Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PANDURANG, TUKIA AND BHILLIA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF HYDERABAD.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/12/1954
BENCH:
BOSE, VIVIAN
BENCH:
BOSE, VIVIAN
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
CITATION:
1955 AIR 216 1955 SCR (1)1083
ACT:
Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 34-Prior concert-
Common intention-Same or similar intention-Distinction
between.
HEADNOTE:
It is well-settled that common intention in s. 34 of tile
Indian Penal Code presupposes prior concert. It requires a
prearranged plan because before a man can be vicariously
convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have
boon done in furtherance of the common intention of them
all. Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting of
minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and
each can have the same intention, namely the intention to
kill, and each can individually inflict a separate fatal
blow and yet none would have the common intention required
by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds
to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each
would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused
but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any
of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his
separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the
murder however clearly an intention to kill could be proved
in his case.
Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention
with common intention; the partition which divides their
bounds is often very thin, nevertheless the distinction is
real and substantial, and if overlooked will result in
miscarriage of justice.
The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of
time required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, But
there must
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be pre-arrangement and premeditated concert. It is not
enough, to have the same intention independently of each
other.
The inference of common intention should never be reached
unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the
circumstances of the case. It is a question of fact in
every case and however similar the circumstances, facts in
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one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the
conclusion on the facts in another. All that is necessary
is either to have direct proof of prior concert, or proof of
circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference, or,
in other words, the incriminating facts must be incompatible
with the innocence of the accused and incapable of ex-
planation on any other reasonable hypothesis.
When appellate judges, who agree on the question of guilt
differ on that of sentence, it is usual not to impose the
death penalty unless there are compelling reasons.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King-Emperor ([1924] L.R. 52 I.A.
40), Mahbub Shalt v. King-Emperor ([1945] L.P.- 72 I.A. 148)
and Mamand v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 45), referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 91 to
93 of 1954.
Appeals by Special Leave granted by Supreme Court on the
18th January, 1954 from the Judgment and Order dated the
18th June, 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad
in Confirmation Case No. 376/6 of 1952-53 and Criminal
Appeals Nos.394/6, 395/6 and 392/6 of 1952-53 arising out of
the Judgment and Order dated the 2nd June, 1952 of the Court
of the Sessions Judge at Bidar in Sessions Case No. 9/8 of
1951-52.
J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant.
(In Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 1954).
N. C. Chakravarty, for the appellants. (In Criminal
Appeals Nos. 92 and 93 of 1954).
P. A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent. 1954.
December 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BOSE J.-Five persons including the three appellants, were
prosecuted for the murder of one Ram-chander Shelke. Each
was convicted and each was
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sentenced to death under section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code.
The appeals and the confirmation proceedings in the High
Court were heard by M. S. Ali Khan and V. R. Deshpande, JJ.
They differed. The former considered that the convictions
should be maintained but was of opinion that the sentence in
each case should be commuted to imprisonment for life. The
latter favoured an acquittal in all five cases. The matter
was accordingly referred to a third Judge, P. J. Reddy, J.
He agreed with the first about the convictions and adjudged
all five to be guilty under section 302. On the question of
sentence he considered that the death sentences on the three
appellants, Pandurang, Tukia and Bhilia, should be
maintained and that those of the other two should be
commuted to transportation for life.
It seems that the opinion of the third Judge was accepted as
the decision of the Court and so the sentences suggested by
him were maintained as well as the convictions.
All five convicts then applied to the High Court for leave
to appeal. The petition was heard by Ali Khan and Reddy,
JJ. and they made the following order:
"The circumstances of the crime in this case were such that
a brutal murder had been committed and sentence of death was
the only one legally possible for the Sessions Judge to have
passed and it was confirmed by the High Court".
Leave to appeal was refused.
Pandurang, Tukia and Bhilia, who were sentenced to death,
applied here for special leave to appeal. Their petition
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was granted. The other two have not appealed.
