Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Limited vs. The Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association(Regd)

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 1416
EXTRA-ORDINARY JURISDICTION
PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) NO.15870/2025
KANGRA CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK LIMITED …PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE KANGRA CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK PENSIONERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION
(REGD.) & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
R1: The Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare
Association (Regd.)
R2: The State of Himachal Pradesh
R3: The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh
R4: The Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Staff Pension Trust
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH & PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.
Heard learned senior counsel Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. Kavin Gulati
and Mr. Shadan Farasat, for their respective parties, alongwith
learned counsel assisting them.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:
2. At the outset, Mr. Kavin Gulati, learned senior counsel for
respondent no.1, raised the issue of non-maintainability of the
instant Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.12.11
14:34:30 IST
Reason:
Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Constitution’). The parties have, thus, addressed us on the same.

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RESPONDENT NO.1’S CONTENTIONS:
3. Mr. Gulati, learned senior counsel, submitted that the present
petition is not maintainable for the reason that the original
Judgment dated 15.05.2012 in CWP No.1679/2010 [2012:HHC:4682], as
passed by the learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High
Court (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’), as upheld by
the Division Bench of the High Court on 26.02.2024 in LPA
No.316/2012 [2014:HHC:11898-DB], was further challenged before this
Court by the petitioner in SLP (C) No.16819/2024. But the said
challenge was dismissed by Order dated 23.09.2024 in SLP (C)
No.16819/2024. It was further submitted that later, a Miscellaneous
Application (hereinafter referred to as ‘MA’) Diary No.51429/2024
was filed before this Court for recall of the order of dismissal,
which was also withdrawn by the petitioner on 20.12.2024. However,
such withdrawal was with liberty to file a review petition before
the High Court. It was submitted that in the said Order (of
withdrawal of the MA with the liberty supra ), no liberty was
granted to the petitioner to move this Court again, in case the
petitioner did not succeed in/was aggrieved by the order/s to be
passed in the review petition. Further, it was submitted that even
otherwise, once this Court had upheld, by the Order dated
23.09.2024 supra , the original Judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench on merits in the
same case between the same parties, such Judgment, being in
personam , could not be opened up for fresh consideration de novo ,
as was being attempted by the petitioner in the present proceeding.

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He cited T K David v Kuruppampady Service Cooperative Bank Limited ,
(2020) 9 SCC 92 for the proposition that the present petition was
not maintainable and referred to Punjab State Cooperative
Agricultural Development Bank Limited v Registrar, Cooperative
Societies , (2022) 4 SCC 363 on the merits of the case, without
prejudice to his objection on maintainability. It was prayed that
the petition deserved dismissal.
PETITIONER’S RESPONSE:
4. Per contra , Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the contentions urged by respondent no.1
are misconceived. It was submitted that nowhere, along the whole
chain, any Court, be it the learned Single Judge or the Division
Bench of the High Court, or even this Court, had considered the
issue(s) raised, both on facts and in law, by the petitioner. Mr.
Sibal, learned senior counsel, pointedly urged that, at the very
least, the petitioner was, and is, duly entitled to one such
serious consideration on merits. He further contended that the
position in law is clear that inasmuch as even if a matter is
dismissed by this Court without any adjudication on merits, a
review would lie before the Court whose judgment/order was under
challenge in this Court. For such proposition, he placed reliance
on Manisha Nimesh Mehta v Board of Directors, Represented by
Chairman and Managing Director of ICICI Bank , (2024) 9 SCC 573. He
vehemently disputed the applicability of T K David ( supra ) to the
instant case.

