Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1682 of 1996
PETITIONER:
K.Pandurangan
RESPONDENT:
S.S.R.Velusamy & Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/09/2003
BENCH:
N.Santosh Hegde & B.P.Singh.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(With Crl.A.Nos.1684/96, 1683/96 and 1685/96)
SANTOSH HEGDE,J.
In these appeals, the appellants were charged for
offences punishable under Sections 420, 477(a), 468, 420
read with Section 109, 409 read with 109 and 468 read with
109 IPC. The trial court, namely, the VIth Additional
Assistant Sessions Judge, Thiruchirapalli, convicted the
appellants under various sections, among them, for offences
punishable under Section 420 and Section 420 read with
109 IPC. It awarded a maximum sentence of 5 years R.I.
On an appeal filed by the convicted accused, the
appellate court confirmed the conviction recorded by the
trial court but reduced the sentence to 2 ½ years each and
further acting purportedly under various GOs. of the
Government, it granted remission of the said sentence of 2 ½
years also.
In a revision filed by the complainant, the High Court
of Judicature at Madras considering the question of
jurisdiction of the court to remit the sentence under the
various G.Os. came to the conclusion that such a remission
could not have been granted by the court, hence, allowed the
revision. It also came to the conclusion that there is no need
to remit the matter back to the lower appellate court,
accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment of the lower
appellate court and restored the judgment of the trial court
both in regard to conviction and sentence. The effect of the
said judgment was that the appellants have to undergo the
sentence of 5 years awarded by the trial court.
In these appeals, Shri M.N.Krishnamani, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the High
Court was in error in entertaining the revision at the instance
of the complainant. He also submitted that the High Court
was in error in setting aside the judgment of the lower
appellate court which granted the appellants benefit of
remission. Alternatively he contended that neither the lower
appellate court nor the High Court have gone into the merits
of the case on facts, hence, they have been denied the benefit
of appeal which is otherwise provided under the Criminal
Procedure Code.
While Shri A.T.M.Ranga Ramanujam, learned senior
counsel appearing for the State strongly supported the
judgment of the High Court and contended that from the
purport of the order of the lower appellate court, it is clear
that the court had applied its mind in regard to the facts of the
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case before confirming the conviction. He also submitted that
it is possible that the counsel appearing for the appellants
before the lower appellate court did not address any argument
on merits, therefore, the complaint of the learned counsel for
the appellants that the appellants did not get benefit of the
appeal on facts is not correct. He supported the finding of the
High Court on the question of grant of remission which he
submitted, was without jurisdiction.
So far as the first question as to the maintainability of
the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned,
we think the said argument has only to be noted to be
rejected. Under the provisions of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the court has suo moto power of revision, if
that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the
instance of an outsider would not make any difference
because ultimately it is the power of revision which is
already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being
exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is
done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect
such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note
the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir
Khan vs. The State (Delhi Administration), (AIR 1976 SC
2205).
The second question that has come up for our
consideration in this case pertains to the right of the lower
appellate court to grant various remissions under various
notifications issued by the State, reference to which has been
made by the lower appellate court in its judgment. The right
to grant remission is governed by the provisions of Section
432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which vests the said
power with appropriate Government and not in any court.
Even that power is subject to conditions enumerated in that
Section and one such condition is that an accused person who
is being granted remission of sentence will have to be in
custody, when the decision to grant remission is made by the
Government concerned. See proviso to Section 432(5) of the
Code which was not the factual position in this case apart
from the fact the Court has no jurisdiction of remission of
sentence under Section 432 of the Code. Therefore, in our
opinion, the first appellate court was not justified in granting
the remission.
This leaves us to consider the last question argued
before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that the
appellants had a right of appeal on facts conferred statutorily
by the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein they could have
convinced the appellate court that the findings of the court
below are erroneous and not based on facts. He pointed out
from the judgment of the lower appellate court that there has
been no such consideration by the said court. He submitted
that if we are not inclined to accept his argument in regard to
the right of the appellate court to grant remission, then he is
entitled to the benefit of hearing before the appellate court on
merits of the case. On facts, he submitted that the contention
of the learned counsel for the State that there was no
argument addressed by his counterpart on merits of the case
before the lower appellate court is not correct and the same is
also not so reflected in the judgment of the said court. We
have also perused the said judgment and we do not think
there is any application of mind in regard to the factual aspect
of the case by the lower appellate court which has merely
proceeded to consider the quantum of sentence and grant of
remission. Apart from the fact that right of appeal is
statutorily provided by the Code, a Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of A.R.Antulay vs. R.S.Nayak & Anr.
(1988 2 SCC 602) has held that deprivation of one statutory
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right of appeal would amount to denial of procedure
established by law under Article 21, and further such denial
violates the guarantee of equal protection of law under article
14 of the Constitution. Placing reliance on the said judgment
of this court, we are of the opinion that since the lower
appellate court, which was the first court of appeal, has not
considered the factual aspect of the case while considering
the appeal, we think the appellants have been denied an
opportunity of agitating their case on facts against the
judgment of the trial court. In such circumstances, we think
the prayer of the learned counsel is justified. Therefore, we
allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the
High Court and remand the matter back to the Court of the
Sessions Judge at Thiruchirapalli who will hear all appeals
which were filed against the judgment and conviction made
by the VIth Additional Assistant Sessions Judge,
Thiruchirapalli in Calender Case No 2 of 1988 and other
connected matters. Since the matter is very old, we think it
appropriate to direct the said appellate court to dispose of the
same on merits within three months from the receipt of the
records.
Ordered accordingly.