The prosecution case is this. On 7-12-1950, about 3 o’clock
in the afternoon,, Ramchander Shelke (the deceased) went to
his field known as "Bhavara" with his wife’s sister Rasika
Bai (P.W.1) and his servant Subhana Rao (P.W.7). Rasika Bai
started to pick chillies in the field while Ramehander went
to another field "Vaniya-che-seth" which is about a furlong
away. We gather that this field is near a river called
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Papana. Anyway, Rasika Bai heard shouts from that
direction, so she ran to the river bank with Subhana and
they both say that they saw all five accused attacking
Ramchander with axes and sticks.
Two other persons, Laxman (P.W.6) and Elba (P.W.5), who were
in the neighbourhood, also heard the cries and ran to the
spot. They also say they witnessed the assault and name all
five accused. The former has a field near by and was
working in it; the latter was a passer-by.
Rasika Bai shouted out to the assailants not to beat
Ramchander but they threatened her and then ran away.
Ramehander died on the spot almost immediately.
There are four eye-witnesses, and the main question we have
to consider is whether they can be believed. Ordinarily, we
would not have enquired into questions of fact but as three
persons have been sentenced to death on the opinion of the
third Judge, despite the opinion of one that the death
sentence should not be imposed and of the other that the
appellants are not guilty and so should be acquitted, we
have deemed it advisable to examine the evidence.
Two of the eye-witnesses were considered unreliable by
Reddy, J. in the High Court, so we will omit them from
consideration and concentrate on the other two, Rasika Bai
(P.W.1) and Subhana (P.W.7). Both give substantially the
same version of what they saw of the assault. They heard
Ramehander’s cries from the direction of the river bank and
rushed there. They say they saw all five accused striking
him, the three appellants Pandurang, Tukia and Bhilia with
axes, the other two, who have not appealed, with sticks. It
is said that there is some discrepancy between Rasika Bai’s
statement in the Sessions Court and in the Committal Court
about the order in which the blows were given and their
number. Ali Khan, J. and Reddy, J. considered this
unimportant and so do we. The important thing is that both
witnesses are agreed on the following points-
(1) that Tukia struck Ramchander on his cheek;
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Rasika Bai adds that he also struck him on the head;
(2) that Pandurang hit him on the head;
(3) that after these blows Ramchander fell
down and then Bhilia hit him on the neck.
Subhana does not say that the other two struck any
particular blow. Rasika says that one of them, Nilia, hit
Ramchander on the thigh with his stick and assigns no
particular blow to the other.
Rasika Bai’s version is that on seeing the assault she
called out to the accused not to hit but they " raised
their axes and sticks" and threatened her, and then ran
away. Subbana merely says that they ran away.
After this all the accused absconded. They were arrested on
different dates and were committed to trial separately. The
dates of arrest and committal
respectively in the case of each are as follows:-
Bhilia 9-1 -1951 and 14-6-1951
Tukia 13-10-1951 and 10-1-1952
Pandurang 31-8 -1951 and 10-1-1952
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Tukaram 13-4 -1951 and 29-9-1951
Nilia 13-10-1951 and 10-1-1952
The main attack on this evidence was directed to the fact
that neither the accused nor the eye-witnesses are named in
the First Information Report. According to the prosecution,
the report was made in the following circumstances.
Rasika and Subbana say that after the assault they went back
to the village and told Rasika’s sister Narsabai, P.W. 2
(the deceased’s widow) what they had seen. Narsabai says
that they disclosed the names of the assailants at that
time.
From here we go to the Police Patel who lives in a
neighbouring village one mile away. He is Mahadappa (P.W.
9). He says that he was standing outside his house in his
own village when the sun was setting and saw Krishnabai, the
mother-in-law of the deceased, crying as she passed by
outside his house. He asked her what was wrong and she told
him that her sonin-law had been killed. On hearing this he
wrote out
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a report, Ex. No. 4, and sent it to the Police Station at
Udgir which is about six miles from the scene of the murder.
The First Information Report was recorded on the basis of
this report at 10 o’clock the next morning.