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5. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel, concluded his arguments by
urging that if the judgment impugned is not interfered with, it may
result in the closure of the petitioner-Bank itself, and being a
Cooperative Bank, ultimately, the customers of the Bank would
suffer as there would be no purpose for the petitioner-Bank to
grant them any loan for any work in District Kangra, State of
Himachal Pradesh. He submitted, hence, that the financial condition
and future prospects of the petitioner-Bank as also its customers
would be jeopardized and seriously prejudiced. Moreover, it was
contended that the financial condition of the petitioner-Bank was
not conducive to cushion the payment outflow. He further submitted
that the petitioner-Bank has an inherent right to
consider/reconsider any scheme/policy especially, relating to
pension regarding its employees based on bona fide financial
constraints. In the present matter, when the outflow/liability to
pay far exceeds what is received by the petitioner-Bank, equity
also is in its favour as there are no sources of money from which
such huge demand can be fulfilled.
NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED AND ESTIMATED FINANCIAL BURDEN:
6. On a quick response from learned senior counsel and learned
counsel for respondent no.1, as to the number of persons who would
likely be affected/impacted, the answer is that it would be no more
than 141 pensioners and 45 spouses of the pensioners who had passed

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away. Further submission canvassed was that the financial liability
would not exceed more than approximately INR 30-35 crores.
7. On this, Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel, on instructions,
opined that the financial liability could be about INR 250 crores.
8. Be that as it may, we consciously refrain from returning
findings on the merits of the matter. We are of the considered
opinion that the issue of maintainability, raised by respondent
no.1, needs an evaluation at the threshold. It would be a futility
to hear the parties on merits before adjudicating on the
preliminary objection.
RESPONDENT NO.4’S STAND:
9. As noted in Order dated 22.08.2025, Mr. Farasat, learned senior
counsel, had informed us that respondent no.4-Trust would be
supporting the petitioner-Bank as ultimately, it would have to
pay/bear the liability. On facts, it was stated that respondent
no.4-Trust was not in a position to pay respondent no.1/its members
more than what they were presently receiving.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
10. In these particular facts and circumstances, the history of
the lis and the matter having travelled to this Court in the
present proceeding for the third time, we find force in the

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preliminary objection. For proper contextual appreciation, it is
apposite to set out the relevant extracts of the Orders dated
23.09.2024 and 20.12.2024 referred to supra , as also the Order
dated 12.08.2022 in Civil Appeal No.5251/2022:
I. 12.08.2022:

II. 23.09.2024:

III. 20.12.2024:

11. The principle that a review is maintainable even after
dismissal simpliciter of an SLP by this Court is not in dispute.
Reference in this regard to the pronouncements in Kunhayammed v

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State of Kerala , (2000) 6 SCC 359 and Khoday Distilleries Limited v
Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal ,
(2019) 4 SCC 376, both by Benches of 3-Judges, is sufficient.
12. In T K David ( supra ), the principle was enunciated thus by a
3-Judge Bench:

(emphasis supplied)
13. In Manisha Nimesh Mehta ( supra ), the Bombay High Court
dismissed a bunch of review petitions as non-maintainable, holding
that as the special leave petitions against the original
judgment(s) therein had been dismissed by this Court. Remitting the
said review petitions to the High Court, while setting aside the
ruling of the Bombay High Court, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court held
as follows:
‘ 8. It seems that as per the settled law, which holds the
field as of date, the applicability of doctrine of merger

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is contingent upon leave being granted by the court in
the special leave petition. To wit, the dismissal of a
special leave petition—regardless of whether it is
through a speaking or a non-speaking order—does not
attract the doctrine of merger; thereby making a review
petition before the High Court maintainable as ruled in
the above-cited decisions. Conversely, where this Court
grants leave, and thereafter dismisses the civil appeal,
be that by way of a speaking or non-speaking order, the
order under appeal merges with the order passed by this
Court. In such cases, the doctrine of merger is
applicable squarely.
xxx
10. Reverting to the case at hand, the special leave
petition was dismissed [Perfect Infraengineers
Ltd. v. I CICI  Bank Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1843] as this
Court was not “inclined to interfere with the impugned
judgment [Manisha Nimesh Mehta v. I CICI  Bank, 2024 SCC
OnLine Bom 2407]”. Indisputably, no leave was granted and
consequently, the merger principle was not invoked. That
being so, the High Court may not be legally correct in
dismissing the review petition at the threshold for want
of maintainability. ’
(emphasis supplied)
14. Upon a perusal of the judgment impugned in Manisha Nimesh
Mehta ( supra ), we find that the Bombay High Court had found it ‘ not

