Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4147 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Managing Director, NorthEast K.R.T.C.
RESPONDENT:
Devidas Manikrao Sadananda
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/2006
BENCH:
Arijit Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
Kapadia, J.
Leave granted.
This civil appeal by grant of special leave to appeal is directed against
the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kamataka High Court dated
14.3.2005 in Writ Appeal No.6521 of 2002 by which the writ appeal preferred
by Northeast Karnataka Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as, "the Corporation") stood dismissed.
The short question which arises for determination in this civil appeal is:
whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Labour Court
misdirected itself in not invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
namely, the facts speak for themselves.
The Corporation is an ‘Undertaking’ which is catering to the requirements
of the travelling public in various parts of the State of Karnataka. It has
more than 60,000 employees appointed under Karnataka State Road Transport
Corporation (Cadre and Recruitment) Regulations, 1982. The service
conditions of each employee are governed by Karnataka State Road Transport
Corporation Servants (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as, "the 1971 Regulations").
Respondent-workman was working as a driver in the Corporation. On 13.2.96
the bus which he was driving on the route from Basavakalyan to Hyderabad
met with an accident while trying to overtake another bus of the
Corporation. According to the management of the Corporation, in the process
of overtaking the bus which was driven by respondent-workman collided with
the hind portion of the other bus and consequent upon which the other bus
went and dashed against a tree resulting in injuries to 56 passengers and
death of 4 passengers. This was in addition to severe damage caused to the
bus of the Corporation. On 10.6.96 the officials of the Corporation
collected statements of the passengers in the preliminary enquiry and
reported the matter to the Disciplinary Authority of the Corporation
constituted under the 1971 Regulations. Based on the said report on which
the respondent-workman also gave his reply, the departmental enquiry was
instituted. On 11.8.97 the enquiry was conducted under the said 1971
Regulations. On receipt of the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority
passed an order on the same day dismissing the respondent-workman from the
services of the Corporation.
Aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 11.8.97, the respondent-workman
raised a dispute under Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
before the Labour Court, Gulbarga bearing number K.I.D. No. 147 of 1998. On
receipt of the notice from the Labour Court the Corporation filed its
written statement. On the preliminary issue as to whether the departmental
enquiry held by the management was fair and proper, the Labour Court vide
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its order dated 24.8.98 held that the domestic enquiry held by the
management was fair and proper, that the enquiry conducted was in
accordance with rules of natural justice and in accordance with the
regulations; and that there was no vagueness or uncertainty in the
proceedings so as to render the enquiry unfair. Accordingly, the contention
of the respondent-workman that the enquiry was not fair and proper, stood
rejected. This was Part-I Award. However, vide Part-II Award dated
19.10.99, the Labour Court held that there was no evidence whatsoever to
show that the respondent-driver had not taken reasonable care in the
process of driving. The Labour Court took the view in this connection that
the management ought to have examined the driver of the bus against which
the offending vehicle (bus) collided. According to the Labour Court non-
examination of the said driver was fatal to the case of the management.
According to the Labour Court there was no eye-witness to the accident.
According to the Labour Court the reporting officer of the Corporation was
not an eye-witness and the statements collected by him from the respective
passengers cannot be considered as substantive evidence to say that the
respondent-driver acted in a negligent manner. In the circumstances, the
Labour Court set aside the order of dismissal and directed the respondent-
driver to be reinstated with full back wages.
The Part-II Award of the Labour Court was challenged by the Corporation by
filing writ petition before the learned Single Judge of the Kamataka High
Court who took the view that in absence of any evidence before the Labour
Court, reinstatement was rightly awarded. At this stage, it may be pointed
out that the learned Single Judge directed reinstatement initially without
back wages. On an application for review, the learned Single Judge,
however, granted reinstatement with 50% back wages. It is interesting to
note that while refusing the petition of the Corporation, the learned
Single Judge has observed that he was reducing the back wages so that in
future the respondent-driver would perform his duties satisfactorily
keeping in view the safety of the general public. This order by implication
finds respondent-driver guilty of rash and negligent driving. Be’-that as
it may, the matter was carried in appeal by the Corporation to the Division
Bench of the High Court. As stated above, by the impugned judgment the
Division Bench held that in the absence of evidence the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was not applicable to the facts of the present case.
Accordingly, by the impugned judgment the writ appeal stood dismissed.
Hence this civil appeal.
As stated above, the short question which arises for determination in the
present case is: whether the Labour Court had erred in the facts and
circumstances of this case in not invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
The facts, as narrated above, show that the offending bus collided with the
hind portion of the other bus. That other bus was running in front of the
offending bus. The impact of the offending bus running into the other bus
was so great that the other bus went and dashed into a tree resulting in
injuries to 56 passengers and death of 4 lives. In such circumstances, was
the Labour Court not required to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
is the question which we have to answer.
In the case of Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. The State of Raiasthan, [1974] 1
SCC 690, this Court held that the maxim "res ipsa loquitur" does not embody
any rule of substantive law nor a rule of evidence. It is resorted to when
the accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is
primarily within the knowledge of the driver. It was held that the mere
fact that the cause of the accident is unknown does not prevent the
plaintiff from recovering damages from the defendant if the proper
inference to be drawn from- the circumstances which are known is that the
accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant. It was held that
the fact of the accident may constitute evidence of negligence and in such
cases the above maxim applies. The principal function of the maxim is to
prevent injustice which would result if the management is compelled to
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prove the precise cause of the accident, particularly, when the respondent-
driver has knowledge of the cause of the accident This judgment has not
been considered by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court.
In the case of Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi and Ors., v. M/s. Ranjit Ginning
& Pressing Co. (P.) Ltd. and Anr., [1977] 2 SCC 745, this Court held that
where the evidence shows dashing of the vehicle against the tree was so
violent that it caused the death of the passengers then the burden rests on
the opposite party to show that the cause of the accident could not have
been avoided by exercise of ordinary care and caution [See: para 5}. In the
present case no such attempt was made by the driver to show the plea of
inevitability, therefore, the Labour Court had erred in misdirecting itself
in not invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur".
In the case of Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugananasambandam, [2005] 3
SCC 241, this Court held that in certain cases the accident speaks for
itself; that in such cases the management has only to prove the accident
and nothing more; and that in such cases the driver has to establish that
the accident happened due to some cause other than his own negligence. Once
the maxim "res ipsa loquitur’ is found to be applicable, the burden of
proof would shift on the delinquent In such cases, the nature of impact has
to be seen because it indicates that the vehicle was being driven rashly
and negligently. In such cases, the burden of proof was on the driver to
show that the offending vehicle was not driven by him rashly and
negligently. In the said case, it was further held that the learned Single
Judge of the High Court in that case had erred in observing that unless
witnesses (passengers) were examined by the management it was not possible
to draw any inference of misconduct against the workman. In this
connection, it was held that the principles of Evidence Act have no
application in a domestic enquiry. It was observed that the principles of
natural justice are required to be complied with in a domestic enquiry,
however, they cannot be stretched too far nor can they be applied in a
vacuum. In the case of Cholan Roadways (supra) this Court came to the
conclusion that in cases of accident of the above nature it was not
necessary as a relevant factor to examine before the enquiry officer
passengers of the bus and that the Labour Court had failed to apply the
correct standard of proof in relation to the domestic enquiry, which is
"preponderance of probability" and thus a case for judicial review stood,
clearly made out by the Corporation.
Accordingly the matter is remitted to the Labour Court to decide whether on
the facts and circumstances of this case the above maxim "res ipsa
loquitur" applies or not.
We, accordingly, allow the civil appeal with no order as to costs.