MADHAV vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 18-08-2021

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ture1<br>REPORTABLE<br>IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<br>CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION<br>Criminal Appeal No. 852 of 2021<br>(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2345 of 2019)<br>MADHAV ... APPELLANT(S)<br>Versus<br>STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ... RESPONDENT(S)<br>WITH<br>Criminal Appeal No. 853 of 2021<br>(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9326 of 2018)<br>J U D G M E N T<br>V. Ramasubramanian, J.<br>Leave granted.<br>2. Challenging their conviction for the offence punishable<br>Not Verified<br>igned by under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal<br>UMAR<br>1.08.18<br>IST<br>Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short) and the sentence of life
lly s<br>L K<br>202<br>:07<br>on:
2 imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2500/­ imposed upon them by st the I  Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar, M.P., and confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur,   Accused   Nos.2   and   3   have   come   up   with   these criminal appeals. 3. We have heard Mr. Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad and Mr.   Amit   Arjariya,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the appellants and Shri S.U. Lalit, learned counsel appearing for the State. 4. Smt. Sahodra Bai ( hereinafter referred to as “A­2” ), who is the   appellant   in   one   of   these   appeals,   is   the   sister   of Shri   Madhav   ( hereinafter   referred   to   as   “A­3 ”)   who   is   the appellant   in   the   other   appeal.   Shri   Raju   Yadav   who   was Accused No.1 is the husband of Sahodra Bai.  5. The   case   of  the   prosecution  was  that  on  the   night of 13.05.2008,   at  about  22.30   hrs.,  all  the   three   accused, in furtherance   of   the   common   intention   of   all,   attacked   one Pappu  Nand Kishore (brother of A­1) with a knife and  lathis resulting in his death and that, thereafter, with the intention 3 of screening the offenders from legal punishment, A­2 took the victim   to   the   Government   Hospital   and   sent   a   false information to the Police as though the murderous assault on the victim was committed by two other persons by name Ruia and   Kailash.   While   all  the  three   accused  were   charged for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, A­2 was charged additionally for the offences punishable under Sections 211 and 194 IPC. 6. The prosecution mainly relied upon   the purported eye­ (i) witness  account  of   PWs  4,  5,  6,  7  and   9,   (ii)   the  medical evidence regarding the cause of death; and   the recovery of (iii) the weapons used for the commission of the offence namely, knife   and   lathis ,   from   the   houses   of   the   accused   and   the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory  ”  ). (“FSL for short 7. Out of the witnesses on whose ocular testimony, heavy reliance was placed by the prosecution, PWs 6 and 7 were the persons whom A­2 had named as the accused, in the first information sent from the hospital on the night of 13.05.2008. PWs   4   and   5   were   related   to   PWs   6   and   7.   Actually   the 4 prosecution treated PWs 4 and 5 as hostile, after they stated during chief examination that they did not see A­3 at the spot, which   was   contrary   to   their   statement   to   the   Police.   The Sessions Court believed their testimony partly in so far as it related   to   the   presence   of   A­1   and   A­2   at   the   spot   but disbelieved their evidence, in so far as it related to the alleged assault on the victim. But the High Court proceeded on the footing, without any rhyme or reason, as though PWs 4 and 5 were independent witnesses who corroborated the testimony of PW­9. The High Court even overlooked the fact that the Trial Court   declared   them   as   hostile   at   the   request   of   the prosecution.  8. PW­6 was a person by name Kailash Yadav and PW­7 was a   person   by   name   Ruia   Yadav.   As   stated   in   the   previous paragraph, PWs 6 and 7 were the ones who were named as accused, in the First Information Report FIR No.331 of 2008 registered on 13.05.2008, on the basis of the intimation sent by A­2 from the hospital. The Sessions Court disbelieved the evidence of PW­6 in entirety, but accepted one portion of the 5 statement of PW­7, on the basis of the so called corroboration by one Smt. Radha Rani, mother of the deceased, examined on the   side   of   the   defence   as   DW­1.   