Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1356
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11160-11161 of 2024)
T. MANJUNATH ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
AND ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals, by special leave, call into
th
question the order dated 26 July, 2024, passed by
1
the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru , whereby
the High Court decided two Criminal Revision
Petitions, being Criminal Revision Petition No. 422 of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.11.26
11:53:29 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
1
2
2018 and Criminal Revision Petition No. 599 of
3 rd
2018 , arising out of the order dated 23 August,
2017, passed by the LXXVI Additional City Civil and
4
Sessions Court & Special Court, Bengaluru . By the
impugned order, the High Court allowed the revision
petition filed by the State and dismissed the revision
5
petition preferred by T. Manjunath , consequently
setting aside and reversing the order of the trial
Court, whereby the application for discharge filed by
the accused-appellant had been allowed. The High
Court further granted liberty to the investigating
agency to proceed against the appellant in
accordance with law, including permission to file a
fresh chargesheet after obtaining the requisite
sanction from the competent authority.
2
Preferred by the State.
3
Preferred by T Manjunath (accused-appellant).
4
Hereinafter, referred to as the “trial Court”.
5
Hereinafter, referred to as the “accused-appellant”.
2
Factual Background
4. The factual matrix relevant and essential for the
disposal of the appeals may be noted hereinbelow.
5.
The accused-appellant was working as a Senior
Inspector of Motor Vehicles at R.T.O. Office, K.R.
Puram, Bengaluru, when a trap was
attempted/arranged against him. The Lokayuktha
Inspector Sri Sanjeevarayappa secured two
independent witnesses who were Government
servants, and in their presence, conducted the pre-
trap proceedings.
6. During the pre-trap proceedings, an amount of
Rs. 15,000/- was entrusted to the complainant to be
handed over to the accused-appellant upon demand.
7. Thereafter, the Lokayuktha Inspector, along
with his trap team, two independent witnesses, and
the complainant, left for the RTO office, KR Puram,
Bengaluru, where the accused-appellant was
3
working. The accused-appellant was trapped while
demanding and accepting illegal gratification of
Rs.15,000/- from the complainant through co-
accused H. B. Mastigowda (accused No.2), a private
person who is alleged to have received the amount at
the instance of accused-appellant (accused No. 1).
8. The trap proceedings led to registration of Crime
No.48/2012 under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
6
1988 . During the investigation, exercising powers
under Section 19 of the PC Act, sanction was granted
by the Commissioner of Transport for prosecution of
the accused-appellant for the offences punishable
under Section 7, 8, 13(1)(d), read with 13(2) of the PC
Act. Chargesheet was filed against the accused-
appellant for the aforesaid offences.
9. Thereafter, the accused-appellant preferred an
application under Section 227 read with Section 239
6
For short, ‘PC Act’.
4
7
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , seeking
discharge.
10. Two primary grounds were raised by the
accused-appellant:
(a) That the accused-appellant, having been
appointed by the State Government, could
not have been prosecuted on the strength of
sanction issued by the Commissioner of
Transport, who was not competent to accord
sanction for prosecuting the appellant;
(b) That the accused-appellant stood exonerated
in the departmental proceedings instituted
on the same charges and allegations, as were
levelled in the criminal case, and hence, the
continued criminal prosecution against the
accused-appellant was unjustified.
7
For short, ‘CrPC’.
5
rd
11. The trial Court vide order dated 23 August,
2017, allowed the application and discharged the
accused-appellant as well as the co-accused H.B.
Mastigowda on the ground that the sanction for
prosecution was not valid, as the authority that
exercised jurisdiction was not the competent
authority. However, liberty was given to the
investigating agency to file a fresh chargesheet after
obtaining sanction from the competent authority in
accordance with law. The relevant findings from the
trial Court’s order are reproduced hereinbelow for the
sake of ready reference:
“8. The issue regarding the validity of the Sanction
Order is taken up for consideration as a preliminary
issue.
9. As per Sec 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, obtaining of valid sanction from the Competent
Authority to prosecute the public servant is
mandatory The accused No 1 is a Public servant,
working as Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicles He is a
Group-B Officer The service particulars of the
accused No 1 (page-50 of the charge sheet file) would
disclose that the Authority competent to remove the
accused No 1 from the said post is the Government of
6
Karnataka But the Sanction Order accorded in this
case is by the Commissioner of Transport which is
invalid and no sanction in the eye of law.
10. The accused No. 2 is a private person. According
to the prosecution, the accused No. 2 received the
tainted currency notes from the complainant at the
instance of the accused No. 1. Obtaining of valid
sanction from the Competent Authority to prosecute
the accused No 1 is mandatory It is well settled that
cognizance can be taken in respect of the offences
alleged against the accused only once and if there are
several accused, against some of whom sanction for
prosecution may be necessary, it is mandatory that
sanction be awaited till such time cognizance is
awaited or otherwise, it would lead to confused state
of affairs which is impermissible Since the Sanction
Order accorded to prosecute the accused No 1 in
this case is by the Commissioner of Transport,
which is invalid and non-est , it is just and proper
to return the entire charge sheet papers to the
Investigating Agency with liberty to the State to
proceed further in accordance with law and to file
a charge-sheet afresh after obtaining necessary
sanction from the Competent Authority as far as
the accused No 1 is concerned who is a public
servant along with the accused No 2 Till such
time, it is just and proper to discharge the accused
No 1 & 2 Hence, I answer the above point
accordingly.”
[Emphasis supplied]
12. The above order was assailed by both the State
and the accused-appellant by way of separate
revision petitions before the High Court.
7
13. The High Court allowed the revision petition
filed by the State and dismissed the revision petition
preferred by the accused-appellant, setting aside the
order passed by the trial Court.
14. In doing so, the High Court held that the
sanction had been accorded by the competent
authority observing that no liberty could be granted
to the accused to contest the proceedings on the
ground of the validity of sanction because the order
of sanction was accorded by the competent authority
th
in terms of the notification dated 11 February,
2010, which confers jurisdiction upon the Transport
Commissioner to accord the sanction.
15. The impugned order was set aside, and the trial
Court was directed to proceed against both the
accused in accordance with law. The aforesaid order
of the High Court is in challenge before us at the
8
instance of the accused-appellant T. Manjunath in
these appeals by special leave.
Submissions on behalf of the accused-appellant
16.
Learned senior counsel, Shri Devadatt Kamat,
representing the accused-appellant, vehemently and
fervently contended that the departmental
proceedings were instituted against the accused-
appellant on identical charges and same set of facts
and evidence and have culminated in the exoneration
of the accused-appellant, and therefore, his
prosecution in the criminal case is totally unjustified.
He urged that the witnesses examined in the
departmental disciplinary proceedings were the same
as those who were cited by the prosecution in the
criminal case. The disciplinary authority, upon a
comprehensive appreciation of the evidence, recorded
a categorical finding that Shri K.R. Manjunath
(complainant), Shri Nagesh (shadow witness), and
9
Shri Maruthiraj (witness) did not support the case of
the department, and that the testimony of the
Investigating Officer remained uncorroborated.
Based on these findings, the disciplinary authority
proceeded to exonerate the accused-appellant of the
charges.
17. It was the contention of learned senior counsel
that the standard of proof required to bring home the
charges in the disciplinary proceedings is of
significantly lower degree than the standard of proof
required to establish the guilt of the accused in a
criminal trial. While in departmental proceedings,
charges can be established merely on basis of
preponderance of possibilities, in a criminal trial, the
prosecution would be required to establish the
charges by proving its case beyond all manner of
doubt.
10
18. Thus, once the delinquent employee stands
exonerated in the departmental proceedings, where
the burden of proof is much lesser, the continuance
of criminal proceedings founded on the very same set
of allegations and evidence would not be justified.
19. To buttress his contentions, learned senior
counsel placed reliance on Ashoo Surendranath
8
Tewari v. Dept Superintendent , and urged that
the criminal proceedings sought to be pursued
against the accused-appellant deserve to be quashed.
20. Further, during the course of hearing, learned
senior counsel Shri Kamat handed over to the Court
rd
the office memorandum dated 3 December, 1991,
evidencing the appointment of the accused-appellant
T. Manjunath, to the post of Inspector of Motor
Vehicles. He referred to this document and contended
that the appointment of the accused-appellant had
8
(2020) 9 SCC 636.
