GANESH SUKHDEO GURULE vs. TAHSILDAR SINNAR

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 10-12-2018

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Full Judgment Text

1 CORRECTED REPORTABLE    THE IN     SUPREME     COURT     OF    INDIA   CIVIL   APPELLATE     JURISDICTION   CIVIL   APPEAL     NO.11916     Of    2018  GANESH SUKHDEO GURULE       ...APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS TAHSILDAR SINNAR & ORS.    ...RESPONDENT(S) J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T   ASHOK   BHUSHAN,J. This   appeal   has   been   filed   against   the   judgment dated 22.11.2018 of the High Court of Bombay dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.  2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well   as   the   counsel   for   the   respondent   No.4   who   has appeared on caveat. The interest of respondent No.4 and other   private   respondents   being   common   we   have   not 2 issued notice to other respondents. 3. The brief facts of the case necessary for deciding the appeal are: On   07.09.2018,   respondents   moved   a   no­confidence motion against the appellant. Tahsildar issued notice dated   07.09.2018   convening   special   meeting   of   Gram Panchayat for consideration of no­confidence motion on 14.09.2018. On  14.09.2018 out of  nine members of the Gram Panchayat  only eight members were present in the meeting. Six members voted in favour of the motion and two members were opposed to it. One of the members who voted   in   favour   of   no­confidence   motion   was   not qualified to vote, namely,  Smt. Sushila Prakash Darade who had not filed her caste certificate after election, hence, she was disqualified to continue to be a member or to vote in any meeting. A Dispute Application under 35(3­B) of the Maharashtra Gram Panchayat Rules, 1958 challenging the no­confidence motion passed was filed. The   Addl.   Collector,   Nasik   passed   an   order   dated 16.10.2018   approving   the   special   meeting   dated 3 14.09.2018   holding   that   no­confidence   motion   was validly passed. Against the order passed by the Addl. Collector, a writ petition was filed by the appellant which   has   been   dismissed   by   the   High   Court   by   the impugned  judgment.   Aggrieved by  the judgment of the High Court this appeal has been filed. 4. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submits   that total   members   of   Gram   Panchayat   being   nine   and   one member   being   disqualified   to   vote   the   two­third majority   has   to   be   computed   on   the   basis   of   eight members which comes to 5.33 and there being only five valid votes in favour of  no­confidence motion, motion cannot be held to be  passed. One  of the members who voted   in   favour   of   no­confidence   motion   i.e.   Smt. Sushila   Prakash   Darade   being   disqualified   to   sit   and vote   cannot   be   counted   in   favour   of   no­confidence motion,   two­third   majority   being   5.33,   at   least   six votes   were   required   for   passing   the   no­confidence motion.   It   is   submitted   that   caste   certificate   being not submitted by Smt. Sushila Prakash Darade within six months   as   required   by   law   she   automatically   became 4 disqualified   to   sit   or   vote   in   the   meeting   of   Gram Panchayat. 5. The   submissions   made   by   the   counsel   of   the appellant   were   refuted   by   the   counsel   for   the respondent. It is submitted that there being only eight members present and one being disqualified, two­third majority  shall  be computed  from seven and five  votes caste in favour of the no­confidence motion, the motion shall be treated to be validly passed. It is contended that   provision   of   Section   35(3)   of   the   Maharashtra Village   Panchayats   Act,   1959   has   to   be   read   to   mean that   majority   of   not   less   than   two­third   of   total number of members present and voting, thus, there being only 8 members present, majority is to be computed from 7   excluding   one   disqualified   member.   He   submits   that motion of no­confidence was validly passed against the appellant and rightly upheld by the High Court. 6.Learned   counsel   for   the   parties   relied   on   few judgments which shall be referred to while considering 5 the submissions. 7. Section   35   of   the   Maharashtra   Village   Panchayats Act deals with motion of no­confidence. Section 35(1) and Section 35(3) which are relevant for  the present case are as follows:
[one third]
rswho ar
the Tahsildar as may be prescribed.[Such
notice once given shall not be withdrawn.
