Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX ANDHRA PRADESH, HYDERABAD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, HYDERABAD.
DATE OF JUDGMENT07/03/1986
BENCH:
MADON, D.P.
BENCH:
MADON, D.P.
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
CITATION:
1986 AIR 1054 1986 SCR (1) 570
1986 SCC (2) 391 1986 SCALE (1)353
ACT:
Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 - Section 4(3)(i) &
Explanation and Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 2 (15) & 11
- Road Transport Corporation - Whether engaged in the
advancement of an object of general public utility, not
involving carrying on of activity for profit - Whether
exempt from income tax.
Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950.
Sections 22, 23, 28 and 30 - Andhra Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation - Activities of - Whether carried on
for profit - Income tax - Whether entitled to claim
exemption.
HEADNOTE:
The Respondent, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation, is a Road Transport Corporation established
under s.3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Prior
to the establishment of the Respondent-Corporation, road
transport in the State of Andhra Pradesh was a department of
the Government, being run by the Government of Hyderabad
prior to the formation of the State of Andhra and thereafter
by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. During the whole of
this period, the income made from road transport was exempt
from income-tax. After the Respondent-Corporation was
formed, the Income-tax Department took the view that the
income of the Respondent-Corporation was liable to income
tax and assessed the Respondent-Corporation to income-tax
for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60.
The Respondent-Corporation filed writ petitions in the
High Court contending that the property owned by it and the
income earned by it were the property and income of a State
exempted from Union taxation under Article 289(1) of the
Constitution, but the same were dismissed by the High Court.
Appeals filed by the Respondent-Corporation in this Court
were also dismissed.
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Thereafter the Respondent-Corporation filed returns in
respect of the assessment years 1960-61, 1961-62 and 1962-63
showing its income as ’Nil’. In respect of the assessment
years 1960-61 and 1961-62 it claimed exemption from income-
tax under s.4(3)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In respect
of the assessment year 1962-63 it claimed exemption under
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s.11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Respondent-Corporatios
claim for exemption was rejected by the Income-tax Officer.
The appeals filed by the Respondent-Corporation were allowed
by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but in the appeals
filed by the Department before the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal, the order of the Income-tax Officer was restored.
In the reference, the High Court held that the Respondent-
Corporation was entitled to the exemptions claimed.
In the appeals to this Court by the Revenue, it was
contended that the Respondent-Corporation was not entitled
to any exemption as claimed by it because its activities
were carried on for profit as shown by sections 22, 23 and
28 of the Road Transport Corporation Act.
Dismissing the appeals,
^
HELD : 1. The respondent Corporation was entitled to
the exemption claimed by it both under the Income-tax Act of
1922 and of 1961. [584 F]
2. The object of the activity carried on by the
respondent Corporation undisputedly was one of general
public utility. [582 G]
3. A Road Transport Corporation cannot be expected or
be required to run at a loss. It is not established for the
purpose of subsidising the public in matters of
transportation of passengers and goods. The objects for
establishing a Road Transport Corporation are set out in s.3
of the Road Transport Corporation Act. Section 18 shows that
it is the duty of a Road Transport Corporation to provide,
secure and promote the provision of an efficient, adequate,
economical and properly co-ordinated system of road
transport services in the State. No activity can be carried
on efficiently, properly, adequately or economically unless
it is carried on business principles. If an activity is
carried on business principles, it would usually result in
profit, but it is not possible so to
572
carry on a charitable activity that the expenditure balances
the income and there is no resultant profit, for to achieve
this would not only be difficult of practical realisation
but would reflect unsound principles of management. What
s.22 does when it states that it shall be the general
principle of a Road Transport Corporation that in carrying
on its undertakings it shall act on business principles is
to emphasize the objects set out in s.3 for which a Road
Transport Corporation is established and to prescribe the
manner in which the general duty of the Corporation set out
in s.18 is to be performed. [583 B-F]
4. The test is "what is the pre-dominant object of the
activity - Whether it is to carry out a charitable purpose
or to earn profit ?" If the pre-dominant object is to carry
out a charitable purpose and not to earn profit, the purpose
would not lose its charitable character merely because some
profit arises from the activity. [583 F-G]
5. The activity of the Respondent-Corporation is not
carried on with the object of making profit is made
abundantly clear by the provisions of s.30 under which prior
to the amendment of that section by the Amendment Act of
1959, the balance of income left, after utilisation of the
net profits for the purposes set out in s.30, was to be made
over to the State Government for the purpose of road
development and after the Amendment Act of 1959 is to be
utilised for financing the expansion programmes of the
Respondent-Corporation and the remainder, if any, is to be
made over to the Government for the purpose of road
development. The amount handed over to the State Government
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does not become a part of the general revenue of the State
but is impressed with an obligation that it should be
utilised only for the purpose of road development. [584 B-D]
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v.
