Punjab And Sind Bank vs. Raj Kumar

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 313
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 847 OF 2026


PUNJAB & SIND BANK … APPELLANT


VS.


SH. RAJ KUMAR … RESPONDENT



J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

The greater the trust reposed, the stricter the scrutiny imposed.
1. The present appeal, by special leave, at the instance of Punjab and
1 th
Sind Bank takes exception to the judgment and order dated 11
2 3
September, 2024 of the High Court of Delhi . Vide the impugned
4
order, a writ appeal filed by the P&SB was dismissed and the
5
judgment and order of the Single Judge, allowing a writ petition filed
by the respondent, affirmed. The Single Judge modified the
punishment of ‘dismissal from service’ imposed upon the respondent
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.04.02
17:14:07 IST
Reason:
1
P&SB
2
impugned order
3
High Court
4
LPA No. 410 of 2023
5 rd
dated 3 February, 2023
1


to ‘compulsory retirement’ on the ground of discrimination in
imposition of punishment thereby offending Article 14 of the
Constitution.

2. Facts, triggering this appeal, are these:
a. Respondent joined the P&SB as a Clerk/Cashier in the year 1987 until
he was placed under suspension in December of 2011, followed by
th
disciplinary action of dismissal from service on 25 November, 2024.
At the time of dismissal, the respondent held the post of “Senior
Manager in MMGS-III Scale”.
b. The punishment of dismissal imposed on the respondent (senior
manager at the relevant time) was preceded by a show cause notice,
a chargesheet and an inquiry in accordance with the Punjab and Sind
Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1981 on the allegation that
6 7
the respondent connived with two others (one officer and a gunman )
to misappropriate money of the customers for their personal gain,
stealing bank records, etc. The disciplinary authority imposed the
penalty of compulsory retirement on the co-delinquent gunman while
the co-delinquent officer was awarded “lowering by two stages”. The
precise import of the said punishment remains unclear; however, we
assume that the expression denotes a reduction in ‘pay’ by two
stages.

6
Gurjant Singh
7
Sukhdev Singh
2


c. Dejected, the respondent unsuccessfully filed an appeal and
subsequently a review against the order of the disciplinary authority
but to no avail. Seeking his reinstatement, the respondent then
8
approached the writ court by filing a writ petition .
d. Initially, the said writ petition was disposed of by a Single Judge vide
th
order dated 12 December, 2017. After rejecting the claim of the
respondent on the merits of the disciplinary proceedings, the Single
Judge directed the appellate authority to impose an appropriate
punishment upon the respondent keeping the principle of parity in
9
mind. Respondent carried the said order in an intra-court appeal ,
th
which was disposed of by a Division Bench ( vide order dated 8
January, 2019) by setting aside the order under appeal and directing
the Single Judge to decide the writ petition on merits.
e. Apart from challenging the decision on merits, the respondent’s claim
before the High Court was also that he was discriminated against in
imposition of punishment; while one of the co-delinquents was
compulsorily retired and the other awarded punishment of “lowering
by two stages”, he was dismissed from service. Later, before the
Single Judge who decided the writ petition on remand, the respondent
limited his challenge only to the quantum of punishment, on the
ground of parity with the co-delinquents. The Single Judge proceeded
to allow the writ petition after noting that for similar charges, different

8
WP (C) No. 11034/2017
9
LPA No. 708 of 2018
3


punishments were imposed on the co-delinquents with the respondent
having been given the most severe punishment without any difference
in their roles. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment of the Single
Judge are reproduced below:
11. The only issue that this Court is required to delve into is to test the
correctness and legality of the action of Punjab and Sind Bank in awarding
the punishment of dismissal to the Petitioner while awarding lesser
punishment to those alleged and proved to have acted in 'connivance’……

16. From a conspectus of the aforementioned judgments, it is luminously
clear that doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of
India is not an abstract doctrine and is enforceable in Court of Law. It is
applicable to all equally placed even if they are guilty and the principle of
parity has to be kept in mind by the disciplinary authority tasked to decide
the quantum of punishment. …………

19. Having perused the respective charges, it is amply clear that the
charges against the Petitioner and the two co-delinquent employees
related to the same transactions/incidents and the gravamen of the
allegations was the same………. This Court is unable to find any substantial
difference in the charges levelled against the three co-delinquents, which
would justify a differential treatment in punishment, save and except, that
the Petitioner in his capacity as Bank Manager had signed the documents
and/or checked the transactions in question. This by itself is not an
aggravating factor of such a magnitude, which would justify one co-
delinquent being sent home on compulsory retirement, remaining entitled
to pensionary and terminal benefits for life and thereafter family pension
to his family and the other being dismissed, entailing forfeiture of the
entire past service, not only depriving him of all retiral/terminal benefits
but leaving the dependents in his family in a state of penury.