But   that   portion   of   the evidence of PW­7 taken by the Sessions Court to be probable, merely related to an argument that the victim Pappu had with his brother Raju (A­1) nearly two hours before the time of occurrence of the crime. Interestingly the argument between the   deceased   and   A­1   was   purportedly   in   relation   to   an amount of Rs.250/­ borrowed by the deceased from PW­7, but not repaid by him. 9. The Sessions Court considered Sapna Yadav, examined as PW­9, who was aged 16 years at the time of occurrence, as the star witness. She was the niece of the deceased. Though her statement was recorded by the Police only on 03.06.2008, after 21 days of the date of occurrence, the Sessions Court proceeded to believe her evidence and convicted all the three accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with   Section   34   IPC.     However,   A­2   was   acquitted   of   the charges under Sections 211 and 194 IPC. All of them were 6 sentenced   to  life   imprisonment  and  also  imposed   a  fine of Rs.2500/­. 10. A­1   and   A­2   being   husband   and   wife   respectively, together filed an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.1323 of 2009 and A­3 filed a separate appeal in Criminal Appeal No.727 of 2009,   on   the   file   of   the   High   Court,   challenging   their conviction and sentence. Relying mainly upon the testimony of the star witness PW­9 and the medical evidence regarding the cause of death, the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence   and   dismissed   the   appeals.   Aggrieved   by   the dismissal of their appeals, A­2 and A­3 alone have come up with   the   above   criminal   appeals.   However,   A­1   has   been arrayed as Respondent No.2, in the appeal filed by A­2. 11. Drawing our attention to the inherent contradictions in the   testimonies   of   PWs   9   and   14,   and   the   glaring inconsistencies between their testimonies, the learned counsel for   the   appellants   argued   that   the   conviction   was   based entirely upon surmises and that such a conviction is wholly unsustainable in law.  7 12. However, placing reliance upon the seizure of the knife and     allegedly used for the commission of the offence, lathis from the houses of the accused under seizure memos and the report received from FSL, it was argued by the learned counsel representing the State that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that the Sessions Court and the High Court were justified in relying upon the evidence of PW­9 and others.   13. We have carefully considered the material on record and the submissions of the learned counsel on both sides. 14. A close scrutiny of the sequence of events that happened from the date of occurrence of the crime,  namely,  13.05.2008, would   show   that   the   investigation   in   this   case,   instead   of proceeding in pursuit of truth, had proceeded towards burying the   truth.   This   can   be   best   appreciated   by   narrating   the sequence of events as under:­ (a)  Admittedly, an information was received by one Shri G.P. Dwivedi working as Assistant Sub­inspector in Moti Nagar Police Station, Sagar District at about 23.00   hrs.   on   13.05.2008   from   the   Government 8 Hospital (Tili) about a person having been brought dead. The information had been sent at the instance of A­2, who had taken the body of the victim in an auto rickshaw to the hospital. This Assistant Sub Inspector   was   examined   as   PW­12.   According   to PW­12, a FIR was registered in FIR No.331 of 2008 at 23.50 hrs. showing the name of the complainant as Smt. Sahodra Bai (A­2) and showing Ruia Yadav and Kailash Yadav (later examined as PWs 6 and 7) as the accused. (b) Admittedly   the   investigation   was   taken   over   by another Assistant Sub­inspector by name R.K. Sen, examined as PW­14. According to him, he started the   investigation   in   the   morning   of   14.05.2008. Therefore, in the normal course, one would have expected the investigation first to proceed against Ruia Yadav and Kailash Yadav, who were named as accused. But interestingly right from the beginning, the investigation carried out by PW­14 proceeded in the reverse gear, by making the informant,  namely, Sahodra   Bai   and   her   husband   and   brother   as accused and the original accused Ruia and Kailash as   witnesses.   One   would   have   expected   an Investigating Officer, who takes up investigation in the   morning   of   14.05.2008,   in   relation   to   a  FIR 9 registered   at   23.50   hours   the   previous   night,  to record the statements of the informant, visit the place   of   commission   of   the   crime,   secure   the accused and collect evidence to find out the truth. But in this case, the IO, right from the beginning, had turned the case entirely against the informant and her family. The reason for the IO doing this, is not far to seek.  (c)       During   cross­examination,   PW­14   admitted   that there were demonstrations by political parties when the   investigation   was   taken   up   by   him   on 14.05.2008   against   Ruia   and   Kailash.   