Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1942 OF 2014
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHARVAN KUMAR RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
1. By way of this appeal, the appellants - Union of
India and its officers related with South Eastern Railway –
have challenged the judgment and order dated 30.08.2013
passed by the High Court of Calcutta in WPCT No. 330 of
2013, whereby the High Court has disapproved the order
dated 21.06.2013 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Calcutta Bench (‘the Tribunal’) in OA No. 293 of
2011 and has also held that the remitted proceedings in the
disciplinary enquiry against the respondent were rendered
nullity, for having not been concluded within the time
limit fixed by the Tribunal in its earlier order dated
03.09.2010.
1.1. In view of its findings and conclusion, the High
Court has disposed of the writ petition filed by the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BALA PARVATHI
Date: 2022.07.12
16:57:59 IST
Reason:
respondent with directions to the appellants to reinstate
him in service and to pay him 50% back wages from the date
2
of removal from service i.e., 17.02.2011 and until the date
of reinstatement.
2. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and
the issues arising for consideration in this appeal, all
the factual aspects and merits of the charges in the
disciplinary proceedings need not be dilated upon. Only a
brief reference to the relevant background aspects would
suffice.
2.1. It has been the case of appellants that on
09.11.2005, the respondent, an Electric Locomotive Driver,
while piloting a locomotive engine, overshot the signal and
thereby, endangered the property and operation of railways
as also the life of citizens. As per railway manual, a
joint enquiry was conducted in regard to the incident in
question and it was found that it had been a matter of
averted collision, due to the locomotive not being
controlled; and that the brake adjustment rods were
allegedly manipulated by the respondent-driver and his co-
driver, in an attempt to justify their stand that the
engine could not be controlled due to the poor power of
brakes. Based on the enquiry report, a major penalty
charge-sheet bearing No. RS/ACC/6/2005/SK/MJ dated
06.12.2005 was issued to the respondent.
2.2. After the enquiry proceedings, the Disciplinary
Authority, having examined the record and the findings of
the Enquiry Officer, ultimately served the respondent with
the punishment notice dated 23.02.2006, imposing the
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penalty of removal from railway service with immediate
effect.
2.3. The respondent preferred an appeal before the
Appellate Authority against the aforesaid punishment notice
dated 23.02.2006 wherein, after considering the assurances
given by the respondent to remain more careful in the
future, the Appellate Authority, by its order dated
23.08.2006, modified the penalty to that of downgrading his
pay to the lowest stage in the scale of Rs. 4,000-6,000/-.
2.4. The respondent preferred a revision petition against
the order so passed by the Appellate Authority but the
Revisional Authority, by its order dated 14.03.2007,
declined to interfere while observing that as per technical
review, nothing was wrong with the brakes of the
locomotive; and that the respondent had encountered several
down-gradients successfully and fading of brakes could not
occur abruptly.
2.5. The respondent, thereafter, filed OA No. 373 of 2007
before the Tribunal, challenging the orders passed against
him and seeking reinstatement with all benefits. The
Tribunal decided the OA so filed by the respondent by its
order dated 03.09.2010.
2.5.1. Though the Tribunal noted the questions involved in
the matter as to whether the report of the Commissioner,
Railway Safety/Joint Enquiry could hold somebody guilty or
their role was only to ascertain systemic defects so as to
prevent recurrence in future; and as to whether such report
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could be accepted in evidence without examining the
authors? The Tribunal, however, observed that these
questions were not required to be answered and proceeded to
hold that the proceedings suffered from illegality and
impropriety in view of the fact that one of the members who
had submitted the joint enquiry report, Shri A. Sadasiva,
was the same person who had also issued major penalty
charge-sheet and then, imposed the penalty in his capacity
as the Disciplinary Authority. The Tribunal also noticed
that this objection was duly taken by the respondent in his
representation but, the Appellate Authority and the
Revisional Authority did not consider the same.
2.5.2. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the orders
passed against the respondent but, provided for the
proceedings afresh in the following words: -
“10. The orders passed by the Disciplinary
Authority Appellate Authority & Revisional
Authority are quashed and set aside. In case the
same Disciplinary Authority continues an ad-hoc
Disciplinary Authority shall be appointed. The
Disciplinary Authority shall proceed from the
stage of consideration or ( sic ) representation
against the report of Enquiry Officer
uninfluenced by the earlier decisions. This
exercise be completed within two months of
receipt of order. All other contentions are left
open. No costs.”