11
been made under the authority of the Governor of
Karnataka and, therefore, the appointing authority of
the accused-appellant was the State Government. On
this premise, it was urged that the sanction for
prosecution could have been validly accorded only by
the State Government and not by the Commissioner.
21. Shri Kamat further argued that the expression
“competence” occurring in Section 19(4) of the PC
Act, has to be treated at par with “jurisdiction”.
According to him, by virtue of Section 19(1) of the Act,
the authority competent to grant sanction for
prosecution of the accused-appellant was the State
Government alone, and sanction accorded by an
officer not authorised to remove the accused from the
post was without the authority of law and suffered
from patent lack of jurisdiction. He thus urged that
the view taken by the High Court in reversing the
12
order passed by the trial Court is absolutely
unjustified and deserves to be set aside.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent-State
22.
Per contra , Shri Aman Panwar, learned AAG
representing the State of Karnataka, vehemently and
fervently opposed the submissions advanced on
behalf of the accused-appellant. He contended that
the mere exoneration of the accused-appellant in the
disciplinary proceedings cannot, by itself, furnish a
ground to quash the criminal proceedings even if
both proceedings are founded on the same set of
facts. He submitted that the exoneration of the
accused-appellant in the disciplinary proceedings
was occasioned solely because the complainant, the
shadow witness, and the accompanying witness did
not support the case of the department. The
exoneration was totally unjustified because the trap-
13
laying Officer had, in his deposition, fully supported
the case of department.
23. He urged that the law is well settled by a catena
of judgments rendered by this Court that in cases
where the accused is apprehended for accepting
illegal gratification, the mere fact of the complainant,
the shadow witness and the accompanying witness
turning hostile, would have no bearing on the
outcome of the case, and that the conviction in the
criminal case can be based/sustained even on the
sole testimony of the trap laying officer, if found
credible and trustworthy. He further submitted that
the accused himself admitted having demanded the
bribe when the trap memo was prepared and thus,
the prosecution case is founded on unimpeachable
material, the worth whereof would have to be
assessed at the trial.
14
24. Learned counsel placed reliance on State v. T.
9
Murthy , State of MP v. Virender Kumar
10
Tripathi , and State of Bihar v. Rajmangal
11
Ram
to urge that the controversy regarding the
competence of the sanctioning authority and its effect
on the trial has been settled by this Court in these
precedents expressly holding that a sanction order
cannot be struck down on the ground of lack of
competence of the authority issuing it.
25. Learned AAG has vehemently and fervently
controverted the claim made by Shri Kamat based on
documents handed over during the course of hearing
that the appointing authority of the appellant is the
State Government. He urged that no such plea was
taken by the appellant before the High Court and that
the unverified documents handed over by the
9
(2004) 7 SCC 763.
10
(2009) 15 SCC 533.
11
(2014) 11 SCC 388.
15
appellant across the board cannot be considered to
decide the issue of appointing authority. He further
contended that the office memorandum relied upon
by the accused-appellant is not the appointment
order at all; it is merely a posting order issued under
the authority of the Governor of Karnataka. As a
matter of fact, the appointing authority of the
accused-appellant is none other than the
Commissioner. To substantiate this contention,
th
learned counsel handed over an order dated 11
February, 2010, which, according to him,
conclusively establishes that the Commissioner was
the appointing authority competent to remove the
accused-appellant from service and, as a necessary
corollary, to grant sanction for prosecution. He thus
urged that on both facets, namely, the question of
competence as well as the aspect of the appointing
authority, the accused-appellant has failed to make
16
out any case warranting interference in the impugned
order.
Discussion and Analysis
26.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at the Bar and have
th
carefully gone through the impugned order dated 26
July, 2024 passed by the High Court, as well as the
rd
order dated 23 August, 2017 passed by the trial
Court. We have also minutely perused the findings
recorded by the disciplinary authority while
exonerating the accused-appellant in the
departmental proceedings.
A. Effect of Departmental Clean
Chit/Exoneration on Criminal Proceedings
27. First, we will consider the plea of the accused-
appellant that, as the departmental proceedings have
resulted in his exoneration, the criminal proceedings
cannot be continued.
17
28. For this purpose, we have perused the findings
rd
as recorded in the Enquiry report dated 23
September, 2021. Relevant excerpts of the report are
reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready
reference: -
“13) The points that arise for my consideration are
Point No 1: Whether the Disciplinary Authority
has proved the charges?
Point No 2: What order?
14) Above points are answered as under
Point No 1: In the Negative
Point No 2: As per final order for the following,
REASONS
15) The Disciplinary Authority has examined the
shadow witness as PW-1, complainant as PW-2,
colleague of the complainant as PW-3, and the
Investigation Officer came to be examined as PW-4
and got marked documents Ex P-1 to P-26 The
shadow witness, complainant and his colleague i.e.,
PW-1 to 3 have not supported the version of the
Disciplinary Authority Even though, the Disciplinary
Authority cross-examined PW-1 to 3 and suggested
the version of the Disciplinary Authority that, DGO
has demanded bribe of Rs 24,000/- for twelve
tippers, but after negotiation with the complainant
PW-2, the bribe amount was reduced to Rs 18,000/-
and at last PW-1 gave Rs 15,000/- to Paramesh @
Mastigouda on the say of the DGO but, the said
18
version of the disciplinary authority has been denied
by PW-1 to 3.
16) No doubt, the Disciplinary Authority succeeded
in proving about the lodging of the complaint Ex P-
10, basing on it, PW-4 registered crime No 48/2012
and sent FIR vide Ex P-12 to court and his superiors
The pre-trap malazar was drawn on 13/06/2012
vide Ex P-2 PW-1 has produced Rs 18,000/- (500x
36) currency notes and their numbers were noted in
the sheet Ex P-1 by the panch witness i.e., PW-1 and
Vishwas Investigation Officer has deposed about
drawing of Ex P-4 panchanama on 13/06/2012,
wherein the trap was unsuccessful as the DGO was
not in the office at about 5:15 pm on 13/06/2012.
17) PW-4 has further deposed about trap
panchanama Ex P-5, which was conducted on
14/06/2012, wherein the trap was conducted at
2nd floor of the RTO office, KR Puram at 12:30 pm
PW-4 deposed about the recovery of Rs 15,000/-
from Mastigouda and his hand wash was made in
the sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned
to pink colour The said mahazar Ex P-5 was
concluded at Lokayukta police, MS Building,
Bengaluru at 4:50 pm.
18) The prime witnesses for establishing the charges
leveled against the DGO are the complainant, PW-2
and his colleague PW-3 and shadow witness PW-1
But, the said prime witnesses have not supported
the version of the Disciplinary Authority The
complainant is working as a Supervisor in
Prashanth Crushers, which has twelve tippers
plying within jurisdiction of KR Puram RTO, wherein
DGO was serving as Motor Vehicle Inspector The
19
allegation of PW-1 is that, the DGO was stopping the
said tippers near Hoskote often and insisted the
drivers to telephone to their owner asking him to
look after the DGO otherwise DGO threatened to
book case against the said tippers The owner of the
sad Prashanth Crushers has asked PW-2 to lodge
the complaint to the Lokayukta police Accordingly,
PW-2 approached PW-4 on 12/06/2012 and
disclosed about the demand of bribe amount by the
DGO to PW-4, PW-4 directed PW-1 to record the
conversations held between the DGO in respect of
demand of bribe amount by giving the voice-recorder
PW-1 met the DGO and made negotiation of bribe
amount i.e. , DGO alleged to have demanded Rs
2,000/- per tipper in total Rs 24,000/-, but after
negotiation, amount was reduced to Rs 18,000/-
PW-1 has again approached PW-4 on 13/06/2012
and lodged the complaint, Ex P-10 and basing on it,
Cr No 48/2012 was registered and FIR, Ex P-12 was
sent to court and his superiors
19) PW-2, complainant has deposed before the court
that, he has affixed his signature on the complaint
at Ex P-10, on the say of his owner, but shown his
ignorance about its content PW-2 further deposed
that, DGO has never demanded bribe amount and
also not asked the complainant to give the amount
in the hands of said Paramesh @ Mastigouda He has
given Rs 15,000/- to said Paramesh (@ Mastigouda
No doubt, PW-4 has recovered Rs 15,000/- from said
Paramesh under the trap and hands of the said
Paramesh were washed in the sodium carbonate
solution, which turned to pink colour
20) PW-3, the colleague of PW-2 has shown his
ignorance about demand of bribe amount by the
20
DGO from PW-2 and he has not accompanied PW-2
to the RTO, KR Puram office, he has not gone inside
the said RTO office and he is unaware of the incident
that has taken place in the RTO office Even though,
the Presenting Officer cross-examined PW-3, but
nothing is elicited during the cross-examination to
establish the charge levelled against DGO.
