Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
V. K. KANGAN & ORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/08/1975
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 2190 1976 SCR (1) 369
1976 SCC (2) 895
ACT:
Land Acquisition Act-Section 4, Sec. 5-A and Section 6.
Madras Land Acquisition Rules 3(b).
Mandatory or directory-Validity of notification Whether
can be challenged after unreasonable lapse of time.
HEADNOTE:
The respondents are the owners of the land in question.
the land was sought to be acquired for an Engineering
College at the instance of the Education Department of the
State of Mysore. Section 4 notification was issued in the
year 1960. After an enquiry into the objections filed under
section 5A the land Acquisition officer sent his report to
the Government. Government over-ruled the objection and
issued a notification under section 6. The Education
Department at whose instance the land was sought to be
acquired was not given notice as required by rule (b) of
Madras Land Acquisition rules. The respondents field a Writ
Petition in the High Court challenging the validity or
both the notifications on the ground that the Education
Department was not consulted. The High Court upheld the
contention of’ the respondents and quashed the notifications
issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Act on the ground that
if the Department concerned filed any reply pursuant to the
notice issued the objector would know what the Department
has stated by way of reply and at the stage of hearing of
objection. tile objector might adduce evidence or address
arguments to meet what is stated in such reply. The
objector. could further urge before the Government that the
reasons given by the department in reply to the objections
should not be accepted:
On appeal by Special Leave it was contended by the
appellant.
1. Rule 3 (b) is inconsistent With section 5A (2) for
the reasons that sub section (2) of section 5A provides for
further enquiry in the discretion of the Collector and rule
3(b) if treated as mandatory would be to convert the
discretionary power into a mandatory duty and is therefore,
ultra vires the section. 2. The provisions of rule 3(b) were
not mandatory and that therefore, failure to issue the
notice to the department concerned was not fatal to the
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validity of the notification.
^
HELD: 1. Section 5A requires the Collector to make a
report after hearing the objections. It does not mean that a
rule cannot be framed which would enable the department
concerned to place its view point before the Collector when
considering the objection under section 5A. The proceeding
of the Collector are quasi-judicial and it is only proper
that he should be apprised of the attitude of the department
requiring the land in the light of the objections filed. It
would be helpful to the Government in making the decision to
have before it the answer to the objection by the department
in order to appreciate the riv view point. Rule 3(b) is not
Ultra vires Section SA. [372F-H 373 A-C]
2. In determining the question whether a provision is
mandatory or directory one must look into the subject
matter. and consider the importance of the provision
disregarded and the relation of. that provision to the
general object intended to be secured. One has to consider
the nature the design and the consequence which will follow
from construing a provision in one way or the other. Rule
3(b) was enacted for the purpose of enabling the Collector
to have all the
370
relevant materials before him for coming to a
conclusion to be incorporated A in the report to be sent to
the Government in order to enable the Government to make
proper decision. The High Court was right in holding that
the provision WAS mandatory. [373C-F]
The notification under Section 6 was quashed but the
notification under section 4 was upheld. [373-G]
CIVIL APPEAL No. 1021 or 1973
The respondents raised further contention in the above
appeal to the effect that notification under section 4
should be quashed since the public notice as required by
section 4 is not given and the report under section 5A was
not sent to the Government within the prescribed period.
HELD: The notification under section 4 was published
on 13-4- 1967. Objections were filed by the respondent under
section 5A of the Act. The notification under section 6 was
published in October 1968. The Writ Petition was filed in
July 1969. The respondent was not entitled to challenge the
validity of the notification under section 4 of the Act as
Writ Petition challenging the notification was filed after
an unreasonable lapse of time. The respondent should have
challenged the validity of the notification under section 4
within a reasonable time of’ the publication of the
notification. The respondent knew of the notification and
file(l objections under section 5A of the Act. There is no
substance in the argument that the report under section 5A
was not sent to the Government within the prescribed period.
In any event since a fresh enquiry is directed under section
5A the Collector will in any event have to send a fresh
report to the Government. [374D-G]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1700 &
1827 and 1021 of 1973.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders
dated the 17-7-1972, S 6 1972 and 8-8-1972 of the Mysore
High Court in W.P.S NOS. 1921/1969/,2869/1967 & 3815/69
respectively.
L. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India, M. Veerappa,
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Altaf Ahmad, for the appellants (in Civil Appeal No.
1700/73).
A. K. Sen, K. N. Bhat, for respondents (1-6 & 8-10)
M. Veerappa & Altaf Ahmad, for the appellant.
K. N. Bhat, for respondents 1-7
M. Veerappa, for the appellants.
R. B. Datar, Jayashree Wad and Rajen Yashpaul, for the
respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Civil Appeals Nos. 1700 & 1827 of 1973
MATHEW J.-We take up for consideration Civil Appeal No.
1827 f 1973. The respondents are the owners of the lands in
question.
