining three questions are reproduced below:<br>“(i) Whether the Government has the right to<br>alienate, transfer or distribute natural<br>resources/national assets otherwise than by following<br>a fair and transparent method consistent with the<br>fundamentals of the equality clause enshrined in the<br>JUDGMENT<br>Constitution?<br>(iii) Whether the exercise undertaken by DoT<br>from September 2007 to March 2008 for grant of UAS<br>licences to the private respondents in terms of the<br>recommendations made by TRAI is vitiated due to<br>arbitrariness and mala fides and is contrary to public<br>interest?<br>(iv) Whether the policy of first-come-first-served<br>followed by DoT for grant of licences is ultra vires the<br>provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and<br>whether the said policy was arbitrarily changed by the<br>Minister of Communications and Information<br>Technology (hereinafter referred to as “the Minister of | |
| “(i) Whether the Government has the right to<br>alienate, transfer or distribute natural<br>resources/national assets otherwise than by following<br>a fair and transparent method consistent with the<br>fundamentals of the equality clause enshrined in the<br>JUDGMENT<br>Constitution? |
| |
| (iii) Whether the exercise undertaken by DoT<br>from September 2007 to March 2008 for grant of UAS<br>licences to the private respondents in terms of the<br>recommendations made by TRAI is vitiated due to<br>arbitrariness and mala fides and is contrary to public<br>interest? |
| (iv) Whether the policy of first-come-first-served<br>followed by DoT for grant of licences is ultra vires the<br>provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and<br>whether the said policy was arbitrarily changed by the<br>Minister of Communications and Information<br>Technology (hereinafter referred to as “the Minister of |
73
Page 73
Communications and Information Technology”),
without consulting TRAI, with a view to favour some of
the applicants?”
73. While dealing with question No.(i), the Court observed that
the State is empowered to distribute natural resources as
they constitute public property/national assets. Thereafter,
the Bench observed as follows:
“75.…while distributing natural resources the State is
bound to act in consonance with the principles of
equality and public trust and ensure that no action is
taken which may be detrimental to public interest.
Like any other State action, constitutionalism must be
reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural
resources. In Article 39( b ) of the Constitution it has
been provided that the ownership and control of the
material resources of the community should be so
distributed so as to best subserve the common good,
but no comprehensive legislation has been enacted to
generally define natural resources and a framework
for their protection...”
74. The learned Judges adverted to the ‘public trust doctrine’
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as enunciated in The Illinois Central Railroad Co. Vs.
25
The People of the State of Illinois ; M.C. Mehta Vs.
26
Kamal Nath & Ors. ; Jamshed Hormusji Wadia Vs.
27
Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Anr. ;
Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi Vs. State of A.P. &
28
Ors. ; Fomento Resorts And Hotels Limited & Anr.
25 36 L ED 1018 : 146 U.S. 387 (1892)
26 (1997) 1 SCC 388
27 (2004) 3 SCC 214
28 (2006) 3 SCC 549
74
Page 74
29
Vs. Minguel Martins & Ors. and Reliance Natural
30
Resources Limited Vs. Reliance Industries Limited
and held:
“85. As natural resources are public goods, the
doctrine of equality, which emerges from the
concepts of justice and fairness, must guide the State
in determining the actual mechanism for distribution
of natural resources. In this regard, the doctrine of
equality has two aspects: first , it regulates the rights
and obligations of the State vis-à-vis its people and
demands that the people be granted equitable access
to natural resources and/or its products and that they
are adequately compensated for the transfer of the
resource to the private domain; and second , it
regulates the rights and obligations of the State vis-à-
vis private parties seeking to acquire/use the resource
and demands that the procedure adopted for
distribution is just, non-arbitrary and transparent and
that it does not discriminate between similarly placed
private parties.”
Referring to the decisions of this Court in Akhil Bhartiya
31
Upbhokta Congress Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
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and Sachidanand Pandey & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal
32
& Ors. , the Bench ultimately concluded thus:
“89. In conclusion, we hold that the State is the legal
owner of the natural resources as a trustee of the
people and although it is empowered to distribute the
same, the process of distribution must be guided by
the constitutional principles including the doctrine of
equality and larger public good.”
29 (2009) 3 SCC 571
30 (2010) 7 SCC 1
31 (2011) 5 SCC 29
32 (1987) 2 SCC 295
75
Page 75
75. On a reading of the above paragraphs, it can be noticed
that the doctrine of equality; larger public good, adoption
of a transparent and fair method, opportunity of
competition; and avoidance of any occasion to scuttle the
claim of similarly situated applicants were emphasised
upon. While dealing with alienation of natural resources
like spectrum, it was stated that it is the duty of the State
to ensure that a non-discriminatory method is adopted for
distribution and alienation which would necessarily result
in the protection of national/public interest.
76. Paragraphs 85 and 89, while referring to the concept of
‘public trust doctrine’, lay emphasis on the doctrine of
equality, which has been segregated into two parts – one is
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the substantive part and the other is the regulatory part.
In the regulatory facet, paragraph 85 states that the
procedure adopted for distribution should be just and non-
arbitrary and must be guided by constitutional principles
including the doctrine of equality and larger public good.
Similarly, in paragraph 89 stress has been laid on
transparency and fair opportunity of competition. It is
76
Page 76
further reiterated that the burden of the State is to ensure
that a non-discriminatory method is adopted for
distribution and alienation which would necessarily result
in the protection of national and public interest.
77. Dealing with Questions No.(iii) and (iv) in paragraphs 94 to
96 of the judgment, the Court opined as follows:
“94. There is a fundamental flaw in the first-come-
first-served policy inasmuch as it involves an element
of pure chance or accident. In matters involving
award of contracts or grant of licence or permission to
use public property, the invocation of first-come-first-
served policy has inherently dangerous implications.
Any person who has access to the power corridor at
the highest or the lowest level may be able to obtain
information from the government files or the files of
the agency/instrumentality of the State that a
particular public property or asset is likely to be
disposed of or a contract is likely to be awarded or a
licence or permission is likely to be given, he would
immediately make an application and would become
entitled to stand first in the queue at the cost of all
others who may have a better claim.
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95. This Court has repeatedly held that wherever a
contract is to be awarded or a licence is to be given,
the public authority must adopt a transparent and fair
method for making selections so that all eligible
persons get a fair opportunity of competition. To put it
differently, the State and its agencies/
instrumentalities must always adopt a rational
method for disposal of public property and no attempt
should be made to scuttle the claim of worthy
applicants. When it comes to alienation of scarce
natural resources like spectrum, etc. it is the burden
of the State to ensure that a non-discriminatory
method is adopted for distribution and alienation,
77
Page 77
which would necessarily result in protection of
national/public interest.
96. In our view, a duly publicised auction conducted
fairly and impartially is perhaps the best method for
discharging this burden and the methods like first-
come-first-served when used for alienation of natural
resources/public property are likely to be misused by
unscrupulous people who are only interested in
garnering maximum financial benefit and have no
respect for the constitutional ethos and values. In
other words, while transferring or alienating the
natural resources, the State is duty-bound to adopt
the method of auction by giving wide publicity so that
all eligible persons can participate in the process.”
78. Our reading of these paragraphs suggests that the Court
was not considering the case of auction in general, but
specifically evaluating the validity of those methods
adopted in the distribution of spectrum from September
2007 to March 2008. It is also pertinent to note that
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reference to auction is made in the subsequent paragraph
(96) with the rider ‘perhaps’. It has been observed that “a
duly publicized auction conducted fairly and impartially is
perhaps the best method for discharging this burden.” We
are conscious that a judgment is not to be read as a
statute, but at the same time, we cannot be oblivious to
the fact that when it is argued with vehemence that the
78
Page 78
judgment lays down auction as a constitutional principle,
the word “perhaps” gains significance. This suggests that
the recommendation of auction for alienation of natural
resources was never intended to be taken as an absolute
or blanket statement applicable across all natural
resources, but simply a conclusion made at first blush over
the attractiveness of a method like auction in disposal of
natural resources. The choice of the word ‘perhaps’
suggests that the learned Judges considered situations
requiring a method other than auction as conceivable and
desirable.
79. Further, the final conclusions summarized in paragraph
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102 of the judgment (SCC) make no mention about auction
being the only permissible and intra vires method for
disposal of natural resources; the findings are limited to
the case of spectrum. In case the Court had actually
enunciated, as a proposition of law, that auction is the only
permissible method or mode for alienation/allotment of
natural resources, the same would have found a mention
in the summary at the end of the judgment.
79
Page 79
80. Moreover, if the judgment is to be read as holding auction
as the only permissible means of disposal of all natural
resources, it would lead to the quashing of a large number
of laws that prescribe methods other than auction, e.g., the
MMRD Act. While dealing with the merits of the Reference,
at a later stage, we will discuss whether or not auction can
be a constitutional mandate under Article 14 of the
Constitution, but for the present, it would suffice to say
that no court would ever implicitly, indirectly, or by
inference, hold a range of laws as ultra vires the
Constitution, without allowing every law to be tested on its
merits. One of the most profound tenets of
constitutionalism is the presumption of constitutionality
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assigned to each legislation enacted. We find that the 2G
Case does not even consider a plethora of laws and
judgments that prescribe methods, other than auction, for
dispensation of natural resources; something that it would
have done, in case, it intended to make an assertion as
wide as applying auction to all natural resources.
Therefore, we are convinced that the observations in Paras
80
Page 80
94 to 96 could not apply beyond the specific case of
spectrum, which according to the law declared in the 2G
Case , is to be alienated only by auction and no other
method.
81. Thus, having come to the conclusion that the 2G Case
does not deal with modes of allocation for natural
resources, other than spectrum, we shall now proceed to
answer the first question of the Reference pertaining to
other natural resources, as the question subsumes the
essence of the entire reference, particularly the set of first
five questions.
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82. The President seeks this Court’s opinion on the limited
point of permissibility of methods other than auction for
alienation of natural resources, other than spectrum. The
question also harbours several concepts, which were
argued before us through the hearing of the Reference,
that require to be answered in order to derive a
comprehensive answer to the parent question. Are some
81
Page 81
methods ultra vires and others intra vires the Constitution
of India, especially Article 14? Can disposal through the
method of auction be elevated to a Constitutional
principle? Is this Court entitled to direct the executive to
adopt a certain method because it is the ‘best’ method? If
not, to what extent can the executive deviate from such
‘best’ method? An answer to these issues, in turn, will give
an answer to the first question which, as noted above, will
answer the Presidential Reference.
83. Before proceeding to answer these questions, we would
like to dispose of a couple of minor objections. The first
pertained to the classification of resources made in the 2G
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Case . Learned counsel appearing for CPIL argued that all
that the judgment in the 2G Case has done is to carve out
a special category of cases where public auction is the only
legally sustainable method of alienation viz. natural
resources that are scarce, valuable and are allotted to
private entities for commercial exploitation. The learned
Attorney General, however, contested this claim and
argued that no such proposition was laid down in the 2G
82
Page 82
judgment. He pointed out that the words “commercial
exploitation” were not even used anywhere in the
judgment except in an extract from another judgment in a
different context. We agree that the judgment itself does
not carve out any special case for scarce natural resources
only meant for commercial exploitation. However, we feel,
despite that, in this Reference, CPIL is not barred from
making a submission drawing a distinction between natural
resources meant for commercial exploitation and those
meant for other purposes. This Court has the jurisdiction
to classify the subject matter of a reference, if a genuine
case for it exists.
84. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, in support
of his stand that the first question of the Reference
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must be answered in a way so as to allow auction
as the only mode for the disposal of natural resources,
submitted that a combined reading of Article 14, which
dictates non- arbitrariness in State action and equal
opportunity to those similarly placed; Article 39(b) which is
a Directive Principle of State Policy dealing with
distribution of natural resources for the common good of
83
Page 83
the people; and the “trusteeship” principle found in the
Preamble which mandates that the State holds all natural
resources in the capacity of a trustee, on behalf of the
people, would make auction a constitutional mandate
under Article 14 of the Constitution. It is imperative,
therefore, that we evaluate each of these principles before
coming to any conclusion on the constitutional verdict on
auction.
85. In the 2G Case , two concepts namely, “public trust
doctrine” and “trusteeship” have been adverted to, which
were also relied upon by learned counsel for CPIL, in
defence of the argument that the State holds natural
resources in a fiduciary relationship with the people. As far
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as “trusteeship” is concerned, there is no cavil that the
State holds all natural resources as a trustee of the public
and must deal with them in a manner that is consistent
with the nature of such a trust. However, what was
asserted on behalf of CPIL was that all natural resources
fall within the domain of the “public trust doctrine”, and
therefore, there is an obligation on the Government to
84
Page 84
ensure that their transfer or alienation for commercial
exploitation is in a fair and transparent manner and only in
pursuit of public good. The learned Attorney General on
the other hand, zealously urged that the subject matter of
the doctrine and the nature of restrictions, it imposes, are
of limited scope; that the applicability of the doctrine is
restricted to certain common properties pertaining to the
environment, like rivers, seashores, forest and air, meant
for free and unimpeded use of the general public and the
restrictions it imposes is in the term of a complete
embargo on any alienation of such resources, for private
ownership. According to him, the extension of the public
trust doctrine to all natural resources has led to a
considerable confusion and needs to be clarified.
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86. The doctrine of public trust enunciated more thoroughly by
the United States Supreme Court in Illinois (supra) was
introduced to Indian environmental jurisprudence by this
Court in M.C. Mehta (supra). Speaking for the majority,
Kuldip Singh, J. observed as follows :
“25. The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the
85
Page 85
principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and
the forests have such a great importance to the people
as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make
them a subject of private ownership. The said resources
being a gift of nature, they should be made freely
available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.
The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect
the resources for the enjoyment of the general public
rather than to permit their use for private ownership or
commercial purposes. According to Professor Sax the
Public Trust Doctrine imposes the following restrictions
on governmental authority:
‘Three types of restrictions on governmental
authority are often thought to be imposed by
the public trust: first, the property subject to
the trust must not only be used for a public
purpose, but it must be held available for use
by the general public; second, the property
may not be sold, even for a fair cash
equivalent; and third the property must be
maintained for particular types of uses’.”
The learned Judge further observed:-
“34. Our legal system — based on English common law
— includes the public trust doctrine as part of its
jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural
resources which are by nature meant for public use and
enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-
shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically
fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty
to protect the natural resources. These resources meant
for public use cannot be converted into private
ownership.”
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87. The judgment in Kamal Nath’s case (supra) was
explained in Intellectuals Forum (supra). Reiterating
that the State is the trustee of all natural resources which
86
Page 86
are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment, the
Court observed thus:
“76. The Supreme Court of California, in National
Audubon Society Vs. Superior Court of Alpine
Country also known as Mono Lake case summed up
the substance of the doctrine. The Court said:
“Thus the public trust is more than an
affirmation of State power to use public
property for public purposes. It is an
affirmation of the duty of the State to protect
the people's common heritage of streams,
lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering
the right only in those rare cases when the
abandonment of the right is consistent with
the purposes of the trust.”
This is an articulation of the doctrine from the angle of
the affirmative duties of the State with regard to public
trust. Formulated from a negatory angle, the doctrine
does not exactly prohibit the alienation of the property
held as a public trust. However, when the State holds a
resource that is freely available for the use of the public,
it provides for a high degree of judicial scrutiny on any
action of the Government, no matter how consistent
with the existing legislations, that attempts to restrict
such free use. To properly scrutinise such actions of the
Government, the courts must make a distinction
between the Government's general obligation to act for
the public benefit, and the special, more demanding
obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain
public resources…”
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It was thus, held that when the affirmative duties are set out
from a nugatory angle, the doctrine does not exactly prohibit
87
Page 87
the alienation of property held as a public trust, but mandates a
high degree of judicial scrutiny.
88. In Fomento (supra), the Court was concerned with the
access of the public to a beach in Goa. Holding that it was
a public beach which could not be privatized or blocked
denying traditional access, this Court reiterated the public
trust doctrine as follows:
“52. The matter deserves to be considered from
another angle. The public trust doctrine which has been
invoked by Ms Indira Jaising in support of her argument
that the beach in question is a public beach and the
appellants cannot privatise the same by blocking/
obstructing traditional access available through Survey
No. 803 (new No. 246/2) is implicitly engrafted by the
State Government in Clause 4( ix ) of the agreement.
That doctrine primarily rests on the principle that
certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests
have such a great importance to the people as a whole
that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a
subject of private ownership. These resources are gift of
nature, therefore, they should be freely available to
everyone irrespective of one's status in life.”
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89. In Reliance Natural Resources (supra), it has been
observed that even though the doctrine of pubic trust has
been applied in cases dealing with environmental
jurisprudence, “it has broader application”. Referring to
Kamal Nath (supra), the Court held that it is the duty of
88
Page 88
the Government to provide complete protection to the
natural resources as a trustee of the people at large.
90. The public trust doctrine is a specific doctrine with a
particular domain and has to be applied carefully. It has
been seriously debated before us as to whether the
doctrine can be applied beyond the realm of environmental
protection. Richard J. Lazarus in his article, “ Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine” ,
while expressing scepticism over the ‘liberation’ of the
doctrine, makes the following observations:-
“The strength of the public trust doctrine necessarily
lies in its origins; navigable waters and submerged lands
are the focus of the doctrine, and the basic trust
interests in navigation, commerce, and fishing are the
object of its guarantee of public access. Commentators
and judges alike have made efforts to “liberate”,
“expand”, and “modify” the doctrine’s scope yet its
basic focus remains relatively unchanged. Courts still
repeatedly return to the doctrine’s historical function to
determine its present role. When the doctrine is
expanded, more often than not the expansions require
tortured constructions of the present rather than
repudiations of the doctrine’s past.”
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89
Page 89
However, we feel that for the purpose of the present opinion, it
is not necessary to delve deep into the issue as in Intellectuals
Forum (supra), the main departure from the principle explained
by Joseph. L. Sax in his Article “The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention” is
that public trust mandates a high degree of judicial scrutiny, an
issue that we will anyway elaborately discuss while enunciating
the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.
91. We would also like to briskly deal with a similar argument
made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan. The learned senior counsel
submitted that the repository of sovereignty in our
framework is the people of this country since the opening
words of the Constitution read “We The People of India…
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do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this
Constitution,” and therefore the government, as the agent
of the Sovereign, the people, while alienating natural
resources, must heed to judicial care and due process.
Firstly, this Court has held in Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon’ble
33
Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors. that the “Constitution is
33 (2007) 3 SCC 184; Para 21
90
Page 90
the supreme lex in this country” and “all organs of the
State derive their authority, jurisdiction and powers from
the Constitution and owe allegiance to it”. Further, the
notion that the Parliament is an agent of the people was
squarely rebutted in In Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912
(supra), where it was observed that “the legislature as a
body cannot be seen to be an agency of the electorate as a
whole” and “acts on its own authority or power which it
derives from the Constitution”.
92. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Birla Cotton,
34
Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr. this Court
held that “the doctrine that it (the Parliament) is a
delegate of the people coloured certain American decision
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does not arise here” and that in fact the “Parliament which
by a concentration of all the powers of legislation derived
from all the three Legislative Lists becomes the most
competent and potent legislature it is possible to erect
under our Constitution.” We however, appreciate the
concern of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the lack of any such
34 [1968] 3 SCR 251
91
Page 91
power in the hands of the people must not be a sanction
for recklessness during disposal of natural resources. The
legislature and the Executive are answerable to the
Constitution and it is there where the judiciary, the
guardian of the Constitution, must find the contours to the
powers of disposal of natural resources, especially Article
14 and Article 39(b).
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92
Page 92
MANDATE OF ARTICLE 14:
93. Article 14 runs as follows:
“ 14. Equality before law. – The State shall not
deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India.”
94. The underlying object of Article 14 is to secure to all
persons, citizens or non-citizens, the equality of status and
opportunity referred to in the preamble to our Constitution.
The language of Article 14 is couched in negative terms
and is in form, an admonition addressed to the State. It
does not directly purport to confer any right on any person
as some of the other Articles, e.g., Article 19 , do. The right
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to equality before law is secured from all legislative and
executive tyranny by way of discrimination since the
language of Article 14 uses the word “State” which as per
Article 12, includes the executive organ. [See: Basheshar
Nath Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi &
35
Rajasthan & Anr. ]. Besides, Article 14 is expressed in
| 1959 Supp (1) SCR 528- “ | | | | | | | | | | | Coming then | | | | to the l | anguage | | | | | | of | | | the | | Article | | | | | it m | ust | | be | | noted, | |
|---|
| first | and | foremost | | | | | that | | t | his | | Article is, | | | in form, | an | | | admonition | | | | | | | | | addressed | | | | | to | | the | | | State |
| and | does | | not | directly | | | | purpo | | | | rt | to | confe | r any right | | | on | | any | | | | person | | | | | as | | som | | e of | | the | | | other |
| Articles, | | e.g., | | | Article | | | 19 | | , | do | . | The obli | | gation t | hus | | | imposed | | | | | | | o | n | | the | | | State, | | | no | | doubt, | |
93
Page 93
absolute terms and its effect is not curtailed by restrictions
like those imposed on Article 19(1) by Articles 19(2)-(6).
However, notwithstanding the absence of such restrictions,
certain tests have been devised through judicial decisions
to test if Article 14 has been violated or not.
95. For the first couple of decades after the establishment of
this Court, the ‘classification’ test was adopted which
allowed for a classification between entities as long as it
was based on an intelligible differentia and displayed a
rational nexus with the ultimate objective of the policy.
36
Budhan Choudhry & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar referred
to in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmiya Vs. Shri Justice S.R.
37
Tendolkar and Ors. explained it in the following terms:
JUDGMENT
“It is now well established that while article 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order,
however, to pass the test of permissible classification
two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that
| ensures | | for | | the | benefit | | | | of | | all | persons, f | | | | or, as a | necessary | | | result | | | | | of | | | the | | | | operation | | | | of | | this | |
|---|
| Article | , t | hey | | all | enjoy | | | equality | | | | | | | before | the law. | That | is | , | however, | | | | | | | | the | | | | indirect, | | | though | | | | |
| necessary | | | | and | inevitable, | | | | | | r | esult of t | | | | he mandate. | | The | | | command | | | | | | | | | | o | f th | e Articl | | | | | e | is |
| directed | | to | | the | State | | and | | | t | he | | reality of | | | the obligation | | thus | | | imposed | | | | | | | | | on | | the | State | | | | is | the | |
| measure | | of | | the | fundamental | | | | | | | right whic | | | | h every | perso | n | within | | | | the | | | | territory o | | | | | | f India | | | | i | s | to |
| enjoy. | ” | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
94
Page 94
are grouped together from others left out of the group
and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question. The classification may be founded
on different bases, namely, geographical, or according
to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary
is that there must be a nexus between the basis of
classification and the object of the Act under
consideration. It is also well established by the decisions
of this Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not
only by a substantive law but also by a law of
procedure.”
96. However, after the judgment of this Court in E.P.
38
Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr the
‘arbitrariness’ doctrine was introduced which dropped a
pedantic approach towards equality and held the mere
existence of arbitrariness as violative of Article 14,
however equal in its treatment. Justice Bhagwati (as his
Lordship was then) articulated the dynamic nature of
JUDGMENT
equality and borrowing from Shakespeare’s Macbeth, said
that the concept must not be “cribbed, cabined and
confined” within doctrinaire limits: -
“85. …Now, what is the content and reach of this great
equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the
words of Bose. J., “a way of life”, and it must not be
subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic
approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to
38 (1974) 4 SCC 3
95
Page 95
truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do
so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is
a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions
and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within
traditional and doctrinaire limits.”