21)The shadow witness, PW-1 has deposed half-
heartedly before the Inquiry Officer and he does not
remember how much amount was given by the
complainant to the Police Inspector He further
deposed that, PW-1 was standing near the door of
the chamber of DGO and the door was closed, hence
he could not hear the conversations and also witness
anything which transpired between the complainant
and the DGO PW-1, could not hear the conversation
that took place inside the chamber, but PW-1 has
witnessed complainant giving the tainted money of
Rs 15,000/- to one Sri Mastigouda and the said
amount was kept in his trouser pocket and he could
not hear as to who instructed Sri Mastigouda to
receive the said money During the cross-
examination made by the Presenting Officer, PW-1
admitted that, he was standing near the door, when
the complainant went inside the chamber and door
was slightly opened at that time, he could not hear,
but denied the suggestions made by the Presenting
Officer that, he heard the conversations of DGO that
he demanded bribe amount from the complainant
and further heard that, the complainant negotiated
with DGO for reducing the bribe amount and DGO
asked the complainant to give the said money to Sri
Mastigouda.
21
22) According to the theory of the Disciplinary
Authority, the complainant and DGO negotiated the
bribe amount from Rs 24000/- to Rs 18,000/- in
order to permit twelve tippers belonging to
Prashanth Crushers to ply on road i.e., within the
jurisdiction of RTO, KR Puram, the complainant
approached PW-4 as per the directions of his owner
to lodge complaint Ex P-10, but the complainant has
not supported the said version that, DGO demanded
bribe amount of Rs 24,000/- and after negotiation,
it was reduced to Rs 18,000/- The said amount of
Rs 18,000/- (500x36) was given to PW-4 on
13/06/2012 and the value and number of the said
currency notes were written on a sheet Ex P-1 by the
panch witnesses PW-3 was present at the time of
drawing pre-panchanama, Ex P-3 and also trap
panchanama Ex P-5 on 14/06/2012 But, PW-3,
who is the colleague of PW-2 i.e., employee of
Prashanth Crushers has completely turned hostile
and there is no corroboration in the evidence of PW-
2 and 3 with respect to demand of bribe amount by
the DGO from PW-2 and he has given bribe amount
of Rs 15,000/- to the said Paramesh @ Mastigouda
on the say of the DGO.
23) According to Disciplinary Authority, the shadow
witness, PW-1, accompanied PW-2 and 3 to the RTO
office, KR Puram i.e, 2nd floor and was standing
near the door of the DGOs chamber and heard the
conversations between PW-2 and DGO regarding
negotiation of reducing the bribe amount and he
witnessed the receipt of Rs 15,000/- by the said
Paramesh from PW-2 on the say of the DGO But,
PW-1 categorically deposed that, he has not heard
the conversations held between PW-2 and DGO and
he had witnessed the incident of giving amount of Rs
22
15,000/- by PW-2 to the said Paramesh Evidence of
PW-1 to 3 is not linking the chain of events i.e., DGO
has demanded bribe amount from PW-2 and PW-2
has given the said amount to said Paramesh as per
the say of the DGO The said fact of demand of bribe
amount from DGO and receipt of said bribe amount
by the said Paramesh as per the say of the DGO from
PW-2 is totally missing from the evidence of PW-1 to
3.
24) The solitary evidence of Investigation Officer,
PW-4 alone will not establish the charge leveled
against DGO PW-4 deposed that, PW-2 had
approached PW-4 on 12/06/2012 disclosed about
the demand of bribe amount by DGO PW-4 directed
PW-2 to record the conversations of DGO in the
voice-recorder PW-4 registered crime No 48/2012 on
the basis of the complaint lodged by PW-2 on
13/06/2012 PW-4 has secured PW-1 and another
panch witness namely, Sri Vishwas and introduced
them to PW-2 and disclose about the complaint, Ex
P-10 PW-4 has further deposed that, PW2 has
produced Rs 18,000/- (500 x36) currency notes and
the value of the said notes and numbers were noted
in the sheet Ex P1 One of the police staff had
smeared the phenolphthalein powder on the said
currency notes and as per the directions of PW-4,
Panch witness namely, Vishwas kept the said
tainted notes in the pant pocket of PW-2 and the
hand wash of the said Vishwas was made in the
sodium carbonate solution, which turned to pink
PW4 directed the complainant to give the said
tainted notes to the DGO, only after demand and
PW-1 had to accompany PW-2 along with PW-3 to
the RTO office, KR Puram for trap Trap was not
successful on 13/06/2012 as DGO left the office at
23
5:00 pm itself In that respect mahazar Ex P-4 was
drawn PW-1 to 4 along with Vishwas and staff have
returned back to PW 4’s office and returned the
tainted notes and also voice-recorder and also the
pen camera and asked the said raiding party to come
on 14/06/2012 at 10:00 am
25) PW-4 was successful in getting the trap on
14/06/2012 at 12:30 pm at 2nd floor of the RTO
office, KR Puram by accompanying PW-1 to 3 and
Vishwas along with his staff and the trap mahazar
was drawn vide Ex P-5 at PW-4’s office PW-4 has
followed PW-1 to 3 along with Vishwas and the staff
to RTO office He was standing at the 2nd floor
amidst public PW-4 has directed PW-2 to give signal
after giving the said tainted notes after demand PW-
2 made signal and the said raiding party went to the
chamber of DGO and PW-2 stated that, he had given
the amount to the said Paramesh and hand wash of
the said Paramesh was made m the sodium
carbonate solution, which turned into pink colour
and the amount was seized from said Paramesh at
the RTO office itself.
26) There is no corroboration in the evidence of PW-
4 and PW-1 to 3 The important aspect of demand of
bribe amount by the DGO is not forthcoming from
the evidence of PW-1 to 3, though it is finding place
in the complaint, Ex P-10, Ex P-2 and Ex P-5 trap
panchanama The acceptance of bribe amount by the
said Paramesh as per say of DGO is also missing
from the evidence of PW-1 to 3 The charge levelled
against DGO is that, he has demanded bribe amount
from PW-2 The main ingredients of illegal demand of
bribe amount from the complainant and receipt of
the bribe amount by said Paramesh on the say of the
24
DGO are missing in the instant case on hand The
evidence of the PW-1 to 4 in other aspect may
corroborate, but it is no way helpful to the
Disciplinary Authority in proving the charge levelled
against the DGO.
…..
32) On appreciation of entire oral and documentary
evidence, I hold that the charge leveled against the
DGO is not established and preponderance of
probabilities also do not point at his misconduct
Point No 1: Hence, Point No 1 is answered in the
Negative
Point No 2: For the reasons stated above, I
proceed to record the following findings –
FINDINGS
The Disciplinary Authority has not
proved the charges framed against DGO Sri T
Manjunath, Senior Inspector of Motor
Vehicles, Office of RegionalTransport Officer
KR Puram, Bengaluru DGO will retire from
service on 31/05/2028.
This report is submitted to the Hon’ble
Upalokayukta in a sealed cover,
Dated this the 23 September, 2021
Sd/-”
29. Upon perusal of the above report, it is evident
that the disciplinary authority’s discretion was
swayed by the fact that the Sri K.R. Manjunath
(complainant), Sri Nagesh (shadow witness), and Sri
25
Maruthiraj (colleague of the complainant) did not
support the department’s case and feigned ignorance
about the transaction of bribe. However, the order of
the disciplinary authority also takes note of the fact
that Sri Sanjeevarappa (Investigating Officer) fully
supported the case of the department and proved the
trap panchnama , as per which the tainted currency
notes were recovered from the hands of Paramesh @
Mastigowda (accused No. 2), and the allegation of
demand of a bribe was proved against the accused-
appellant. We feel that the conclusion drawn by the
disciplinary authority that guilt of the delinquent
employee could not be proved merely on the
testimony of the trap laying officer, is premature and
unfounded.