371
They were sought to be acquired for the Regional Engineering
College at the instance of the Education department of the
State of Mysore. In a notification under s. 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act (hereinafter called the Act) dated 5-1-1960
and published in the Mysore Gazette dated 5-5-1960, it was
stated that in view of the urgency of the cases, the
provisions of s. SA of the Act shall not apply to the case.
The respondents challenged the notification in a writ
petition (No. 768 of 1960). When the writ petition came up
for final disposal, a memo was produced on behalf of the
State Government and the Court, On the basis of the Memo,
dismissed the writ petition. The memo was to this effect: -
’‘The respondent agrees to modify the impugned
notification issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17
of the Land Acquisition Act and to give an opportunity to
the petitioner of being heard under Section 5-A of the Act.
Hence the relief sought for by the petitioner becomes
unnecessary."
The Special Land Acquisition officer, Mangalore,
issued notices to the respondents stating that the
respondents will be given opportunity to file Objections
under s. 5A of the Act pursuant to the order in Writ
Petition No. 768 of 1960. The respondents filed their
objections and, after an inquiry, the Land Acquisition
officer sent his report to the Government. The Government
considered the report and over ruled the objections. This
was followed by a notification under s. 6 of the Act. The
respondents challenged the above notification as well as the
notification under s. 4 by a writ petition in the High
Court.
The respondents attacked the validity of the
notification on the ground that the Education Department at
whose instance the land was sought to be acquired was not
given notice as required under rule 3(b) of the Madras Land
Acquisition Rules as in force in the Madras area of the
State of Mysore at the time of inquiry under s. 5A and that
since the requirement of notice as enjoined by rule 3(b) was
mandatory, the failure to comply with that requirement
rendered the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act
invalid.
The High Court by its order upheld the contention of
the respondents and quashed the notifications issued under
s. 4 and s. 6 of the Act. It is against this order that the
appeal has been filed by special leave by the State of
Karnataka and the Special Land Acquisition officer,
Mangalore.
The only point which arises for consideration is
whether the pro visions of rule 3(b) were mandatory and
therefore the failure to issue the notice to the department
concerned as enjoined by the rule was fatal to the validity
of the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
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The reasons which impelled the High Court to come to
that conclusion were, if the Department to which a notice is
issued files any reply by way of answer to the objections,
the objector will know what the Department has stated by way
of reply and, at the stage
372
Of hearing of objections, he (the objector) may adduce
evidence or A address arguments to meet what has been stated
in such reply, and that the objectors will have an
opportunity of urging before the Government that the reasons
given by the Department in the reply to the objections
should not be accepted.
Rule 3 reads:
"R. 3 Hearing of objection: (a) If a statement of 13
objections (is?) filed after the due date or by a person who
is not interested in the land it shall be summarily
rejected. (b) If any objections are received from a person
interested in the land and within the time prescribed in sub
section ( 1) of s 5A, the Collector shall fix a date for
hearing the objections and give notice thereof to the
objector as well as to the department or company requiring
the land, where such department is not the Revenue
Department; Copies of the objections shall also be forwarded
to such department or company. The department or company may
file on or before the date fixed by the collector a
statement by way of answer to the objections and may also
depute a representative to attend the enquiry." l)
The learned Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of
the appellants submitted that rule 3(b) is inconsistent with
s. 5A(2) or tilt: reason that s. 5A(2) itself provides for
making further inquiry which the Collector thinks necessary
after considering the objections filed by the owner or the
person interested in the land and to read rule 3(b) as
casting a mandatory duty upon him to give notice of the
objection to the department requiring the land and to
consider the answer to the objection, if any, filed by the
Department would be contrary to the section. The argument
was that when sub-section (2) of s. 5A provides for further
inquiry in the discretion of the Collector a rule making it
mandatory that the Deputy Commissioner (the Collector)
should give notice of the objection to the department
concerned and consider its answer to the objection would be
to convert a discretionary power into a mandatory duty and
is therefore ultra vires 1 the section.
We do not think that the contention is right. What the
material provision of s 5A(2) says is that "the Collector
shall give the objector . an opportunity of being heard
either in person or by pleader and shall after hearing all
such objections and after making such further enquiry if any
as he thinks necessary". This does not mean that a rule
cannot be framed by the rule-making-authority for the
guidance of the Deputy Commissioner (the Collector) which
would enable the Department concerned to place its view-
point before him when considering the objection under s. 5A.
The proceedings of the Collector are quasi-judicial and it
is only proper that he should be apprise of the attitude of
the department requiring the land in the light of the
objections filed. If the department requiring the land
thinks, in the light of the objection, that the land sought
to be acquired is not necessary for the purpose for which it
was required to be acquired or that more suitable land is
available in the vicinity, it is only fair that
373
the Deputy Commissioner (Collector) is informed about it.