This   is perhaps why, the IO first took A­1 to the Medical Officer (examined as PW­2) of the District Hospital for medical examination on 15.05.2008 and got a report   to   the   effect   that   there   were   several abrasions on the back of A­1. On the basis of such a   report,   the   IO   concluded   that   these   abrasions must have been caused during the scuffle that the deceased had with A­1. (c) After   obtaining   the   medical   report   about   the injuries on the body of A­1 on 15­5­2008, PW­12 admittedly called all the three accused to the police station in the morning of 16.05.2008 and effected their arrest. In other words, within three days of 10 the  commission of  the  crime,  persons  named as accused in the FIR were made witnesses for the prosecution and the informant, her husband and her brother were made as accused. (d) It is only after 18 days of effecting the arrest of all the three accused, that the statement of PW­9, the so called star witness, was recorded by the IO. 15. It is quite strange and  completely unfathomable as to how, where, why and at what point of time, the investigation that should have started against PWs 6 and 7 took a U­turn and   proceeded   towards   the   very   informant   and   her   family members. Right from the beginning, the defence taken by the accused was that due to political influence, they were made accused and the actual accused were made witnesses. This stands corroborated by the admission made by PW­14 (IO) that when he took up the investigation on 14.05.2008, there were demonstrations held by political parties. 16. What is shocking is the admission made by PW­14 during cross­examination that he was not aware, at the time when he started   the   investigation   (in   the   morning   of   14.05.2008), whether  the  accused  named  in the  FIR,   namely ,  Ruia and 11 Kailash Yadav (later examined as PWs 6 and 7) were in police custody. But he admitted that after he took up investigation in the morning of 14.05.2008, he did not arrest both of them. 17. The reason why the IO did not even suspect the role of Ruia   and   Kailash   Yadav   in   the   commission   of   the   crime, remains  unexplained. We  are  conscious  of the  fact that at times persons who commit a crime, themselves make/lodge the first information, so as to create an  alibi  of innocence. But even in such cases the investigation would normally proceed first   against   those   named   as   accused   in   the   FIR   and, thereafter,   the   needle   of   suspicion   may   turn   against   the informant himself. 18. A  useful  reference  can   be   made  in   this   regard   to  the decision of this Court in  Kari Choudhary  vs.  Mst. Sita Devi 1 & Ors . . It was a case where the mother­in­law of the victim first filed a complaint of culpable homicide against unknown persons,   who,   allegedly   sneaked   into   the   bedroom   of   her daughter­in­law and murdered her. During the progress of the 1  (2002) 1 SCC 714 12 investigation   into   the   FIR   registered   on   the   basis   of   the mother­in­law’s complaint, the Police found that the murder was committed pursuant to a conspiracy hatched by the first informant   and   her   other   daughters­in­law.   Therefore,   the Police   sent   a   report   to   the   Court   to   the   effect   that   the allegations in the FIR registered at the behest of the mother­ in­law were false. The Police thereafter registered a fresh FIR and continued the investigation against the original informant and   others.   The   original   informant   filed   a   protest   petition against the Report of the Police on the first FIR, but the same was rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate ( “CJM”for short ). However, the said order was over­turned by the High Court in a revision and the CJM was directed to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code. Thereafter, the Police filed a charge­sheet   against   the   original   informant   (mother­in­law) and two others. The CJM committed the case to Sessions and the Sessions Judge framed a charge for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 but the mother­in­law approached the High Court and got the proceedings quashed. 13 That order became the subject matter of appeal before this Court in   (supra). The main contention of the Kari Choudhary original informant in that case was that once the order of the CJM rejecting the protest petition was set aside by the High Court, the logical consequence of such an order was that the conclusion reached by the Police that the original complaint was false, also stood rejected. Therefore, it was contended that there cannot be another prosecution and that too against the original informant. While rejecting the said contention, this Court held that the course adopted by the Court on the first complaint cannot disable the Police to continue to investigate into the offence and to reach a final conclusion regarding the real culprit. Yet another contention before this Court in  Kari Choudhary   (supra) was that once the proceedings initiated under the first FIR ended in a final report, the Police had no authority to register a second FIR.  While dealing with the said contention, this Court opined;  Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in 14 respect   of   the   same   episode,   they  would   normally   take   the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them…” 
