Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 117 of 2000
PETITIONER:
SHAMBHU
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/03/2002
BENCH:
R.P. Sethi & K.G. Balakrishnan
JUDGMENT:
K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.
Appellant-Shambhu and his wife Sadhna Bai were tried by the Court of
Addl. Sessions Judge, Indore in Madhya Pradesh, for the offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Against the present appellant,
there was also a charge under Section 376 IPC. The Sessions Judge found
them ’not guilty’ and acquitted of the charges framed against them. Aggrieved
by the judgment of the Sessions Court, the State of Madhya Pradesh preferred
an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the Division Bench of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court found the present appellant guilty of offences
punishable under Section 302 IPC, for having caused the death of one Sunder
Bai and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. The finding of the High
Court is challenged before us.
The prosecution case is that on 28th June, 1986, deceased Sunder
Bai went to the house of appellant Shambhu requesting him to repay the sum of
Rs.1,000/- entrusted by her with the appellant. The further case of the
prosecution is that the appellant committed rape on Sunder Bai and thereafter,
the appellant’s wife, Sadhna Bai poured kerosene oil on the body of Sunder
Bai and the appellant set fire to her. PW-2, Amritlal, having reached
Prianko colony on a bicycle, heard the sound of "bachao, bachao" (help, help)
and went near the house of appellant-Shambhu. He saw the deceased
Sunder Bai set on fire by appellant-Shambhu. Hearing the sounds, many
other people collected there and some of them took Sunder Bai to hospital. In
the meantime, the husband of the deceased Sunder Bai also reached the place
of incident. PW-2, Amritlal, went to the Police Station and gave Ex. P-1 report.
PW-10, Mohan Singh, S.H.O. Police Station Annapurna, visited the place of
incident in the night of 26th June itself. He also visited the M.Y. Hospital where
the deceased was admitted with burn injuries. PW-10 sent a requisition to the
Executive Magistrate, PW-9, for recording dying declaration of the deceased.
PW-9, Executive Magistrate, reached the hospital and recorded the dying
declaration of deceased Sunder Bai. Subsequently, Sunder Bai died while
undergoing treatment in the hospital and her body was subjected to post-
mortem examination. Ten witnesses were examined on the side of the
prosecution and the main items of evidence relied on by the prosecution were
the evidence of PW-2 and the dying declaration allegedly made by deceased
Sunder Bai, which was recorded by PW-9, the Executive Magistrate. The
learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant for the reasons that the First
Information Report was recorded belatedly and there were a series of
discrepancies in Ex. P-1 F.I. Statement and that the dying declaration recorded
by PW-9 was not reliable as there was no satisfactory evidence to show
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4
that Sunder Bai was in a fit state to give the dying declaration. Learned
Sessions Judge also disbelieved PW-9 on the ground that he was not in a
position to state the percentage of the burn injuries on the body of the deceased
Sunder Bai; he had not brought the memorandum received from the police
station; and that he did not verify whether the doctor had given sedatives to the
deceased. PW-9 was also disbelieved on the ground that he deposed that he
reached the hospital in a scooter whereas the Police Inspector had deposed
otherwise.
The High Court, in appeal, reversed the finding of the Sessions Judge
and held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving that appellant-Shambhu
had caused the death of deceased Sunder Bai. The High Court held that the
dying declaration was reliable and that there was no reason to disbelieve the
evidence of PW-9.
The counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court seriously
erred in reversing the acquittal of the appellant, and as the trial court had taken
a reasonable view of the evidence, the High Court should not have reversed the
findings of the Sessions Judge.
This Court, in Surjan & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1956 SC
425, observed that in an appeal against acquittal while the High Court is free
to appreciate the evidence for itself and to act on its own view thereof, it will not
do so lightly and will be slow to reverse an acquittal, except for strong and
compelling reasons, when it differs from that of the trial Court.
Power of the High Court, while considering the appeal against acquittal
was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Harbans Singh & Anr. vs.