26
12
30. This Court has, in a catena of decisions , held
that the mere fact that a decoy/complainant in a trap
case turns hostile would not adversely affect the case
of prosecution and that conviction can be based even
on the evidence of the trap laying officer, if found
reliable and trustworthy.
31. We may further observe that when a witness
deposing on oath in a criminal trial resiles from the
original version and does not support the prosecution
case, he would be liable to face prosecution for
perjury. Under this pressure, the witness may
choose to speak the truth. Thus, the mere fact that
some of the witnesses did not support the
department’s case in the disciplinary proceedings
would, by itself, not give any assurance that they
would behave in the same manner at the criminal
12
N. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. , (2001) 1 SCC 691; Neeraj Datta v.
State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731.
27
trial. In the present case, as is evident, the
exoneration of the accused-appellant in the
departmental proceedings is merely on the ground
that the decoy and associating witnesses did not
support the case of department.
32. The possibility of the criminal case still resulting
into conviction, irrespective of the factum of the
witnesses turning hostile being a realistic possibility,
we feel that there is no merit behind the argument of
Shri Kamat that exoneration in the departmental
proceeding should lead to automatic discharge in the
criminal case. Hence, the said argument advanced
on behalf of the accused-appellant, placing reliance
on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari (supra) , has no
merit and is rejected.
33. Though the core facts in both proceedings may
bear resemblance, the viewpoint, scope, and
standards for adjudication are entirely different, and
28
each is governed by a distinct forum and procedure.
Hence, exoneration in the departmental proceedings
does not, ipso facto , furnish a ground for dropping
the criminal charges more particularly in Trap Cases.
B. Sanction Under Section 19 PC Act:
Competence and Jurisdictional Validity
34. The second fold of the argument advanced by
learned counsel for the accused-appellant was based
on the alleged illegality vitiating the sanction order.
35. The question of competence of the sanctioning
authority – being the bone of contention between the
parties, the same requires to be considered . The
controversy essentially turns around whether the
expression “competence” is to be understood as
synonymous with “authority” or “jurisdiction” to
remove the employee from service for the purposes of
Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988.
29
36. For appreciating this submission, the language
of the enabling provision, i.e., Section 19 needs to be
reproduced hereunder: -
“19. Previous sanction necessary for
prosecution.—
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under [sections 7, 11, 13 and 15]
alleged to have been committed by a public
servant, except with the previous sanction [save
as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and
Lokayuktas Act, 2013]—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as
the case may be, was at the time of commission
of the alleged offence employed in connection
with the affairs of the Union and is not removable
from his office save by or with the sanction of the
Central Government, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or
as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed] in
connection with the affairs of a State and is not
removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the State Government, of that
Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the
authority competent to remove him from his
office:
[Provided that no request can be made, by a
person other than a police officer or an officer of an
investigation agency or other law enforcement
authority, to the appropriate Government or
30
competent authority, as the case may be, for the
previous sanction of such Government or authority
for taking cognizance by the court of any of the
offences specified in this sub-section, unless—
(i) such a person has filed a complaint in a
competent court about the alleged offences for
which the public servant is sought to be
prosecuted; and
(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint
under section 203 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the
complainant to obtain the sanction for
prosecution against the public servant for
further proceeding:
Provided further that in the case of request from
the person other than a police officer or an officer of
an investigation agency or other law enforcement
authority, the appropriate Government or competent
authority shall not accord sanction to prosecute a
public servant without providing an opportunity of
being heard to the concerned public servant:
Provided also that the appropriate Government or
any competent authority shall, after the receipt of the
proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a
public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to
convey the decision on such proposal within a period
of three months from the date of its receipt:
Provided also that in case where, for the purpose
of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal consultation
is required, such period may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, be extended by a further period
of one month:
Provided also that the Central Government may,
for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a public
servant, prescribe such guidelines as it considers
necessary.
31
Explanation. — For the purposes of sub-section (1),
the expression “public servant” includes such
person—
(a) who has ceased to hold the office during
which the offence is alleged to have been
committed; or
(b) who has ceased to hold the office during
which the offence is alleged to have been
committed and is holding an office other than the
office during which the offence is alleged to have
been committed.]
(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises
as to whether the previous sanction as required under
sub-section (1) should be given by the Central
Government or the State Government or any other
authority, such sanction shall be given by that
Government or authority which would have been
competent to remove the public servant from his office
at the time when the offence was alleged to have been
committed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a
special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a
Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the
ground of the absence of, or any error, omission
or irregularity in, the sanction required under
sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that
court, a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on the ground of any error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction granted by the
authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,
omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure
of justice;
32
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on any other ground and no court shall
exercise the powers of revision in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial,
appeal, or other proceedings.
( 4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether
the absence of, or any error, omission or
irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or
resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have
regard to the fact whether the objection could and
should have been raised at any earlier stage in the
proceedings.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) error includes competency of the
authority to grant sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution
includes reference to any requirement that
the prosecution shall be at the instance of a
specified authority or with the sanction of a
specified person or any requirement of a
similar nature.”
[Emphasis supplied]
37. Section 19(1) clearly stipulates that where the
appointing authority of the accused is the State
Government, the sanction for prosecution must be
accorded by the State Government and by none
other. The judgments in T. Murthy (supra), Virender
Kumar Tripathi (supra), and Rajmangal Ram
33
(supra) relied upon by the learned standing counsel
for the State, advert to the Explanation appended
under Section 19(4). In our view, the Explanation to
Section 19(4) would become relevant and come into
play only when the question of validity or otherwise
of the sanction is under scrutiny before the appellate
13
or the revisional forum as provided in sub-Section
(3) of Section 19. In the present case, such a
determination was made by the learned Special
Judge in the original jurisdiction, who held that the
sanction was invalid as it had been issued by an
authority lacking jurisdiction to do so, and that no
authority other than the State Government could
have granted a sanction in respect of the accused-
appellant, his appointment having been made by the
State Government itself.
13
Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186.
34
38. In this factual background, the Explanation
below Section 19(4) is not germane to the
controversy, for it operates only in situations where
the finding, sentence, or order of the Special Judge
on the aspect of sanction is under scanner before the
appellate or revisional Court on the grounds specified
therein. Thus, these decisions are of no assistance to
the State and are distinguishable on facts.
C. Divergent claims regarding the Appointing
Authority
39. Having held so, we now proceed to advert to the
situation that has arisen owing to the inconsistency
in the diverse claims regarding the authority who
actually appointed the accused-appellant. As noted
hereinabove, competing assertions have been
advanced regarding the actual appointing authority
of the accused-appellant, based on the documents
handed over to the Court during the course of the
hearing of the appeals. While learned counsel for the
35
State maintains that the Commissioner is the
appointing authority of the accused-appellant, the
learned senior counsel representing the accused-
appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the
appointing authority is the State Government.
40. In view of this disputed factual scenario, we are
of the considered opinion that, for a proper and
effective resolution of the controversy, it would be
expedient in the interest of justice to remit the matter
to the trial Court for fresh adjudication on the limited
issue regarding the actual appointing authority of the
accused-appellant and the consequential bearing
thereof on the validity of the sanction order.
41. The contention advanced on behalf of the
accused-appellant that he is entitled to be discharged
on account of his exoneration in the departmental
proceedings does not merit acceptance and is,
accordingly, rejected.
36
42. The finding recorded by the High Court on the
aspect of the validity of the sanction is set aside, and
the matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh
determination of the issue of sanction in accordance
with law, keeping in view the above observations.
43. For this purpose, the trial Court shall be at
liberty to summon the original
records/contemporaneous documents pertaining to
appointment of the accused-appellant, and thereafter
to take an appropriate decision regarding the validity
or otherwise of the sanction, in accordance with law.
In case the trial Court finds that the sanction has
been issued by a competent authority, the trial shall
proceed. However, in case the conclusion is
otherwise, the trial Court shall return the
chargesheet to the investigating agency for procuring
fresh sanction from the appropriate authority.
44. The appeals are disposed of in these terms.
37
45. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 10, 2025.
