Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1938 of 2007
PETITIONER:
State of Tamil Nadu
RESPONDENT:
Seshachalam
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/09/2007
BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1938 OF 2007
[With CA Nos.1940, 1941, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947, 1949,
1950, 1952,1954, 1955, 1957, 1958 and 1960 of 2007]
J U D G M E N T
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. These appeals involving identical questions of law and fact were taken
up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Respondents herein have been working in the Secretariat of the
Government of Tamil Nadu. Each and every department in the Government
Secretariat prior to 1961 had a separate unit for appointment, promotion etc.
The State, however, amended the Special Rules in the year 1961 whereby all
the departments in the Secretariat were made the "one unit" for the purpose
of appointment and promotion. Appointments in the Secretariat at all entry
level posts, i.e., Junior Assistants (subsequently re-designated as Assistants),
Assistants (subsequently re-designated as Assistant Section Officers),
Typist/Personal Clerks were to be made from the common list of candidates
selected by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. Promotion to
different higher posts in different departments was also being made from
amongst those employees. The Government of Tamil Nadu, however, by
issuing G.O.Ms. No.1290 dated 05.06.1970 excluded the Finance and Law
Departments from the "one unit" system. Whereas posts in the cadre of
Assistants, Assistant Section Officers, Typists/Personal Clerks continued to
be filled up from the common list of candidates, but in Finance and Law
Departments, further promotions were effected from amongst the employees
allotted thereto only. Appointments to Finance Department, however, were
made at random and probably in terms of the option exercised by any
particular candidate. Many persons, who have, thus, been ranking higher
were employed in "one unit" departments whereas some of the candidates
ranking lower were employed under fortuitous circumstances in the Finance
Department. The employees working in the Finance Department, therefore,
obtained promotions much ahead of their peers or even seniors who were
discharging their duties in other departments coming within the "one unit".
3. G.O.Ms. No.3288 (Public Services Department) was thereafter issued
on 29.10.1971 specifying Finance and Law Departments as separate units
from the level of Superintendent (Section Officer) and above. Admittedly,
however, Rule 4 of the Special Rules of the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service
was amended in that behalf. The said policy, however, is said to have been
implemented. Two employees, S. Kalaiselvan and S. Sivasubramanian, filed
an Original Application before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in
the year 1990 claiming promotion and scale of pay at par with those who
were working in the Finance Department and who were said to be juniors to
them but had been promoted to higher posts in Finance Department. The
said Original Application was allowed by the Tribunal by an order dated
16.4.1993 opining that there existed no guidelines to allot any employee to
the Finance Department, vis-‘-vis, other departments and, thus, the
employees working in other departments could not have been deprived of
the benefit of promotion. It was furthermore pointed out that even Rule 4 of
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the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service had not been
amended by the said GOMs No.1290 dated 05.06.1970.
4. The Government of Tamil Nadu thereafter amended the Service Rules
with retrospective effect from 05.06.1970 by issuing G.O.Ms. No.30
Personnel and Administrative Reforms (D) Department dated 28.1.1994.
Upon issuance of the said Government Order, an application for review was
filed but the same was dismissed by the Tribunal by an order dated
30.1.1995. The Government was thereafter advised to implement the order
of the Tribunal by giving promotion to the concerned employees with
retrospective effect from the date on which their juniors had been promoted
as Assistant Section Officers in the Finance Department. Sanction was also
accorded for creation of two supernumerary posts, namely, posts of
Assistant Section Officers in the respective departments. Several
representations thereafter were made by persons said to be similarly situated
claiming promotion and parity in the scale of pay as compared to their
counterparts in the Finance Department. A large number of Original
Applications were also filed before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal.
Upon consideration of various pros and cons, the Government of Tamil
Nadu issued a GOM bearing No.126 dated 29.5.1998, relevant paragraphs
whereof read as under :
"10. The Government accordingly direct that :-
(i) the pay of the seniors in One Unit who have
been recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat
Service on or before 28.1.1994, shall be
stepped up on par with their juniors in the
Finance unit by upgrading the posts held by
them to the Scale of pay applicable to the
juniors with immediate effect.