Now nobody tells us who carried the report to the Police
Station. It is written on a printed form and is signed by
the Police Patel. Opposite the column headed "Name and
address of the-complainant or informant" is entered "Tukaram
s/o Panda Sheolka". The Sub-Inspector, who wrote out the
first information report on the basis of this report,
entered the following in it:
"I am to submit that today a report dated 7-12-1950 from the
Police Patel, Neemgaon village, has been received stating
that (1) Tukaram, s/o Panda Sheolka, r/o Neemgaon village,
came and stated that on 7-12-1950 Ramchander, s/o Govind
Reddy was murdered, etc".
The Police Patel tells us that this Tukaram is a cousin of
the deceased. He also says that-
"Tukaram, whose name is entered in column No. 2, is not the
informant but is the complainant in this case. Tukaram had
not given any written complaint to me. He had not given
oral information to me. When I saw Krishnabai weeping and
going, I did not know where Tukaram was. I do not know
whether Tukaram was present in the village on that day or
not".
This does shroud the matter in mystery but the fact that the
report was made is, we think, beyond dispute, also that it
was made about 10 o’clock the following morning. It is to
be noted that the SubInspector does not say that Tukaram
brought the report to him but that Ex. 4 (the report
received from the Police Patel) states that Tukaram gave the
Police Patel the information. In that he is not right
(though the mistake is natural enough), because Ex. 4 merely
places Tukaram’s name opposite the printed column headed
"complainant or informant". That leaves the matter
equivocal but in view of what the Police Patel tells us, we
think that he did mean to convey that
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Tukaram was the complainant, probably because he did not
want to enter a woman’s name and so picked on the nearest
male relative. We see no reason to doubt his statement. He
says he did not know any names at that time; and that is
evident from the report. But what the learned counsel for
the appellants says is that he saw Narsabai on the evening
of the murder and as she did not give him any names it is
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evident that no one knew who the assailants were and that
therefore the accusation made against the accused was a
subsequent concoction and that it was for that reason that
they waited till the next morning before reporting the
matter to the police.
The Police Patel Mahadappa admits that he went to the scene
of the occurrence the same night and that he stayed there
the whole night. He also admits that he saw Narsabai there
but says he did not speak to her. We have no doubt that he
learned the names of the assailants when he went there but
this was after he had sent his report. There is some
mystery about the report. It did not reach the Police
Station till 10 A.M. the next day though it was written
about sunset the evening before, but as we do not know who
took it and why he delayed it is idle to speculate. What is
certain is that there was no point in sending off a report
without names the next morning if the idea of delay was to
concoct a story and implicate innocent persons. They would
either have hit on the names by then or would have waited a
little longer until they made up their minds about the story
they intended to tell. The haphazard way in which the
report was written and dispatched indicates rustic
simplicity rather than clever and well planned deceit. It
has to be remembered that the deceased left no male
relatives except this cousin Tukaram, about whom the Police
Patel speaks, and his father Pandu, and though cause for
enmity between Ramchander and three of the appellants is
disclosed, there is nothing to connect this Tukaram or his
father Pandu with the quarrel; and no one suggests that
anybody else bore them a grudge. We think it unlikely that
these three women, Rasikabai, Narsa-
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bai and Krishnabai, would have been capable of concocting
this elaborate story and of influencing the Police Patel to
stay his hand till they bad thought of a suitable tale and
found likely victims for their plot. Moreover, the whole
village probably turned out as soon as the news spread; in
any case the witnesses are agreed that there was a large
crowd there. We think it would have been easy to find many
persons to say that though they asked Rasikabai and Subhana
and Narsabai and others present to tell them what had
happened, nobody could because no one knew. It would be
ridiculous to suppose that the whole village bore the
accused a grudge and joined in an elaborate conspiracy
against them. In the circumstances, we think Mahadappa told
the truth. The absence of the names in the report is
therefore not of much consequence in this case especially as
the names were disclosed in full at the time of the inquest.
All the witnesses who speak about this are agreed on that
point.
