RUCHIKA PUGLANI vs. AASNA DIGIN & ANR.

Case Type: Civil Misc Misc

Date of Judgment: 28-10-2022

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Full Judgment Text

Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 $~52(Appellate) * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CM(M) 398/2022 & CM APPL.20682/2022 RUCHIKA PUGLANI ..... Petitioner Through: Mr.Anjum Kumar, Adv. versus AASNA DIGIN & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr.Joel, Adv. for R-1 Mr.Rishab Raj Jain, Adv. for BSES-RPL/R- 2 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR J U D G M E N T (O R A L) % 28.10.2022 th 1. The impugned order dated 15 February 2022, passed by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge (“the learned ASCJ”), invokes Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to stay the trial in CS SCJ 1421/2021 (Ruchika Puglani v. Aasna Digin) pending the outcome of CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 (Aasna Digin v. Pawan Hans Taheem ) . Ruchika Puglani, the petitioner before me, is the plaintiff in CS SCJ 1421/2021 (the trial in which has been stayed) and Defendant 2 in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021. Facts CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 CM(M) 398/2022 Page 1 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 2. CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 was instituted by the respondent Aasna Digin (“Aasna”) against Pawan Hans Taheem (“Pawan”) and Ruchika Puglani (“Ruchika”) who are husband and wife. Ruchika is the petitioner in the present petition. 3. Aasna claimed, in the plaint in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021, to be the landlord of Pawan and Ruchika in respect of the premises situated at 70/18, Second Floor, B Side, B-1 Extension, Sewak Park, Uttam Nagar, Delhi 110059 (hereinafter “the suit property”). It was claimed that Aasna had let out the said premises to Pawan and Ruchika vide th lease deed dated 13 April 2019 for a period of 11 months at a fixed rd monthly rent of ₹ 11,000/-. The period of lease was to expire on 23 January 2020. Even after the expiry of the period of lease, the plaint averred that Aasna allowed Pawan and Ruchika to continue residing in the suit property on oral monthly lease, and that Pawan and Ruchika had agreed to vacate the suit property on seven days’ notice. 4. Aasna further averred, in her plaint, that Pawan and Ruchika were in default of rent since January 2021. Aasna claimed to have called upon them to vacate the suit premises in March 2021. On Pawan and Ruchika failing to do so, Aasna instituted CS ADJ DJ 482/2021. The suit also averred that, apart from arrears of rent, Pawan and Ruchika were in arrears of electricity charges, water charges, RWA charges and other utility charges, totalling approximately to ₹ 21,000/-. 5. Premised on the aforesaid assertions and allegations, Aasna CM(M) 398/2022 Page 2 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 prayed, in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021, that Pawan and Ruchika be directed to immediately vacate the suit property and that vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property be restored to her. Additionally, outstanding monetary claims, which were allegedly remaining to be paid by Pawan and Ruchika, were also claimed in the suit. 6. Mr. Anjum Kumar, learned Counsel for Ruchika, the petitioner in the present petition, submits that his client is yet to receive summons in the aforesaid suit. CS SCJ 1421/2021 7. CS SCJ 1421/2021 was instituted by Ruchika against Aasna Digin and BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. (“BSES”). Pawan is not a party in the said suit. 8. Ruchika contends, in the plaint in CS SCJ 1421/2021, that she, with her husband Pawan, were co-tenants in respect of the suit property, enjoying electricity supply provided by BSES. The plaint, while admitting that there was matrimonial discord between Pawan and Ruchika, averred, nonetheless, that Ruchika continued to reside in the suit property and that no electricity charges were due to BSES. While alleging that Aasna was employing coercive measures to evict Ruchika from the suit property, without due justification, the main grievance of Ruchika, in her plaint, stemmed from an incident which th took place at 5 p.m. on 9 December 2021, when electricity in the suit property was suddenly disconnected. On enquiring into the matter, CM(M) 398/2022 Page 3 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 Ruchika claims that the meter, through which electricity was supplied to the suit property, was found missing. On visiting the office of BSES, Ruchika was informed that electricity had not been disconnected by BSES but that the case was one of theft of the electricity meter, for which the BSES authorities advised Ruchika to approach the police. Following the said advice, the plaint avers that an FIR was lodged by Ruchika at the police station at about 12.22 a.m. 9. Despite repeated efforts to contact the concerned officials at BSES, the plaint in CS SCJ 1421/2021 alleges that electricity at the suit property was not restored, despite the obligation of BSES to do so, given that no dues to BSES remained pending. Significantly, para 