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may be,[shall forthwith stop exercising all
the powers and perform all the functions and
duties of the office and thereupon such
powers, functions and duties shall vest in
theUpa­Sarpanchin case the motion is carried
out against theSarpanch; and in case the
motion is carried out against both
theSarpanchandUpa­Sarpanch, in such
officer, not below the rank of Extension
Officer, as may be authorised by the Block
Development Officer, till the dispute, if any,
referred to under sub­section (3B) is
decided:”
6 8. The main issue which arises for consideration is that what shall be two­third majority for holding the no­confidence motion to be passed in the Panchayat in the   facts   of   the   present   case.   Admittedly   there   are nine   members   in   the   Village   Panchayat.   Out   of   nine members   in   the   meeting   held   on   14.09.2018,   eight members were present. Out of eight members present, one member was disqualified to sit and vote by virtue of she   having   not   submitted   her   caste   certificate   after the election. She was one out of six members who have voted   in   favour   of     no­confidence   motion.   There   are five valid votes in favour of  no­confidence motion as two   against   it.   The   statute   provides   for   special majority  for passing  a  motion. The   Shackleton   on the “ Law and Practice of Meetings ” in paragraph 7.32 while dealing with special majority states: "In   cases   where   special   majorities   are prescribed,   the   provisions   of   the   relevant statute or rules or rules must be carefully observed.   Thus,   where   under   an   old   Act   a motion   was   to   be   “determined   by   a   majority consisting of two­thirds of the votes of the ratepayers present” at a meeting, and 37 were 7 present, the votes of 20 ratepayers in favour of the motion (the remainder abstaining) were deemed to be insufficient to comply with the statute.” 9. In the present case statute, Section 35(3) refers to majority as “a majority of not not less than two­ third of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of   the   Panchayat”.   The   above   expression   clearly indicates the majority of not less than   two­third of the “total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote”. The key words in the expression   are   members   who   are   for   the   time   being entitled to sit and vote  at a meeting in the Panchayat. The computation of majority thus refers to “entitlement to sit and vote at any meeting”. Thus, the number of members who are entitled to sit and vote in a meeting have to be taken into consideration for computing the majority. Total number of members being nine  and one member   being   disqualified   to   sit   and   vote,   the computation   of   majority   has   to   be   on   the   basis   of number eight,   two­third of the number eight will be 8 5.33.   The   Submission   of   the   respondent   is   that   the two­third   majority   has   to   be   computed   out   of   the members   present   and   voting   i.e.   seven   excluding   one member   who   was   unqualified   to   vote   and   five   is   more than  two­third of seven, the majority has been rightly passed. The interpretation put by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted in view of the clear   language   of   statute.   The   crucial   words   in   the statute   are   members   “who   are   for   the   time   being entitled to sit and vote”. This, expression cannot be treated   to   be   expression  members   present   and   voting. The submission of the respondent that for computation of majority number of seven members should be treated, cannot be accepted. 10. The next submission pressed by the respondent is that  for applying the principle of  rounding off 5.33 votes have to be rounded as to five. Thus, five votes are sufficient  to accept majority for the purpose of passing no­confidence motion. Whether 5.33 votes can be rounded up into 5 votes or requirement is at lest six votes is the real issue. When there are  clear words in 9 the   statute   i.e.   “not   less   two­third   of   the   total number of members” applying the principle of rounding off, 5.33 vote cannot be treated as 5. Vote of a person cannot be expressed in fraction. When computation of a majority  comes  with fraction of a vote that fraction has to be treated as one vote, because votes cannot be expressed in fraction. The principle that figure less than .5 is to be ignored and figure more than .5 shall be treated as one, is  not  applicable in the statutory scheme   as   delineated   by   Section   35.   Provision   of Section 35(1) which provides for requirement for moving motion of no­confidence by not less than one­third of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Panchayat,   is   the   same   expression   as   used   in   sub­ section   (3).   Obviously,   requirement   of   not   less   than one­third number for moving motion has to be computed from total number of the members who are entitled to sit   and   vote.   Thus,   the   same   expression   having   been used   in   sub­section   (3)   of   Section   35   both   the expressions have to be  given  the same meaning.  