19.Therefore, it happens at times that the real culprit lodges
the first information against known or unknown persons, to misdirect the investigation of an offence. But even in such a case, it is only during the course of investigation into the first FIR   that   the   case   may   take   a   U­turn.   When   it   does,   the informant may also have to face additional charges for the offences punishable under various provisions of Chapter XI of IPC.   This   is   exactly   the   reason   why,   in   this   case,   the prosecution  charged   A­2  for  the   offences  punishable   under Sections 194 and 211 IPC. But the Trial Court acquitted her of the charges under these two provisions. 20. As stated earlier, when a question was put to him as to whether Ruia and Kailash Yadav (PWs 6 and 7), who were the original accused, were ever taken into custody, the IO (PW­14) feigned ignorance. The answer given by the IO is as follows:­ “It was not in my knowledge that when I started investigation at that time Ruia and Kailash Yadav 15 were   in   the   custody   of   the   police.   On   having knowledge   about   this   information   that   case   is registered against Ruia and Kailash, I have not tried to arrest them.”  But interestingly, the star witness for the prosecution,  namely , PW­9, who was admittedly just 16 years of age at the time of occurrence, not only claimed knowledge about their arrest, but also revealed what happened thereafter. The testimony of PW­ 9 in this regard reads as follows:­ “It is true that after death of my Mausa Pappu, Police had taken into custody Rooiya and Kailash for murder. It is not known to me that where my Mausa was living who is leader there. It is true that for taking into custody of Rooiya and Kailash there   was   strike   in   Mohalla.   Persons   of   Yadav caste assembled. It is true that persons of Yadav caste put pressure on police and leaving Rooiya and Kailash on that day soil of my Mausa came.”  21. Unfortunately neither the Trial Court nor the High Court took note of the above admission on the part of PW­9 in the context of the admission made by the IO as PW­14. 22. That the case was foisted against the very informant and their family members due to political pressure is also borne out by  another  admission made  by PW­14  which  reads as follows: 16 “I was given verbal instructions by higher police officers that Kailash Yadav, Rooiya @ Bhagirath Yadav   be   impleaded   as   witnesses   instead   of accused. When I have started the investigation at that   time   Additional   Superintendent   of   Police Tilak   Singh   has   given   me   verbal   order   that Kailash   &   Rooiya   be   impleaded   as   witnesses instead   of   accused.   In   my   diary   I   have   not mentioned about that order. In this case during the course of investigation accused was having bad relation with deceased this fact has not come on record.”  23. According   to   the   IO,   the   knife   used   by   A­1   for   the commission of the offence was seized from the house of A­1. Similarly the     used for the commission of the offence lathis were also seized from the houses of A­2 and A­3.  Seizure was effected, according to the IO, in the presence of witnesses and seizure memos prepared. But those witnesses Dal Chandra and Deen Dayal did not support the prosecution. Dal Chandra was examined as PW­1 and he stated categorically  that in (i)  his presence no enquiry was conducted from the accused;  and (ii)   that   in   his   presence   no   weapons   were   seized   from   the accused. However, he admitted his signatures in the seizure memos. He explained this by stating that he signed the seizure memo and memorandum statement outside the hotel situate 17 near the police station. Even after he was declared hostile, he reiterated in response to the questions posed by the Additional Public Prosecutor that seizure of the weapons was not effected in   his   presence.   Yet   the   High   Court   gave   credence   to   the testimony of PW­1 merely on the ground that he admitted the signatures in the seizure memo and memorandum statement. 24. The fact that right from the beginning, the IO proceeded to favour those two persons originally named as accused in the FIR, is also borne out by the statement made by him in chief examination that even on the very first day, he recorded the   statements   of   several   witnesses   including   Kailash   and Ruia. It means that he started with a pre­determination that the informant, her husband and her brother were the culprits and the original accused were innocent. The relevant portion of the evidence of PW­14 in this regard reads as follows:­ “From place of incidence blood stained soil and common   soil   was   collected   and   was   sealed   in different   –   different   packets   was   seized   in presence   of   witnesses   and   seizure   Memo   is Ex.P/15 on which from B to B is my signature.  