19 of the plaint, which sets out the cause of action on the basis of which the suit was instituted, reads thus: “19. That the cause of action arose firstly when the plaintiff alongwith her husband taken on rent the suit property. It again arose on 09.12.2021 when the electricity meter of the suit property was removed by the defendants in connivance with each other. It again arose on 10.12.2021 when the plaintiff alongwith her mother at around 10:30 am went to the office of the defendant No.2 at District Centre, who refused to address the grievance of the plaintiff. It again arose on 13.12.2021 the plaintiff received the reply from the customer care of the defendant No.2 that to contact the area division office for removal of her grievance and it further arose on 14.12.2021 the plaintiff again went to the area division office of the defendant No.2 at BLOCK-B, SEWAK PARK, DWARKA, NEW DELHl-110059 but the defendant No.2 in connivance with defendant No.1 have refused to restore the electricity connection in the suit property. The cause of action is still continuing one as the defendants have failed to restore the electricity connection of the plaintiff.” CM(M) 398/2022 Page 4 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 10. Ruchika, therefore, in her plaint, sought a decree of mandatory injunction against the defendants directing BSES to restore the electricity connection and to install a fresh electricity meter in the suit property and for an injunction restraining the respondents from disconnecting or removing the electricity connection/meter from the suit property. The dispute 11. Aasna filed an application, before the learned ASCJ in CS SCJ 1421/2021, seeking stay of trial in the said suit, citing, for the purpose, the pendency of CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 instituted prior in point of time. th 12. The learned ASCJ has, vide the impugned order dated 15 February 2022, allowed the said application and has, consequently, stayed trial in CS SCJ 1421/2021 pending proceedings in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021. 13. Ruchika claims to be aggrieved thereby. The impugned order 14. The learned ASCJ has, in arriving at his decision, proceeded on the premise that the right to electricity is but a facet of the right to enjoy possession of immoveable property. A person in possession of immoveable property cannot, regardless of the nature of his possession, claim a right to electricity. To illustrate this position, the CM(M) 398/2022 Page 5 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 learned ASCJ has posed a poser, as to whether a trespasser in immoveable property could claim an electricity connection and has, needless to say, answered the query in the negative. 15. The learned ASCJ has proceeded to frame the question that arose before him as “where the plaintiff is entitled to enjoy the suit property”. This issue, he holds, was the issue which formed subject matter of consideration in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021, which required the Court to decide “whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to retain possession of the suit property”. Thus, holds the learned ASCJ, the matters in issue in both the suits were substantially the same. 16. The learned ASCJ has further observed that BSES was merely an agent of Aasna and was doing what was asked of it by Aasna. As, therefore, in the perception of the learned ASCJ, Ruchika and her husband Pawan were sailing in the same boat insofar as Aasna was concerned, and were claiming a right to remain in the suit property under the lease deed, the learned ASCJ holds that the requisite ingredients of Section 10 of the CPC exist in the present case. 17. On the said premise, the learned ASCJ has proceeded, as already noted, to stay the trial of CS SCJ 1421/2021, pending proceedings in CS ADJ DJ 482/2022. Rival Contentions 18. I have heard Mr. Anjum Kumar, learned Counsel for the CM(M) 398/2022 Page 6 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 petitioner and Mr. Joel, learned Counsel for the respondent at considerable length. The matter has been argued threadbare. 19. Mr. Anjum Kumar submits that the impugned order cannot sustain in law, as the issues in CS SCJ 1421/2021 and CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 were different, the parties were different and the reliefs sought were different. The mere fact that some issues may be overlapping, he submits, cannot be a ground to stay the trial in the suit instituted later, pending the outcome of that instituted earlier. 20. Mr. Joel, supporting the impugned order submits, on the other hand, that the learned ASCJ was perfectly justified in the view he took. He submits, echoing the opinion expressed by the learned ASCJ that, if Ruchika had no right to stay in the suit property, she could, equivalently, have no right to seek restoration of electricity. The right to electricity, therefore, he submits, is a consequence of her right to stay in suit property. If, therefore, CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 were to be decided against Pawan and Ruchika and in favour of Aasna, he submits that the wind would proverbially stand knocked out of the sails of CS SCJ 1421/2021 instituted by Ruchika. The decision in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 therefore, he submits, would also operate as res judicata , where CS SCJ 1421/2021 was concerned. 