2.6. After the directions aforesaid, the matter was taken
up for reconsideration but, the Disciplinary Authority
required additional time to complete the proceedings, and
hence, an application seeking enlargement of time for
deciding the case was filed before the Tribunal, being
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Miscellaneous Application No. 436 of 2010. However, this
application was dismissed by the Tribunal on 03.01.2011,
essentially for the reason that the same was lacking in
material particulars like the timeframe laid down by the
Railway Board for taking a decision on the Enquiry Report.
2.7. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed its
order on 17.02.2011, once again imposing the major penalty
of removal from railway service on the respondent, while
concluding that the respondent did not stop the engine on
time due to his negligence. It was also mentioned in the
order of the Disciplinary Authority that the respondent
could prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority
within 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the
order.
2.8. The respondent did not challenge the order so passed
by the Disciplinary Authority on 17.02.2011 in appeal.
Instead, he moved the Tribunal and filed OA No. 293 of 2011
with the contention, inter alia , that the Tribunal had
stipulated a time limit of two months to complete the
proceedings by its order dated 03.09.2010 and the
proceedings had abated for having not been completed within
the prescribed time limit.
2.8.1. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, dismissed
the OA so filed by the respondent by its order dated
21.06.2013 while holding that the proceedings would have
abated only if it were so directed in specific terms. The
Tribunal found that in the instant case, while directing
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that respondent’s case be decided within two months, it had
not been specifically provided that the proceedings would
abate if not completed within two months. It was also noted
that the respondent had not preferred an appeal against the
order dated 17.02.2011, and two years had already elapsed.
However, in the interest of justice, it was directed that
if the respondent were to file an appeal against the order
dated 17.02.2011, the Appellate Authority would consider
and decide the same within a period of one month in
accordance with law. The Tribunal referred to a decision of
its Full Bench and observed, inter alia , as under: -
“8. Further it has been observed by the Tri-
bunal by inserting the reference that it is only
when in an order a specific direction of abating
of the proceedings not completed within a spe-
cific time limit the proceedings abates but not
otherwise. It is clear that in the earlier O.A.
time limited was given but not specifically pro-
vided that the proceedings will abate if not done
within the stipulated time frame. Considering the
observation made above, since the applicant has
also not preferred the appeal against the order
dated 17.2.2011. However, more than two years
have already elapsed but considering the interest
of justice we deem it appropriate to issue a di-
rection to the applicant that in case he prefers
an appeal against the order dated 17.2.2011 the
appellate authority shall consider and decide the
same within the next period of one month in ac-
cordance with law and the decision so taken be
communicated to the applicant.
9. However, in regard to considering the
prayer of the applicant is concerned we are not
inclined to interfere in the same. As such, the
O.A. is dismissed, no orders as to costs.”
3. The aforesaid order dated 21.06.2013 as passed by the
Tribunal in OA No. 293 of 2011 was challenged in WPCT No.
7
330 of 2013, which has been considered and allowed by the
High Court by way of the impugned order dated 30.08.2013.
3.1. The High Court has taken the view that the
Disciplinary Authority had no jurisdiction or authority to
complete the proceedings beyond the period prescribed by
the Tribunal. The High Court has observed that even though
Miscellaneous Application No. 436 of 2010, seeking
enlargement of time was dismissed by the Tribunal on
03.01.2011, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded with the
matter; and such proceedings beyond the time prescribed
were nullity in the eyes of law. It has further been held
that once the proceedings were held to be a nullity, there
could be no question of preferring a statutory appeal, and
such proceedings could only be challenged before a Court of
law. The relevant observations and reasoning of the High
Court read as under: -
“….Since the authorities concerned failed to
complete the disciplinary proceedings in terms of
the earlier order passed by the learned Tribunal,
an application was filed on behalf of the
respondents before the said learned Tribunal for
extension of time and the said application was
numbered as M.A. 436 of 2010. The learned
Tribunal, however, dismissed the aforesaid
application on 3rd January, 2011. Even though the
rd
learned Tribunal by the specific order dated 3
January, 2011 passed in M.A. 436 of 2010 refused
to extend the time limit for completion of the
disciplinary proceedings in respect of the
petitioner herein, the Disciplinary Authority in
an illegal manner proceeded with the disciplinary
proceedings and passed the order of punishment
removing the said petitioner from Railway
service.