On that   date   only   witnesses   Rahul   Yadav,   Rajesh Yadav, Kailash Yadav, Ruia @ Bhagirath Yadav, Baby   @   Leelabai,   Gandharv   Patel,   Raghuvir Thakur,   Brijesh   Rawat,   Om   Prakash   Pathak, 18 Gorelal   Kurmi,   Mahesh   Kurmi   statement   was obtained   as   told   by   them   and   nothing   was increased or decreased from my side.” 25. Interestingly the story built by the prosecution was that A­1 had a quarrel with his brother (the deceased), sometime before the commission of the crime, over the non­repayment of a sum of Rs.250/­ by the deceased to Ruia and that in the quarrel, A­1 got injured and that thereafter all the 3 accused attacked the victim resulting in his death. A­1 had no reason to   take   up   the   cause   of   Ruia   and   go   to   the   extent   of committing the murder of his own brother. But unfortunately, the Trial Court has believed this story on the basis of the testimony of DW­1, the mother of both A­1 and the deceased. All that DW­1 stated in her testimony was that A­1 questioned the deceased as to why he was not returning the money due and payable to Ruia.   26. Coming to the testimony of PW­9, projected as the star witness for the prosecution, the explanation given by the IO for recording her statement on 03.06.2008, after 21 days of the occurrence of the crime, is unbelievable. In any case, if her 19 evidence is to be accepted, it should be accepted in total. We have already extracted one portion of her evidence, where she has   categorically   admitted   that   Ruia   and   Kailash   were originally taken into custody and that there were protests from the people of the caste to which they belonged and that those people also put pressure on the police to give a clean chit to Ruia   and   Kailash.   These   admissions   on   the   part   of   PW­9, made the prosecution case completely untrustworthy. 27. Apart from the fact that the witnesses in whose presence the seizure of the weapons was allegedly effected, had turned hostile, there was also one more thing. There is nothing on record to show that the blood stains said to have been present in those weapons, matched with the blood of the deceased. Unfortunately, the High Court proceeded on a wrong premise that there was scientific evidence to point to the guilt of the accused, merely because as per Exhibit P­25 (FSL Report), the knife   and   lathis   said   to   have   been   seized   by   the   police, contained stains of human blood. The prosecution has not established either through the report of FSL or otherwise, that 20 the blood stains contained in the knife and  lathis  were that of the deceased. 28. We are conscious of the fact that there is a divergence of
Raghav Prapanna Tripathivs.The
,a Constitution Bench of this Court
by a majority held that,“…that it would be far­fetched to
conclude from the mere presence of blood­stained earth that that earth was stained with human blood and that the human
blood was that of the victims…”. InKansa Beheravs.State
,this Court acquittedthe appellant on the ground
that though the Serologist report found the shirt anddhoti
recovered from the possession of the appellant to be stained with human blood, there is no evidence to connect the same
with the blood of the deceased. InSurinder Singhvs.State
, theblood stains found on the knife allegedly used
for   the   commission   of   the   offence,   were   established   to   be human blood. But this Court rejected the prosecution theory 2 AIR 1963 SC 74 3  (1987) 3 SCC 480,  4  (1989) Supp.(2) SCC 21 21 on the ground that those blood stains on the knife were not
shown to be of the same group as the blood of the deceased.In
Raghunath,Ramkishan & Ors.vs.State of Haryana,
this Court held that the blood stain, though of a human blood, is not conclusive evidence to show that it belongs to the blood
group of the deceased. InSattatiyavs.State of
6 Maharashtra , this Court found the credibility of the evidence relating to the recovery of the object used for the commission of the crime, substantially dented, on account of the fact that the blood stains, though found to be of human source, could not be linked with the blood of the deceased.
29.In contrast, this Court held inState of Rajasthanvs.
7 Teja Ram and Others , that at times the Serologist may fail to deduct the origin of the blood, either because the stain is too   insufficient   or   because   of   hematological   changes   and plasmatic   coagulation.   After   referring   to   the   Constitution
Bench decision inRaghav Prapanna Tripathi(supra), this
5  (2003) 1 SCC 398 6  (2008) 3 SCC 210 7 (1999) 3 SCC 507 22
Court held inTeja Ram(supra) that it is not as though the
circumstances arising from the recovery of the weapon would stand   relegated   to   disutility,   in   all   cases   where   there   was failure of detecting the origin of the blood. This Court indicated
inTeja Ram(supra) that,“…the effort of the Criminal Court
should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts…”and that the
doubts should be of reasonable dimension, which a judicially conscientious mind entertains with some objectivity.