21. These circumstances, according to Mr. Joel, sufficiently justify the passing of the impugned order by the learned ASCJ. 22. Mr. Joel has pressed, into service, paras 9 and 11 of the report in CM(M) 398/2022 Page 7 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 1 Aspi Jal v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor , paras 23 and 24 of the report in the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in H.S. 2 Sahni v. Mukul Singhal , paras 4 and 5 of the report in Gupte 3 Cardiac Care Centre and Hospital v. Olympic Pharma Care (P) Ltd. and various passages from the judgment of a learned Single Judge of 4 the High Court of Allahabad in Ram Narain v. Ram Swarup . He further contends that the test which should apply to Section 10 would be the same which applies to Section 11, inasmuch as one of the prime considerations in deciding whether the trial of the later suit is required to be stayed under Section 10 is whether the decision in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata in the later suit. Mr. Joel extrapolates the argument to contend that Explanations IV and VI to Section 11 of the CPC should also apply, mutatis mutandis , to Section 10. Apropos the scope and ambit of Explanation VI to Section 11 of the CPC, Mr. Joel relies on Narayana Prabhu Venkateshwara v. Narayana Prabhu 5 Krishna Prabhu . 23. Among other things, submits Mr. Joel, concurrent proceedings in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 and CS SCJ 1421/2021 might result in contrary findings by the Courts seized with the said suits on the aspect of termination of the lease whereby Pawan and Ruchika were permitted to reside in the suit property. 1 (2013) 4 SCC 333 2 (2022) 89 PTC 565 3 (2004) 6 SCC 756 4 AIR 1962 All 108 5 (1977) 2 SCC 181 CM(M) 398/2022 Page 8 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 Analysis 24. The scope and ambit of Section 10 of the CPC is no longer res integra . They stand exhaustively delineated by the judgments of the Supreme Court in National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro 6 Sciences v. C. Paremeshwara (“ NIMHANS hereinafter) and Aspi 1 Jal . 25. I have, in my earlier decisions in Amita Vashisht v. Tarun 7 8 Vedi and Hnunpuii v. MCD , had an occasion to peruse the said decision and opine regarding the scope of Section 10. I deem it appropriate, with humility, to reproduce certain passages from my 7 8 decisions in Amita Vashisht and Hnunpuii , which considered and 6 took into account the principles enunciated in NIMHANS and Aspi 1 Jal thus: 7 From Amita Vashisht20. The law relating to Section 10 has been authoritatively expounded by the Supreme Court in its decisions in 6 1 NIMHANS and Aspi Jal . 21. Suits, pending before different courts, may often have overlapping issues. The result of one suit may often influence the outcome of another. The CPC contains various provisions to deal with such contingencies. Inter alia , where suits involved issues which are overlapping and where the outcome of one suit may materially affect another, the suits may be consolidated, in exercise of the jurisdiction vested by Section 6 (2005) 2 SCC 256 7 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2954 8 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2654 CM(M) 398/2022 Page 9 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537
151 of the CPC. The power to consolidate, as held
in Mahalaxmi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Ashabhai
Atmaram Patel9 is, in fact, intended “to save costs, time and
effort and to make the conduct of several actions more
convenient by treating them as one action”. “Consolidation of
suits is”, as the same decision holds, “ordered for meeting the
ends of justice as it saves the parties from multiplicity of
proceedings, delay and expenses and the parties are relieved
of the need of adducing the same or similar documentary and
oral evidence twice over in the two suits at two different
trials”. Para 18 of the report in Prem Lala Nahata v. Chandi
Prasad Sikaria10 delineates, precisely, the power of
consolidation, as well as the occasion for its exercise, thus:
“18. It cannot be disputed that the court has power to
consolidate suits in appropriate cases. Consolidation is
a process by which two or more causes or matters are
by order of the court combined or united and treated as
one cause or matter. The main purpose of consolidation
is therefore to save costs, time and effort and to make
the conduct of several actions more convenient by
treating them as one action. The jurisdiction to
consolidate arises where there are two or more matters
or causes pending in the court and it appears to the
court that some common question of law or fact arises
in both or all the suits or that the rights to relief
claimed in the suits are in respect of or arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions; or that for
some other reason it is desirable to make an order
consolidating the suits. (See Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 37, para 69.)”