The Disciplinary Authority namely, Sri A.K.
Mukherjee, Sr. Divisional Electrical Engineer
(OP), S.E. Railway, Adra refused to show any
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respect to the solemn order passed by the learned
Tribunal and in a most illegal manner, passed the
order of punishment in respect of the petitioner
herein by conducting the disciplinary proceedings
even after expiry of the prescribed time limit
fixed by the learned Tribunal.
The petitioner herein, however, challenged
the aforesaid order of dismissal before the
learned Tribunal by filing another application
being O.A. 293 of 2011. The learned Tribunal,
unfortunately, failed to appreciate that the
order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was
nullity in the eye of law since the said
Disciplinary Authority conducted the disciplinary
proceedings in respect of the petitioner herein
after the expiry of the prescribed time limit
fixed by the said learned Tribunal.
When a proceeding is nullity in the eye of
law, question of preferring any statutory appeal
before the Appellate Authority cannot and does
not arise and the same can be directly challenged
before any court of law. The learned Tribunal,
most unfortunately, dismissed the application
filed by the petitioner herein on the ground that
no appeal was preferred before the Appellate
Authority without realizing the fact that the
order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was
nullity in the eye of law since the final order
of punishment was passed by the Disciplinary
Authority after expiry of the prescribed time
limit fixed by the learned Tribunal.
The impugned order passed by the Disciplinary
Authority dated 17th February, 2011 cannot be
sustained in the eye of law since the
Disciplinary Authority had no authority and/or
jurisdiction to conduct and complete the
disciplinary proceedings beyond the prescribed
time limit.
The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, should
not have dismissed the writ petition for not
preferring any appeal before the Appellate
Authority since the order passed by the
Disciplinary Authority was nullity in the eye of
law….”
3.2. For the aforesaid reasons, the High Court set aside
the order of the Tribunal dated 21.06.2013 and also quashed
the order dated 17.02.2011 passed by the Disciplinary
Authority as being illegal, invalid and nullity in the eyes
9
of law. The High Court even proceeded to make adverse
observation against the officer who had acted as the
Disciplinary Authority; and proceeded to order
reinstatement of the respondent with 50% of back wages from
the date of removal from service, i.e., 17.02.2011 and
until the date of reinstatement. The High Court observed
and directed as under: -
“For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned
order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated
th
17 February, 2011 stands quashed being illegal,
invalid and nullity in the eye of law.
For the identical reasons, the impugned order
passed by the learned Tribunal cannot be
sustained and the same is, therefore, set aside.
We do not approve the conduct of Sri A. K.
Mukherjee, Sr. Divisional Electrical Engineer
(OP), S.E. Railway, Adra and Disciplinary
Authority since the said Disciplinary Authority
did not show any respect to the solemn order
passed by the learned Tribunal and we record our
strong displeasure in this regard. We hope the
superior authority will take note of our
displeasure in respect of the aforesaid conduct
of the Disciplinary Authority for not showing
proper respect to the solemn order passed by the
learned Tribunal.
Since the disciplinary proceedings initiated on
the basis of the charge-sheet could not be
completed within the prescribed time limit, the
same stood automatically quashed.
The respondent authorities are directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith. We
are also of the opinion that justice will be done
in the facts of the present case if 50% of the
back wages is paid to the petitioner herein.
The respondent authorities are, therefore,
directed to pay 50% of the back wages to the
petitioner herein from the date of removal of the
said petitioner herein from the date of removal
of the said petitioner from service i.e. with
effect from 17th February, 2011 till the date of
reinstatement of the said petitioner in service
in terms of this order. The respondent
authorities are also directed to calculate the
aforesaid back wages within three weeks from date
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and disburse the same to the petitioner herein
within a period two weeks thereafter positively.”