Income-tax Officer, B-1 B-Bard, Hyderabad and Another,
[1964] 52 I.T.R. 524, 535-36; = [1964] 7 S.C.R. 17, 29-30,
Additional Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat v. Surat Art
Silk Cloth Manufactures Association, [1980] 121 I.T.R. 1,
25-26, S.C., Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Bar
Council of Maharashtra, [1981] 130 I.T.R. 28, 33-34, (S.C.),
relied upon and In re The Trustees of the ’Tribune’, [1939]
7 I.T.R. 415 P.C. referred to,
573
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 216 to
218 (NT) of 1973.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3rd December, 1971 of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R.C. No. 14 of 1970.
S.T. Desai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.
F.S. Nariman, B. Parthasarthy and T.A. Ramachandran for
the Respondent.
O.P. Rana, G.S. Chatterjee, S.K. Dholakia, C.S.S. Rao
and Raju Ramachandran for the Interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MADON, J. The above three Appeals have been filed by
certificate granted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court under
section 261 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, against the
judgment of that High Court in an income-tax reference. The
Respondent, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation, is a Road Transport Corporation established
with effect from January 11, 1958, by the State of Andhra
Pradesh by a notification issued under section 3 of the Road
Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (Act No. 64 of 1950)
(hereinafter referred to in short as "the RTC Act"). Prior
to the establishment of the Respondent Corporation road
transport in the State of Andhra Pradesh was a department of
the Government, being run by the Government of Hyderabad
prior to the formation of the State of Andhra and thereafter
by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. During the whole of
this period the income made from road transport was exempt
from income tax. After the Respondent Corporation was
formed, the Income-tax Department took the view that the
income of the Respondent Corporation was liable to income-
tax and assessed the Respondent Corporation to income-tax
for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60. The Respondent
Corporation thereupon filed a writ petition in the Andhra
Pradesh High Court contending that the property owned by it
and the income earned by it were the property and income of
a State exempted from Union taxation under Article 289(1) of
the Constitution. This contention was rejected and the writ
petitions were dismissed by the High Court. Appeals filed by
the Respon-
574
dent Corporation in this Court were also dismissed. The
judgment of this Court is reported as Andhra Pradesh State
Road Transport Corporation v. Income-tax Officer, B-1 B-
Ward, Hyderabad and Anr., [1964] 52 I.T.R. 524, 535-36; s.c.
[1964] 7 S.C.R. 17, 29-30. After referring to the various
provisions of the RTC Act, this Court held :
"Far from making any provision which would make
the income of the corporation the income of the
State, all the relevant provisions emphatically
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bring out the separate personality of the
corporation and proceed on the basis that the
trading activity is run by the corporation and the
profit and loss that would be made as a result of
the trading activity would be the profit and loss
of the corporation. . . . When we are deciding the
question as to whether the income derived by the
corporation is the income of the State, the
provision made by section 30 for making over to
the State Government the balance that may remain
as indicated therein, is of no assistance. The
income is undoubtedly the income of the
Corporation. All that section 30 requires is that
a part of that income may be entrusted to the
State Government for a specific purpose of road
development. It is not suggested or shown that
when such income is made over to the State, it
becomes a part of the general revenue of the
State. It is income which is impressed with an
obligation and which can be utilised by the State
Government only for the specific purpose for which
it is entrusted to it."