22. As against this, Section 10 of the CPC is a somewhat
drastic provision, inasmuch as it brings the trial in the later
suit to a complete halt. It eviscerates, therefore, in a manner of
speaking, the right of the litigant to expeditious trial. The
corridors of the court not being the most habitable of places,
where one would choose to linger long, Section 10 is required
to be construed strictly.
9 (2013) 4 SCC 404 10 (2007) 2 SCC 551 CM(M) 398/2022 Page 10 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537
23. It is not necessary for this Court to enter into the
niceties of the provision. As already noted, the provision has
been examined in considerable detail by the Supreme Court in
its decisions in NIMHANS6 and Aspi Jal1, which are regarded
as authorities on the issue.
24. Para 8 of NIMHANS6 and paras 9, 11 and 12 of Aspi
Jal1 read thus:
NIMHANS 6:
“8. The object underlying Section 10 is to prevent
Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously
trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in
issue. The object underlying Section 10 is to avoid two
parallel trials on the same issue by two Courts and to
avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which
are directly and substantially in issue in previously
instituted suit. The language of Section 10 suggests
that it is referable to a suit instituted in the civil Court
and it cannot apply to proceedings of other nature
instituted under any other statute. The object of Section
10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from
simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the
same parties in respect of the same matter in issue. The
fundamental test to attract Section 10 is, whether on
final decision being reached in the previous suit, such
decision would operate as res-judicata in the
subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only in cases where
the whole of the subject matter in both the suits is
identical. The key words in Section 10 are “the matter
in issue is directly and substantially in issue” in the
previous instituted suit. The words “directly and
substantially in issue” are used in contra-distinction to
the words “incidentally or collaterally in issue”.
Therefore, Section 10 would apply only if there is
identity of the matter in issue in both the suits, meaning
thereby, that the whole of subject matter in both the
proceedings is identical.”
Aspi Jal1
CM(M) 398/2022 Page 11 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537
“9. Section 10 of the Code which is relevant for the
purpose reads as follows:
“10. Stay of suit. - No court shall proceed with
the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue
is also directly and substantially in issue in a
previously instituted suit between the same
parties, or between parties under whom they or
any of them claim litigating under the same title
where such suit is pending in the same or any
other court in India having jurisdiction to grant
the relief claimed, or in any court beyond the
limits of India established or continued by the
Central Government and having like
jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court.
Explanation.—The pendency of a suit in a
foreign court does not preclude the courts in
India from trying a suit founded on the same
cause of action.”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is
evident that where a suit is instituted in a court to
which provisions of the Code apply, it shall not
proceed with the trial of another suit in which the
matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue
in a previously instituted suit between the same parties.