38
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11160-11161 of 2024)
T. MANJUNATH ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
AND ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals, by special leave, call into
th
question the order dated 26 July, 2024, passed by
1
the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru , whereby
the High Court decided two Criminal Revision
Petitions, being Criminal Revision Petition No. 422 of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.11.26
11:53:29 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
1
2
2018 and Criminal Revision Petition No. 599 of
3 rd
2018 , arising out of the order dated 23 August,
2017, passed by the LXXVI Additional City Civil and
4
Sessions Court & Special Court, Bengaluru . By the
impugned order, the High Court allowed the revision
petition filed by the State and dismissed the revision
5
petition preferred by T. Manjunath , consequently
setting aside and reversing the order of the trial
Court, whereby the application for discharge filed by
the accused-appellant had been allowed. The High
Court further granted liberty to the investigating
agency to proceed against the appellant in
accordance with law, including permission to file a
fresh chargesheet after obtaining the requisite
sanction from the competent authority.
2
Preferred by the State.
3
Preferred by T Manjunath (accused-appellant).
4
Hereinafter, referred to as the “trial Court”.
5
Hereinafter, referred to as the “accused-appellant”.
2
Factual Background
4. The factual matrix relevant and essential for the
disposal of the appeals may be noted hereinbelow.
5.
The accused-appellant was working as a Senior
Inspector of Motor Vehicles at R.T.O. Office, K.R.
Puram, Bengaluru, when a trap was
attempted/arranged against him. The Lokayuktha
Inspector Sri Sanjeevarayappa secured two
independent witnesses who were Government
servants, and in their presence, conducted the pre-
trap proceedings.
6. During the pre-trap proceedings, an amount of
Rs. 15,000/- was entrusted to the complainant to be
handed over to the accused-appellant upon demand.
7. Thereafter, the Lokayuktha Inspector, along
with his trap team, two independent witnesses, and
the complainant, left for the RTO office, KR Puram,
Bengaluru, where the accused-appellant was
3
working. The accused-appellant was trapped while
demanding and accepting illegal gratification of
Rs.15,000/- from the complainant through co-
accused H. B. Mastigowda (accused No.2), a private
person who is alleged to have received the amount at
the instance of accused-appellant (accused No. 1).
8. The trap proceedings led to registration of Crime
No.48/2012 under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
6
1988 . During the investigation, exercising powers
under Section 19 of the PC Act, sanction was granted
by the Commissioner of Transport for prosecution of
the accused-appellant for the offences punishable
under Section 7, 8, 13(1)(d), read with 13(2) of the PC
Act. Chargesheet was filed against the accused-
appellant for the aforesaid offences.
9. Thereafter, the accused-appellant preferred an
application under Section 227 read with Section 239
6
For short, ‘PC Act’.
4
7
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , seeking
discharge.
10. Two primary grounds were raised by the
accused-appellant:
(a) That the accused-appellant, having been
appointed by the State Government, could
not have been prosecuted on the strength of
sanction issued by the Commissioner of
Transport, who was not competent to accord
sanction for prosecuting the appellant;
(b) That the accused-appellant stood exonerated
in the departmental proceedings instituted
on the same charges and allegations, as were
levelled in the criminal case, and hence, the
continued criminal prosecution against the
accused-appellant was unjustified.
7
For short, ‘CrPC’.
5
rd
11. The trial Court vide order dated 23 August,
2017, allowed the application and discharged the
accused-appellant as well as the co-accused H.B.
Mastigowda on the ground that the sanction for
prosecution was not valid, as the authority that
exercised jurisdiction was not the competent
authority. However, liberty was given to the
investigating agency to file a fresh chargesheet after
obtaining sanction from the competent authority in
accordance with law. The relevant findings from the
trial Court’s order are reproduced hereinbelow for the
sake of ready reference:
“8. The issue regarding the validity of the Sanction
Order is taken up for consideration as a preliminary
issue.
9. As per Sec 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, obtaining of valid sanction from the Competent
Authority to prosecute the public servant is
mandatory The accused No 1 is a Public servant,
working as Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicles He is a
Group-B Officer The service particulars of the
accused No 1 (page-50 of the charge sheet file) would
disclose that the Authority competent to remove the
accused No 1 from the said post is the Government of
6
Karnataka But the Sanction Order accorded in this
case is by the Commissioner of Transport which is
invalid and no sanction in the eye of law.
10. The accused No. 2 is a private person. According
to the prosecution, the accused No. 2 received the
tainted currency notes from the complainant at the
instance of the accused No. 1. Obtaining of valid
sanction from the Competent Authority to prosecute
the accused No 1 is mandatory It is well settled that
cognizance can be taken in respect of the offences
alleged against the accused only once and if there are
several accused, against some of whom sanction for
prosecution may be necessary, it is mandatory that
sanction be awaited till such time cognizance is
awaited or otherwise, it would lead to confused state
of affairs which is impermissible Since the Sanction
Order accorded to prosecute the accused No 1 in
this case is by the Commissioner of Transport,
which is invalid and non-est , it is just and proper
to return the entire charge sheet papers to the
Investigating Agency with liberty to the State to
proceed further in accordance with law and to file
a charge-sheet afresh after obtaining necessary
sanction from the Competent Authority as far as
the accused No 1 is concerned who is a public
servant along with the accused No 2 Till such
time, it is just and proper to discharge the accused
No 1 & 2 Hence, I answer the above point
accordingly.”
[Emphasis supplied]
12. The above order was assailed by both the State
and the accused-appellant by way of separate
revision petitions before the High Court.
7
13. The High Court allowed the revision petition
filed by the State and dismissed the revision petition
preferred by the accused-appellant, setting aside the
order passed by the trial Court.
14. In doing so, the High Court held that the
sanction had been accorded by the competent
authority observing that no liberty could be granted
to the accused to contest the proceedings on the
ground of the validity of sanction because the order
of sanction was accorded by the competent authority
th
in terms of the notification dated 11 February,
2010, which confers jurisdiction upon the Transport
Commissioner to accord the sanction.
15. The impugned order was set aside, and the trial
Court was directed to proceed against both the
accused in accordance with law. The aforesaid order
of the High Court is in challenge before us at the
8
instance of the accused-appellant T. Manjunath in
these appeals by special leave.
Submissions on behalf of the accused-appellant
16.
Learned senior counsel, Shri Devadatt Kamat,
representing the accused-appellant, vehemently and
fervently contended that the departmental
proceedings were instituted against the accused-
appellant on identical charges and same set of facts
and evidence and have culminated in the exoneration
of the accused-appellant, and therefore, his
prosecution in the criminal case is totally unjustified.
He urged that the witnesses examined in the
departmental disciplinary proceedings were the same
as those who were cited by the prosecution in the
criminal case. The disciplinary authority, upon a
comprehensive appreciation of the evidence, recorded
a categorical finding that Shri K.R. Manjunath
(complainant), Shri Nagesh (shadow witness), and
9
Shri Maruthiraj (witness) did not support the case of
the department, and that the testimony of the
Investigating Officer remained uncorroborated.
Based on these findings, the disciplinary authority
proceeded to exonerate the accused-appellant of the
charges.
17. It was the contention of learned senior counsel
that the standard of proof required to bring home the
charges in the disciplinary proceedings is of
significantly lower degree than the standard of proof
required to establish the guilt of the accused in a
criminal trial. While in departmental proceedings,
charges can be established merely on basis of
preponderance of possibilities, in a criminal trial, the
prosecution would be required to establish the
charges by proving its case beyond all manner of
doubt.
10
18. Thus, once the delinquent employee stands
exonerated in the departmental proceedings, where
the burden of proof is much lesser, the continuance
of criminal proceedings founded on the very same set
of allegations and evidence would not be justified.
19. To buttress his contentions, learned senior
counsel placed reliance on Ashoo Surendranath
8
Tewari v. Dept Superintendent , and urged that
the criminal proceedings sought to be pursued
against the accused-appellant deserve to be quashed.
20. Further, during the course of hearing, learned
senior counsel Shri Kamat handed over to the Court
rd
the office memorandum dated 3 December, 1991,
evidencing the appointment of the accused-appellant
T. Manjunath, to the post of Inspector of Motor
Vehicles. He referred to this document and contended
that the appointment of the accused-appellant had
8
(2020) 9 SCC 636.