State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 439 and it was held as under :
"It is clear that in emphasizing in many cases the necessity of
"compelling reasons" to justify an interference with an order of
acquittal, the Court did not in any way try to curtail the power
bestowed on appellate courts under S.423 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure when hearing appeals against acquittal; but conscious of
the intense dislike in our jurisprudence of the conviction of
innocent persons and of the fact that in many systems of
jurisprudence the law does not provide at all for any appeal against
an order of acquittal the Court was anxious to impress on the
appellate courts the importance of bestowing special care in the
sifting of evidence in appeal against acquittals. .. What
may be called the golden thread running through all these decisions
is the rule that in deciding appeals against acquittals the Court of
Appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, must
examine also the reasons on which the order of acquittal was
based and should interfere with the order only when satisfied that
the view taken by the acquitting Judge is clearly unreasonable.
Once the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view
taken by the lower court is clearly an unreasonable one that itself is
a "compelling reason" for interference. For, it is a court’s duty to
convict a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt, no less than it is its duty to acquit the accused
when such guilt is not so established."
Of course, where two views are possible and the trial court has taken a
reasonable view and acquitted the accused, the High Court in appeal cannot
interfere with such finding, but when there is perverse finding based on
erroneous appreciation of evidence and a serious miscarriage was caused,
the High Court has ample power to reverse that finding.
The counsel for the appellant further contended that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4
We have carefully considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
We do not think that the High Court has erred in finding the appellant guilty of
murder. Even if the evidence of PW-2 is eschewed, there is convincing and
satisfactory evidence to prove that the appellant was responsible for the murder
of the deceased Sunder Bai. PW-9, the Executive Magistrate, got intimation
from the Police that deceased Sunder Bai was admitted in the hospital and that
her dying declaration was to be recorded. He reached the hospital and recorded
the dying declaration of the deceased Sunder Bai. The evidence of PW-9 shows
that when he recorded the dying declaration the doctor was present and he had
certified that Sunder Bai was in a fit state to make the statement. The dying
declaration was recorded in the form of question-answers. It was
recorded at 10.45 PM on 28.6.1986. The translated version of the relevant
portion of the dying declaration of deceased Sunder Bai is as follows:
"I had kept my money with Shambhu. When I went today to ask for
my money, which was about Rs. One thousand, then he called me
in the evening. When I again went at about 7.00/8.00 P.M. then he
asked me to sit at ’Charav’ and then immediately the wife of
Shambhu had sprinkled the kerosene oil at me and Shambhu had
lit the match stick and said lighted match-stick was touched with
my body. Shambhu had raped me (IZZAT LOOTI). Then I raise
the alarm and I ran, thereafter the residents of that Mohalla had
extinguished fire by tearing my clothes etc."
It is also mentioned in the dying declaration that it was recorded in
ward no. 8 of M.Y. Hospital and the attestation by the doctor that the
complainant was in a fit state to make the statement was taken prior to making
the statement and that no other police officer or anybody else was present at the
time of making such dying declaration.
The Sessions Judge disbelieved the dying declaration on flimsy grounds
based on irrelevant considerations. Whether the Executive Magistrate
reached the hospital in a scooter or any other conveyance or whether the
Magistrate had noted the percentage of burn injuries on the body of the
deceased are irrelevant matters which should not have weighed with the
Sessions Judge in disbelieving the dying declaration.
It has been held by this Court that if the dying declaratio
n
is truthful and reliable, conviction can be based solely thereupon
(1983) 2 SCC 14 [State of Assam vs. Mafizuddin Ahmed].
The counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, contended that the
dying declaration should not have been accepted without there being further
corroboration of material particulars. He relied on the decision in (1971) 3
SCC 767 [Lallubhai Devchand Shah and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat].
In the instant case, there has been material corroboration, in the sense
that deceased Sunder Bai was found with burn injuries near the house of the
appellant. PW-2 saw the deceased near the house of the appellant and it was
from that place that the deceased was removed to the hospital. PW-1, husband
of the deceased Sunder Bai, also deposed that on hearing about the incident, he
rushed to the place of occurrence and saw the deceased with burn injuries.
The High Court considered all this evidence and came to the conclusion that the
appellant had committed the offence of murder.
The way in which the learned Sessions Judge appreciated the evidence in
the instant case shows that the evidence was not viewed from the correct
perspective. The High Court has rightly reversed the judgment of the
Sessions Court. There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed
accordingly.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4
..J
[ R.P. Sethi ]
..J
[ K.G. Balakrishnan ]
March 6, 2002.