(ii) The stepping up of their pay on par with the
juniors in the Finance Unit by upgrading the
posts held by them to the scale of pay
applicable to the junior ordered in sub-para
(1) above is purely a person-oriented
upgradation and no new posts will be
created for this purpose.
(iii) The upgradation sanctioned for the seniors
will lapse in the event of the retirement of
the individuals concerned or their promotion
to the upgraded post in their normal turn.
(iv) The pay of the other seniors in the One Unit
in the same cadre will be stepped up on par
with immediate juniors in the Finance Unit,
with effect from the date of issue of this
order.
(v) In respect of the Typists/Personal
Clerks/Personal Assistants, in One Unit who
have not relinquished their right for
promotion as Assistant Section Officer, and
are still awaiting their turn for promotion as
Assistant Section Officer, their pay shall be
upgraded to Assistant Section Officer scale
on par with their immediate junior in the
Finance Unit who got his promotion as
Assistant Section Officer.
11. The benefits of upgradation of pay of the
seniors on par with their juniors as per
Commission’s Seniority list ordered in sub-paras
(i) to (iv) of Para 10 above, shall also be extended
to those seniors in the Finance Unit who were
recruited before 28.1.1994 and or drawing less pay
than their juniors in One Unit.
12. The upgradation ordered above is subject to
the following terms and conditions :
(1) The upgradation ordered will involve only
stepping up of pay of the senior on par with
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his junior in the upgraded scale of pay.
(2) It does not entitle him to any claim for
arrears of pay.
XXX XXX XXX
These orders shall come into force with effect from
the date of issue of the orders.
13 ...
14. The Departments of Secretariat concerned
shall issue necessary orders for upgradation of
posts and for stepping-up of the pay of the Seniors
in One Unit in the upgraded scales ordered in para
10 above, after obtaining necessary individual
undertaking in the format enclosed from the
seniors concerned to the effect that they accept the
terms and conditions of this order."
5. The said Government Order further stipulated that undertaking should
be given by the seniors getting upgradation of their pay with their juniors in
the Finance Department in the format enclosed to the effect that they accept
the terms and conditions thereto. Respondents before us, save and except
R. Ragothaman in CA No.1955 of 2007 indisputably had retired much prior
to issuance of the said Government Order dated 29.5.1998. They also made
representations before the appellant demanding fixation of their pay at par
with their juniors in the Finance Department. As the said request was not
acceded to, a large number of original applications were filed before the
Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. By a common judgment pronounced
on 20.1.2004, the Tribunal dismissed the said applications opining that the
same were barred by limitation. It was held that the applicants having
retired long back and having filed applications between 1998 to 2003 and
the promoters having retired as Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and
Joint Secretaries and in some cases as Additional Secretaries, they should
have raised the dispute long back when their juniors had been given
promotions in the Finance Department and as the original applications were
filed after 20 years, the same could not be entertained.
6. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, respondents filed writ
petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. By reason of the
impugned judgment dated 21.4.2006, a Division Bench of the High Court,
inter alia, held that the cause of action for filing the original application
arose only upon issuance of GOMS No.126 dated 29.5.1998 and in that view
of the matter it cannot be said that the original applications filed by the
respondents suffered from delay and latches and/or otherwise barred by
limitation as GOMS No.126 applied also in respect of those who had retired
before 29.5.1998. It was also opined that the respondents who had not been
in service on or before 28.1.1994 came within the scope and ambit of the
said GOMs. Although GOMs 126 provided for operation with prospective
effect and by reason thereof past benefits were not made available, the same
should be construed in consonance with the provisions contained in Article
14 of the Constitution of India, holding :
"There is no specific clause in G.O.Ms. No.126
excluding the applicability of this G.O. to the
persons who had retired before 29.5.1998. The
G.O. itself recites that the Government wanted to
provide a solution to the long standing problem
and had decided to take a sympathetic view to
effect lasting and equitable solution to the long
standing issue so as to redress the grievances of the
seniors in the One Unit by upgrading the pay of the
seniors in One Unit on par with their immediate
juniors in the Finance Unit.
