Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 402
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.14900 of 2024)
R. SHASHIREKHA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and
rd
order dated 3 September 2024, passed by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in
Criminal Petition No. 5821 of 2024 whereby the High Court
allowed the petition filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 4
thereby quashing the FIR and further investigation in Crime
Case No.172 of 2024 pending on the file of XXXII Additional
Signature Not Verified
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru (hereinafter, “trial
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2025.03.27
15:48:35 IST
Reason:
court”).
1
3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal
are as under:
3.1 The husband of the appellant (hereinafter, ‘deceased’)
and respondent Nos.2 and 3 were partners of one M/s.
Soundarya Constructions, incorporated in 1994. Respondent
No.4 was working as a manager in M/s. Soundarya
Constructions.
th
3.2 On 14 April 2024, the husband of the Appellant was
found dead at his residence. Thereafter, the police drew a
panchnama and conducted the inquest as per Section 174 of
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘Cr.P.C.’)
wherein it was found that the deceased died by way of
hanging and he had committed suicide. Thus, the police filed
an Unnatural Death Report No.15 of 2024 (hereinafter,
‘UDR’) and the case was closed.
nd
3.3 On 22 May 2024, after about 39 days of the death of
the deceased, the appellant registered a complaint at the
th
concerned Police Station alleging that on 18 May 2024,
when she was cleaning the wardrobe of the deceased, she
found a death note, written by the deceased in his own
handwriting. The note stated that the deceased was cheated
2
by respondent Nos.2 and 3 whereby he had incurred losses
of Rs.60 crore. It was further stated that respondent Nos.2
and 3 had forged the signature of the deceased on blank
cheques and blank papers and misused them. The note also
stated that respondent Nos.2 and 3 made the deceased invest
money in M/s. Soundarya Constructions. Respondent Nos.2
and 3 lied to the deceased and told him that the company
was in loss, despite the same being in profit. They made him
mortgage his personal properties and the money received
from the deceased was used by respondent Nos.2 and 3 for
their personal gain. She further stated in the FIR that
respondent No.4 was also directly involved in the above case.
3.4 Consequently, a complaint being Case Crime No. 172 of
nd
2024 was registered against respondent Nos.2 to 4 on 22
May 2024 for offences punishable under Sections 306, 420
and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter, ‘IPC’).
3.5 Upon registration of the complaint and commencement
of the investigation, aggrieved, respondent Nos.2 to 4 filed a
petition being Criminal Petition No. 5821 of 2024 under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. before the High Court to quash the
3
FIR and further investigation in Crime Case No.172 of 2024
pending on the file of the trial court.
3.6 The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide
impugned final judgment and order, allowed the petition of
respondent Nos.2 to 4 and held that for an offence to be
constituted under Section 306 of the IPC there must be
proximate and positive act to instigate in aiding suicide. The
document allegedly forged by respondent Nos.2 to 4 is a
5-year-old document, thus, the death of the deceased has no
proximity to the death of the deceased. Next, with regard to
Section 420 of the IPC, it was held that if the deceased was
lured into something during his lifetime, it was open for the
deceased to file a complaint and not upon the appellant i.e.,
the wife of the deceased. Therefore, the ingredients of neither
Section 306 nor Section 420 of the IPC are made out.
3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, a special leave petition was
filed by the appellant-complainant in which notice was
th
issued vide order dated 5 November 2024.
4. We have heard Shri Shanthkumar V. Mahale, learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Shri
D.L. Chidananda, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
4
respondent No.1/State and Shri Dama Sheshadri Naidu,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
Nos.2-4/accused persons.
5.
Shri Mahale, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge
of the High Court has grossly erred in allowing the petition
filed by respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein. It is submitted that the
learned Single Judge has almost conducted a mini-trial
which is not permissible for the High Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. He submits that
since the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the judgment and order passed by the
High Court needs to be quashed and set aside.
6. Shri Mahale submits that, in any case, the learned
Single Judge of the High Cout has grossly erred in quashing
the proceedings under Section 306 of IPC. It is submitted
that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has not given
any reason as to why the allegations taken at its face value in
the FIR, the case under Section 306 of IPC could not be made
out.
7. Shri Mahale submits that the learned Single Judge of
5
the High Court has grossly erred insofar as quashing of the
proceedings under Section 420 of IPC is concerned. It is
submitted that during the investigation, the investigating
agency has seized sufficient material to indicate that
respondent Nos.2 to 4 had committed an act of cheating,
breach of trust and forgery.