4. The appellants have challenged the judgement and
order so passed by the High Court by way of this appeal.
4.1. It may be pointed out that in this matter, leave to
appeal was granted by this Court on the very first date of
consideration i.e., 07.02.2014 and, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, this Court stayed the operation
of all the judgments passed in this matter. Thereafter, by
an order dated 14.08.2015, this Court directed the
appellants to deposit 50% back wages in terms of the
directions of the High Court and provided that the
respondent would be entitled to withdraw the same against
the security of immoveable property. We are informed that
such payment has indeed been made and the respondent has
received the same while furnishing the requisite security.
5. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing
for the appellants has submitted that the High Court was
not justified in upsetting and reversing the well-
considered order of the Tribunal dated 21.06.2013, which
did not suffer from any infirmity.
5.1. The learned ASG has referred to the charges against
the respondent and the findings recorded against him that
he did not stop the locomotive before the danger starter
and advance starter, which directly endangered the safety
of railway operations. The learned ASG would submit that
the High Court has proceeded merely on technical grounds
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while ignoring the gravity of charges in this case.
5.2. The learned ASG has further submitted that the
Tribunal in its order dated 21.06.2013 had rightly held
that even if time limit was set earlier for conclusion of
the disciplinary proceedings, the said proceedings did not
abate, if not finalised within the time limit fixed by the
Tribunal because no such directions were contained in the
earlier order requiring completion of the proceedings
within two months. According to the learned ASG, the order
passed in the earlier round by the Tribunal having not
signified that the proceedings would come to an end after
expiry of two months, the view of the High Court in
treating the proceedings as nullity remains unjustified.
5.3. The learned ASG has further submitted that the
Tribunal in its order dated 21.06.2013 had also taken note
of the fact that the respondent had not preferred the
statutory appeal and even while dismissing the OA, reserved
such liberty for the respondent. Hence, there was no reason
for the High Court to interfere with the justified order of
the Tribunal.
5.4. We may observe in the passing that the learned ASG
also attempted to refer to the merits of the case and to
support the findings of the Disciplinary Authority but, we
do not consider it necessary to enter into the merits of
case, for the same having not formed the subject of
consideration of the Tribunal in its order dated 21.06.2013
and of the High Court in its impugned order dated
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30.08.2013.
6. While countering the submissions made on behalf of
the appellants, learned counsel for the respondent has duly
supported the order impugned and has submitted that in the
given set of facts and circumstances, no case for
interference is made out.
6.1. Learned counsel for the respondent has strenuously
argued that in view of the mandate of the previous order of
the Tribunal dated 03.09.2010, the Disciplinary Authority
was duty bound to decide the matter within two months and
it having failed to do so and then, even the application
seeking extension of time having been dismissed by the
Tribunal on 03.01.2011, the Disciplinary Authority could
not have continued with the matter. Hence, according to the
learned counsel, the order passed by the Disciplinary
Authority on 17.02.2011 is a nullity in the eyes of law,
for the stipulated period of time, as provided for by the
Tribunal, having expired and no extension having been
granted.
6.2. The learned counsel has submitted that Courts and
Tribunals have inherent powers to prescribe time limits to
conduct proceedings and any such prescription remains
binding on the authority conducting the proceedings.
According to the learned counsel, if such directions are
not properly and punctually complied with, the proceedings
would come to an end with the expiry of the time fixed by
the Court or the Tribunal. Thus, learned counsel would
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contend, the view taken by the High Court remains justified
and calls for no interference.
7. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions and having examined the record, we are clearly
of the view that neither the approach of the High Court nor
its conclusion could be endorsed. In other words, the
propositions of the High Court, treating the proceedings in
question as having abated or having been rendered nullity
cannot be approved from any standpoint.
8. It appears that the High Court has taken the period
of two months for completion of the proceedings, as stated
in the order of the Tribunal dated 03.09.2010, to be an
inflexible mandate as also of fatal consequence in the
manner that after its expiry, the department could not have
taken the disciplinary proceedings to their logical
conclusion. This approach of the High Court cannot be
supported even from a technical standpoint and obviously
stands at conflict with the substance of the matter.