Thus, 10 one­third of total number of members who are entitled to sit and vote have to be determined on the strength of members entitled to vote at a particular time. The same   meaning   has   also   to   be   applied   while   computing two­third majority. 11. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   has   placed reliance on two judgments, one, of this Court in  State of U.P. and another vs. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others, (2005)   2   SCC   10 .   In   the   above   case,   this   Court   was considering applicability of percentage of reservation in the context of U.P. Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled   Casts,   Scheduled   Tribes   and   Other   Backward Classes) Act, 1994. The percentage prescribed for the reservation category in the State of U.P. noticed in paragraph   2   of   the   judgment.   Respondent   belonging   to general category was at the top of the waiting list. He filed a writ petition directing the State to issue a letter of appointment to the respondent. The High Court held   that   50   %   of   general   category   which   was   46.50 ought to have been treated as 47. The High Court had 11 allowed   the   writ   petition   and   held   the   respondent entitled   for   appointment   as   47th   general   category candidate. The appeal filed by the State was dismissed by this Court. Paragraph 2,6 and 7 of the judgment are as follows: “2.   The   percentages   of   reservation,   as applicable   and   as   was   actually   applied,   are set out in the following table:
CategoryPercentage<br>(prescribed)Percentage<br>worked out<br>toNumber<br>of posts<br>reserved
General50%46.5046
Scheduled<br>Castes21%19.5320
Other<br>Backward<br>Classes27%25.1126
Scheduled<br>Tribes2%1.861
6.   The   High   Court   has   found   mainly   two faults with the process adopted by the State Government. First, the figure of 46.50 should have been rounded off to 47 and not to 46; and secondly, in the category of freedom fighters and   ex­servicemen,   total   3   posts   have   been earmarked   as   horizontally   reserved   by inserting such reservation into general quota of 46 posts which had the effect of pushing out   of   selection   zone   three   candidates   from merit list of general category.  7. We do not find fault with any of the two reasonings adopted by the High Court. The rule 12 of   rounding   off   based   on   logic   and   common sense   is:   if   part   is   one­half   or   more,   its value shall be increased to one and if part is less   than   half   then   its   value   shall   be ignored. 46.50 should have been rounded off to 47   and   not   to   46   as   has   been   done.   If   47 candidates   would   have   been   considered   for selection in general category, the respondent was   sure   to   find   a   place   in   the   list   of selected   meritorious   candidates   and   hence entitled to appointment. ” 12. The judgment of this Court in the above case was on rounding off the vacancies. The reserved post being 50% of the total number of posts reservation in no manner can exceed 50%. In the facts of aforesaid case, there were  total  93 posts, 47 was    treated more than  50%. Hence, the  post for general category which was  46.50 was   rounded   off   to   47   by   the   High   Court   which   was approved   by   this   Court.   The   said   case   related   to computation of vacancies for particular category as per 1994   Act   which   principle   cannot   be   applied   in computation of  a  special majority as required by the statute in question. 13. Another judgment is a Full Bench judgment in  Jayram 13 vs.   Secretary,   U.D.D.   Mumbai,   2010   (3)   MH.   LJ   465, which is relied by learned counsel for the respondent, by   referring   to   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Pawan Kumar   Tiwari   (supra)   the   Full   Bench   of   Bombay   High Court   held   that   there   is   no   justification   that fraction below 0.5 be ignored in allotting the seats to registered or recognised parties on the basis of groups as per statutory scheme delineated by Bombay Provincial Municipal   Corporations   Act,   1949.   Referring   to   the judgment of this Court in   in Pawan Kumar Tiwari (supra) paragraph 31, the Full Bench of Bombay High Court has rightly   held   that   rounding   off   was   not   the   ratio   or principle on which  Pawan Kumar Tiwari case  was decided. Paragraph 31 of the judgment is quoted below: "31. Mr.   Anturkar,   learned   Counsel vehementaly   contended   that   rule   of   rounding off is now well recognised and is based upon the logic and common sense. For this he relied upon   State   of   U.P.   vs.   Pawan   Kumar   Tiwari, (2005) 2 SCC 10. In that case, 93 posts of Civil Judges, J.D. were advertised and 50% of the   posts   were   reserved   for   different categories   and   50%   were   for   the   general   or open   category.   In   view   of   this   percentage 46.50   seats   would   be   available   for   reserved category and 46.50 for general category. The State   Government   rounded   off   the   number   of 14 posts available for general category at 46 and for   the   reserved   category   at   47.   