8. Shri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of respondent Nos.2 to 4, on the contrary, submits that the
learned Single Judge has, upon consideration of the entire
material in a well-reasoned order, found that the allegations,
taken at its face value, do not constitute an offence
punishable under Sections 306 and 420 of IPC. He submits
that no case is made out for interference and pressed for
dismissal of the appeal.
9. Shri Chidananda, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of respondent No.1-State submits that after the matter was
investigated, the investigating agency found sufficient
material to proceed for the offence punishable under Sections
306 and 420 of IPC. He, therefore, supports the appeal.
10. Insofar as the averment in the FIR with regard to the
offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC is concerned, it
6
is averred by the appellant-complainant that after her
th
husband had died on 14 April 2024 by committing suicide,
while she was checking the belongings of her deceased
th
husband on 18 May 2024, she found a death note written
by her husband in his own handwriting. She narrated that
after she read the said death note, she came to know that her
husband has incurred a loss of Rs.60 crore and was cheated
by the partners of M/s. Soundarya Constructions i.e.
respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein. She has stated in the FIR
that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have given false promises and
forged her husband’s signature on blank cheques and blank
papers and misused the same. She further stated that her
husband was blackmailed by respondent Nos.2 and 3. She
further states that her husband used to always be worried
about the fraudulent activities of respondent Nos.2 and 3.
She further states that a week before her husband’s death,
her husband had been receiving continuous calls from
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and whenever such call was
received, he used to be completely upset and decided to die
by committing suicide and wrote the death note. It is also
averred in the FIR that respondent No.4 was also directly
7
involved in the above case.
11. From the allegations taken in the FIR at its face value, it
can be seen that the case of the appellant-complainant is
that even much before her husband died, he used to be
blackmailed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. According to her, a
week before her husband’s death, her husband had been
receiving continuous calls from the above persons and
whenever he received such calls, he was completely upset
and had decided to commit suicide.
12. If the version of the appellant-complainant is to be
accepted, the question remains as to why she kept silent
th nd
from 14 April 2024 till 22 May 2024. If her husband was
upset a week before his death, whenever he received calls
from respondent Nos.2 and 3 and if he was blackmailed by
the said respondents, then nothing could prevent the
appellant-complainant from reporting this matter to the
police immediately after the deceased committed suicide.
Thus, it is apparent from the material on record that all these
allegations were an afterthought.
13. Assuming that the allegations are true, even otherwise,
the case under Section 306 of IPC would not be made out.
8
Recently, this Court in a case of Prakash and Others v.
1
State of Maharashtra and Another in which one of us
(Gavai, J.) was a Member has considered all the earlier
judgments with regard to Section 306 of IPC. After referring
to the earlier judgments, this Court has observed thus:
“ 31. In the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh
Sengar (supra), this Court, under similar
circumstances, had quashed the chargesheet under
Section 306 of the IPC against the accused-
appellant. A factor that had weighed with the Court
in the said case was that there was a time gap of 48
hours being the alleged instigation and the
commission of suicide. This Court held that the
deceased was a victim of his own conduct,
unconnected with the quarrel that had ensued
between him and the appellant, 48 hours prior to
the commission of his suicide.
32. In the case at hand, taking the allegations in
the FIR at face value, the incident at the
th
mahalokadalat had occurred on 17 February
2015, while the deceased had committed suicide on
th
20 March 2015. There is a clear gap of over a
month between the incident at the mahalokadalat
and the commission of suicide. We therefore find
that the courts below have erroneously accepted the
prosecution story that the act of suicide by the
deceased was a direct result of the words uttered by
the appellants at the mahalokadalat.
…………….
34. …….The cardinal principle of the subject-matter
at hand is that there must be a close proximity
between the positive act of instigation by the
accused person and the commission of suicide by
the victim. The close proximity should be such as to
1
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3835 : 2024 INSC 1020
9
create a clear nexus between the act of instigation
and the act of suicide. As was held in the case
of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra), if the
deceased had taken the words of the appellants
seriously, a time gap between the two incidents
would have given enough time to the deceased to
think over and reflect on the matter. As such, a gap
of over a month would be sufficient time to dissolve
the nexus or the proximate link between the two
acts.”
14. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court itself would
reveal that the Government Pleader appearing in the case has
submitted before the High Court that the entire investigation
was complete and what was remaining was the filing of a
final report before the concerned court. The learned Single
Judge has observed that he has perused the entire
investigation papers and perusal of the same revealed that
there is not a titter of a document that would pin respondent
Nos.2 to 4 down for any act of abetment for suicide of the
husband of the appellant-complainant.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that even
taking the allegations at its face value, it cannot be said that
the allegations would amount to instigating the deceased to
commit suicide. In any case, there is no reasonable nexus
between the period to which the allegations pertain and the
10
date of death. In that view of the matter, we do not find that
the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in
quashing the proceedings under Section 306 of IPC.