His Lordship went on to explain the length and breadth of Article
14 in the following lucid words:
“85… From a positivistic point of view, equality is
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule
of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and
caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and is
therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any
matter relating to public employment, it is also violative
of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in
State action and ensure fairness and equality of
treatment. They require that State action must be based
on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all
similarly situate and it must not be guided by any
extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that
would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason
for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing
from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and
relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of
permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide
exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16.
Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are
different lethal radiations emanating from the same
vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are
inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.”
JUDGMENT
96
Page 96
97. Building upon his opinion delivered in Royappa’s case
(supra) , Bhagwati, J., held in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union
39
of India & Anr. :
“The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well
as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or
non- arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding
omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by
Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in
order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be
“right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or
oppressive.”
98. In Ajay Hasia & Ors. Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi &
| | | | | | at the ‘arbitrariness’ test was lying | | ‘ | arbitrariness | | | | | ’ | test | | was | | | | lying | | |
|---|
| “ | latent | | and | | submerged” | in the | “ | simple | | | but | | pregnant | | | | | ” | form | | | | of |
doctrine to the ‘arbitrariness’ doctrine in the following words:
“16…The doctrine of classification which is evolved by
the courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor is it the
objective and end of that article. It is merely a judicial
formula for determining whether the legislative or
executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore
constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not
reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions
referred to above, the impugned legislative or executive
action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of
equality under Article 14 would be breached. Wherever
therefore there is arbitrariness in State action whether it
be of the legislature or of the executive or of an
‘authority’ under Article 12, Article 14 immediately
springs into action and strikes down such State action.
JUDGMENT
39 (1978) 1 SCC 248
40 (1981) 1 SCC 722
97
Page 97
In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-
arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme
and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of
the fabric of the Constitution.”
| . Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport<br>Authority of India & Ors.41 explained the limitations of<br>Article 14 on the functioning of the Government as follows: -<br>“12…It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that<br>where the Government is dealing with the public,<br>whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts<br>or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of<br>largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its<br>sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any<br>person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity<br>with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational<br>or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government<br>in the matter of grant of largesse including award of<br>jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc. must be confined<br>and structured by rational, relevant and non-<br>discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government<br>departs from such standard or norm in any particular<br>case or cases, the action of the Government would be<br>liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the<br>JUDGMENT<br>Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but<br>was based on some valid principle which in itself was<br>not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.” | Rama | na Dayaram | Shetty | Vs. I | nternational | | | Airport | | |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | explained | | the | limitations | | | of |
| Article | 14 on the funct | ioning of t | he Governmen | t as fo | llows: | | - |
|---|
| “ | 12…I | | t must, therefo | re, be tak | en to | be | | the | | law | | that |
|---|
| where | | | the Governm | ent is de | aling | with | | | th | e | public, | |
| wheth | | | er by way of giv | ing jobs o | r entering | | | into | | contracts | | |
| or | | issu | ing quotas or li | cences or | granting | | o | ther | | form | | s of |
| larges | | | se, the Govern | ment cann | ot ac | t arbitrarily | | | | | a | t its |
| sweet<br>perso | | | will and, like a<br>n it pleases, but | private i<br>its action | ndividual,<br>must be | | | deal<br>in c | | with any<br>onformity | | |
| with s | | | tandard or norm | s which is | not a | rbitrary, | | | | irrational | | |
| or | | irre | levant. The pow | er or discretion | | of the | | Government | | | | |
| in | | the | matter of gra | nt of largesse i | | ncluding | | | | awar | | d of |
| jobs, c | | | ontracts, quota | s, licences | , etc. | mus | | t | be | confined | | |
| and | | | structured by | rational, | relevant | | | a | | nd | | non- |
| discriminatory standa | | | | rd or norm | and | if the | | Government | | | | |
| depart | | | s from such st | andard or | norm | in | a | ny | | particular | | |
| case o | | | r cases, the ac | tion of the | Government | | | | | would | | be |
| liable | | | to be struck do | wn, unless | it can | be | | shown | | | by | the |
| JUD<br>Government that the | | | | GME<br>departure | NT<br>was | not | | arbitrary, | | | | but |
| was b | | | ased on some | valid principle w | | hich | | in | | itself | | was |
| not irr | | | ational, unreaso | nable or d | iscriminatory.” | | | | | | | |
100. Equality and arbitrariness were thus, declared “sworn
enemies” and it was held that an arbitrary act would fall foul
of the right to equality. Non-arbitrariness was equated with
the rule of law about which Jeffrey Jowell in his seminal
article “ The Rule of Law Today ” said: -
41 (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628
98
Page 98
“Rule of law principle primarily applies to the power of
implementation. It mainly represents a state of
procedural fairness . When the rule of law is ignored by
an official it may on occasion be enforced by courts.”
101. As is evident from the above, the expressions ‘arbitrariness’
and ‘unreasonableness’ have been used interchangeably and
in fact, one has been defined in terms of the other. More
recently, in Sharma Transport Vs. Government of A.P. &
42
Ors. , this Court has observed thus:
“25…In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be
shown that it was not reasonable and manifestly
arbitrary. The expression “arbitrarily” means: in an
unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or
at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not
founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done
or acting according to reason or judgment, depending
on the will alone.”
JUDGMENT
102. Further, even though the ‘classification’ doctrine was never
overruled, it has found less favour with this Court as
compared to the ‘arbitrariness’ doctrine. In Om Kumar &
43
Ors. Vs. Union of India , this Court held thus:
“59. But, in E.P. Royappa v. State of T. N . Bhagwati, J
laid down another test for purposes of Article 14. It
was stated that if the administrative action was
(2002) 2 SCC 188
42
43 (2001) 2 SCC 386
99
Page 99
“arbitrary”, it could be struck down under Article 14.
This principle is now uniformly followed in all courts
more rigorously than the one based on classification.
Arbitrary action by the administrator is described as
one that is irrational and not based on sound reason.
It is also described as one that is unreasonable.”
| | | | | | |
|---|
| 3.However, this Court has also alerted against the arbitrary<br>use of the ‘arbitrariness’ doctrine. Typically, laws are<br>struck down for violating Part III of the Constitution of<br>India, legislative incompetence or excessive delegation.<br>However, since Royappa’s case (supra), the doctrine has<br>been loosely applied. This Court in State of A.P. & Ors.<br>Vs. McDowell & Co. & Ors.44 stressed on the need for an<br>objective and scientific analysis of arbitrariness, especially<br>while striking down legislations. Justice Jeevan Reddy | ted against the arbitrary<br>ne. Typically, laws are | | | | | |
| | Typically, | | laws | | are |
| struck | | down | | for | | violatin | g Part | | III | | of | | the | | Constitution | | of |
|---|
| India, | | legislative | | incompetence | | or | | excessive | | delegation. |
|---|
observed:
JUDGMENT
“43…The power of Parliament or for that matter, the
State Legislatures is restricted in two ways. A law made
by Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by
courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz., (1)
lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of
the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the
Constitution or of any other constitutional provision.
There is no third ground. We do not wish to enter into a
discussion of the concepts of procedural
unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness —
concepts inspired by the decisions of United States
Supreme Court. Even in U.S.A., these concepts and in
44 (1996) 3 SCC 709
100
Page 100
particular the concept of substantive due process have
proved to be of unending controversy, the latest
thinking tending towards a severe curtailment of this
ground (substantive due process). The main criticism
against the ground of substantive due process being
that it seeks to set up the courts as arbiters of the
wisdom of the legislature in enacting the particular
piece of legislation. It is enough for us to say that by
whatever name it is characterised, the ground of
invalidation must fall within the four corners of the two
grounds mentioned above. In other words, say, if an
enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can
be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of
the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined
therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as
violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1), it can be struck down
only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (s) to
(6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck
down by just saying that it is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity
has to be found before invalidating an Act. An
enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that
court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the
legislatures, composed as they are of the
representatives of the people, are supposed to know
and be aware of the needs of the people and what is
good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in
judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it
should be remembered that even in the case of
administrative action, the scope of judicial review is
limited to three grounds, viz., (i) unreasonableness,
which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii)
illegality and (iii) procedural impropriety (see Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service which
decision has been accepted by this Court as well).
JUDGMENT
An expression used widely and rather indiscriminately
— an expression of inherently imprecise import. The
extensive use of this expression in India reminds one of
what Frankfurter, J said in Hattie Mae Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 87 L ED 610 : 318
101
Page 101
US 54 (1943). “The phrase begins life as a literary
expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition and
repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula,
undiscriminatingly used to express different and
sometimes contradictory ideas”, said the learned
Judge.”
| Therefore, | | ever | | since the | Royappa | era, | | the | c | onception | | of |
|---|
| ‘ | arbitrariness | ’ | has | | not u | ndergone | a | ny | | significan | t | change. |
|---|
| Some | | decisions | | have | commented | | on | | the | | doctrinal |
|---|
looseness of the arbitrariness test and tried keeping its
folds within permissible boundaries. For instance, cases
where legislation or rules have been struck down as being
arbitrary in the sense of being unreasonable [See: Air
45
India Vs. Nergesh Meerza (SCC at pp. 372-373)] only
on the basis of “arbitrariness”, as explained above, have
JUDGMENT
been doubted in McDowell’s case (supra). But otherwise,
the subject matter, content and tests for checking violation
of Article 14 have remained, more or less, unaltered.
| From | | a | | scrutiny | | of | the | trend | | o | f | decisions | it | | is | | clearly |
|---|
| perceivable | | that | the | acti | on of | the | State, | | whether | it | | relates |
|---|
| to | | distribution | | of | | largess | e, grant | | of | contracts | or | allotment |
|---|
45 (1981) 4 SCC 335
102
Page 102
| of | | land, | is | to | be t | ested on | the touchstone of | Article 1 | 4 | of |
|---|
| the | | Constitution. | A law m | ay not be struck dow | n for b | eing |
|---|
| arbitrary | | without | the po | inting out | of | a c | onstitutional |
|---|
| infirmity as McDowell’s case (supra) has said. Therefore,<br>a State action has to be tested for constitutional infirmities<br>qua Article 14 of the Constitution. The action has to be fair,<br>reasonable, non-discriminatory, transparent, non-<br>capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism, in<br>pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable<br>treatment. It should conform to the norms which are<br>rational, informed with reasons and guided by public<br>interest, etc. All these principles are inherent in the<br>fundamental conception of Article 14. This is the mandate | infirmity | | | a | s McDowell’s c | | | | ase (supra) | has said | . Therefore, |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| a | State | | action | | | has | to be te | sted for constitution | | al infirmities |
| qua | Article | 14 | | of t | he Const | itution. The | action h | as to be | fair, |
|---|
| reasonable | , | non-discrim | inatory, | transpar | ent, | non- |
|---|
| capricious, | unbiased, with | out favouritism or n | epotism | , | in |
|---|
| pursuit | | of | promotion of he | althy competition a | nd equitable |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| rational, | i | nforme | | | d with r | easons an | d | guided | by public | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| interest, | e | tc. | | All | these | principles a | re | inhe | rent in | the |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| fundamental | | | conception o | | | f Article 14. | This is t | | he mandate | |
| of | | Article | 1 | 4 o | f | | th | e Constitu | tion of India. |
|---|
JUDGMENT
WHETHER ‘ AUCTION ’ A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE :
| Such | | being | | the | constit | utional intent | and | effect | | of |
|---|
| Article | | 14, | th | e | question ari | ses - can auction as | a metho | d | of |
|---|
| disposal | of | natur | al resour | ces be declared a c | onstitutional |
|---|
| mandate | u | nder | A | rticle 14 | of the Constitution o | f India? | We |
|---|
| would | | unhesitatingly answ | er it in the | | negativ | e since | any |
|---|
103
Page 103
| other | | answer w | ould be co | mpletely contrary | to t | he | scheme |
|---|
| of | | Article | 14. | Firstly, Arti | cle 14 may | | impl | y p | ositive | and |
|---|
| negative | rights | for | an ind | ividual, but | | with | respec | t | to | the |
|---|
| State, it is only couched in negative terms; like an<br>admonition against the State which prohibits the State<br>from taking up actions that may be arbitrary,<br>unreasonable, capricious or discriminatory. Article 14,<br>therefore, is an injunction to the State against taking<br>certain type of actions rather than commanding it to take<br>particular steps. Reading the mandate of auction into its<br>scheme would thus, be completely contrary to the intent of<br>the Article apparent from its plain language. | State, | it | is o | nly couche | d in negative | | | t | erm | s; | like | | | an |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| admonitio | | n ag | ainst the | State which | | prohibits | | | the | | S | tate | |
| from | ta | king | up actio | ns that | ma | y | be | arbitrary, |
|---|
| unreasonable, | capricious | or discriminatory. | Article |
|---|
| therefore | , is a | n injunctio | n to the | State | | against | | taking |
|---|
| certain ty | pe of | actions rat | her than commandin | g it | to | take |
|---|
| | | | | | | | |
|---|
| scheme w | ould | thus, be co | mpletely contrary | to t | he i | ntent | | of |
| the | | Articl | e apparent from i | ts plain language. |
|---|
| Secondly, | a co | nstitutional | mandate is | an | | absolu | te p | rinciple |
|---|
| that | | has t | J<br>o be | UDG<br>applied in a | MENT<br>ll situations | ; | it | | cannot | be | applied |
|---|
| in | | some a | nd n | ot tested in | others. The | | absolute | principle | | is |
|---|
| then | applied o | n a case by | case basis | to | | see | which | actions |
|---|
| fulfill | | the | requirements of | the constitutiona | l pr | inciple | and |
|---|
104
Page 104
108. Justice K. Subba Rao in his lectures compiled in a book
titled “ Some Constitutional Problems ”, critically
analyzing the trends of Indian constitutional development,
stated as follows:
“If the Courts, instead of limiting the scope of the
articles by construction, exercise their jurisdiction in
appropriate cases, I have no doubt that the arbitrariness
of the authorities will be minimised. If these authorities
entrusted with the discretionary powers, realize that
their illegal orders infringing the rights of the people
would be quashed by the appropriate authority, they
would rarely pass orders in excess of their powers. If
they knew that not only the form but the substance of
the orders would be scrutinized in open court, they
would try to keep within their bounds. The fear of
ventilation of grievance in public has always been an
effective deterrent. The apprehension that the High
Courts would be swamped with writs has no basis.”
Similar sentiments were expressed by Justice K. K. Mathew
109.
in series of lectures incorporated in the form of a book
JUDGMENT
titled “ Democracy, Equality and Freedom ” in which it is
stated that “the strength of judicial review lies in case to
| This | is precisely | | why | | this | Court | in | |
|---|
Holiness Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru Vs.
46 (1973) 4 SCC 225
105
Page 105
| “ | 1695 | | | | … | The | | | | reason | | | | | why | the | expression | | | | | | | "du | e process" | | | | | | | |
|---|
| has | | | never | | | | | been | | | | | | defined i | | s that i | | t embodies a | | | | | | | concept | | | | | | of | |
| fairness | | | | | | which | | | | | | h | | as | to be | decide | | d | with | | | | reference | | | | to | | | the | | |
| facts | | | | | and | | | | | circumstanc | | | | | | es of | | each | | | | | case | | and | | | | also | | | |
| according | | | | | | | | to | | | the | | | mores f | | or the | | time | | | being in | | | | force | | | | in | | | a |
| society | | | | | | to | | | whic | | | | | h | the c | oncept | | has | | | to | | | be | applied | | | | . | | As | |
| Justice | | | | | Frankfurter | | | | | | | | | | said, | "due | process" | | | | | i | s | not | a technical | | | | | | | |
| conception | | | | | | | | | with | | | | | a f | ixed c | ontent | | unrelated | | | | | | to | time, | | | place | | | | |
| and | | | | circumstances | | | | | | | | | | | [See | Joint | | Anti-Fascis | | | | | | | t Refugee | | | | | | | |
| Committee | | | | | | | | | | v. | | | | McGrath | | | U. | S. | 123] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Equality, | | therefore, ca | nnot b | e | limited | to | mean | | only |
|---|
| auction, | without | testing i | t in every | | scenario. |
|---|
47
of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar , this Court,
48
quoting from Kotch Vs. Pilot Comm'rs , had held that
“the constitutional command for a State to afford equal
protection of the laws sets a goal not attainable by the
invention and application of a precise formula. This Court
has never attempted that impossible task”. One cannot
JUDGMENT
test the validity of a law with reference to the essential
elements of ideal democracy, actually incorporated in the
Constitution. (See: Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj
49
Narain ). The Courts are not at liberty to declare a
statute void, because in their opinion it is opposed to the
spirit of the Constitution. Courts cannot declare a
47 1952 SCR 284 at pp. 297
48 330 U.S. 552
49 1975 (Supp) SCC 1
106
Page 106
limitation or constitutional requirement under the notion of
having discovered some ideal norm . Further, a
constitutional principle must not be limited to a precise
formula but ought to be an abstract principle applied to
| The re | percussion | of | holding | auction | as | | a |
|---|
| constitutional | | mandate | would | be | the | v | oiding | | of | e | very |
|---|
| action | t | hat | | deviates fro | m it, | including | social | endeavours, |
|---|
| welfare | schemes | | and p | romotional | policies, | even | | though |
|---|
| CPIL | i | tself | | has | | argued a | gainst | the | same | , a | nd | aske | d | for |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| natural | resources | | | mea | | nt for | privat | | e a | nd | commercial | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| business | ventures. | | | | It wo | uld be | odd | to | derive | | auction | | as | | a |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| constitutional | | | principle o | | | nly for | a li | mited | | set | of | situations | | | |
| from | | th | e | wide | and | gene | ric declaration | | of | Article | 14. | The |
|---|
| strength | of | | JUDG<br>constitutiona | MENT<br>l adjudication | lies | in | case | t | o | case |
|---|
| adjudication | | and | | therefor | e auction c | annot | be | elevated | to | | a |
|---|
| reading | | auction a | s a constitutional | mandate | w | ould |
|---|
| be | | impermissible | | becaus | e such | an | approach | may | distort |
|---|
| another | constitutional pr | inciple | embodied | in | Article | 3 | 9(b). |
|---|
107
Page 107
| Th | e | said | article | enumerat | ing certain | principles | of | policy | , to |
|---|
| be | followed | by | t | he State, | reads as follows: | |
|---|
| “The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards<br>securing –<br>(a) … …<br>…<br>(b) that the ownership and control of the<br>material resources of the community are<br>so distributed as best to subserve the<br>common good;<br>… …<br>…” | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| The | | disposal | | | of | natural resou | | | rces is a | facet | | | | of | | t | he | | use | | | and |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| distribution | | | | o | f s | uch | r | esources. | Article 39(b) | | | mandate | | | | | | s | that | | | the |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ownership | | | | and | | control of n | | | atural resources | | | | | | should | | | | | be | | so |
| “ | The | | State | shal | l, in parti | cular, direc | t | it | s | polic | y t | owards |
|---|
| securing | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (b) | t | hat | | the owne | rship and | control | | o | f | the |
|---|
| | aterial resour | | | ces of the | community | | | | are |
| | o | distributed | | as best t | o | subserv | | e | the |
| distributed | | so | as | to | b | est subse | rve the common | good. | Article | 37 |
|---|
| provide | s t | hat | th | e p | rovisions of | Part IV shall | | no | t | be | enforceable |
|---|
| by | | any | | Court, | but | the pri | nciples lai | d | down | | therein | | are |
|---|
| nevertheless | fundamental in th | e governance | of | the | country | and |
|---|
| it | | shall | be | | the | duty | of the St | ate to apply | | these | principles | in |
|---|
making laws.