Keeping in view the explicit intention of the
Government, it is apparent that the G.O. had been
issued as a beneficial measure and the provisions
in such G.O. are to be liberally construed so as to
benefit the employees for whose benefit the G.O.
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was avowedly issued. It is not disputed that the
petitioners were in service on and before 28.1.1994
and therefore, they fall within the scope and ambit
of the impugned G.O. Once they are covered
under the said G.O., the benefit of the said G.O.
will flow automatically."
It was further held that the said Government Order applied not only to
the existing staff but also to the retired employees and as such a beneficial
interpretation to the said Government Order should be given as the said
provisions have to be read in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution
of India.
7. Mr. M.S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants, would submit that the High Court committed a serious error in
passing the impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take into
consideration that :
(i) no explanation was offered by the respondents for not preferring there
claim petitions prior to or immediately after the announcement of the
order dated 16.04.1993;
(ii) the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the finding
of fact arrived at by the Tribunal;
(iii) doctrine of legitimate expectation does not postulate conferment of
any right which has been lost for any reason whatsoever; and
(iv) as in terms of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, no employee
has any fundamental right of promotion, upgradation, allocation of
any particular department or to receive any benefit after
superannuation the impugned judgment is unsustainable.
8. Mr. Venkataramani, Dr. A.E. Chelliah, senior counsel appearing on
behalf of respondents and caveator-in-person on the other hand contended
that :
(i) from the perusal of the order of Tribunal dated 16.04.1993, it would
appear that observations made therein were not confined only to the
two employees who had filed the original application but covered the
cases of all others similarly situated;
(ii) having regard to the fact that the State was required to respond
comprehensively to the said observations and that the review
application filed by the State in view of the said order has been
dismissed, before issuing the GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998, the
State must be held to have considered the ground realities as also the
plight of those employees who had suffered discrimination,
irrespective of the fact as to whether they were in service or had
retired.
(iii) GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998 must be given effect to for stepping
up the scale of pay of the employees to bring them at par with their
juniors in the Finance Department with the object of treating all the
employees equally;
(iv) no new right having been created by GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998,
any mini classification or micro classification would offend Article 14
of the Constitution of India as there was no rational object behind the
same and it is not possible to segregate the cases of the employees in
service vis-‘-vis the retired employees.
9. The employees of the Finance and Law Departments were being
treated differently from a long time. The respondents herein never
questioned the purported different treatment meted out to them by the State
either by making representations or by filing any application before the
Central Administrative Tribunal. Only two of the employees did. Their
applications were allowed, inter alia, on the premise that posting of
employees in the Finance and Law Departments took place by way of
fortuitous circumstances and were not supported by any rationality. The
State, we have noticed hereinbefore, amended the Rules with retrospective
effect. The said Rule is still in force. Validity of the said Rule has not been
questioned by the respondents. Different treatments meted out to the
employees of the Finance and Law Departments vis-‘-vis other department
is now covered by Rules, but despite the same, the State intended to assuage
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the feelings of the employees by issuance of the said GOMs No.126 dated
29.5.1998. The said notification was issued upon considering various
factors including pendency of a large number of matters before the
Administrative Tribunal on the said issue. The State intended to lay down a
policy for providing financial benefits with prospective effect. Various pros
and cons therefor were examined. Avenues available to the State were taken
to into consideration. Only thereafter it was directed :
"The Government, after careful consideration of
all these points and also the related issues
involved, have decided to take a sympathetic view
and attempt a lasting and equitable solution to this
long standing issue, so as to redress the grievances
of the seniors in the One Unit, by upgrading the
pay of the seniors in One Unit on par with their
immediate juniors in the Finance Unit."