Having failed in its contention that its income was
exempt from income-tax under Article 289(1) of the
Constitution, the Respondent Corporation filed returns in
respect of the assessment years 1960-61, 1961-62, and 1962-
63, showing its income as "Nil". In respect of the
assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62, which are the subject
of Civil Appeals Nos. 216 and 217 (NT) of 1973 before us, it
claimed exemption from income-tax under section 4(3) (i) of
the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as
"the 1922 Act"). In respect of the assessment year 1962-63,
which is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 218 (NT) of 1973
before us, it claimed
575
exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as "the 1961 Act"). The Respondent
Corporation’s claim for exemption was rejected by the
Income-tax Officer, Company Circle, Hyderabad. The appeals
filed by the Respondent Corporation were allowed by the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, D-Range,
Hyderabad, but the appeals filed by the Department before
the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, were
allowed and at the instance of the Respondent Corporation
the Tribunal by a common order made in all the three appeals
before it stated a case and referred the following question
of law to the High Court:
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of
the case, the assessee’s income for the assessment
years 1960-61 and 1961-62 was exempt from income-
tax under section 4(3)(i) of the Income-tax Act,
1922, and for the assessment years 1962-63, under
section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961."
The High Court answered the above question in favour of the
Respondent Corporation and against the Department and on an
application made by the Appellant, the Commissioner of
Income-Tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, granted under section
261 of the 1961 Act a certificate of fitness for appeal to
this Court.
Section 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act, omitting what is not
relevant for our purpose, provided as follows :
(3) Any income, profits or gains falling within
the following classes shall not be included in the
total income of the person receiving them :
(i) Subject to the provisions of clause (c) of
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sub-section (1) of section 16, any income derived
from property held under trust or other legal
obligation wholly for religious or charitable
purposes, in so far as such income is applied or
accumulated for application to such religious or
charitable purposes as relate to anything done
within the taxable territories, and in the case of
property so held in part only for such purposes,
576
the income applied or finally set apart for
application thereto :
Provided that such income shall be included in the
total income-
x x x x
(b) in the case of income derived from business
carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable
institution, unless the income is applied wholly
for the purposes of the institution and either-
(i) the business is carried on in the course of
the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of
the institution, or
(ii) the work in connection with the business is
mainly carried on by beneficiaries of the
institutions;
x x x x
In this sub-section ’charitable purpose’ includes
relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the
advancement of any other object of general public utility,
but nothing contained in clause (i) or clause (ii) shall
operate to exempt from the provisions of this Act that part
of the income from property held under a trust or other
legal obligation for private religious purposes which does
not enure for the benefit of the public".
The material provisions of section 11(1)(a) of the 1961
Act are as follows :
"11. Income from property held for charitable or
religious purposes.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 60 to
63, the following income shall not be included in
the total income of the previous year of the
person in receipt of the income-
(a) income derived from property held under trust
577
wholly for charitable or religious purposes, to
the extent to which such income is applied to such
purposes in India . . . ."
Clause (15) of the section 2 of the 1961 Act defines
the expression charitable purpose. This definition is as
follows :
"(15) ’charitable purpose’ includes relief of the
poor, education, medical relief, and the
advancement of any other object of general public
utility not involving the carrying on of any
activity for profit".
The difference between the 1922 Act and the 1961 Act
with respect of the definition of the expression ’charitable
purpose" was thus stated by this Court in Additional
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat v. Surat Art Silk Cloth
Manufacturers Association, [1980] 121 I.T.R. 1, 25-26, s.c.