108
Page 108
| Therefore, | this | Article, i | n a sense | , i | s | a | restriction | | on |
|---|
| ‘ | distributio | n’ | bui | lt into the | Constitution. | But | the | restriction |
|---|
| is | i | mpose | d | on | the obj | ect and | | not | the | m | eans. | | The |
|---|
| overarching and underlying principle governing<br>‘distribution’ is furtherance of common good. But for the<br>achievement of that objective, the Constitution uses the<br>generic word ‘distribution’. Distribution has broad contours<br>and cannot be limited to meaning only one method i.e.<br>auction. It envisages all such methods available for<br>distribution/allocation of natural resources which ultimately<br>subserve the “common good”.<br>3.In State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Vs. L. Abu Kavur Bai & | overarchin | | g a | | nd | un | derlying | principl | | e | governing | | | |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ‘ | distributio | n’ | is f | urtheran | | ce of common | | good. | | But | for | | the |
| achievement | of | that obje | ctive, the | | Constitutio | n | uses | | the |
|---|
| generi | c wo | rd | ‘distribution | ’. Distribution | has | broad | contours |
|---|
| and | canno | t | be | limited to | meaning | | on | ly | one | method | | i.e. |
|---|
| auction. I | t | envisages a | ll such | methods | available | | for |
|---|
| | | | | | od”. | | | | | | | |
| In | State o | f T | am | il | Nadu | & Ors. Vs. | L. | Abu | Kavu | r | Bai | | & |
| thi | s | Cou | rt | explai | ned the | broad-based | concept | | of |
|---|
| “ | 89 | | . … | The | word | | ‘distribut | | ion’ used | i | n | A | rticle | | 39(b | | ) | must | |
|---|
| be | | | broadly | | construed so | | | | that a court | | | m | ay | g | ive | full | | | and |
| comprehensive | | | | | | | effect to | | the statutory | | | | inten | | t c | ontained | | | |
| in | | | Article | | 39 | (b | ). | A narr | ow construction | | | | | o | f t | he | | word | |
| ‘ | distributio | | | | n’ | might | | defea | t or frustrate | | | | the | | ver | y | object | | |
| which | | | | the | Article | | seeks to | | subserve | …” | | | | | | | | | |
109
Page 109
| After | | noting | de | finitions | of ‘distr | ibution’ | fro | m different |
|---|
| “ | 92 | . | | It | is | obviou | | s, there | fore, that | in view | | of t | he vast | | |
|---|
| range | | | | | of | transactions | | | contempla | ted | by | the | word | | |
| ‘d | istribution’ | | | | | | as | mention | ed in the d | ictionaries r | | | eferred | | |
| t | o a | bove, | | | | it | will | not be | correct to | construe th | | | e word | | |
| ‘d | istribution’ | | | | | | in | a purely | literal se | nse so | | as to | mean | | |
| only | | | | division | | | of | a part | icular kin | d or | to | pa | rticular | | |
| persons | | | | | . | | The | words, | apportionment, | | | allo | tment, | | |
| allocation, | | | | | | classification, | | | clearly fa | ll within | | the | broad | | |
| sweep | | | | | of | th | e w | ord ‘dist | ribution’. | So constru | | | ed, the | | |
| word | | | ‘ | distributio | | | | n’ as use | d in Articl | e 39(b) | | will | include | | |
| various | | | | | facets, a | | | spects, | methods a | nd terminolo | | | gy of | | a |
| broad-based | | | | | | | concept of | | distribution | | | | | | |
| It | can | | thus | | , b | e s | een from | the afore-quoted | | paragraphs | | that |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| the | | ter | | m “ | distribute” und | | | oubtedly, | has wide a | | mplitude | and |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| encompasse | | | | | | s al | l mann | ers and m | ethods | of | distribution, | |
| which | | would | inc | lude cl | asses, ind | ustries, | regi | ons, | private |
|---|
| and | public | JUDG<br>sections, etc. | MEN<br>Having re | T<br>gard | to | the | basic | | nature |
|---|
| o | f | Article | 39(b) | , a nar | rower con | cept | of | eq | uality | | under |
|---|
| Article | | 14 | than | that dis | cussed ab | ove, | may f | rustrate | | the |
|---|
| broader | c | oncep | t of dis | tribution, | as conceive | d in | Article |
|---|
| 39(b). | | Ther | e ca | nnot, th | erefore, b | e a cavil th | at “common |
|---|
| good | ’ | and | “l | arge | r public | interests” | have | t | o be | regarded | | as |
|---|
| constitutiona | l re | ality des | erving act |
|---|
110
Page 110
| Learned | c | ouns | el for | CPIL argued | t | hat | revenue |
|---|
| maximization | during the | sale or alienation | of | a natural |
|---|
| resource | for | commercial | exploitation i | s | | the | on | ly way | of |
|---|
| achieving public good since the revenue collected can be<br>channelized to welfare policies and controlling the<br>burgeoning deficit. According to the learned counsel, since<br>the best way to maximize revenue is through the route of<br>auction, it becomes a constitutional principle even under<br>Article 39(b). However, we are not persuaded to hold so.<br>Auctions may be the best way of maximizing revenue but<br>revenue maximization may not always be the best way to<br>subserve public good. “Common good” is the sole guiding<br>factor under Article 39(b) for distribution of natural | | | | | | | |
|---|
| factor | u | nder | A | rticle 39( | b) for distribution o | f natural |
| achievin | g public | good sinc | e the revenue | | collect | ed can | be |
|---|
| channelized | | to | welfare | policies and | | controlling | the |
|---|
| burgeoning | defic | it. Accord | ing to the learned | counsel, si | nce |
|---|
| the | | best | way | to | maximize | revenue is through th | e rout | e of |
|---|
| auction, | it | becomes a con | stitutional principle e | ven un | der |
|---|
| | | are not persuaded t | | | o hold so. | |
|---|
| | | way of maximizing re | | | venue but | |
| | | | | | | |
| revenue | maximization may | | not always | be | the b | est wa | y to |
| | | | | | | |
| subserve | public | good. “Co | mmon good” | is | the so | le guiding | |
| resource | s. I | t is | the touc | hstone of testing | wh | ether | any |
|---|
| policy | s | ubserve | s the “co | mmon good | ” | and if | it d | oes, |
|---|
| irrespective | | of | the mea | ns adopted, | i | t | is | clearly | in |
|---|
| accordance | with | the princip | le enshrined | in | Article | 39(b). |
|---|
| In | | The | State | of Kar | nataka and | | Anr. | Vs. S | hri |
|---|
51 (1977) 4 SCC 471
111
Page 111
| observed that keepin | g in mind the purpose | | of | an | | Article |
|---|
| like | | 39(b), a broad rath | er than a narrow | meaning | should | be |
|---|
| given to the words of | that Article. In hi | s inimitable | | style, |
|---|
| his Lordship opined thus:<br>“83. Two conclusions strike us as quintessential. Part<br>IV, especially Article 39(b) and (c), is a futuristic<br>mandate to the state with a message of<br>transformation of the economic and social order.<br>Firstly, such change calls for collaborative effort from<br>all the legal institutions of the system: the legislature,<br>the judiciary and the administrative machinery.<br>Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high<br>purpose of the Constitution, viz., social and economic<br>justice in the context of material want and utter<br>inequalities on a massive scale, compels the court to<br>ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words<br>used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their<br>connotation into contradiction of the objectives<br>inspiring the provision. To be Pharisaic towards the<br>Constitution through ritualistic construction is to<br>weaken the social-spiritual thrust of the founding<br>fathers' dynamic faith.” | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| “ | 83. | | Two conclusions | strike us as quintessential. | | | | Part | |
| IV, | | | especially Article | 39(b) and (c), is | a | futuristic | | | |
| mandate to the | | | | state with a | message | | | | of |
| transformation of the | | | | economic and | social | | o | rder. | |
| Firstly, such change c | | | | alls for collaborativ | e effort | | | from | |
| all | | the legal institution | | s of the system: th | e legislature, | | | | |
| the | | judiciary and t | | he administrative | machinery. | | | | |
| Secondly and conseq | | | | uentially, loyalty | to | the | | high | |
| purpose of the Constit<br>justice in the contex | | | | ution, viz., social a<br>t of material wa | nd economic<br>nt and utter | | | | |
| inequalities on a mass | | | | ive scale, compels | the court | | | | to |
| ascribe expansive me | | | | aning to the pregnant | | | w | ords | |
| used with hopeful fore | | | | sight, not to circumscribe | | | | their | |
| connotation into co | | | | ntradiction of th | e objectives | | | | |
| inspiring the provision | | | | . To be Pharisaic | toward | | | s the | |
| Constitution through | | | | ritualistic construction | | | i | s | to |
| weaken the social-sp | | | | iritual thrust of t | he | founding | | | |
| fathers' dynamic faith. | | | | ” | | | | | |
JUDGMENT
| In | | the case of Benn | ett Coleman & C | o. | and | Ors. | | Vs. |
|---|
| that | “the only norm | which the Constitution | | furnishes | | for |
|---|
| distribution of materi | al resources of t | he | community | | is |
|---|
| elastic norm of comm | on good.” Thus “co | mmon | good | ” | i | s | a |
|---|
| norm in Article 39(b) w | hose applicability | was | considered | by |
|---|
52 (1972) 2 SCC 788
112
Page 112
| this | | Court on | the facts of | the case | . E | ven in | that | case, | this |
|---|
| Court | did not | evolve econ | omic criteria | of its | own | to | achieve |
|---|
| the | | goa | l of “c | ommon go | od” in Article | 39(b | ), which | is | part |
|---|
| of the Directive Principles.<br>9.The norm of “common good” has to be understood and<br>appreciated in a holistic manner. It is obvious that the<br>manner in which the common good is best subserved is not<br>a matter that can be measured by any constitutional<br>yardstick - it would depend on the economic and political<br>philosophy of the government. Revenue maximization is<br>not the only way in which the common good can be<br>subserved. Where revenue maximization is the object of a<br>policy, being considered qua that resource at that point of | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| policy | , | being | considered | qua that | r | esource | at that | point | | of |
| o | f t | he | Directiv | e Principles |
|---|
| The | | norm of | “common | good” has | to | be | understood | and |
|---|
| appreciated i | n a holistic | manner. | It | is o | bviou | s t | hat | the |
|---|
| manner | in wh | ich the com | mon good | is | best s | ubserved | is | not |
|---|
| a | | matter tha | t can be | measured | b | y an | y constitutional |
|---|
| | | | | nd on the economic and political | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| | | | | ment. Revenue maximization is | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| not | | the | only | way in w | hich the | | common | good | | can | | be | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| subserved. W | | | | here revenu | e maximization is | | | the | object | | of | | a |
| time | t | o | be th | e best way | to subserv | e the | commo | n | good, |
|---|
| auction | would | be one of | the preferable m | ethods, | though |
|---|
| not | | the | only | method. Wh | ere revenue | maximizatio | n | is | not |
|---|
| the | | object o | f a policy | of distribution, t | he question | | of |
|---|
| auction | woul | d not aris | e. Revenue | considerations | | may |
|---|
| assume | sec | ondary co | nsideration | to | developmental |
|---|
considerations.
113
Page 113
| Therefore, i | n | conclusion | , the submission | that | the | mandate |
|---|
| of | Artic | le 1 | 4 i | s | that any | disposa | l of | a | natural | resource | for |
|---|
| commercial | use must b | e for revenue | | maximization | , a | nd |
|---|
| thus by auction, is based neither on law nor on logic. There<br>is no constitutional imperative in the matter of economic<br>policies- Article 14 does not pre-define any economic policy<br>as a constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of 39(b)<br>imposes no restrictions on the means adopted to subserve<br>the public good and uses the broad term ‘distribution’,<br>suggesting that the methodology of distribution is not<br>fixed. Economic logic establishes that alienation/allocation<br>of natural resources to the highest bidder may not<br>necessarily be the only way to subserve the common good, | thus | | by | auction, is based | neither | on | law | | nor | | on | logic. | | There |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| is | no | c | onstitutional imp | erative i | n t | he | matter | | | | of | economic | |
| policies | - Article | 14 does | not pre-define | any | | economic | policy |
|---|
| as | a | co | nstitutional man | date. Even | the | mandate | of | 39(b) |
|---|
| impose | s no | restrictions | on the means | adopted | to | subserve |
|---|
| th | e | public | good and u | ses the | broad | t | erm | ‘ | distribution | ’, |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| fixed. E | | conomic logic es | | | | tablishes | that | alienation/allocation | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| of | natural | | resources t | | | o the | highest | | bidd | | | er | ma | y | not |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| necessarily | | | be | | the only | way to subserve | | | the | | common | | | good, | |
| an | d | at | times, | | may run | counter | to | public | | good. | Hence | , | it |
|---|
| needs l | ittle | JUDG<br>emphasis th | MENT<br>at disposal | of | al | l natural | resources |
|---|
| through | auctions is clear | ly not a | constitutional | mandate. |
|---|
| LEGITIMATE | DEVIATIONS F | ROM AUCTION |
|---|
| As | a | re | sult | , | this Court | has, on | a | number | o | f o | ccasions, |
|---|
| delivere | d j | udgments d | irecting | means | | for | disposal | of |
|---|
| natural | resources oth | er than | | auction | f | or | different |
|---|
114
Page 114
| resources | in | different circumst | ances. It would be profitable |
|---|
| to | | refer t | o a | | few cases and | appreciate the reasons | | this |
|---|
| Court ha | s adopted for devi | ating from the method | | of |
|---|
auction.
| In | | M/s | Kasturi Lal Laks | hmi Reddy Vs. State | | of |
|---|
| efficacy o | f auction in promotin | g a domestic industry, | | P.N. |
|---|
Bhagwati, J. observed: -
| simplicit | | | er there can be no d | | | oubt that the State would | | | |
|---|
| have to | | | auction or invite t | | | enders for securing | the | | |
| highest | | | price, subject, of cou | | | rse, to any other relevant | | | |
| overridin | | | g considerations of p | | | ublic weal or interest, | but | | |
| n | | a ca | se | | like this where | the State is allocating | | | |
| resource | | | s such as water, pow | | | er, raw materials etc. | f | or | |
| the | | pur | pose | | of encouraging | setting up of industries | | | |
| within th | | | e State, we do not t | | | hink the State is bound | | to | |
| advertis | | | JUDGME<br>e and tell the people | | | NT<br>that it wants a particular | | | |
| ndustry | | | to | be set up within t | | he State and invite those | | | |
| nterest | | | ed to | | come up with p | roposals for the purpose. | | | |
| The | | Stat | e may choose to do | | | so, if it thinks fit and i | n | | a |
| given | | | situation, it may | | | even turn out to | | be | |
| advantageous for the State t | | | | | | o do so, but if any private | | | |
| party co | | | mes | | before the Stat | e and offers to set up | | an | |
| ndustry | | | , the | | State would not | be committing breach | | of | |
| any | | con | stitutional or legal o | | | bligation if it negotiates | | | |
| with suc | | | h party and agrees | | | to provide resources | and | | |
| other fa | | | cilities for the pur | | | pose of setting up | the | | |
| ndustry | | | . The State is not o | | | bliged to tell such party: | | | |
| “Please | | | wait | | I will first adv | ertise, wee whether | any | | |
115
Page 115
| other offer | | | s are forthcom | ing and then after | considering |
|---|
| all | | offers, | decide wheth | er I should let you | set up the |
| industry”... | | | The State m | ust be free in suc | h a case to |
| negotiate | | | with a private | entrepreneur wit | h a view to |
| inducing hi | | | m to set up a | n industry within t | he State and |
| if | | the St | ate enters | into a contract | with such |
| entreprene | | | ur for prov | iding resources | and other |
| facilities fo | | | r setting up a | n industry, the con | tract cannot |
| be | | assailed | as invalid s | o long as the Stat | e has acted |
| bona fide, | | | reasonably | and in public inte | rest. If the |
| terms an | | | d conditions | of the contra | ct or the |
| surroundin | | | g circumstan | ces show that th | e State has |
| acted mala | | | fide or out of | improper or corru | pt motive or |
| in | | order to | promote the | private interests of | someone at |
| the | | cost | of the State | , the court will | undoubtedly |
| interfere a | | | nd strike do | wn State action a | s arbitrary, |
| unreasona | | | ble or contrar | y to public interest. | But so long |
| as the Sta | | | te action is b | ona fide and rea | sonable, the |
| court will<br>advertisem | | | not interfere<br>ent was give | merely on the gro<br>n or publicity mad | und that no<br>e or tenders |
| In | S | achida | nand Pande | y (supra) after no | ticing Kasturi |
|---|
| Lal’ | s case ( | supra), it was | concluded as und |
|---|
| “ | 40. On a | consideratio | n of the relevant c |
|---|
| at | the Ba | r the followin | g propositions may |
| a | s well e | stablished: S | tate-owned or pub |
| property | | is not to be | dealt with at the |
| discretion | | of the exec | utive. Certain pre |
| principles | | have to be | observed. Public i |
| the param | | ount conside | ration. One of the |
| of | secur | ing the pu | blic interest, wh |
| considere | | d necessary t | o dispose of a prop |
| sell the p | | roperty by p | ublic auction or b |
| tenders. T | | hough that i | s the ordinary rule |
| a | n invaria | ble rule. The | re may be situatio |
| there ar | | e compellin | g reasons nec |
116
Page 116
| departure from the | | rule but then | th | e reason |
|---|
| the | departure must | be rational and | | should n |
| suggestive of discri | | mination. Appearance of p | | |
| justice is as impor | | tant as doing | jus | tice. No |
| should be done whi | | ch gives an appearance of | | |
| jobbery or nepotism | | | | |
| In | | Haji T.M. Hassa | n Rawther | Vs. | Kerala | Financial |
|---|
| haustive review o | f the law | including |
|---|
| the | d | ecisions in Kast | uri Lal (supra) | and Sac | hidanand |
|---|
| Pandey (supra), it wa | s held that publi | c dispos | al of State |
|---|
| owned properties is n | ot the only rule. | It was, | inter-alia | , |
|---|
observed that:
| “ | 14. | | The public prope | rty owned by | the | State or | by any | | |
|---|
| instrumentality of the | | | | | State should | be g | enerally | sold by | | |
| publi | | | | c auction or by | inviting tenders. | | This Co | urt has | | |
| been | | | | insisting upon th | at rule, not only to | | get the | highest | | |
| price | | | | for the property | but also to ensur | | e fairnes | s in the | | |
| activities of the Sta | | | | | te and publi | c a | uthoritie | s. They | | |
| should undoubtedly a | | | | | ct fairly. Thei | r ac | tions sh | ould be | | |
| legitimate. Their deali | | | | | ngs should be | ab | oveboar | d. Their | | |
| JUD<br>transactions should b | | | | | GMENT<br>e without aversi | | on or af | fection. | | |
| Nothing should be sug | | | | | gestive of discrimination. | | | Nothing | | |
| should be done by th | | | | | em which gives a | | n impre | ssion | of | |
| bias, | | | | favouritism or n | epotism. Ordinari | | ly these | factors | | |
| woul | | | | d be absent if | the matter is | br | ought to | public | | |
| auction or sale by | | | | | tenders. That | is | why th | e court | | |
| repeatedly stated and | | | | | reiterated that t | | he State | -owned | | |
| properties are require | | | | | d to be disposed | | of publi | cly. But | | |
| that | | | | is not the only | rule. As O. Chinnappa R | | | eddy, | | J. |
| observed “that though | | | | | that is the ordin | | ary rule, | it is not | | |
| an | | | | invariable rule” | . There may | | be sit | uations | | |
| necessitating departu | | | | | re from the r | ule, | but the | n such | | |
| instances must be jus | | | | | tified by compulsions and | | | not by | | |
117
Page 117
| compromise. It must b | e justified by compelling re | asons |
|---|
| and not by just conven | ience.” | |
| Here, | | the Court added to th | e previous decisions | and sai | d that | | a |
|---|
| blithe | | deviation from public | disposal of resource | s woul | | d not | | be |
|---|
| | | | | | | | |
| tolerable; such a deviatio | | | n must be justified | by | co | mpelling | | |
| reasons and not by just convenience.<br>125.In M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. Vs. State of M.P. &<br>Ors.55, this Court held as follows:<br>“45. Although to ensure fair play and transparency in<br>State action, distribution of largesse by inviting open<br>tenders or by public auction is desirable, it cannot be<br>held that in no case distribution of such largesse by<br>negotiation is permissible. In the instant case, as a<br>policy decision protective measure by entering into<br>agreements with selected industrial units for assured<br>supply of sal seeds at concessional rate has been taken<br>by the Government. The rate of royalty has also been<br>fixed on some accepted principle of pricing formula as<br>will be indicated hereafter. Hence, distribution or<br>JUDGMENT<br>allotment of sal seeds at the determined royalty to the<br>respondents and other units covered by the agreements<br>cannot be assailed. It is to be appreciated that in this<br>case, distribution by public auction or by open tender<br>may not achieve the purpose of the policy of protective<br>measure by way of supply of sal seeds at concessional<br>rate of royalty to the industrial units covered by the<br>agreements on being selected on valid and objective<br>considerations.” | | | | | | | | |
| In | M.P. Oil Extracti | on and Anr. Vs. State | of | M.P. | | & |
|---|
| “45. Although to ensu | re fair play and transparen | | cy in | |
|---|
| State action, distribut<br>tenders or by public | ion of largesse by in<br>auction is desirable, i | viting<br>t cann | open<br>ot be | |
| held that in no case | distribution of such | larges | se by | |
| negotiation is permis | sible. In the instant | case, | as | a |
| policy decision prote | ctive measure by e | ntering | into | |
| agreements with sele | cted industrial units | for as | sured | |
| supply of sal seeds at | concessional rate has | been | taken | |
| by the Government. T | he rate of royalty ha | s also | been | |
| fixed on some accept | ed principle of pricing | formu | la as | |
| will be indicated h | ereafter. Hence, distributio | | n or | |
| JUD<br>allotment of sal seeds | GMENT<br>at the determined ro | yalty t | o the | |
| respondents and other | units covered by the | agreements | | |
| cannot be assailed. It | is to be appreciated | that i | n this | |
| case, distribution by | public auction or by | open t | ender | |
| may not achieve the p | urpose of the policy | of protective | | |
| measure by way of su | pply of sal seeds at c | oncessional | | |
| rate of royalty to the | industrial units covered b | | y the | |
| agreements on being | selected on valid a | nd obj | ective | |
| considerations.” | | | | |
55 (1997) 7 SCC 592
118
Page 118
| In | | Netai | Bag & Ors. Vs. | State of W.B. | & | Ors. |
|---|
| Cour | t | observed that non- fl | oating of tenders | or | not | holding |
|---|
| of | | public | auction would, no | t in all cases, be | deeme | d | to | | be |
|---|
| the result of the exercise of the executive power in an<br>arbitrary manner. It was stated:<br>“19. …There cannot be any dispute with the proposition<br>that generally when any State land is intended to be<br>transferred or the State largesse decided to be<br>conferred, resort should be had to public auction or<br>transfer by way of inviting tenders from the people. That<br>would be a sure method of guaranteeing compliance<br>with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Non-<br>floating of tenders or not holding of public auction would<br>not in all cases be deemed to be the result of the<br>exercise of the executive power in an arbitrary manner.<br>Making an exception to the general rule could be<br>justified by the State executive, if challenged in<br>appropriate proceedings. The constitutional courts<br>cannot be expected to presume the alleged<br>irregularities, illegalities or unconstitutionality nor the<br>courts can substitute their opinion for the bona fide<br>opinion of the State executive. The courts are not<br>concerned with the ultimate decision but only with the<br>JUDGMENT<br>fairness of the decision-making process. | the | | result | of the exercise | of the executiv | e p | owe | r | in | | an |
|---|
| “ | 19. | …The | | re cannot be an | y dispute with the | proposition | | | | |
|---|
| that | | generally when any | | | State land is intended t | | | o | be | |
| transferre | | | | d or the Stat | e largesse decided | | to | | be | |
| conferred, | | | | resort should | be had to public | auctio | | n | | or |
| transfer b | | | | y way of inviting | tenders from the | people. | | That | | |
| would | | | be | a sure method | of guaranteeing | compliance | | | | |
| with | | the m | | andate of Article | 14 of the Constitution. | | | Non- | | |
| floating of | | | | tenders or not h | olding of public a | uction w | | ould | | |
| not in all<br>exercise o | | | | cases be deem<br>f the executive p | ed to be the resul<br>ower in an arbitrary | | t of the<br>manner. | | | |
| Making a | | | | n exception to | the general rul | e c | ould | | be | |
| justified | | | | by the State | executive, if challenge | | | d | | in |
| appropriat | | | | e proceedings. | The constitutiona | | l c | ourts | | |
| cannot | | | | be expected | to presume t | he | alleged | | | |
| irregularit | | | | ies, illegalities o | r unconstitutionality | | nor | the | | |
| courts | | | ca | n substitute the | ir opinion for th | e b | ona | fide | | |
| opinion o | | | | f the State exe | cutive. The courts | | are | not | | |
| concerned | | | | with the ultima | te decision but o | nly | with | the | | |
| fairness of | | | | JUDGM<br>the decision-ma | | | | | | |
| This | | Cour | t | onc | e again pointed o | ut that there can | be | exceptions |
|---|
| from | | auction; | the ultimate test | is only that of | fairness | of | | the |
|---|
| decision | | makin | g process and co | mpliance with A | rticl | e 14 | o | f | the |
|---|
Constitution.