which are about the merits of the Review Petitions. ’ Thus, as the
Bombay High Court dismissed the review petitions on the ground of
maintainability alone, statedly, there entailed no consideration on
merits whatsoever.
15. In T K David ( supra ), Bussa Overseas and Properties Private
Limited v Union of India , (2016) 4 SCC 696 was noted with approval.
In Bussa Overseas and Properties Private Limited ( supra ), a 2-Judge
Bench surveyed the precedential landscape and ultimately held:
‘ 29. Needless to state that when the prayer for review is
dismissed, there can be no merger. If the order passed in

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review recalls the main order and a different order is
passed, definitely the main order does not exist. In that
event, there is no need to challenge the main order, for
it is the order in review that affects the aggrieved
party.
30. The decisions pertaining to maintainability of
special leave petition or for that matter appeal have to
be seemly understood. Though in the decision in Shanker
Motiram Nale [Shanker Motiram Nale v. Shiolalsing
Gannusing Rajput, (1994) 2 SCC 753] the two-Judge Bench
referred to Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil
Procedure that bars an appeal against the order of the
court rejecting the review, it is not to be understood
that the Court has curtailed the plenary jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution by taking recourse
to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. It has
to be understood that the Court has evolved and
formulated a principle that if the basic judgment is not
assailed and the challenge is only to the order passed in
review, this Court is obliged not to entertain such
special leave petition. The said principle has gained the
authoritative status and has been treated as a
precedential principle for more than two decades and we
are disposed to think that there is hardly any necessity
not to be guided by the said precedent. ’
(emphasis supplied)
16. Of course, in S Narahari v S R Kumar , (2023) 7 SCC 740, while
referring the question of maintainability of an SLP against an
Order against which an earlier SLP has been dismissed without
liberty to a Larger Bench, it was opined as under:
‘ 36. In simpler terms, this would essentially mean that
even in cases where the special leave petition was
dismissed as withdrawn, where no reason was assigned by
the Court while dismissing the matter and where leave was
not granted in the said special leave petition, the said
dismissal would not be considered as laying down law
within the ambit of Article 141 of the Constitution of
India.
37. If a dismissal of special leave petition by way of a
non-speaking order is not considered law under Article
141 of the Constitution of India, the same also cannot be
considered as res judicata, and therefore, in every such
dismissal, even in cases where the dismissal is by way of
a withdrawal, the remedy of filing a fresh special leave
petition would still persist. Further, if on the said
reasoning, a remedy to file a review in the High Court is

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allowed, then the same reasoning cannot arbitrarily
exclude the filing of a subsequent special leave
petition.
38. We are painfully aware of the fact that such an
interpretation, if expanded beyond the specific scope of
filing a review in the High Court is allowed, it would
open the floodgates of litigation, and would essentially
mean that every dismissal of special leave petition must
be accompanied with reasons declaring the same. ’
17. Notably, in S Narahari ( supra ), the initial SLP was withdrawn
and not dismissed. Next in sequence come the Orders dated
29.07.2024 and 13.08.2024 (where one of us, Prashant Kumar Mishra,
J., was part of the coram ) in SLP(C) Nos.17501-17502/2024 [ N. F
Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association Lumding
Division v The Union of India & Ors. ], which stand duly considered
in Satheesh V K v Federal Bank Limited , (2025) 259 Comp Cas 354. In
SLP (C) Diary No.36933/2025 [ Vasantalata Kom Vimalanand Mirjankar
Rep. by GPA Holder v Deepa Mavinkurve & Ors. ], the initial SLP had
been dismissed without liberty, after which the petitioner moved
the Karnataka High Court in review and having lost, assailed the
original judgment as also the judgment in review, which this Court
disapproved of in terms below:
‘ 7. This Court is of the opinion that reliance placed by
the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner in S.
Narahari (supra) is misplaced as in the said case,
initial SLP had been dismissed as withdrawn and not
dismissed. The judgment in Kunhayammed (supra) and Khoday
Distilleries (supra) also nowhere state that the
Petitioner is entitled to a ‘second bite at the cherry’
by filing a subsequent SLP challenging the order of the
High Court against which an SLP has already been
dismissed. The aforesaid judgments only state that a
review petition is maintainable before the High Court
after dismissal of the SLP by a non-speaking order.
8. This Court is further of the opinion that under Order
XLVII Rule 7 CPC, no appeal lies against the order passed
by the High Court dismissing the review petition. To
circumvent this provision of law, another SLP has been