20. In my view, Bank has been unable to substantiate and justify why the
Petitioner was awarded the extreme punishment of dismissal while the
other two have been let off with lesser punishment… .

23. Looking at the punishments awarded to the co-delinquents for same
incidents/transactions and acts of connivance and testing the impugned
action on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as well as
keeping in mind the long and unblemished spell of service of the Petitioner,
save and except, the present delinquency, this Court is inclined to convert
the punishment from 'dismissal' to one of 'compulsory retirement'… .

(emphasis ours)
4


f. This order was carried in an intra-court appeal by the P&SB which has
been dismissed vide the impugned order. The Division Bench found no
perversity in the order of the Single Judge.

3. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned counsel for the P&SB cited
authorities to buttress his point as to how interference with the order
of punishment by the High Court is contrary to settled principles of
law and, thus, merits interdiction by this Court.
4. Per contra , Mr. G.S. Chaturvedi, representing the respondent,
supported the impugned order upholding the decision of the Single
Judge by referring to the invidious discrimination that he was
subjected to. Additionally, he invited our attention to an observation
th
made by a Division Bench of the High Court in its order dated 8
January, 2019 to the following effect:
nd
9. It appears that on 2 January, 2012 while he was still under suspension,
the Appellant wrote a letter to the Bank in Hindi stating that if there was
any mistake on his part while working as the Branch Manager at
Roshanpur, he was prepared to make good the loss incurred by the Bank.
He further stated that on that date he had deposited Rs. 2 lacs. It appears
that a police complaint was also filed. This led to the Appellant submitting
th
another handwritten letter in Hindi which was received by the Bank on 19
May,2012 whereby upon the direction of the police, he deposited demand
drafts worth Rs. 4,19,214.00/-. The last few lines of the said letter are
significant where he stated "sriman ji meri koi galti nahi hai bahut dabav
ke karan paise jama kar raha hu. Samaaj mein apni izzat bachae rakhne
ke liye kar raha hu" . Prima facie, therefore, appears that on both the
occasions, the Petitioner was depositing money under pressure and neither
of his letters could be actually viewed as an admission of guilt by the
Appellant.

(italics in original, underlining ours)

The plea advanced (though abandoned before the benches of the
High Court) touches upon the merits of the respondent’s claim of
innocence and that he was unfairly punished.
5


5. Counsel for the parties have been heard and the materials on record
perused.
6. The disciplinary action taken by the P&SB having not been assailed
on its merits by the respondent before the Single Judge except the
quantum of punishment, we are tasked to decide a limited point.
7. In light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are
reminded of the consistent line of decisions of this Court delineating
the circumstances in which judicial interference is warranted in
matters concerning imposition of punishment by disciplinary
authorities.
8. We consider it apt to note the relevant passages from a few of these
decisions, hereunder:-
10
a. Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh :

15. …It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate
with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate
to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. …

11
b. Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India :

25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision,
but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the
choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion
of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the
offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so
disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in
itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part
of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which
is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the
decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic,
then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and
perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review… .
(emphasis ours)

10
(1983) 2 SCC 442
11
(1987) 4 SCC 611
6



12
c. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (three-Judge Bench):

18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary
authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding
authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to
maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose
appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the
misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial
review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and
impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to
shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

12
(1995) 6 SCC 749
13
(1997) 7 SCC 463
7


pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi case [AIR 1961 SC 418 : (1961) 2 SCR 343]
that the Court might — to shorten litigation — think of substituting its own
view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment
awarded by the competent authority. (In B.C. Chaturvedi [AIR 1961 SC 418
: (1961) 2 SCR 343] and other cases referred to therein it has however
been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different.)
For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent,
namely, State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar [(1988) 2 SCC 52: 1988
SCC (L&S) 436 : (1988) 6 ATC 876] cannot be of any help.

35. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the order of the Tribunal which
has interfered with the quantum of punishment and which has also
substituted its own view of the punishment. The punishment awarded by
the departmental authorities is restored. In the circumstances, there will be
no order as to costs.
(emphasis ours)


14
e. Om Kumar v. Union of India :

67. But where an administrative action is challenged as “arbitrary” under
Article 14 on the basis of Royappa [(1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165]
(as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the
question will be whether the administrative order is “rational” or
“reasonable” and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The courts would
then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether
the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted
illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken
irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no
reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these
rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. [In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal
Council [(1991) 3 SCC 91] (SCC at p. 111).] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then
was) pointed out that “reasonableness” of the administrator under Article
14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the stand
point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC
651] (SCC at pp. 679-80), Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India [(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] (SCC at p. 691),
Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [(1989) 4 SCC
187 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569] (SCC at p. 241) and U.P. Financial Corpn. v.
Gem Cap (India) (P). Ltd. [(1993) 2 SCC 299] (SCC at p. 307) while judging
whether the administrative action is “arbitrary” under Article 14 (i.e.
otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a
Wednesbury review always.

68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under
Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts by applying
proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as
“arbitrary” under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on
Wednesbury principles applies.

14
(2001) 2 SCC 386
8



Proportionality and punishments in service law

69. The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect of
Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of “arbitrariness”
of the order of punishment is questioned under Article 14.

70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur v.
Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1] this Court referred
to “proportionality” in the quantum of punishment but the Court observed
that the punishment was “shockingly” disproportionate to the misconduct
proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC
(L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] this Court stated that the court will not
interfere unless the punishment awarded was one which shocked the
conscience of the court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back
to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the
other. However, in rare situations, the court could award an alternative
penalty. It was also so stated in Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997
SCC (L&S) 1806].
(emphasis ours)


15
f. Union of India v. R.K. Sharma :

13. In our view, the observations in Ranjit Thakur case [(1987) 4 SCC 611
: 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] extracted above, have been
misunderstood. In that case the facts were such that they disclosed a bias
on the part of the Commanding Officer. In that case the appellant Ranjit
Thakur had fallen out of favour of the Commanding Officer because he had
complained against the Commanding Officer. For making such a complaint
the Commanding Officer had sentenced him to 28 days' rigorous
imprisonment. While he was serving the sentence he was served with
another charge-sheet which read as follows:
“Accused 1429055-M Signalman Ranjit Thakur of 4 Corps Operating Signal
Regiment is charged with—
Army Act, Disobeying a lawful command given by his
Section 41(2). superior officer
In that he,
at 1530 hours on 29-5-1985 when ordered by JC 106251-P Sub Ram
Singh, the Orderly Officer of the same Regiment to eat his food, did not
do so.”

On such a ridiculous charge rigorous imprisonment of one year was
imposed. He was then dismissed from service, with the added
disqualification of being declared unfit for any future civil employment. It
was on such gross facts that this Court made the observations quoted above
and held that the punishment was so strikingly disproportionate that it
called for interference. The above observations are not to be taken to mean
that a court can, while exercising powers under Article 226 or 227 and/or

15
(2001) 9 SCC 592
9


under Article 32, interfere with the punishment because it considers the
punishment to be disproportionate. It is only in extreme cases, which on
their face show perversity or irrationality that there can be judicial review.
Merely on compassionate grounds a court should not interfere.

(emphasis ours)


g. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v.
16
P.C. Kakkar :

11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the
court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was
illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral
standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 :
(1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of
the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not
substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial
review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the
decision.

12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the
court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten
litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal
course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would
be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority
to reconsider the penalty imposed.
(emphasis ours)

17
h. State of Gujarat v. Anand Acharya :

15. The well-settled proposition of law that a court sitting in judicial review
against the quantum of punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings
will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty is not in dispute.
However, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court, then the court would
appropriately mould the relief either by directing the
disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to
shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof (see Bhagat
Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983) 2 SCC 442 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 342] , Ranjit
Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1] and U.P.
SRTC v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra [(2000) 3 SCC 450 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 356]).


16
(2003) 4 SCC 364
17
(2007) 9 SCC 310
10


18
i. S.R. Tewari v. Union of India :
28. The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very
limited and the court cannot substitute its own views or findings by
replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation
of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the
scope for interference by the court is very limited and restricted to
exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or
the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court,
cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as
to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts
to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would
not suffice. …
(emphasis ours)
19
j. Rajasthan SRTC v Bajrang Lal :
21. As regards the question of disproportionate punishment is concerned,
the issue is no more res integra. …
22. In view of the above, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent
employee, that the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate
to the delinquency is not worth acceptance. The only punishment in case of
the proved case of corruption is dismissal from service.
(emphasis ours)