119
Page 119
| In | | M & | T Consult | ants, Secunderabad V | s. S.Y. |
|---|
| , this Court ag | ain reiterated | t | hat | non- fl | oating | of |
|---|
| tenders d | oes not alway | s lead to t | he | | conclusion | that t | he |
|---|
| exercise of the power is<br>“17. A careful and<br>consideration of the m<br>not leave any reasona<br>facts and circumstanc<br>obnoxious which requ<br>condemnation by court<br>now well settled th<br>absence of public au<br>sufficient reason to ca<br>a public authority as<br>or amounting to mal<br>improper abuse of po<br>Courts have always<br>latitude being left wit<br>own techniques of<br>concomitant economic<br>the exigencies of a s<br>financial policy in the<br>motivated by public i<br>such ventures.” | exercise | | | | | of the power is | arbitrary: | | | | | | |
|---|
| | “ | 17. A | | | careful and | dispassionate | | | | assessmen | | t and |
| | consideration of the m | | | | | aterials placed | | | | on | record | does |
| | not | | | leav | e any reasona | ble impression | | | | , on | the pe | culiar |
| | facts an | | | | d circumstanc | es of this | case, t | | | | hat an | ything |
| | obnoxio | | | | us which requ | ires either | | public | | | critici | sm or |
| | condemnation by court | | | | | s of law ha | d | taken | | | place. I | t is by |
| | now w | | | | ell settled th | at non-floating | | | | of | tende | rs or |
| | absence | | | | of public au | ction or invitation | | | | | alone | is no |
| | sufficien | | | | t reason to ca | stigate the | move o | | | | r an act | ion of |
| | a | | public authority as | | | either arbitrary or | | | | | unreasonable | |
| | or amounting to mal<br>improper abuse of po | | | | | a fide or i<br>wer by the | mproper<br>authorit | | | | exercise or<br>y concerned. | |
| | Courts | | | | have always | leaned in | favour | | | | of suf | ficient |
| | latitude | | | | being left wit | h the authorities t | | | | | o adop | t their |
| | own te | | | | chniques of | management | | o | | f p | rojects | with |
| | concomi | | | | tant economic | expediencies | | | | depending | | upon |
| | the | | | exi | gencies of a s | ituation guided | | | | by | appropriate | |
| | financia | | | | l policy in the | best interests | | | | of | the aut | hority |
| | motivat | | | | ed by public i | nterest as | wel | | | l in | undertaking | |
| | such ve | | | | ntures.” | | | | | | | |
| In | | Villian | ur Iyarkkai P | adukappu | Maiya | m Vs. U | nion | of |
|---|
| e Judge Bench | of | this C | ourt | was |
|---|
| concerne | d with the deve | lopment of | the | Por | t of Pon | dicherry |
|---|
| where a | contractor had | been selected | wi | thout fl | oating | | a |
|---|
| tender or | holding public | auction. It | was | held | as und |
|---|
| 57<br>58 | (2003) | | 8 | | SCC 1 |
|---|
| (2009) | | 7 | | SCC 5 |
120
Page 120
| “164. The plea raised by the learned counsel for the<br>appellants that the Government of Pondicherry was<br>arbitrary and unreasonable in switching the whole<br>public tender process into a system of personal<br>selection and, therefore, the appeals should be<br>accepted, is devoid of merits. It is well settled that<br>non-floating of tenders or not holding of public<br>auction would not in all cases be deemed to be the<br>result of the exercise of the executive power in an<br>arbitrary manner.<br>171. In a case like this where the State is allocating<br>resources such as water, power, raw materials, etc.<br>for the purpose of encouraging development of the<br>port, this Court does not think that the State is bound<br>to advertise and tell the people that it wants<br>development of the port in a particular manner and<br>invite those interested to come up with proposals for<br>the purpose. The State may choose to do so if it<br>thinks fit and in a given situation it may turn out to be<br>advantageous for the State to do so, but if any<br>private party comes before the State and offers to<br>develop the port, the State would not be committing<br>breach of any constitutional obligation if it negotiates<br>with such a party and agrees to provide resources<br>and other facilities for the purpose of development of<br>the port.” | “ | 164. | | | | The pl | ea raised | by the le | arned | cou | nsel | for | the | |
|---|
| appellants th | | | | | | at the G | overnmen | t of | Pondicherry | | | was | |
| arbitrary an | | | | | | d unreasonable in | | switching | | the | whole | | |
| public | | | | | tende | r proces | s into a | system | | of personal | | | |
| selection an | | | | | | d, there | fore, the | appeals | | should | | be | |
| accepted, is | | | | | | devoid o | f merits. | It is | well | settled | | that | |
| non-floating | | | | | | of tende | rs or n | ot holdin | | | | | |
| 171 | | | | . In | a cas | e like thi | s where t | he State | | is allocating | | | |
| resources su | | | | | | ch as wa | ter, powe | r, raw m | | aterials, | | etc. | |
| for | | | | the | purp | ose of en | couraging | development | | | of | the | |
| port | | | | , t | his Cou | rt does n | ot think t | hat the St | | ate is | bound | | |
| to | | | | advertise | | and te | ll the p | eople | tha | t it | wants | | |
| development | | | | | | of the p | ort in a p | articular | | manner | | and | |
| invite those i<br>the purpose. | | | | | | nterested<br>The Sta | to come<br>te may c | up with p<br>hoose to | | roposals<br>do so | | for<br>if it | |
| thinks fit and | | | | | | in a give | n situatio | n it may tu | | rn ou | t t | o be | |
| advantageou | | | | | | | State to do so, but if any<br>before the State and offers to | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | nd offer | | s | to |
| develo | | | | | p the | port, the | State wou | ld not be | | committing | | | |
| breach | | | | | of an | y constitu | tional obl | igation if i | | t negotiates | | | |
| with | | | | s | uch a | party an | d agrees | to provid | | e resources | | | |
| and | | | | other fac | | ilities for | the purp | ose of | dev | elopmen | | t | of |
| the | | | | port.” | | | | | | | | | |
JUDGMENT
129. Hence, it is manifest that there is no constitutional
mandate in favour of auction under Article 14. The
Government has repeatedly deviated from the course of
auction and this Court has repeatedly upheld such actions.
The judiciary tests such deviations on the limited scope of
arbitrariness and fairness under Article 14 and its role is
limited to that extent. Essentially whenever the object of
121
Page 121
policy is anything but revenue maximization, the Executive
is seen to adopt methods other than auction.
| 0. A fortiori, besides legal logic, mandatory auction may be<br>contrary to economic logic as well. Different resources<br>may require different treatment. Very often, exploration<br>and exploitation contracts are bundled together due to the<br>requirement of heavy capital in the discovery of natural<br>resources. A concern would risk undertaking such<br>exploration and incur heavy costs only if it was assured<br>utilization of the resource discovered; a prudent business<br>venture, would not like to incur the high costs involved in<br>exploration activities and then compete for that resource | | A | fortiori, be | | sides | | legal lo | gic, mandato | ry | auctio | n may | be |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| contrary | | | to | economic log | | | ic as well. | Different | | resources | |
| may | | require | different tre | atment. Very | often, e | xploration |
|---|
| and | exploitati | on contracts | are bundled t | ogether | due | | to | the |
|---|
| requirement | of heavy cap | ital in the d | iscovery | of | natural |
|---|
| | | | | | vy costs only if it was assured | | | | | | |
| utilization of | | | the resource | | | discovered; | a pruden | | | t business | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| venture, | | wou | ld no | t | like to | incur the hig | h costs i | | | nvolved | | in |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| exploration a | | | ctivities and | | | then compet | e for | | tha | t resource | | |
| in | an | | open a | uction. | The l | ogic is similar | to | | that | applied | | in |
|---|
| patents. | | Firm | JU<br>s are | | DGM<br>given | ENT<br>incentives to | invest in | research |
|---|
| and | developm | ent | with the | promise of | exclusive | access | | to |
|---|
| th | e | market fo | r the | sale of t | hat invention | . Such an | approach |
|---|
| is | | economic | ally | and le | gally sound | and s | ometimes |
|---|
| necessary to | spur | | resear | ch and development. | Similarly, |
|---|
| bundling | exp | loration and | exploitation | contract | s may | be |
|---|
| necessary to | spur | growth i | n a specific in |
|---|
122
Page 122
| Similar | deviation | from a | uction can | not | be | | ruled | out | when |
|---|
| the | | object | of | a | State | policy is | to | promote | domestic |
|---|
| development of an industry, like in Kasturi Lal’s case,<br>discussed above. However, these examples are purely<br>illustrative in order to demonstrate that auction cannot be<br>the sole criteria for alienation of all natural resources.<br>POTENTIAL OF ABUSE<br>132.It was also argued that even if the method of auction is not<br>a mandate under Article 14, it must be the only<br>permissible method, due to the susceptibility of other<br>methods to abuse. This argument, in our view, is contrary<br>to an established position of law on the subject cemented | development | | | | | | of | | an indu | stry, like in | Kasturi L | | | | al’s | case | , |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| discussed | | | | | a | bove. | | Howe | ver, these | examples | | | | are | purely | |
| | | | | | | | | | en if the method of auction is not | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | cle 14, it must be the only | | | | | | | |
| permissible | | | | | | method, du | | | e to the | susceptibilit | | | | y of | other | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| method | | | | s | to | abuse. This a | | | rgument, i | n our | | | view, | is contrary | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| to | | an | e | stablished | | | | positio | n of law on | the | subject | | | cemented | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| illustrative | in | order to de | monstrate | that | auction | cannot | | be |
|---|
| the | | sole | criteria | for aliena | tion of all n | atural | | resources. |
|---|
JUDGMENT
| In | | R.K. | Gar | g Vs. | Union | of India | & Ors. |
|---|
| Bhagwati, | | speaking for a | Constitutio | n Bench of f | ive learned |
|---|
| “ | 8. | … | Th | e | Cou | rt | must alw | ays remember | | that “le | | gislation |
|---|
| is | | directed | | | | to | practical | problems, | tha | t | the e | conomic |
| mechanism i | | | | | | s highly sen | | sitive and | complex, th | | | at many |
123
Page 123
| problems | | | are singular an | d continge | nt, that la | ws are not | | |
|---|
| abstract | | | propositions an | d do not relate to abs | | tract units | | |
| and are | | | not to be mea | sured by a | bstract s | ymmetry | ” | ; |
| “ | that exa | | ct wisdom and | nice adaptio | n of reme | dy are not | | |
| always | | | possible” and | that “judgment is | | largely | a | |
| prophecy | | | based on | meager | and uni | nterpreted | | |
| experien | | | ce”. Every legis | lation particularly in | | economic | | |
| matters | | | is essentially | empiric an | d it is | based on | | |
| experimentation or wha | | | | t one may | call trial | and error | | |
| method | | | and therefore it | cannot provide for a | | ll possible | | |
| situation | | | s or anticipate | all possible | abuses. | There may | | |
| be | | crudit | ies and inequiti | es in complicated ex | | perimental | | |
| economic | | | legislation but | on that account alon | | e it cannot | | |
| be | | struck | down as invalid | . The court | s cannot, | as pointed | | |
| out by th | | | e United State | s Supreme | Court in | Secretary | | |
| of | | Agric | ulture v. Cent | ral Reig R | efining C | ompany | 60 | |
| be | | conve | rted into tribun | als for relief | from suc | h crudities | | |
| and ineq | | | uities. There ma | y even be possibilitie | | s of abuse, | | |
| but that<br>the legi | | | too cannot of its<br>slation, becaus | elf be a ground for i<br>e it is not possibl | | nvalidating<br>e for any | | |
| legislatur | | | e to anticipate | as if by som | e divine p | rescience, | | |
| distortion | | | s and abuses | of its legislation whic | | h may be | | |
| made by | | | those subject t | o its provisions and | | to provide | | |
| against s | | | uch distortions | and abuses | . Indeed, | howsoever | | |
| great ma | | | y be the care | bestowed | on its fra | ming, it | is | |
| difficult t | | | o conceive of a | legislation | which is n | ot capable | | |
| of | | being | abused by pe | rverted human inge | | nuity. The | | |
| Court m | | | ust therefore a | djudge the | constitut | ionality | of | |
| such legi | | | JUDG<br>slation by the | MENT<br>generality o | f its prov | isions and | | |
| not by its | | | crudities or ine | quities or b | y the pos | sibilities | of | |
| abuse of | | | any of its provis | ions. If any | crudities, | inequities | | |
| or | | possib | ilities of abuse | come to l | ight, the | legislature | | |
| can alw | | | ays step in an | d enact s | uitable a | mendatory | | |
| legislatio | | | n. That is the e | ssence of | pragmatic | approach | | |
| which m | | | ust guide and in | spire the l | egislature | in dealing | | |
| with com | | | plex economic i | ssues.” | | | | |
60 94 L Ed 381 : 338 US 604 (1950)
124
Page 124
| Then | again, | in D. K. Triv | edi & Son | s & | Ors. | Vs. | Stat | e of |
|---|
| le upholdi | ng t | he | constitutional |
|---|
| validity of | Section 15(1 | ) of the M | MRD | Ac | t, t | his | C | ourt |
|---|
| explained the principle in the following words:<br>“50. Where a statute confers discretionary powers<br>upon the executive or an administrative authority, the<br>validity or constitutionality of such power cannot be<br>judged on the assumption that the executive or such<br>authority will act in an arbitrary manner in the<br>exercise of the discretion conferred upon it. If the<br>executive or the administrative authority acts in an<br>arbitrary manner, its action would be bad in law and<br>liable to be struck down by the courts but the<br>possibility of abuse of power or arbitrary exercise of<br>power cannot invalidate the statute conferring the<br>power or the power which has been conferred by it.”<br>5.Therefore, a potential for abuse cannot be the basis for | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| Therefore, a | potential fo | r abuse ca | nnot | be | the | basis | for |
| explained th | e principle in | the followin | g words: |
|---|
| “ | 50. | | Where | a statute co | nfers discretionary | | | | |
|---|
| upon | | | the ex | ecutive or an | administrat | ive a | uthority | | |
| validity or c | | | | onstitutionalit | y of such | powe | r ca | nno | |
| judged on t | | | | he assumption | that the e | xecutive | | or | |
| authority w | | | | ill act in an | arbitrary | manner | | in | |
| exercise of | | | | the discretio | n conferre | d upon i | | t. If | |
| executive o | | | | r the adminis | trative authorit | | y ac | ts i | |
| arbitrary ma | | | | nner, its acti | on would b | e ba | d in | law | |
| liable to b<br>possibility o | | | | e struck dow<br>f abuse of po | n by the courts but<br>wer or arbitrary exercis | | | | |
| power cann | | | | ot invalidate | the statute conferring | | | | |
| power or the | | | | power which | has been c | onferred | | by i | t.” |
| striking dow | n a method a | s ultra vire | s the | Constitution. | It is |
|---|
| the | | actual | JUDG<br>abuse itself t | MENT<br>hat must b | e broug | ht b | efore | the |
|---|
| Court | for | being tested | on the a | nvil | of | constitutional |
|---|
| provisions. I | n fact, it may | be said th | at even | auction | ha | s a |
|---|
| potential of | abuse, like an | y other me | thod | of a | llocation, | but |
|---|
| that | canno | t be the | basis of | declarin | g it | | as | an |
|---|
| unconstituti | onal method | ology eith | er. T | hes | e d | rawbacks |
|---|
| include cart | elization, “win | ners curse | ” (the | phenomenon | by |
|---|
125
Page 125
| which a | bidder b | ids a hi | gher, u | nrealistic | | an | d | unexecutable |
|---|
| price ju | st to | surpass the | competition; | or | | where | a | bidder, | in |
|---|
| case of | multiple | auction | s, bids | for | al | l | the | resources | | and |
|---|
| ends up winning licenses for exploitation of more<br>resources than he can pragmatically execute), etc.<br>However, all the same, auction cannot be called ultra vires<br>for the said reasons and continues to be an attractive and<br>preferred means of disposal of natural resources especially<br>when revenue maximization is a priority. Therefore,<br>neither auction, nor any other method of disposal can be<br>held ultra vires the Constitution, merely because of a<br>potential abuse. | ends u | p | winni | ng lice | nses | for | exploitation | | | of | | more | |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| resourc | es t | han | he ca | n pragmatically | | | | execute), | | | | etc. |
| Howeve | r, all | the | same, a | uction | cannot | be | called | ultra | vires |
|---|
| for | the | said | reasons and | continues | | to | be | | an | attractive | | and |
|---|
| preferre | d means | of dispo | sal of | natural | resources | especially |
|---|
| when r | evenue | maximization | is | a | p | riority. | | Therefore, |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| held ul | tra | vires | the Co | nstitution, | | merely | because | of | | a |
| JUDICIAL RE | VIEW O | F POLIC | Y DECISIONS |
|---|
| The | lea | rned | Attorney Ge | neral a | lso | | argued | t | hat | dictating | | a |
|---|
| method | of | distribution f | or natural | | resources | | violate | s | the |
|---|
| age | old | established pri | nciple | of | non-interference | | b | y | the |
|---|
| judiciar | y in | policy | matter | s. Even | thoug | h | the | contours | o | f | the |
|---|
| power | of judicial | review | of poli | cy | decisions | has | become | | a |
|---|
| trite su | bjec | t, as | the C | ourts | have | r | epeatedly | delivered |
|---|
| opinion | s on | it, w | e wish t | o reiterate | some | o | f | the | principles |
|---|
126
Page 126
| in | b | rief, | especial | ly with r | egard t | o economic | | polic | y choices |
|---|
137. One of the earliest pronouncements on the subject came
from this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union
62
of India (commonly known as “ Bank Nationalization
| Case”) wherein this Court held that it is not the foru<br>where conflicting policy claims may be debated; it is o<br>required to adjudicate the legality of a measure which h<br>little to do with relative merits of different political a<br>economic theories. The Court observed:<br>“63. This Court is not the forum in which these<br>conflicting claims may be debated. Whether there is a<br>genuine need for banking facility in the rural sector,<br>JUDGMENT<br>whether certain classes of the community are deprived<br>of the benefit of the resources of the banking industry,<br>whether administration by the Government of the<br>commercial banking sector will not prove beneficial to<br>the community and will lead to rigidity in the<br>administration, whether the Government administration<br>will eschew the profit-motive, and even if it be<br>eschewed, there will accrue substantial benefits to the<br>public, whether an undue accent on banking as a means<br>of social regeneration, especially in the backward areas,<br>is a doctrinaire approach to a rational order of priorities<br>for attaining the national objectives enshrined in our<br>Constitution, and whether the policy followed by the | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| “ | 63 | | . | | This | | | | Court | | is no | t the f | orum | | i | | n | | | which | | | these | | | |
| conflicting | | | | | | | | | claim | | s may b | e debat | ed. | Whether | | | | | | | | the | re is | | | a |
| genuine | | | | | | | need fo | | | | r banki | ng facili | ty in | | | the | | | | rural | | | sector, | | | |
| whether | | | | | | | J<br>certain | | | | UDG<br>classes | MEN<br>of the c | T<br>ommunity | | | | | | | are d | | | eprived | | | |
| of | | t | he | | | benefit of | | | | | the res | ources o | f the | | | banking in | | | | | | | dustry, | | | |
| whether | | | | | | | | administration | | | | by the | Government | | | | | | | | | | of | the | | |
| commercial | | | | | | | | | | banking sec | | tor will | not | prove | | | | | | beneficial | | | | | to | |
| the | | | | community | | | | | | | and | will lea | d to | | | | rigidity | | | | | | in | the | | |
| administration, w | | | | | | | | | | | hether | the Government | | | | | | administration | | | | | | | | |
| will | | | | eschew | | | | | | th | e profit-motive, | | and | | | | even | | | | | if | it | | be | |
| eschewed | | | | | | | | , | there | | will acc | rue sub | stantial | | | | | benefits | | | | | to | the | | |
| public, | | | | | | whether a | | | | | n undue | accent | on banking | | | | | | | | as a | | means | | | |
| of | | s | ocial | | | | regeneration, es | | | | | pecially | in the | | | | backward | | | | | | areas, | | | |
| is | | a | doctrinaire a | | | | | | | | pproach | to a rat | ional | | | order | | | | | of pr | | iorities | | | |
| for | | | attaining | | | | | | | the | nation | al objectives | | | | enshrined | | | | | | | in | our | | |
| Constitution, | | | | | | | | | | an | d wheth | er the | policy | | | | followed | | | | | | by | the | | |
62 (1970) 1 SCC 248
127
Page 127
| Government in office or the policy propounded by its<br>opponents may reasonably attain the national<br>objectives are matters which have little relevance in<br>determining the legality of the measure. It is again not<br>for this Court to consider the relative merits of the<br>different political theories or economic policies. The<br>Parliament has under Entry 45, List I the power to<br>legislate in respect of banking and other commercial<br>activities of the named banks necessarily incidental<br>thereto: it has the power to legislate for acquiring the<br>undertaking of the named banks under Entry 42, List III.<br>Whether by the exercise of the power vested in the<br>Reserve Bank under the pre-existing laws, results could<br>be achieved which it is the object of the Act to achieve,<br>is, in our judgment, not relevant in considering whether<br>the Act amounts to abuse of legislative power. This<br>Court has the power to strike down a law on the ground<br>of want of authority, but the Court will not sit in appeal<br>over the policy of the Parliament in enacting a law. The<br>Court cannot find fault with the Act merely on the<br>ground that it is inadvisable to take over the<br>undertaking of banks which, it is said by the petitioner,<br>by thrift and efficient management had set up an<br>impressive and efficient business organization serving<br>large sectors of industry.” | Government | | | | in office or the po | licy propounded by i | ts |
|---|
| opponents | | | | may reasonably | attain the national | |
| objectives a | | | | re matters which h | ave little relevance | in |
| determining | | | | the legality of the | measure. It is again not | |
| for | t | his Cou | | rt to consider the | relative merits of the | |
| different po | | | | litical theories or e | conomic policies. The | |
| Parliament | | | | has under Entry 45 | , List I the power | to |
| legislate in | | | | respect of banking | and other commercial | |
| activities of | | | | the named banks | necessarily incidental | |
| thereto: it h | | | | as the power to leg | islate for acquiring the | |
| undertaking | | | | of the named banks | under Entry 42, List I | II. |
| Whether by | | | | the exercise of th | e power vested in the | |
| Reserve Ban | | | | k under the pre-exis | ting laws, results could | |
| be | achieved | | | which it is the objec | t of the Act to achieve, | |
| is, | in | our jud | | gment, not relevant | in considering whether | |
| th | e | Act am | | ounts to abuse of | legislative power. This | |
| Cour | | t | has th | e power to strike do | wn a law on the ground | |
| of want of a | | | | uthority, but the Cou | rt will not sit in appeal | |
| over<br>Cour | | the pol<br>t canno | | icy of the Parliament<br>t find fault with t | in enacting a law. The<br>he Act merely on the | |
| ground tha | | | | t it is inadvisabl | e to take over the | |
| undertaking | | | | of banks which, it is | said by the petitioner, | |
| by | t | hrift an | | d efficient manage | ment had set up | an |
| impressive a | | | | nd efficient busine | ss organization serving | |
| large | | sectors | | | | |
| In | R.K. Ga | JUDGMEN<br>rg (supra), this Co | T<br>urt even observed | that |
|---|
| greater judic | ial deference must | be shown towards a | l | aw |
|---|
| relating to | economic activities | due to the complexity | | of |
|---|
| economic p | roblems and thei | r fulfillment through | | a |
|---|
| methodology | of trial and error. A | s noted above, it was | also |
|---|
| clarified that | the fact that an ec | onomic legislation may | be |
|---|
| troubled by | crudities, inequiti | es, uncertainties or | t | he |
|---|
| possibility o | f abuse cannot be | the basis for striking | | it |
|---|
128
Page 128
| down. The f | ollowing observa | tions which refer t | o a couple |
|---|
| of | | American | Supreme Co | urt decisions | are | a l | impid |
|---|
enunciation on the subject :
| “8. Another rule of equal importance is that laws<br>relating to economic activities should be viewed with<br>greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as<br>freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no<br>less a person than Holmes, J., that the legislature should<br>be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to<br>deal with complex problems which do not admit of<br>solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula<br>and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing<br>with economic matters, where, having regard to the<br>nature of the problems required to be dealt with,<br>greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the<br>legislature. The court should feel more inclined to give<br>judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of<br>economic regulation than in other areas where<br>fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has<br>this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in<br>Morey v. Doud63 where Frankfurter, J., said in his<br>inimitable style: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| “ | 8. | Another | rule of equal | importance | is th | | at laws | |
| relating to e | | | conomic activit | ies should be | | view | ed with | |
| greater latit | | | ude than laws t | ouching civil rights | | | such | as |
| freedom of s | | | peech, religion | etc. It has been sai | | | d by | no |
| less | | a person | than Holmes, J. | , that the legislature | | | should | |
| be | | allowed | some play in th | e joints, because it | | | has | to |
| dea | | l with c | omplex problem | s which do | not a | | dmit | of |
| solution thro | | | ugh any doctrin | aire or strait-jacket | | | formula | |
| and | | this is p | articularly true i | n case of legislation | | | dealing | |
| with | | econom | ic matters, wh | ere, having regard | | | to t | he |
| nature of t<br>greater play | | | he problems re<br>in the joints | quired to be dea<br>has to be allowed | | | lt with,<br>to the | |
| legislature. T | | | he court should | feel more inclined | | | to give | |
| judicial defe | | | rence to legislat | ive judgment i | n the | | field | of |
| economic r | | | egulation than | in other | areas | | where | |
| fundamental | | | human rights | are involved. | Nowh | | ere h | as |
| this | | admonit | ion been more fe | licitously expressed | | | than | in |
| Morey v. | | | Doud63 where Frankfurter, J., said in his<br>yle: | Frankfurter, J. | , said | | in | his |
| inimitable st | | | | | | | | |
| utilities, tax an | d economic regulati | | |
|---|
| JUDGM<br>here are good r | ENT<br>easons for judicial s | | |
| t if not judicial d | eference to legislati | | |
| nt. The legislat | ure after all | has t | |
| ive responsibili | ty. The courts ha | | |
| e power to destr | oy, not to reconstru | | |
| hese are added | to the complexity | | |
| ic regulation, | the uncertainty, t | | |
| to error, the bew | ildering conflict of t | | |
| , and the numb | er of times the | | judg |
| een overruled | by events — s | | |
| n can be see | n to be the | path | |
| wisdom and ins | titutional prestige a | | |
| ’...” | | | |
129
Page 129
| In | | Premium | Granites & | Anr. V | s. State | of | | T.N. | & | | Ors. |
|---|
| this | | Court | clarified | | that it | is the v | alidity | | of | a | | law a | nd | | not | | its |
|---|
| “ | 54. | | | | It | i | s | not | | the | | | domai | n of th | e court | | | | to | | embar | | | k upon | | | | |
|---|
| unchartered | | | | | | | | | | ocean of p | | | | | ublic p | olicy | | in | | | an | | | exercise | | | | | to |
| consider | | | | | | | | a | s t | o | whether a | | | | particu | lar | public | | | | | policy | | | is | wise | | | |
| or | | | a | | bette | | | | r p | ublic | | | | policy | can be | evolved. | | | | | Such e | | | | xercise | | | | |
| must | | | | | | be | | l | ef | t | to | | the di | | scretion | of | the | | | | executi | | | | ve | | and | | |
| legislative | | | | | | | | | authorities as | | | | | | the ca | se may | | | | be. | | | The | | court | | | | is |
| called | | | | | | | upon | | | to | c | onsider | | | the va | lidity | | of | | | a | public | | | policy | | | | |
| only | | | | | when | | | | a | challenge is | | | | | made t | hat | such | | | | policy d | | | | ecision | | | | |
| infringes fundamental<br>Constitution of India or a | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rights<br>ny othe | guaranteed b<br>r statutory right.. | | | | | | | | | y the<br>.” | | | | |
140. In Delhi Science Forum & Ors. Vs. Union of India &
65
Anr. a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, while
rejecting a claim against the opening up of the telecom
JUDGMENT
sector reiterated that the forum for debate and discourse
over the merits and demerits of a policy is the Parliament.