The   High Court found fault with the process and held that the number of posts available for general category could not be rounded off at 46, but should   have   been   rounded   off   at   47.   The Supreme   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   of   the State Government and held that if the seats for   reserved   category   are   fixed   at   47,   it would cross the limit of 50% and therefore it could   not   be   upheld   and   as   such   number   of posts available for reserved category could be fixed   at   46   and   that   for   general   category should have been fixed at 47. Their Lordships observed as follows in para 9:­ “9.   There   is   yet   another   reason   why   the judgment   of   the   High   Court   has   to   be maintained. The total number of vacancies was 93. Consequent upon the allocation of reservation   and   calculation   done   by   the appellants,   the   number   of   reserved   seats would be 47, leaving only 46 available for general   category   candidates.   Meaning thereby, the reservation would exceed 50% which would be unconstitutional. The total number   of   reserved   seats   could   not   have been more than 46 out of 93. ” In   fact,   in   this   case,   both   the   groups had   46.5   and   if   the   same   formula   would   be applied, then in each case .50 could have been rounded off to 1 and each of the group would be   entitled   to   47   seats.   In   that   case,   the total number would become 94, while the total vacancies   available   were   only   93.   Thus, rounding off is not the ratio or principle on which that case was decided. It was decided mainly on the question as to whether reserved categories may get seats more than 50% quota. Therefore   the   authority   in   Pawan   Kumar 15 Tiwari's case could not be used in support of the view taken in Vasant Gite.” 14. Further, in paragraph 34 Full Bench of Bombay High Court   itself   held   that   there   is   no   justification   to ignore fraction below 0.5 in the context of allocation of registered or recognised parties or groups who are entitled to number of seats. The above judgment of the Bombay   High   Court   in   no   manner   supports   the   case   of respondent rather supports the appellant's contention. 15. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   so   far   as disqualification   of   one   of   the   members   who   had   not filed her caste certificate relied on   Anant vs. Chief before the Election Commissioner, 2017 (1) Mh.L.J. 431,  Full Bench the issue was raised as to whether on non­ submission   of   caste   certificate   within   six   months period   disqualification   is   automatic.   Answering   the reference   Full   Bench   held   that   the   provision   for requiring   submission   of   caste   certificate   within   a period   of   six   months   for   election   is   mandatory   and disqualification would be automatic. In paragraph 100 16 of the judgment the Full Bench held the following : “100.   In   the   result,   we   hold   that   the time limit of six months prescribed in the two provisos to Section 9A of the said Act, within which an elected person is required to produce the   Validity   Certificate   from   the   Scrutiny Committee is mandatory.  Further,   in   terms   of   second   proviso   to Section   9A   if   a   person   fails   to   produce Validity   Certificate   within   a   period   of   six months from the date on which he is elected, his   election   shall   be   deemed   to   have   been terminated   retrospectively   and   he   shall   be disqualified for being a Councillor. Such   retrospective   termination   of   his election   and   disqualification   for   being   a Councillor would be automatic and validation of his caste claim after the stipulated period would   not   result   in   restoration   of   his election. The   questions   raised,   stand   answered accordingly. ” 16. It is further relevant to note that this Court in Special   Leave   Petition   (C)Nos.   29874­29875   of   2016 (Shankar   s/o   Raghunath   Devre   (Patil)   vs.   State   of Maharashtra & Ors.) has approved the view taken by the Full   Bench   vide   its   judgment   dated   23.08.2018   by holding   that   the   requirement   of   submitting   caste 17 certificate is mandatory. 17. Thus, in so far as vote of one member, Smt. Sushila Prakash Darade, the same can  neither be computed for the no­confidence motion nor is relevant for computing two­third   majority   as   per   the   statutory   scheme.   The words 'not less than' used in Section 35(3) of the Act has   to   be   given   meaning   and   purpose.   When   majority comes to 5.33 votes “not less than 5.33 votes” have to be given meaning, hence, 5.33 can never be rounded off to 5, fraction has to be treated as one because votes cannot be treated as fraction. Hence, 5.33 votes to be read as 6 votes for passing of the motion as mandated by Section 35(3). 