16.
Having held that no error was committed by the High
Court in quashing the FIR with respect to the offence
punishable under Section 306 of the IPC, we will now
consider whether the High Court was justified in quashing
offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC.
17. Insofar as Section 420 of IPC is concerned, the only
observation the learned Single Judge of the High Court has
made was if the complainant’s husband had been lured into
something during his lifetime, it was open for him to file a
complaint. The learned Single Judge of the High Court
further observed that it was not open for the appellant-
complainant to file a complaint after the death of her
husband. Having observed this, the learned Single Judge of
the High Court observed that no semblance of the ingredients
of either Section 306 of IPC or Section 420 of IPC were found
in the case at hand.
18. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, in our view,
while quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC,
11
has acted in a casual and cursory manner. If the learned
Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that even
investigation papers as collected by the investigating agency
did not constitute an offence punishable under Section 420
of IPC, then the least that was expected of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court was to give reasons as to why the
material collected by the investigating agency which has been
placed before the learned Single Judge of the High Court was
not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable under
Section 420 of IPC.
19. In absence of any reason given, we are of the considered
view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has
erred in quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC.
20. In that view of the matter, we are inclined to partly allow
the appeal.
21. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is partly allowed;
rd
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 3
September 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 5821 of
12
2024 insofar as it quashes the proceedings under
Section 306 of IPC is concerned, is upheld;
rd
(iii) The impugned judgment and order dated 3
September 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 5821 of
2024 insofar as it quashes the proceedings under
Section 420 of IPC is concerned, is quashed and set
aside; and
(iv) The learned trial court would proceed further in
accordance with law insofar as the case under
Section 420 of IPC is concerned.
22. However, we clarify that, in the event respondent Nos.2
to 4 are of the view that even the material collected by the
investigating agency is not sufficient to proceed further for
the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC, they will be
at liberty to file an application for discharge, which shall be
considered by the trial court in accordance with law without
being influenced by the observations made by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court and this Court.
13
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
............................................J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 27, 2025.
14
2025 INSC 402
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.14900 of 2024)
R. SHASHIREKHA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and
rd
order dated 3 September 2024, passed by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in
Criminal Petition No. 5821 of 2024 whereby the High Court
allowed the petition filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 4
thereby quashing the FIR and further investigation in Crime
Case No.172 of 2024 pending on the file of XXXII Additional
Signature Not Verified
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru (hereinafter, “trial
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2025.03.27
15:48:35 IST
Reason:
court”).
1
3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal
are as under:
3.1 The husband of the appellant (hereinafter, ‘deceased’)
and respondent Nos.2 and 3 were partners of one M/s.
Soundarya Constructions, incorporated in 1994. Respondent
No.4 was working as a manager in M/s. Soundarya
Constructions.
th
3.2 On 14 April 2024, the husband of the Appellant was
found dead at his residence. Thereafter, the police drew a
panchnama and conducted the inquest as per Section 174 of
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘Cr.P.C.’)
wherein it was found that the deceased died by way of
hanging and he had committed suicide. Thus, the police filed
an Unnatural Death Report No.15 of 2024 (hereinafter,
‘UDR’) and the case was closed.
nd
3.3 On 22 May 2024, after about 39 days of the death of
the deceased, the appellant registered a complaint at the
th
concerned Police Station alleging that on 18 May 2024,
when she was cleaning the wardrobe of the deceased, she
found a death note, written by the deceased in his own
handwriting. The note stated that the deceased was cheated
2
by respondent Nos.2 and 3 whereby he had incurred losses
of Rs.60 crore. It was further stated that respondent Nos.2
and 3 had forged the signature of the deceased on blank
cheques and blank papers and misused them. The note also
stated that respondent Nos.2 and 3 made the deceased invest
money in M/s. Soundarya Constructions. Respondent Nos.2
and 3 lied to the deceased and told him that the company
was in loss, despite the same being in profit. They made him
mortgage his personal properties and the money received
from the deceased was used by respondent Nos.2 and 3 for
their personal gain. She further stated in the FIR that
respondent No.4 was also directly involved in the above case.
3.4 Consequently, a complaint being Case Crime No. 172 of
nd
2024 was registered against respondent Nos.2 to 4 on 22
May 2024 for offences punishable under Sections 306, 420
and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter, ‘IPC’).