9. As noticed, after the respondent was awarded the
penalty of removal from service by the order dated
23.02.2006 in conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings,
he challenged the same and the Appellate Authority, by its
order dated 23.08.2006, altered the penalty to that of
downgrading his pay. The Revisional Authority by its order
dated 14.03.2007 held that the negligence on the part of
the respondent was established and found no reason to
interfere. However, the Tribunal, in the earlier round of
14
litigation, while dealing with OA No. 373 of 2007, chose
not to examine the other material questions involved in the
matter but, disapproved the imposition of penalty on the
respondent for the reason that the person acting as the
Disciplinary Authority had been one of the members who had
earlier submitted the joint enquiry report. In this view of
the matter, the Tribunal quashed the orders passed against
the respondent but, being conscious of the fact that the
disciplinary proceedings were otherwise required to be
taken to the logical conclusion, issued directions to
ensure that the matter be dealt with by the Disciplinary
Authority other than the person who had been a member of
the joint enquiry team and the proceedings be taken up from
the stage of consideration of representation of the
respondent against the report of the Enquiry Officer. While
concluding on the matter, the Tribunal also expected that
such afresh exercise be completed within two months of the
receipt of the order, after leaving all other contentions
open. As noticed, the appellants attempted to seek
enlargement of time in view of the fact that the exercise
could not be completed within the said period of two months
but, this prayer for enlargement was declined by the
Tribunal not on its merits but, for a different reason that
the particulars like the time-frame laid down by the
Railway Board for taking the decision on the enquiry report
was not stated before it. The said order expecting
conclusion of the proceedings within two months from the
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date of receipt of copy of the order was passed on
03.09.2010; the application seeking enlargement was
dismissed on 03.01.2011; and the Disciplinary Authority
passed its order on 17.02.2011. Thus, the question was
about the status of such order so passed by the
Disciplinary Authority beyond the period fixed by the
Tribunal which had not been enlarged. The Tribunal in its
order dated 21.06.2013 held that the proceedings pursuant
to the order dated 03.09.2010 would have abated only if it
was so directed in specific terms and not otherwise. The
Tribunal had been correct in this approach and, in our
view, the High Court has unjustifiably interfered with the
just and proper order passed by the Tribunal.
9.1. It needs hardly any elaboration to say that fixing of
the period of two months by the Tribunal in this case had
only been to ensure expeditious proceedings because the
matter was being restored for reconsideration in the year
2010, though the disciplinary proceedings related with the
incident dated 09.01.2005. However, the said period of two
months did not acquire any status akin to that of a
statutory mandate that the disciplinary proceedings would
have automatically come to an end with its expiry. It
remains trite that if an Adjudicating Authority in exercise
of its jurisdiction could grant or fix a time period to do
a particular thing, in the absence of a specific statutory
provision to the contrary, the jurisdiction to fix such a
time period inhers the jurisdiction to extend the time
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initially fixed. Such conditional orders have regularly
been construed by this Court to be in terrorem so as to put
a check on the dilatory tactics by any litigant or to guard
against any laxity on the part of the Adjucating Authority
but, the Court is not powerless to enlarge the time even
though it had peremptorily fixed the period at any earlier
stage. In the case of Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das: (1961)
3 SCR 763, this Court examined the peremptory order of the
Court fixing the period of payment of deficit court fees in
the backdrop of the fact that the application for extension
of time came up for hearing only after the time fixed by
the Court had expired and the application was rejected.
This Court put the things in perspective while observing,
inter alia , as under: -
“5…Such orders are not like the law of the Medes
and the Persians. Cases are known in which Courts
have moulded their practice to meet a situation
such as this and to have restored a suit or
proceeding, even though a final order had been
passed…”
9.2. We may elaborate a little. When a conditional order
is passed by the Court/Tribunal to do a particular act or
thing within a particular period but the order does not
provide anything as to the consequence of default, the
Court/Tribunal fixing the time for doing a particular thing
obviously retains the power to enlarge such time. As a
corollary, even the Appellate Court/Tribunal or any higher
forum would also be having the power to enlarge such time,
if so required. In any case, it cannot be said that the
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proceedings would come to an end immediately after the
expiry of the time fixed.
