Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8944 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.20716 of 2011)
M/s Kulja Industries Limited …Appellant
Versus
Chief Gen. Manager W.T. Proj.
BSNL & Ors. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. Leave granted.
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2. The short question that falls for determination in this
appeal is whether the respondent-Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited (for short ‘BSNL’) could have blacklisted the
appellant for allotment of future contracts for all times to
come. High Court of Judicature at Bombay before whom the
blacklisting order was assailed by the appellant has answered
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that question in the affirmative and dismissed Writ Petition
No.2289 of 2011 filed by the appellant giving rise to the
present appeal.
3. Two tender notices for supply of Permanent Lubricated
HDPE Pipe (Telecom Ducts) and Installation of O.F. Cable
through Blowing Technique were issued by BSNL in the year
2004 and 2005. It is common ground that the appellant-
company emerged successful in regard to both the tender
notices. It is also not in dispute that several orders for supply
of the material were placed with the appellant-company
during the years 2004-2006 and that goods were supplied to
various consignee units of BSNL pursuant to the same. The
appellant’s case is that a “receipt certificate” was issued in its
favour after delivery of the goods and that bills for payment
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of the price of the goods were raised in triplicate to the Chief
Controller of Accounts, WTP BSNL, Mumbai from time to
time. The appellant’s further case is that a single account to
receive 95% of the payment due from BSNL was maintained
by it and since the amounts received from the respondent-
BSNL by cheques did not carry any particulars of the
consignment for which such payment was being made it
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could, in no way, discover excess payment, if any, released
by BSNL against the bills sent by the appellant.
4. The appellant’s further case is that on gaining
knowledge about the excess payments received by it, an
offer for reconciliation of the accounts was made to the BSNL
and since any such reconciliation was likely to take 30 to 45
days, the appellant offered to adjust the excess amount
credited to its account towards the outstanding bills on an ad
th
hoc basis. A letter dated 10 May, 2006 was, according to
the appellant, addressed to the respondent-BSNL in that
regard.
5. The respondent-BSNL on the other hand has a different
story to tell. According to it four of its officers had abused
their official position and fraudulently generated 'voucher
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numbers' on the duplicate and triplicate copies of the bills
submitted by the appellant to facilitate payments as if the
said bills were genuine thereby causing wrongful loss to the
respondent-BSNL and a corresponding gain to the appellant.
There was in this process an excess payment of Rs.7.98
crores made and credited to the account of the appellant by
the accounts officer of respondent-BSNL.
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6. Taking note of the fraudulent payments made to the
appellant, the BSNL lodged an FIR with CBI ACB Mumbai
against one of its Senior Accounts Officers and a Director of
the appellant-company alleging commission of offences
punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420 Indian
Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Investigation that
followed has culminated in a charge-sheet filed before the
Special Judge for CBI cases, Bombay in which four officials of
the BSNL including D. Tripathi-Senior Accounts Officer,
Laxman Dixit-Assistant Accounts Officer, Krishnakumari
Patnaik-Junior Accounts Officer, Poolchand Yadav-Cashier
and Lalit Gupta-Director and Bhavani Sharma-Consultant of
the appellant-company have been arraigned as accused
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persons.
7. What is important for the present is that by a letter
st
dated 21 April, 2010, BSNL blacklisted the appellant
permanently on the ground that the appellant had committed
gross misconduct and irregularities by receiving excessive
payments amounting to Rs.7,98,55,508/- from BSNL thereby
wrongfully causing loss to the said company. The appellant
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denied these allegations, inter alia , contending that BSNL
Policy/Manual did not provide for punitive action in the
nature of blacklisting and that excess payment at best was
an irregularity which had been cured by refund of the
amount in question. The appellant also alleged that
reconciliation of accounts revealed that the appellant was
entitled to an amount, far in excess of the payments received
by it. That assertion was repeated in a legal notice sent by
the appellant-company but since BSNL took no corrective
action in terms of the reconciliation, W.P. No.4536 of 2010
was filed before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in
which it assailed the blacklisting order. The High Court
allowed the petition on the short ground that the appellant
had not been afforded any opportunity of being heard before
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the blacklisting order was issued by the respondent. The
High Court did not go into the merits of the dispute but
reserved liberty to the appellant to raise all such contentions
as were open to it if and when BSNL issued a show cause
notice for blacklisting it again. The BSNL was left free to pass
a fresh order and take a final decision in the matter within six
weeks from the date of the issue of the show cause notice.