:
"It is obvious that the exclusionary clause was
added with a view to overcoming the decision of
the Privy Council in the Tribune’s case, (1939) 7
I.T.R. 415 (PC), where it was held that the object
of supplying the community with an organ of
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educated public opinion by publication of a
newspaper was an object of general public utility
and hence charitable in character even though the
activity of publication of the newspaper was
carried on on commercial lines with the object of
earning profit. The publication of the newspaper
was an activity engaged in by the trust for the
purpose of carrying out its charitable purpose and
on the facts it was clearly an activity which had
profit-making as its predominant object, but even
so it was held by the Judicial Committee that
since the purpose served was an object of general
public utility, it was a charitable purpose. It is
clear from the speech of the Finance Minister that
it was with a view to setting at naught this
decision that the exclusionary clause was added in
the definition of ’charitable purpose’. The test
which has, therefore, now to be applied is whether
the predominant object of the activity involved in
carrying
578
out the object of general public utility is to
subserve the charitable purpose or to earn profit.
Where profit-making is the predominant object of
the activity, the purpose, though an object of
general public utility, would cease to be a
charitable purpose. But where the predominant
object of the activity is to carry out the
charitable purpose and not to earn profit, it
would not lose its character of a charitable
purpose merely because some profit arises from the
activity. The exclusionary clause does not require
that the activity must be carried on in such a
manner that it does not result in any profit. It
would indeed be difficult for persons in charge of
a trust or institution to so carry on the activity
that the expenditure balances the income and there
is no resulting profit. That would not only be
difficult of practical realisation but would also
reflect unsound principles of management."
The position as stated above in the above case was
reiterated by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, [1981] 130 I.T.R. 28,
33-34, S.C. In that case this Court said :
"It may be noticed that whereas any object of
general public utility was included in the
definition of ’charitable purpose’ in the 1922
Act, the present definition has inserted the
restrictive words ’not involving the carrying on
of any activity for profit’ which qualify or
govern the last head of charitable purpose. In CIT
v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce, [1965] 55 I.T.R.
722, a case decided by this Court under the 1922
Act, where the restrictive words were absent, this
court laid down that if the primary or dominant
purpose of a trust or institution was charitable,
any other object which by itself might not be
charitable but which was merely ancillary or
incidental to the primary or dominant purpose
would not prevent the trust or institution from
being a valid charity. After the addition of the
restrictive words in the definition in the 1961
Act, this court in Addl. CIT v. Surat
579
art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association [1980]
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121 I.T.R. 1 affirmed that the aforesaid test of
primary or dominant purpose of a trust or
institution still holds good, that the restrictive
words qualify ’object’ and not the advancement or
accomplishment thereof and that the true meaning
of the restrictive words was that when the purpose
of a trust or institution was the advancement of
an object of general public utility it was that
object of general public utility and not its
accomplishment or carrying out which must not
involve the carrying on of any activity for
profit. And, applying these tests, trading bodies
like Andhra Chamber of Commerce and Surat Art Silk
Cloth Manufacturers Association have been held to
be institutions constituted with a view to advance
an object of general public utility because their
primary or dominant purpose was to promote and
protect industry, trade and commerce either
generally or in certain commodities, even though
some benefit through some of their activities did
accrue to their members which was regarded as
incidental and this Court held that the income
derived from diverse sources by these institutions
(rental income from property in the case of Andhra
Chamber of Commerce and income from annual
subscriptions collected from its members and
commission of a certain percentage of the value of
licences for import of foreign yarn and quotas for
purchase of indigenous yarn obtained by the
assessee from its members in the case of Surat Art
Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association) was exempt
from tax liability under s. 11 of the Act."