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filed challenging the main judgment and order dated 30th
January, 2014 against which SLP has already been
dismissed. …
xxx
10. … This Court is of the opinion that the present SLP
against main order dated 30th January, 2014 is an abuse
of process of Court as it amounts to re-litigation and to
entertain the present SLP would amount to challenging one
of the foundation pillars of Rule of law namely finality
in litigation. Accordingly, the present SLP is
dismissed. ’
18. The clincher can be found in Satheesh V K ( supra ), where a 2-
Judge Bench has recently held:
‘ 4. Having been permitted to withdraw the special leave
petition, the appellant next approached the High Court
with a petition [R.P. No. 1294 of 2024] seeking review of
the order dated October 1, 2024. Such petition came to be
dismissed vide order dated December 5, 2024.
5. Consequent upon such dismissal, these two civil
appeals were presented by the appellant before this court
on December 12, 2024. The appeal [Civil Appeal No. 11752
of 2025] registered prior in point of time is directed
against the order dated October 1, 2024 of disposal of
the appellant's writ petition, whereas the one [Civil
Appeal No. 11753 of 2025.] subsequently registered is
directed against the dismissal of the review petition.
xxx
14. Since the question of examining the merits of the
appellant's claim would arise if the objection to the
maintainability were overcome, we proceed to examine the
maintainability aspect first.
xxx
16. The question we are tasked to decide, though of
frequent occurrence now-a-days, is not res integra. It
is, whether a special leave petition (second in the
series) would be maintainable against a judgment and
order which was earlier challenged before this court but
such challenge turned out to be abortive because the
special leave petition before this court is either (i)
withdrawn unconditionally, or (ii) dismissed on merits by
a brief order not containing reasons, or (iii) withdrawn
with liberty to apply for review but without the liberty
to approach this court once again, should the review too
fail.
xxx
19.Having noticed S. Narahari   v.   S.R. Kumar   [(2023) 7 SCC
740; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 772], a stark dissimilarity in
facts is discernible. There, the unsuccessful petitioner
at the time of dismissal of the special leave petition as

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withdrawn had prayed for and was granted leave to apply
for a review. Upon the review being dismissed, the parent
order was challenged once again. Before us, there is
something very adverse to the appellant. He having sensed
that the co-ordinate Bench was not inclined to entertain
the special leave petition, did not invite an order of
dismissal thereof on merits but went away content with
permission to withdraw. Neither permission was sought to
apply for review nor was any window kept open by this
court to permit the appellant to approach it once again
mounting a challenge to the same order. This is a plain
and simple case where the law laid down in the previous
century by a co-ordinate Bench in its decision
in Upadhyay and Co. v. State of U.P. [(1999) 1 SCC 81;
1998 SCC OnLine SC 997] would squarely apply.
xxx
21. In   Upadhyay and Co.   v.   State of U. P., it was held
thus [See page 84 of (1999) 1 SCC]:
“9. In the meanwhile, the petitioner challenged
the order of the Allahabad High Court dated May
3, 1996 by filing S.L.P. (C) No. 12673 of 1996 in
this court. But for reasons better known to the
petitioner he withdrew the special leave petition
on July 9, 1996. Thereafter, he filed an
application before the High Court for
clarification of the order dated May 3, 1996, but
the Division Bench did not find anything to be
clarified about that order and hence dismissed
the petition on October 10, 1997.
10. The present special leave petitions are filed
against the two orders of the High Court, one
dated May 3, 1996 and the other dated September
10, 1997.
11. We made a recapitulation of the events as
above for the purpose of showing that the
petitioner has absolutely no case in the present
special leave petitions. He cannot, at any rate,
now challenge the order of the High Court dated
May 3, 1996 over again having withdrawn the
special leave petition which he filed in
challenge of the same order. It is not a
permissible practice to challenge the same order
over again after withdrawing the special leave
petition without obtaining permission of the
court for withdrawing it with liberty to move for
special leave again subsequently.
12. The above principle has been incorporated as
a rule in the realm of suits. Order 23, rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure deals with withdrawal
of suit or abandonment of part of the claim. Sub-
rule (3) says that the court may in certain
contingencies grant permission to withdraw from a
suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in