18. We are, thus, of the view that no­confidence motion was   not   validly   passed   and   the   order   of   the   Addl. Collector as well as of the High Court are erroneous. It is held that motion of no­confidence was not passed against the appellant since it was not passed by two­ third of the total number of the members who were for 18 the   time   being   entitled   to   sit   and   vote.   The proceedings   dated   14.09.2018,   order   of   the   Addl. Collector   approving   the   proceedings   as   well   as   the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition are set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly. .........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI ) ..........................J.     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) ..........................J. NEW DELHI, ( S. ABDUL NAZEER ) December 10, 2018. 19 REPORTABLE    THE IN     SUPREME     COURT     OF    INDIA   CIVIL   APPELLATE     JURISDICTION   CIVIL   APPEAL     NO.11916     Of    2018  GANESH SUKHDEO GURULE       ...APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS TAHSILDAR SINNAR & ORS.    ...RESPONDENT(S) J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T   ASHOK   BHUSHAN,J. This   appeal   has   been   filed   against   the   judgment dated 22.11.2018 of the High Court of Bombay dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.  2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well   as   the   counsel   for   the   respondent   No.4   who   has appeared on caveat. The interest of respondent No.4 and other   private   respondents   being   common   we   have   not issued notice to other respondents. 20 3. The brief facts of the case necessary for deciding the appeal are: On   07.09.2018,   respondents   moved   a   no­confidence motion against the appellant. Tahsildar issued notice dated   07.09.2018   convening   special   meeting   of   Gram Panchayat for consideration of no­confidence motion on 14.09.2018. On  14.09.2018 out of  nine members of the Gram Panchayat  only eight members were present in the meeting. Six members voted in favour of the motion and two members were opposed to it. One of the members who voted   in   favour   of   no­confidence   motion   was   not qualified to vote, namely,  Smt. Sushila Prakash Darade who had not filed her caste certificate after election, hence, she was disqualified to continue to be a member or to vote in any meeting. A Dispute Application under 35(3­B) of the Maharashtra Gram Panchayat Rules, 1958 challenging the no­confidence motion passed was filed. The   Addl.   Collector,   Nasik   passed   an   order   dated 16.10.2018   approving   the   special   meeting   dated 14.09.2018   holding   that   no­confidence   motion   was 21 validly passed. Against the order passed by the Addl. Collector, a writ petition was filed by the appellant which   has   been   dismissed   by   the   High   Court   by   the impugned  judgment.   Aggrieved by  the judgment of the High Court this appeal has been filed. 4. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submits   that total   members   of   Gram   Panchayat   being   nine   and   one member   being   disqualified   to   vote   the   two­third majority   has   to   be   computed   on   the   basis   of   eight members which comes to 5.33 and there being only five valid votes in favour of  no­confidence motion, motion cannot be held to be  passed. One  of the members who voted   in   favour   of   no­confidence   motion   i.e.   Smt. Sushila   Prakash   Darade   being   disqualified   to   sit   and vote   cannot   be   counted   in   favour   of   no­confidence motion,   two­third   majority   being   5.33,   at   least   six votes   were   required   for   passing   the   no­confidence motion.   It   is   submitted   that   caste   certificate   being not submitted by Smt. Sushila Prakash Darade within six months   as   required   by   law   she   automatically   became disqualified   to   sit   or   vote   in   the   meeting   of   Gram 22 Panchayat. 5. The   submissions   made   by   the   counsel   of   the appellant   were   refuted   by   the   counsel   for   the respondent. It is submitted that there being only eight members present and one being disqualified, two­third majority  shall  be computed  from seven and five  votes caste in favour of the no­confidence motion, the motion shall be treated to be validly passed. It is contended that   provision   of   Section   35(3)   of   the   Maharashtra Village   Panchayats   Act,   1959   has   to   be   read   to   mean that   majority   of   not   less   than   two­third   of   total number of members present and voting, thus, there being only 8 members present, majority is to be computed from 7   excluding   one   disqualified   member.   He   submits   that motion of no­confidence was validly passed against the appellant and rightly upheld by the High Court. 6.Learned   counsel   for   the   parties   relied   on   few judgments which shall be referred to while considering the submissions. 23 7. Section   35   of   the   Maharashtra   Village   Panchayats Act deals with motion of no­confidence. Section 35(1) and Section 35(3) which are relevant for  the present case are as follows:
[one third]
rswho ar
the Tahsildar as may be prescribed.[Such
notice once given shall not be withdrawn.