The answer of the department to the objection filed by the
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objector, even if adverse to the objector, would, at any
rate, enable the Collector to bring a more informed and
rational approach to the controversy before him. The
Collector has to send his recommendation to government on
the basis of his finding together with the record of the
proceedings for the ultimate decision by the Government. IT
would be helpful to the Government in making the decision to
have before it the answer to the objection by the department
in order to appreciate the rival view points. We do not
think that rule 3(b) was ultra vires. the section.
We also think that the government when it framed the
rule had in mind that the Deputy Commissioner (Collector)
should follow it while functioning under s. 5A(2) and so the
requirement of the rule was mandatory.
In determining the question whether a provision is
mandatory or directory, one must look into the subject
matter and consider the importance of the provision
disregarded and the relation of that provision to the
general object intended to be secured. No doubt, all laws
are mandatory in the sense they impose the duty to obey on
those who come within its purview. But it does not follow
that every departure from it shall taint the proceedings
with a fatal blemish. The determination of the question
whether a provision is mandatory or directory would, in the
ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law maker.
And that has to he gathered not only from the phraseology of
the provision but also by considering its nature, its design
and the consequences which would follow from construing it
in one way or the other. We see no reason why the rule
should receive a permissible interpretation instead of a
pre-emptory construction. As we said, the rule was enacted
for the purpose of enabling the Deputy Commissioner (Land
Acquisition Collector) to have all the relevant materials
before him for coming to a conclusion to be incorporated in
the report to be sent to the Government in order to enable
the Government to make the proper decision. In Lonappan
v.Sub-Collector of Palghat(1) the Kerala High Court took the
view that the requirement of the rule regarding the giving
of notice to the department concerned was mandatory. The
view of the Madras High Court in K. V. Krishna Iyer v. The
State of Madras(2)is also much the same.
We think that the High Court was right in its
conclusion that the requirement of the rule was mandatory.
We quash the proceedings of the Collector (Special Land
Acquisition officer, 2nd appellant) under s. SA(2) as also
the decision of the Government on the basis of the report of
the Collector under the sub-section. The result is that the
notification under s. 6 has to be quashed and we do so. But
We sec no reason to quash the notification under s. 4.
We direct the Collector (2nd appellant) to proceed with
the inquiry on the basis of the objection already filed
under s. 5A after
(1) A.I.R. 1959 Kerala 343. (2) (1967) 2 Madras law
Journal 422.
374
giving notice to the department concerned viz., the
Education Department and after allowing it an opportunity to
file an answer to the objection. We dismiss the appeal
subject to the modification indicated. No costs.
The facts and circumstances in Civil Appeal No. 1700
of 1973 are similar to those in Civil Appeal No. 1827 of
1973, the only difference being that the rule which falls to
be considered is rule 5(2) framed by the Government of
Mysore under s. 55 of the Act. That rule is similar to rule
3(b) of the Madras rule. For the reasons given in the
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judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1827 of 1973, dismiss Civil
Appeal No. 1700 of 1973 also with the modification indicated
therein and without any order as to costs.
Civil Appeal No. 1021 of 1973
The facts in this appeal are similar to those in the
two Civil - Appeals referred to above and the decision there
will govern the decision here.
But counsel for the respondent in this appeal said
that the notification under s. 4 should be quashed in
respect of properties involved in this appeal for the
reasons that public notice had not been given as required in
s. 4 of the Act, that the report under s. 5A was not sent to
the Government within the prescribed period, that the High
Court failed to pass upon these questions and that the case
must therefore be remitted to the High Court.
The notification under s. 4 was published on 13-
4.1967. Objections were filed by the respondent under s. 5A
of the Act. The Deputy I I Commissioner submitted his report
to the Government. The Government over ruled the objections.
The notification under s. 6 was published in the gazette on
19-10-1968. The Writ Petition challenging the validity of
the notification was filed some time in July or August,
1969. We do not think that the respondent was entitled to
challenge the validity of the notification under s. 4 of the
Act as the Writ Petition challenging the notification was
filed after an unreasonable lapse of time. If public notice
as required by s. 4 of the Act was not given and that would
per se vitiate the notification under s. 4, the ’ appellant
should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time
of the publication of the notification. The respondent knew
of the notification and filed objection under s. 5 of the
Act. In these circumstances we see no reason to accept the
submission of counsel. We also see no substance in the
argument of the counsel that the report drawn up under s.
SA(2) was not sent to the Government within the time
prescribed and therefore the proceedings were invalid. We
have directed a fresh inquiry by the Deputy Commissioner
(Collector) under s. SA and therefore, the Deputy
Commissioner will in any event have to send a fresh report
to the Government.
In this view we do not think that there is any ground
for remitting the case to the High Court, simply because the
High Court failed to , consider these points. The appeal is
dismissed with the modification; indicated in the two
appeals referred to above. No costs.
P.H.P. Appeals dismissed.
375