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respect of the subject-matter of such suit. Sub-
rule (4) reads thus:
‘1. (4) Where the plaintiff—
(a) abandons any suit or part of a claim
under sub-rule (1), or
(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a
claim without the permission referred to
in sub-rule (3),
he shall be liable for such costs as the
court may award and shall be precluded
from instituting any fresh suit in
respect of such subject-matter or such
part of the claim.’
13. The aforesaid ban for filing a fresh suit is
based on public policy. This court has made the
said rule of public policy applicable to
jurisdiction under article 226 of the
Constitution (Sarguja Transport Service v. State
Transport Appellate Tribunal [(1987) 1 SCC 5;
1987 SCC (Cri) 19; 1986 SCC OnLine SC 233]). The
reasoning for adopting it in writ jurisdiction is
that very often it happens, when the petitioner
or his counsel finds that the court is not likely
to pass an order admitting the writ petition
after it is heard for some time, that a request
is made by the petitioner or his counsel to
permit him to withdraw it without seeking
permission to institute a fresh writ petition. A
court which is unwilling to admit the petition
would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a
fresh petition while it may just agree to permit
withdrawal of the petition. When once a writ
petition filed in a High Court is withdrawn by
the party concerned, he is precluded from filing
an appeal against the order passed in the writ
petition because he cannot be considered as a
party aggrieved by the order passed by the High
Court. If so, he cannot file a fresh petition for
the same cause once again. The following
observations of E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the
learned Chief Justice then was) are to be quoted
here:
‘[W]e are of the view that the principle
underlying rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code
should be extended in the interests of
administration of justice to cases of
withdrawal of writ petition also, not on
the ground of res judicata but on the
ground of public policy as explained
above. It would also discourage the
litigant from indulging in bench-hunting
tactics. In any event there is no
justifiable reason in such a case to

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permit a petitioner to invoke the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High
Court under article 226 of the
Constitution once again. While the
withdrawal of a writ petition filed in
the High Court without permission to file
a fresh writ petition may not bar other
remedies like a suit or a petition under
article 32 of the Constitution of India
since such withdrawal does not amount to
res judicata, the remedy under article
226 of the Constitution of India should
be deemed to have been abandoned by the
petitioner in respect of the cause of
action relied on in the writ petition
when he withdraws it without such
permission.’…
15. We have no doubt that the above rule of
public policy, for the very same reasoning,
should apply to special leave petitions filed
under article 136 of the Constitution also. Even
otherwise, the order passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court on May 3, 1998 does not warrant
interference on merits as the learned Judges of
the High Court have taken into account all the
relevant facts and come to the correct
conclusion.”
(emphasis ours)
22.Upadhyay and Co.   v.   State of U.P.  [(1999) 1 SCC 81;
1998 SCC OnLine SC 997], which
precedes   Kunhayammed   v.   State of Kerala  [(2000) 245 ITR
360 (SC); (2000) 119 STC 505 (SC); (2000) 6 SCC 359; 2000
SCC OnLine SC 1008] in point of time, is still the law
holding the field declaring in no certain terms that the
principle flowing from Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is also applicable to special leave
petitions presented before this court. Reading Upadhyay
and Co. v. State of U.P. together with Sarguja Transport
Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [(1987) 1
SCC 5; 1987 SCC (Cri) 19; 1986 SCC OnLine SC 233.] ,
which had the occasion to deal with a subsequently filed
writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of
India after unconditional withdrawal of the first writ
petition under the same article, the position in law
seems to be this-a second special leave petition would
not be maintainable at the instance of a party, who
elects not to proceed with the challenge laid by him in
an earlier special leave petition and withdraws such
petition without obtaining leave to file a fresh special
leave petition; if such party applies for a review before
the court from whose order the special leave petition was
initially carried and the review fails, then he can