Xxxxxxxxx
may be,[shall forthwith stop exercising all
the powers and perform all the functions and
duties of the office and thereupon such
powers, functions and duties shall vest in
theUpa­Sarpanchin case the motion is carried
out against theSarpanch; and in case the
motion is carried out against both
theSarpanchandUpa­Sarpanch, in such
officer, not below the rank of Extension
Officer, as may be authorised by the Block
Development Officer, till the dispute, if any,
referred to under sub­section (3B) is
decided:”
24 8. The main issue which arises for consideration is that what shall be two­third majority for holding the no­confidence motion to be passed in the Panchayat in the   facts   of   the   present   case.   Admittedly   there   are nine   members   in   the   Village   Panchayat.   Out   of   nine members   in   the   meeting   held   on   14.09.2018,   eight members were present. Out of eight members present, one member was disqualified to sit and vote by virtue of she   having   not   submitted   her   caste   certificate   after the election. She was one out of six members who have voted   in   favour   of     no­confidence   motion.   There   are five valid votes in favour of  no­confidence motion as two   against   it.   The   statute   provides   for   special majority  for passing  a  motion. The   Shackleton   on the “ Law and Practice of Meetings ” in paragraph 7.32 while dealing with special majority states: "In   cases   where   special   majorities   are prescribed,   the   provisions   of   the   relevant statute or rules or rules must be carefully observed.   Thus,   where   under   an   old   Act   a motion   was   to   be   “determined   by   a   majority consisting of two­thirds of the votes of the ratepayers present” at a meeting, and 37 were present, the votes of 20 ratepayers in favour of the motion (the remainder abstaining) were 25 deemed to be insufficient to comply with the statute.” 9. In the present case statute, Section 35(3) refers to majority as “a majority of not not less than two­ third of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of   the   Panchayat”.   The   above   expression   clearly indicates the majority of not less than   two­third of the “total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote”. The key words in the expression   are   members   who   are   for   the   time   being  at a meeting in the Panchayat. entitled to sit and vote The computation of majority thus refers to “entitlement to sit and vote at any meeting”. Thus, the number of members who are entitled to sit and vote in a meeting have to be taken into consideration for computing the majority. Total number of members being nine  and one member   being   disqualified   to   sit   and   vote,   the computation   of   majority   has   to   be   on   the   basis   of number eight,   two­third of the number eight will be 5.33.   The   Submission   of   the   respondent   is   that   the 26 two­third   majority   has   to   be   computed   out   of   the members   present   and   voting   i.e.   seven   excluding   one member   who   was   unqualified   to   vote   and   five   is   more than  two­third of seven, the majority has been rightly passed. The interpretation put by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted in view of the clear   language   of   statute.   The   crucial   words   in   the statute   are   members   “who   are   for   the   time   being entitled to sit and vote”. This, expression cannot be treated   to   be   expression  members   present   and   voting. The submission of the respondent that for computation of majority number of seven members should be treated, cannot be accepted. 10. The next submission pressed by the respondent is that  for applying the principle of  rounding off 5.33 votes have to be rounded as to five. Thus, five votes are sufficient  to accept majority for the purpose of passing no­confidence motion. Whether 5.33 votes can be rounded up into 5 votes or requirement is at lest six votes is the real issue. When there are  clear words in the   statute   i.e.   “not   less   two­third   of   the   total 27 number of members” applying the principle of rounding off, 5.33 vote cannot be treated as 5. Vote of a person cannot be expressed in fraction. When computation of a majority  comes  with fraction of a vote that fraction has to be treated as one vote, because votes cannot be expressed in fraction. The principle that figure less than .5 is to be ignored and figure more than .5 shall be treated as one, is  not  applicable in the statutory scheme   as   delineated   by   Section   35.   Provision   of Section 35(1) which provides for requirement for moving motion of no­confidence by not less than one­third of the total number of the members who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the Panchayat,   is   the   same   expression   as   used   in   sub­ section   (3).   Obviously,   requirement   of   not   less   than one­third number for moving motion has to be computed from total number of the members who are entitled to sit   and   vote.   Thus,   the   same   expression   having   been used   in   sub­section   (3)   of   Section   35   both   the expressions have to be  given  the same meaning.  Thus, one­third of total number of members who are entitled 28 to sit and vote have to be determined on the strength of members entitled to vote at a particular time. The same   meaning   has   also   to   be   applied   while   computing two­third majority. 11. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   has   placed reliance on two judgments, one, of this Court in  State of U.P. and another vs. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others, (2005)   2   SCC   10 .   In   the   above   case,   this   Court   was considering applicability of percentage of reservation in the context of U.P. Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled   Casts,   Scheduled   Tribes   and   Other   Backward Classes) Act, 1994. The percentage prescribed for the reservation category in the State of U.P. noticed in paragraph   2   of   the   judgment.   Respondent   belonging   to general category was at the top of the waiting list. He filed a writ petition directing the State to issue a letter of appointment to the respondent. The High Court held   that   50   %   of   general   category   which   was   46.50 ought to have been treated as 47. The High Court had allowed   the   writ   petition   and   held   the   respondent 29 entitled   for   appointment   as   47th   general   category candidate. The appeal filed by the State was dismissed by this Court. Paragraph 2,6 and 7 of the judgment are as follows: “2.   The   percentages   of   reservation,   as applicable   and   as   was   actually   applied,   are set out in the following table:
CategoryPercentage<br>(prescribed)Percentage<br>worked out<br>toNumber<br>of posts<br>reserved
General50%46.5046
Scheduled<br>Castes21%19.5320
Other<br>Backward<br>Classes27%25.1126
Scheduled<br>Tribes2%1.861
6.   The   High   Court   has   found   mainly   two faults with the process adopted by the State Government. First, the figure of 46.50 should have been rounded off to 47 and not to 46; and secondly, in the category of freedom fighters and   ex­servicemen,   total   3   posts   have   been earmarked   as   horizontally   reserved   by inserting such reservation into general quota of 46 posts which had the effect of pushing out   of   selection   zone   three   candidates   from merit list of general category.  7. We do not find fault with any of the two reasonings adopted by the High Court. The rule of   rounding   off   based   on   logic   and   common sense   is:   if   part   is   one­half   or   more,   its 30 value shall be increased to one and if part is less   than   half   then   its   value   shall   be ignored. 46.50 should have been rounded off to 47   and   not   to   46   as   has   been   done.   If   47 candidates   would   have   been   considered   for selection in general category, the respondent was   sure   to   find   a   place   in   the   list   of selected   meritorious   candidates   and   hence entitled to appointment. ” 12. The judgment of this Court in the above case was on rounding off the vacancies. The reserved post being 50% of the total number of posts reservation in no manner can exceed 50%. In the facts of aforesaid case, there were  total  93 posts, 47 was    treated more than  50%. Hence, the  post for general category which was  46.50 was   rounded   off   to   47   by   the   High   Court   which   was approved   by   this   Court.   The   said   case   related   to computation of vacancies for particular category as per 1994   Act   which   principle   cannot   be   applied   in computation of  a  special majority as required by the statute in question. 13. Another judgment is a Full Bench judgment in  Jayram vs.   Secretary,   U.D.D.   Mumbai,   2010   (3)   MH.   LJ   465, 31 which is relied by learned counsel for the respondent, by   referring   to   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Pawan Kumar   Tiwari   (supra)   the   Full   Bench   of   Bombay   High Court   held   that   there   is   no   justification   that fraction below 0.5 be ignored in allotting the seats to registered or recognised parties on the basis of groups as per statutory scheme delineated by Bombay Provincial Municipal   Corporations   Act,   1949.   Referring   to   the judgment of this Court in  Pawan Kumar Tiwari (supra)  in paragraph 31, the Full Bench of Bombay High Court has rightly   held   that   rounding   off   was   not   the   ratio   or principle on which  Pawan Kumar Tiwari case  was decided. Paragraph 31 of the judgment is quoted below: "31. Mr.   Anturkar,   learned   Counsel vehementaly   contended   that   rule   of   rounding off is now well recognised and is based upon the logic and common sense. For this he relied upon   State   of   U.P.   vs.   Pawan   Kumar   Tiwari, (2005) 2 SCC 10. In that case, 93 posts of Civil Judges, J.D. were advertised and 50% of the   posts   were   reserved   for   different categories   and   50%   were   for   the   general   or open   category.   In   view   of   this   percentage 46.50   seats   would   be   available   for   reserved category and 46.50 for general category. The State   Government   rounded   off   the   number   of posts available for general category at 46 and for   the   reserved   category   at   47.   The   High 32 Court found fault with the process and held that the number of posts available for general category could not be rounded off at 46, but should   have   been   rounded   off   at   47.   