11
been made under the authority of the Governor of
Karnataka and, therefore, the appointing authority of
the accused-appellant was the State Government. On
this premise, it was urged that the sanction for
prosecution could have been validly accorded only by
the State Government and not by the Commissioner.
21. Shri Kamat further argued that the expression
“competence” occurring in Section 19(4) of the PC
Act, has to be treated at par with “jurisdiction”.
According to him, by virtue of Section 19(1) of the Act,
the authority competent to grant sanction for
prosecution of the accused-appellant was the State
Government alone, and sanction accorded by an
officer not authorised to remove the accused from the
post was without the authority of law and suffered
from patent lack of jurisdiction. He thus urged that
the view taken by the High Court in reversing the
12
order passed by the trial Court is absolutely
unjustified and deserves to be set aside.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent-State
22.
Per contra , Shri Aman Panwar, learned AAG
representing the State of Karnataka, vehemently and
fervently opposed the submissions advanced on
behalf of the accused-appellant. He contended that
the mere exoneration of the accused-appellant in the
disciplinary proceedings cannot, by itself, furnish a
ground to quash the criminal proceedings even if
both proceedings are founded on the same set of
facts. He submitted that the exoneration of the
accused-appellant in the disciplinary proceedings
was occasioned solely because the complainant, the
shadow witness, and the accompanying witness did
not support the case of the department. The
exoneration was totally unjustified because the trap-
13
laying Officer had, in his deposition, fully supported
the case of department.
23. He urged that the law is well settled by a catena
of judgments rendered by this Court that in cases
where the accused is apprehended for accepting
illegal gratification, the mere fact of the complainant,
the shadow witness and the accompanying witness
turning hostile, would have no bearing on the
outcome of the case, and that the conviction in the
criminal case can be based/sustained even on the
sole testimony of the trap laying officer, if found
credible and trustworthy. He further submitted that
the accused himself admitted having demanded the
bribe when the trap memo was prepared and thus,
the prosecution case is founded on unimpeachable
material, the worth whereof would have to be
assessed at the trial.
14
24. Learned counsel placed reliance on State v. T.
9
Murthy , State of MP v. Virender Kumar
10
Tripathi , and State of Bihar v. Rajmangal
11
Ram
to urge that the controversy regarding the
competence of the sanctioning authority and its effect
on the trial has been settled by this Court in these
precedents expressly holding that a sanction order
cannot be struck down on the ground of lack of
competence of the authority issuing it.
25. Learned AAG has vehemently and fervently
controverted the claim made by Shri Kamat based on
documents handed over during the course of hearing
that the appointing authority of the appellant is the
State Government. He urged that no such plea was
taken by the appellant before the High Court and that
the unverified documents handed over by the
9
(2004) 7 SCC 763.
10
(2009) 15 SCC 533.
11
(2014) 11 SCC 388.
15
appellant across the board cannot be considered to
decide the issue of appointing authority. He further
contended that the office memorandum relied upon
by the accused-appellant is not the appointment
order at all; it is merely a posting order issued under
the authority of the Governor of Karnataka. As a
matter of fact, the appointing authority of the
accused-appellant is none other than the
Commissioner. To substantiate this contention,
th
learned counsel handed over an order dated 11
February, 2010, which, according to him,
conclusively establishes that the Commissioner was
the appointing authority competent to remove the
accused-appellant from service and, as a necessary
corollary, to grant sanction for prosecution. He thus
urged that on both facets, namely, the question of
competence as well as the aspect of the appointing
authority, the accused-appellant has failed to make
16
out any case warranting interference in the impugned
order.
Discussion and Analysis
26.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at the Bar and have
th
carefully gone through the impugned order dated 26
July, 2024 passed by the High Court, as well as the
rd
order dated 23 August, 2017 passed by the trial
Court. We have also minutely perused the findings
recorded by the disciplinary authority while
exonerating the accused-appellant in the
departmental proceedings.
A. Effect of Departmental Clean
Chit/Exoneration on Criminal Proceedings
27. First, we will consider the plea of the accused-
appellant that, as the departmental proceedings have
resulted in his exoneration, the criminal proceedings
cannot be continued.
17
28. For this purpose, we have perused the findings
rd
as recorded in the Enquiry report dated 23
September, 2021. Relevant excerpts of the report are
reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready
reference: -
“13) The points that arise for my consideration are
Point No 1: Whether the Disciplinary Authority
has proved the charges?
Point No 2: What order?
14) Above points are answered as under
Point No 1: In the Negative
Point No 2: As per final order for the following,
REASONS
15) The Disciplinary Authority has examined the
shadow witness as PW-1, complainant as PW-2,
colleague of the complainant as PW-3, and the
Investigation Officer came to be examined as PW-4
and got marked documents Ex P-1 to P-26 The
shadow witness, complainant and his colleague i.e.,
PW-1 to 3 have not supported the version of the
Disciplinary Authority Even though, the Disciplinary
Authority cross-examined PW-1 to 3 and suggested
the version of the Disciplinary Authority that, DGO
has demanded bribe of Rs 24,000/- for twelve
tippers, but after negotiation with the complainant
PW-2, the bribe amount was reduced to Rs 18,000/-
and at last PW-1 gave Rs 15,000/- to Paramesh @
Mastigouda on the say of the DGO but, the said
18
version of the disciplinary authority has been denied
by PW-1 to 3.
16) No doubt, the Disciplinary Authority succeeded
in proving about the lodging of the complaint Ex P-
10, basing on it, PW-4 registered crime No 48/2012
and sent FIR vide Ex P-12 to court and his superiors
The pre-trap malazar was drawn on 13/06/2012
vide Ex P-2 PW-1 has produced Rs 18,000/- (500x
36) currency notes and their numbers were noted in
the sheet Ex P-1 by the panch witness i.e., PW-1 and
Vishwas Investigation Officer has deposed about
drawing of Ex P-4 panchanama on 13/06/2012,
wherein the trap was unsuccessful as the DGO was
not in the office at about 5:15 pm on 13/06/2012.
17) PW-4 has further deposed about trap
panchanama Ex P-5, which was conducted on
14/06/2012, wherein the trap was conducted at
2nd floor of the RTO office, KR Puram at 12:30 pm
PW-4 deposed about the recovery of Rs 15,000/-
from Mastigouda and his hand wash was made in
the sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned
to pink colour The said mahazar Ex P-5 was
concluded at Lokayukta police, MS Building,
Bengaluru at 4:50 pm.
18) The prime witnesses for establishing the charges
leveled against the DGO are the complainant, PW-2
and his colleague PW-3 and shadow witness PW-1
But, the said prime witnesses have not supported
the version of the Disciplinary Authority The
complainant is working as a Supervisor in
Prashanth Crushers, which has twelve tippers
plying within jurisdiction of KR Puram RTO, wherein
DGO was serving as Motor Vehicle Inspector The
19
allegation of PW-1 is that, the DGO was stopping the
said tippers near Hoskote often and insisted the
drivers to telephone to their owner asking him to
look after the DGO otherwise DGO threatened to
book case against the said tippers The owner of the
sad Prashanth Crushers has asked PW-2 to lodge
the complaint to the Lokayukta police Accordingly,
PW-2 approached PW-4 on 12/06/2012 and
disclosed about the demand of bribe amount by the
DGO to PW-4, PW-4 directed PW-1 to record the
conversations held between the DGO in respect of
demand of bribe amount by giving the voice-recorder
PW-1 met the DGO and made negotiation of bribe
amount i.e. , DGO alleged to have demanded Rs
2,000/- per tipper in total Rs 24,000/-, but after
negotiation, amount was reduced to Rs 18,000/-
PW-1 has again approached PW-4 on 13/06/2012
and lodged the complaint, Ex P-10 and basing on it,
Cr No 48/2012 was registered and FIR, Ex P-12 was
sent to court and his superiors
19) PW-2, complainant has deposed before the court
that, he has affixed his signature on the complaint
at Ex P-10, on the say of his owner, but shown his
ignorance about its content PW-2 further deposed
that, DGO has never demanded bribe amount and
also not asked the complainant to give the amount
in the hands of said Paramesh @ Mastigouda He has
given Rs 15,000/- to said Paramesh (@ Mastigouda
No doubt, PW-4 has recovered Rs 15,000/- from said
Paramesh under the trap and hands of the said
Paramesh were washed in the sodium carbonate
solution, which turned to pink colour
20) PW-3, the colleague of PW-2 has shown his
ignorance about demand of bribe amount by the
20
DGO from PW-2 and he has not accompanied PW-2
to the RTO, KR Puram office, he has not gone inside
the said RTO office and he is unaware of the incident
that has taken place in the RTO office Even though,
the Presenting Officer cross-examined PW-3, but
nothing is elicited during the cross-examination to
establish the charge levelled against DGO.