It restated that the services of this Court are not sought till
the legality of the policy is disputed, and further, that n o
| direction | c | a | n | be | | given | or be e | xpected | from t | he | courts, |
|---|
| unless | | while | implementi | ng such | policies, | there i | s violation |
|---|
(1994) 2 SCC 691
64
65 (1996) 2 SCC 405
130
Page 130
| or | infringement | of any | of the co | nstitutional or | statutory |
|---|
| “7. What has been said in respect of legislations is<br>applicable even in respect of policies which have been<br>adopted by Parliament. They cannot be tested in Court<br>of Law. The courts cannot express their opinion as to<br>whether at a particular juncture or under a particular<br>situation prevailing in the country any such national<br>policy should have been adopted or not. There may be<br>views and views, opinions and opinions which may be<br>shared and believed by citizens of the country including<br>the representatives of the people in Parliament. But that<br>has to be sorted out in Parliament which has to approve<br>such policies…”<br>1.In BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of<br>India & Ors.66, this Court further pointed out that the<br>Court ought to stay away from judicial review of efficacy of<br>policy matters, not only because the same is beyond its | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| policy | matters | , | not only | because | the same | is b | eyond | | its |
| “7 | . | What | | | | has | | been sa | id in res | pect of | legisla | | tions i | s |
|---|
| applicable e | | | | | | ven | | in resp | ect of poli | cies which | | hav | e been | |
| adopted | | | | | by | Parliament. | | | They can | not be | tested i | | n Court | |
| of | Law. | | | The | | courts can | | | not expre | ss their | opinio | | n as t | o |
| whether | | | | | at | a | particular | | juncture | or under | | a pa | rticular | |
| situation | | | | pr | | evailing in | | | the count | ry any | such | | national | |
| policy | | shoul | | | | d | have been | | adopted | or not. | There | | may be | |
| views | | and | | | | views | | , opinio | ns and o | pinions | which | | may be | |
| share | | d | and | | | believed by | | | citizens of | the country in | | | cluding | |
| the | representatives of th | | | | | | | | e people i | n Parliament. | | | But that | |
| ha | s to | be | | | so | rted | | out in P | arliament | which | has | to a | pprove | |
| suc | h p | olicie | | | | s…” | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | ’ Union (Regd.) Vs. | | Union of | | |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | , this | Court furt | her pointed ou | t that | the | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Court | ought | to | stay awa | | y from jud | icial review of | efficacy | | of |
| jurisdiction, | but | also | because i | t lack | s t | he | necessary |
|---|
| expertise | re | quired for s | uch a task | . Affirming the | previous |
|---|
| views | of | | thi | s Court, the | Court obs | erved t | hat | whi | le dealing |
|---|
| wit | h | economic | legisl | ations, th | e Courts, w | hile | not |
|---|
| jettisoning | its | j | urisdict | ion to cu | rb arbitrary | action | | or |
|---|
| unconstitutional | legislat | ion, shoul | d interfere | onl | y in those |
|---|
| cases | wher | e t | h | e view | reflected | in the | legislat | ion is | not |
|---|
66 (2002) 2 SCC 333
131
Page 131
| possible | to | | be | taken | at all. | | The | | Court | | wen | t | on | | to |
|---|
| emphasize | that | unless t | he economic | | decision, | base | d | on |
|---|
| economic e | xpediencies, i | s demonstrated | to | | be | | so | violative |
|---|
| of constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to<br>reason, that the courts would decline to interfere.<br>2.In BALCO (supra), the Court took notice of the judgment<br>in Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.<br>& Anr. Vs. Reserve Bank of India67 and observed that<br>some matters like price fixation are based on such<br>uncertainties and dynamics that even experts face<br>difficulty in making correct projections, making it all the<br>more necessary for this Court to exercise non- | of | | constitutional | or | l | egal | limits o | n | | power | or | so | abhorrent | | to |
|---|
| reason, | tha | t the | courts w | ould decline | to | i | nterfere. |
|---|
| In | | BALCO | (supr | a), | | the C | ourt took | n | otic | e o | f | the | judgment |
|---|
| in | | Peerless | General Fin | ance | and | Investment | Co. | Ltd. |
|---|
| | | | | | | | e fixation are based on such | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| uncertaintie | | | s | and | | dyna | | mics | that | | even | | | | experts | | | face |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| difficult | | y in | making | | | | corr | ect projections, | | | | | making | | | it | all | the |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| more | | necessar | | | y | | for | this | Court | | | to | | exercise | | | | non- |
interference:
JUDGMENT
67 (1992) 2 SCC 343
132
Page 132
| n M/s | Prag Ic | e & | | Oil | Mill | s & | Anr | . | Vs. |
|---|
| this C | ourt had | observe | d as | und | er: ( | SCC |
|---|
| “ | We | do | | not | thin | k that it i | | s the fun | ction | of t | his | Cour | t or | of |
|---|
| any | | court | | | to | sit | in jud | gment | over | suc | h | matte | rs | of |
| economi | | | | c | polic | y | as mu | st necessaril | | y b | e l | eft t | o the | |
| governmen | | | | | t of | the | day | to decid | e. Many | | of t | hem | , as | a |
| measure | | | | o | f pr | ice | fixat | ion mus | t necessaril | | | y be | , are | |
| matters | | | | of | prediction of | | | ultimate | results o | | n w | hich | even | |
| experts | | | | ca | n s | eriously | | err and | doubtlessly | | | by | differ. | |
| Courts | | | c | an | certainly no | | | t be exp | ected | to | decide | | them | |
| without | | | | eve | n th | e aid of e | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| | | | , this C | ourt sai | d that | | the | judiciar | | y cannot | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| engage | in | an | exercise | | of comparative a | | | | nalysis | | over | | the | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| fairness, | logical | | or | scient | ific basis | , or | w | isdom | | of a | policy. | | | | It |
| held | tha | t t | he C | ourt can | not strik | e down | a policy | decision |
|---|
| take | n b | y t | J<br>he | UDG<br>Governm | MEN<br>ent mer | T<br>ely | because | it fe | els | that |
|---|
| another | decisio | n would h | ave bee | n fairer, | or more | scientific |
|---|
| or | l | ogical, | or | wiser. The | wisdom | and | ad | visabilit | y of | | the |
|---|
| policies | ar | e or | dinarily | not amenable | to | judicia | l review |
|---|
| unless | | the | p | olicies | are con | trary | t | o | statutory | | or |
|---|
133
Page 133
| constitutiona | l | provisions | or arbitrar | y | or | irrational | or | | an |
|---|
| 5.Mr. Subramanian Swamy also brought to our notice a<br>Report on Allocation of Natural Resources, prepared by a<br>Committee, chaired by Mr. Ashok Chawla (hereinafter<br>referred to as the “Chawla Committee Report”), which has<br>produced a copious conceptual framework for the<br>Government of India on the allocation and pricing of scarce<br>natural resources viz. coal, minerals, petroleum, natural<br>gas, spectrum, forests, land and water. He averred to<br>observations of the report in favour of auction as a means<br>of disposal. However, since the opinion rendered in the<br>Chawla Committee Report is pending acceptance by the | Mr. | | Subramanian | | | Swam | y also | | brought | | | | to | | o | ur | notice | | | | | a |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Report o | | | n Allocation of | | | Natural | | Resources, | | | | | | prepare | | | d | by | | | a |
| Chawla C | | | ommittee | | Repo | rt is | pendin | | g | acceptanc | | | | | | e | by | | the | | |
| Committe | e, | chaired by | Mr. | Ashok | Chawla | (hereinafter |
|---|
| referred | to a | s t | he | “ | Chaw | la Committe | e | Report” | ), | which | | has |
|---|
| produced | a | | copious | conceptual | framework | fo | r | the |
|---|
| Government | of | India on t | he allocation | and | pricing | of | scarce |
|---|
| | | | | land and water. He averred to | | | | | | | |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | rt in favour of auction as a means | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| of | | dispos | al. | However, s | ince | th | e | opinion | rendered | in | | the |
| Government, | it | | would b | e inappropriate | for | us | to | place |
|---|
| judicial r | eliance | | on | it. | Besides | , | the | Report | conducts | | an |
|---|
| economic | , and | not | | legal, | analysi | s | of | the | | mean | s o | f disposal |
|---|
| of | | natura | l resources. Th | e purpose | of | this | Reference | would |
|---|
| be | best | served | if | | this C | ourt gave | a | constitution | al a | nswer |
|---|
134
Page 134
146. To summarize in the context of the present Reference, it
needs to be emphasized that this Court cannot conduct a
comparative study of the various methods of distribution
of natural resources and suggest the most efficacious
mode, if there is one universal efficacious method in the
first place. It respects the mandate and wisdom of the
executive for such matters. The methodology pertaining to
disposal of natural resources is clearly an economic policy.
It entails intricate economic choices and the Court lacks
the necessary expertise to make them. As has been
repeatedly said, it cannot, and shall not, be the endeavour
of this Court to evaluate the efficacy of auction vis-à-vis
other methods of disposal of natural resources. The Court
cannot mandate one method to be followed in all facts and
JUDGMENT
circumstances. Therefore, auction, an economic choice of
disposal of natural resources, is not a constitutional
mandate. We may, however, hasten to add that the Court
can test the legality and constitutionality of these
methods. When questioned, the Courts are entitled to
analyse the legal validity of different means of distribution
and give a constitutional answer as to which methods are
135
Page 135
ultra vires and intra vires the provisions of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, it cannot and will not compare
which policy is fairer than the other, but, if a policy or law
is patently unfair to the extent that it falls foul of the
| fairness requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution, the<br>Court would not hesitate in striking it down.<br>7.Finally, market price, in economics, is an index of the value<br>that a market prescribes to a good. However, this valuation<br>is a function of several dynamic variables; it is a science<br>and not a law. Auction is just one of the several price<br>discovery mechanisms. Since multiple variables are<br>involved in such valuations, auction or any other form of | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| involved | | in | | such | | valuatio | ns, auction | | or | any | other | | form | | of |
| Finally, | market | | price, in e | conomics | , | is | an | index | of | the | | value |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | to a good. However, this | | | | | | | | valuation | | | | |
|---|
| | | | | | | | | dynamic variables; it is | | | | | | | | a science | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| and | | not | | a | | law. | | Auction | is just | | one | | | of | the | several | | | | price | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| discovery | | | | | | mechanisms. | | | Since | | | multip | | | le v | ariables | | | | | are |
| competitive | bidding, can | not constitute | even | an | economic |
|---|
| mandate, | much | l | ess | a co | nstitutional | | mandate |
|---|
| In | | our | opinion, | | auction | despite | | being a | more | | preferable |
|---|
| metho | d | of | | alienation/allotment | | of | n | atural | | resources, |
|---|
| cannot | | be | | held | | to | be | a constitutiona | l | requirement | | or |
|---|
| limitation | | for | | alienation | of | all | | natur | al | resources | | and |
|---|
136
Page 136
| therefore, | | every | | metho | d other | | than | | auction | | cannot | | be |
|---|
| struck | | down | | as | | ultra-vire | s the | | constitutional | | mandate. | |
|---|
149. Regard being had to the aforesaid precepts, we have
opined that auction as a mode cannot be conferred the
status of a constitutional principle. Alienation of natural
resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for
the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However,
when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or
welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural
resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit
maximizing private entrepreneurs, adoption of means
other than those that are competitive and maximize
revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14
JUDGMENT
of the Constitution. Hence, rather than prescribing or
proscribing a method, we believe, a judicial scrutiny of
methods of disposal of natural resources should depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case, in consonance
with the principles which we have culled out above. Failing
which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review,
shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair,
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Page 137
unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with
Article 14 of the Constitution.
| In | | conclusion, o | ur | answer | to the | first | set | of | | five | questions | is |
|---|
| that | | auctions | are | | not t | he only | | permissible | | method | | for |
|---|
| disposal | | of | | all n | atural res | ources | across | a | ll | | sectors | | and | | in | all |
|---|
circumstances.
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| these | | question | s would h | ave a | | direct | | bearing | | on | the | | mode |
of alienation of Spectrum and therefore, in light of the
statement by the learned Attorney General that the
Government is not questioning the correctness of
JUDGMENT
judgment in the 2G Case , we respectfully decline to
answer these questions. The Presidential Reference is
answered accordingly.
152. This opinion shall be transmitted to the President in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Part V of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
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Page 138
……………………………………...
……………………………………...
……………………………………...
(DIPAK MISRA, J.)
……………………………………...
JUDGMENT
ARS/RS
139
Page 139
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ADVISORY JURISDICTION
SPECIAL REFERENCE NO.1 OF 2012
THE IN MATTER OF :
Special Reference under Article 143(1)
Of the Constitution of India
O P I N I O N
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.
1. I have had the privilege of perusing the opinion
rendered by my esteemed brother, D.K. Jain, J. Every
bit of the opinion (which shall hereinafter be referred
to by me, as the “main opinion”) is based on settled
propositions of law declared by this Court. There can,
therefore, be no question of any disagreement
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therewith. I fully endorse the opinion expressed
therein.
2. The first question posed in the Presidential
reference, is in fact the reason, for my having to
record, some other nuances on the subject whereof
advice has been sought. The first question in the
Presidential reference requires the Supreme Court to
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Page 140
tender advice on, “Whether the only permissible method
for disposal of all natural resources across all
sectors and in all circumstances, is by the conduct of
reference. Take for instance a hypothetical situation
where, the legality of 100 instances of disposal of
different types of natural resources is taken up for
consideration. If the first question is taken in its
literal sense, as to whether the method of disposal of
all natural resources in all circumstances is by
auction alone, then, even if 99 out of the aforesaid
100 different natural resources are such, which can
only be disposed of by way of auction, the answer to
the first question would still be in the negative.
This answer in the negative would give the erroneous
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impression, that it is not necessary to dispose of
natural resources by way of auction. Surely, the
Presidential reference has not been made, to seek such
an innocuous advice. The instant reference has been
made despite the Central Government being alive to the
fact, that there are natural resources which can only
be disposed of by way of auction. A mining lease for
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Page 141
coal under Section 11A of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 can be granted,
only by way of selection through auction by competitive
been taken by the Central Government to henceforth
allot spectrum only through competitive bidding by way
of auction. Such instances can be multiplied. It is
therefore obvious, that Government is alive to the
fact, that disposal of some natural resources have to
be made only by auction. If that is so, the first
question in the reference does not seek a literal
response. The first question must be understood to
seek this Court’s opinion on whether there are
circumstances in which natural resources ought to be
disposed of only by auction. Tendering an opinion,
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without a response to this facet of the matter, would
not make the seeker of advice, any wiser. It is this
aspect alone, which will be the main subject of focus
of my instant opinion.
3. Before venturing into the area of consideration
expressed in the foregoing paragraph, it is necessary
to record, that there was extensive debate during the
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Page 142
course of hearing, on whether, maximization of revenue
must be the sole permissible consideration, for
disposal of all natural resources, across all sectors
acknowledged, that auction by way of competitive
bidding, was certainly an indisputable means, by which
maximization of revenue returns is assured. It is not
as if, one would like to bind the learned Attorney
General to the acquiesced proposition. During the
course of the days and weeks of erudite debate, learned
counsel emphasized, that disposal of assets by
processes of tender, tender-cum-auction and auction,
could assure maximization of revenue returns. Of
course, there are a large variety of tender and auction
processes, each one with its own nuances. And we were
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informed, that a rightful choice, would assure
maximization of revenue returns. The term “auction”
expressed in my instant opinion, may therefore be read
as a means to maximize revenue returns, irrespective of
whether the means adopted should technically and
correctly be described as tender, tender-cum-auction,
or auction.
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Page 143
4. The concept of equality before the law and equal
protection of the laws, emerges from the fundamental
right expressed in Article 14 of the Constitution of
maturity and evolution of the nation’s thought. To
start with, breach of equality was a plea advanced by
individuals claiming fair treatment. Challenges were
raised also on account of discriminatory treatment.
Equality was sought by those more meritorious, when
benefits were bestowed on those with lesser caliber.
Gradually, judicial intervention came to be sought for
equitable treatment, even for a section of the society
put together. A jurisdiction, which in due course,
came to be described as public interest litigation. It
all started with a demand for the basic rights for
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respectable human existence. Over the years, the
concept of determination of societal rights, has
traversed into different directions and avenues. So
much so, that now rights in equity, sometimes even
present situations of conflict between individual
rights and societal rights. The present adjudication
can be stated to be a dispute of such nature. In a
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Page 144
maturing society, individual rights and plural rights
have to be balanced, so that the oscillating pendulum
of rights, fairly and equally, recognizes their
one citizen on the one side, and 124,14,91,960 (the
present estimated population of India) citizens of the
country on the other. The true effect of the Article
14 of the Constitution of India is to provide equality
before the law and equal protection of the laws not
only with reference to individual rights, but also by
ensuring that its citizens on the other side of the
balance are likewise not deprived of their right to
equality before the law, and their right to equal
protection of the laws. An individual citizen cannot
be a beneficiary, at the cost of the country (the
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remaining 124,14,91,960 citizens) i.e., the plurality.
Enriching one at the cost of all others would amount to
deprivation to the plurality i.e., the nation itself.
The gist of the first question in the Presidential
reference, raises the issue whether ownership rights
over the nation’s natural resources, vest in the
citizens of the country. An answer to the instant
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Page 145
issue in turn would determine, whether or not it is
imperative for the executive while formulating a policy
for the disposal of natural resources, to ensure that
interest litigation as a jurisprudential concept is a
matter of extensive debate in India, and even more than
that, outside India. This concept brings into focus
the rights of the plurality (as against individual’s
right) specially when the plurality is, for one or the
other reason, not in a position to seek redressal of
its grievances. This inadequacy may not always emerge
from financial constrains. It may sometimes arise out
of lack of awareness. At other times merely from the
overwhelming might of executive authority. The
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jurisprudential thought in this country, after the
emergence of public interest litigation, is seeking to
strike a balance between individual rights and the
rights of the plurality. After all, all natural
resources are the nation’s collective wealth. This
Court has had the occasion over the last few decades,
to determine rights of citizens with reference to
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Page 146
natural resources. The right of an individual citizen
to those assets, as also, the rights of the remaining
citizens of the country, have now emerged on opposite
rendered by this Court, on issues relatable to disposal
of resources by the State, to determine whether the
instant issue stands settled, by law declared by this
Court.
6(a) First of all reference was made to the decision
of this Court in S.G. Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India &
Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1427, wherein this Court observed as
under:
“14. this In context it is important to
emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is
first the essential of the rule of law upon which
whole our constitutional system is based. In a
system governed by rule of law, discretion, when
conferred upon executive authorities, must be
confined within clearly defined limits. The rule
law of from this point of view means that
decisions should be made by the application of
known principles and rules and, in general, such
decisions should be predictable and the citizen
should know where he is . If a decision is taken
without any principle or without any rule it is
unpredictable and such a decision is the
antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with
the Rule of law. (See Dicey — Law of the
Constitution — 10th Edn., Introduction cx). “Law
has reached its finest moments,” stated Douglas,
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147
Page 147
| s, (1770<br>iscretion | ) 4 Bur<br>guided |
|---|
(emphasis is mine)
In the aforesaid case, it came to be emphasized that
executive action should have clearly defined limits and
should be predictable. In other words, the man on the
street should know why the decision has been taken in
favour of a particular party. What came to be
impressed upon was, that lack of transparency in the
decision making process would render it arbitrary.
(b) Also cited for our consideration was the
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judgment in Rashbihari Panda etc. Vs. State of Orissa
(1969) 1 SCC 414. In this case it was canvassed on
behalf of the appellants, that the machinery devised
by the Government for sale of Kendu leaves in which
they had acquired a trade monopoly, was violative of
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and
19(1)( g ) of the Constitution. It was pointed out, that
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Page 148
in the scheme of events the purchasers were merely
nominees of the agents. It is also contended, that
after the Supreme Court had struck down the policy
themselves, the Government to help their party-men set
up a body of persons who were to be purchasers to whom
the monopoly sales were to be made at concessional
rates and that the benefit which would have otherwise
been earned by the State would now get diverted to
those purchasers. It was held:
“15. Section 10 of the Act is a counterpart
of Section 3 and authorises the Government to
sell or otherwise dispose of Kendu leaves in
such manner as the Government may direct. If the
monopoly of purchasing Kendu leaves by Section 3
is valid, insofar as it is intended to be
administered only for the benefit of the State,
the sale or disposal of Kendu leaves by the
Government must also be in the public interest
and not to serve the private interest of any
person or class of persons. It is true that it
for is the Government, having regard to all the
circumstances, to act as a prudent businessman
would, and to sell or otherwise dispose of Kendu
leaves purchased under the monopoly acquired
under Section 3, but the profit resulting from
sale the must be for the public benefit and not
private for gain . Section 11 which provides that
out of the net profits derived by the Government
from the trade in Kendu leaves an amount not
less than one half is to be paid to the Samitis
and Gram Panchayats emphasises the concept that
the machinery of sale or disposal of Kendu
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149
Page 149
leaves must also be quashed to serve the public
interest. If the scheme of disposal creates a
class of middlemen who would purchase from the
Government Kendu leaves at concessional rates
would and earn large profits disproportionate to
nature the of the service rendered or duty
performed by them, it cannot claim the
protection of Article 19(6)( ) . ii
16. Section 10 leaves the method of sale
or disposal of Kendu leaves to the Government as
they think fit. The action of the Government if
conceived and executed in the interest of the
general public is not open to judicial scrutiny.
it But is not given to the Government thereby to
create a monopoly in favour of third parties
from their own monopoly .