3.5 Upon registration of the complaint and commencement
of the investigation, aggrieved, respondent Nos.2 to 4 filed a
petition being Criminal Petition No. 5821 of 2024 under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. before the High Court to quash the
3
FIR and further investigation in Crime Case No.172 of 2024
pending on the file of the trial court.
3.6 The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide
impugned final judgment and order, allowed the petition of
respondent Nos.2 to 4 and held that for an offence to be
constituted under Section 306 of the IPC there must be
proximate and positive act to instigate in aiding suicide. The
document allegedly forged by respondent Nos.2 to 4 is a
5-year-old document, thus, the death of the deceased has no
proximity to the death of the deceased. Next, with regard to
Section 420 of the IPC, it was held that if the deceased was
lured into something during his lifetime, it was open for the
deceased to file a complaint and not upon the appellant i.e.,
the wife of the deceased. Therefore, the ingredients of neither
Section 306 nor Section 420 of the IPC are made out.
3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, a special leave petition was
filed by the appellant-complainant in which notice was
th
issued vide order dated 5 November 2024.
4. We have heard Shri Shanthkumar V. Mahale, learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Shri
D.L. Chidananda, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
4
respondent No.1/State and Shri Dama Sheshadri Naidu,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
Nos.2-4/accused persons.
5.
Shri Mahale, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge
of the High Court has grossly erred in allowing the petition
filed by respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein. It is submitted that the
learned Single Judge has almost conducted a mini-trial
which is not permissible for the High Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. He submits that
since the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the judgment and order passed by the
High Court needs to be quashed and set aside.
6. Shri Mahale submits that, in any case, the learned
Single Judge of the High Cout has grossly erred in quashing
the proceedings under Section 306 of IPC. It is submitted
that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has not given
any reason as to why the allegations taken at its face value in
the FIR, the case under Section 306 of IPC could not be made
out.
7. Shri Mahale submits that the learned Single Judge of
5
the High Court has grossly erred insofar as quashing of the
proceedings under Section 420 of IPC is concerned. It is
submitted that during the investigation, the investigating
agency has seized sufficient material to indicate that
respondent Nos.2 to 4 had committed an act of cheating,
breach of trust and forgery.
8. Shri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of respondent Nos.2 to 4, on the contrary, submits that the
learned Single Judge has, upon consideration of the entire
material in a well-reasoned order, found that the allegations,
taken at its face value, do not constitute an offence
punishable under Sections 306 and 420 of IPC. He submits
that no case is made out for interference and pressed for
dismissal of the appeal.
9. Shri Chidananda, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of respondent No.1-State submits that after the matter was
investigated, the investigating agency found sufficient
material to proceed for the offence punishable under Sections
306 and 420 of IPC. He, therefore, supports the appeal.
10. Insofar as the averment in the FIR with regard to the
offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC is concerned, it
6
is averred by the appellant-complainant that after her
th
husband had died on 14 April 2024 by committing suicide,
while she was checking the belongings of her deceased
th
husband on 18 May 2024, she found a death note written
by her husband in his own handwriting. She narrated that
after she read the said death note, she came to know that her
husband has incurred a loss of Rs.60 crore and was cheated
by the partners of M/s. Soundarya Constructions i.e.
respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein. She has stated in the FIR
that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have given false promises and
forged her husband’s signature on blank cheques and blank
papers and misused the same. She further stated that her
husband was blackmailed by respondent Nos.2 and 3. She
further states that her husband used to always be worried
about the fraudulent activities of respondent Nos.2 and 3.
She further states that a week before her husband’s death,
her husband had been receiving continuous calls from
respondent Nos.2 and 3 and whenever such call was
received, he used to be completely upset and decided to die
by committing suicide and wrote the death note. It is also
averred in the FIR that respondent No.4 was also directly
7
involved in the above case.
11. From the allegations taken in the FIR at its face value, it
can be seen that the case of the appellant-complainant is
that even much before her husband died, he used to be
blackmailed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. According to her, a
week before her husband’s death, her husband had been
receiving continuous calls from the above persons and
whenever he received such calls, he was completely upset
and had decided to commit suicide.
12. If the version of the appellant-complainant is to be
accepted, the question remains as to why she kept silent
th nd
from 14 April 2024 till 22 May 2024. If her husband was
upset a week before his death, whenever he received calls
from respondent Nos.2 and 3 and if he was blackmailed by
the said respondents, then nothing could prevent the
appellant-complainant from reporting this matter to the
police immediately after the deceased committed suicide.
Thus, it is apparent from the material on record that all these
allegations were an afterthought.