21)The shadow witness, PW-1 has deposed half-
heartedly before the Inquiry Officer and he does not
remember how much amount was given by the
complainant to the Police Inspector He further
deposed that, PW-1 was standing near the door of
the chamber of DGO and the door was closed, hence
he could not hear the conversations and also witness
anything which transpired between the complainant
and the DGO PW-1, could not hear the conversation
that took place inside the chamber, but PW-1 has
witnessed complainant giving the tainted money of
Rs 15,000/- to one Sri Mastigouda and the said
amount was kept in his trouser pocket and he could
not hear as to who instructed Sri Mastigouda to
receive the said money During the cross-
examination made by the Presenting Officer, PW-1
admitted that, he was standing near the door, when
the complainant went inside the chamber and door
was slightly opened at that time, he could not hear,
but denied the suggestions made by the Presenting
Officer that, he heard the conversations of DGO that
he demanded bribe amount from the complainant
and further heard that, the complainant negotiated
with DGO for reducing the bribe amount and DGO
asked the complainant to give the said money to Sri
Mastigouda.
21
22) According to the theory of the Disciplinary
Authority, the complainant and DGO negotiated the
bribe amount from Rs 24000/- to Rs 18,000/- in
order to permit twelve tippers belonging to
Prashanth Crushers to ply on road i.e., within the
jurisdiction of RTO, KR Puram, the complainant
approached PW-4 as per the directions of his owner
to lodge complaint Ex P-10, but the complainant has
not supported the said version that, DGO demanded
bribe amount of Rs 24,000/- and after negotiation,
it was reduced to Rs 18,000/- The said amount of
Rs 18,000/- (500x36) was given to PW-4 on
13/06/2012 and the value and number of the said
currency notes were written on a sheet Ex P-1 by the
panch witnesses PW-3 was present at the time of
drawing pre-panchanama, Ex P-3 and also trap
panchanama Ex P-5 on 14/06/2012 But, PW-3,
who is the colleague of PW-2 i.e., employee of
Prashanth Crushers has completely turned hostile
and there is no corroboration in the evidence of PW-
2 and 3 with respect to demand of bribe amount by
the DGO from PW-2 and he has given bribe amount
of Rs 15,000/- to the said Paramesh @ Mastigouda
on the say of the DGO.
23) According to Disciplinary Authority, the shadow
witness, PW-1, accompanied PW-2 and 3 to the RTO
office, KR Puram i.e, 2nd floor and was standing
near the door of the DGOs chamber and heard the
conversations between PW-2 and DGO regarding
negotiation of reducing the bribe amount and he
witnessed the receipt of Rs 15,000/- by the said
Paramesh from PW-2 on the say of the DGO But,
PW-1 categorically deposed that, he has not heard
the conversations held between PW-2 and DGO and
he had witnessed the incident of giving amount of Rs
22
15,000/- by PW-2 to the said Paramesh Evidence of
PW-1 to 3 is not linking the chain of events i.e., DGO
has demanded bribe amount from PW-2 and PW-2
has given the said amount to said Paramesh as per
the say of the DGO The said fact of demand of bribe
amount from DGO and receipt of said bribe amount
by the said Paramesh as per the say of the DGO from
PW-2 is totally missing from the evidence of PW-1 to
3.
24) The solitary evidence of Investigation Officer,
PW-4 alone will not establish the charge leveled
against DGO PW-4 deposed that, PW-2 had
approached PW-4 on 12/06/2012 disclosed about
the demand of bribe amount by DGO PW-4 directed
PW-2 to record the conversations of DGO in the
voice-recorder PW-4 registered crime No 48/2012 on
the basis of the complaint lodged by PW-2 on
13/06/2012 PW-4 has secured PW-1 and another
panch witness namely, Sri Vishwas and introduced
them to PW-2 and disclose about the complaint, Ex
P-10 PW-4 has further deposed that, PW2 has
produced Rs 18,000/- (500 x36) currency notes and
the value of the said notes and numbers were noted
in the sheet Ex P1 One of the police staff had
smeared the phenolphthalein powder on the said
currency notes and as per the directions of PW-4,
Panch witness namely, Vishwas kept the said
tainted notes in the pant pocket of PW-2 and the
hand wash of the said Vishwas was made in the
sodium carbonate solution, which turned to pink
PW4 directed the complainant to give the said
tainted notes to the DGO, only after demand and
PW-1 had to accompany PW-2 along with PW-3 to
the RTO office, KR Puram for trap Trap was not
successful on 13/06/2012 as DGO left the office at
23
5:00 pm itself In that respect mahazar Ex P-4 was
drawn PW-1 to 4 along with Vishwas and staff have
returned back to PW 4’s office and returned the
tainted notes and also voice-recorder and also the
pen camera and asked the said raiding party to come
on 14/06/2012 at 10:00 am
25) PW-4 was successful in getting the trap on
14/06/2012 at 12:30 pm at 2nd floor of the RTO
office, KR Puram by accompanying PW-1 to 3 and
Vishwas along with his staff and the trap mahazar
was drawn vide Ex P-5 at PW-4’s office PW-4 has
followed PW-1 to 3 along with Vishwas and the staff
to RTO office He was standing at the 2nd floor
amidst public PW-4 has directed PW-2 to give signal
after giving the said tainted notes after demand PW-
2 made signal and the said raiding party went to the
chamber of DGO and PW-2 stated that, he had given
the amount to the said Paramesh and hand wash of
the said Paramesh was made m the sodium
carbonate solution, which turned into pink colour
and the amount was seized from said Paramesh at
the RTO office itself.
26) There is no corroboration in the evidence of PW-
4 and PW-1 to 3 The important aspect of demand of
bribe amount by the DGO is not forthcoming from
the evidence of PW-1 to 3, though it is finding place
in the complaint, Ex P-10, Ex P-2 and Ex P-5 trap
panchanama The acceptance of bribe amount by the
said Paramesh as per say of DGO is also missing
from the evidence of PW-1 to 3 The charge levelled
against DGO is that, he has demanded bribe amount
from PW-2 The main ingredients of illegal demand of
bribe amount from the complainant and receipt of
the bribe amount by said Paramesh on the say of the
24
DGO are missing in the instant case on hand The
evidence of the PW-1 to 4 in other aspect may
corroborate, but it is no way helpful to the
Disciplinary Authority in proving the charge levelled
against the DGO.
…..
32) On appreciation of entire oral and documentary
evidence, I hold that the charge leveled against the
DGO is not established and preponderance of
probabilities also do not point at his misconduct
Point No 1: Hence, Point No 1 is answered in the
Negative
Point No 2: For the reasons stated above, I
proceed to record the following findings –
FINDINGS
The Disciplinary Authority has not
proved the charges framed against DGO Sri T
Manjunath, Senior Inspector of Motor
Vehicles, Office of RegionalTransport Officer
KR Puram, Bengaluru DGO will retire from
service on 31/05/2028.
This report is submitted to the Hon’ble
Upalokayukta in a sealed cover,
Dated this the 23 September, 2021
Sd/-”
29. Upon perusal of the above report, it is evident
that the disciplinary authority’s discretion was
swayed by the fact that the Sri K.R. Manjunath
(complainant), Sri Nagesh (shadow witness), and Sri
25
Maruthiraj (colleague of the complainant) did not
support the department’s case and feigned ignorance
about the transaction of bribe. However, the order of
the disciplinary authority also takes note of the fact
that Sri Sanjeevarappa (Investigating Officer) fully
supported the case of the department and proved the
trap panchnama , as per which the tainted currency
notes were recovered from the hands of Paramesh @
Mastigowda (accused No. 2), and the allegation of
demand of a bribe was proved against the accused-
appellant. We feel that the conclusion drawn by the
disciplinary authority that guilt of the delinquent
employee could not be proved merely on the
testimony of the trap laying officer, is premature and
unfounded.