It was contended on behalf of the Appellant that the
Respondent Corporation was not entitled to any exemption as
claimed by it because its activities were carried on profit
as shown by sections 22, 23 and 28 of the RTC Act. In
fairness to learned Counsel for the Appellant it must be
stated that in view of the Judgment of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in In re The Trustees of The
’Tribune’, [1939] 7 I.T.R. 415 P.C. in which it was held
that where an activity carried on with the object of general
public utility did not cease to be charitable in character
even though it was carried
580
on on commercial lines with the object of earning profit,
the concentration of the attack was on the exemption claimed
in respect of the assessment year 1962-63 which was covered
by the 1961 Act. The above contention entails an examination
of the relevant provisions of the RTC Act. The objects for
which a Road Transport Corporation is established by a State
Government are set out in section 3. These objects are :
(a) the advantages offered to the public, trade
and industry by the development of road transport;
(b) the desirability of co-ordinating any form or
road transport with any other form of transport;
and
(c) the desirability of extending and improving
the facilities for road transport in any area and
of providing an efficient and economical system of
road transport service therein.
These were, therefore, the objects for which the Respondent
Corporation was established. Section 18 reiterates the above
objects. It provides as follows :
"18. General duty of Corporation.-
It shall be the general duty of a Corporation so
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to exercise its powers as progressively to provide
or secure or promote the provision of an
efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-
ordinated system of road transport services in the
State or part of the State for which it is
established and in any extended area:
x x x x
Section 19 enumerates the powers of a Road Transport
Corporation. They include the power to operate road
transport services in the State and in any extended area and
to provide for any ancillary service. Section 22 provides as
follows :
"22. General principle of Corporation’s finance.-
581
It shall be the general principle of a Corporation
that in carrying on its undertaking it shall act
on business principles."
Under sub-section (1) of section 23, the capital of a Road
Transport Corporation is to be provided by the Central
Government and the State Government in such proportion as
may be agreed to by both the Governments. Under sub-section
(2) of section 23, where the capital of a Road Transport
Corporation is not provided by the Central Government or the
State Government, such Corporation may raise such capital by
the issue of shares as may be authorized in that behalf by
the State Government. Under sub-section (3) of section 23,
the shares are to be subscribed by the Central Government
the State Government and other parties including persons
whose undertakings have been acquired by the Corporation and
under sub-section (6) a Corporation may at any time, with
the previous approval of the State Government, redeem the
shares issued to the other parties in such manner as may be
prescribed. Under section 24, if after the issue of such
shares, the Corporation requires additional capital, it may,
with the previous approval of the State Government, raise
such additional capital by the issue of new shares and the
provisions of section 23 apply to such issue. Under section
25, the shares of a Road Transport Corporation are to be
guaranteed by the State Government both as to the payment of
the principal and the annual dividend at such minimum rate
as may be fixed by the State Government by notification
published in the Official Gazette at the time of issuing the
shares. Section 26 authorizes a Road Transport Corporation,
with the previous approval of the State Government, to
borrow money in the open market for purposes of raising its
working capital or for meeting any expenditure of a capital
nature. Section 27 provides that every Road Transport
Corporation is to have its own fund and all receipts of the
Corporation are to be carried thereto and all payments by
the Corporation are to be made therefrom, and that except as
otherwise directed by the State Government, all moneys
belonging to that fund are to be deposited in the Reserve
Bank of India or with the agents of the Reserve Bank of
India or invested in such securities as may be approved by
the State Government. Under section 28 where the capital of
a Road Transport Corporation is provided by the Central
Government and the State Government, the Corpo-
582
ration is to pay interest on such capital and where the
Corporation has raised its capital by issue of shares it is
to pay dividend on such shares at such rate as may, from
time to time, be fixed by the Corporation, subject to any
general limitations which may be imposed by the State
Government in consultation with the Central Government, and
such interest and dividend are to be deemed to be a part of
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the expenditure of the Corporation. Section 30 provides as
follows :
"30. Disposal of net profits.-
After making provision for payment of interest and
dividend under section 28 and for depreciation,
reserve and other funds under section 29, a
Corporation may utilise such percentage of its net
annual profits as may be specified in this behalf
by the State Government for the provision of
amenities to the passengers using the road
transport services, welfare of labour employed by
the Corporation and for such other purposes as may
be prescribed with the previous approval of the
Central Government, (and out of the balance such
amount as may, with the previous approval of the
State Government and the Central Government, be
specified in this behalf by the Corporation, may
be utilised for financing the expansion programmes
of the Corporation and the remainder, if any,
shall be made over to the State Government for the
purpose of road development.)"