10. It is one thing to say that the State had come up with a policy decision
which is beneficial to all the employees irrespective of the fact as to whether
they had reached the age of superannuation or not, the only criteria being
that they were recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service on or before
28.1.1994 but it is another thing to say that the claim petitions filed by the
responders were based on the success of their colleagues before the
Administrative Tribunal in the year 1994. The employees working in the
Finance Department had been promoted long back. We have noticed
hereinbefore that some of them retired as Additional Secretaries whereas the
respondents retired as merely Assistants. Presumably, promotions to the
employees of the Finance Department were given systematically over a long
period of time but no such grievance was made nor any application was filed
before the appropriate forum. Such grievance, in our opinion, should have
been raised or proper application before the Tribunal should have been filed
long long back. It was in the aforementioned situation, the Tribunal was of
the opinion that their applications were barred by limitation. Assuming that
the cause of action for filing such applications arose in view of the
observations made by the Tribunal in its order dated 16.4.1993 passed in
Original Application No.166 of 1990, but then in terms of the Act and the
Rules, the respondents were required to file a proper application within a
period of one year only. It is borne out from the records that, in fact, 62
such applications were already pending when GOMs No.126 was issued.
11. Some of the respondents might have filed representations but filing of
representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or
latches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay
and/or latches on the part of a Government servant may deprive him of the
benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of
India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known
that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant. Opinion of the
High Court that GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998 gave a fresh lease of life
having regard to the legitimate expectation, in our opinion, is based on a
wrong premise. Legitimate expectation is a part of the principles of natural
justice. No fresh right can be created by invoking the doctrine of legitimate
expectation. By reason thereof only the existing right is saved subject, of
course, to the provisions of the statute. {See State of Himachal Pradesh &
Anr. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan & Ors. [1992 Supp.(2) SCC 351]}.
12. We may notice that in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy
& Ors. [(2004) 1 SCC 347], this Court held :
"The respondents furthermore are not even entitled
to any relief on the ground of gross delay and
laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The
first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976
wherein the respondents herein approached the
High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not
only two writ petitions had been decided but one
way or the other, even the matter had been
considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra).
The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states,
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should be a ground for denying the relief to the
other persons similarly situated would operate
against the respondents. Furthermore, the other
employees not being before this Court although
they are ventilating their grievances before
appropriate courts of law no order should be
passed which would prejudice their cause. In such
a situation, we are not prepared to make any
observation only for the purpose of grant of some
relief to the respondents to which they are not
legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom
who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court
of law."
See also Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh & Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh &
Ors. [2007 (4) SCALE 204].
Only because a cut off date has been fixed, the same per se cannot be
said to be arbitrary as some date is required to be fixed for that purpose.
Recently, this Court in K.S. Krishnaswamy etc. v. Union of India &
Anr. [2006 (12) SCALE 307] held :
"Nakara’s case (supra) was a case of revision of
pensionary benefits and classification of
pensioners into two groups by drawing a cut off
line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to
employees retiring on or after the cut- off date. The
criterion made applicable was "being in service
and retiring subsequent to the specified date". This
Court held that for being eligible for liberalised
pension scheme, application of such a criterion is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it was
both arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. It was
further held that the employees who retired prior to
a specified date, and those who retired thereafter
formed one class of pensioners. The attempt to
classify them into separate classes/groups for the
purpose of pensionary benefits was not founded on
any intelligible differentia, which had a rational
nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The
facts of Nakara’s case (supra) are not available in
the facts of the present case. In other words, the
facts in Nakara’s case are clearly distinguishable."