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8. A show cause notice was accordingly issued by BSNL on
th
4 November, 2010 to which the appellant filed a reply. The
appellant was also called for a personal hearing in support of
its reply to the show cause notice as directed by the High
th
Court. By an order dated 15 January, 2011 BSNL once
again directed the blacklisting of the appellant, inter alia ,
holding that the appellant had defrauded BSNL by using
duplicate and triplicate copies of the bills that stood already
cleared for payment. These bogus and fraudulent claims
made under bogus and fabricated bills were then processed
by some of the officers of the BSNL for payment resulting in
double and at times triple payment in favour of the appellant.
The relevant portion of the blacklisting order is to the
following effect:
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“Hence, the supplier with a clear intention to
defraud BSNL, WTP, Mumbai, have prepared
duplicate and triplicate copies of bills already
processed for payment and have again put up the
same for payment with BSNL. Thus, in short these
were bogus and/or fraudulent claims made on the
basis of forged and/or fabricated bills/documents.
Thereafter, by joining hands with some of the erring
officers of BSNL, the supplier has got the afore
mentioned duplicate and triplicate copies of bills
processed for payment and have fraudulently
received double/triple payment(s) for supplying
material only once.
Therefore, by not only claiming but also
receiving double and/or triple payment on the basis
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of forged/fabricated/duplicate and triplicate copies of
same bills, the supplier has committed gross fraud
on the public exchequer. The fraudulent act on the
part of supplier got completed by not only claiming
such bogus payments but also by receiving the
th
same from BSNL. Moreover, by letter dated 10
May, 2006, the supplier has not only acknowledged
but have also accepted the fact of claiming as also
accepting aforesaid bogus payments and hence the
supplier had agreed for reconciliation of same after
deducting such bogus payments. If the accounts
would not have reconciled, the supplier would have
caused huge losses to the public exchequer.
Hence, there is every apprehension that if the
supplier is allowed to deal in any manner with the
BSNL in future, the supplier will venture into
committing same and/or similar fraud (s) on the
public exchequer and therefore, it is not at all in the
interest of public exchequer that the supplier
continues to be authorised supplier of BSNL.
Hence, in view of the all the above facts and
circumstances and the entire record and proceedings
of this case, it is possible for this organisation to
take a view to permanent banning and impose
penalty upon the supplier so as to prevent the
supplier from dealing with entire BSNL, throughout
the country in any manner, consequently stopping
all the future business transactions of entire BSNL
with the supplier.
Hereby M/s. Kulja Industries Ltd., Solan
(Himachal Pradesh) is permanently banned and is
consequently prevented from having any business
dealing with entire BSNL through the country.
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This is issued with the approval of the
competent authority.
Sd/-
AGM (MM) 15.1.2011
O/o CGM, WTP, Mumbai-54”
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9. Aggrieved by the above order the appellant once again
approached the High Court in W.P. No. 2289 of 2011 which
was heard and dismissed by a Division Bench of the High
Court in terms of the order impugned in this appeal. The
High Court was of the opinion that reconciliation of the
account had proved that the appellant had received payment
twice over for the supplies made by it and that merely
because the excess payment received had been
subsequently refunded by the appellant did not obliterate the
act of misconduct and fraud. The High Court observed:
“In the order impugned, the Authority has
stated that on the reconciliation of the account, it
was found as a fact that the Petitioner has received
payment twice for the supply of the same material,
because the supply was ongoing and the amount
was found to be payable to the Petitioner, that was
paid to him. Mere payment of the amount does not
wipe out the fact that the Petitioner had submitted
the Bills claiming double payment. In our opinion,
in view of this finding, no interference is called for in
the order impugned. The Petition is rejected. No
costs.”
JUDGMENT
10. The present appeal calls in question the correctness of
the above order of the High Court as noticed earlier.
11. Appearing for the appellant-company, Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi, strenuously argued that debarring the appellant
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permanently and for all times to come was wholly arbitrary
and unjustified. It was contended that the blacklisting order
had serious civil consequences for the person blacklisted
making it obligatory for the Authority passing the order to act
fairly and reasonably. Inasmuch as respondent-BSNL had
blacklisted the appellant permanently, the decision was
neither fair nor reasonable. Paras 31 and 32 of the bid
document also, according to the learned counsel, provides
for blacklisting only for a “suitable period”. This implies that
blacklisting had to be for a definite period and not for all
times to come. Since the products manufactured by the
appellant were mostly, if not entirely, supplied for
consumption to the respondent-BSNL, any order
permanently blacklisting the appellant from entering into
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contracts making supplies was tantamount to rendering the
appellant jobless and economically defunct. No such order of
blacklisting could, therefore, be sustained as the punishment
implicit in such an order was totally disproportionate to the
gravity of the offence allegedly committed by the appellant.