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neither challenge the order rejecting the review nor the
order of which review was sought.
23. That no appeal lies from an order rejecting a
petition for review is clear from the plain language of
Order XLVII, Rule 7(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. We
need not burden this judgment by referring to any
authority on this point.
24. However, the principle underlying Order XLVII, Rule
7(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure may be understood.
Whenever a party aggrieved by a decree or order seeks a
review thereof based on parameters indicated in section
114 read with Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the application ultimately fails, the decree or order
under review does not suffer any change. It remains
intact. In such an eventuality, there is no merger of the
decree or order under review in the order of rejection of
the review because such rejection does not bring about
any alteration or modification of the decree or order;
rather, it results in an affirmance of the decree or
order. Since there is no question of any merger, the
party aggrieved by the rejection of the review petition
has to challenge the decree or order, as the case may be,
and not the order of rejection of the review petition. On
the contrary, if the petition for review is allowed and
the suit or proceedings is placed for rehearing, rule
7(1) permits the party aggrieved to immediately object to
the order allowing the review or in an appeal from the
decree or order finally passed or made in the suit, i.e.,
after rehearing of the matter in dispute.
xxx
33. Since the facts in Kunhayammed v. State of
Kerala [(2000) 245 ITR 360 (SC); (2000) 119 STC 505 (SC);
(2000) 6 SCC 359; 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1008] and Khoday
Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare
Karkhane Ltd. [(2019) 4 SCC 376; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 308]
were different, there is evidently no consideration of
the decision in Upadhyay and Co.   v.   State of U.P.  [(1999)
1 SCC 81; 1998 SCC OnLine SC 997] which clinches the
issue and assists us in drawing the conclusion we do
hereunder.
34. In so far as the order dated August 13, 2024 passed
in N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors
Association Lumding Division v. Union of India [Special
Leave Petition (C) Nos. 17501 and 17502 of 2024] is
concerned, the order records developments having taken
place subsequent to the order dated July 29, 2024 which,
in the opinion of the Bench, required a further
consideration. The order dated August 13, 2024, for such
reason, recalled the earlier order dated July 29, 2024
and issued notice on the special leave petition as well
as on the application for stay together with interim
protection. The order dated August 13, 2024 recalled the
order dated July 29, 2024 whereby hearing was adjourned

16
sine die awaiting the reference made in S.
Narahari v. S.R. Kumar [(2023) 7 SCC 740; 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 772]. No assistance can, thus, be drawn by the
appellant from such order.
35. We have no doubt that entertaining a special leave
petition in a case of the present nature would be
contrary to public policy and can even tantamount to
sitting in appeal over the previous order of this court
which has attained finality. The maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the public
good that there be an end to litigation) would apply in
all fours when it is found that proceedings challenging
an order were not carried forward by withdrawing the
special leave petition and the litigant has returned to
the same court after some time mounting a challenge to
the self-same order which was earlier under challenge and
such challenge had not been pursued. This is a course of
action which cannot be justified either in principle or
precept.
36. For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary objections
to the maintainability of the appeals raised by the
respondent succeed. ’
(emphasis supplied)
19. The relevant timeline is encapsulated as under:
(a) 15.05.2012: Single Judge of the High Court decided CWP
No.1679/2010, and issued directions, parts whereof aggrieved
both the petitioner-Bank as also respondent no.1.
(b) 03.09.2014: Division Bench of the High Court allowed
Letters Patent Appeals [2014:HHC:7460-DB] preferred
thereagainst by the petitioner-Bank (LPA No.138/2014) as also
respondent no.1 (LPA No.316/2012), and dismissed CWP
No.1679/2010 holding the same to be not maintainable.
(c) 12.08.2022: This Court restored ( only ) LPA No.316/2012 to
the file of the Division Bench for consideration in terms of
the Order extracted supra .