For application of the provisions of Section 10 of the
Code, it is further required that the Court in which the
previous suit is pending is competent to grant the relief
claimed. The use of negative expression in Section 10
i.e. “no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit”
makes the provision mandatory and the court in which
the subsequent suit has been filed is prohibited from
proceeding with the trial of that suit if the conditions
laid down in Section 10 of the Code are satisfied. The
basic purpose and the underlying object of Section 10
of the Code is to prevent the courts of concurrent
jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining and
adjudicating upon two parallel litigations in respect of
same cause of action, same subject-matter and the
same relief. This is to pin down the plaintiff to one
litigation so as to avoid the possibility of contradictory
CM(M) 398/2022 Page 12 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537
verdicts by two courts in respect of the same relief and
is aimed to protect the defendant from multiplicity of
proceeding.
*****
11. In the present case, the parties in all the three
suits are one and the same and the court in which the
first two suits have been instituted is competent to
grant the relief claimed in the third suit. The only
question which invites our adjudication is as to whether
“the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in
issue in previously instituted suits”. The key words in
Section 10 are “the matter in issue is directly and
substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit”.
The test for applicability of Section 10 of the Code is
whether on a final decision being reached in the
previously instituted suit, such decision would operate
as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. To put it
differently one may ask, can the plaintiff get the same
relief in the subsequent suit, if the earlier suit has been
dismissed? In our opinion, if the answer is in
affirmative, the subsequent suit is not fit to be
stayed. However, we hasten to add then when the
matter in controversy is the same, it is immaterial what
further relief is claimed in the subsequent suit.
12. As observed earlier, for application of Section
10 of the Code, the matter in issue in both the suits
have to be directly and substantially in issue in the
previous suit but the question is what “the matter in
issue” exactly means? As in the present case, many of
the matters in issue are common, including the issue as
to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of
possession of the suit premises, but for application of
Section 10 of the Code, the entire subject-matter of the
two suits must be the same. This provision will not
apply where few of the matters in issue are common
and will apply only when the entire subject matter in
controversy is same. In other words, the matter in issue
is not equivalent to any of the questions in issue.”
(Emphasis supplied)
CM(M) 398/2022 Page 13 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 25. No doubt, both the decisions have underscored, as a “fundamental test”, for the purposes of Section 10 of the CPC, being whether, on a final decision reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. Even so, both the decisions go on to observe that, in order for Section 10 to be applied, there must be complete identity of subject matter in both suits . It has been emphasized, in both the decisions, that the key expression in Section 10 are “directly and substantially in issue”, which have been contra-distinguished from the expression “incidentally or collaterally in issue”. 26. “Therefore”, as held in both the decisions “Section 10 would apply only if there is identity of the matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of the subject matter in both the proceedings is identical”. 1 27. This aspect stands further clarified in Aspi Jal . In para 1 9 of the report in Aspi Jal , the Supreme Court has held that “the basic purpose and the underline object of Section 10 of the Code is to prevent the courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining and adjudicating upon two parallel litigations in respect of “ same cause of action, same subject matter and the same relief .” As a result, the effort, as per the said decision, as “to pin down the plaintiff to one litigation so as to avoid the possibility of contradictory verdicts by two courts in respect of the same relief and is aimed to protect the defendants from multiplicity of proceedings”. 1 28. Interestingly, in Aspi Jal , the parties in all suits were the same. The courts in which the earlier suits had been instituted were competent to grant the relief sought in the latter suit. Even so, the Supreme Court observed that the issue remained to be adjudicated “as to whether the matter in issue is also directly and substantially an issue in previously instituted suit”. Underscoring, once again, the importance of the expression “directly and substantially in issue”, the Supreme Court went on to hold that, even if “many of the matters in issue are common, including the issue of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of possession of the suit premises, but for application of Section 10 of the Code the entire subject matter of the two suits must be the same”. It CM(M) 398/2022 Page 14 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 was categorically held that Section 10 “will not apply where a few of the matters are common and will apply only when the entire subject matter of the controversy is same”. 8 From Hnunpuii
“12. Section 10 of the CPC reads thus:
“10. Stay of suit. - No Court shall proceed with the
trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also
directly and substantially in issue in a previously
instituted suit between the same parties, or between
parties under whom they or any of them claim
litigating under the same title where such suit is
pending in the same or any other Court in India having
jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court
beyond the limits of India established or continued by
the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or
before the Supreme Court.