12. On behalf of the respondent-BSNL, it was argued by Mr.
Bansal that the blacklisting order under challenge was not
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relatable to paras 31 and 32 of the bid document. The order
simply declared the petitioner-company ineligible for
allotment of any contract in future in terms of para 2.3 of the
tender document, the relevant portion wherefore reads as
under:
“2.3 Disqualification Clause: The supplier/
Manufacturers in the following category are not
eligible to bid in the said tender.
i ....
ii. Firms against whom investigation cases are
registered with the CBI or other statutory
investigations agencies of State/Central Govt.
iii ....”
13. It was further contended by the learned counsel that
even if the order was held to be referable to paras 31 and 32
of the bid document, an order permanently blacklisting the
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appellant was also justified having regard to the nature of
the fraud committed by it in collusion with the officers of the
respondent-corporation and involving a huge amount of
nearly eight crores.
14. We may at the outset deal with the contention whether
paras 31 and 32 of the bid document to which Mr. Rohtagi
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has made reference is the only source of the power to
blacklist a defaulting contractor. These paras are as under:
“31. Purchaser reserves the right to disqualify the
supplier for a suitable period who habitually failed to
supply the equipment in time. Further, the
suppliers whose equipment do not perform
satisfactory in the field in accordance with the
specifications may also be disqualified for a suitable
period as decided by the purchaser.
32. Purchaser reserves the right to blacklist a bidder
for a suitable period in case he fails to honour his
bid without sufficient grounds.”
15. A plain reading of the above would show that BSNL, the
purchaser has reserved the right to disqualify any supplier
who
(a) habitually fails to supply the equipment in time or (b)
the equipment supplied by the supplier does not perform
satisfactory in the field in accordance with the
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specifications or
(c) fails to honour his bid without sufficient grounds.
16. A literal construction of the provisions of paras 31 and
32 extracted above would mean that the power to disqualify
or blacklist a supplier is available to the purchaser only in the
three situations enumerated in paras 31 and 32 and no
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other. Any such interpretation would, however, give rise to
anomalous results. We say so because in cases where a
supplier is found guilty of much graver offences, failures or
violations, resulting in much heavier losses and greater
detriment to the purchasers in terms of money, reputation or
prejudice to public interest may go unpunished simply
because all such acts of fraud, misrepresentation or the like
have not been specifically enumerated as grounds for
blacklisting of the supplier in paras 31 and 32 of the tender
document. That could in our opinion never be the true
intention of the purchaser when it stipulated paras 31 and 32
as conditions of the tender document by which the purchaser
has reserved to itself the right to disqualify or blacklist
bidders for breach or violation committed by them. If
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bidders who commit a breach of a lesser degree could be
punished by an order of blacklisting there is no reason why a
breach of a more serious nature should go unpunished, be
ignored or rendered inconsequential by reason only of an
omission of such breach or violation in the text of paras 31
and 32 of the tender document. Paras 31 and 32 cannot, in
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that view, be said to be exhaustive; nor is the power to
blacklist limited to situations mentioned therein.
17. That apart the power to blacklist a contractor whether
the contract be for supply of material or equipment or for the
execution of any other work whatsoever is in our opinion
inherent in the party allotting the contract. There is no need
for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or
reserved by contractor. That is because ‘blacklisting’ simply
signifies a business decision by which the party affected by
the breach decides not to enter into any contractual
relationship with the party committing the breach. Between
two private parties the right to take any such decision is
absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever.
The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in
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the case of private parties. But any such decision is subject
to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any
of its instrumentalities. This implies that any such decision
will be open to scrutiny not only on the touchstone of the
principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of
proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being blacklisted
thus becomes an essential pre-condition for a proper
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exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made
pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and
proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly
examinable by a writ Court. The legal position on the subject
is settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court
starting with Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v.
State of West Bengal and Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 70 where
this Court declared that blacklisting has the effect of
preventing a person from entering into lawful relationship
with the Government for purposes of gains and that the
Authority passing any such order was required to give a fair
hearing before passing an order blacklisting a certain entity.
This Court observed:
“20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a
person from the privilege and advantage of entering
into lawful relationship with the Government for
purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is
created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the
relevant authority is to have an objective
satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that
the person concerned should be given an
opportunity to represent his case before he is put on
the blacklist.”
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18. Subsequent decisions of this Court in M/s Southern
Painters v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. and
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Anr. AIR 1994 SC 1277 ; Patel Engineering Ltd. Union
of India (2012) 11 SCC 257 ; B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v.
Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 548 ;
Joseph Vilangandan v. The Executive Engineer, (PWD)
Ernakulam & Ors. ( 1978) 3 SCC 36 among others have
followed the ratio of that decision and applied the principle of
audi alteram partem to the process that may eventually
culminate in the blacklisting of a contractor.
19. Even the second facet of the scrutiny which the
blacklisting order must suffer is no longer res integra . The
decisions of this Court in Radha krishna Agarwal and Ors.
v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 457 ; E.P.
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (1974) 4 SCC
3 ; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr . (1978) 1
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SCC 248 ; Ajay Hasia and Ors. v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi and Ors., ( 1981) 1 SCC 722 ; R.D. Shetty v.
International Airport Authority of India and Ors.,
( 1979) 3 SCC 489 and Dwarkadas Marfatia and sons v.
Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (1989) 3 SCC
751 have ruled against arbitrariness and discrimination in
every matter that is subject to judicial review before a Writ
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Court exercising powers under Article 226 or Article 32 of the
Constitution. It is also well settled that even though the
right of the writ petitioner is in the nature of a contractual
right, the manner, the method and the motive behind the
decision of the authority whether or not to enter into a
contract is subject to judicial review on the touchstone of
fairness, relevance, natural justice, non-discrimination,
equality and proportionality. All these considerations that go
to determine whether the action is sustainable in law have
been sanctified by judicial pronouncements of this Court and
are of seminal importance in a system that is committed to
the rule of law. We do not consider it necessary to burden
this judgment by a copious reference to the decisions on the
subject. A reference to the following passage from the
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decision of this Court in M/s Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors.
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (1990) 3 SCC 752
should, in our view, suffice:
“11. It is well settled that every action of the State
or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its
executive power, must be informed by reason. In
appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason
may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under
Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance
in this connection may be placed on the
observations of this Court in Miss Radha Krishna
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Agarwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1977]
3 SCR 249 …... In case any right conferred on the
citizens which is sought to be interfered, such action
is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution, and must
be reasonable and can be taken only upon lawful
and relevant grounds of public interest. Where there
is arbitrariness in State action of this type of
entering or not entering into contracts, Article 14
springs up and judicial review strikes such an action
down. Every action of the State executive authority
must be subject to rule of law and must be informed
by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public
authority, in such monopoly or semi-monopoly
dealings, it should meet the test of Article 14 of the
Constitution. If a Governmental action even in the
matters of entering or not entering into contracts,
fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same
would be unreasonable……. It appears to us that rule
of reason and rule against arbitrariness and
discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice
are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or
action by State instrumentality in dealing with
citizens in a situation like the present one. Even
though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of
contractual rights, the manner, the method and
motive of a decision of entering or not entering into
a contract, are subject to judicial review on the
touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair
play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination
in the type of the transactions and nature of the
dealing as in the present case.”
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20. The legal position governing blacklisting of suppliers in
USA and UK is no different. In USA instead of using the
expression ‘Blacklisting’ the term “debarring” is used by the
Statutes and the Courts. The Federal Government considers
‘suspension and debarment’ as a powerful tool for protecting
taxpayer resources and maintaining integrity of the
processes for federal acquisitions. Comprehensive guidelines
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are, therefore, issued by the government for protecting
public interest from those contractors and recipients who are
non-responsible, lack business integrity or engage in
dishonest or illegal conduct or are otherwise unable to
perform satisfactorily. These guidelines prescribe the
following among other grounds for debarment:
(a) Conviction of or civil judgment for --
(1) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense in
connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or
performing a public or private agreement or
transaction;
(2) Violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes,
including those proscribing price fixing between
competitors, allocation of customers between
competitors, and bid rigging;
(3) Commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery,
bribery, falsification or destruction of records,
making false statements, tax evasion, receiving
stolen property, making false claims, or obstruction
of justice; or
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(4) Commission of any other offense indicating a lack of
business integrity or business honesty that seriously
and directly affects your present responsibility;
(b) Violation of the terms of a public agreement or
transaction so serious as to affect the integrity
of an agency program, such as —
(1) A willful failure to perform in accordance with the
terms of one or more public agreements or
transactions;
(2) A history of failure to perform or of unsatisfactory
performance of one or more public agreements or
transactions; or
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(3) A willful violation of a statutory or regulatory
provision or requirement applicable to a public
agreement or transaction;
(c) xxxx
(d) Any other cause of so serious or compelling a
nature that it affects your present
responsibility .