17. Validity of the schemes adopted by the
Government of Orissa for sale of Kendu leaves
must be adjudged in the light of Article 19(1)
( g ) and Article 14. Instead of inviting tenders
the Government offered to certain old
contractors the option to purchase Kendu leaves
for the year 1968 on terms mentioned therein.
The reason suggested by the Government that
these offers were made because the purchasers
had carried out their obligations in the
previous year to the satisfaction of the
Government is not of any significance. From the
affidavit filed by the State Government it
appears that the price fetched at public
auctions before and after January 1968, were
much higher than the prices at which Kendu
leaves were offered to the old contractors . The
Government realised that the scheme of offering
to enter into contracts with the old licensees
and to renew their terms was open to grave
objection, since it sought arbitrarily to
exclude many persons interested in the trade.
The Government then decided to invite offers for
advance purchases of Kendu leaves but restricted
the invitation to those individuals who had
carried out the contracts in the previous year
without default and to the satisfaction of the
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Page 150
Government. By the new scheme instead of the
Government making an offer, the existing
contractors were given the exclusive right to
make offers to purchase Kendu leaves. But
insofar as the right to make tenders for the
purchase of Kendu leaves was restricted to those
persons who had obtained contracts in the
previous year the scheme was open to the same
objection. The right to make offers being open
a limited to class of persons it effectively
shut out all other persons carrying on trade in
Kendu leaves and also new entrants into that
business. It was ex facie discriminatory, and
imposed unreasonable restrictions upon the right
persons of other than existing contractors to
carry on business. In our view, both the schemes
evolved by the Government were violative of the
fundamental right of the petitioners under
Article 19(1)( ) and g Article 14 because the
schemes gave rise to a monopoly in the trade in
Kendu leaves to certain traders, and singled out
other traders for discriminatory treatment .
18. The classification based on the
circumstance that certain existing contractors
had carried out their obligations in the
previous year regularly and to the satisfaction
of the Government is not based on any real and
substantial distinction bearing a just and
reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved i.e. effective execution of the
monopoly in the public interest. Exclusion of
all persons interested in the trade, who were
not in the previous year licensees is ex facie
arbitrary, it had no direct relation to the
object of preventing exploitation of pluckers
and growers of Kendu leaves, nor had it any just
or reasonable relation to the securing of the
full benefit from the trade to the State.
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19. Validity of the law by which the State
assumed the monopoly to trade in a given
commodity has to be judged by the test whether
entire the benefit arising therefrom is to enure
the to State, and the monopoly is not used as a
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Page 151
| it unre<br>from ca | asonably<br>rrying o |
|---|
JUDGMENT
20. explanation No has been attempted on
behalf of the State as to why an offer made by a
well known manufacturer of bidis interested in
trade the to purchase the entire crop of Kendu
leaves for the year 1968 for rupees three crores
turned was down. If the interests of the State
alone were to be taken into consideration, the
State stood to gain more than rupees one crore
accepting by that offer . We are not suggesting
that merely because that offer was made, the
Government was bound to accept it. The
Government had to consider, as prudent
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Page 152
| earned J<br>hat in t | udges o<br>heir vie |
|---|
| 21. The<br>have observed<br>the discretion<br>nor was the a<br>fides. But tha<br>that the Gov | |
| o have |
| considered the prevailing prices of Kendu leaves<br>about the time when offers were made, the<br>estimated crop of Kendu leaves, the conditions<br>in the market and the likelihood of offerers at<br>higher prices carrying out their obligations,<br>and whether it was in the interests of the State<br>to invite tenders in the open market from all<br>persons whether they had or had not taken<br>contracts in the previous year. If the<br>Government was anxious to ensure due performance<br>by those who submitted tenders for purchase of<br>Kendu leaves, it was open to the Government to<br>devise adequate safeguards in that behalf. In<br>ou r judgment , th e ple a tha t th e actio n o f th e | |
JUDGMENT
22. That plea would have assisted the
Government if the action was in law valid and
the objection was that the Government erred in
the exercise of its discretion. It is
unnecessary in the circumstances to consider
whether the Government acted in the interest of
their party-men and to increase party funds in
devising the schemes for sale of Kendu leaves in
1968.
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Page 153
23. During the pendency of these
proceedings the entire year for which the
contracts were given has expired. The persons to
whom the contracts were given are not before us,
and we cannot declare the contracts which had
been entered into by the Government for the sale
of Kendu leaves for the year 1968 unlawful in
these proceedings. Counsel for the appellants
agrees that it would be sufficient if it be
directed that the tenders for purchase of Kendu
leaves be invited by the Government in the next
season from all persons interested in the trade.
trust We that in accepting tenders, the State
Government will act in the interest of the
general public and not of any class of traders
that so in the next season the State may get the
entire benefit of the monopoly in the trade in
Kendu leaves and no disproportionate share
thereof may be diverted to any private agency .
Subject to these observations we make no further
order in the petitions out of which these
appeals arise.”
(emphasis is mine)
A perusal of the observations made by this Court
reveal, that the Government must act as a prudent
businessman, and that, the profit earned should be for
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public benefit and not for private gains. A plea of
reasonable restriction raised under Article 19(6) of
the Constitution of India to save the governmental
action was rejected on the ground that the scheme
created middlemen who would earn large disproportionate
profits. This Court also held the action to be
discriminatory because it excluded others like the
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Page 154
petitioners from the zone of consideration. Finally, a
direction came to be issued by this Court requiring the
Government to act in the interest of the general public
profits are diverted to any private agency.
(c) Reliance was also placed on Ramana Dayaram
Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India &
Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 489, wherein this Court held as
under:
“21. This rule also flows directly from the
doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14. It is
now well-settled as a result of the decisions of
this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,
(1974) 4 SCC 3, and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, that Article 14 strikes
arbitrariness at in State action and ensures
fairness and equality of treatment. It requires
that State action must not be arbitrary but must
based be on some rational and relevant principle
which is non-discriminatory: it must not be guided
any by extraneous or irrelevant considerations,
because that would be denial of equality . The
principle of reasonableness and rationality which
is legally as well as philosophically an essential
element of equality or non-arbitrariness is
projected by Article 14 and it must characterise
every State action, whether it be under authority
of law or in exercise of executive power without
making of law. The State cannot, therefore, act
arbitrarily in entering into relationship,
contractual or otherwise with a third party, but
action its must conform to some standard or norm
which is rational and non-discriminatory . This
principle was recognised and applied by a Bench of
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155
Page 155
this Court presided over by Ray, C.J., in Erusian
Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal (supra) where the learned Chief Justice
pointed out that-
“the State can carry on executive function
making by a law or without making a law.
exercise The of such powers and functions
trade in by the State is subject to Part
of III the Constitution. Article 14 speaks
equality of before the law and equal
protection of the laws. Equality of
opportunity should apply to matters of
public contracts. The State has the right
trade. to The State has there the duty to
observe equality. An ordinary individual
choose can not to deal with any person. The
Government cannot choose to exclude persons
by discrimination . The order of
blacklisting has the effect of depriving a
person of equality of opportunity in the
matter of public contract. A person who is
on the approved list is unable to enter
into advantageous relations with the
Government because of the order of
blacklisting .... A citizen has a right to
claim equal treatment to enter into a
contract which may be proper, necessary and
essential to his lawful calling .... It is
true that neither the petitioner nor the
respondent has any right to enter into a
contract but they are entitled to equal
treatment with others who offer tender or
quotations for the purchase of the goods”.
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must, It therefore follow as a necessary
corollary from the principle of equality
enshrined in Article 14 that though the State is
entitled to refuse to enter into relationship
with any one, yet if it does so, it cannot
arbitrarily choose any person it likes for
entering into such relationship and discriminate
between persons similarly circumstanced, but it
must act in conformity with some standard or
principle which meets the test of reasonableness
non-discrimination and and any departure from
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Page 156
such standard or principle would be invalid
unless it can be supported or justified on some
rational and non discriminatory ground .
| Governmen<br>of Ori<br>wholly | t of Or<br>ssa, (19<br>supports |
|---|
(emphasis is mine)
An analysis of the aforesaid determination by this
Court would lead to the inference that the State has
the right to trade. In executing public contracts in
its trading activity the State must be guided by
relevant principles, and not by extraneous or
irrelevant consideration. The same should be based on
reasonableness and rationality as well as non-
arbitrariness. It came to be concluded, that the State
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while entering into a contractual relationship, was
bound to maintain the standards referred to above. And
any departure from the said standards would be invalid
unless the same is supported by good reasons.
(d) Our attention was also invited to the decision
rendered in Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of
Jammu & Kashmir & Anr., (1980) 4 SCC 1, wherein the
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Page 157
factual background as well as, the legal position came
to be expressed in paragraph 19 of the judgment which
is being set out below:
| cumstance<br>o be m | s in wh<br>ade and |
|---|
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Page 158
| Sundarb<br>State w | ani, in<br>ould be |
|---|
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159
Page 159
| no more<br>1500 metr | than R<br>ic tonne |
|---|
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160
Page 160
said be to be disadvantageous to the State or in
way any favouring the second respondents at the
cost of the State. The argument of the
petitioners was that at the auctions held in
December 1978, January 1979 and April 1979, the
price of resin realised was as much as Rs.484,
Rs.520 and Rs.700 per quintal respectively and
when the market price was so high, it was
improper and contrary to public interest on the
part of the State to sell resin to the second
respondents at the rate of Rs.320 per quintal
under the impugned Order. This argument,
plausible though it may seem, is fallacious
because it does not take into account the policy
the of State not to allow export of resin
outside its territories but to allot it only for
in use factories set up within the State. It is
obvious that, in view of this policy, no resin
would be auctioned by the State and there would
no be question of sale of resin in the open
market and in this situation, it would be
totally irrelevant to import the concept of
market price with reference to which the
adequacy of the price charged by the State to
2nd the respondents could be judged. If the
State were simply selling resin, there can be no
doubt that the State must endeavour to obtain
highest the price subject, of course, to any
other overriding considerations of public
interest and in that event, its action in giving
resin to a private individual at a lesser price
would be arbitrary and contrary to public
interest. But, where the State has, as a matter
policy, of stopped selling resin to outsiders
decided and to allot it only to industries set
within up the State for the purpose of
encouraging industrialisation, there can be no
scope for complaint that the State is giving
resin at a lesser price than that which could be
obtained in the open market. The yardstick of
price in the open market would be wholly inept,
because in view of the State policy, there would
no be question of any resin being sold in the
open market. The object of the State in such a
case is not to earn revenue from sale of resin,
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Page 161
| of resin<br>79-80 an | from its<br>d the p |
|---|
JUDGMENT
(emphasis is mine)
An examination of the factual position of the
controversy dealt with in the judgment extracted above
reveals, that the State Government formulated a policy
to set up a factory within the State, which would
result in creation of more job opportunities for the
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Page 162
people of the State. The setting up of the said
factory would assure the State of atleast 1500 metric
tones of resin without any financial involvement. This
the people of the State. It is therefore, that this
Court concluded that the impugned order passed by the
State in favour of the second respondent could not be
said to be disadvantageous to the State and favouring
the second respondent. In a manner of understanding,
this Court found no infirmity in the impugned order
passed by the State Government because the State
Government had given effect to a policy which would
“best subserve the common good” of the inhabitants of
the State (as in Article 39(b) of the Constitution of
India) while assigning a material resource, though no
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reference was made to Article 39(b) of the Constitution
of India in the judgment. What is also of importance
is, that this Court expressly noticed, that if the
State Government was simply selling resin, it was
obliged to obtain the highest possible price.
(e) Reference was then made to Dwarkadas Marfatia
and Sons Vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay,
163
Page 163
(1989) 3 SCC 293, wherein the case of the respondent
was, that in his evidence it had been mentioned by
Katara that the plot had been allotted to Dhanji Mavji
major portion of such plot. It was further asserted,
that there was no challenge to this evidence in cross-
examination. It was also asserted, that there was no
evidence on the alleged policy of the Port Trust of
giving plots on joint tenancy to all the occupants.
According to learned counsel for the respondent, in the
letters addressed by the Port Trust and in the letters
by and on behalf of the appellant and/or their alleged
associate concerns they had specifically admitted, that
there was a policy of the Port Trust to allot plots to
the occupants of the major portions thereof and in fact
JUDGMENT
a grievance was made by them, that in accordance with
the said policy of the Bombay Port Trust, a plot was
not being allotted to the associates of the appellant.
In that view of the matter it was contended, that the
issue whether the plot should have been given on joint
tenancy or not, could not have been gone into by the
court in exercise of its jurisdiction of judicial
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Page 164
review. Reliance was placed on the observations of Lord
Justice Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935,
illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.
In the aforesaid factual background this Court
concluded as under:
“21. We are unable to accept the
submissions. Being a public body even in respect
its of dealing with its tenant, it must act in
public interest, and an infraction of that duty
amenable is to examination either in civil suit
in or writ jurisdiction .
….. …..
28. Learned Additional Solicitor General
reiterated on behalf of the respondent that no
question of mala fide had been alleged or proved
in these proceedings. Factually, he is right.
it But has to be borne in mind that governmental
policy would be invalid as lacking in public
interest, unreasonable or contrary to the
professed standards and this is different from
fact the that it was not done bona fide . It is
true as learned Additional Solicitor General
contended that there is always a presumption
that a governmental action is reasonable and in
public interest. It is for the party challenging
its validity to show that the action is
unreasonable, arbitrary or contrary to the
professed norms or not informed by public
interest, and the burden is a heavy one.
JUDGMENT
….. …...
37. As we look upon the facts of this
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Page 165
case, there was an implied obligation in respect
dealings of with the tenants/occupants of the
Port Trust authority to act in public
interest/purpose. That requirement is fulfilled
it if is demonstrated that the Port Trust
authorities have acted in pursuance of a policy
which is referable to public purpose . Once that
norm is established whether that policy is the
best policy or whether another policy was
possible, is not relevant for consideration. It
is, therefore, not necessary for our present
purposes to dwell on the question whether the
obligation of the Port Trust authorities to act
in pursuance of a public purpose was a public
law purpose or a private law purpose. Under the
constitutional scheme of this country the Port
Trust authorities were required by relevant law
act to in pursuance of public purpose. We are
satisfied that they have proceeded to so act .
(emphasis is mine)
In the instant matter, even though the controversy
pertained to a tenancy issue, this Court held, that a
public body was bound to act in public interest.
(f) In chronological sequence, learned counsel then
cited Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors. Vs. Indian Oil
JUDGMENT
Corporation & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 752. Relevant
observations made therein, with reference to the
present controversy, are being placed below:
“12. It is well settled that every action of the
State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise
of its executive power, must be informed by reason.
In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason
may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under
Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution.
Reliance in this connection may be placed on the
166
Page 166
observations of this Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal
v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457. It appears to
us, at the outset, that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the respondent company
IOC is an organ of the State or an instrumentality
of the State as contemplated under Article 12 of the
Constitution. The State acts in its executive power
under Article 298 of the Constitution in entering or
entering not in contracts with individual parties.
Article 14 of the Constitution would be applicable
those to exercises of power . Therefore, the action
of State organ under Article 14 can be checked. See
Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar at p. 462,
but Article 14 of the Constitution cannot and has
not been construed as a charter for judicial review
of State action after the contract has been entered
into, to call upon the State to account for its
actions in its manifold activities by stating
reasons for such actions. In a situation of this
nature certain activities of the respondent company
which constituted State under Article 12 of the
Constitution may be in certain circumstances subject
to Article 14 of the Constitution in entering or not
entering into contracts and must be reasonable and
taken only upon lawful and relevant consideration;
it depends upon facts and circumstances of a
particular transaction whether hearing is necessary
and reasons have to be stated. In case any right
conferred on the citizens which is sought to be
interfered, such action is subject to Article 14 of
the Constitution, and must be reasonable and can be
taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of
public interest. Where there is arbitrariness in
State action of this type of entering or not
entering into contracts, Article 14 springs up and
judicial review strikes such an action down. Every
action of the State executive authority must be
subject to rule of law and must be informed by
reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public
authority, in such monopoly or semi-monopoly
dealings, it should meet the test of Article 14 of
Constitution. the If a governmental action even in
matters the of entering or not entering into
contracts, fails to satisfy the test of
reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable . In
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167
Page 167
| SCC 29 | 3. It ap |
| rule a | gainst a |
17. We are of the opinion that in all such cases
whether public law or private law rights are
involved, depends upon the facts and circumstances
of the case. The dichotomy between rights and
remedies cannot be obliterated by any strait-jacket
formula. It has to be examined in each particular
case. Mr Salve sought to urge that there are certain
cases under Article 14 of arbitrary exercise of such
“power” and not cases of exercise of a “right”
arising either under a contract or under a statute.
We are of the opinion that that would depend upon
the factual matrix.
JUDGMENT
18. Having considered the facts and circumstances
the of case and the nature of the contentions and
dealing the between the parties and in view of the
present state of law, we are of the opinion that
decision of the State/public authority under Article
of 298 the Constitution, is an administrative
decision and can be impeached on the ground that the
decision is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of
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Page 168
| unts of | money is |
|---|
| of the m | onopolis |
JUDGMENT
19. Such transaction should continue as an
administrative decision with the organ of the State.
may It be contractual or statutory but in a
situation of transaction between the parties for
nearly two decades, such procedure should be
followed which will be reasonable, fair and just,
that is, the process which normally be accepted ( sic
expected) is to be followed by an organ of the State
that and process must be conscious and all those
affected should be taken into confidence .
20. Having regard to the nature of the
transaction, we are of the opinion that it would be
appropriate to state that in cases where the
169
Page 169
| , the ap | pellant |
| ence. Eq | uality |
23. is It not our decision which is important but
a decision on the above basis should be arrived at
which should be fair, just and reasonable — and
consistent with good government — which will be
arrived at fairly and should be taken after taking
persons the concerned whose rights/obligations are
affected, into confidence. Fairness in such action
should be perceptible, if not transparent .”
(emphasis is mine)
What came to be concluded in the judgment extracted
above can be described as an extension of the
applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of
JUDGMENT
India on the subject of contractual agreements.
Hithertobefore, an act of awarding contracts was
adjudged on the touchstone of fairness. For the first
time, even a decision of not entering into a
contractual arrangement has been brought under the
scope of judicial review. The requirement of being
fair, just and reasonable, i.e., principles applicable
170
Page 170
in good governance, have been held to be equally
applicable for not entering into a contractual
arrangement. Another facet of the aforesaid decision
why the contractual arrangement which had continued for
long years (from 1965 to 1983) was being terminated.
(g) Much emphasis was placed on the judgment
rendered by this Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi &
Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 212.
Observations which relied upon during the course of
hearing are being set out hereinunder:
21. The Preamble of the Constitution of
India resolves to secure to all its citizens
Justice , social, economic and political; and
Equality of status and opportunity. Every State
action must be aimed at achieving this goal. Part
IV of the Constitution contains ‘Directives
Principles of State Policy’ which are fundamental
in the governance of the country and are aimed at
securing social and economic freedoms by
appropriate State action which is complementary
to individual fundamental rights guaranteed in
Part III for protection against excesses of State
action, to realise the vision in the Preamble.
This being the philosophy of the Constitution,
it can be said that it contemplates exclusion of
Article 14 — non-arbitrariness which is basic to
rule of law — from State actions in contractual
field when all actions of the State are meant for
public good and expected to be fair and just? We
have no doubt that the Constitution does not
envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness
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171
Page 171
| re differ | ent matt |
| view of | its tot |
22. There is an obvious difference in the
contracts between private parties and contracts
which to the State is a party. Private parties
concerned are only with their personal interest
whereas the State while exercising its powers and
discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as
expected is of it, for public good and in public
interest. The impact of every State action is
also on public interest. This factor alone is
sufficient to import at least the minimal
requirements of public law obligations and
impress with this character the contracts made by
State the or its instrumentality . It is a
different matter that the scope of judicial
review in respect of disputes falling within the
domain of contractual obligations may be more
limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be
relegated to adjudication of their rights by
resort to remedies provided for adjudication of
purely contractual disputes. However, to the
extent, challenge is made on the ground of
violation of Article 14 by alleging that the
impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or
unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also
falls within the domain of contractual
obligations would not relieve the State of its
obligation to comply with the basic requirements
Article of 14 . To this extent, the obligation is
of a public character invariably in every case
irrespective of there being any other right or
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172
Page 172
obligation in addition thereto. An additional
contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant
of the guarantee under Article 14 of non-
arbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of
its actions.
23. Thus, in a case like the present, if it
shown is that the impugned State action is
arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14
the of Constitution, there can be no impediment
striking in down the impugned act irrespective of
question the whether an additional right,
contractual or statutory, if any, is also
available to the aggrieved persons .
24. The State cannot be attributed the
split personality of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde in the
contractual field so as to impress on it all the
characteristics of the State at the threshold
while making a contract requiring it to fulfil
the obligation of Article 14 of the Constitution
and thereafter permitting it to cast off its garb
of State to adorn the new robe of a private body
during the subsistence of the contract enabling
it to act arbitrarily subject only to the
contractual obligations and remedies flowing from
it. It is really the nature of its personality as
State which is significant and must characterize
its all actions, in whatever field, and not the
nature of function, contractual or otherwise,
which is decisive of the nature of scrutiny
permitted for examining the validity of its act.
requirement The of Article 14 being the duty to
fairly, act justly and reasonably, there is
nothing which militates against the concept of
requiring the State always to so act, even in
contractual matters . There is a basic difference
between the acts of the State which must
invariably be in pubic interest and those of a
private individual, engaged in similar
activities, being primarily for personal gain,
which may or may not promote public interest.
Viewed in this manner, in which we find no
conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no
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173
Page 173
reason why the requirement of Article 14 should
extend not even in the sphere of contractual
matters for regulating the conduct of the State
activity.
| ng that | ‘the |
| essenti<br>rsons’, | ally dif<br>it has |
“... whole The conception of unfettered
discretion is inappropriate to a public
authority, which possesses powers solely in
order that it may use them for the public
good.
There is nothing paradoxical in the
imposition of such legal limits. It would
indeed be paradoxical if they were not
imposed. Nor is this principle an oddity of
British or American law: it is equally
prominent in French law. Nor is it a
special restriction which fetters only
local authorities: it applies no less to
ministers of the Crown. is Nor it confined
the to sphere of administration: it
operates wherever discretion is given for
some public purpose , for example where a
judge has a discretion to order jury trial.
It is only where powers are given for the
personal benefit of the person empowered
that the discretion is absolute. Plainly
this can have no application in public law.