26
12
30. This Court has, in a catena of decisions , held
that the mere fact that a decoy/complainant in a trap
case turns hostile would not adversely affect the case
of prosecution and that conviction can be based even
on the evidence of the trap laying officer, if found
reliable and trustworthy.
31. We may further observe that when a witness
deposing on oath in a criminal trial resiles from the
original version and does not support the prosecution
case, he would be liable to face prosecution for
perjury. Under this pressure, the witness may
choose to speak the truth. Thus, the mere fact that
some of the witnesses did not support the
department’s case in the disciplinary proceedings
would, by itself, not give any assurance that they
would behave in the same manner at the criminal
12
N. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. , (2001) 1 SCC 691; Neeraj Datta v.
State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731.
27
trial. In the present case, as is evident, the
exoneration of the accused-appellant in the
departmental proceedings is merely on the ground
that the decoy and associating witnesses did not
support the case of department.
32. The possibility of the criminal case still resulting
into conviction, irrespective of the factum of the
witnesses turning hostile being a realistic possibility,
we feel that there is no merit behind the argument of
Shri Kamat that exoneration in the departmental
proceeding should lead to automatic discharge in the
criminal case. Hence, the said argument advanced
on behalf of the accused-appellant, placing reliance
on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari (supra) , has no
merit and is rejected.
33. Though the core facts in both proceedings may
bear resemblance, the viewpoint, scope, and
standards for adjudication are entirely different, and
28
each is governed by a distinct forum and procedure.
Hence, exoneration in the departmental proceedings
does not, ipso facto , furnish a ground for dropping
the criminal charges more particularly in Trap Cases.
B. Sanction Under Section 19 PC Act:
Competence and Jurisdictional Validity
34. The second fold of the argument advanced by
learned counsel for the accused-appellant was based
on the alleged illegality vitiating the sanction order.
35. The question of competence of the sanctioning
authority – being the bone of contention between the
parties, the same requires to be considered . The
controversy essentially turns around whether the
expression “competence” is to be understood as
synonymous with “authority” or “jurisdiction” to
remove the employee from service for the purposes of
Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988.
29
36. For appreciating this submission, the language
of the enabling provision, i.e., Section 19 needs to be
reproduced hereunder: -
“19. Previous sanction necessary for
prosecution.—
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under [sections 7, 11, 13 and 15]
alleged to have been committed by a public
servant, except with the previous sanction [save
as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and
Lokayuktas Act, 2013]—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as
the case may be, was at the time of commission
of the alleged offence employed in connection
with the affairs of the Union and is not removable
from his office save by or with the sanction of the
Central Government, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or
as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed] in
connection with the affairs of a State and is not
removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the State Government, of that
Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the
authority competent to remove him from his
office:
[Provided that no request can be made, by a
person other than a police officer or an officer of an
investigation agency or other law enforcement
authority, to the appropriate Government or
30
competent authority, as the case may be, for the
previous sanction of such Government or authority
for taking cognizance by the court of any of the
offences specified in this sub-section, unless—
(i) such a person has filed a complaint in a
competent court about the alleged offences for
which the public servant is sought to be
prosecuted; and
(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint
under section 203 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the
complainant to obtain the sanction for
prosecution against the public servant for
further proceeding:
Provided further that in the case of request from
the person other than a police officer or an officer of
an investigation agency or other law enforcement
authority, the appropriate Government or competent
authority shall not accord sanction to prosecute a
public servant without providing an opportunity of
being heard to the concerned public servant:
Provided also that the appropriate Government or
any competent authority shall, after the receipt of the
proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a
public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to
convey the decision on such proposal within a period
of three months from the date of its receipt:
Provided also that in case where, for the purpose
of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal consultation
is required, such period may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, be extended by a further period
of one month:
Provided also that the Central Government may,
for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a public
servant, prescribe such guidelines as it considers
necessary.
31
Explanation. — For the purposes of sub-section (1),
the expression “public servant” includes such
person—
(a) who has ceased to hold the office during
which the offence is alleged to have been
committed; or
(b) who has ceased to hold the office during
which the offence is alleged to have been
committed and is holding an office other than the
office during which the offence is alleged to have
been committed.]
(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises
as to whether the previous sanction as required under
sub-section (1) should be given by the Central
Government or the State Government or any other
authority, such sanction shall be given by that
Government or authority which would have been
competent to remove the public servant from his office
at the time when the offence was alleged to have been
committed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a
special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a
Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the
ground of the absence of, or any error, omission
or irregularity in, the sanction required under
sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that
court, a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on the ground of any error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction granted by the
authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,
omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure
of justice;
32
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this
Act on any other ground and no court shall
exercise the powers of revision in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial,
appeal, or other proceedings.
( 4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether
the absence of, or any error, omission or
irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or
resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have
regard to the fact whether the objection could and
should have been raised at any earlier stage in the
proceedings.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) error includes competency of the
authority to grant sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution
includes reference to any requirement that
the prosecution shall be at the instance of a
specified authority or with the sanction of a
specified person or any requirement of a
similar nature.”
[Emphasis supplied]
37. Section 19(1) clearly stipulates that where the
appointing authority of the accused is the State
Government, the sanction for prosecution must be
accorded by the State Government and by none
other. The judgments in T. Murthy (supra), Virender
Kumar Tripathi (supra), and Rajmangal Ram
33
(supra) relied upon by the learned standing counsel
for the State, advert to the Explanation appended
under Section 19(4). In our view, the Explanation to
Section 19(4) would become relevant and come into
play only when the question of validity or otherwise
of the sanction is under scrutiny before the appellate
13
or the revisional forum as provided in sub-Section
(3) of Section 19. In the present case, such a
determination was made by the learned Special
Judge in the original jurisdiction, who held that the
sanction was invalid as it had been issued by an
authority lacking jurisdiction to do so, and that no
authority other than the State Government could
have granted a sanction in respect of the accused-
appellant, his appointment having been made by the
State Government itself.
13
Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186.
34
38. In this factual background, the Explanation
below Section 19(4) is not germane to the
controversy, for it operates only in situations where
the finding, sentence, or order of the Special Judge
on the aspect of sanction is under scanner before the
appellate or revisional Court on the grounds specified
therein. Thus, these decisions are of no assistance to
the State and are distinguishable on facts.
C. Divergent claims regarding the Appointing
Authority
39. Having held so, we now proceed to advert to the
situation that has arisen owing to the inconsistency
in the diverse claims regarding the authority who
actually appointed the accused-appellant. As noted
hereinabove, competing assertions have been
advanced regarding the actual appointing authority
of the accused-appellant, based on the documents
handed over to the Court during the course of the
hearing of the appeals. While learned counsel for the
35
State maintains that the Commissioner is the
appointing authority of the accused-appellant, the
learned senior counsel representing the accused-
appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the
appointing authority is the State Government.
40. In view of this disputed factual scenario, we are
of the considered opinion that, for a proper and
effective resolution of the controversy, it would be
expedient in the interest of justice to remit the matter
to the trial Court for fresh adjudication on the limited
issue regarding the actual appointing authority of the
accused-appellant and the consequential bearing
thereof on the validity of the sanction order.
41. The contention advanced on behalf of the
accused-appellant that he is entitled to be discharged
on account of his exoneration in the departmental
proceedings does not merit acceptance and is,
accordingly, rejected.
36
42. The finding recorded by the High Court on the
aspect of the validity of the sanction is set aside, and
the matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh
determination of the issue of sanction in accordance
with law, keeping in view the above observations.
43. For this purpose, the trial Court shall be at
liberty to summon the original
records/contemporaneous documents pertaining to
appointment of the accused-appellant, and thereafter
to take an appropriate decision regarding the validity
or otherwise of the sanction, in accordance with law.
In case the trial Court finds that the sanction has
been issued by a competent authority, the trial shall
proceed. However, in case the conclusion is
otherwise, the trial Court shall return the
chargesheet to the investigating agency for procuring
fresh sanction from the appropriate authority.
44. The appeals are disposed of in these terms.
37
45. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 10, 2025.
38