21. The guidelines also stipulate the factors that may
influence the debarring official’s decision which include the
following:
(a) The actual or potential harm or impact that results
or may result from the wrongdoing.
(b) The frequency of incidents and/or duration of the
wrongdoing.
(c) Whether there is a pattern or prior history of
wrongdoing.
(d) Whether contractor has been excluded or
disqualified by an agency of the Federal Government
or have not been allowed to participate in State or
local contracts or assistance agreements on a basis
of conduct similar to one or more of the causes for
debarment specified in this part.
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(e) Whether and to what extent did the contractor plan,
initiate or carry out the wrongdoing.
(f) Whether the contractor has accepted responsibility
for the wrongdoing and recognized the seriousness
of the misconduct.
(g) Whether the contractor has paid or agreed to pay all
criminal, civil and administrative liabilities for the
improper activity, including any investigative or
administrative costs incurred by the government,
and have made or agreed to make full restitution.
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(
(h) Whether contractor has cooperated fully with the
government agencies during the investigation and
any court or administrative action.
(i) Whether the wrongdoing was pervasive within the
contractor’s organization.
(j) The kind of positions held by the individuals involved
in the wrongdoing.
(k) Whether the contractor has taken appropriate
corrective action or remedial measures, such as
establishing ethics training and implementing
programs to prevent recurrence.
(l) Whether the contractor fully investigated the
circumstances surrounding the cause for debarment
and, if so, made the result of the investigation
available to the debarring official.”
22. As regards the period for which the order of debarment
will remain effective, the guidelines state that the same
would depend upon the seriousness of the case leading to
such debarment.
23. Similarly in England, Wale s and Northern Ireland , there
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are statutory provisions that make operators ineligible on
several grounds including fraud, fraudulent trading or
conspiracy to defraud, bribery etc.
24. Suffice it to say that ‘debarment’ is recognised and
often used as an effective method for disciplining deviant
suppliers/contractors who may have committed acts of
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omission and commission or frauds including
misrepresentations, falsification of records and other
breaches of the regulations under which such contracts were
allotted. What is notable is that the ‘debarment’ is never
permanent and the period of debarment would invariably
depend upon the nature of the offence committed by the
erring contractor.
25. In the case at hand according to the respondent-BSNL,
the appellant had fraudulently withdrawn a huge amount of
money which was not due to it in collusion and conspiracy
with the officials of the respondent-corporation. Even so
permanent debarment from future contracts for all times to
come may sound too harsh and heavy a punishment to be
considered reasonable especially when (a) the appellant is
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supplying bulk of its manufactured products to the
respondent-BSNL and (b) The excess amount received by it
has already been paid back.
26. The next question then is whether this Court ought to
itself determine the time period for which the appellant
should be blacklisted or remit the matter back to the
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authority to do so having regard to the attendant facts and
circumstances. A remand back to the competent authority
has appealed to us to be a more appropriate option than an
order by which we may ourselves determine the period for
which the appellant would remain blacklisted. We say so for
two precise reasons. Firstly , because blacklisting is in the
nature of penalty the quantum whereof is a matter that rests
primarily with the authority competent to impose the same.
In the realm of service jurisprudence this Court has no doubt
cut short the agony of a delinquent employee in exceptional
circumstances to prevent delay and further litigation by
modifying the quantum of punishment but such
considerations do not apply to a company engaged in a
lucrative business like supply of optical fibre/HDPE pipes to
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BSNL. Secondly, because while determining the period for
which the blacklisting should be effective the respondent-
Corporation may for the sake of objectivity and transparency
formulate broad guidelines to be followed in such cases.
Different periods of debarment depending upon the gravity of
the offences, violations and breaches may be prescribed by
such guidelines. While, it may not be possible to exhaustively
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enumerate all types of offences and acts of misdemeanour,
or violations of contractual obligations by a contractor, the
respondent-Corporation may do so as far as possible to
reduce if not totally eliminate arbitrariness in the exercise of
the power vested in it and inspire confidence in the fairness
of the order which the competent authority may pass against
a defaulting contractor.
27. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order
passed by the High Court and allow writ petition No.2289 of
2011 filed by the appellant but only to the extent that while
the order blacklisting the appellant shall stand affirmed, the
period for which such order remains operative shall be
determined afresh by the competent authority on the basis
of guidelines which the Corporation may formulate for that
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purpose. The needful shall be done by the Corporation
and/or the competent authority expeditiously but not later
than six months from today. The parties are left to bear
their own costs.
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.………………….……….…..…J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
………..…………………..…..…J.
(VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi
October 4, 2013
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