30.The decisionTeja Ram(supra) was followed inGura
Singhvs.State of Rajasthan
and inPrabhu Dayalvs.
9 State of Rajasthan .  
31.InR. Shajivs.State of Kerala
of almost all previous decisions starting fromPrabhu Babaji
Navlevs.State of Bombay
and including those inRaghav
Prapanna Tripathi(supra);Teja Ram(supra),Gura Singh
(supra);John Pandianvs.State
; andSunilClifford
8  (2001) 2 SCC 205 9  (2018) 8 SCC 127 10  (2013) 14 SCC 266 11  AIR 1956 SC 51 12  (2010) 14 SCC 129 23
Danielvs.State of Punjab
and came to the conclusion that
once   the   recovery   is   made   in   pursuance   of   a   disclosure statement   made   by   the   accused,   the   matching   or   non­ matching of blood groups loses significance.
32.Therefore, as pointed out by this Court inBalwan Singh
vs.State of Chhattisgarh
formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove that the blood groups match. But the judicial conscience of the Court should be satisfied both about the recovery and about the origin of the human blood.  
33.In the case on hand, even PW­1, who allegedly witnessed
the seizure had turned hostile. Right from the beginning there has been an attempt on the part of the prosecution to shield the culprits named in the first FIR, on account of political pressure, as admitted by PW­14 and corroborated by PW­9, whom   the   prosecution   considered   to   be   a   star   witness. Unfortunately, both the Sessions Court and the High Court completely overlooked these aspects.  13  (2012) 11 SCC 205 14  (2019) 7 SCC 781 24
34.It is seen from the judgment of the High Court that the
accused were represented byamicus curiaeeither due to the
inability of the accused to engage a counsel or due to the non­ appearance of the counsel engaged by them at the time of hearing. As a result, the accused do not appear to have had the best of legal assistance. It is in such type of cases that the burden   of   the   court   is   very   heavy   and   unfortunately,   the Sessions   court   and   the   High   court   did   not   discharge   this burden properly. 35. In the light of the above, we are clearly of the view that the investigation in this case was carried out by PW­14, not with the intention of unearthing the truth, but for burying the same fathom deep, for extraneous considerations and that it was designed to turn the informant and her family members as the accused and allow the real culprits named in the FIR to escape. Both the Sessions Court as well as the High Court have completely overlooked some of the important admissions made by PWs 9 and 14. They have not even taken into account the normal human conduct. It is unbelievable that A­1, A­2 25 and A­3 caused the death of A­1’s brother due to the failure of the victim to return an amount of Rs.250/­ due and payable to Ruia (PW­7) and that thereafter, they deliberately named Ruia as   the   accused.   It   is   equally   unbelievable   that   one   of   the persons who killed the victim, in the presence of witnesses, took the body of the victim to the hospital in an autorickshaw. The normal human behaviour in such circumstances will be either to flee the place of occurrence or to go to the police station to surrender, except in cases where they are intelligent and seasoned criminals. Neither did happen.  36. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the appeals deserve to be allowed.   But before we do that, we must take note of the fact that A­1 has not come up on appeal. Though Shri   Shreeyash   U.   Lalit,   learned   counsel   for   the   State submitted that     A­1’s case stands on a completely different footing and that therefore, in the absence of an independent appeal by him, he cannot be granted any relief, we do not agree. This is not a case where we have proceeded on the basis of   individual   overt   acts   on   the   part   of   A­2   and   A­3   (the 26 appellants­ herein )   to   conclude   that   they   are   entitled   to acquittal.     This   is   a   case   where   we   have   disbelieved,   in entirety, the story of the prosecution. Therefore, to deny the benefit of the said conclusion to A­1 merely on the ground of a technicality that he is not on appeal would be to close our eyes to a gross injustice, especially when we are empowered under Article 142 to do complete justice. 37. Therefore, the appeals filed by the appellants are allowed and the conviction handed over by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court as against all the three accused, including A­1, are set aside. All the three accused shall be released forthwith, unless they are in custody in relation to any other case. …..…………....................J.       (Indira Banerjee) ..…..………......................J (V. Ramasubramanian) AUGUST  18, 2021 NEW DELHI.