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(d) 26.02.2024: The High Court’s Division Bench allowed LPA
No.316/2012, setting aside the portion of the Order dated
15.05.2012 which was impugned by the respondent no.1.
(e) 23.09.2024: This Court dismissed the challenge to the
Order dated 26.02.2024.
(f) 20.12.2024: This Court dismissed an MA seeking recall of
the Order dated 23.09.2024, but granted liberty, as sought by
the applicant-petitioner, to approach the High Court in a
Review Petition.
(g) 11.04.2025: The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
Review Petition No.18/2025 [2025:HHC:10419], impugned before
us. The relevant extract therefrom reads as under:

20. Undoubtedly, only the Judgment rendered in review is impugned
herein. That said, it is evident that the afore-quoted Paragraph 10
was unnecessary, for once liberty was granted to the petitioner to
invoke review jurisdiction by this Court on 20.12.2024, the
Division Bench need not have felt inhibited by the dismissal of the

18
SLP on 23.09.2024, despite it expressly keeping the question of law
open. At first blush, this could have prompted us to go down the
route adopted by this Court in Manisha Nimesh Mehta ( supra ).
However, the difference here is that it is seen that the Division
Bench of the High Court has recorded that it did not find any
infirmity or illegality in the matter, warranting review of the
concerned Judgment dated 26.02.2024. In the extant facts, on a
holistic conspectus, the said reasoning is deemed enough to sustain
the Impugned Judgment, duly keeping in mind that the same was not
rendered in substantive writ or appellate proceedings, but only in
review jurisdiction, which is limited and circumscribed. We are
satisfied that the Impugned Judgment cannot be interdicted.
Illustratively speaking, from another lens:
1. If the petitioner-Bank had succeeded in the review, it
would not be aggrieved and therefore, there would be no
question of it again resorting to Article 136 of the
Constitution;
2. If the petitioner-Bank had succeeded in the review, the
aggrieved party would be respondent no.1, which could and
would, if it approached this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution, only assail the order/judgment passed in review,
inasmuch as the original judgment, which stood in its favour,
would cease to exist due to the order/judgment passed in
review.
21. It is also to be factored in that even we are not sitting in
appeal of or review over the Order dated 23.09.2024. Another chance

19
cannot be accorded to the petitioner to agitate its case before
this Court. Indubitably, the initial SLP was dismissed on
23.09.2024 and MA seeking recall of the dismissal was withdrawn
with liberty to prefer a review in the High Court on 20.12.2024.
The withdrawal of the MA on 20.12.2024 was without further liberty
to approach this Court once again. The review before the High Court
at the instance of the Petitioner has failed. Resultantly, the
original Judgment dated 26.02.2024 attains finality, albeit keeping
open the question(s) of law but closing the same inter-partes , as
directed vide Order dated 23.09.2024.
22. Moreover, guided by Bussa Overseas and Properties Private
Limited ( supra ), T K David ( supra ), Upadhyay and Co. v State of
Uttar Pradesh , (1999) 1 SCC 81 and Satheesh V K ( supra ), and for
reasons aforesaid, we accept the preliminary objection, adjudge the
special leave petition as not maintainable and dismiss the same in
limine .
23. Therefore, there is no doubt that a party does not require any
liberty to move in review before the High Court after dismissal
simpliciter of an SLP by a non-speaking Order of this Court.
However, if the High Court refuses to exercise review jurisdiction,
to our mind, it would not be just and proper to permit the same
party to approach this Court again, in the absence of specific
liberty having been granted by this Court. We have borne in mind
Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the
decisions of this Court, quoted hereinbefore.