Explanation. - The pendency of a suit in a foreign court
does not preclude the Courts in India from trying a suit
founded on the same cause of action.
13. NIMHANS6 crystallizes the principles governing
Section 10 of the CPC thus, in para 8 of the report:
“8. The object underlying Section 10 is to prevent
courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously
trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter
in issue. The object underlying Section 10 is to avoid
two parallel trials on the same issue by two courts
and to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues
which are directly and substantially in issue in
previously instituted suit. The language of Section 10
suggests that it is referable to a suit instituted in the
civil court and it cannot apply to proceedings of other
nature instituted under any other statute. The object of
Section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent
jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel
suits between the same parties in respect of the same
CM(M) 398/2022 Page 15 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537
matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract Section<br>10 is, whether on final decision being reached in the<br>previous suit, such decision would operate as res<br>judicata in the subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only<br>in cases where the whole of the subject-matter in both<br>the suits is identical. The key words in Section 10 are<br>“the matter in issue is directly and substantially in<br>issue” in the previous instituted suit. The words<br>“directly and substantially in issue” are used in<br>contradistinction to the words “incidentally or<br>collaterally in issue”. Therefore, Section 10 would<br>apply only if there is identity of the matter in issue in<br>both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of the<br>subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical.”<br>(Emphasis supplied)matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract Section
10 is, whether on final decision being reached in the
previous suit, such decision would operate as res
judicata in the subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only
in cases where the whole of the subject-matter in both
the suits is identical. The key words in Section 10 are
“the matter in issue is directly and substantially in
issue” in the previous instituted suit. The words
“directly and substantially in issue” are used in
contradistinction to the words “incidentally or
collaterally in issue”. Therefore, Section 10 would
apply only if there is identity of the matter in issue in
both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of the
subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In Aspi Jal1 , the Supreme Court, relying
on NIMHANS6, held, in para 9 of the report, thus:
“9. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision,
it is evident that where a suit is instituted in a court to
which provisions of the Code apply, it shall not
proceed with the trial of another suit in which the
matter in issue is also directly and substantially in
issue in a previously instituted suit between the same
parties. For application of the provisions of Section 10
of the Code, it is further required that the Court in
which the previous suit is pending is competent to
grant the relief claimed. The use of negative expression
in Section 10 i.e. “no court shall proceed with the trial
of any suit” makes the provision mandatory and the
court in which the subsequent suit has been filed is
prohibited from proceeding with the trial of that suit if
the conditions laid down in Section 10 of the Code are
satisfied. The basic purpose and the underlying object
of Section 10 of the Code is to prevent the courts of
concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously
entertaining and adjudicating upon two parallel
litigations in respect of same cause of action, same
subject-matter and the same relief. This is to pin down
the plaintiff to one litigation so as to avoid the
possibility of contradictory verdicts by two courts in
CM(M) 398/2022 Page 16 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 respect of the same relief and is aimed to protect the defendant from multiplicity of proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. As such, what is required, for a trial in a later suit to be stayed, during the pendency of an earlier suit, is unity and identity of the subject matter in issue in the two suits, to the extent that a final decision in the former suit would operate as res judicata in the latter. A triple identity test has been identified by the Supreme Court; there must be identity of cause of action, identity of subject-matter, and identity of relief. Overlapping is insufficient; what is required is identity .” (Emphasis in original) 26. In my considered opinion, the law enunciated by the Supreme Court with respect to Section 10 is clear, categorical and unexceptional. Though Mr. Joel did emphasise para 11 of the decision 1 in Aspi Jal , as requiring to be read alongwith para 9, the two paragraphs do not appear to me to be inconsistent in any