Once that hurdle is surmounted, there is very little else to
criticise in the evidence of Rasikabai and Subhana, bar
unimportant discrepancies and the fact that they have made a
few small and unimportant contradictions between their
testimony in court and some of their numerous earlier
statements. There were three sets of committal proceedings,
and of course the usual questioning by the police and then
the proceedings in the Sessions Court, so it is not surpris-
ing, that these simple rustics should get confused and not
remember in minute detail exactly what they had said from
stage to stage. But the major part of their story hangs
together remarkably well despite the many attempts to trip
them in cross-examination in the various courts. As Reddy,
J. has dealt with these discrepancies in detail, we need not
go over it all again.
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The injuries shown in the Inquest Report and the postmortem
report do not tally. It is questionable how far an inquest
report is admissible except under section 145 of the Indian
Evidence Act but we do not regard the difference as of value
so far as the appel-
1091
lants are concerned; at best it could only have helped
Tukaram and Nilia who have not appealed.
The Inquest Report shows eight injuries. The first four are
incised wounds and tally with the evidence given by the
witnesses. The remaiding four are described as "blue and
black marks". The postmortem mentions the first four but
not the others. The doctor was recalled by the High Court
and be gives some sort of explanation about postmortem
stains on the body which we do not think is satisfactory,
but the utmost this shows is that no stick blows- were found
on the body and that we are prepared to accept.
On a careful consideration of the evidence we think Rasika
and Subhana are telling the truth and that they can be
relied on. We will not rely on the other two witnesses. We
are prepared to disregard the evidence of Rasika and Subhana
in so far as they say that Tukaram and Nilia also beat
Ramchander because the medical evidence does not disclose
any injuries which could have been caused by a stick or
sticks. As a matter of fact Subhana does not ascribe any
particular blow either to Tukaram or to Nilia though he does
describe in detail what the other three did. All be says
about Tukaram and Nilia is that"The accused present were
striking Ramchander; Pandurang, Bhilia and Tukia were
holding axes. Tukaram and Nilia had sticks in their bands".
This sort of omnibus accusation is not of much value, and
Rasikabai is not much better though she does say that Nilia
bit Ramchander on the thigh. Except for this, all she says
is that
"We saw the accused present striking Ramchander Shelke".
We think Rasika and Subhana are telling the truth when they
say that these two accused were also there but we think that
because of that they think they must have joined in the
attack and so have added that detail to their story. It is
also possible that Nilia did hit out at Ramchander but that
the blow did not land on his body. In any case, they only
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had sticks in their hands which have not even been conceded
the dignity of lathis. So the part they played was
negligible.
We have looked into their cases to this extent so that we
can set them on one side in determining who was responsible
for the remaining injuries and also because the part they
played will be necessary in determining the extent of the
common object or intention, if any.
The medical evidence shows that the injury that caused death
was the one on the neck. All the eyewitnesses are agreed
that Bhilia was responsible for that. We refer to the other
eye-witnesses here to show that there is no discrepancy on
this point, but we only rely on Rasikabai and Subhana for
determining the fact Bhilia was directly charged with the
murder and the injury on the throat is ascribed to him in
the charge. His conviction cannot therefore be assailed on
any of the technical points which arise in the case of the
other two. We uphold his conviction under section 302 of
the Indian Penal Code.
The injury on the throat having been accounted for, we are
left with three. They are-
(1) an incised wound on the scalp above the left ear,
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(2)an incised wound on the scalp, central part,and
(3)a lacerated wound on the left side of the face
which crushed the upper and lower jaws including the lips
and teeth.
The doctor says that (1) and (2) could not have caused death
but that the third could. Rasikabai and Subhana are agreed
that the only person who struck on the cheek is Tukia.
Rasikabai adds that he also hit Ramchander on the bead.
That means that Tukia and Pandurang caused the two non-fatal
injuries on the head, one each, and that Tukia alone caused
the fatal one on the cheek. Tukia’s conviction under
section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was therefore jusified.