13. In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.
[(2005) 1 SCC 625], a Division Bench of this Court, as regards applicability
of doctrine of promissory estoppel, opined :
"In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory
estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must
be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking
the doctrine and bald expressions without any
supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is
attracted because the party invoking the doctrine
has altered its position relying on the assurance of
the Government would not be sufficient to press
into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to
consider all aspects including the results sought to
be achieved and the public good at large, because
while considering the applicability of the doctrine,
the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental
principles of equity must for ever be present in the
mind of the Court.
20. In Shrijee Sales Coporation and Anr. v. Union
of India (1997 (3) SCC 398) it was observed that
once public interest is accepted as the superior
equity which can override individual equity the
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principle would be applicable even in cases where
a period has been indicated for operation of the
promise. If there is a supervening public equity,
the Government would be allowed to change its
stand and has the power to withdraw from
representation made by it which induced persons
to take certain steps which may have gone adverse
to the interest of such persons on account of such
withdrawal. Moreover, the Government is
competent to rescind from the promise even if
there is no manifest public interest involved,
provided no one is put in any adverse situation
which cannot be rectified. Similar view was
expressed in Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd.
Meerut etc. etc. v. P.P. State Electricity Board and
Ors. (AIR 1997 SC 3810 ) and in Sales Tax officer
and Anr. v. Shree Durga Oil Mills and Anr. (1998
(1) SCC 573) and it was further held that the
Government could change its industrial policy if
the situation so warranted and merely because the
resolution was announced for a particular period, it
did not mean that the government could not amend
and change the policy under any circumstances. If
the party claiming application of the doctrine acted
on the basis of a notification it should have known
that such notification was liable to be amended or
rescinded at any point of time, if the government
felt that it was necessary to do so in public
interest."
{See also Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity
Inspector and E.T.I.O. and Ors. [(2007) 5 SCC 447]
14. Interpretation of GOMS No.126 would, no doubt, depend upon the
backdrop of the events in which it was made but it is trite that the intention
of the maker of the policy must be drawn from the language used therein.
For the said purpose, the entire document should be read in its entirety.
Original Application No.166 of 1990 was filed by two serving employees.
The State could in obedience to the Tribunal’s order create two
supplementary posts and promote them thereto so as to treat them at par with
their juniors working in the Finance Department. The Notification envisages
a personal pay by way of stepping up of pay. It was given the prospective
effect. No arrear of pay was to be paid. The upgradation sanctioned was to
lapse in the event of retirement of the individuals or their promotion to the
upgraded post. The said upgradation were to be subject to the terms and
conditions contained in clause 12 of the said order, a reading whereof would
clearly, in our opinion, lead to only one conclusion that it was meant to be
applied to the existing employees. By reason thereof, on upgradation, the
seniors were required to continue to perform the duties attached to the
existing post till they get their normal promotion to the next higher category.
Upgradation of their posts was further dependant on the fact as to whether
they had been promoted in their normal course only. It was meant to be a
one time affair. In respect of some categories of employees, the question of
upgradation was deferred as specified in paragraph 12(6).
15. It would, in our opinion, therefore, be incorrect to construe that the
notification applied to all who had been recruited to the Tamil Nadu
Secretariat Service on or before 28.1.1994. Additional benefits have been
accorded by reason of the said notification. A person who fulfills the
conditions, thus, would be entitled to the benefits provided for therein.
Those who had not fulfilled the same could not claim any benefit thereunder.
For the said purpose, the Court, in our view, should not give a strained or
extended meaning thereto. While construing such a notification, the
financial impact thereof is also required to be taken into consideration. {See
State of A.P. & Anr. v. A.P. Pensioners’ Association & Ors. [(2005) 13 SCC
161] and Union of India & Anr. v. Manik Lal Banerjee [(2006) 9 SCC
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643]}.
16. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on R.L. Marwaha v. Union of
India & Ors. [(1987) 4 SCC 31] is misplaced. This Court in the said
decision was considering validity of a subordinate legislation whereby
retrospective effect was granted. It was not a case where pensionary benefit
was granted to a class of employees. The benefit was meant to be accorded
to the existing employees only.
17. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Venkataramani on the following
passage of The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [(1952) 3 SCR
284] :
"The learned Attorney-General, appearing in
support of these appeals, however, contends that
while a reasonable classification of the kind
mentioned above may be a test of the validity of a
particular piece of legislation, it may not be the
only test which will cover all cases and that there
may be other tests also. In answer to the query of
the Court he formulates an alternative test in the
following words : If there is in fact inequality of
treatment and such inequality is not made with a
special intention of prejudicing any particular
person or persons but is made in the general
interest of administration, there is no infringement
of article 14. It is at once obvious that, according
to the test thus formulated, the validity of State
action, legislative or executive, is made entirely
dependent on the state of mind of the authority.
This test will permit even flagrantly discriminatory
State action on the specious plea of good faith and
of the subjective view of the executive authority as
to the existence of a supposed general interest of
administration. This test, if accepted, will amount
to adding at the end of article 14 the words "except
in good faith and in the general interest of
administration." This is clearly not permissible for
the Court to do. Further, it is obvious that the
addition of these words will, in the language of
Brewer, J., in Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. W. H. Ellis (165 U.S. 150), make
the protecting clause a mere rope of sand, in no
manner restraining State action. I am not,
therefore, prepared to accept the proposition
propounded by the learned Attorney-General,
unsupported as it is by any judicial decision, as a
sound test for determining the validity of State
action."
This Court therein was dealing with the provisions of the West Bengal
Special Courts Act. The said decision, in our opinion, has no application
with the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly, when in the said
decision itself, it has been pointed out that Article 14 does not insist that
every piece of legislation must have universal application and it does not
take away from the State the power to classify person for the purpose of
legislation.
18. As to what, therefore, is necessary for this purpose is that
classification must be rational and in order to pass the test : (1) the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and (2) the
differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the Act.
19. Equally misplaced is the decision of this Court in The State of Jammu
& Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors. [(1974) 1 SCC 19], wherein
this Court, inter alia, held that educational qualification can be held to be a
criteria for valid classification for different scales of pay. Justice V.R.
Krishna Iyer, held :
"The social meaning of Articles 14 to 16 is neither
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dull uniformity nor specious ’talentism’. It is a
process of producing quality out of larger areas of
equality extending better facilities to the latent
capabilities of the lowly. It is not a methodology of
substitution of pervasive and slovenly mediocrity
for activist and intelligent-but not snobbish and
uncommitted-cadres. However, if the State uses
classification casuistically for salvaging status and
elitism, the point of no return is reached for
Articles 14 to 16 and the Courts jurisdiction
awakens to dadden such manoeuvres. The soul of
Article 16 is the promotion of the common man’s
capabilities, over-powering environmental
adversities and opening up full opportunities to
develop in official life without succumbing to the
sophistic argument of the elite that talent is the
privilege of the few and they must rule, wriggling
out of the democratic imperative of Articles 14 and
16 by the theory of classified equality which at its
worst degenerates into class domination."
20. Reference has also been made by Mr. Venkataramani to a decision of
this Court in U.P. Raghavendra Acharya & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.
[2006 (6) SCALE 23] wherein it was held that pension is not a bounty and it
is a deferred salary. This Court is not concerned herein with such a
situation. In the said decision, this Court was concerned with a case where
an employee retiring on a particular date was to receive 50% of the pension
on the enhanced salary. In the fact situation obtaining therein that as the
revision of pay and consequent revision in pension had come into force and
by reason of a notification, the modality of computing the pension was
required to be determined, those who had fulfilled the conditions laid down
therein were held to be entitled to the benefits provided for thereunder
holding that the concerned employees had a vested right therein.
21. For the reasons aforementioned, we regret to express our inability to
agree with the view of the High Court. The impugned order of the High
Court is, therefore, set aside. The appeals are allowed. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no orders as to costs.