manner. No doubt, one of the principal tests to be applied, in deciding whether to stay the trial of a suit later instituted in point of time, on the ground of pendency of an earlier suit, is whether a decision in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata in the later suit. That test, however, cannot be read in isolation. Section 10, for its application, necessarily requires that the two suits should be (to quote from para 9 of the report 1 in Aspi Jal ) “in respect of same cause of action, same subject matter 1 and the same relief”. The decision in Aspi Jal underscores the position by identifying the objective of Section 10 as “avoiding the possibility of contradictory verdicts by two courts in respect of the same relief”. As such, it is not merely avoiding of the possibility of contradictory verdicts of two courts which has to guide the exercise of CM(M) 398/2022 Page 17 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 jurisdiction under Section 10. The possibility of contradictory verdicts has to be in respect of the same relief. In the considered opinion of this Court, it would be completely impermissible for this Court, bound by Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India, to undermine, in any manner, the requirement of sameness of relief, which has been 1 repeated twice in para 9 of Aspi Jal . The contention advanced by Mr. Joel, if accepted, in my considered opinion, would amount to reducing, to a redundancy, the words “in respect of the same relief”, as 1 contained in para 9 of Aspi Jal . 27. Indeed, the decision of the Coordinate Single Bench of this 2 Court in H.S. Sahni , on which Mr. Joel relies, correctly understands this position. Para 23 of the report in the said case reads thus: “23. The fundamental test that is to be applied to determine whether Section 10 was applicable or not, is to see whether on the final decision being reached in the first suit, such decision would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. Where there was “identity of matter” in both the suits, i.e., the whole of the subject matter in both the proceedings were identical, even if further relfs were claimed in the subsequent suit, it would be immaterial and the second suit would necessarily have to be stayed .” (Emphasis supplied) 28. Further, the subject matter of the two suits must be identical. Identity of subject matter and identity of relief are, therefore, the inescapable sine qua non for Section 10 to apply. The mere fact that the outcome of one suit may have an effect on the outcome of the other is insufficient to invoke the said provision. It cannot be forgotten that what is required by Section 10, even as per the statute, is CM(M) 398/2022 Page 18 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 that the matter in issue in the suit later instituted is also directly and substantially in issue ” in the earlier instituted suit. The Court cannot be unmindful of the use of the word “and” between “directly” and “substantially”. What is required, therefore, is not mere substantial similarity of issues. There must be direct and substantial similarity of issues in the two suits. 29. Given the facts of the present case, it is not necessary, in my view, to enter in greater detail into the niceties of Section 10 of the CPC. 30. Applying these tests to the case at hand, it is apparent that no case, for staying the trial in CS SCJ 1421/2021, could be said to exist. CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 was a suit instituted by Aasna seeking to evict Pawan and Ruchika from the suit property. CS SCJ 1421/2021, on the other hand, is a suit instituted by Ruchika, complaining about disconnection of electricity in the suit property despite there being no payment outstanding to BSES in respect thereof. The reference to the dispute in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021, though it finds place in CS SCJ 1421/2021 is, in the considered opinion of this Court, completely tangential to the actual dispute forming subject matter of the suit instituted by Ruchika. 31. The parties to the two suits in the present case are different. BSES is not a party in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021. Indeed, there could be no question of BSES being a party in the said suit, as no relief, with respect to restoration of electricity or installation of any electricity CM(M) 398/2022 Page 19 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 meter, was even remotely in contemplation therein. CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 being an eviction suit, the parties to the suit were Aasna on the one hand as the landlady, and Pawan and Ruchika on the other hand, as the tenants. The suit does not make any reference to electricity, its disconnection, theft of any electricity meter, affixation of any electricity meter or restoration of electricity. 