In Pandurang’s case we are left with the difficult question
about section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
1093
But before we deal with that, we will set section 149 of the
Indian Penal Code aside. There is no charge under section
149 and, as Lord Sumner points out in Barendra Kumar Ghosh
v. King-Emperor(1), section 149, unlike section 34, creates
a specific offence and deals with the punishment of that
offence alone. We would accordingly require strong reasons
for using section 149 when it is not charged even if it be
possible to convict under that section in the absence of a
specific charge, a point we do not decide here. But that
apart, there is, in our opinion, no evidence here which
would justify the conclusion of a common object even if one
had been charged.
There is some vague evidence to the effect that there had
once been a dacoity at Ramchander’s house and that he
suspected "the "accused" and reported them to the police who
arrested them, but nothing came of it and they were later
released. This is put forward as one of the grounds of
enmity and to show why all five joined in the attack. But
in the absence of anything specific we are not prepared to
act on such a vague allegation especially about the persons
who are said to have been wrongfully blamed. What, however,
is more specific is this: Ramchander bought a field called
Hatkerni at Neemgaon from one Shivamma Patelni about a year
before the murder. Narsabai tells us that the three accused
Nilia, Bhilia and Tukia, all of whom are Lambadas used to
live in that field. When Ramchander bought it he turned
them out and she says that gave them cause for enmity
against him.
Now even if it be accepted that this evidence is indicative
of prior concert, it only embraces the three Lambadas,
Nilia, Bhilia and Tukia. Pandurang, who is a Hatkar, is not
included. As this is the only evidence indicating a common
purpose, and as we know nothing about what preceded the
assault (for the witnesses arrived after it bad started), we
cannot gatber any common object from the fact that Pandu-
rang, though armed with an axe, only inflicted a light blow
on the scalp which did not break any of the
(1) (1924) L.R 52 I.A. 40, 52,
1094
fragile bones in that region and from the fact that two
others who were lightly armed with what have been called
"sticks" inflicted no injuries at all. Section 149 is
therefore out of the question.
Turning now to section 34, that was not charged in
Pandurang’s case but we need not consider whether such an
omission is fatal because even if it had been charged there
is no evidence from which a common intention embracing him
can legitimately be deduced.
As we have just said, the witnesses arrived at a time when
the beating was already in progress. They knew nothing
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about what went before. We are not satisfied that Tukaram
is proved to have done anything except be present, and even
if it be accepted that Nilia aimed a blow, at Ramchander’s
thigh be was so half hearted about it that it did not even
hit him; and in Pandurang’s case, though armed with a lethal
weapon, he did no more than inflict a comparatively light
head injury. It is true they all ran away when the eye-
witnesses arrived and later absconded, but there is nothing
to indicate that they ran away together as a body, or that
they met afterwards. Rasikabai says that the "accused"
raised their axes and sticks and threatened her when she
called out to them, but that again is an all embracing
statement which we are not prepared to take literally in the
absence of further particulars. People do not ordinarily
act in unison like a Greek chorus and, quite apart from
dishonesty, this is a favourite device with witnesses who
are either not mentally alert or are mentally lazy and are
given to loose thinking. They are often apt to say "all"
even when they only saw "some" because they are too lazy,
mentally, to differentiate. Unless therefore a witness
particularises when there are a number of accused it is
ordinarily unsafe to accept omnibus inclusions like this at
their face value. We are unable to deduce any prior
arrangement to murder from these facts.
Now in the case of section 34 we think it is well
established that a common intention presupposes prior
concert. It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a
man can be vicariously convicted for the
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criminal act of another, the act must have been done in
furtherance of the common intention of them all: Mahbub Shah
v. King-Emperor(1). Accordingly there must have been a
prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously
attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely
the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a
separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common
intention required by the section because there was no prior
meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case
like that, each would be individually liable for whatever
injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for
the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot
prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be
convicted of the murder however clearly an intention to kill
could be proved in his case: Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King-
Emperor(2) and Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor(1). As their
Lordships say in the latter case, "the partition which
divides their bounds is often very thin: nevertheless, the
distinction is real and substantial, and if overlooked will
result in miscarriage of justice".