13. Assuming that the allegations are true, even otherwise,
the case under Section 306 of IPC would not be made out.
8
Recently, this Court in a case of Prakash and Others v.
1
State of Maharashtra and Another in which one of us
(Gavai, J.) was a Member has considered all the earlier
judgments with regard to Section 306 of IPC. After referring
to the earlier judgments, this Court has observed thus:
“ 31. In the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh
Sengar (supra), this Court, under similar
circumstances, had quashed the chargesheet under
Section 306 of the IPC against the accused-
appellant. A factor that had weighed with the Court
in the said case was that there was a time gap of 48
hours being the alleged instigation and the
commission of suicide. This Court held that the
deceased was a victim of his own conduct,
unconnected with the quarrel that had ensued
between him and the appellant, 48 hours prior to
the commission of his suicide.
32. In the case at hand, taking the allegations in
the FIR at face value, the incident at the
th
mahalokadalat had occurred on 17 February
2015, while the deceased had committed suicide on
th
20 March 2015. There is a clear gap of over a
month between the incident at the mahalokadalat
and the commission of suicide. We therefore find
that the courts below have erroneously accepted the
prosecution story that the act of suicide by the
deceased was a direct result of the words uttered by
the appellants at the mahalokadalat.
…………….
34. …….The cardinal principle of the subject-matter
at hand is that there must be a close proximity
between the positive act of instigation by the
accused person and the commission of suicide by
the victim. The close proximity should be such as to
1
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3835 : 2024 INSC 1020
9
create a clear nexus between the act of instigation
and the act of suicide. As was held in the case
of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra), if the
deceased had taken the words of the appellants
seriously, a time gap between the two incidents
would have given enough time to the deceased to
think over and reflect on the matter. As such, a gap
of over a month would be sufficient time to dissolve
the nexus or the proximate link between the two
acts.”
14. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court itself would
reveal that the Government Pleader appearing in the case has
submitted before the High Court that the entire investigation
was complete and what was remaining was the filing of a
final report before the concerned court. The learned Single
Judge has observed that he has perused the entire
investigation papers and perusal of the same revealed that
there is not a titter of a document that would pin respondent
Nos.2 to 4 down for any act of abetment for suicide of the
husband of the appellant-complainant.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that even
taking the allegations at its face value, it cannot be said that
the allegations would amount to instigating the deceased to
commit suicide. In any case, there is no reasonable nexus
between the period to which the allegations pertain and the
10
date of death. In that view of the matter, we do not find that
the learned Single Judge of the High Court has erred in
quashing the proceedings under Section 306 of IPC.
16.
Having held that no error was committed by the High
Court in quashing the FIR with respect to the offence
punishable under Section 306 of the IPC, we will now
consider whether the High Court was justified in quashing
offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC.
17. Insofar as Section 420 of IPC is concerned, the only
observation the learned Single Judge of the High Court has
made was if the complainant’s husband had been lured into
something during his lifetime, it was open for him to file a
complaint. The learned Single Judge of the High Court
further observed that it was not open for the appellant-
complainant to file a complaint after the death of her
husband. Having observed this, the learned Single Judge of
the High Court observed that no semblance of the ingredients
of either Section 306 of IPC or Section 420 of IPC were found
in the case at hand.
18. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, in our view,
while quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC,
11
has acted in a casual and cursory manner. If the learned
Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that even
investigation papers as collected by the investigating agency
did not constitute an offence punishable under Section 420
of IPC, then the least that was expected of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court was to give reasons as to why the
material collected by the investigating agency which has been
placed before the learned Single Judge of the High Court was
not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable under
Section 420 of IPC.
19. In absence of any reason given, we are of the considered
view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has
erred in quashing the proceedings under Section 420 of IPC.
20. In that view of the matter, we are inclined to partly allow
the appeal.
21. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is partly allowed;
rd
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 3
September 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 5821 of
12
2024 insofar as it quashes the proceedings under
Section 306 of IPC is concerned, is upheld;
rd
(iii) The impugned judgment and order dated 3
September 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 5821 of
2024 insofar as it quashes the proceedings under
Section 420 of IPC is concerned, is quashed and set
aside; and
(iv) The learned trial court would proceed further in
accordance with law insofar as the case under
Section 420 of IPC is concerned.
22. However, we clarify that, in the event respondent Nos.2
to 4 are of the view that even the material collected by the
investigating agency is not sufficient to proceed further for
the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC, they will be
at liberty to file an application for discharge, which shall be
considered by the trial court in accordance with law without
being influenced by the observations made by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court and this Court.
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23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
............................................J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 27, 2025.
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