JUDGMENT
the For same reasons there should in
principle be no such thing as unreviewable
administrative discretion, which should be
just as much a contradiction in terms as
unfettered discretion . The question which
has to be asked is what is the scope of
judicial review, and in a few special cases
the scope for the review of discretionary
decisions may be minimal. It remains
axiomatic that all discretion is capable of
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Page 174
abuse, and that legal limits to every power
are to be found somewhere.
| involve<br>ewable,<br>exercise | d, but<br>irrespect<br>d, canno |
|---|
26. A useful treatment of the subject is to
be found in an article “Judicial Review and
Contractual Powers of Public Authorities”, (1990)
106 LQR 277-92 . The conclusion drawn in the
article on the basis of recent English decisions
is that “public law principles designed to
protect the citizens should apply because of the
public nature of the body, and they may have some
role in protecting the public interest”. The
trend now is towards judicial review of
contractual powers and the other activities of
the government. Reference is made also to the
recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Jones
v. Swansea City Council, (1990) 1 WLR 54, where
the court's clear inclination to the view that
contractual powers should generally be reviewable
is indicated, even though the Court of Appeal
faltered at the last step and refrained from
saying so. It is significant to note that
emphasis now is on reviewability of every State
action because it stems not from the nature of
function, but from the public nature of the body
exercising that function; and all powers
possessed by a public authority, howsoever
conferred, are possessed ‘ solely in order that it
use may them for the public good ’ . The only
exception limiting the same is to be found in
specific cases where such exclusion may be
desirable for strong reasons of public policy .
This, however, does not justify exclusion of
reviewability in the contractual field involving
the State since it is no longer a mere private
activity to be excluded from public view or
scrutiny.
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175
Page 175
27. Unlike a private party whose acts
uninformed by reason and influenced by personal
predilections in contractual matters may result
in adverse consequences to it alone without
affecting the public interest, any such act of
the State or a public body even in this field
would adversely affect the public interest. Every
holder of a public office by virtue of which he
acts on behalf of the State or public body is
ultimately accountable to the people in whom the
sovereignty vests. As such, all powers so vested
him in are meant to be exercised for public good
promoting and the public interest. This is
equally true of all actions even in the field of
contract. Thus, every holder of a public office
is a trustee whose highest duty is to the people
of the country and, therefore, every act of the
holder of a public office, irrespective of the
label classifying that act, is in discharge of
public duty meant ultimately for public good.
With the diversification of State activity in a
Welfare State requiring the State to discharge
wide its ranging functions even through its
several instrumentalities, which requires
entering into contracts also, it would be unreal
not and pragmatic, apart from being unjustified
exclude to contractual matters from the sphere of
State actions required to be non-arbitrary and
justified on the touchstone of Article 14 .
28. Even assuming that it is necessary to
import the concept of presence of some public
element in a State action to attract Article 14
and permit judicial review, we have no hesitation
in saying that the ultimate impact of all actions
of the State or a public body being undoubtedly
on public interest, the requisite public element
for this purpose is present also in contractual
matters. We, therefore, find it difficult and
unrealistic to exclude the State actions in
contractual matters, after the contract has been
made, from the purview of judicial review to test
validity its on the anvil of Article 14 .
JUDGMENT
29. can It no longer be doubted at this
176
Page 176
| Kasturi<br>ashmir, | Lal Laks<br>(1980) |
|---|
33. No doubt, it is true, as indicated by
us earlier, that there is a presumption of
validity of the State action and the burden is on
the person who alleges violation of Article 14 to
prove the assertion. However, where no plausible
reason or principle is indicated nor is it
discernible and the impugned State action,
therefore, appears to be ex facie arbitrary, the
initial burden to prove the arbitrariness is
discharged shifting onus on the State to justify
action its as fair and reasonable. If the State
unable is to produce material to justify its
action as fair and reasonable, the burden on the
person alleging arbitrariness must be held to be
discharged. The scope of judicial review is
limited as indicated in Dwarkadas Marfatia case
(supra) to oversee the State action for the
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177
Page 177
| to be m<br>e grou | ore appr<br>nd of |
|---|
36. The meaning and true import of
arbitrariness is more easily visualized than
precisely stated or defined. The question,
whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is
ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the
circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to
apply is to see whether there is any discernible
principle emerging from the impugned act and if
so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness.
Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and
there is no impediment in following that
procedure, performance of the act otherwise and
in a manner which does not disclose any
discernible principle which is reasonable, may
itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every
State action must be informed by reason and it
follows that an act uninformed by reason, is
arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by
laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the
to men whom the governance is entrusted for the
time being . It is trite that ‘be you ever so
high, the laws are above you’. This is what men
in power must remember, always.”
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178
Page 178
(emphasis is mine)
The legal proposition laid down in the instant judgment
may be summarized as follows. Firstly, State action in
Secondly, it would be alien to the constitutional
scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of Article
14 of the Constitution of India in contractual matters.
Thirdly, the fact that a dispute falls in the domain of
contractual obligation, would make no difference, to a
challenge raised under Article 14 of the Constitution
of India on the ground that the impugned act is
arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable. Fourthly, every
State action must be informed of reason and it follows
that an act uninformed by reason is arbitrary. Fifthly,
where no plausible reason or principle is indicated (or
JUDGMENT
is discernible), and where the impugned action ex facie
appears to be arbitrary, the onus shifts on the State
to justify its action as fair and reasonable. Sixthly,
every holder of public office is accountable to the
people in whom the sovereignty vests. All powers
vested in a public office, even in the field of
contract, are meant to be exercised for public good and
179
Page 179
for promoting public interest. And Seventhly, Article
14 of the Constitution of India applies also to matters
of governmental policy even in contractual matters, and
unconstitutional.
(h) Thereafter our attention was invited to the
decision rendered in Lucknow Development Authority Vs.
M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243. Seriously, the instant
judgment has no direct bearing to the issue in hand.
The judgment determines whether compensation can be
awarded to an aggrieved consumer under the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986. It also settles who should
shoulder the responsibility of paying the compensation
awarded. But all the same it has some interesting
observations which may be noticed in the context of the
JUDGMENT
matter under deliberation. Portions of the
observations emphasized upon are being noticed below:
“8. ….. Under our Constitution sovereignty
vests in the people. Every limb of the
constitutional machinery is obliged to be people
oriented. No functionary in exercise of
statutory power can claim immunity, except to
extent the protected by the statute itself.
Public authorities acting in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions
oppressively are accountable for their behaviour
180
Page 180
| has not<br>ictionar | been de<br>y it mea |
|---|
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181
Page 181
| od by t<br>erance i | he autho<br>s due |
|---|
“Even where there is no ministerial duty as
above, and even where no recognised tort
such as trespass, nuisance, or negligence
is committed, public authorities or
officers may be liable in damages for
malicious, deliberate or injurious wrong-
doing. There is thus a tort which has been
called misfeasance in public office, and
which includes malicious abuse of power,
deliberate maladministration, and perhaps
also other unlawful acts causing injury.”
(p. 777)
JUDGMENT
The jurisdiction and power of the courts to
indemnify a citizen for injury suffered due to
abuse of power by public authorities is founded
as observed by Lord Hailsham in Cassell & Co.
Ltd. v. Broome, 1972 AC 1027, on the principle
that, ‘an award of exemplary damages can serve a
182
Page 182
| rvants o<br>f the pe | f the go<br>ople and |
|---|
JUDGMENT
183
Page 183
reasons the for this appears to be development
law of which, apart, from other factors
succeeded in keeping a salutary check on the
functioning in the government or semi-government
offices by holding the officers personally
responsible for their capricious or even ultra
vires action resulting in injury or loss to a
citizen by awarding damages against them .
Various decisions rendered from time to time
have been referred to by Wade on Misfeasance by
Public Authorities . We shall refer to some of
them to demonstrate how necessary it is for our
society. In Ashby v. White, (1703) 2 LD Raym
938, the House of Lords invoked the principle of
ubi jus ibi remedium in favour of an elector who
was wrongfully prevented from voting and decreed
the claim of damages. The ratio of this decision
has been applied and extended by English Courts
in various situations.
11. Today the issue thus is not only of
award of compensation but who should bear the
brunt. The concept of authority and power
exercised by public functionaries has many
dimensions. It has undergone tremendous change
with passage of time and change in socio-
economic outlook. The authority empowered to
function under a statute while exercising power
discharges public duty. It has to act to
subserve general welfare and common good. In
discharging this duty honestly and bona fide,
loss may accrue to any person. And he may claim
compensation which may in circumstances be
payable. But where the duty is performed
capriciously or the exercise of power results in
harassment and agony then the responsibility to
the pay loss determined should be whose? In a
modern society no authority can arrogate to
itself the power to act in a manner which is
arbitrary. It is unfortunate that matters which
require immediate attention linger on and the
in man the street is made to run from one end to
other with no result. The culture of window
clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in
ordinary matters a common man who has neither
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184
Page 184
political the backing nor the financial strength
match to the inaction in public oriented
departments gets frustrated and it erodes the
credibility in the system. Public
administration, no doubt involves a vast amount
administrative of discretion which shields the
action of administrative authority. But where it
found is that exercise of discretion was mala
fide and the complainant is entitled to
compensation for mental and physical harassment
then the officer can no more claim to be under
protective cover . When a citizen seeks to
recover compensation from a public authority in
respect of injuries suffered by him for
capricious exercise of power and the National
Commission finds it duly proved then it has a
statutory obligation to award the same. It was
never more necessary than today when even social
obligations are regulated by grant of statutory
powers. The test of permissive form of grant is
over. It is now imperative and implicit in the
exercise of power that it should be for the sake
society. of When the court directs payment of
damages or compensation against the State the
ultimate sufferer is the common man. It is the
payers' tax money which is paid for inaction of
those who are entrusted under the Act to
discharge their duties in accordance with law .
It is, therefore, necessary that the Commission
when it is satisfied that a complainant is
entitled to compensation for harassment or
mental agony or oppression, which finding of
course should be recorded carefully on material
and convincing circumstances and not lightly,
then it should further direct the department
concerned to pay the amount to the complainant
from the public fund immediately but to recover
the same from those who are found responsible
for such unpardonable behaviour by dividing it
proportionately where there are more than one
functionaries.”
JUDGMENT
(emphasis is mine)
The judgment brings out the foundational principle of
185
Page 185
executive governance. The said foundational principle
is based on the realization that sovereignty vests in
the people. The judgment therefore records that every
by the judgment is, that a public authority exercising
public power discharges a public duty, and therefore,
has to subserve general welfare and common good. All
power should be exercised for the sake of society. The
issue which was the subject matter of consideration,
and has been noticed along with the citation, was
decided by concluding that compensation shall be
payable by the State (or its instrumentality) where
inappropriate deprivation on account of improper
exercise of discretion has resulted in a loss,
compensation is payable by the State (or its
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instrumentality). But where the public functionary
exercises his discretion capriciously, or for
considerations which are malafide, the public
functionary himself must shoulder the burden of
compensation held as payable. The reason for shifting
the onus to the public functionary deserves notice.
This Court felt, that when a court directs payment of
186
Page 186
damages or compensation against the State, the ultimate
sufferer is the common man, because it is tax payers
money out of which damages and costs are paid.
Union of India & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 530. The instant
case dealt with a challenge to the allotment of retail
outlets for petroleum products (petrol pumps).
Allotment was made in favour of 15 persons on the
ground of poverty or unemployment. Rest of the
relevant facts emerge from the extracts from the
judgment reproduced below:
“24. The orders of the Minister reproduced
above read: “the applicant has no regular income
to support herself and her family”, “the
applicant is an educated lady and belongs to
Scheduled Tribe community”, “the applicant is
unemployed and has no regular source of income”,
“the applicant is an uneducated, unemployed
Scheduled Tribe youth without regular source of
livelihood”, “the applicant is a housewife whose
family is facing difficult financial
circumstances” etc. etc. There would be
literally millions of people in the country
having these circumstances or worse. There is no
justification whatsoever to pick up these
persons except that they happen to have won the
favour of the Minister on mala fide
considerations. None of these cases fall within
the categories placed before this Court in
Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union
of India, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 382, but even if we
assume for argument sake that these cases fall
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187
Page 187
in some of those or similar guidelines the
exercise of discretion was wholly arbitrary.
Such a discretionary power which is capable of
being exercised arbitrarily is not permitted by
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While
Article 14 permits a reasonable classification
having a rational nexus to the objective sought
be to achieved, it does not permit the power to
pick and choose arbitrarily out of several
persons falling in the same category. A
transparent and objective criteria/procedure has
be to evolved so that the choice among the
members belonging to the same class or category
based is on reason, fair play and non-
arbitrariness. It is essential to lay down as a
matter of policy as to how preferences would be
assigned between two persons falling in the same
category. If there are two eminent sportsmen in
distress and only one petrol pump is available,
there should be clear, transparent and objective
criteria/procedure to indicate who out of the
is two to be preferred. Lack of transparency in
system the promotes nepotism and arbitrariness .
It is absolutely essential that the entire
system should be transparent right from the
stage of calling for the applications up to the
stage of passing the orders of allotment. The
names of the allottees, the orders and the
reasons for allotment should be available for
public knowledge and scrutiny . Mr Shanti Bhushan
has suggested that the petrol pumps, agencies
etc. may be allotted by public auction —
category wise amongst the eligible and
objectively selected applicants. We do not wish
impose to any procedure on the Government. It is
a matter of policy for the Government to lay
down. We, however, direct that any procedure
laid down by the Government must be transparent,
just, fair and non-arbitrary .
….. …..
JUDGMENT
26. With the change in socio-economic
outlook, the public servants are being entrusted
with more and more discretionary powers even in
field the of distribution of government wealth
188
Page 188
| aside an | order o |
|---|
| you ca | nnot hol |
(emphasis is mine)
This judgment has a direct bearing on the controversy
in hand. It clearly delineates the manner in which
discretion must be exercised, specially when the object
of discretion is State largesse. A perusal of the
observations reproduced above reveal, that the State
largesse under reference (petrol pumps) were to be
allotted on the ground of poverty and unemployment.
Such an allotment was obviously based on a policy to
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“best subserve the common good” enshrined in Article
39(b) of the Constitution of India. This Court found
no fault in the policy itself. The fault was with the
manner of giving effect to the policy. It was held,
that a transparent and objective criteria/procedure has
to be evolved, so that the choice out of those who are
eligible can be made fairly and without any
189
Page 189
arbitrariness. The exercise of discretion which
enables the competent authority to arbitrarily pick and
choose out of several persons falling in the same
Constitution of India.
(j) Out of the more recent judgments our attention
was invited to Meerut Development Authority Vs.
Association of Management Studies & Anr. etc., (2009) 6
SCC 171. The controversy adjudicated upon in this case
emerges from the decision of the appellant to allotment
of 2 plots of land. For the said purpose the appellant
invited tenders from interested persons. In response
the respondent submitted its tender. After the
allotment of one of the plots to the respondent, the
respondent raised an objection that the appellant had
JUDGMENT
fixed the reserved price of the second plot at a rate
much higher than its adjoining plots. The respondent
assailed the action of the appellant in issuing a fresh
advertisement for the allotment of the second plot. In
the course of determination of the aforesaid
controversy this Court held:
“26. A tender is an offer. It is something
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Page 190
| he realm | of cont |
|---|
| al revi | ew may |
27. bidders The participating in the
tender process have no other right except the
right to equality and fair treatment in the
matter of evaluation of competitive bids offered
interested by persons in response to notice
inviting tenders in a transparent manner and
free from hidden agenda . One cannot challenge
the terms and conditions of the tender except on
the abovestated ground, the reason being the
terms of the invitation to tender are in the
realm of the contract. No bidder is entitled as
a matter of right to insist the authority
inviting tenders to enter into further
negotiations unless the terms and conditions of
notice so provided for such negotiations.
JUDGMENT
28. is It so well settled in law and needs
restatement no at our hands that disposal of the
public property by the State or its
instrumentalities partakes the character of a
trust. The methods to be adopted for disposal of
public property must be fair and transparent
providing an opportunity to all the interested
persons to participate in the process .
29. The Authority has the right not to
accept the highest bid and even to prefer a
tender other than the highest bidder, if there
exist good and sufficient reasons, such as, the
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Page 191
highest bid not representing the market price
but there cannot be any doubt that the
Authority's action in accepting or refusing the
bid must be free from arbitrariness or
favouritism.
….. …..
| |
| aw has b<br>atise, A | een succ<br>dministr |
“The powers of public authorities are therefore
essentially different from those of private
persons. A man making his will may, subject to
rights any of his dependants, dispose of his
property just as he may wish. He may act out of
malice or a spirit of revenge, but in law this
does not affect his exercise of his power. In
same the way a private person has an absolute
power to allow whom he likes to use his land, to
release a debtor, or, where the law permits, to
evict a tenant, regardless of his motives. This
unfettered is discretion. But a public authority
do may none of these things unless it acts
reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and
relevant grounds of public interest . So a city
council acted unlawfully when it refused
unreasonably to let a local rugby football club
use the city's sports ground, though a private
owner could of course have refused with
impunity. Nor may a local authority arbitrarily
release debtors, and if it evicts tenants, even
though in accordance with a contract, it must
reasonably act and ‘ within the limits of fair
dealing ’ . The whole conception of unfettered
discretion is inappropriate to a public
authority, which possesses powers solely in
order that it may use them for the public
th
, Administrative Law, 9 Edn. H.W.R. Wade
good.”
and C.F. Forsyth .
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40. There is no difficulty to hold that
the authorities owe a duty to act fairly but it
is equally well settled in judicial review, the
court is not concerned with the merits or
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Page 192
correctness of the decision, but with the manner
in which the decision is taken or the order is
made. The court cannot substitute its own
opinion for the opinion of the authority
deciding the matter.
| dicial r | eview i |
|---|
| ion. By<br>not exam | way of<br>ine the |
….. …..
50. We are, however, of the opinion that
the effort, if any, made by MDA to augment its
financial resources and revenue itself cannot be
said to be an unreasonable decision. It is well
said that the struggle to get for the State the
full value of its resources is particularly
pronounced in the sale of State-owned natural
assets to the private sector. Whenever the
Government or the authorities get less than the
full value of the asset, the country is being
cheated; there is a simple transfer of wealth
from the citizens as a whole to whoever gets the
assets “ at a discount ” . Most of the times the
wealth of the State goes to the individuals
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193
Page 193
within the country rather than to multinational
corporations; still, wealth slips away that
ought to belong to the nation as a whole.
(emphasis is mine)
treatment and the right to be treated equally. The
evaluation of tenders, it has been held, must be
transparent and free from any hidden agenda. The view
expressed in Wades Tretise on Administrative Law, that
public authorities cannot act in a manner which is open
to private persons, was accepted. Public authorities,
it was held, can neither act out of malice nor a spirit
of revenge. A public authority is ordained to act,
reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and
relevant grounds of public interest. Most importantly
it was concluded, that the State “must” get the “full
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value” of the resources, specially when State owned
assets are passed over to private individuals/entities.
Not stopping there the Court added further, that
whoever pays less than the full value, get the assets
belonging to the citizens “at a discount”, and as such
the wealth that belongs to the nation slips away.
194
Page 194
(k) Also cited for our consideration was the
judgment in Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. Vs.
Reliance Industries Ltd. etc., (2010) 7 SCC 1. The
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122. From the above analysis, the following
are the broad sustainable conclusions which can be
195
Page 195
derived from the position of the Union:
| ugh exp | loration |
|---|
| on of na<br>n of g | tural r<br>overnmen |
statutory scheme as well as the proper
interpretation of the PSC mandates the
Government to determine the price of the gas
before it is supplied by the contractor.
( 4 ) The policy of the Government, including the
gas utilisation policy and the decision of
EGOM would be applicable to the pricing in the
present case.
( 5 ) The Government cannot be divested of its
supervisory powers to regulate the supply and
distribution of gas .
….. …..
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128. a constitutional In democracy like ours,
national the assets belong to the people. The
Government holds such natural resources in trust.
Legally, therefore, the Government owns such
assets for the purposes of developing them in the
interests of the people . In the present case, the
Government owns the gas till it reaches its
ultimate consumer. A mechanism is provided under
the PSC between the Government and the contractor
(RIL, in the present case). The PSC shall override
any other contractual obligation between the
contractor and any other party.
….. …..
196
Page 196
| tives of | the Sta |
|---|
| ow from | one to |
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250 We hold that with respect to the natural
resources extracted and exploited from the
geographic zones specified in Article 297 the
Union may not:
( 1 ) transfer title of those resources after their
extraction unless the Union receives just and
proper compensation for the same;
( 2 ) allow a situation to develop wherein the
various users in different sectors could
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Page 197
potentially be deprived of access to such
resources;
( 3 ) allow the extraction of such resources without
periodic evaluation of the current
distribution and making an assessment of how
greater equity can be achieved, as between
sectors and also between regions;
( 5 ) allow a contractor or any other agency to
extract and distribute the resources without
the explicit permission of the Union of India,
which permission can be granted only pursuant
to a rationally framed utilisation policy; and
( 6 ) no end user may be given any guarantee for
continued access and of use beyond a period to
be specified by the Government.
contract Any including a PSC which does not take
into its ambit stated principles may itself become
vulnerable and fall foul of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
(emphasis is mine)
Interestingly, in this case the position adopted by the
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Union needs to be highlighted. This Court was
informed, that natural resources are vested in the
Government, as a matter of trust, in the name of the
people of India. And that, it was the solemn duty of
the State to protect the national interest. The most
significant assertion expressed on behalf of the Union
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Page 198
was, that natural resources must always be used in the
interest of the country and not in private interest.
It is in the background of the stance adopted by the
extracted above.
(l) Last of all reference was made to the decision
of this Court in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 29:
65. What needs to be emphasised is that the
State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities
cannot give largesse to any person according to
sweet the will and whims of the political
entities and/or officers of the State. Every
action/decision of the State and/or its
agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or
confer benefit must be founded on a sound,
transparent, discernible and well-defined
policy, which shall be made known to the public
publication by in the Official Gazette and other
recognised modes of publicity and such policy
must be implemented/executed by adopting a non-
discriminatory and non-arbitrary method
irrespective of the class or category of persons
proposed to be benefited by the policy. The
distribution of largesse like allotment of land,
grant of quota, permit licence, etc. by the
State and its agencies/instrumentalities should
always be done in a fair and equitable manner
the and element of favouritism or nepotism shall
influence not the exercise of discretion, if
any, conferred upon the particular functionary
officer or of the State .
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66. may We add that there cannot be any
policy, much less, a rational policy of
allotting land on the basis of applications made
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Page 199
individuals, by bodies, organisations or
institutions dehors an invitation or
advertisement by the State or its
agency/instrumentality. By entertaining
applications made by individuals, organisations
institutions or for allotment of land or for
grant of any other type of largesse the State
cannot exclude other eligible persons from
lodging competing claim. Any allotment of land
grant or of other form of largesse by the State
its or agencies/instrumentalities by treating
exercise the as a private venture is liable to
treated be as arbitrary, discriminatory and an
of act favouritism and/or nepotism violating the
soul of the equality clause embodied in Article
of 14 the Constitution .
67. This, however, does not mean that the
State can never allot land to the
institutions/organisations engaged in
educational, cultural, social or philanthropic
activities or are rendering service to the
society except by way of auction. Nevertheless,
is it necessary to observe that once a piece of
land is earmarked or identified for allotment to
institutions/organisations engaged in any such
activity, the actual exercise of allotment must
done be in a manner consistent with the doctrine
equality. of The competent authority should, as
a matter of course, issue an advertisement
incorporating therein the conditions of
eligibility so as to enable all similarly
situated eligible persons,
institutions/organisations to participate in the
process of allotment, whether by way of auction
otherwise. or In a given case the Government may
allot land at a fixed price but in that case
also allotment must be preceded by a wholesome
exercise consistent with Article 14 of the
Constitution.”