9. What follows from the precedents noted above is that courts should

exercise restraint while interdicting orders of punishment. Normally,
no court in exercise of its power of judicial review should interfere
with an order of punishment imposed on a delinquent as a measure
of disciplinary action by the competent authority and substitute its
own judgment for that of the former. This is premised on the reason
that the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the situation, and
the requirements of maintaining discipline within the work force.
While it is not the law that the courts should invariably stay at a
distance when legality and/or propriety of a particular punishment is

18
(2013) 6 SCC 602
19
(2014) 8 SCC 693
11


questioned, judicial scrutiny of the disciplinary action by way of
punishment could arise only if the circumstances are such that no
reasonable person would impose the punishment which is questioned
and/or such punishment has the effect of shocking the conscience of
the court. To put in simpler words, interference could be warranted if
it appeals to the court that the disciplinary authority has ‘used a
sledgehammer for cracking a nut’. A punishment, which is strikingly
or shockingly disproportionate and is not commensurate with the
gravity of misconduct, proved to have been committed in course of
inquiry or otherwise, would border on arbitrariness and offend Article
14 of the Constitution.
10. Where a court, upon due consideration, arrives at the conclusion that
the punishment imposed is disproportionate, its intervention is
circumscribed in nature. Judicial scrutiny and interference, if at all,
has to be based on reasons in support of the court’s ultimate
satisfaction that the disciplinary authority has faltered in the exercise
of his discretion. In such a situation, the court may adopt one of two
courses: it may remit the matter to the competent authority for
reconsideration of the punishment; or, in the rarest of cases, it may
substitute the punishment while supporting such a course with cogent
reasons.
11. After refreshing our memory with these well-established principles,
the only question that arises for consideration is whether interference
by the Single Judge with the order passed by the Disciplinary
12


Authority, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, satisfied
the requisite threshold. If we find that such interference was not
called for, then the impugned order (which upheld the view taken by
the Single Judge) will have to be set aside.
12. Whether the imposition of lighter punishment on the co-delinquents
while imposing the punishment of ‘dismissal from service’ upon the
respondent is in outright defiance of logic? We think not.
13. Sight cannot be lost of the fact that the respondent, when he
committed the offence, was holding the post of “Senior Manager in
MMGS-III Scale”, which is obviously much higher than the co-
delinquents (officer and gunman). Authority carries accountability;
higher the authority, higher the accountability. The rank of the
respondent was not merely titular; it carried with it an increased
degree of responsibility and integrity. The role of the respondent not
only necessitated personal obedience but also supervision of the
actions of the subordinates. The co-delinquents, having limited
powers and authority, could not have been equated with the
respondent. The gravity of the misconduct necessarily had to be
measured with the nature of the misconduct. Thus, grant of the
benefit of parity to the respondent by the High Court merely because
the co-delinquents were given lighter punishment was entirely
misconceived. The differentiation in rank coupled with the increased
trust of the employer on the respondent certainly constituted a
13


compelling ground for a more stringent punishment to be imposed on
him.
14. Taking an overall view, the fact that the disciplinary authority found
it prudent in the circumstances to impose a harsher punishment on a
higher-ranking official is neither disproportionate, nor shocks our
conscience. The High Court clearly fell in error in the course of
adjudication of the lis.
15. Quite apart, equating a branch manager of a bank with its gunman
seems to us to be in outrageous defiance of logic and reason. This is
20
not a case akin to Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab where this
Court interfered with disciplinary action finding that some out of
several, guilty of the same misconduct, were picked and chosen for
harsher punishment leaving aside others without any convincing
reason.
16. Reference to the observation made by the Division Bench, noted in
paragraph 4 supra, is of no real consequence. Manifest as it is, the
Division Bench while remanding the writ petition for a fresh decision
recorded only a prima facie finding that the respondent might have
been pressurized to make deposit of a portion of the misappropriated
amount. Even the Single Judge, on remand, did not finally record
similar such finding to rule in favour of the respondent. The argument
made in desperation to salvage the situation is, thus, rejected.

20
(1983) 4 SCC 225
14


17. Considering the facts of the present case, we do not find any
perversity or irrationality with the punishment imposed. We have,
therefore, reached the irresistible conclusion that interference by the
Single Judge with the decision of the disciplinary authority, since
affirmed by the Division Bench vide the impugned order, was uncalled
for.
18. Thus, the impugned order (upholding the order of the Single Judge)
is set aside together with the order that it upheld. The punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority (namely, dismissal from
service) imposed on the respondent is restored.
19. The appeal is allowed on the aforesaid terms.
20. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.


………………………….……………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



…………………..……………………J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
New Delhi;
April 02, 2026.
15