The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of
time required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, as
for example, when one man calls on bystanders to help him
kill a given individual and they, either by their words or
their acts, indicate their assent to him and join him in the
assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds.
There is a pre-arranged plan however hastily formed and
rudely conceived. But pre-arrangement there must be and
premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in the latter
Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently
of each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if
necessary, to kill those who oppose.
In the present case, there is no evidence of any prior
meeting. We know nothing of what they said or did before
the attack-not even immediately before. Pandurang is not
even of the same caste as the others,
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(1) [1945] L.R. 72 I.A. 148, 153, 154.
(2) [19241 L.R. 52 I.A. 40, 49.
1096
Bhilia, Tukia and Nilia are Lambadas, Pandurang is a Hatkar
and Tukaram a Maratha. It is true prior concert and
arrangement can, and indeed often must, be determined from
subsequent conduct as, for example, by a systematic plan of
campaign unfolding itself during the course of the action
Which could only be referable to prior concert and pre-
arrangement, or a running away together in a body or a
meeting together subsequently. But, to quote the Privy
Council again,
"the inference of common intention should never be reached
unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the
circumstances of the case".
But to say this is no more than to reproduce the ordinary
rule about circumstantial evidence, for there is no special
rule of evidence for this class of case. At bottom, it is a
question of fact in every case and however similar the
circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a
precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in
another. All that is necessary is either to have direct
proof of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which
necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to put
it in the time-honoured way, "the incriminating facts must
be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and
incapable of explanation on any other reasonable
hypothesis". (Sarkar’s Evidence, 8th edition, page 30).
The learned counsel for the State relied on Mamand v.
Emperor(1) because in that case the accused all ran away and
their Lordships took that into consideration to establish a
common intention. But there was much more than that. There
was evidence of enmity on the part of the accused who only
joined in the attack but had no hand in the killing, and
none on the part of the two who did the actual murder.
There was evidence that all three lived together and that
one was a younger brother and the other a tenant of the
appellant in question. There was evidence that they all ran
away together: not simply that they ran away at the same
moment of time when discovered, but that they ran away
together. As we have said, each case must rest on its own
facts and the mere
(1) A.I.R 1946 P-C 45.
1097
similarity of the facts in one case cannot be used to
determine a conclusion of fact in another. In the present
case, we are of opinion that the facts disclosed do not
warrant an inference of common intention in Pandurang’s
case. Therefore, even if that had been charged, no
conviction could have followed on that basis. Pandurang is
accordingly only liable for what he actually did.
In our opinion, his act falls under section 326 of the
Indian Penal Code. A blow on the head with an axe which
penetrates half an inch into the head is, in our opinion,
likely to endanger life. We therefore set aside his
conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and
convict him instead under section 326. We are of opinion
that in his case a sentence of imprisonment for a term of
ten years will suffice. We accordingly set aside the
sentence of death and alter it to one of ten years’ rigorous
imprisonment.
That leaves the question of sentence in the case of Bhilia
and Tukia. It was argued that no sentence of death can be
passed unless two Judges concur because of section 377 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it was argued that
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section 378 of the Code does not abrogate or modify that
provision. We do not intend to examine that here because we
are of opinion that the sentence should be reduced to
transportation in these two cases mainly because of the
difference of opinion in the High Court, not only on the
question of guilt, but also on that of sentence. In saying
this we do not intend to fetter the discretion of Judges in
this matter, for a question of sentence is, and must always
remain, a matter of discretion, unless the law directs
otherwise. But when appellate Judges, who agree on the
question of guilt, differ on that of sentence, it is usual
not to impose the death penalty unless there are compelling
reasons. We see no reason to depart from this practice in
this case and so reduce the sentences of death in the case
of Bhilia and Tukia to transportation for life because of
the difference of opinion in the High Court.
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