9.3. In the present case, even the order dismissing the
application for enlargement of time on a technical ground
of not placing before the Tribunal instructions of the
Railway Board, had again been not of giving any such status
of mandatory and rigid character to the period originally
fixed that the proceedings would have abated.
10. We are impelled to observe that while treating the
proceedings as having abated and as nullity, the High Court
has ignored the fundamental principles that fixing of such
time period was only a matter of procedure with an
expectation of conclusion of the proceedings in an
expeditious manner. This period of two months had not
acquired any such mandatory statutory character so as to
nullify the entire of the disciplinary proceedings with its
expiry.
10.1. Moreover, when no consequence of default was stated
in the order dated 03.09.2010, the period as stated therein
was only of expectations and not of mandate. We may also
observe that very many times, such fixing of time period
causes more complications and harm rather than serving the
cause of justice. Fixing of such period could only be
justified if there are strong and compelling reasons for
the same; and if at all such period is proposed to be
fixed, not only the reasons for the same but, even the
consequences of default are also required to be stated if
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such period is, for any valid reason, expected to operate
with adverse consequences on the defaulter.
11. The upshot of the discussion foregoing is that the
proceedings in question neither abated nor could have been
considered nullity only because of passage of the expected
time period stated in the order of the Tribunal dated
03.09.2010. There was no reason or justification for the
High Court to interfere with the just and proper order
passed by the Tribunal on 21.06.2013, which deserves to be
restored with necessary consequential directions.
12. Before concluding, we also deem it necessary to
observe that the High Court in the impugned order proceeded
to pass unnecessary strictures against the Disciplinary
Authority who had passed the order dated 17.02.2011. As
noticed, the displeasure as expressed by the High Court has
itself been founded on a wrong premise where the High Court
assumed that the proceedings were rendered nullity and as
if the Disciplinary Authority could not have touched the
same at all after expiry of the expected period of time. We
are clearly of the view that even if the High Court were to
proceed on the premise that the proceedings should not have
continued, there was no justification to observe that the
Disciplinary Authority had been disrespectful towards the
judicial process. In any case, when the order impugned is
not being approved, such observations/strictures shall also
stand annulled.
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13. Accordingly, and in view of the above, the impugned
order dated 30.08.2013 is set aside and the order dated
21.06.2013 passed by the Tribunal is restored.
13.1. Resultantly, it would be permissible for the
respondent to prefer an appeal against the order dated
17.02.2011 before the Appellate Authority. Having regard
to the circumstances of the case and the background, we
deem it appropriate to provide that if the respondent files
such an appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order, the same shall be considered by the
Appellate Authority on merits, but strictly in accordance
with law and without being influenced by any observations
occurring in any of the orders passed by the Tribunal or by
the High Court or for that matter, any observations
occurring in the present judgment. All the contentions of
the parties are, therefore, left open to be examined by the
Appellate Authority on merits, who would also be expected
to deal with the appeal expeditiously and while assigning
the same a priority for consideration.
14. Before concluding, one more aspect is required to be
dealt with; it relates to the payment of 50% back wages to
the respondent and furnishing of security of immoveable
property by him in terms of the order passed by this Court
on 14.08.2015. We are informed that such payment has been
made and the respondent has received the same while
furnishing the requisite security. Having regard to the
totality of circumstances, the said order dated 14.08.2015
20
is made absolute. However, the security furnished by the
respondent stands discharged.
15. The appeal stands allowed to the extent and in the
manner indicated above. No order as to costs. Pending
applications also stand disposed of.
....................J
(DINESH MAHESHWARI)
....................J
(KRISHNA MURARI)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 06, 2022
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ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.3 SECTION XVI
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).1942/2014
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SHARVAN KUMAR Respondent(s)
Date : 06-07-2022 This appeal was called on for hearing
today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA MURARI
(VACATION BENCH)
For Appellant(s) Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Ld. ASG
Ms. Shreya Jain, Adv.
Ms. Vimla Sinha, Adv.
Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Shree Pal Singh, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeal stands allowed in terms of the
signed reportable judgment. No order as to costs.
Pending applications also stand disposed of.
(B.Parvathi) (Ranjana Shailey)
Court Master Court Master
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)