20
24. On the aspect of the pending Reference adverted to above, we
need only reproduce the relevant passages from Union Territory of
Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir National Conference , 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1140, where the Court (speaking through one of us, Ahsanuddin
1
Amanullah, J.), held as under :
’ 32. … T hat apart, it is settled that mere reference to a
larger Bench does not unsettle declared law. In Harbhajan
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608, a 2-Judge
Bench said:
“15. Even if what is contended by the learned
counsel is correct, it is not for us to go into
the said question at this stage; herein cross-
examination of the witnesses had taken place. The
Court had taken into consideration the materials
available to it for the purpose of arriving at a
satisfaction that a case for exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code was
made out. Only because the correctness of a
portion of the judgment in Mohd. Shafi [(2007) 14
SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : (2007) 4 SCR
1023 : (2007) 5 Scale 611] has been doubted by
another Bench, the same would not mean that we
should wait for the decision of the larger Bench,
particularly when the same instead of assisting
the appellants runs counter to their contention.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC
321, another 2-Judge Bench indicated:
“29. As was indicated in Harbhajan Singh case
[Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 13
SCC 608 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1135], the pendency
of a reference to a larger Bench, does not mean
that all other proceedings involving the same
issue would remain stayed till a decision was
rendered in the reference. The reference made
in Gian Singh case [(2010) 15 SCC 118] need not,
therefore, detain us. Till such time as the
decisions cited at the Bar are not modified or
altered in any way, they continue to hold the
field.”
(emphasis supplied)
34. On the other hand, when it was thought proper that
other Benches of this Court, the High Courts and the
1
We have followed Union Territory of Ladakh ( supra ) in our recent judgment in
Sankar Padam Thapa v Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2194.

21
Courts/Tribunals below stay their hands, the same was
indicated in as many words, as was the case in   State of
Haryana   v.   G D Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited,   (2018)
3 SCC 585:
“9. Taking all this into consideration, we are of
the opinion that it would be appropriate if in
the interim and pending a final decision on
making a reference (if at all) to a larger Bench,
the High Courts be requested not to deal with any
cases relating to the interpretation of or
concerning Section   24   of the   Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013. The Secretary General will urgently
communicate this order to the Registrar General
of every High Court so that our request is
complied with.
10. Insofar as the cases pending in this Court
are concerned, we request the Benches concerned
dealing with similar matters to defer the hearing
until a decision is rendered one way or the other
on the issue whether the matter should be
referred to a larger Bench or not. Apart from
anything else, deferring the consideration would
avoid inconvenience to the litigating parties,
whether it is the State or individuals.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. We are seeing before us judgments and orders by High
Courts not deciding cases on the ground that the leading
judgment of this Court on this subject is either referred
to a larger Bench or a review petition relating thereto
is pending. We have also come across examples of High
Courts refusing deference to judgments of this Court on
the score that a later Coordinate Bench has doubted its
correctness. In this regard, we lay down the position in
law. We make it absolutely clear that the High Courts
will proceed to decide matters on the basis of the law as
it stands. It is not open, unless specifically directed
by this Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a
review petition, as the case may be. It is also not open
to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgment by stating
that it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In
any case, when faced with conflicting judgments by
Benches of equal strength of this Court, it is the
earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts,
as held by a 5-Judge Bench in National Insurance Company
Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. The High
Courts, of course, will do so with careful regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case before it. ’
(emphasis supplied)

22
QUALIFICATION ON FACTS:
25. At this stage and at the request of Mr. Sibal, learned senior
counsel, in the peculiar facts of the present case, we make it
clear that the liability/claims against/on the petitioner-Bank
would be limited to only 141 persons and 45 spouses of the original
writ petitioners, totalling 186. The instant direction is made in
the special facts herein, exercising powers under Article 142 of
the Constitution. We are persuaded to so direct to prevent further
litigation and this paragraph shall not constitute binding
precedent. Our statement and interpretation of the law hereinabove
is not affected.
PROCEDURAL DIRECTION(S):
26. IA No.271985/2025 is allowed; exemption from filing OT is
granted. IAs No.271983/2025 & 230737/2025 are formally allowed.
...................,J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
....................,J.
[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]
RD
03 DECEMBER, 2025
NEW DELHI