32. As against this, CS SCJ 1421/2021 is a simple suit predicated on disconnection of electricity consequent to theft of an electricity meter. The prayer in the suit is for restoration of electricity and reinstallation of the meter, as there were no dues pending against BSES. 33. Viewed any which way, and howsoever widely one may interpret Section 10, in the considered opinion of this Court, it is impossible to hold that there is even similarity , much less identity , of subject matter, between CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 and CS SCJ 1421/2021. The mere fact that, if she has no right to continue in the suit property, she may not have a right to electricity, cannot be a ground to hold that there is identity of subject matter in the two suits. 34. Mr Joel sought to contend that, as a person allegedly not entitled to continue in the suit property, Ruchika had no right to electricity. As a submission advanced to support the impugned order, the contention is completely misguided. It is necessary to appreciate, precisely, the case set up by Ruchika in CS SCJ 1421/2021. Ruchika’s case is that, as an occupant who is in occupation of the suit property, and who has CM(M) 398/2022 Page 20 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 paid all dues to BSES, she is entitled to electricity. If the meter was removed, and electricity disconnected thereby, she claims a right, as such occupant, to re-installation of the meter and reconnection of electricity. BSES, quite obviously, is not concerned with the personal feud between Ruchika and Aasna. The claim of Ruchika in CS SCJ 1421/2021 is against BSES, not against Aasna. Aasna has been impleaded as a defendant in CS SCJ 1421/2021 only because Ruchika alleges that Aasna was employing coercive measures to ensure her removal from the premises. That allegation, though it figures in the plaint in CS SCJ 1421/2021, is really tangential to the claim of Ruchika therein, and, for that precise reason, the attempt of Mr Joel to capitalize on the said allegation to infer identity of subject matter between CS SCJ 1421/2021 and CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 must fail. The observation, of the learned ADJ, that BSES was an agent of Aasna, as a ground to justify staying of trial in CS SCJ 1421/2021 is, therefore, equally off the mark. 35. The error in the impugned order actually stems from the initial error, on the part of the learned ADJ, in identifying the issue before him in CS SCJ 1421/2021. The learned ADJ identifies the issue as “whether the plaintiff is entitled to enjoy the suit property”. That, actually, was not the issue in controversy in the suit. The issue before the learned ADJ was whether, as an occupant of premises in respect of which complete electricity dues stood paid to BSNL, Ruchika was entitled to replacement of the stolen electricity meter and restoration of electricity. Once the issue is thus reworded, no illusion of identity of subject matter between CS SCJ 1421/2021 and CS ADJ DJ CM(M) 398/2022 Page 21 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 482/2021 would remain. 36. There is, in fact, complete want of identity and even similarity, in respect of cause of action, subject matter and relief in the two suits. The cause of action in CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 was continued occupation, by Pawan and Ruchika, of the suit property, despite alleged termination of the lease. The cause of action in CS SCJ 1421/2021, on the other hand, was disconnection of electricity and theft of electricity meter despite the electricity dues having been paid up to date. The subject matter of the two suits is also different, as CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 was in the nature of an eviction suit and CS SCJ 1421/2021 was a suit complaining about disconnection of electricity and theft of an electricity meter and seeking restoration of the status quo ante . The relief sought in the two suits is also completely different, inasmuch as CS ADJ DJ 482/2021 sought eviction of Pawan and Ruchika from the suit property and restoration of possession of the suit property to Aasna, whereas CS SCJ 1421/2021 sought installation of an electricity meter and restoration of electricity. 37. There being complete want of identity or even similarity of cause of action, subject matter or relief in the two suits, I am of the opinion that the learned ASCJ was in error in staying the trial of CS SCJ 1421/2021 pending the outcome of CS ADJ DJ 482/2021. 38. In view of the clear facts in the present case, it is not necessary for this Court to enter into the arguments of Mr. Joel, though persuasively articulated, in respect of Section 11 vis-à-vis Section 10, CM(M) 398/2022 Page 22 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47 Neutral Citation Number : 2022/DHC/004537 5 and the decision in Narayana Prabhu Venkateshwara , on which he sought to place reliance. Conclusion 39. Resultantly, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. The application of the respondent under Section 10, as preferred before the learned ADJ in CS SCJ 1421/2021 would, accordingly, stand dismissed. 40. This petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms with no orders as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of. C.HARI SHANKAR, J OCTOBER 28, 2022/ kr CM(M) 398/2022 Page 23 of 23 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI Signing Date:31.10.2022 18:28:47