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(emphasis is mine)
The observations of this Court in the judgment
200
Page 200
extracted above neither need any summarization, nor any
further elaboration.
(m) Surely, there cannot be any escape from a
Union of India & Ors., (2012) 3 SCC 1, which according
to the preamble of the Presidential reference, seems to
be the reason why the reference came to be made.
During the course of hearing extensive debate, between
rival parties, ensued on the effect of the observations
recorded by this Court in paragraphs 95 and 96 of the
judgment. The aforesaid paragraphs are being extracted
hereinbelow:
“95. This Court has repeatedly held that
wherever a contract is to be awarded or a
licence is to be given, the public authority
must adopt a transparent and fair method for
making selections so that all eligible persons
get a fair opportunity of competition. To put it
differently, the State and its
agencies/instrumentalities must always adopt a
rational method for disposal of public property
and no attempt should be made to scuttle the
claim of worthy applicants. When it comes to
alienation of scarce natural resources like
spectrum etc., it is the burden of the State to
ensure that a non-discriminatory method is
adopted for distribution and alienation, which
would necessarily result in protection of
national/public interest.
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Page 201
| mum finan<br>e constit | cial be<br>utional |
|---|
In so far as the controversy in the aforesaid case is
concerned, it would be relevant to mention that the
petitioner approached this Court by invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The
petition came to be filed as a cause in public
interest. The reason which promoted the petitioner to
approach this Court was that the Union had adopted the
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policy of “first come first serve” for allocation of
licences of spectrum. It was alleged that the
aforesaid policy involved the element of pure chance or
accident. It was asserted on behalf of the petitioners
that invocation of the principles of “first come first
serve” for permission to use natural resources had
inherently dangerous implications. The implications
202
Page 202
expressed by the petitioners were duly taken into
consideration and the plea raised on behalf of the
petitioners was accepted. Thereupon, the following
judgment:
“102. In th
e result, the writ petitions are allowed
in the following terms:
(i) The licences granted to the private
Respondents on or after 10.1.2008 pursuant to
two press releases issued on 10.1.2008 and
subsequent allocation of spectrum to the
licensees are declared illegal and are
quashed.
(ii) The above direction shall become operative
after four months.
(iii) Keeping in view the decision taken by the
Central Government in 2011, TRAI shall make
fresh recommendations for grant of licence and
allocation of spectrum in 2G band in 22
Service Areas by auction, as was done for
allocation of spectrum in 3G band.
(iv) The Central Government shall consider the
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recommendations of TRAI and take appropriate
decision within next one month and fresh
licences be granted by auction.
(v) Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 9 who have been
benefited at the cost of Public Exchequer by a
wholly arbitrary and unconstitutional action
taken by the DoT for grant of UAS Licences and
allocation of spectrum in 2G band and who off-
loaded their stakes for many thousand crores
in the name of fresh infusion of equity or
transfer of equity shall pay cost of Rs. 5
crores each. Respondent Nos. 4, 6, 7 and 10
shall pay cost of Rs. 50 lakhs each because
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Page 203
| ns were k<br>n four m | ept pend<br>onths, 50 |
|---|
(vii) However, it is made clear that the
observations made in this judgment shall not,
in any manner, affect the pending
investigation by the CBI, Directorate of
Enforcement and Ors. agencies or cause
prejudice to those who are facing prosecution
in the cases registered by the CBI or who may
face prosecution on the basis of
chargesheet(s) which may be filed by the CBI
in future and the Special Judge, CBI shall
decide the matter uninfluenced by this
judgment. We also make it clear that this
judgment shall not prejudice any person in the
action which may be taken by other
investigating agencies under Income Tax Act,
1961, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
and other similar statutes.”
JUDGMENT
It needs to be noticed that a review petition came to
be filed by the Union against the instant judgment.
The same, however, came to be withdrawn without any
reservations. During the course of hearing of the
instant petition, the Learned Attorney General for
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Page 204
India informed this Court that the Union had decided to
give effect to the judgment, in so far as the
allocation of spectrum is concerned. In the above view
and 96 extracted hereinabove. A perusal of the
aforesaid paragraphs reveals, that in line with the
judgments rendered by this Court interpreting Article
14 of the Constitution of India, this Court yet again
held, that while awarding a contact or a licence, the
executive must adopt a transparent and fair method.
The executive must ensure, that all eligible persons
get a fair opportunity to compete. For awarding
contracts or licences, the executive should adopt a
rational method, so as to ensure that claims of worthy
applicants are not scuttled. On the subject of natural
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resources like spectrum, etc., this Court held that it
was the bounden duty of the State to ensure the
adoption of a non-discriminatory method which would
result in protection of national/public interest. This
Court also expressed the view that “perhaps” the best
method for doing so would be through a duly publicized
auction conducted fairly and impartially. Thus viewed,
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Page 205
it was affirmed, that the State was duty bound to adopt
the method of auction by giving wide publication while
alienating natural resources, so as to ensure that all
of applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, in matters where the State, its
instrumentalities, and their functionaries, are engaged
in contractual obligations (as they emerge from the
judgments extracted in paragraph 6 above) are being
briefly paraphrased. For an action to be able to
withstand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, it has already been expressed in the “main
opinion” that it has to be fair, reasonable, non-
discriminatory, transparent, non-capricious, unbiased,
without favouritism or nepotism, in pursuit of
JUDGMENT
promotion of healthy competition and equitable
treatment. The judgments referred to, endorse all
those requirements where the State, its
instrumentalities, and their functionaries, are engaged
in contractual transactions. Therefore, all
“governmental policy” drawn with reference to
contractual matters, it has been held, must conform to
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Page 206
the aforesaid parameters. While Article 14 of the
Constitution of India permits a reasonable
classification having a rational nexus to the object
falling in the same category. Therefore, a criteria or
procedure has to be adopted so that the choice among
those falling in the same category is based on reason,
fair play and non-arbitrariness. Even if there are
only two contenders falling in the zone of
consideration, there should be a clear, transparent and
objective criteria or procedure to indicate which out
of the two is to be preferred. It is this, which would
ensure transparency.
8. Another aspect which emerges from the judgments
(extracted in paragraph 6 above) is that, the State,
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its instrumentalities and their functionaries, while
exercising their executive power in matters of trade or
business etc. including making of contracts, should be
mindful of public interest, public purpose and public
good. This is so, because every holder of public
office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the
State, or its instrumentalities, is ultimately
207
Page 207
accountable to the people in whom sovereignty vests.
As such, all powers vested in the State are meant to be
exercised for public good and in public interest.
on discretion are - a clear, transparent and objective
criteria or procedure which promotes public interest,
public purpose and public good. A public authority is
ordained, therefore to act, reasonably and in good
faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds of public
interest.
9. Observations recorded by this Court on the
subject of revenue returns, during the course of the
States engagements in commercial ventures (emerging
from the judgments extracted in paragraph 6 above), are
being summarized hereunder. It has been held, where
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the Sate is simply selling a product, there can be no
doubt that the State must endeavour to obtain the
highest price, subject of course to any other
overriding public consideration. The validity of a
trading agreement executed by the Government has to be
judged by the test, that the entire benefit arising
therefrom enures to the State, and is not used as a
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Page 208
cloak for conferring private benefits on a limited
class of persons. If a contract has been entered into,
taking in account the interest of the State and the
authority. The endeavour to get the State the “full
value” of its resources, it has been held, is
particularly pronounced in the sale of State owned
natural resources, to the private sector. Whenever the
State gets less than the full value of the assets, it
has been inferred, that the country has been cheated,
in a much as, it amounts to a simple transfer of
wealth, from the citizens as a whole, to whoever gets
the assets at a discount. And in that sense, it has
been concluded, the wealth that belongs to the nation
is lost. In Reliance Natural Resources Ltd.’s case
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(supra), the Union of India adopted the position, that
natural resources are vested in the State as a matter
of trust, for and on behalf of the citizens of the
country. It was also acknowledged, that it was the
solemn duty of the State, to protect those natural
resources. More importantly, it was accepted, that
natural resources must always be used in the common
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Page 209
interest of the citizens of the country, and not for
private interest.
10. Based on the legal/constitutional
there are circumstances in which natural resources
ought to be disposed of only by ensuring maximum
returns. For this, I shall place reliance on a
conclusion drawn in the “main opinion”, namely,
“Distribution of natural resources is a policy
decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus,
executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy
decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose,
and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated
for commercial pursuits of profit maximizing private
entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that
JUDGMENT
are competitive and maximize revenue, may be arbitrary
and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
(refer to paragraph 149 of the “main opinion”). I am
in respectful agreement with the aforesaid conclusion,
and would accordingly opine, that when natural
resources are made available by the State to private
persons for commercial exploitation exclusively for
210
Page 210
their individual gains, the State’s endeavour must be
towards maximization of revenue returns. This alone
would ensure, that the fundamental right enshrined in
laws), and the directive principle contained in Article
39(b) of the Constitution of India (that material
resources of the community are so distributed as best
to subserve the common good), have been extended to the
citizens of the country.
11. A similar conclusion would also emerge in a
slightly different situation. This Court in a case
dealing with a challenge to the allotment of retail
outlets for petroleum products [Common Cause, A
Registered Society Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1996) 6
SCC 530] has held, that Article 14 of the Constitution
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of India, does not countenance discretionary power
which is capable of being exercised arbitrarily. While
accepting that Article 14 of the Constitution of India
permits a reasonable classification having a rational
nexus to the object sought to be achieved, it was held
that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not
permit the State to pick and choose arbitrarily out of
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Page 211
several persons falling in the same category. A
transparent and objective criteria/procedure has to be
evolved so that the choice amongst those belonging to
the one expressed above, where by reasonable
classification based on some public purpose, the choice
is limited to a set of private persons, amongst whom
alone, the State has decided to dispose of natural
resources. Herein again, in my opinion, if the
participation of private persons is for commercial
exploitation exclusively for their individual gains,
then the State’s endeavour to maximize revenue alone,
would satisfy the constitutional mandate contained in
Articles 14 and 39(b) of the Constitution of India.
12. In the “main opinion”, it has been concluded,
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that auction is not a constitutional mandate, in the
nature of an absolute principle which has to be applied
in all situations. And as such, auction cannot be read
into Article 14 of the Constitution of India, so as to
be applied in all situations (refer to paragraph 107 of
the “main opinion”). Auction is certainly not a
constitutional mandate in the manner expressed, but it
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can surely be applied in some situations to maximize
revenue returns, to satisfy legal and constitutional
requirements. It is, therefore, that I have chosen to
pointed out, the Attorney General for India had acknowledged
during the course of hearing, that auction by way of
competitive bidding was certainly an indisputable means, by
which maximization of revenue returns is assured (in this
behalf other observations recorded by me in paragraph 3
above may also be kept in mind).
In the aforesaid view of
the matter, all that needs to be stated is, that if the
State arrives at the conclusion, in a given situation,
that maximum revenue would be earned by auction of the
natural resource in question, then that alone would be
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the process which it would have to adopt, in the
situations contemplated in the foregoing two
paragraphs.
13. One is compelled to take judicial notice of the
fact, that allotment of natural resources is an issue
of extensive debate in the country, so much so, that
the issue of allocation of such resources had recently
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Page 213
resulted in a washout of two sessions of Parliament.
The current debate on allotment of material resources
has been prompted by a report submitted by the
The report it is alleged, points out that private and
public sector companies had made windfall gains because
the process of competitive bidding had not been
adopted. The country witnessed a similar political spat
a little while earlier, based on the allocation of the
2G spectrum. On that occasion the controversy was
brought to this Court by way of a public interest
litigation, the judgment whereof is reported as Centre
for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India,
(2012) 3 SCC 1 . Extensive revenue loss, in the course
of allocation of the 2G spectrum was duly noticed. On
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each occasion when the issue of allocation of natural
resources, results in an alleged loss of revenue, it is
portrayed as a loss to the nation. The issue then
becomes a subject matter of considerable debate at all
levels of the Indian polity. Loss of one, essentially
entails a gain to the other. On each such occasion
loss to the nation, translates into the identification
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Page 214
of private players as the beneficiaries. If one were
to accept the allegations appearing in the media, on
account of defects in the disposal mechanism, private
current debate, rival political parties have made
allegations against those responsible, which have been
repudiated with counter allegations. This Court is
not, and should never be seen to be, a part of that
debate. But it does seem, that the Presidential
reference is aimed at invoking this Court’s advisory
jurisdiction to iron out the creases, so that legal and
constitutional parameters are correctly understood.
This would avoid such controversies in future. It is
therefore, that an opinion is also being rendered by
me, on the fourth question, namely, “What is the
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permissible scope for interference by courts with
policy making by the Government including methods for
disposal of natural resources?” On this the advice
tendered in the “main opinion” inter alia expresses,
“We may, however, hasten to add that the Court can test
the legality and constitutionality of these methods.
When questioned, the Courts are entitled to analyse the
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Page 215
legal validity of different means of distribution and
give a constitutional answer as to which methods are
ultra vires and intra vires the provisions of the
a policy or law is patently unfair to the extent that
it falls fouls of the fairness requirement of Article
14 of the Constitution, the Court would not hesitate in
striking it down.”, (refer to paragraph 146 of the
“main opinion”). While fully endorsing the above
conclusion, I wish to further elucidate the
proposition.
Before adverting to anything else, it is essential
to refer to Article 39 (b) of the Constitution of
India.
JUDGMENT
“39. Certain principles of policy to be
followed by the State – The State shall
in particular, direct its policy towards
securing -
(b) that the ownership and control of the
material resources of the community are
so distributed as best to subserve the
common good ;
(emphasis is mine)
The mandate contained in the Article extracted above
envisages, that all material resources ought to be
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Page 216
distributed in a manner which would “best subserve the
common good”. It is therefore apparent, that
governmental policy for distribution of such resources
It has been expressed in the “main opinion”, that
matters of policy fall within the realm of the
legislature or the executive, and cannot be interfered
with, unless the policy is in violation of statutory
law, or is ultra vires the provision(s) of the
Constitution of India. It is not within the scope of
judicial review for a Court to suggest an alternative
policy, which in the wisdom of the Court could be
better suited in the circumstances of a case. Thus far
the position is clearly unambiguous.
JUDGMENT
The legality and constitutionality of policy is
one matter, and the manner of its implementation quite
another. Even at the implementation stage a forthright
and legitimate policy, may take the shape of an
illegitimate stratagem (which has been illustrated at a
later juncture hereinafter). Since the Presidential
reference is not based on any concrete fact situation,
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Page 217
it would be appropriate to hypothetically create one.
This would enable those responsible for decision
making, to be able to appreciate the options available
would also ensure that a truly meaningful opinion has
been rendered. The illustration, that has been chosen
is imaginary, and therefore, should not be taken as a
reference to any similar real life
situation(s)/circumstance(s). The focus in the instant
consideration is limited to allocation of natural
resources for private commercial exploitation, i.e.,
where a private player will be the beneficiary of such
allocation, and will exploit the natural resource to
make personal profits therefrom.
JUDGMENT
The illustration chosen will be used to express an
opinion on matters which are governed by statutory
provisions, as also, those which are based on
governmental policy. This is so because in so far as
the present controversy is concerned, the parameters
for distribution of natural resources must be examined
under these two heads separately.
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Coal is a natural resource. It shall constitute
the illustrative natural resource for the present
consideration. Let us assume a governmental decision
Reference may be made to the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter
referred to as, the MMDR Act). The enactment deals
exclusively with natural resources. Section 11A of the
MMDR Act has been chosen as the illustrative provision,
to demonstrate how a forthright legitimate legislative
policy, may take the shape of an illegitimate
stratagem. The choice of Section 11A aforesaid is on
account of the fact that it was added to the MMDR Act
only on 13.2.2012, and as such, there may not have
been, as of now, any actual allocation of coal lots
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based thereon. Section 11A of the MMDR Act, is
being placed hereunder :
“11A. Procedure in respect of coal or lignite
– The Central Government may, for the purpose
of granting reconnaissance permit, prospecting
licence or mining lease in respect of an area
containing coal or lignite, select, through
auction by competitive bidding on such terms
and conditions as may be prescribed, a company
engaged in, -
(i) production of iron and steel;
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(ii) generation of power;
(iii) washing of coal obtained from a
mine; or
(iv) such other end use as
the Central Government may,
by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify, and the
State Government shall grant such
reconnaissance permit, prospecting
licence or mining lease in respect of
coal or lignite to such company as
selected through auction by competitive
bidding under this section:
Provided that the auction by competitive
bidding shall not be applicable to an area
containing coal or lignite,-
(a) where such area is considered for
allocation to a Government company or
corporation for mining or such other
specified end use;
(b) where such area is considered for
allocation to a company or
corporation that has been awarded a
power project on the basis of
competitive bids for tariff
(including Ultra Mega Power Projects).”
Explanation – For the purposes of this
section “company” means a company as defined
in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 and
includes a foreign company within the meaning
of section 591 of that Act.
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(emphasis is mine)
For the grant of a mining lease in respect of an area
containing coal, the provision leaves no room for any
doubt, that selection would be made through auction by
competitive bidding. No process other than auction,
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can therefore be adopted for the grant of a coal mining
lease.
Section 11A of the MMDR Act also defines the zone
| partici<br>gible, th | pation<br>e conten |
|---|
in the production of iron and steel, or generation of
power, or washing of coal obtained from a mine, or an
activity notified by the Central Government. Only
those satisfying the legislatively prescribed zone of
eligibility, are permitted to compete for a coal mining
lease. For the sake of fairness, and to avoid
arbitrariness, the provision contemplates, that the
highest bidder amongst those who participate in the
process of competitive bidding, would succeed in
obtaining the concerned coal mining lease. The
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legislative policy limiting the zone of consideration
could be subject matter of judicial review. It could
be assailed, in case of violation of a legal or
constitutional provision. As expressed in the “main
opinion” the facts of each individual case, will be the
deciding factor for such determination. In the absence
of any such challenge, the legislative policy would be
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binding and enforceable. In such an eventuality, those
who do not fall within the zone of consideration, would
be precluded from the process of competitive bidding
if the objective is to best subserve the common good
(as in Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India) the
legislative policy would be fully legitimate. If
however, the expressed legislative policy has no nexus
to any legitimate objective, or it transgresses the
mandate of distribution of material resources to “best
subserve the common good”, it may well be unfair,
unreasonable or discriminatory.
For an effective analysis, Section 11A of the MMDR
Act needs a further closer examination. Section 11A
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aforesaid, as an exception to the legislative policy
referred to in the foregoing paragraph, also provides
for the grant of a mining lease for coal to a private
player, without following the auction route. The
provision contemplates the grant of a mining lease for
coal, without any reciprocal monetary or other
consideration from the lessee. The proviso in section
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11A of the MMDR Act, excludes the auction route where
the beneficiary is engaged in power generation. Such
exclusion, is contemplated only when the power
important to highlight, that there is no express
assurance in section 11A aforesaid, that every
entrepreneur who sets up a power project, having
succeeded on the basis of competitive bidding, would be
allotted a coal mining lease. But if such an allotment
is actually made, it is apparent, that such
entrepreneur would get the coal lot, without having to
participate in an auction, free of cost. The
legislative policy incorporated in Section 11A of the
MMDR Act, if intended to best subserve the common good,
may well be valid, even in a situation where the
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material resource is being granted free of cost. What
appears to be free of cost in the proviso in Section
11A of the MMDR Act, is in actuality consideration
enmeshed in providing electricity at a low tariff. The
aforesaid proviso may be accepted as fair, and may not
violate the mandate contained in Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, or even the directive principles
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contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution of
India.
Hypothetically, assume a competitive bidding
| amongst<br>on proje | private<br>ct. The |
|---|
agrees to supply electricity at the lowest tariff would
succeed in such an auction. The important question is,
if the private party who succeeds in the award of the
project, is granted a mining lease in respect of an
area containing coal, free of cost, would such a grant
satisfy the test of being fair, reasonable, equitable
and impartial. The answer to the instant query would
depend on the facts of each individual case.
Therefore, the answer could be in the affirmative, as
well as, in the negative. Both aspects of the matter
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are being explained in the succeeding paragraph.
Going back to the hypothetical illustration based
on Section 11A of the MMDR Act. One would add some
further facts so as to be able to effectively project
the legal point of view. If the bidding process to
determine the lowest tariff has been held, and the said
bidding process has taken place without the knowledge,
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that a coal mining lease would be allotted to the
successful bidder, yet the successful bidder is awarded
a coal mining lease. Would such a grant be valid? In
so because, the competitive bidding for tariff was not
based on the knowledge of gains, that would come to the
vying contenders, on account of grant of a coal mining
lease. Such a grant of a coal mining lease would
therefore have no nexus to the “competitive bid for
tariff”. Grant of a mining lease for coal in this
situation would therefore be a windfall, without any
nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In the
bidding process, the parties concerned had no occasion
to bring down the electricity tariff, on the basis of
gains likely to accrue to them, from the coal mining
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lease. In this case, a material resource would be
deemed to have been granted without a reciprocal
consideration i.e., free of cost. Such an allotment
may not be fair and may certainly be described as
arbitrary, and violative of the Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Such an allotment having no
nexus to the objective of subserving the common good,
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would fall foul even of the directive principle
contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, a forthright and legitimate policy,
In a slightly changed factual scenario, the
conclusion may well be different. If before the
holding the process of auction, for the award of a
power project (based on competitive bids for tariff),
it is made known to the contenders, that the successful
bidder would be entitled to a mining lease over an area
containing coal, those competing for the power project
would necessarily incorporate the profit they were
likely to make from such mining lease. While
projecting the tariff at which they would supply
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electricity, they would be in a position to offset such
profits from their costs. This would result in an in
an opportunity to the contenders to lower the tariff to
a level lower than would have been possible without the
said lease. In such a situation the gains from the
coal mining lease, would be enmeshed in the competitive
bidding for tariff. Therefore, it would not be just to
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assume in the instant sequence of facts, that the coal
lot has been granted free of cost. One must read into
the said grant, a reciprocal consideration to provide
deemed to be aimed at “subserving the common good” in
terms of Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India.
Therefore even the allotment of such a mining lease,
which appears to result in the allocation of a natural
resource free of cost, may well satisfy the test of
fairness and reasonableness contemplated in Article 14
of the Constitution of India. Moreso, because a fair
playing field having been made available to all those
competing for the power project, by making them aware
of the grant of a coal mining lease, well before the
bidding process. The question of favouritism therefore
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would not arise. Would such a grant of a natural
resource, free of cost, be valid? The answer to the
query, in the instant fact situation, may well be in
the affirmative.
The policy of allocation of natural resources for
public good can be defined by the legislature, as has
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been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Likewise,
policy for allocation of natural resources may also be
determined by the executive. The parameters for
matter, there can be no doubt about the conclusion
recorded in the “main opinion” that auction which is
just one of the several price recovery mechanisms,
cannot be held to be the only constitutionally
recognized method for alienation of natural resources.
That should not be understood to mean, that it can
never be a valid method for disposal of natural
resources (refer to paragraphs 10 to 12 of my instant
opinion).
I would therefore conclude by stating that no part
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of the natural resource can be dissipated as a matter
of largess, charity, donation or endowment, for private
exploitation. Each bit of natural resource expended
must bring back a reciprocal consideration. The
consideration may be in the nature of earning revenue
or may be to “best subserve the common good”. It may
well be the amalgam of the two. There cannot be a
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dissipation of material resources free of cost or at a
consideration lower than their actual worth. One set
of citizens cannot prosper at the cost of another set
............................J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 27, 2012.
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