The bracketed portion in section 30 was substituted for the
words "and the balance shall be made over to the State
Government for the purpose of road development" by the Road
Transport Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1959 (Act No. 28 of
1959).
It was not disputed that the object of the activity
carried on by the Respondent Corporation was one of general
public utility. What was submitted was that such activity
was carried on for profit as shown by section 22 under which
the Respondent Corporation was enjoined to act on business
principles. It was further submitted that the Respondent
Corporation could issue shares even to the members of the
583
public and that dividend would be paid to the shareholders
and, therefore, profit would be made from the activity of
the Respondent Corporation by its owners, namely, the
shareholders. We are unable to accept these submissions.
The submission founded upon section 22 is based upon a
misunderstanding of what that section provides. A road
Transport Corporation cannot be expected or be required run
at a loss. It is not established for the purpose of
subsidizing the public in matters of transportation of
passengers and goods. The objects for establishing a Road
Transport Corporation are those set out in section 3 of the
RTC Act which we have already reproduced above. Section 18
shows that it is the duty of a Road Transport Corporation to
provide, secure and promote the provision of an efficient,
adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of
road transport services in the State. No activity can be
carried on efficiently, properly, adequately or economically
unless it is carried on on business principles. If an
activity is carried on on business principles, it would
usually result in profit, but as pointed out by this Court
in the Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association Case,
it is not possible so to carry on a charitable activity that
the expenditure balances the income and there is no
resultant profit, for to achieve this would not only be
difficult of practical realization but would reflect unsound
principles of management. What section 22, therefore, does
when it states that it shall be the general principle of a
Road Transport Corporation that in carrying on its
undertakings it shall act on business principles is to
emphasize the objects set out in section 3 for which a Road
Transport Corporation is established and to prescribe the
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manner in which the general duty of the Corporation set out
in section 18 is to be performed. It is now firmly
established by decisions of this Court in the Surat Art
Cloth Manufacturers Association Case and the Bar Council of
Maharashtra Case that the test is "What is the pre-dominant
object of the activity - whether it is to carry out a
charitable purpose or to earn profit?" If the pre-dominant
object is to carry out a charitable purpose and not to earn
profit, the purpose would not lose its charitable character
merely because some profit arises from the activity.
584
There is no factual foundation for the submission based
upon section 23(2) and other sections of the RTC Act which
empower a Road Transport Corporation to issue shares
including issuing shares to members of the public and to pay
dividend thereon. It is an admitted position, as pointed out
by the High Court in its judgment under Appeal, that no
share capital has been raised under section 23(2) and the
entire capital has been provided by the Government under
section 23(1) and the Government is only paid interest
thereon under section 28(1) just as interest would be paid
on any money due as a debt. That the activity of the
Respondent Corporation is not carried on with the object of
making profit is made abundantly clear by the provisions of
section 30 under which prior to the amendment of that
section by the Amendment Act of 1959, the balance of income
left, after utilization of the net profits for the purposes
set out in section 30, was to be made over to the State
Government for the purpose of road development and after the
Amendment Act of 1959 is to be utilized for financing the
expansion programmes of the Respondent Corporation and the
remainder, if any, is to be made over to the State
Government for the purpose of road development. As pointed
out by this Court in Andhra Pradesh Road Transport
Corporation v. Income-tax Officer, B-I B-Ward, Hyderabad and
Anr. the amount handed over to the State Government does not
become a part of the general revenue of the State but is
impressed with an obligation that it should be utilized only
for the purpose for which it is entrusted, namely, road
development. It is not, and cannot be, disputed that road
development is an object of general public utility.
For the reasons given above, we hold that the
Respondent Corporation was entitled to the exemption claimed
by it both under the 1922 Act and the 1961 Act.
In the result, these Appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs.
A.P.J. Appeals dismissed.
585