The Supreme   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   of   the State Government and held that if the seats for   reserved   category   are   fixed   at   47,   it would cross the limit of 50% and therefore it could   not   be   upheld   and   as   such   number   of posts available for reserved category could be fixed   at   46   and   that   for   general   category should have been fixed at 47. Their Lordships observed as follows in para 9:­ “9.   There   is   yet   another   reason   why   the judgment   of   the   High   Court   has   to   be maintained. The total number of vacancies was 93. Consequent upon the allocation of reservation   and   calculation   done   by   the appellants,   the   number   of   reserved   seats would be 47, leaving only 46 available for general   category   candidates.   Meaning thereby, the reservation would exceed 50% which would be unconstitutional. The total number   of   reserved   seats   could   not   have been more than 46 out of 93. ” In   fact,   in   this   case,   both   the   groups had   46.5   and   if   the   same   formula   would   be applied, then in each case .50 could have been rounded off to 1 and each of the group would be   entitled   to   47   seats.   In   that   case,   the total number would become 94, while the total vacancies   available   were   only   93.   Thus, rounding off is not the ratio or principle on which that case was decided. It was decided mainly on the question as to whether reserved categories may get seats more than 50% quota. Therefore   the   authority   in   Pawan   Kumar Tiwari's case could not be used in support of the view taken in Vasant Gite.” 33 14. Further, in paragraph 34 Full Bench of Bombay High Court   itself   held   that   there   is   no   justification   to ignore fraction below 0.5 in the context of allocation of registered or recognised parties or groups who are entitled to number of seats. The above judgment of the Bombay   High   Court   in   no   manner   supports   the   case   of respondent rather supports the appellant's contention. 15. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   so   far   as disqualification   of   one   of   the   members   who   had   not filed her caste certificate relied on   Anant vs. Chief Election Commissioner, 2017 (1) Mh.L.J. 431,  before the Full Bench the issue was raised as to whether on non­ submission   of   caste   certificate   within   six   months period   disqualification   is   automatic.   Answering   the reference   Full   Bench   held   that   the   provision   for requiring   submission   of   caste   certificate   within   a period   of   six   months   for   election   is   mandatory   and disqualification would be automatic. In paragraph 100 of the judgment the Full Bench held the following : 34 “100.   In   the   result,   we   hold   that   the time limit of six months prescribed in the two provisos to Section 9A of the said Act, within which an elected person is required to produce the   Validity   Certificate   from   the   Scrutiny Committee is mandatory.  Further,   in   terms   of   second   proviso   to Section   9A   if   a   person   fails   to   produce Validity   Certificate   within   a   period   of   six months from the date on which he is elected, his   election   shall   be   deemed   to   have   been terminated   retrospectively   and   he   shall   be disqualified for being a Councillor. Such   retrospective   termination   of   his election   and   disqualification   for   being   a Councillor would be automatic and validation of his caste claim after the stipulated period would   not   result   in   restoration   of   his election. The   questions   raised,   stand   answered accordingly. ” 16. It is further relevant to note that this Court in Special   Leave   Petition   (C)Nos.   29874­29875   of   2016 (Shankar   s/o   Raghunath   Devre   (Patil)   vs.   State   of Maharashtra & Ors.) has approved the view taken by the Full   Bench   vide   its   judgment   dated   23.08.2018   by holding   that   the   requirement   of   submitting   caste certificate is mandatory. 35 17. Thus, in so far as vote of one member, Smt. Sushila Prakash Darade, the same can  neither be computed for the no­confidence motion nor is relevant for computing two­third   majority   as   per   the   statutory   scheme.   The words 'not less than' used in Section 35(3) of the Act has   to   be   given   meaning   and   purpose.   When   majority comes to 5.33 votes “not less than 5.33 votes” have to be given meaning, hence, 5.33 can never be rounded off to 5, fraction has to be treated as one because votes cannot be treated as fraction. Hence, 5.33 votes to be read as 6 votes for passing of the motion as mandated by Section 35(3). 18. We are, thus, of the view that no­confidence motion was   not   validly   passed   and   the   order   of   the   Addl. Collector as well as of the High Court are erroneous. It is held that motion of no­confidence was not passed against the appellant since it was not passed by less than two­third of the total number of the members who were for the time being entitled to sit and vote. The 36 proceedings   dated   14.09.2018,   order   of   the   Addl. Collector   approving   the   proceedings   as   well   as   the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition are set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly. .........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI ) ..........................J.     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) ..........................J. NEW DELHI, ( S. ABDUL NAZEER ) December 10, 2018.